Malone+Urfalian+and+Evan+Rork

For K's ====The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China to develop sustainable investment standards in China’s financing institutions.====

1AC – Climate Advantage
====The choices made in Asian infrastructure development now will determine the future of global warming – expanding renewable energy markets and building sustainable and climate resilient infrastructure through the AIIB are key to keep warming below 2 degrees==== The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (the AIIB or the Bank) is poised AND with major long-term commercial benefits for many members of the AIIB.
 * Nassiry and Nakhooda 16** – Darius Nassiry, head of the international cooperation department at the Global Green Growth Institute, investment manager with the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund) Center for Global Development, Smita Nakhooda, international finance to support developing countries to respond to climate change, "The AIIB and the investment in action," 4/13/2016, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/the_aiib_and_investment_in_action_final_20160413.pdf//TK

And the aff causes a global alt energy movement – spills over and creates a global model that solves climate change
//Can China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) fix climate change? Yes.// //AND// //to climate change replicable elsewhere. Deals like this don't occur every day.//
 * Taggart 15** - principal of Sydney, Australia-based Grenatec, a non-profit research organization studying the viability of a Pan-Asian Energy Infrastructure (Stewart Taggart, 3/31/2015, "Can China's Infrastructure Bank Solve Climate Change?," http://grenatec.com/can-chinas-infrastructure-bank-solve-climate-change)//TK//

//**====And AIIB success will kickstart global finance and lending institutions to increase sustainable development====**// //**Elgin-Cossart and Hart '15** - Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at American Progress. She focuses on U.S. foreign policy toward China and works to identify new opportunities for bilateral cooperation, particularly on energy, climate change, and cross-border investment - Senior Fellow at American Progress, where she works on issues involving foreign policy, international development, and global conflict (Center for American Progress, "China's New International Financing Institutions Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Investment Standards," September 2015, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/21140703/RaceToTheTop-brief.pdf)// JB­­­ In recent years, China has moved into development finance in a very big way AND banks, and in the process, create a race to the top.

Now is key to prevent 2 degrees increase
The news is in: humans are totally failing in the global effort to stop AND goal will require dedication, international cooperation and a lot of hard work.
 * Harvey '14 ­- Chelsea Harvey is a science reporter for Business Insider. She is based in New York City (Chelsea Harvey, science reporter, "Here's How Little Time We Have Until Global Warming Is Out Of Control," September 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/when-will-climate-change-be-out-of-control-2014-9 )// JB**

Consensus of global scientists agree – warming is real, anthropogenic and happening now
Human-caused climate change is happening and is accelerating; dangerous impacts are becoming AND to inform Americans about the scientific consensus regarding the realities of climate change.
 * Maibach et al '14** Distinguished Professor of Communication at George Mason University and Director of the Center for Climate Change Communication at GMU. (Edward Maibach, Teresa Myers, Anthony Leiserowitz, "Climate Scientists need to set the Record Straight: There is a scientific consensus that human caused climate change is happening," 5/7/14, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2013EF000226/full)//NH

Climate change will be catastrophic and result in human extinction
In the Online Journal of Space Communication, Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA AND our Sun" (Hsu 2010) (Fig. 2.1).
 * Flournoy Ph.D. 12** – Professor at the University of Ohio, Ph.D. and M.A. from the Univeristy of Texas, Postgraduate Associateship at the University of London, B.A. from Southern Methodist University, Editor of the Online Journal of Space Communications. Citing Dr. Feng Hsu, Senior Engineer and Manager at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (Don M., Ph.D., SpringerBriefs in Space Development, "Solar Power Satellites," 2012, Springer)//JSL

Loopholes and loose regulations in the AIIB now could cause backsliding – only U.S. involvement can correct course and ensure environmentally friendly regulations
Unfortunately, the AIIB's draft environmental and social framework, released last week, does AND as well as the comparative advantage of each institution in undertaking specific projects.
 * Elgin-Cossart and Hart '15** - Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at American Progress. She focuses on U.S. foreign policy toward China and works to identify new opportunities for bilateral cooperation, particularly on energy, climate change, and cross-border investment - Senior Fellow at American Progress, where she works on issues involving foreign policy, international development, and global conflict (Center for American Progress, "China's New International Financing Institutions Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Investment Standards," September 2015, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/21140703/RaceToTheTop-brief.pdf)// VM

The plan solves – leverages empirically successful US-Chinese cooperation to cut GHG emissions
Continuing to maintain that stance would be a mistake. The United States has an AND United States is well placed to play a constructive role in that endeavor.
 * Mauro '15**- senior fellow at Peterson Institute for International Economics (Paolo Mauro, Peterson Institute for International Economics, "Why America Should Join the AIIB," 6/12/15, https://piie.com/commentary/op-eds/why-america-should-join-aiib)//NH

AIIB is key to clean economic development
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asia requires approximately USD 8 trillion AND strengthen resilience to climate change through infrastructure investments will also be important considerations.
 * Nassiry and Nakhooda 16** (Darius Nassiry is head of the international cooperation department at the Global Green Growth Institute. Previously, he was an investment manager with the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund) and conducted research as a visiting fellow on climate finance with the Center for Global Development. Smita Nakhooda is a leads ODI's work stream on climate finance, and is an expert on climate change and energy policy in developing countries. She currently advises various international organisations and governments on climate finance issues. Smita holds an MSc in Environmental Policy and Regulation from the London School of Economics and Political Science (UK), and a BA in Government and Environmental Studies from Dartmouth College (USA), "The AIIB and investment in action on climate change," March 2016, ODI, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10441.pdf)

Climate change leads to natural disasters that deplete resources, causing wars that we aren't prepared for, as well as refugee crises– the time to act is now
The former leader of one of the UK's main political parties says the world will AND basis. It has to be an international effort consistent with our principles."
 * Kirby 15** (Alex, writer for Climate Change Network, former honorary visiting fellow of Green-Templeton College, University of Oxford, a member of the consultative committee of the China Center for Climate Change Communication, and a board member of the Geneva-based Zoï Environment NetworkThe Guardian, "Tackle climate change or face resource wars, Lord Ashdown warns", 9/9/15, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/09/tackle-climate-change-or-face-resource-wars-lord-ashdown-warns)//ml

Warming exacerbates various forms of structural violence
Hoerner 8 (J. Andrew, Former director of Research at the Center for a Sustainable Economy, Director of Tax Policy at the Center for Global Change at the University of Maryland College Park, and editor of Natural Resources Tax Review. He has done research on environmental economics and policy on behalf of the governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. Andrew received his B.A. in Economics from Cornell University and a J.D. from Case Western Reserve School of Law—AND—Nia Robins—former inaugural Climate Justice Corps Fellow in 2003, director of Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative "A Climate of Change African Americans, Global Warming, and a Just Climate Policy for the U.S." July 2008, http://www.ejcc.org/climateofchange.pdf) Everywhere we turn, the issues and impacts of climate change confront us. One AND expected to experience more intense storms resembling Katrina and Rita in the future.

Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension—-culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable
Tamás **Szentes 8**, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. "Globalisation and prospects of the world society" 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf__ __It' s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a__ __AND__ __mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.__

__**====Prioritize solutions to warming-its impacts are underrepresented in decision calculus====**__ __**Nixon 11** (Rob Nixon is the Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, NY Times Contributor and former is an affiliate of the Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies the Harvard University Press 2011 "Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor" Pg 2-3 http://www.elimeyerhoff.com/books/nixon-rob—slow-violence-and-the-environmentalism-of-the-poor.pdf)__ __Underlying his plan is an overlooked but crucial subsidiary benefit that he outlined: offloading__ __AND__ __are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which casualties are postponed, often for generations.__

//**NEG**//__

MES: T gov 2 gov Counter-Plan Dip Cap Case

1nc Arctic Co-op

Engagement is exclusively bilateral between governments
Kane, 8 – US Marine Corps Major, thesis SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF OPERATIONAL STUDIES for the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting (Brian, "Comprehensive Engagement: A Winning Strategy " http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA504901) NSS = National Security Strategy Engagement strategies are not new. Since the end of the Cold War, engagement AND 10 This definition of engagement has been the most successful historically.11

"Its" is exclusive—-means no channel other than US government engagement
Douglas F. **Brent 10**, attorney, June 2, 2010, "Reply Brief on Threshold Issues of Cricket Communications, Inc.," online: http://psc.ky.gov/PSCSCF/2010%20cases/2010-00131/20100602_Crickets_Reply_Brief_on_Threshold_Issues.PDF) Italics and bold in the original AT&T also argues that Merger Commitment 7.4 only permits extension of AND agreement with AT&T (or whether such agreement has been extended).

Voting issue –
====1. limits – a government limit is the only way to keep the topic manageable – otherwise they could use any 3^^rd^^ party intermediary, lift barriers to private engagement, or target civil society – it makes topic preparation impossible====

The US is pushing for India's entry into the NSG now – it's on track, but more work needs to be done
The US on Friday said that there is "a path forward" for India AND would be finished by the end of this year," the official said.
 * PTI 6/25** (The Times of India, "A path forward for India to become NSG member by year end: US," http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/A-path-forward-for-India-to-become-NSG-member-by-year-end-US/articleshow/52914708.cms)ww

Engagement costs diplomatic capital
This backdrop of great power rivalry and sharp ideological disagreement helps to explain U. AND geopolitical struggle with China, one that cannot be ignored or wished away.
 * FRIEDBERG '11** (Aaron L.; Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, "Future Tense," New Republic, May 5, https://newrepublic.com/article/87879/united-states-china-diplomacy-taiwan)ww

Dip Cap key to India's NSG entry
With China indicating to oppose India's entry in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), AND Minister Modi, this will be a very major challenge," he added.
 * ANI 6/7** (The Indian Express, "India's NSG admission depends on Obama's grit: Uday Bhaskar," http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/indias-nsg-admission-depends-on-obamas-grit-uday-bhaskar-2839154/)ww

Indian NSG entry key to global nonproliferation
Amidst PM Narendra Modi's aggressive push for India's entry into NSG (Nuclear Suppliers' Group AND governments to support India's application when it comes up at the NSG Plenary.
 * FE 6/23** (The Financial Express, "Special NSG meeting in Seoul, ends," http://www.financialexpress.com/article/india-news/live-india-nsg-membership-bid-pm-narendra-modi-meet-china-xi-jinping-nuclear-suppliers-group/294676/)ww

Proliferation Risks Multiple Scenarios for Nuclear War
There are numerous dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, including but not AND possible that they could do so with the assistance of a renegade government.
 * Totten** 19**94** (Samuel; Associate Professor of Education – University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, "Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation and Its Genocidal Implications" in The Widening Circle of Genocide ed. Charney p. 298)ww

Already the world's third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, AND main areas: how India produces electricity, and how it distributes it.
 * ====India's Current trajectory makes climate solvency impossible====**
 * Martin 15** (Richard, senior editor for energy at MIT Technology Review, "India's Energy Crisis," MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/542091/indias-energy-crisis/, October 7, 2015)

NSG Entry is key Indian Ratification of the Paris Agreement
A big outcome of the NSG failure is that India will now not ratify the AND was understood that an NSG membership would help India clear the Paris Agreement.
 * BAGCHIL 6/24** (Indrani; The Times of India, "As its NSG bid fails, India says Paris Climate Agreement ratification may be delayed," http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/As-its-NSG-bid-fails-India-says-Paris-Climate-Agreement-ratification-may-be-delayed/articleshow/52906697.cms)ww

India key to the Paris Agreement – third biggest greenhouse gas emitter and gets modeled by 134 other countries
What India finally offers in Paris and how the United States and the developed world AND unbearable heat, and more highly destructive weather events will affect most nations.
 * Vickery 15** (Raymond E. Vickery Jr., Vickery is a leading adviser on U.S.-India relations. He is a Global Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, where he was previously a Public Policy Scholar, and is a Senior Adviser in India at the Albright Stonebridge Group. He is the author of books on U.S.-India economic engagement and India energy, as well as numerous articles on these subjects, 11/22/15, The Diplomat, "Why India is Key to a Climate Change Agreement in Paris," http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/why-india-is-key-to-a-climate-change-agreement-in-paris/, accessed 6/24/16, Kent Denver-jKIM)

Paris agreement key to prevent extinction from climate change
On December 12, delegates to the United Nations climate change meeting outside Paris, AND have "recognized that climate change and its effects are real and serious."
 * SUMNER '15** (Thomas; Student Science, "Paris meeting yields climate agreement," https://student.societyforscience.org/article/paris-meeting-yields-climate-agreement, 12/12)ww

Economic engagement fuels structural contradictions of capitalism in China- drive for accumulation fuels US-China conflict
(Ho-fung, associate professor of sociology at Johns Hopkins University Issue 19, Fall, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/12/china-new-global-order-imperialism-communist-party-globalization/) Trump isn't the only one smitten with China. Hailed by the business press and AND But given the stakes, it's one the Left must be ready for.
 * Hung, PhD, 15**

Capitalism is a protection racket—it's the root cause of every impact. Left unaddressed, it'll cause extinction—only a revolution can solve
(William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis) In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to AND just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.
 * Robinson, PhD Sociology, 16**

The 1AC frames engagement as cooperation between nations- this depoliticizes the class interests that design and benefit from engagement. Instead we should engage Chinese workers against capitalism
(Martin, Professor Emeritus of Economics at Lewis and Clark College, The U.S. Economy and China: Capitalism, Class, and Crisis, Volume 61, Issue 09 (February) http://monthlyreview.org/2010/02/01/the-u-s-economy-and-china-capitalism-class-and-crisis/) The "Nation-State" Argument Those who argue that U.S. AND our own organizing, we are likely to find ourselves with valuable allies.
 * Hart-Landsberg, PhD, 10**

The US and China cooperate in the Arctic now
Enhanced Cooperation on Climate-Related Ocean Issues: The State Oceanic Administration ( AND capacity-building efforts for expanding coverage in the Arctic and Southern Oceans.
 * Department of State 15** [US Department of State, June 24, 2015, "U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track", http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/06/244205.htm] AMarb

China says no – they can't alienate Russia
The Arctic has been included in the annual US-Sino Strategic and Economic Dialogue AND whenever the concept of 'freedom of navigation' is evoked in Arctic governance.
 * Peng and Wegge 15** – MA in International Relations from Waseda University and previously worked for the China and Global Security Program of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute AND a Ph.D. on International Relations in the Arctic from the University of Tromsø [Jingchao Peng & Njord Wegge, 2015, "China's bilateral diplomacy in the Arctic", Polar Geography, 38:3, 233-249, DOI: 10.1080/1088937X.2015.1086445, Taylor and Francis] AMarb

Current Chinese practices makes exploitation likely
In the last few years, China has stepped up its funding of Arctic research AND so far these projects have been launched under the aegis of environmental science.
 * Guilford, 13** (Gwynn, Master of International Affairs from Columbia, B.A. in Chinese from Middlebury, "What Is China's Arctic Game Plan?," 5/16/13, http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/what-is-chinas-arctic-game-plan/275894/, BC)

a) Bad scientific practices—Norway proves
There are a number of areas where the work on the management plan can be AND underpinning the plan work is sound and stands the test of international scrutiny.
 * Hoel and Olsen, 12**—Alf Håkon Hoel is a Regional Director at the Institute of Marine Research in Tromsø. He is a political scientist who has written extensively on issues relating to the management of living marine resources and the marine environment; Erik Olsen is a senior scientist and heads the Research Program for Oil and Fish at the Institute of Marine Research in Bergen, Norway. He has a background as a fisheries biologist (PhD), but has since 2002 focused his research and advisory activities on marine spatial management " Integrated Ocean Management as a Strategy to Meet Rapid Climate Change: The Norwegian Case ," 1/22/12, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3357825/

b) Groupthink
Related to this, in concluding a planning cycle, the emphasis has been upon AND and provide decision-makers with a more explicit foundation for their decisions.
 * Hoel and Olsen, 12**—Alf Håkon Hoel is a Regional Director at the Institute of Marine Research in Tromsø. He is a political scientist who has written extensively on issues relating to the management of living marine resources and the marine environment; Erik Olsen is a senior scientist and heads the Research Program for Oil and Fish at the Institute of Marine Research in Bergen, Norway. He has a background as a fisheries biologist (PhD), but has since 2002 focused his research and advisory activities on marine spatial management " Integrated Ocean Management as a Strategy to Meet Rapid Climate Change: The Norwegian Case ," 1/22/12, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3357825/

c) Excludes economic concerns
A second area where management plans can be further developed is by inclusion of economic AND is putting a bandaid over a bullet hole, we are sewing it shut
 * Hoel and Olsen, 12**—Alf Håkon Hoel is a Regional Director at the Institute of Marine Research in Tromsø. He is a political scientist who has written extensively on issues relating to the management of living marine resources and the marine environment; Erik Olsen is a senior scientist and heads the Research Program for Oil and Fish at the Institute of Marine Research in Bergen, Norway. He has a background as a fisheries biologist (PhD), but has since 2002 focused his research and advisory activities on marine spatial management " Integrated Ocean Management as a Strategy to Meet Rapid Climate Change: The Norwegian Case ," 1/22/12, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3357825/

Minilateralism is key to larger multilateral deals—Paris proves
The deal between China and the United States to limit greenhouse-gas (GHG AND and increase the chances that the UNFCCC will produce a strong multilateral agreement.
 * Stowe '14** (Robert; Executive Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program and Manager of the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, both University-wide programs based in the Harvard Kennedy School. From 2003 through 2009, he was Associate Director of the Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program and the Energy Technology Innovation Policy Research Group in the Kennedy School. Rob has worked in non-profit, academic, and business organizations, including as Vice President of Programs of the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs, which provides assistance in agriculture and agribusiness to developing countries and as a consultant to the World Bank and other organizations on agricultural management projects. Rob holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an A.B. in physics from Harvard College; 11/17/14; "The U.S.-China Deal on Climate Change: Minilateralism at Work," accessed 6/26/16, http://www.theenergycollective.com/robertstowe/2156196/us-china-deal-climate-change-minilateralism-work)

A minilateral Climate Council solves better—allows effective cooperation and enforcement
However, there are three signiªcant questions or hesitations that are likely to be raised AND happned The transition out of HEG leads to violence, heg isnt capatilist
 * Eckersley '12** (Robyn; May 2012; Professor and Head of Political Science in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia; Global Environmental Politics 12:2, May 2012, published by MIT; "Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?," accessed 6/26/16, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/GLEP_a_00107)

2NR: Neolib, Aff conceded green cap fails

Neg AIIB

1 Diplomatic and economic engagement is the offer of positive inducements in exchange for specific concessions Hall, 14 - Senior Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University (Ian, The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, p. 3-4) This book explores the various modes of engagement employed in the Indian case, their uses, and their limits. It follows the growing consensus in the literature that defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to influence the behavior of states.8 It acknowledges that various, different engagement strategies can be utilized. In particular, as Miroslav Nincic argues, we can distinguish between "exchange" strategies and "catalytic" ones. With the first type of strategy, positive inducements are offered to try to "leverage" particular quid pro quos from the target state.9 An investment might be canvassed, a trade deal promised, or a weapons system provided in return for a specific concession. With the second type of strategy, inducements are offered merely to catalyze something bigger, perhaps even involving the wholesale transformation of a target society.10 In this kind of engagement, many different incentives might be laid out for many different constituencies, from educational opportunities for emerging leaders to new terms of trade for the economic elite. The objects of engagement can include changing specific policies of the target state or transforming the wider political, economic, or social order of a target society. Both of these objectives could be pursued with coercive strategies employing either compellence or deterrence—or indeed with a mixture of both engagement and coercion." But much recent research has argued that the evidence for the efficacy of both compellence and deterrence in changing target state policies is inconclusive.12 Both military and economic sanctions have been shown to have mixed results, and many scholars argue that coercion rarely works." By contrast, there is some considerable evidence that engagement strategies can both elicit discrete quid pro quos from states and generate wider political and social change within them that might in the medium to long term lead to changed behavior at home or in international relations.14 Moreover, it is clear that engagement is both more commonly utilized than often recognized by scholars of international relations and that it is generally considered more politically accepted to politicians and publics in both engaging states and in the states they seek to engage.15 Engagement strategies take different forms depending on their objectives. They can emphasize diplomacy, aiming at the improvement of formal, state-to- state contacts, and be led by professional diplomats, special envoys, or politicians. Alternatively, they can emphasize military ties, utilizing military-to- military dialogues, exchanges, and training to build trust, convey strategic intentions, or simply foster greater openness in the target state's defense establishment.16 They can be primarily economic in approach, using trade, investment, and technology transfer to engender change in the target society and perhaps to generate greater economic interdependence, constraining a target state's foreign policy choices.17 Finally, they can seek to create channels for people-to-people contact through state-driven public diplomacy, business forums and research networks, aid and development assistance, and so on. Violation – the plan is an unconditional offer – it happens regardless of whether China changes its behavior Voting issue – to protect limits and ground. The number of solvency advocates defending a QPQ is narrow, and an affirmative that can't defend a QPQ would lose to an unconditional counterplan. We create a functional limit on the topic – the alternative is "resolved: China" which is not debatable 2 Polls show Clinton will win the election now Benen 6/15 (Steve, MSNBC. "Latest polls show Clinton getting stronger, Trump falling." http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/latest-polls-show-clinton-getting-stronger-trump-falling) When Donald Trump wrapped up the Republicans' presidential nomination, 2016 polling showed him gaining on – and in some cases, even surpassing – Hillary Clinton. The combination of GOP consolidation and Democratic divisions meant a general election landscape that looked very close. The problem for Republicans is that this dynamic couldn't last. Consider the latest Bloomberg Politics poll released late yesterday. Democrat Hillary Clinton has opened up a double-digit lead nationally over Republican Donald Trump, whose negatives remain unusually high for a presidential candidate amid early indications that the Orlando terrorist attack has had little direct impact on the 2016 race. A new Bloomberg Politics national poll shows Clinton leading Trump 49 percent to 37 percent among likely voters in November's election, with 55 percent of those polled saying they could never vote for the real-estate developer and TV personality. Note, there are multiple factors unfolding at the same time. Clinton is starting to consolidate Democratic backing now that her party's primaries and caucuses are over; Clinton allies have begun hitting the airwaves with effective (and for now, unanswered) ads in battleground states; and Trump has faced intense scrutiny of late over his bigoted antics. The result is a 12-point lead for the former Secretary of State as the general election gets underway in earnest. (For context, it's worth noting that four years ago at this time, a Bloomberg Politics poll showed President Obama ahead by 13 points. In terms of the national popular vote, he ended up winning by 4 points.) Complicating matters, a new Washington Post/ABC News poll shows a whopping 70% of Americans now have an unfavorable opinion of Trump, while only 29% have a favorable view. Both are the worst numbers the Republican has seen this year. To be sure, Democrats shouldn't be too pleased – Clinton's 43% favorability rating is hardly impressive – but the party can take some comfort in the fact that Trump is the least popular major-party presidential candidate of the modern era. As for the demographic preferences, Clinton does the worst with white men (23% favorable/75% unfavorable). Trump, meanwhile, has managed to alienate minority communities to an extraordinary degree, faring worst among African Americans (4% favorable/94% unfavorable) and Hispanics (11% favorable/89% unfavorable). Engagement with China causes an electoral backlash – ensures the plan gets spun negatively Golan 15 (Shahar, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, "Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics", https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) In recent times China has become one of the most contentious issues regarding American foreign polic y. Out of all issues concerning East Asia, China generates the greatest political attention in the US; American politicians frequently use the China card in foreign policy debate, especially during campaigns. The rethink of the military bases will provide ammunition for critics of the administration who will try to spin the reform as soft on the PRC. In his book US - Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Robert Sutter, an acclaimed China expert, describes the political environment of the US regarding China policy as "an atmosphere of suspicion and cynicism in American domestic politics over China policy," setting the stage "for often bitter and debilitating fights in US domestic politics over China policy in ensuing years that on balance are seen not to serve the overall national interests of the United States" (Sutter, 2013, p.81). Sutter's observations show that electoral needs in the US often cause candidates to use harsher rhetoric and actions against the PRC than they believe are beneficial for the US. While many scholars have argued that administrations will ultimately favor pragmatic forward - moving relationships with the PRC, aspiring presidents have not been shy of criticism of the PRC leading up to presidential elections. This portrays how political maneuvering is needed to pursue policies that could be perceived as warm towards the PRC. Because of these domestic hurdles, US history has proven a pattern of presidents pursuing forward - moving, pragmatic relations with the PRC after a campaign of harsh rhetoric pointed at the Asian state. Ronald Reagan, who ended complicating arm sales to Taiwan in order to improve relations with the PRC, criticized Carter's handling of Taiwan, claiming that he was not friendly enough to the island (Sutter, p.80). Democrats have also utilized harsh rhetoric pointed at the PRC during campaigns only to change course after getting elected. In their article "The China Card: Playing Politics with Sino - American Relations" Peter Trubowitz and Jungkun Seo explained that once resuming office, after a campaign in which Bill Clinton took a harsh stance against China he "quickly reversed course, jettisoning his anti - China campaign rhetoric and devising a political formula to make it easier for Beijing to qualify for MFN approval by Congress. Later, Clinton took the lead in backing China's entry into the World Trade Organization by granting China permanent normal trade relations in 2000 " (Trubowitz & Seo, 2012, 210). In the most recent American presidential election the pattern seemed to persist. The Obama - Romney foreign policy debate at times seemed like a competition on who could orate fiercer rhetoric towards the PRC. Following the debate, writing for 'Foreign Affairs' the historian of American foreign policy David Miline argued in "Pragmatism or What?: the future of US foreign policy", that Romney and Obama held similar pragmatic foreign policy stances. Miline concludes that, After arguing that he [Mitt] had to use rhetoric that would appeal the Tea Party: Romney and Obama are in fact both results - oriented pragmatists whose similarities outweigh their differences. And this, of course, is a source of angst to the base of both parties. (Miline, 2012, p.936) He added that "if Romney does win the election in November, neo - conservatives are likely to find his administration as unwelcoming as Wilsonians have found Obama's" (Miline, p.949). This pattern of harsh rhetoric regarding US - China relations that is often contradictory to the interest of the US and not necessarily aligned with the candidates desired policy, seems certain to continue. Hence, although the rethink of the military bases is clearly in the US' national interest, future candidates might attempt to manipulate the rethink in order to utilize the China card. Once freed of political constraints, Sutter notes that American administrations from both sides of the political spectrum tend to pursue forward developments commonly viewing "domestic American influences ... as obstacles to the administration's objectives in fostering cooperative relations with China and broader international interests" (Shambaugh, p.104). In fact, to avoid the trouble of fighting domestic forces, Sutter also argues that "the president, his administration at times impose discipline, secrecy, or other means in order to carry out foreign policy while keeping domestic American influences at arm's length " ( Shambaugh, p.103). Sutter evaluates that unlike the executive branch, "the US Congress is much more open to and dependent on domestic American constituencies" (Shambaugh, p.103). Therefore, a more consistent fight against the reforms is likely to occur in both chambers of the legislative branch. Congress' dependence on American constituencies causes it to be much more responsive to the interests of certain lobbying groups and public opinion. For example, the 'pro-Taiwan' lobby always has a stake in policy regarding US - China relations for fairly obvious reasons; likewise, some interest groups will attempt to influence policy in regards to topics that are not necessarily visibly correlated to their issue of concern. Colin Dueck (2010) explains this phenomena in his book Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy since World War II by arguing that "electoral coalitions in the United States come together across a broad range of issue, many of which have nothing to do with international relations at all;" this analysis brings to light how the reforms could draw criticisms from a coalition of interest groups, some not directly related to security (p.301). As this section alluded to earlier, the most likely source of opposition to reform will come from the Taiwan lobby. Sutter, as well as many other experts, have claimed that Taiwan is "the most sensitive and complex issue regarding US - China relations", and while Taiwan manages to maintain support in the US due to Taiwan - interest lobby members of Congress, this complicates US policy towards the ROC (Sutter, p.138). In his Foreign Affairs article "Diplomacy Ink: the influence of lobbies on US foreign policy, " John Newhouse (2009) claims that "for years, the lobby that promoted Taiwanese interests, known simply as the China lobby, was the superpower of lobbies representing foreign causes in the United States" (p.90). The lobby, with its strong hold on Congress, has previously managed to complicate the US' pursuit of improved relations with the PRC. For example, the State Department legal adviser during Carter's administration, when commentating on the Taiwan Relations Act, said, "We were not as Taiwan - oriented as the Senate Foreign Relations committee" attributing that to "[a] lot of provisions that were cranked into the bill once it got there were... Taiwan - favoring positions." (Tucker, 2011, p.119). In more recent times, with the aid of the Taiwan lobby, "many in Congress and among the Republican presidential aspirants criticized President Obama's decision not to sell F - 16 Fighters despite strong requests from Taiwan's president" (Tucker, 2011, p.252). In its pursuit of cooler measures towards the PRC, the Taiwan lobby could find an ally in labor unions in the US. Labor unions that fight for workers' rights in the US see the 'world factory' — the PRC — as an adversary to their cause. Sutter notes this can be seen in "think tanks associated with organized labor in the United States [that] have tended to call for tougher policies against perceived unfair Chinese trade and economic policies " ( Shambaugh, p.122). A security deal that is set to improve US - China relations will be seen as a source of improvement in trade between the two states. Although they are not natural stakeholders on a debate about national security, labor unions are likely to lobby Congress against reforms alongside the Taiwan lobby. Another factor that one cannot dodge when debating American foreign policy or US - China relations in particular is political ideology. Dueck explains that electoral needs caused the Republican Party "by the time of the Korean War to become more hawkish than Democrats — a position they have never relinquished", and concludes that "today as before, a hawkish American nationalism forms the center of gravity of the Republican Party, especially in its conservative base, when it comes to foreign policy issues" (Dueck, p.307). Focusing specifically on the China debate, Peter Heyes Gries (2014) argues in his book "The Politics of American Foreign Policy: how ideology divides liberals and conservative over foreign affairs" that "Conservatives desire a tougher China Policy than liberals do... because on average they maintain much more negative attitudes towards communist countries in general and the Chinese government in particular" (n.p.). Meanwhile, when regarding the other political opposition, Gries infers that "the anti - China advocacy of Big Labor has likely counteracted the greater liberal warmth towards China within the Democratic Party" (n.p.). It becomes revealed that a clear divergence between general attitudes of Republican and Democrat voters when it comes to China, with the former preferring cooler relations. Therefore the rethink of the military bases is likely to be spun as soft on China, especially in conservative circles, and used to berate Democrats for caving to Chinese aggression. Finally, another constraint regarding the PRC is general American public opinion towards the East Asian country. Sutter explains that "American Public opinion remains more negative than positive regarding the policies and practices of China, but it is not in a position, as it was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, to prompt serious negative change in American China policy"( Shambaugh, p.117). While public opinion in the US regarding the PRC has soften since the early 1990's, the general distaste for Chinese actions lead politicians to pursue populist rhetoric at times in order to appease public sentiment. Sutter points that this can be seen in the media that "reflected trends in American public opinion in demonstrating a continuing tendency to highlight the negative implication of Chinese developments for American interests and values" (Shambaugh, p.118). While American public opinion, as Sutter points out, is not a position to strongly affect American actions towards the PRC, it could provide further motivation for politicians to use harsh rhetoric against the PRC. In sum, the greatest domestic constraint for the rethink of the military bases is going to be the debate regarding the PRC. Interests groups lobbying for better US — ROC relations and labor unions; politicians with conservative outlooks; Presidential hopefuls; and the American media and public opinion promise to create some roadblocks for the rethink of US military bases in the Pacific. The plan is unpopular —- over half of the public sees China's rise as a threat Westcott, 5/6/16 (Ben, "Half of Americans still see China's rise as threat, survey suggests; Majority also think US should be world's sole military superpower, according to poll," http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1941667/half-americans-still-see-chinas-rise-threat-survey, article downloaded 6/4/16, JMP) Half of Americans still believe China's emergence as a world power is a major threat to the United States, according to a new survey released by the Pew Research Centre on Friday. But Islamic State, refugees fleeing from Iraq and Syria and climate change were all ranked as more worrying in the survey, which polled more than 4,000 United States citizens. In the latest of a series of surveys published by Pew, attitudes towards China remain negative but stable as tensions in the South China Sea continue to pit the two superpowers against each other. "You're talking about people in a country that's used to being number one, that like to be number one and China's clearly challenging that number one position," said David Zweig, an expert on China and international relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. About 55 per cent of United States citizens interviewed in the survey said they wanted the United States to remain the sole military superpower in the world, including 67 per cent of Republican voters. In addition, almost a quarter of interviewees said they saw China as an adversary to the United States, the same number as Russia. Both numbers haven't changed much in recent years, according to Pew. Zweig said a quarter of Americans seeing China as an adversary wasn't unsurprising, but it could be a problem in the future. "It's a problem when people tend not to trust each other, when they see negatives even when there aren't necessarily negatives," he said. "I think that Chinese clearly believe America wants to contain China's rise ... and if you ask a lot of Americans they see China as a bully, as a threat." Zweig said that according to previous Pew surveys, attitudes to China in the United States had started to sour in 2012 following territorial tensions in the South China Sea and President Xi Jinping taking office. The Pew survey was conducted between April 4 and 19 this year. Fifty per cent of respondents said China's emergence as a world power was a major threat, 80 per cent cited Islamic State as a major fear and 55 per cent said they were threatened by the number of refugees leaving Syria and Iraq. GOP candidates will rhetorically weaponize the plan Harris 16 (Peter, Prof of political science @ Colorado State U, "President Obama's Partisan Foreign Policy," Jan 26, nationalinterest.org/feature/president-obamas-partisan-foreign-policy-15019?page=2) The political scientist V.O. Key once wrote that "latent" public opinion is the only type of public opinion that government officials truly care about. Politicians do not cater to audiences in the here and now, he suggested, but rather are focused on engineering positive endorsements of their policies among people in the future. Indeed, leaders are quite willing to tolerate poor approval ratings because there is always a hope—an expectation, even—that posterity will bring absolution. Given his standing in the polls, President Barack Obama can probably be counted among those politicians who have put their faith in vindication by future generations. But Obama will have to wait a long time before anything close to a unanimous verdict on his legacy can emerge—let alone a positive one. This is especially true in the realm of foreign affairs, where Obama's agenda has been thoroughly partisan and divisive—pleasing to Democrats but anathema to Republicans. When it comes to Obama's record on foreign policy, Republicans smell blood. Indeed, it has been a staple for the party's presidential hopefuls to accuse Obama of weakness on national security, with his failure to "defeat" the Islamic State, the resurgence of Russia as a bona fide power on the world stage, the nuclear deal with Iran—along with the attendant worsening of relations with Israel—and the looming rise of China being among the most common lines of attack. Earlier this month, the Republican presidential debate in South Carolina offered a window into how the party is using foreign policy to sully Obama and the Democrats. Riled up over the seizure of U.S. sailors by Iran two days prior, the assembled GOP contenders fell over themselves to castigate the president for allowing the country and members of its armed forces to be humiliated by a sworn adversary. Ted Cruz led the charge. "I give you my word," he declared, "[that] if I am elected president, no serviceman or servicewoman will be forced to be on their knees in any nation that captures our fighting men and women. We'll field the full force and fury of the United States of America." The detainees had already been released by the time this grandstanding took place. And the truth is that the sailors had only been held by Iran's forces because they had wrongly strayed into Iranian waters. More sober critics of President Obama were probably correct to avoid politicizing the issue; Nikki Haley, for example, wisely declined to invoke the crisis in her response to the president's State of the Union. Yet the overreaction of the GOP's presidential candidates showed just how eager they are during this electoral cycle to weaponize the perception that Obama is weak on national security. What mattered to them were not the facts—that this was, in sum, a very minor encounter and certainly not a military crisis—but rather the political potential to make foreign policy a winning issue for the Republican Party come November. Listening to the Republicans, one would be forgiven for thinking that Obama's entire foreign policy has been an unmitigated disaster from start to finish. The Middle East is in flames, and only carpet bombing and U.S. boots on the ground can save it; Vladimir Putin has become such a threat to U.S. interests that it is now worth shooting down his planes over Syria; and world leaders from Tehran to Beijing to Mexico City spend their days guffawing over American stupidity. But this is not how everybody in domestic politics views Obama's record on international issues, of course. On the contrary, loyal members of the president's electoral coalition have solid reasons to judge his tenure in the White House as an incredible success story. After all, what Republicans denounce as weakness—namely, Obama's reluctance to use U.S. military power abroad—is actually a major strength in the eyes of many Democrats. Obama secured the Democratic nomination and won the 2008 election partly on the back of his pledge to wind down the deeply unpopular war in Iraq. And if anything, the Democratic coalition seems to have grown more anti-war over the course of the Obama presidency, not less. Initially a proponent of ramping up the military effort in Afghanistan, for example, President Obama was encouraged early in his first term—not least of all by electoral concerns—to reduce the U.S. footprint in that country, as well as in Iraq. Especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden, Obama shifted his focus from defeating America's enemies in battle to ending a decade of warfare in the Middle East. The wisdom of retrenchment in Iraq and Afghanistan is open to debate, of course, given the worsening security situation in both countries. But the goal of extricating the United States from foreign wars remains in vogue among Democrats. So does avoiding future wars. Consider John Kerry's remarks in response to Iran's implementation of the controversial nuclear deal. "I think we have also proven once again why diplomacy has to always be our first choice, and war our last resort," he said. "And that is a very important lesson to reinforce. We have approached this challenge with the firm belief that exhausting diplomacy before choosing war is an imperative. And we believe that today marks the benefits of that choice." The implicit claim is that, under a different president, the United States could well have found itself embroiled in open warfare with Iran. But thanks to Obama's steady hand and strategic foresight, diplomacy has proven sufficient to meet the objectives of keeping America safe and maintaining security in the Persian Gulf. Diplomacy pays. Militarism does not. Diplomacy is also bearing fruit in Cuba, Obama's supporters might say. Tough talk, economic blockade and the assassination plots of yesteryear have done nothing to advance the U.S. goal of regime change in Havana. In stark contrast, Obama's approach brings new hope that the two countries can mend their bilateral relations and that, in time, the Cuban government will either reform or be replaced by its own people. Elsewhere, too, diplomacy appears to have paid dividends. Although it has a much lower profile in U.S. domestic politics than the attempted rapprochements with Iran and Cuba, for example, Obama's opening to Burma has seen that country edge towards democratization and an improvement of its human rights record (even if Obama's support for democratic reforms in other countries—Egypt and Bahrain spring to mind—has been mixed). On the environment—a central issue for many in the Democratic coalition—Obama can claim to have delivered the Paris Agreement on tackling climate change, a marked improvement on previous global compacts, as well as ensuring that China plays its part in curbing carbon emissions. He has done so in the teeth of bitter Republican opposition, of course, which makes his legacy on the environment particularly vulnerable to partisan disagreement. And then there is the question of American leadership of the global economy under the Obama administration. It is sometimes easy to forget just how fragile things were in January 2009 when Obama first took office, but it is surely a non-trivial achievement that, seven years later, an open world economy has survived relatively intact, with most major world powers having eschewed the sort of beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies that characterized the interwar period. It is clear, then, that the Obama foreign policy has given groups within the Democratic coalition plenty to be happy about: diplomatic solutions that have reduced reliance on militarism, the promise of improved relations with some longstanding adversaries and achievements in the realms of climate, human rights and trade. And indeed, Democrats are much more likely to rate Obama favorably as a world leader. The cost of these achievements has been to reject the militarist and macho brand of foreign policy that plays well with hawkish voters, the result being that Obama has little chance of being remembered as a strong commander-in-chief. He will have to live with his detractors' attempts to blame him for turmoil in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere; his legacy will long be tarnished by accusations of weakness, appeasement and misplaced priorities. In his new book, The Obama Doctrine, Colin Dueck notes that President Obama achieved a very rare thing during the 2012 presidential election by turning foreign policy into a "winning issue" for the Democrats. An aggressive foreign policy of targeting terrorists that culminated in the death of bin Laden, a new start with some of America's former adversaries and a seemingly imminent end to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—all of these things made it hard for Mitt Romney to land punches on the sitting president when it came to foreign affairs. But this was a fleeting moment. Just four years later, foreign policy is back to being a highly politicized and utterly partisan issue. Worse still for Obama and his co-partisans, foreign policy an issue area that the Democrats are decidedly vulnerable over, especially given sustained Republican attacks on Hillary Clinton's record as Secretary of State. And so while Obama (like his predecessor before him) might well view posterity as some sort of coconspirator—a source of ultimate validation and vindication for foreign policies not appreciated in their time—his would-be successors in the Democratic Party can enjoy no such luxury. Future public opinion is the least of their worries. Trump victory risks extinction via climate change and global war Nisbet 16 (Matthew, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who studies the role of communication, media, and public opinion in debates over science, technology, and the environment, New Scientist, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," 5/27/16 http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf) Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just promised to "cancel the Paris climate agreement", end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back the "stupid" Obama administration regulations to cut power plant emissions. The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party's line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. "Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason," Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. "If 'crooked' Hillary Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me." Climate incoherence Yet a Trump presidency poses an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates who have doubted climate change. It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises, creating global turmoil that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue in the US and abroad. Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, Trump's incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress. In past comments, he has said he is "not a believer in man-made global warming", declaring that climate change is a "total hoax" and "bullshit", "created by and for the Chinese" to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump's candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults, spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice. He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them "thugs" and "criminals". His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further destabilisation. At home, Trump's promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to deport millions of immigrants will provoke widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, Trump's bravado and reckless unpredictability, his vow to renegotiate trade deals and to walk away from security alliances will generate deep tensions with China, Russia and Europe, risking financial collapse and military conflict. In the midst of such dysfunction and upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the historic climate change pact agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher. 3 The United States should: Not oppose China's organizational initiatives or try to block other countries from participating in them Ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership In coordination with Japan, expand the voting power of China and other emerging powers, without conditions, in regional and global financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and seek a new capital increase for the ADB. CP boosts U.S. strategic influence globally and ensures the AIIB doesn't eclipse existing international financial institutions and spur a new network of regional development banks Morris, 15 —- senior fellow at the Center for Global Development and director of the Rethinking US Development Policy initiative (3/20/15, Scott, "No, the US Will Not Join the AIIB – But Here's One Thing It Can Do," http://www.cgdev.org/blog/no-us-will-not-join-aiib-–-here's-one-thing-it-can-do, article downloaded 6/6/15, JMP) The backlash to the discordant US position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) this week was swift and seemingly universal. So much so that I can't find any voices defending the US view to link to here. Fair enough. As I've already argued (here and here), the criticism is deserved. But I part ways with one emerging narrative about how the US can get back on track. I don't agree that the US should join the very institution that it has so strongly called on others to avoid. Even if the will were there from the Obama administration (and it is decidedly not), the path to membership would be nearly impossible. President Obama couldn't sign the United States up for AIIB membership for the same reason he can't offer US approval for the IMF reform package (something he does want). Namely, the US Congress. Capitol Hill would need to authorize and pay for US participation in the new institution. That will not happen. Earlier this week Treasury Secretary Jack Lew reiterated the Administration's urging for IMF reform in Congressional testimony (play video from 19.17 – 23.38). Yet a better and more feasible option is already at hand. There's a higher likelihood that the Obama administration could work with Congress on a set of measures to increase the attractiveness of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the eyes of the very countries that are now looking fondly toward the AIIB. The US objective at this point will be to ensure that the AIIB does not grow quickly to eclipse the existing international financial institutions (IFIs), or that the AIIB does not otherwise become the launching point for an alternative network of regional development banks, all of them excluding the United States. The best way to do that is to realize more of the pent up ambition for the new institutions through the existing ones. That means one thing: money. The United States, and particularly the US Congress, can't expect to "lead" in institutions like the World Bank if it isn't willing to pony up more resources. This means demonstrating a newfound ambition when it comes to more capital for the World Bank and the regional development banks in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Much of the US talk in these banks in recent years is around doing more with less, leveraging more, and relying more on private money. In the meantime, many of the World Bank's leading shareholders (China, the UK, France, Germany) are now demonstrating that they are perfectly willing to put more of their public resources through multilateral channels. The United States can demonstrate renewed leadership by channeling some of this ambition from other countries into the existing IFIs. Why not announce support for a doubling of World Bank capital? That may sound prohibitively expensive, but the budgetary implications are actually very modest, representing about one percent of the annual US foreign assistance budget. Is that too costly an investment to shore up US strategic influence globally at a time when it appears to be in peril? The counterplan is necessary to reverse fragmentation from China lead initiatives —- impact is diminished U.S. leadership and U.S. backed institutions and declining regional stability and global governance. Frost, 14 —- Senior Advisor at the East-West Center's Washington, D.C., office and a Visiting Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (December, Ellen L, "Rival Regionalisms and Regional Order: A Slow Crisis of Legitimacy," http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/free/021115/SR48.pdf, article downloaded 6/5/16, JMP) Conclusions: Restoring Legitimacy and Direction to Asia's Regional Institutions The world is not yet witnessing "the end of a stable Pacific," to quote Robert Kaplan's dramatic prediction.53 No matter how their structure is designed or how many economies they encompass, regional institutions that exclude the United States will not replace U.S. power as a key organizing force. No other government can bring such massive resources to the table. The real problem is not U.S. weakness, but a slow crisis of legitimacy that diminishes the perceived value of both U.S. leadership and U.S.-backed institutions. The erosion of regional order in Asia threatens both the future stability of the region and global governance. Both China and the United States attach great value to regional stability, but they are on different paths. The trend toward fragmentation and rival regionalisms calls for overcoming organizational "stovepipes" and launching serious strategic thinking and action on the part of the president and his White House aides, leading policymakers in executive branch departments and agencies, and congressional leaders. Unfortunately, top foreign policymakers in Washington are currently hobbled by budgetary constraints and congressional roadblocks and distracted by crises in the Middle East, Ukraine, and West Africa (Ebola). Except for China, Asia is on hold. In addition, domestic political action during much of 2015 and 2016 will be consumed by the November 2016 presidential election. Asian friends of the United States know that these swings in the United States' reputation and leadership come and go. (Recall, for example, the hand-wringing accompanying Japan's economic rise in the 1980s.) They are right, but steps should be taken now to stem the emerging fragmentation of regional and global order and put U.S. influence on sounder footing. The Obama administration has made some important moves, and President Obama's personal interest in Southeast Asia and willingness to travel there have helped re-establish the United States as an active and constructive player. But that is not enough. Stalled trade legislation, sluggish growth in most Western economies, China's mixed behavior in the region, U.S. political dysfunction, and the difficulty of winding down U.S. military engagement in the Middle East call for U.S. action on several fronts. Revive and Reform Global Institutions While Making Way for New Ones There are legitimate reasons why rival regionalisms have emerged. It is both ridiculous and shameful that developing countries remain underrepresented in existing regional and global institutions such as the IMF and the ADB. The major powers governing such institutions should adopt institutional arrangements that rectify this imbalance and adopt voting reforms without conditions. The White House should make the case for reforming both the IMF and the ADB along these lines in broad strategic terms. The resurgence of China's political and economic influence in Asia is a fact of life. The United States should not automatically oppose China's effort to create new organizations, particularly the AIIB. Nor should it try to persuade like-minded allies and partners to stay on the sidelines. They have their own concerns that are similar to Washington's. Instead, U.S. officials should continue to ask questions about governance and adopt a wait-and-see approach. In the case of the AIIB, for instance, it is appropriate to question whether the AIIB will conduct high-quality project evaluation, practice open procurement, take into account environmental and social concerns, recruit staff on the basis of merit, submit to thorough auditing, adopt safeguards against corruption and fraud, and adhere to transparent policies and procedures.54 Act Like a Leader Domestic political dysfunction inflicts a high cost on U.S. foreign policy and national security. The failure thus far to ratify UNCLOS strikes other countries as senseless and hypocritical, especially since the U.S. Navy claims to observe it. Likewise, inaction on IMF reform has contributed directly to the emergence of rival regionalisms. The absence of trade promotion authority damages not only the credibility of U.S. negotiators in the TPP negotiations but also U.S. leadership more generally. Top-level administration officials must appeal to a broader congressional audience by going beyond issue-specific, conventional arguments and instead making the case for ratification of UNCLOS and the TPP and passage of TPA on broad strategic grounds. Executive branch officials, especially the president, must also do a better job of explaining what the rebalancing strategy means and why allocating more budgetary resources and nonmilitary personnel to the Asia-Pacific makes sense, even at a time when parts of the Middle East are again in flames. Asian leaders will only believe in the U.S. rebalancing strategy when they see it in action. But resources remain limited, and the policy toolbox is still heavily weighted toward military hardware and joint military exercises. American men and women in uniform vastly outnumber civilian officials. One goal of the rebalancing strategy is to reduce this huge gap and bolster the United States' political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic presence. The administration must fight more actively and at a higher level to obtain congressional approval for the necessary resources—and resist calls to divert them to the Middle East. Only the president can decide on such trade-offs. The United States may not be able or willing to fund major physical infrastructure projects comparable to those funded by China and, presumably, by the new AIIB, but it can do more to build up Asia's soft infrastructure. One example is expanded English-language instruction, which would have a direct economic effect in poorer ASEAN countries. Although more people are learning Mandarin, English is still the language of not only international business but also science and technology. Further expansion of visiting fellowships for students and young professionals is another relatively low-cost way of restoring the United States' image as a generous leader. Good will is a strategic asset. Reinvigorate APEC's Vision The United States should take advantage of upcoming and future APEC summits to restore APEC's role as an "incubator of big ideas."55 Following former president Clinton's example, the U.S. president and his or her top lieutenants should recommit the United States to an FTAAP and express appreciation for China's support of this initiative. He or she should explain to American audiences why this goal makes sense and where the TPP fits in this vision. Corresponding measures to improve employment prospects at home should be a core part of this strategy. U.S. officials should not appear to be blocking China's effort to promote an FTAAP, because doing so feeds Chinese perceptions that the United States wants to contain China. They are correct, however, that near-term conclusion of the TPP should take priority. At the 2014 APEC heads-of-state meeting in Beijing, the United States warded off a "feasibility study" of the FTAAP, which would formally set the FTAAP in motion, and accepted the establishment of a "strategic study" as a face-saving concession to Beijing. Carrying out the study group's mandate will be a low-profile, time-consuming job for trade experts. More months will pass as APEC member governments study the results and discuss them with affected interest groups. Top-level leaders will not be involved for at least several years. Build on Shared Strategic Interests and Continue to Contribute to Public Goods The postwar history of U.S.-led regional institutions underscores the importance of shared strategic purpose. During the Cold War, opposition to the spread of Communism was the glue holding U.S.-led regional institutions together; when top-priority strategies diverged, the organizations lost their unifying purpose. In today's Asia, all governments see constructive, mutually beneficial U.S.-China relations as a necessary foundation of stability and growth. But beyond those basics, strategic interests differ. U.S. leadership is most effective when Washington avoids dueling with China or imposing a grand strategy on the governments of the region and instead assigns equipment and personnel to noncontroversial, relatively nonpolitical areas such as health and maritime safety. Progress in these fields is as important to the United States as to Asia and should be pursued even if allies and partners engage in "free riding" (which most of them probably will). Beijing gets credit from other governments for not telling them what they should do, but the flip side of that stance is that no one knows what China's ultimate goals in the region are. What goes on in regional institutions, new or old, conforms to this pattern. There are strong reasons to believe that China seeks to establish itself as the dominant power in Asia while diminishing the role of the United States as an external balancer. But how and toward what end does it hope to achieve this outcome? How far will the United States go to accommodate a stronger China? The answers to these questions will have enormous bearing on the norms, composition, tasks, and future achievements of regional institutions. CP helps preserve the Bretton Woods system and improves China's role in the existing international order Harris, 15 —- Economy, Trade, and Business Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (last modified on 8/7/2015, Tobias, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, "The U.S. Response to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIB-Report_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP) Finally, the United States and its allies should take seriously China's complaint that its role in international financial institutions is incommensurate with its wealth. The United States cannot be surprised that China, India and other emerging economies want to create new institutions, when the incumbent institutions have not shifted to reflect the new global distribution of wealth. If the United States wants China to be a responsible stakeholder within the existing order and not create new institutions, it has to give China an appropriate stake in the existing order. While the domestic and international politics of reallocating shares in international financial institutions are complicated, if the United States wants the Bretton Woods system to endure, it has to exert political capital to ensure that the system evolves with the global economy. 4 Pivot marks transition to containment strategy Krepinevich, PhD Harvard, 15 (Andrew F, currently serves as President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china March/April) In the U.S. military, at least, the "pivot" to Asia has begun. By 2020, the navy and the air force plan to base 60 percent of their forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Pentagon, meanwhile, is investing a growing share of its shrinking resources in new long-range bombers and nuclear-powered submarines designed to operate in high-threat environments. These changes are clearly meant to check an increasingly assertive China. And with good reason: Beijing's expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as "the first island chain," encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt Washington's ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism, Washington's goal, and that of its allies and partners, should be to achieve deterrence through denial—to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force. The CP solves China's rise —- reverses perception of containment Harris, 15 —- Economy, Trade, and Business Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (last modified on 8/7/2015, Tobias, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, "The U.S. Response to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIB-Report_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP) U.S. officials have, for years, called upon China to act as a "responsible stakeholder,"8 a country that, in then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's words, "[recognizes] that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system." However, the United States has not been as sensitive when it comes to multilateral political and economic institution building. Instead, Washington has, at times, seemed content to permit the emergence of "rival regionalisms."9 Rather than welcome a greater Chinese role in regional institutions, challenging Beijing to act as a responsible stakeholder, the United States has seemed, at best, resigned and, at worst, hostile to China's efforts to create its own institutions outside the existing regional architecture. While China has its own reasons for wanting to build new regional institutions, Washington has failed to use multilateral organizations as a means to give China a greater stake in the existing order and to counter the argument that the United States seeks to contain or otherwise limit China's power in Asia. Joining the AIIB is containment read their ev, everything they do is to alter Chinese influence and contain their rise peacefully Primacy based approaches to China's rise fail – results in US-China war Glaser, 15 – John, B.A. in Political Science from the University of Massachusetts Amherst, media relations manager for Cato ("The US and China can avoid a collision course – if the US gives up its empire," The Guardian, 5/28/15, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/28/conflict-us-china-not-inevitable-empire //Red+JMP)// //The problem isn't China's rise, but rather America's insistence on maintaining military and economic dominance right in China's backyard// //To avoid a violent militaristic clash with China, or another cold war rivalry, the United States should pursue a simple solution: give up its empire.// //Americans fear that China's rapid economic growth will slowly translate into a more expansive and assertive foreign policy that will inevitably result in a war with the US. Harvard Professor Graham Allison has found: "in 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years when a rising power challenged a ruling power, the outcome was war." Chicago University scholar John Mearsheimer has bluntly argued: "China cannot rise peacefully."// //But the apparently looming conflict between the US and China is not because of China's rise per se, but rather because the US insists on maintaining military and economic dominance among China's neighbors. Although Americans like to think of their massive overseas military presence as a benign force that's inherently stabilizing, Beijing certainly doesn't see it that way.// //According to political scientists Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Beijing sees America as "the most intrusive outside actor in China's internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China's neighbors." (All of which is true.) They think that the US "seeks to curtail China's political influence and harm China's interests" with a "militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish" foreign policy.// //China's regional ambitions are not uniquely pernicious or aggressive, but they do overlap with America's ambition to be the dominant power in its own region, and in every region of the world.// //Leaving aside caricatured debates about which nation should get to wave the big "Number 1" foam finger, it's worth asking whether having 50,000 US troops permanently stationed in Japan actually serves US interests and what benefits we derive from keeping almost 30,000 US troops in South Korea and whether Americans will be any safer if the Obama administration manages to reestablish a US military presence in the Philippines to counter China's maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea.// //Many commentators say yes. Robert Kagan argues not only that US hegemony makes us safer and richer, but also that it bestows peace and prosperity on everybody else. If America doesn't rule, goes his argument, the world becomes less free, less stable and less safe.// //But a good chunk of the scholarly literature disputes these claims. "There are good theoretical and empirical reasons", wrote political scientist Christopher Fettweis in his book Pathologies of Power, "to doubt that US hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability." The international system, rather than cowering in obedience to American demands for peace, is far more "self-policing", says Fettweis. A combination of economic development and the destructive power of modern militaries serves as a much more satisfying answer for why states increasingly see war as detrimental to their interests.// //International relations theorist Robert Jervis has written that "the pursuit of primacy was what great power politics was all about in the past" but that, in a world of nuclear weapons with "low security threats and great common interests among the developed countries", primacy does not have the strategic or economic benefits it once had.// //Nor does US dominance reap much in the way of tangible rewards for most Americans: international relations theorist Daniel Drezner contends that "the economic benefits from military predominance alone seem, at a minimum, to have been exaggerated"; that "There is little evidence that military primacy yields appreciable geoeconomic gains"; and that, therefore, "an overreliance on military preponderance is badly misguided."// //The struggle for military and economic primacy in Asia is not really about our core national security interests; rather, it's about preserving status, prestige and America's neurotic image of itself. Those are pretty dumb reasons to risk war.// //There are a host of reasons why the dire predictions of a coming US-China conflict may be wrong, of course. Maybe China's economy will slow or even suffer crashes. Even if it continues to grow, the US's economic and military advantage may remain intact for a few more decades, making China's rise gradual and thus less dangerous.// //Moreover, both countries are armed with nuclear weapons. And there's little reason to think the mutually assured destruction paradigm that characterized the Cold War between the US and the USSR wouldn't dominate this shift in power as well.// //But why take the risk, when maintaining US primacy just isn't that important to the safety or prosperity of Americans? Knowing that should at least make the idea of giving up empire a little easier.// //Case// //1// //Obama softening U.S. stance to AIIB —- co-financing will reverse perception of containment and resolve diplomatic debacle// //Talley, 15 (3/22/15, Wall Street Journal (Online), "U.S. Looks to Work With China-Led Infrastructure Fund; Obama administration proposes co-financing projects with new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Proquest database, JMP)// //WASHINGTON—The Obama administration, facing defiance by allies that have signed up to support a new Chinese-led infrastructure fund, is proposing that the bank work in a partnership with Washington-backed development institutions, such as the World Bank.// //The collaborative approach is designed to steer the new bank toward economic aims of the world's leading economies and away from becoming an instrument of Beijing's foreign policy. The bank's potential to promote new alliances and sidestep existing institutions has been one of the Obama administration's chief concerns as key allies including the U.K., Germany and France lined up in recent days to become founding members of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.// //The Obama administration wants to use existing development banks to co-finance projects with Beijing's new organization. Indirect support would help the U.S. address another long-standing goal: ensuring the new institution's standards are designed to prevent unhealthy debt buildups, human-rights abuses and environmental risks. U.S. support could also pave the way for American companies to bid on the new bank's projects.// //"The U.S. would welcome new multilateral institutions that strengthen the international financial architecture," said Nathan Sheets, U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs. "Co-financing projects with existing institutions like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank will help ensure that high quality, time-tested standards are maintained."// //Mr. Sheets argues that co-financed projects would ensure the bank complements rather than competes with existing institutions. If the new bank were to adopt the same governance and operational standards, he said, it could both bolster the international financial system and help meet major infrastructure-investment gaps.// //No decision has been made by the new Chinese-led bank about whether it will partner with existing multilateral development banks, as the facility is still being formed, though co-financing is unlikely to face opposition from U.S. allies.// //Zhu Haiquan, a spokesman at China's embassy in Washington, said Beijing is open to collaboration with the existing institutions and that the new bank "is built in the spirit of openness and inclusiveness and will follow high standards.// //"It will effectively cooperate with and complement the existing multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to provide investment and financing for the infrastructure building in Asia," he said.// //World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said through a spokesman that he and his lieutenants are already in "deep discussions" with the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank "on how we can closely work together."// //The U.S. suffered a diplomatic embarrassment last week after several of its key European allies publicly rebuffed Washington's pleas to snub Beijing's invitations to join the bank and instead said they would be founding members.// //Backing the new bank through co-financing could also help the U.S. move past the diplomatic mess, reunite with its trans-Atlantic allies on this issue and counter any perceptions that the U.S. is wholly opposed to the institution as part of a China-containment strategy.// //"Our concern has always been...will it adhere to the kinds of high standards that the international financial institutions have developed?" U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew told U.S. lawmakers last week.// //Co-financing, combined with European membership, "will make it more likely this institution largely conforms to the international standards," said Matthew Goodman, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies adviser and former economics director at the U.S. National Security Council.// //The World Bank, forged out of World War II, remains the leading international development institution with 188 nations as members. But others have emerged amid concerns about drawing more investment and attention to fast-growing regions. Those include the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, European Investment Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.// //The banks' loans are designed to foster infrastructure and development projects that are often high-risk and long-term, helping to lower the costs for governments that couldn't afford borrowing from the private sector. For the most powerful lending countries, they cultivate regional growth prospects and can provide a political tool for influencing smaller countries.// //Beijing has struggled to increase its influence within the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the world's emergency lender, the International Monetary Fund. But as the founder and one of the new bank's largest shareholders, it will have the greatest say in which projects to pick.// //Infrastructure needs around the world are enormous. Emerging countries need new ports, railways, bridges, airports and roads to support faster growth. Developed economies, meanwhile, must replace aging infrastructure. The Asian Development Bank estimates its region alone faces an annual financing shortfall of $800 billion a year. The consulting firm McKinsey & Company estimates global infrastructure-investment needs through 2030 total $57 trillion.// //By comparison, the Asian Development Bank has just $160 billion in capital and the World Bank-which has co-financed with other regional institutions for years—has around $500 billion. The China-led bank plans to have a $50 billion fund to start.// //"We have every intention of sharing knowledge and co-investing in projects throughout Asia," said Mr. Kim, who was picked by President Barack Obama in 2012 as the U.S. nominee to lead the World Bank.// //"From the perspective simply of the need for more infrastructure spending, there's no doubt that we welcome the entry of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Mr. Kim said.// //U.S. support for AIIB won't solve SCS conflict// //Dr. Kawai, 15 —- Professor at the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Public Policy (last modified on 8/7/2015, Masahiro Kawai, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the Evolving International Financial Order," http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIB-Report_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP) ***note —- this ev is footnote #15**// //**15 Bergsten (2015) calls for the U.S. to reverse course and join AIIB with a minority share. Lipscy (2015) also argues that the United States should prefer a world in which China seeks to establish its influence and international prestige by building multilateral development banks rather than one in which it seeks to do so by building military capabilities. But, it is not clear if the U.S. endorsement of AIIB will limit China's aggressive behavior, for example, in the South China Sea. At any rate, it remains highly unlikely that the United States will join AIIB for the time being, given the politics of approving funds for subscription shares for the bank as well as views of China in Congress, which has yet to approve IMF reforms that would give China a larger voice in that institution.**// //**Relations resilient —- they empirically endure crises**// //**Chen, 16 —- Director of the US Center of the China Foundation for International Studies (1/12/16, Yonglong, "Head Tides Won't Set Back Sino-U.S. Ties," http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/head-tides-wont-set-back-sino-u-s-ties/, article downloaded 6/6/16, JMP)**// //**In their respective reviews of Sino-US relations at the end of the year, various institutions, governments, think tanks, mass media and individual observers, particularly in China and the United States, have divergent judgments about the state of those relations based on different intentions, perspectives and criteria. Among those sometimes conflicting observations, however, there is also one underlying consensus: Despite all the contradictions, entanglements and escalation in tensions, the great ship of Sino-US relations has always managed to plow through the waves.**// //**Nowadays, more and more people are concerned about the China-US relationship, and to greater extents. With the exception of an extremely small number of countries, the boundary line between pro- and anti-China camps is getting increasingly blurred. The birth of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was a typical case in point. It was expected that many developing countries would participate actively. But the US might have never anticipated that its traditional allies Britain, France, Germany, Australia and South Korea would become the first founding members of the AIIB, and that it could have failed to prevent those countries from taking part in a China-initiated public goods program for their own benefits. Their participation in the AIIB doesn't mean they now shun America; they remain, for example, key members of such traditional institutions as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. It only means that they no longer endorse the clear China-or-US demarcation as in the past. They can't afford to just listen to the US only on Sino-US relations, not to mention that US stance regarding the AIIB has been widely criticized at home. The warming up of China-Britain, China-France, and China-Germany ties after President Xi Jinping's US visit was telling proof.**// //**Those countries care about the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. But they also have shown great interest in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative China has proposed. Sure, the TPP is a magnificent trade mechanism some countries have conceived in the name of further promoting free trade, which may present benchmark criteria for future world trade. Any country aspiring to join the club must first satisfy those criteria. The TPP is obviously more political, less inclusive. The "One Belt, One Road" initiative is quite different: Starting with infrastructure construction, China and stake-holding countries are supposed to undertake projects they plan, build and share together. It conforms to the national conditions and needs of all participating countries, is pragmatic and inclusive, and makes it easier for host countries to see the practical benefits of the projects, and for other participants to receive moral and economic returns.**// //**Debate on Sino-US relations is expected to continue. But a new type of state-to-state relationship has to be built. By and large, there have been three main ideas in the extensive debate over Sino-US ties since the beginning of 2015: One holds that post-Nixon US China policies have failed completely, and China is becoming, or has already become, a rivalry, and a strategic one, to the US. Typical statements include that China and the US are in a "time of mutual distrust", and that the US needs to revise its grand China strategy, featuring the belief that China is challenging American global leadership, and the US must take tougher containment policies. The second proposes to maintain the policy of engagement, competition, regulation and cooperation, seek to establish security and economic cooperation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific, and to not let the South China Sea issue become a flashpoint for a Sino-US "new cold war" or confrontation. The third advocates all-round cooperation, stating that both China and the US should have sufficient strategic patience, and seek points of cooperation based on common interests.**// //**The first point of view is evidently extremist, but very influential and misleading. The second reflects majority opinion in the US, while the third sounds more or less idealistic. Though there has yet to be a similar major debate in China, and cooperation remains the main theme regarding Sino-US ties, radical opinions such as claims of Sino-US mutual suspicion, US containment of China, and the assumption that a war is inevitable between China and the US, have also been heard from time to time.**// //**Leaders of both China and the US have taken the challenges to lead public opinion, create and take advantage of opportunities, explore ways for building a new type of major-country relationship, and sail against the current. After conclusion of the agreement on the Iran nuclear issue, President Obama called President Xi and praised China's constructive role throughout the process. Before and after countries reached an agreement at the Paris climate summit, Obama called Xi, giving full credit to US-China leadership in facilitating the agreement. Xi's US visit was fruitful in that it guaranteed the correct direction of building a new-type Sino-US major-country relationship; Obama also told Xi that he would leave a stable US-China relationship to the next administration. Bit by bit, both governments have been accumulating mutual confidence through practical moves and projects of collaboration.**// //**A consensus is taking shape among celebrities, ordinary citizens, leaders and strategists in both countries that in spite of all the changes in global and international conditions, China and the US should not change their course of engagement and cooperation. In the current age of globalization and interconnection, with global and regional challenges like wars, terrorist attacks, natural disasters and slow economic recovery emerging and increasing all the time, no country can stay immune and cope with the threats single-handedly. There is little dispute that few global challenges can be handled properly without the joint participation and effective cooperation of China and the US. From the global perspective, historic changes are taking place in the connotations of relations between rising and incumbent powers. People from China, the US and the rest of the world share the hope that the two countries adapt to each other, leave room for each other, manage and control their disagreements, and work harder to seek collaboration. That is the only way for China, the US, and the rest of the world to see a promising future. Are China and the US ready? Instead of forming a "group of two", China and the US share the responsibility to pursue the common goal of building a global community of shared destiny.**// //**Obama softening U.S. stance to AIIB —- co-financing will reverse perception of containment and resolve diplomatic debacle**// //**Talley, 15 (3/22/15, Wall Street Journal (Online), "U.S. Looks to Work With China-Led Infrastructure Fund; Obama administration proposes co-financing projects with new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Proquest database, JMP)**// //**WASHINGTON—The Obama administration, facing defiance by allies that have signed up to support a new Chinese-led infrastructure fund, is proposing that the bank work in a partnership with Washington-backed development institutions, such as the World Bank.**// //**The collaborative approach is designed to steer the new bank toward economic aims of the world's leading economies and away from becoming an instrument of Beijing's foreign policy. The bank's potential to promote new alliances and sidestep existing institutions has been one of the Obama administration's chief concerns as key allies including the U.K., Germany and France lined up in recent days to become founding members of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.**// //**The Obama administration wants to use existing development banks to co-finance projects with Beijing's new organization. Indirect support would help the U.S. address another long-standing goal: ensuring the new institution's standards are designed to prevent unhealthy debt buildups, human-rights abuses and environmental risks. U.S. support could also pave the way for American companies to bid on the new bank's projects.**// //**"The U.S. would welcome new multilateral institutions that strengthen the international financial architecture," said Nathan Sheets, U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs. "Co-financing projects with existing institutions like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank will help ensure that high quality, time-tested standards are maintained."**// //**Mr. Sheets argues that co-financed projects would ensure the bank complements rather than competes with existing institutions. If the new bank were to adopt the same governance and operational standards, he said, it could both bolster the international financial system and help meet major infrastructure-investment gaps.**// //**No decision has been made by the new Chinese-led bank about whether it will partner with existing multilateral development banks, as the facility is still being formed, though co-financing is unlikely to face opposition from U.S. allies.**// //**Zhu Haiquan, a spokesman at China's embassy in Washington, said Beijing is open to collaboration with the existing institutions and that the new bank "is built in the spirit of openness and inclusiveness and will follow high standards.**// //**"It will effectively cooperate with and complement the existing multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to provide investment and financing for the infrastructure building in Asia," he said.**// //**World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said through a spokesman that he and his lieutenants are already in "deep discussions" with the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank "on how we can closely work together."**// //**The U.S. suffered a diplomatic embarrassment last week after several of its key European allies publicly rebuffed Washington's pleas to snub Beijing's invitations to join the bank and instead said they would be founding members.**// //**Backing the new bank through co-financing could also help the U.S. move past the diplomatic mess, reunite with its trans-Atlantic allies on this issue and counter any perceptions that the U.S. is wholly opposed to the institution as part of a China-containment strategy.**// //**"Our concern has always been...will it adhere to the kinds of high standards that the international financial institutions have developed?" U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew told U.S. lawmakers last week.**// //**Co-financing, combined with European membership, "will make it more likely this institution largely conforms to the international standards," said Matthew Goodman, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies adviser and former economics director at the U.S. National Security Council.**// //**The World Bank, forged out of World War II, remains the leading international development institution with 188 nations as members. But others have emerged amid concerns about drawing more investment and attention to fast-growing regions. Those include the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, European Investment Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.**// //**The banks' loans are designed to foster infrastructure and development projects that are often high-risk and long-term, helping to lower the costs for governments that couldn't afford borrowing from the private sector. For the most powerful lending countries, they cultivate regional growth prospects and can provide a political tool for influencing smaller countries.**// //**Beijing has struggled to increase its influence within the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the world's emergency lender, the International Monetary Fund. But as the founder and one of the new bank's largest shareholders, it will have the greatest say in which projects to pick.**// //**Infrastructure needs around the world are enormous. Emerging countries need new ports, railways, bridges, airports and roads to support faster growth. Developed economies, meanwhile, must replace aging infrastructure. The Asian Development Bank estimates its region alone faces an annual financing shortfall of $800 billion a year. The consulting firm McKinsey & Company estimates global infrastructure-investment needs through 2030 total $57 trillion.**// //**By comparison, the Asian Development Bank has just $160 billion in capital and the World Bank-which has co-financed with other regional institutions for years—has around $500 billion. The China-led bank plans to have a $50 billion fund to start.**// //**"We have every intention of sharing knowledge and co-investing in projects throughout Asia," said Mr. Kim, who was picked by President Barack Obama in 2012 as the U.S. nominee to lead the World Bank.**// //**"From the perspective simply of the need for more infrastructure spending, there's no doubt that we welcome the entry of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Mr. Kim said.**// //**U.S. adopting gradual openness towards the AIIB —- solves relations and bank will have high standards**// //**Panda, 9/28/15 —- editor at The Diplomat (Ankit, "Have the US and China Come to an Understanding on the AIIB? The United States and China have come to a working understanding on the role of the AIIB. Washington can move on now," http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/have-the-us-and-china-come-to-an-understanding-on-the-aiib/, article downloaded 4/24/16, JMP)**// //**Has Washington made its peace with China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) at last?**// //**An official fact sheet on U.S.-China economic relations, issued after Chinese President Xi Jinping's meetings with U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House notes that "the United States welcomes China's growing contributions to financing development and infrastructure in Asia and beyond." The introduction to the fact sheet also noted that the "international financial architecture has evolved over time to meet the changing scale, scope, and diversity of challenges and to include new institutions as they incorporate its core principles of high standards and good governance."**// //**Though the AIIB wasn't mentioned explicitly in the statement, the introductory language suggests that Washington is easing its tone on the new China-led financial institution which launched earlier this year with a founding membership comprising over 50 countries, including several Western European states and U.S. partners and allies. The fact sheet notes that both countries "resolve to further strengthen the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank by enhancing their financial capacity, reforming their governance, and improving their effectiveness and efficiency." The AIIB is notably excluded from this list.**// //**The Financial Times reported on the shifting U.S. position on the AIIB in the wake of Xi's visit as well, noting that the U.S. officials had "declared what amounts to a truce in their campaign over China's new Asian infrastructure bank." Per the FT's report, U.S. officials have noted that Xi gave his assurances that the AIIB would "abide by the highest international environmental and governance standards." U.S. officials cited concerns about the AIIB's governance standards as one of their primary concerns when its allies started joining the institution. When the UK joined, for example, the White House issued a statement noting that "We hope and expect that the UK will use its voice to push for adoption of high standards."**// //**The AIIB his its deadline for prospective founding members on March 31, 2015. A framework agreement for the bank's operations was signed on June 29, bringing some much-needed clarity on how the AIIB would manage capital and voting rights. The bank launched with 57 countries, comprising a quarter of the world's nations and 16 of the world's 20 largest economies. The United States, along with Japan, represent two notable economies that chose not to join the AIIB. The AIIB's appealing doesn't appear to be waning anytime soon too. Up to 20 countries are still waiting for their opportunity to join the AIIB, demonstrating that the institution's appeal is far from having achieved global saturation with its inaugural founding members.**// //**That Washington is coming around to the AIIB and softening its position on the institution is a good thing. With a bevy of pressing challenges in the U.S.-China relations, including cyber espionage, freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas, and growing military competition, the United States is better off expending less diplomatic capital on opposition to institutions like the AIIB–which could ultimately serve as a net positive for a region where infrastructure financing is very much needed–and focusing its efforts on other issues.**// //**If you're looking for a more general look at the outcomes of Xi's state visit, Shannon Tiezzi has a helpful compilation of the other issues discussed here.**// //**2**// //**AIIB won't produce strategic rivalry, regardless of US membership – narrow goals, uncertainty, external actors – and competition is net-positive for global coop.**// //**Chen, 15 (Dingding, an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany, "AIIB: Not a US Loss, Not a Chinese Win," http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/aiib-not-a-us-loss-not-a-chinese-win/, CMR)**// //**Too much ink has been spilled over China's seeming success in wooing away the United States' traditional allies to the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Many analysts (here, here, and here) see it as a 'China winning, U.S. losing' story, thereby implicitly highlighting the confrontational nature of Sino-U.S. relations. Such a view is not only too simplistic, but also dangerous for moving Sino-U.S. relations forward. While to some degree it is true that China has scored a political victory by successfully attracting some of America's traditional allies to the AIIB, there are three things we need to consider before we bandwagon with the cliché that China is rising while the U.S. is declining. The first thing to bear in mind is that the AIIB is an economic institution that may or may not carry strategic implications. While many might be tempted to view China's AIIB move as a direct threat to the U.S.-led global financial order, in reality the AIIB's goals are much more limited. It is very important for the U.S. not to view the AIIB as a new signal of strategic rivalry between China and the U.S.; such a distorted view would assign unnecessary strategic significance to the AIIB which is in reality is first and foremost about development. It is about funding more roads, railroads, airports, and pipelines for many developing countries in Asia. If the U.S. becomes hypersensitive to China's every effort in global governance, then it is possible that the U.S. might reach the wrong conclusion that China indeed is trying to overthrow U.S. hegemony and start taking countermeasures to curb China's rising influence. That would be a tragedy. In actuality, China cannot and will not challenge U.S. hegemony. Another thing that is worth remembering, as many have already pointed out, is that the AIIB's future is still uncertain. For one thing, it is the first time that Beijing has tried running a multilateral economic institution. Some internal challenges will not be fixed easily, and some external challenges are even harder to overcome. It is not clear how democratic and transparent the decision-making structure will be within the AIIB, especially now that many major economies like Germany and the U.K. have decided to join the bank. What is more likely is that Beijing's preferences will be constrained by such major players, which is not necessarily a bad thing. The reason is that these more experienced players can help Beijing make better decisions when allocating funds and thus ultimately improve the quality and reputation of the AIIB in the future. More importantly, a more democratic structure in the AIIB will reduce the suspicions and worries of smaller Asian countries that are already wary of China's future intentions. By delegating more power to other players, Beijing can send a strong and reassuring signal to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines thereby moderating tensions between these countries, stemming from maritime territorial disputes. Beijing must make a serious effort to show that the AIIB is not just another weapon to help China dominate Southeast Asia. Failing to do so would jeopardize not only the AIIB's goals but also China's project of a peaceful rise. Finally, it is misleading to claim that the U.S. is a loser in the AIIB project. While it was unwise for the U.S. to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB earlier, it would be equally unwise to underestimate the potential influence of the U.S. on the AIIB and development in Asia in general. Whether or not the U.S. eventually joins the AIIB remains to be seen. If the U.S. does join the AIIB, then we could very well see a different structure for the bank. Even if the U.S. chooses to stay outside of the AIIB in the future, competition between AIIB and the U.S.-led world bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) will ensure that American standards and will continue to dominate the global financial order in the foreseeable future. Needless to say, the China-led AIIB poses some challenges to U.S. influence in Asia. It is imperative for leaders from both China and the United States to avoid falling into a confrontational trap. Healthy competition between different global financial institutions is good for Asia and the world as a whole. To that end, analysts should stop the "China vs. the U.S." hype and pay more attention to how the quality of the AIIB as an institution can be improved.**// //**READ THIS**// //**No China rise impact – numerous checks on aggression.**// //**Eikenberry, 15 (Karl W, retired United States Army lieutenant general who served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from April 2009 to July 2011, "China's Place in U.S. Foreign Policy," www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/09/chinas-place-in-u-s-foreign-policy/, CMR)**// //**For all its ambition, China's strategic options are not unlimited. Indeed, its foreign policy choices are severely constrained both by formidable domestic problems and by unfavorable international factors that the United States would be wise to consider when formulating its response to China's increasing influence.**// //**Internally, Beijing's leaders face an interwoven array of daunting social, environmental, economic, and political problems that, left unresolved, will limit the state's ability to generate national power and could even threaten the Communist Party's monopolistic grip on political and societal control. A brief look at five of these issues makes clear the severity of the situation.**// //**Economic Restructuring: Some 100,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for about half of China's economic assets. Despite 15 years of reform efforts, only half of the SOEs have been corporatized, and their return on assets is not significantly different from those of the traditional SOEs. Overall, SOE financial performance has deteriorated significantly since 2008, becoming a major drag on economic growth. This drag serves as a source of serious political opposition to enterprise reform, thereby limiting the national leadership's effort to focus on strategic sectors such as aviation, energy, and telecommunications.13**// //**Nevertheless, the impetus for reform has not slackened over the past year, as both state and local SOEs have been selling off non-strategic assets in accordance with Party policy direction. Serious political obstacles to economic reform remain, however, including the fact that, for all of their inherent inefficiencies, SOEs predictably provide jobs to workers, who, if unemployed, might question both Party wisdom and its unchallenged supremacy. At the same time, labor costs are rapidly rising. In 2013, for example, China's 269 million migrant workers earned an average of $410 per month, an increase of nearly 14 percent from 2012 and almost twice the rate of the nation's GDP.14 As a result, Chinese firms are being forced to change their enterprise models and export strategies as foreign companies choose lower-wage alternatives to China.15**// //**The three-decade transition from an agrarian to industrial-service economy, which saw the transition of some 300 million people from rural to urban areas, will continue over the next two decades, with another 350 million people—a number in excess of the entire U.S. population—still to follow. The economic impact of this colossal resettlement has been staggering. Chinese investment in real estate, which was $120 billion in 2003, grew to $980 billion in 2011.Chinese investment in real estate, which was $120 billion in 2003, grew to $980 billion in 2011. The infrastructure required to support this exploding urban population is massive.16**// //**Adding to these difficulties, PRC debt loads have exploded over the past decade. Government debt (a large percentage of which is higher-risk local government debt) to GDP ratio stood at 53.5 percent in 2012, up from 32.5 percent in 2005.17 Of greater concern is the recent rapid rise of total debt (encompassing that from the corporate, household, and financial sectors), which increased from 150 percent of GDP in 2009 to 250 percent in 2014.18 Included in these figures are loans to SOEs that have poor repayment records, but that are often protected by political patronage. Moreover, the recent and dramatic rise of China's shadow banking industry has complicated the central government's efforts to bring lending under control.19**// //**Aging Population & Social Welfare Costs: The scope and pace of aging in China's population pose other significant economic problems for the Party. Over the next twenty years, the ratio of workers to retirees (at the current retirement age of sixty) will decrease from five-to-one to two-to-one. This dramatic demographic shift is both exacerbated and made more urgent by the success of the "one child policy" in place since 1979. It will not only erode the huge economic stimulus and advantage of a young working population, but it will also come at a point in China's modernization when it is more vulnerable to the "middle income trap."20Huge expenditures will be required to put into place more comprehensive national health care and pension systems to help avoid that potential pitfall.**// //**Unequal Income Distribution: China's gap between its rich and poor, measured by its Gini coefficient, has widened greatly since its opening to the world in 1979. In 2012, the head of China's National Bureau of Statistics, Ma Jiantang, pegged it at 0.47-0.49, which is slightly below that of the United States, but high for a developing country.21 The reasons for this growing gap in wealth distribution are well understood: rapid urbanization on the backs of migrant workers not offered basic social services (a variant of America's own illegal immigrant phenomenon, except that those affected are PRC citizens); the disparity in wealth between the coastal regions and China's interior provinces; the cumulative impact of quality education and health care disproportionally available to the Party, government, and urban elite; and widespread corruption (discussed below). In 2013, the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress noted the pressing need to attend to this problem, but failed to offer any concrete proposals for doing so.22**// //**Environmental Degradation and Food Safety: China's economic miracle has occurred in tandem with environmental catastrophe. Air and water quality, especially in China's major urban areas, is among the worst in the world. In 2012, China's Vice Minister of Environmental Protection, Wu Xiaoqing, stated that 40 percent of the country's rivers and 55 percent of its groundwater were unfit for drinking. Moreover, he noted that in rural China some 320 million people lack access to safe drinking water.23 The cost of such economic externalities came to roughly $230 billion in 2010, or about 3.5 percent of GDP.24 The scale of investment needed to adequately address known environmental threats is extraordinary. For example, between 2011 and 2020, the government plans to spend $850 billion in water-related projects alone.25 Food safety is also a major issue and an increasingly politicized one. It was only in the face of mounting public pressure that the Ministry of Environmental Protection admitted (in 2014) that the acreage of soil contamination (from heavy metals, pesticides, and other toxins) of China's farmlands had reached a record high of 20 percent.**// //**Political Decay: Most worrisome to China's leaders is the danger of losing their monopoly on political power. President Xi (like his predecessors) routinely calls official corruption a cancer that, if unattended, will destroy the Party. But by insisting on exclusive occupation of China's commanding political heights, the Party itself becomes more vulnerable to dysfunction, corruption, and political decay as the number of political, economic, and social contradictions multiply. China witnessed approximately 180,000 protests in 2010. Reflecting Party anxieties, the state spends large sums of money to ensure "stability maintenance." As recently as 2013, China's expenditures for internal security exceeded those for its armed forces.As recently as 2013, China's expenditures for internal security exceeded those for its armed forces.26**// //**Perhaps the Party leaders' greatest dilemma is that, while they understand the need to decentralize economic and resource allocation decision-making, they seem driven to pursue further political consolidation in hopes that political and economic power can somehow be disentangled. As a result, the development of an independent economic entrepreneurial spirit, the establishment of a more robust rule of law system, and the growth of civil society are all significantly retarded in China, even as pressure for change continues to mount.**// //**International Constraints on China's Rise**// //**PRC leaders also face daunting obstacles in the international arena. These include factors related to history and geopolitics, military potential, and ideological appeal.**// //**History and Geography: China shares land borders with 14 countries, three of which it has fought limited wars with during the past fifty years: Russia (as the Soviet Union), Vietnam, and India. A major land dispute with India remains unresolved, while China's historical influence in the Russian Far East dating back to the Qing Dynasty continues to cause unease in Moscow. China's expansive maritime claims in the East and South China Seas have not only stimulated increasingly fractious disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but have also led to disagreements with North Korea, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Pursuit of these claims has also excited responses in Washington because they involve two American treaty allies and potentially undermine the principle of freedom of navigation—a vital U.S. security interest.27**// //**Indeed, even as Party leaders seek to restore the prestige and influence of dynastic empires in centuries past, China's neighbors show no desire to return to a tributary political order. Moreover, China is not an ethnically monolithic state. Its populace includes restive non-Han Muslim citizens in its northwest Xinjiang Province who have ethnic kin in Central Asia, as well as a large and culturally distinct Tibetan population in its southwest. Additionally, the PRC lays claim to ade facto independent, democratic Taiwan that evinces little desire to unify with the mainland. Even the full assimilation of Hong Kong has proven both politically and socially challenging, as demonstrated by the continuing pro-democracy movement. The tightening and expansion of Chinese power is consistently contested both within its borders and in its immediate neighborhoods.**// //**Military Limitations: Despite extensive modernization over the past 25 years, the People's Liberation Army still lacks extended force projection or sustained blue water naval capabilities. China's military can bring impressive power to bear at particular points along its border and near coastal areas. It can also impose increasing costs on U.S. forces operating near its territory. However, the PLA lags far behind U.S. armed forces in terms of aggregate Asia-Pacific regional, and especially global, capabilities.**// //**Moreover, given the costly political, economic, and social challenges that China's leaders must address over the next two decades, it seems unlikely that the Chinese armed forces will continue to enjoy the double-digit annual budget increases that it has been provided since the mid-1990s. In addition, problems with corruption, a lack of leadership initiative thanks to an over-centralized command structure, and the still unproven ability of the PRC research and development establishment to produce equipment and systems that rival those of the United States and its key allies all cast doubt on the PLA's ability to become a world-class military power in the near- to mid-term.**// //**Absence of Allies and Partners: A state's power is measured by its own usable capabilities and those of its relevant allies and partners in various contingencies.Competent allies magnify a state's power, and here China is at a tremendous disadvantage when compared with the United States. Competent allies magnify a state's power, and here China is at a tremendous disadvantage when compared with the United States. China has only one treaty ally—North Korea—and is sharply at odds even with that regime, whose interests are not always in line which those of the PRC. The one cooperative security organization it nominally leads, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, but no one takes it seriously as a functional military alliance. More important, the current warming relations between Moscow and Beijing will likely cool once Beijing intensifies its efforts to establish a new China-dominated Silk Road through Central Asia, a move the Kremlin views as Chinese encroachment on a traditionally Russian sphere of influence. Meanwhile, after losing its sway over its former quasi-ally Myanmar, China's most reliable source of influence within ASEAN is a struggling Cambodia. And to date, the PLA has yet to establish any foreign military bases of consequence.**// //**The contrast with U.S. capabilities and assets could not be more striking. In the Asia-Pacific region alone, America has active military alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and special relationships with Singapore, New Zealand, and Taiwan. It has some 80,000 servicemen and servicewomen stationed throughout the region. It also leads the 28-member NATO Alliance, the most powerful military coalition in the world. While China can unilaterally apply concentrated pressure at specific locations on its periphery, the United States can call upon a worldwide network of friends and allies to flexibly deal with a wide variety of regional and global security challenges.**// //**Weak Ideational Appeal: China's global economic power is significant but its growth trajectory is slowing. Even if Beijing can buy influence with its cash reserves, its political model is not one that many states (never mind Hong Kong and Taiwan) aspire to adopt, sharply limiting China's "soft power" appeal. The United States ranks ahead of China around the world (except in the Middle East) in favorability ratings, and significantly so among those 18–29 years of age.28 The once and very temporarily vaunted Beijing Consensus, a system that marries market mechanisms to authoritarian political control, remains a mirage. The Communist Party might yet develop a form of governance that is universally attractive, but for now, China finds itself at a distinct disadvantage in the battle of political ideas.**// //**Cooperation is strong in several key areas despite disagreements on economic issues —- and OBOR, not AIIB could determine evaluation of Chinese policy**// //*OBOR = China's One Belt One Road policy// //Solis & Lieberthal, 15 —- Senior Fellow & Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies at Brookings, AND **Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings (9/30/15, Mireya & Kenneth, "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND CHINA'S RISE: HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN RESPOND?" http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2015/09/30-international-economic-governance-chinas-rise/20150930_china_economic_governance_transcript.pdf, article downloaded 6/12/16, JMP)**// //**MS. SOLÍS: So let me ask a very big picture question. We talked about whether China is a revisionist or reformist power; we talked about whether established powers are making sufficient room to accommodate the change in relative capabilities or not in established Bretton Woods institutions but also having an open mind about new institutions. And I think when people discuss this they want to know if ahead of us we have a period of growing a strategic rivalry or whether we think that there could be successful communication, successful engagement, and therefore, that we can find a way to collaborate in the management of the world economy.**// //**So what would be the markers to tell us where are we going? I know this is an extremely challenging question but I think it's probably in the back of everybody's minds here. We care about this because what this may mean for the quality of governance in the future but also for the quality of interaction along the major powers in the world.**// //**So where are we heading?**// //**MR. LIEBERTHAL: I'll take an initial stab (laughter).**// //**MS. SOLÍS: Wise choice.**// //**MR. LIEBERTHAL: Every time you comment, Mireya, now I have a much bigger question, your questions do indeed keep getting bigger but the first of those I thought was big enough at the start (laughter).**// //**If you look at the U.S. and China we seek now to cooperate as much as we can on major global issues. Those are especially in areas now like climate change, nuclear nonproliferation; we are developing more cooperation in counterterrorism, in military to military relations, we are moving that forward. So when you talk about what the nature of the relationships will be in the future the economic side is a part of that but many of these other issues determine the degree of trust in the long term intentions of another country. My sense is at this point – this doesn't fully deal with your question obviously, but as a starting point my sense is at this point that the U.S. and China are able to have considerable confidence in the agreements that they reach in a number of different areas. We understand each other pretty well. What we are very unclear about is long term intentions of the other country and so how much you can trust them strategically down the road.**// //**And I think that's a work in progress. There is no single item that is going to flip a switch on that shy of some huge escalatory event. Very likely this is going to be a matter of, as this whole conversation has suggested, we focused primarily on the central issues of this panel, is how do these institutions develop? How do we react over time? Do we build confidence or on balance are things going to move in a different direction.**// //**One last comment I'd make is that — I know this is somewhat outside the scope of this panel – I think one of the big issues that will affect thinking about China's revisionism or not is going to be the one belt one road effort and how that plays out. And I'm frankly of – I have more confidence in the AIIB than I do in the one belt one road.**// //**3**// //**IMF reform was recently approved by Congress —- helps integrate China into international economic system and revives U.S. leadership**// //**Frankel, 4/13/16 —- professor at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government (Jeffrey, "The Domestic Threat to US Leadership," https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-imf-reform-global-leadership-by-jeffrey-frankel-2016-04, article downloaded 6/5/16, JMP)**// //**CAMBRIDGE – US President Barack Obama has racked up a series of foreign-policy triumphs over the last 12 months. But one that has gained less attention than others was the passage last December of legislation to reform the International Monetary Fund, after five years of obstruction by the US Congress. As the IMF convenes in Washington, DC, for its annual spring meetings on April 15-17, we should pause to savor the importance of this achievement. After all, if the United States had let yet another year go by without ratifying the IMF quota reform, it would have essentially handed over the keys of global economic leadership to China.**// //**The IMF reform was crucial: The allocation of monetary contributions and voting power among member countries had to be updated to reflect the shifts in global economic power in recent decades. Specifically, emerging-market economies like Brazil, China, and India gained a larger role, primarily at the expense of European and Persian Gulf countries.**// //**Obama managed to persuade the leaders of the other G-20 countries to agree to the reform at a 2010 summit in Seoul. The deal's subsequent approval should have been a no-brainer for Congress, as it neither increased America's financial obligations nor took away its voting dominance. More important, the reform represented a golden opportunity for the US to demonstrate global leadership, by recognizing that the existing international order must accommodate changing economic-power dynamics.**// //**Instead, Congress attempted to block IMF reform, effectively denying China its rightful place at the table of global governance. "Moving the goal posts" could succeed only in driving the Chinese to establish their own institutions. In this sense, Congressional intransigence may have undermined America's position in its competition with China for global power and influence.**// //**To most Asians, the US is a more attractive regional hegemon than a China that has been aggressively pursuing territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. But recent US behavior has caused some Asian countries to begin to question America's commitment to supporting regional security and prosperity.**// //**Against this background, many countries, both inside and outside Asia, were happy to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which promised to meet some of the region's financing needs. The AIIB's establishment in December was widely viewed as a severe diplomatic setback for the US.**// //**Fortunately, thanks to Obama's recent string of successes in terms of global engagement, the US now has a chance to get back into the game. Last April, his administration oversaw a breakthrough agreement with Iran over its nuclear program. Moreover, in October, Congress was persuaded to give it Trade Promotion Authority, enabling the completion of the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). More recently, the US has reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba, ending a 55-year policy of isolation that succeeded only in giving Cuba's leaders an excuse for economic failure and handicapping America's relationships throughout Latin America.**// //**Finally, representatives of the 195 parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change reached an agreement in Paris last December to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, spurred in no small part by earlier action by Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The two leaders are scheduled to sign the Paris agreement on April 22 on behalf of their respective countries, the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Add to that the ratification, at long last, of IMF reform, and the US does seem to be on a global winning streak.**// //**None of these five achievements could have been predicted a year ago. With the Republicans having taken full control of the Congress in November 2014, the overwhelming conventional wisdom was that the administration would be blocked from accomplishing much in its final two years.**// //**Making matters worse, internationalism attracts opposition from the far left as well as the far right. Though trade is the most obvious example, it is not the only one. Beyond opposing the TPP, US presidential candidate Bernie Sanders has historically joined with congressional Republicans in trying to block efforts to rescue emerging-market countries in Latin America and Asia at times of financial crisis. These rescues are invariably called "bailouts," even when they cost the US nothing – the US Treasury actually made a profit on the 1995 loan to Mexico that Sanders opposed – and help sustain economic growth. Similarly, New York Senator Chuck Schumer joined the Republicans in trying to block the Iran nuclear agreement.**// //**Obama's recent international successes are not unassailable. Although the IMF deal is done, Obama's other key initiatives could still be derailed by US politics, especially if the political extremes unite. Congress could reject the TPP, in effect telling Asia it is on its own. It could undermine the emerging relationship with Cuba; after all, it has yet to repeal the embargo. As for the Paris agreement, a federal appeals court will first hear a challenge to the administration's implementation strategy, the Clean Power Plan, on June 2.**// //**The Republican presidential campaign adds another element of uncertainty. The two leading candidates for the party's nomination, Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, both say that they would tear up the Iran nuclear deal, if elected. It is worth recalling the outcome of President George W. Bush's analogous decision to tear up Bill Clinton's "framework agreement" with North Korea: the Kim regime promptly and predictably developed a nuclear bomb.**// //**Whether the US will continue to lead the world remains unclear. What is clear is that US politics, not global developments, will be the main determinant.**// //**Solves the case —- sends positive signal to China that improves relations and minimizes future diplomatic clashes**// //**Boston Globe, 3/26/15 (The Editorial Board, "US should integrate China into existing institutions," http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/03/26/should-integrate-china-into-existing-institutions/OhuJ0Oa4HGndoaxPdNOb6L/story.html, article downloaded on 6/4/16, JMP)**// //**When most of the nation's closest allies are deserting the United States on a matter of global economic importance, US politicians of both parties should listen to the underlying message.**// //**Earlier this month, the British government defied the United States and announced it will join a new international development bank created and led by China. Germany, France, and Italy followed within days. And as the initial enrollment deadline for the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank approaches at the end of the month, Australia and South Korea are poised to sign up as well. Without doubt, the new bank exemplifies China's efforts to elbow its way into a global financial system long dominated by the United States, and to convert its economic muscle into diplomatic strength around the world.**// //**But with its growing GDP and vast financial reserves, China is bound to claim a larger role in one way or another. The United States should seek to accommodate that shift in a productive way, by enmeshing the world's second-largest economy more deeply in multilateral bodies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank — three institutions over which the United States has long exercised outsize influence. Instead, Republicans in Congress have stalled even modest reforms that would give China and other major emerging economies more influence over the IMF.**// //**The new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to be headquartered in Shanghai, is plainly a rival to older global financial institutions. While the US-led institutions have made a show of tying aid to transparency and political reforms, China has gained a reputation globally for giving money to repressive governments without strings attached. The European powers joining Beijing's bank argue that they can best promote good governance for the institution by working inside it.**// //**Still, it's obvious that Britain, Germany, and others are eager to get into a rising power's good graces. The Obama administration lobbied US allies not to join, while passive-aggressively insisting that the United States is worried only about the new bank's governance and not about any potential blow to American prestige. In doing so, the administration unnecessarily turned the issue into a US-China diplomatic battle — which the United States has now lost.**// //**All multilateral deals — trade treaties, international development banks, security arrangements — require sacrifices from all parties. Yet the end of the Cold War encouraged Americans of all ideological stripes to believe, for a generation, that the United States can and should dictate the terms of international relations. For the GOP leadership, delaying reforms at the IMF is a convenient way to inflict more political pain on Obama. For the Tea Party right, insisting upon the American way of doing everything is a matter of conviction. But Washington's inability to settle even straightforward matters is undermining the nation's ability to exercise leadership in the world.**//

//**Making some room for China on the global scene wouldn't just be a magnanimous gesture by the United States. It will also help avoid future diplomatic fiascoes. The more China is integrated into existing institutions, the less the imperative to start its own.**//

//**2NR: elections, was conceded in 1ar**//  1 Diplomatic and economic engagement is the offer of positive inducements in exchange for specific concessions Hall, 14 - Senior Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University (Ian, The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, p. 3-4) This book explores the various modes of engagement employed in the Indian case, their uses, and their limits. It follows the growing consensus in the literature that defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to influence the behavior of states.8 It acknowledges that various, different engagement strategies can be utilized. In particular, as Miroslav Nincic argues, we can distinguish between "exchange" strategies and "catalytic" ones. With the first type of strategy, positive inducements are offered to try to "leverage" particular quid pro quos from the target state.9 An investment might be canvassed, a trade deal promised, or a weapons system provided in return for a specific concession. With the second type of strategy, inducements are offered merely to catalyze something bigger, perhaps even involving the wholesale transformation of a target society.10 In this kind of engagement, many different incentives might be laid out for many different constituencies, from educational opportunities for emerging leaders to new terms of trade for the economic elite. The objects of engagement can include changing specific policies of the target state or transforming the wider political, economic, or social order of a target society. Both of these objectives could be pursued with coercive strategies employing either compellence or deterrence—or indeed with a mixture of both engagement and coercion." But much recent research has argued that the evidence for the efficacy of both compellence and deterrence in changing target state policies is inconclusive.12 Both military and economic sanctions have been shown to have mixed results, and many scholars argue that coercion rarely works." By contrast, there is some considerable evidence that engagement strategies can both elicit discrete quid pro quos from states and generate wider political and social change within them that might in the medium to long term lead to changed behavior at home or in international relations.14 Moreover, it is clear that engagement is both more commonly utilized than often recognized by scholars of international relations and that it is generally considered more politically accepted to politicians and publics in both engaging states and in the states they seek to engage.15 Engagement strategies take different forms depending on their objectives. They can emphasize diplomacy, aiming at the improvement of formal, state-to- state contacts, and be led by professional diplomats, special envoys, or politicians. Alternatively, they can emphasize military ties, utilizing military-to- military dialogues, exchanges, and training to build trust, convey strategic intentions, or simply foster greater openness in the target state's defense establishment.16 They can be primarily economic in approach, using trade, investment, and technology transfer to engender change in the target society and perhaps to generate greater economic interdependence, constraining a target state's foreign policy choices.17 Finally, they can seek to create channels for people-to-people contact through state-driven public diplomacy, business forums and research networks, aid and development assistance, and so on. Violation – the plan is an unconditional offer – it happens regardless of whether China changes its behavior Voting issue – to protect limits and ground. The number of solvency advocates defending a QPQ is narrow, and an affirmative that can't defend a QPQ would lose to an unconditional counterplan. We create a functional limit on the topic – the alternative is "resolved: China" which is not debatable 2 Polls show Clinton will win the election now Benen 6/15 (Steve, MSNBC. "Latest polls show Clinton getting stronger, Trump falling." http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/latest-polls-show-clinton-getting-stronger-trump-falling) When Donald Trump wrapped up the Republicans' presidential nomination, 2016 polling showed him gaining on – and in some cases, even surpassing – Hillary Clinton. The combination of GOP consolidation and Democratic divisions meant a general election landscape that looked very close. The problem for Republicans is that this dynamic couldn't last. Consider the latest Bloomberg Politics poll released late yesterday. Democrat Hillary Clinton has opened up a double-digit lead nationally over Republican Donald Trump, whose negatives remain unusually high for a presidential candidate amid early indications that the Orlando terrorist attack has had little direct impact on the 2016 race. A new Bloomberg Politics national poll shows Clinton leading Trump 49 percent to 37 percent among likely voters in November's election, with 55 percent of those polled saying they could never vote for the real-estate developer and TV personality. Note, there are multiple factors unfolding at the same time. Clinton is starting to consolidate Democratic backing now that her party's primaries and caucuses are over; Clinton allies have begun hitting the airwaves with effective (and for now, unanswered) ads in battleground states; and Trump has faced intense scrutiny of late over his bigoted antics. The result is a 12-point lead for the former Secretary of State as the general election gets underway in earnest. (For context, it's worth noting that four years ago at this time, a Bloomberg Politics poll showed President Obama ahead by 13 points. In terms of the national popular vote, he ended up winning by 4 points.) Complicating matters, a new Washington Post/ABC News poll shows a whopping 70% of Americans now have an unfavorable opinion of Trump, while only 29% have a favorable view. Both are the worst numbers the Republican has seen this year. To be sure, Democrats shouldn't be too pleased – Clinton's 43% favorability rating is hardly impressive – but the party can take some comfort in the fact that Trump is the least popular major-party presidential candidate of the modern era. As for the demographic preferences, Clinton does the worst with white men (23% favorable/75% unfavorable). Trump, meanwhile, has managed to alienate minority communities to an extraordinary degree, faring worst among African Americans (4% favorable/94% unfavorable) and Hispanics (11% favorable/89% unfavorable). Engagement with China causes an electoral backlash – ensures the plan gets spun negatively Golan 15 (Shahar, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, "Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics", https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) In recent times China has become one of the most contentious issues regarding American foreign polic y. Out of all issues concerning East Asia, China generates the greatest political attention in the US; American politicians frequently use the China card in foreign policy debate, especially during campaigns. The rethink of the military bases will provide ammunition for critics of the administration who will try to spin the reform as soft on the PRC. In his book US - Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Robert Sutter, an acclaimed China expert, describes the political environment of the US regarding China policy as "an atmosphere of suspicion and cynicism in American domestic politics over China policy," setting the stage "for often bitter and debilitating fights in US domestic politics over China policy in ensuing years that on balance are seen not to serve the overall national interests of the United States" (Sutter, 2013, p.81). Sutter's observations show that electoral needs in the US often cause candidates to use harsher rhetoric and actions against the PRC than they believe are beneficial for the US. While many scholars have argued that administrations will ultimately favor pragmatic forward - moving relationships with the PRC, aspiring presidents have not been shy of criticism of the PRC leading up to presidential elections. This portrays how political maneuvering is needed to pursue policies that could be perceived as warm towards the PRC. Because of these domestic hurdles, US history has proven a pattern of presidents pursuing forward - moving, pragmatic relations with the PRC after a campaign of harsh rhetoric pointed at the Asian state. Ronald Reagan, who ended complicating arm sales to Taiwan in order to improve relations with the PRC, criticized Carter's handling of Taiwan, claiming that he was not friendly enough to the island (Sutter, p.80). Democrats have also utilized harsh rhetoric pointed at the PRC during campaigns only to change course after getting elected. In their article "The China Card: Playing Politics with Sino - American Relations" Peter Trubowitz and Jungkun Seo explained that once resuming office, after a campaign in which Bill Clinton took a harsh stance against China he "quickly reversed course, jettisoning his anti - China campaign rhetoric and devising a political formula to make it easier for Beijing to qualify for MFN approval by Congress. Later, Clinton took the lead in backing China's entry into the World Trade Organization by granting China permanent normal trade relations in 2000 " (Trubowitz & Seo, 2012, 210). In the most recent American presidential election the pattern seemed to persist. The Obama - Romney foreign policy debate at times seemed like a competition on who could orate fiercer rhetoric towards the PRC. Following the debate, writing for 'Foreign Affairs' the historian of American foreign policy David Miline argued in "Pragmatism or What?: the future of US foreign policy", that Romney and Obama held similar pragmatic foreign policy stances. Miline concludes that, After arguing that he [Mitt] had to use rhetoric that would appeal the Tea Party: Romney and Obama are in fact both results - oriented pragmatists whose similarities outweigh their differences. And this, of course, is a source of angst to the base of both parties. (Miline, 2012, p.936) He added that "if Romney does win the election in November, neo - conservatives are likely to find his administration as unwelcoming as Wilsonians have found Obama's" (Miline, p.949). This pattern of harsh rhetoric regarding US - China relations that is often contradictory to the interest of the US and not necessarily aligned with the candidates desired policy, seems certain to continue. Hence, although the rethink of the military bases is clearly in the US' national interest, future candidates might attempt to manipulate the rethink in order to utilize the China card. Once freed of political constraints, Sutter notes that American administrations from both sides of the political spectrum tend to pursue forward developments commonly viewing "domestic American influences ... as obstacles to the administration's objectives in fostering cooperative relations with China and broader international interests" (Shambaugh, p.104). In fact, to avoid the trouble of fighting domestic forces, Sutter also argues that "the president, his administration at times impose discipline, secrecy, or other means in order to carry out foreign policy while keeping domestic American influences at arm's length " ( Shambaugh, p.103). Sutter evaluates that unlike the executive branch, "the US Congress is much more open to and dependent on domestic American constituencies" (Shambaugh, p.103). Therefore, a more consistent fight against the reforms is likely to occur in both chambers of the legislative branch. Congress' dependence on American constituencies causes it to be much more responsive to the interests of certain lobbying groups and public opinion. For example, the 'pro-Taiwan' lobby always has a stake in policy regarding US - China relations for fairly obvious reasons; likewise, some interest groups will attempt to influence policy in regards to topics that are not necessarily visibly correlated to their issue of concern. Colin Dueck (2010) explains this phenomena in his book Hard Line: The Republican Party and US Foreign Policy since World War II by arguing that "electoral coalitions in the United States come together across a broad range of issue, many of which have nothing to do with international relations at all;" this analysis brings to light how the reforms could draw criticisms from a coalition of interest groups, some not directly related to security (p.301). As this section alluded to earlier, the most likely source of opposition to reform will come from the Taiwan lobby. Sutter, as well as many other experts, have claimed that Taiwan is "the most sensitive and complex issue regarding US - China relations", and while Taiwan manages to maintain support in the US due to Taiwan - interest lobby members of Congress, this complicates US policy towards the ROC (Sutter, p.138). In his Foreign Affairs article "Diplomacy Ink: the influence of lobbies on US foreign policy, " John Newhouse (2009) claims that "for years, the lobby that promoted Taiwanese interests, known simply as the China lobby, was the superpower of lobbies representing foreign causes in the United States" (p.90). The lobby, with its strong hold on Congress, has previously managed to complicate the US' pursuit of improved relations with the PRC. For example, the State Department legal adviser during Carter's administration, when commentating on the Taiwan Relations Act, said, "We were not as Taiwan - oriented as the Senate Foreign Relations committee" attributing that to "[a] lot of provisions that were cranked into the bill once it got there were... Taiwan - favoring positions." (Tucker, 2011, p.119). In more recent times, with the aid of the Taiwan lobby, "many in Congress and among the Republican presidential aspirants criticized President Obama's decision not to sell F - 16 Fighters despite strong requests from Taiwan's president" (Tucker, 2011, p.252). In its pursuit of cooler measures towards the PRC, the Taiwan lobby could find an ally in labor unions in the US. Labor unions that fight for workers' rights in the US see the 'world factory' — the PRC — as an adversary to their cause. Sutter notes this can be seen in "think tanks associated with organized labor in the United States [that] have tended to call for tougher policies against perceived unfair Chinese trade and economic policies " ( Shambaugh, p.122). A security deal that is set to improve US - China relations will be seen as a source of improvement in trade between the two states. Although they are not natural stakeholders on a debate about national security, labor unions are likely to lobby Congress against reforms alongside the Taiwan lobby. Another factor that one cannot dodge when debating American foreign policy or US - China relations in particular is political ideology. Dueck explains that electoral needs caused the Republican Party "by the time of the Korean War to become more hawkish than Democrats — a position they have never relinquished", and concludes that "today as before, a hawkish American nationalism forms the center of gravity of the Republican Party, especially in its conservative base, when it comes to foreign policy issues" (Dueck, p.307). Focusing specifically on the China debate, Peter Heyes Gries (2014) argues in his book "The Politics of American Foreign Policy: how ideology divides liberals and conservative over foreign affairs" that "Conservatives desire a tougher China Policy than liberals do... because on average they maintain much more negative attitudes towards communist countries in general and the Chinese government in particular" (n.p.). Meanwhile, when regarding the other political opposition, Gries infers that "the anti - China advocacy of Big Labor has likely counteracted the greater liberal warmth towards China within the Democratic Party" (n.p.). It becomes revealed that a clear divergence between general attitudes of Republican and Democrat voters when it comes to China, with the former preferring cooler relations. Therefore the rethink of the military bases is likely to be spun as soft on China, especially in conservative circles, and used to berate Democrats for caving to Chinese aggression. Finally, another constraint regarding the PRC is general American public opinion towards the East Asian country. Sutter explains that "American Public opinion remains more negative than positive regarding the policies and practices of China, but it is not in a position, as it was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, to prompt serious negative change in American China policy"( Shambaugh, p.117). While public opinion in the US regarding the PRC has soften since the early 1990's, the general distaste for Chinese actions lead politicians to pursue populist rhetoric at times in order to appease public sentiment. Sutter points that this can be seen in the media that "reflected trends in American public opinion in demonstrating a continuing tendency to highlight the negative implication of Chinese developments for American interests and values" (Shambaugh, p.118). While American public opinion, as Sutter points out, is not a position to strongly affect American actions towards the PRC, it could provide further motivation for politicians to use harsh rhetoric against the PRC. In sum, the greatest domestic constraint for the rethink of the military bases is going to be the debate regarding the PRC. Interests groups lobbying for better US — ROC relations and labor unions; politicians with conservative outlooks; Presidential hopefuls; and the American media and public opinion promise to create some roadblocks for the rethink of US military bases in the Pacific. The plan is unpopular —- over half of the public sees China's rise as a threat Westcott, 5/6/16 (Ben, "Half of Americans still see China's rise as threat, survey suggests; Majority also think US should be world's sole military superpower, according to poll," http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1941667/half-americans-still-see-chinas-rise-threat-survey, article downloaded 6/4/16, JMP) Half of Americans still believe China's emergence as a world power is a major threat to the United States, according to a new survey released by the Pew Research Centre on Friday. But Islamic State, refugees fleeing from Iraq and Syria and climate change were all ranked as more worrying in the survey, which polled more than 4,000 United States citizens. In the latest of a series of surveys published by Pew, attitudes towards China remain negative but stable as tensions in the South China Sea continue to pit the two superpowers against each other. "You're talking about people in a country that's used to being number one, that like to be number one and China's clearly challenging that number one position," said David Zweig, an expert on China and international relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. About 55 per cent of United States citizens interviewed in the survey said they wanted the United States to remain the sole military superpower in the world, including 67 per cent of Republican voters. In addition, almost a quarter of interviewees said they saw China as an adversary to the United States, the same number as Russia. Both numbers haven't changed much in recent years, according to Pew. Zweig said a quarter of Americans seeing China as an adversary wasn't unsurprising, but it could be a problem in the future. "It's a problem when people tend not to trust each other, when they see negatives even when there aren't necessarily negatives," he said. "I think that Chinese clearly believe America wants to contain China's rise ... and if you ask a lot of Americans they see China as a bully, as a threat." Zweig said that according to previous Pew surveys, attitudes to China in the United States had started to sour in 2012 following territorial tensions in the South China Sea and President Xi Jinping taking office. The Pew survey was conducted between April 4 and 19 this year. Fifty per cent of respondents said China's emergence as a world power was a major threat, 80 per cent cited Islamic State as a major fear and 55 per cent said they were threatened by the number of refugees leaving Syria and Iraq. GOP candidates will rhetorically weaponize the plan Harris 16 (Peter, Prof of political science @ Colorado State U, "President Obama's Partisan Foreign Policy," Jan 26, nationalinterest.org/feature/president-obamas-partisan-foreign-policy-15019?page=2) The political scientist V.O. Key once wrote that "latent" public opinion is the only type of public opinion that government officials truly care about. Politicians do not cater to audiences in the here and now, he suggested, but rather are focused on engineering positive endorsements of their policies among people in the future. Indeed, leaders are quite willing to tolerate poor approval ratings because there is always a hope—an expectation, even—that posterity will bring absolution. Given his standing in the polls, President Barack Obama can probably be counted among those politicians who have put their faith in vindication by future generations. But Obama will have to wait a long time before anything close to a unanimous verdict on his legacy can emerge—let alone a positive one. This is especially true in the realm of foreign affairs, where Obama's agenda has been thoroughly partisan and divisive—pleasing to Democrats but anathema to Republicans. When it comes to Obama's record on foreign policy, Republicans smell blood. Indeed, it has been a staple for the party's presidential hopefuls to accuse Obama of weakness on national security, with his failure to "defeat" the Islamic State, the resurgence of Russia as a bona fide power on the world stage, the nuclear deal with Iran—along with the attendant worsening of relations with Israel—and the looming rise of China being among the most common lines of attack. Earlier this month, the Republican presidential debate in South Carolina offered a window into how the party is using foreign policy to sully Obama and the Democrats. Riled up over the seizure of U.S. sailors by Iran two days prior, the assembled GOP contenders fell over themselves to castigate the president for allowing the country and members of its armed forces to be humiliated by a sworn adversary. Ted Cruz led the charge. "I give you my word," he declared, "[that] if I am elected president, no serviceman or servicewoman will be forced to be on their knees in any nation that captures our fighting men and women. We'll field the full force and fury of the United States of America." The detainees had already been released by the time this grandstanding took place. And the truth is that the sailors had only been held by Iran's forces because they had wrongly strayed into Iranian waters. More sober critics of President Obama were probably correct to avoid politicizing the issue; Nikki Haley, for example, wisely declined to invoke the crisis in her response to the president's State of the Union. Yet the overreaction of the GOP's presidential candidates showed just how eager they are during this electoral cycle to weaponize the perception that Obama is weak on national security. What mattered to them were not the facts—that this was, in sum, a very minor encounter and certainly not a military crisis—but rather the political potential to make foreign policy a winning issue for the Republican Party come November. Listening to the Republicans, one would be forgiven for thinking that Obama's entire foreign policy has been an unmitigated disaster from start to finish. The Middle East is in flames, and only carpet bombing and U.S. boots on the ground can save it; Vladimir Putin has become such a threat to U.S. interests that it is now worth shooting down his planes over Syria; and world leaders from Tehran to Beijing to Mexico City spend their days guffawing over American stupidity. But this is not how everybody in domestic politics views Obama's record on international issues, of course. On the contrary, loyal members of the president's electoral coalition have solid reasons to judge his tenure in the White House as an incredible success story. After all, what Republicans denounce as weakness—namely, Obama's reluctance to use U.S. military power abroad—is actually a major strength in the eyes of many Democrats. Obama secured the Democratic nomination and won the 2008 election partly on the back of his pledge to wind down the deeply unpopular war in Iraq. And if anything, the Democratic coalition seems to have grown more anti-war over the course of the Obama presidency, not less. Initially a proponent of ramping up the military effort in Afghanistan, for example, President Obama was encouraged early in his first term—not least of all by electoral concerns—to reduce the U.S. footprint in that country, as well as in Iraq. Especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden, Obama shifted his focus from defeating America's enemies in battle to ending a decade of warfare in the Middle East. The wisdom of retrenchment in Iraq and Afghanistan is open to debate, of course, given the worsening security situation in both countries. But the goal of extricating the United States from foreign wars remains in vogue among Democrats. So does avoiding future wars. Consider John Kerry's remarks in response to Iran's implementation of the controversial nuclear deal. "I think we have also proven once again why diplomacy has to always be our first choice, and war our last resort," he said. "And that is a very important lesson to reinforce. We have approached this challenge with the firm belief that exhausting diplomacy before choosing war is an imperative. And we believe that today marks the benefits of that choice." The implicit claim is that, under a different president, the United States could well have found itself embroiled in open warfare with Iran. But thanks to Obama's steady hand and strategic foresight, diplomacy has proven sufficient to meet the objectives of keeping America safe and maintaining security in the Persian Gulf. Diplomacy pays. Militarism does not. Diplomacy is also bearing fruit in Cuba, Obama's supporters might say. Tough talk, economic blockade and the assassination plots of yesteryear have done nothing to advance the U.S. goal of regime change in Havana. In stark contrast, Obama's approach brings new hope that the two countries can mend their bilateral relations and that, in time, the Cuban government will either reform or be replaced by its own people. Elsewhere, too, diplomacy appears to have paid dividends. Although it has a much lower profile in U.S. domestic politics than the attempted rapprochements with Iran and Cuba, for example, Obama's opening to Burma has seen that country edge towards democratization and an improvement of its human rights record (even if Obama's support for democratic reforms in other countries—Egypt and Bahrain spring to mind—has been mixed). On the environment—a central issue for many in the Democratic coalition—Obama can claim to have delivered the Paris Agreement on tackling climate change, a marked improvement on previous global compacts, as well as ensuring that China plays its part in curbing carbon emissions. He has done so in the teeth of bitter Republican opposition, of course, which makes his legacy on the environment particularly vulnerable to partisan disagreement. And then there is the question of American leadership of the global economy under the Obama administration. It is sometimes easy to forget just how fragile things were in January 2009 when Obama first took office, but it is surely a non-trivial achievement that, seven years later, an open world economy has survived relatively intact, with most major world powers having eschewed the sort of beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies that characterized the interwar period. It is clear, then, that the Obama foreign policy has given groups within the Democratic coalition plenty to be happy about: diplomatic solutions that have reduced reliance on militarism, the promise of improved relations with some longstanding adversaries and achievements in the realms of climate, human rights and trade. And indeed, Democrats are much more likely to rate Obama favorably as a world leader. The cost of these achievements has been to reject the militarist and macho brand of foreign policy that plays well with hawkish voters, the result being that Obama has little chance of being remembered as a strong commander-in-chief. He will have to live with his detractors' attempts to blame him for turmoil in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and elsewhere; his legacy will long be tarnished by accusations of weakness, appeasement and misplaced priorities. In his new book, The Obama Doctrine, Colin Dueck notes that President Obama achieved a very rare thing during the 2012 presidential election by turning foreign policy into a "winning issue" for the Democrats. An aggressive foreign policy of targeting terrorists that culminated in the death of bin Laden, a new start with some of America's former adversaries and a seemingly imminent end to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—all of these things made it hard for Mitt Romney to land punches on the sitting president when it came to foreign affairs. But this was a fleeting moment. Just four years later, foreign policy is back to being a highly politicized and utterly partisan issue. Worse still for Obama and his co-partisans, foreign policy an issue area that the Democrats are decidedly vulnerable over, especially given sustained Republican attacks on Hillary Clinton's record as Secretary of State. And so while Obama (like his predecessor before him) might well view posterity as some sort of coconspirator—a source of ultimate validation and vindication for foreign policies not appreciated in their time—his would-be successors in the Democratic Party can enjoy no such luxury. Future public opinion is the least of their worries. Trump victory risks extinction via climate change and global war Nisbet 16 (Matthew, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who studies the role of communication, media, and public opinion in debates over science, technology, and the environment, New Scientist, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," 5/27/16 http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf) Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just promised to "cancel the Paris climate agreement", end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back the "stupid" Obama administration regulations to cut power plant emissions. The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party's line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. "Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason," Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. "If 'crooked' Hillary Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me." Climate incoherence Yet a Trump presidency poses an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates who have doubted climate change. It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises, creating global turmoil that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue in the US and abroad. Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, Trump's incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress. In past comments, he has said he is "not a believer in man-made global warming", declaring that climate change is a "total hoax" and "bullshit", "created by and for the Chinese" to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump's candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults, spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice. He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them "thugs" and "criminals". His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further destabilisation. At home, Trump's promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to deport millions of immigrants will provoke widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, Trump's bravado and reckless unpredictability, his vow to renegotiate trade deals and to walk away from security alliances will generate deep tensions with China, Russia and Europe, risking financial collapse and military conflict. In the midst of such dysfunction and upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the historic climate change pact agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher. 3 The United States should: Not oppose China's organizational initiatives or try to block other countries from participating in them Ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership In coordination with Japan, expand the voting power of China and other emerging powers, without conditions, in regional and global financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and seek a new capital increase for the ADB. CP boosts U.S. strategic influence globally and ensures the AIIB doesn't eclipse existing international financial institutions and spur a new network of regional development banks Morris, 15 —- senior fellow at the Center for Global Development and director of the Rethinking US Development Policy initiative (3/20/15, Scott, "No, the US Will Not Join the AIIB – But Here's One Thing It Can Do," http://www.cgdev.org/blog/no-us-will-not-join-aiib-–-here's-one-thing-it-can-do, article downloaded 6/6/15, JMP) The backlash to the discordant US position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) this week was swift and seemingly universal. So much so that I can't find any voices defending the US view to link to here. Fair enough. As I've already argued (here and here), the criticism is deserved. But I part ways with one emerging narrative about how the US can get back on track. I don't agree that the US should join the very institution that it has so strongly called on others to avoid. Even if the will were there from the Obama administration (and it is decidedly not), the path to membership would be nearly impossible. President Obama couldn't sign the United States up for AIIB membership for the same reason he can't offer US approval for the IMF reform package (something he does want). Namely, the US Congress. Capitol Hill would need to authorize and pay for US participation in the new institution. That will not happen. Earlier this week Treasury Secretary Jack Lew reiterated the Administration's urging for IMF reform in Congressional testimony (play video from 19.17 – 23.38). Yet a better and more feasible option is already at hand. There's a higher likelihood that the Obama administration could work with Congress on a set of measures to increase the attractiveness of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank in the eyes of the very countries that are now looking fondly toward the AIIB. The US objective at this point will be to ensure that the AIIB does not grow quickly to eclipse the existing international financial institutions (IFIs), or that the AIIB does not otherwise become the launching point for an alternative network of regional development banks, all of them excluding the United States. The best way to do that is to realize more of the pent up ambition for the new institutions through the existing ones. That means one thing: money. The United States, and particularly the US Congress, can't expect to "lead" in institutions like the World Bank if it isn't willing to pony up more resources. This means demonstrating a newfound ambition when it comes to more capital for the World Bank and the regional development banks in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Much of the US talk in these banks in recent years is around doing more with less, leveraging more, and relying more on private money. In the meantime, many of the World Bank's leading shareholders (China, the UK, France, Germany) are now demonstrating that they are perfectly willing to put more of their public resources through multilateral channels. The United States can demonstrate renewed leadership by channeling some of this ambition from other countries into the existing IFIs. Why not announce support for a doubling of World Bank capital? That may sound prohibitively expensive, but the budgetary implications are actually very modest, representing about one percent of the annual US foreign assistance budget. Is that too costly an investment to shore up US strategic influence globally at a time when it appears to be in peril? The counterplan is necessary to reverse fragmentation from China lead initiatives —- impact is diminished U.S. leadership and U.S. backed institutions and declining regional stability and global governance. Frost, 14 —- Senior Advisor at the East-West Center's Washington, D.C., office and a Visiting Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (December, Ellen L, "Rival Regionalisms and Regional Order: A Slow Crisis of Legitimacy," http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/free/021115/SR48.pdf, article downloaded 6/5/16, JMP) Conclusions: Restoring Legitimacy and Direction to Asia's Regional Institutions The world is not yet witnessing "the end of a stable Pacific," to quote Robert Kaplan's dramatic prediction.53 No matter how their structure is designed or how many economies they encompass, regional institutions that exclude the United States will not replace U.S. power as a key organizing force. No other government can bring such massive resources to the table. The real problem is not U.S. weakness, but a slow crisis of legitimacy that diminishes the perceived value of both U.S. leadership and U.S.-backed institutions. The erosion of regional order in Asia threatens both the future stability of the region and global governance. Both China and the United States attach great value to regional stability, but they are on different paths. The trend toward fragmentation and rival regionalisms calls for overcoming organizational "stovepipes" and launching serious strategic thinking and action on the part of the president and his White House aides, leading policymakers in executive branch departments and agencies, and congressional leaders. Unfortunately, top foreign policymakers in Washington are currently hobbled by budgetary constraints and congressional roadblocks and distracted by crises in the Middle East, Ukraine, and West Africa (Ebola). Except for China, Asia is on hold. In addition, domestic political action during much of 2015 and 2016 will be consumed by the November 2016 presidential election. Asian friends of the United States know that these swings in the United States' reputation and leadership come and go. (Recall, for example, the hand-wringing accompanying Japan's economic rise in the 1980s.) They are right, but steps should be taken now to stem the emerging fragmentation of regional and global order and put U.S. influence on sounder footing. The Obama administration has made some important moves, and President Obama's personal interest in Southeast Asia and willingness to travel there have helped re-establish the United States as an active and constructive player. But that is not enough. Stalled trade legislation, sluggish growth in most Western economies, China's mixed behavior in the region, U.S. political dysfunction, and the difficulty of winding down U.S. military engagement in the Middle East call for U.S. action on several fronts. Revive and Reform Global Institutions While Making Way for New Ones There are legitimate reasons why rival regionalisms have emerged. It is both ridiculous and shameful that developing countries remain underrepresented in existing regional and global institutions such as the IMF and the ADB. The major powers governing such institutions should adopt institutional arrangements that rectify this imbalance and adopt voting reforms without conditions. The White House should make the case for reforming both the IMF and the ADB along these lines in broad strategic terms. The resurgence of China's political and economic influence in Asia is a fact of life. The United States should not automatically oppose China's effort to create new organizations, particularly the AIIB. Nor should it try to persuade like-minded allies and partners to stay on the sidelines. They have their own concerns that are similar to Washington's. Instead, U.S. officials should continue to ask questions about governance and adopt a wait-and-see approach. In the case of the AIIB, for instance, it is appropriate to question whether the AIIB will conduct high-quality project evaluation, practice open procurement, take into account environmental and social concerns, recruit staff on the basis of merit, submit to thorough auditing, adopt safeguards against corruption and fraud, and adhere to transparent policies and procedures.54 Act Like a Leader Domestic political dysfunction inflicts a high cost on U.S. foreign policy and national security. The failure thus far to ratify UNCLOS strikes other countries as senseless and hypocritical, especially since the U.S. Navy claims to observe it. Likewise, inaction on IMF reform has contributed directly to the emergence of rival regionalisms. The absence of trade promotion authority damages not only the credibility of U.S. negotiators in the TPP negotiations but also U.S. leadership more generally. Top-level administration officials must appeal to a broader congressional audience by going beyond issue-specific, conventional arguments and instead making the case for ratification of UNCLOS and the TPP and passage of TPA on broad strategic grounds. Executive branch officials, especially the president, must also do a better job of explaining what the rebalancing strategy means and why allocating more budgetary resources and nonmilitary personnel to the Asia-Pacific makes sense, even at a time when parts of the Middle East are again in flames. Asian leaders will only believe in the U.S. rebalancing strategy when they see it in action. But resources remain limited, and the policy toolbox is still heavily weighted toward military hardware and joint military exercises. American men and women in uniform vastly outnumber civilian officials. One goal of the rebalancing strategy is to reduce this huge gap and bolster the United States' political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic presence. The administration must fight more actively and at a higher level to obtain congressional approval for the necessary resources—and resist calls to divert them to the Middle East. Only the president can decide on such trade-offs. The United States may not be able or willing to fund major physical infrastructure projects comparable to those funded by China and, presumably, by the new AIIB, but it can do more to build up Asia's soft infrastructure. One example is expanded English-language instruction, which would have a direct economic effect in poorer ASEAN countries. Although more people are learning Mandarin, English is still the language of not only international business but also science and technology. Further expansion of visiting fellowships for students and young professionals is another relatively low-cost way of restoring the United States' image as a generous leader. Good will is a strategic asset. Reinvigorate APEC's Vision The United States should take advantage of upcoming and future APEC summits to restore APEC's role as an "incubator of big ideas."55 Following former president Clinton's example, the U.S. president and his or her top lieutenants should recommit the United States to an FTAAP and express appreciation for China's support of this initiative. He or she should explain to American audiences why this goal makes sense and where the TPP fits in this vision. Corresponding measures to improve employment prospects at home should be a core part of this strategy. U.S. officials should not appear to be blocking China's effort to promote an FTAAP, because doing so feeds Chinese perceptions that the United States wants to contain China. They are correct, however, that near-term conclusion of the TPP should take priority. At the 2014 APEC heads-of-state meeting in Beijing, the United States warded off a "feasibility study" of the FTAAP, which would formally set the FTAAP in motion, and accepted the establishment of a "strategic study" as a face-saving concession to Beijing. Carrying out the study group's mandate will be a low-profile, time-consuming job for trade experts. More months will pass as APEC member governments study the results and discuss them with affected interest groups. Top-level leaders will not be involved for at least several years. Build on Shared Strategic Interests and Continue to Contribute to Public Goods The postwar history of U.S.-led regional institutions underscores the importance of shared strategic purpose. During the Cold War, opposition to the spread of Communism was the glue holding U.S.-led regional institutions together; when top-priority strategies diverged, the organizations lost their unifying purpose. In today's Asia, all governments see constructive, mutually beneficial U.S.-China relations as a necessary foundation of stability and growth. But beyond those basics, strategic interests differ. U.S. leadership is most effective when Washington avoids dueling with China or imposing a grand strategy on the governments of the region and instead assigns equipment and personnel to noncontroversial, relatively nonpolitical areas such as health and maritime safety. Progress in these fields is as important to the United States as to Asia and should be pursued even if allies and partners engage in "free riding" (which most of them probably will). Beijing gets credit from other governments for not telling them what they should do, but the flip side of that stance is that no one knows what China's ultimate goals in the region are. What goes on in regional institutions, new or old, conforms to this pattern. There are strong reasons to believe that China seeks to establish itself as the dominant power in Asia while diminishing the role of the United States as an external balancer. But how and toward what end does it hope to achieve this outcome? How far will the United States go to accommodate a stronger China? The answers to these questions will have enormous bearing on the norms, composition, tasks, and future achievements of regional institutions. CP helps preserve the Bretton Woods system and improves China's role in the existing international order Harris, 15 —- Economy, Trade, and Business Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (last modified on 8/7/2015, Tobias, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, "The U.S. Response to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIB-Report_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP) Finally, the United States and its allies should take seriously China's complaint that its role in international financial institutions is incommensurate with its wealth. The United States cannot be surprised that China, India and other emerging economies want to create new institutions, when the incumbent institutions have not shifted to reflect the new global distribution of wealth. If the United States wants China to be a responsible stakeholder within the existing order and not create new institutions, it has to give China an appropriate stake in the existing order. While the domestic and international politics of reallocating shares in international financial institutions are complicated, if the United States wants the Bretton Woods system to endure, it has to exert political capital to ensure that the system evolves with the global economy. 4 Pivot marks transition to containment strategy Krepinevich, PhD Harvard, 15 (Andrew F, currently serves as President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china March/April) In the U.S. military, at least, the "pivot" to Asia has begun. By 2020, the navy and the air force plan to base 60 percent of their forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Pentagon, meanwhile, is investing a growing share of its shrinking resources in new long-range bombers and nuclear-powered submarines designed to operate in high-threat environments. These changes are clearly meant to check an increasingly assertive China. And with good reason: Beijing's expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as "the first island chain," encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt Washington's ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism, Washington's goal, and that of its allies and partners, should be to achieve deterrence through denial—to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force. The CP solves China's rise —- reverses perception of containment Harris, 15 —- Economy, Trade, and Business Fellow at Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA (last modified on 8/7/2015, Tobias, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, "The U.S. Response to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIB-Report_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP) U.S. officials have, for years, called upon China to act as a "responsible stakeholder,"8 a country that, in then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's words, "[recognizes] that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system." However, the United States has not been as sensitive when it comes to multilateral political and economic institution building. Instead, Washington has, at times, seemed content to permit the emergence of "rival regionalisms."9 Rather than welcome a greater Chinese role in regional institutions, challenging Beijing to act as a responsible stakeholder, the United States has seemed, at best, resigned and, at worst, hostile to China's efforts to create its own institutions outside the existing regional architecture. While China has its own reasons for wanting to build new regional institutions, Washington has failed to use multilateral organizations as a means to give China a greater stake in the existing order and to counter the argument that the United States seeks to contain or otherwise limit China's power in Asia. Joining the AIIB is containment read their ev, everything they do is to alter Chinese influence and contain their rise peacefully Primacy based approaches to China's rise fail – results in US-China war Glaser, 15 – John, B.A. in Political Science from the University of Massachusetts Amherst, media relations manager for Cato ("The US and China can avoid a collision course – if the US gives up its empire," The Guardian, 5/28/15, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/28/conflict-us-china-not-inevitable-empire 15 Bergsten (2015) calls for the U.S. to reverse course and join AIIB with a minority share. Lipscy (2015) also argues that the United States should prefer a world in which China seeks to establish its influence and international prestige by building multilateral development banks rather than one in which it seeks to do so by building military capabilities. But, it is not clear if the U.S. endorsement of AIIB will limit China's aggressive behavior, for example, in the South China Sea. At any rate, it remains highly unlikely that the United States will join AIIB for the time being, given the politics of approving funds for subscription shares for the bank as well as views of China in Congress, which has yet to approve IMF reforms that would give China a larger voice in that institution. Relations resilient —- they empirically endure crises Chen, 16 —- Director of the US Center of the China Foundation for International Studies (1/12/16, Yonglong, "Head Tides Won't Set Back Sino-U.S. Ties," http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/head-tides-wont-set-back-sino-u-s-ties/, article downloaded 6/6/16, JMP) In their respective reviews of Sino-US relations at the end of the year, various institutions, governments, think tanks, mass media and individual observers, particularly in China and the United States, have divergent judgments about the state of those relations based on different intentions, perspectives and criteria. Among those sometimes conflicting observations, however, there is also one underlying consensus: Despite all the contradictions, entanglements and escalation in tensions, the great ship of Sino-US relations has always managed to plow through the waves. Nowadays, more and more people are concerned about the China-US relationship, and to greater extents. With the exception of an extremely small number of countries, the boundary line between pro- and anti-China camps is getting increasingly blurred. The birth of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was a typical case in point. It was expected that many developing countries would participate actively. But the US might have never anticipated that its traditional allies Britain, France, Germany, Australia and South Korea would become the first founding members of the AIIB, and that it could have failed to prevent those countries from taking part in a China-initiated public goods program for their own benefits. Their participation in the AIIB doesn't mean they now shun America; they remain, for example, key members of such traditional institutions as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. It only means that they no longer endorse the clear China-or-US demarcation as in the past. They can't afford to just listen to the US only on Sino-US relations, not to mention that US stance regarding the AIIB has been widely criticized at home. The warming up of China-Britain, China-France, and China-Germany ties after President Xi Jinping's US visit was telling proof. Those countries care about the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. But they also have shown great interest in the "One Belt, One Road" initiative China has proposed. Sure, the TPP is a magnificent trade mechanism some countries have conceived in the name of further promoting free trade, which may present benchmark criteria for future world trade. Any country aspiring to join the club must first satisfy those criteria. The TPP is obviously more political, less inclusive. The "One Belt, One Road" initiative is quite different: Starting with infrastructure construction, China and stake-holding countries are supposed to undertake projects they plan, build and share together. It conforms to the national conditions and needs of all participating countries, is pragmatic and inclusive, and makes it easier for host countries to see the practical benefits of the projects, and for other participants to receive moral and economic returns. Debate on Sino-US relations is expected to continue. But a new type of state-to-state relationship has to be built. By and large, there have been three main ideas in the extensive debate over Sino-US ties since the beginning of 2015: One holds that post-Nixon US China policies have failed completely, and China is becoming, or has already become, a rivalry, and a strategic one, to the US. Typical statements include that China and the US are in a "time of mutual distrust", and that the US needs to revise its grand China strategy, featuring the belief that China is challenging American global leadership, and the US must take tougher containment policies. The second proposes to maintain the policy of engagement, competition, regulation and cooperation, seek to establish security and economic cooperation mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific, and to not let the South China Sea issue become a flashpoint for a Sino-US "new cold war" or confrontation. The third advocates all-round cooperation, stating that both China and the US should have sufficient strategic patience, and seek points of cooperation based on common interests. The first point of view is evidently extremist, but very influential and misleading. The second reflects majority opinion in the US, while the third sounds more or less idealistic. Though there has yet to be a similar major debate in China, and cooperation remains the main theme regarding Sino-US ties, radical opinions such as claims of Sino-US mutual suspicion, US containment of China, and the assumption that a war is inevitable between China and the US, have also been heard from time to time. Leaders of both China and the US have taken the challenges to lead public opinion, create and take advantage of opportunities, explore ways for building a new type of major-country relationship, and sail against the current. After conclusion of the agreement on the Iran nuclear issue, President Obama called President Xi and praised China's constructive role throughout the process. Before and after countries reached an agreement at the Paris climate summit, Obama called Xi, giving full credit to US-China leadership in facilitating the agreement. Xi's US visit was fruitful in that it guaranteed the correct direction of building a new-type Sino-US major-country relationship; Obama also told Xi that he would leave a stable US-China relationship to the next administration. Bit by bit, both governments have been accumulating mutual confidence through practical moves and projects of collaboration. A consensus is taking shape among celebrities, ordinary citizens, leaders and strategists in both countries that in spite of all the changes in global and international conditions, China and the US should not change their course of engagement and cooperation. In the current age of globalization and interconnection, with global and regional challenges like wars, terrorist attacks, natural disasters and slow economic recovery emerging and increasing all the time, no country can stay immune and cope with the threats single-handedly. There is little dispute that few global challenges can be handled properly without the joint participation and effective cooperation of China and the US. From the global perspective, historic changes are taking place in the connotations of relations between rising and incumbent powers. People from China, the US and the rest of the world share the hope that the two countries adapt to each other, leave room for each other, manage and control their disagreements, and work harder to seek collaboration. That is the only way for China, the US, and the rest of the world to see a promising future. Are China and the US ready? Instead of forming a "group of two", China and the US share the responsibility to pursue the common goal of building a global community of shared destiny. Obama softening U.S. stance to AIIB —- co-financing will reverse perception of containment and resolve diplomatic debacle Talley, 15 (3/22/15, Wall Street Journal (Online), "U.S. Looks to Work With China-Led Infrastructure Fund; Obama administration proposes co-financing projects with new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Proquest database, JMP) WASHINGTON—The Obama administration, facing defiance by allies that have signed up to support a new Chinese-led infrastructure fund, is proposing that the bank work in a partnership with Washington-backed development institutions, such as the World Bank. The collaborative approach is designed to steer the new bank toward economic aims of the world's leading economies and away from becoming an instrument of Beijing's foreign policy. The bank's potential to promote new alliances and sidestep existing institutions has been one of the Obama administration's chief concerns as key allies including the U.K., Germany and France lined up in recent days to become founding members of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The Obama administration wants to use existing development banks to co-finance projects with Beijing's new organization. Indirect support would help the U.S. address another long-standing goal: ensuring the new institution's standards are designed to prevent unhealthy debt buildups, human-rights abuses and environmental risks. U.S. support could also pave the way for American companies to bid on the new bank's projects. "The U.S. would welcome new multilateral institutions that strengthen the international financial architecture," said Nathan Sheets, U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs. "Co-financing projects with existing institutions like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank will help ensure that high quality, time-tested standards are maintained." Mr. Sheets argues that co-financed projects would ensure the bank complements rather than competes with existing institutions. If the new bank were to adopt the same governance and operational standards, he said, it could both bolster the international financial system and help meet major infrastructure-investment gaps. No decision has been made by the new Chinese-led bank about whether it will partner with existing multilateral development banks, as the facility is still being formed, though co-financing is unlikely to face opposition from U.S. allies. Zhu Haiquan, a spokesman at China's embassy in Washington, said Beijing is open to collaboration with the existing institutions and that the new bank "is built in the spirit of openness and inclusiveness and will follow high standards. "It will effectively cooperate with and complement the existing multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to provide investment and financing for the infrastructure building in Asia," he said. World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said through a spokesman that he and his lieutenants are already in "deep discussions" with the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank "on how we can closely work together." The U.S. suffered a diplomatic embarrassment last week after several of its key European allies publicly rebuffed Washington's pleas to snub Beijing's invitations to join the bank and instead said they would be founding members. Backing the new bank through co-financing could also help the U.S. move past the diplomatic mess, reunite with its trans-Atlantic allies on this issue and counter any perceptions that the U.S. is wholly opposed to the institution as part of a China-containment strategy. "Our concern has always been...will it adhere to the kinds of high standards that the international financial institutions have developed?" U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew told U.S. lawmakers last week. Co-financing, combined with European membership, "will make it more likely this institution largely conforms to the international standards," said Matthew Goodman, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies adviser and former economics director at the U.S. National Security Council. The World Bank, forged out of World War II, remains the leading international development institution with 188 nations as members. But others have emerged amid concerns about drawing more investment and attention to fast-growing regions. Those include the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, European Investment Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The banks' loans are designed to foster infrastructure and development projects that are often high-risk and long-term, helping to lower the costs for governments that couldn't afford borrowing from the private sector. For the most powerful lending countries, they cultivate regional growth prospects and can provide a political tool for influencing smaller countries. Beijing has struggled to increase its influence within the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the world's emergency lender, the International Monetary Fund. But as the founder and one of the new bank's largest shareholders, it will have the greatest say in which projects to pick. Infrastructure needs around the world are enormous. Emerging countries need new ports, railways, bridges, airports and roads to support faster growth. Developed economies, meanwhile, must replace aging infrastructure. The Asian Development Bank estimates its region alone faces an annual financing shortfall of $800 billion a year. The consulting firm McKinsey & Company estimates global infrastructure-investment needs through 2030 total $57 trillion. By comparison, the Asian Development Bank has just $160 billion in capital and the World Bank-which has co-financed with other regional institutions for years—has around $500 billion. The China-led bank plans to have a $50 billion fund to start. "We have every intention of sharing knowledge and co-investing in projects throughout Asia," said Mr. Kim, who was picked by President Barack Obama in 2012 as the U.S. nominee to lead the World Bank. "From the perspective simply of the need for more infrastructure spending, there's no doubt that we welcome the entry of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Mr. Kim said. U.S. adopting gradual openness towards the AIIB —- solves relations and bank will have high standards Panda, 9/28/15 —- editor at The Diplomat (Ankit, "Have the US and China Come to an Understanding on the AIIB? The United States and China have come to a working understanding on the role of the AIIB. Washington can move on now," http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/have-the-us-and-china-come-to-an-understanding-on-the-aiib/, article downloaded 4/24/16, JMP) Has Washington made its peace with China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) at last? An official fact sheet on U.S.-China economic relations, issued after Chinese President Xi Jinping's meetings with U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House notes that "the United States welcomes China's growing contributions to financing development and infrastructure in Asia and beyond." The introduction to the fact sheet also noted that the "international financial architecture has evolved over time to meet the changing scale, scope, and diversity of challenges and to include new institutions as they incorporate its core principles of high standards and good governance." Though the AIIB wasn't mentioned explicitly in the statement, the introductory language suggests that Washington is easing its tone on the new China-led financial institution which launched earlier this year with a founding membership comprising over 50 countries, including several Western European states and U.S. partners and allies. The fact sheet notes that both countries "resolve to further strengthen the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank by enhancing their financial capacity, reforming their governance, and improving their effectiveness and efficiency." The AIIB is notably excluded from this list. The Financial Times reported on the shifting U.S. position on the AIIB in the wake of Xi's visit as well, noting that the U.S. officials had "declared what amounts to a truce in their campaign over China's new Asian infrastructure bank." Per the FT's report, U.S. officials have noted that Xi gave his assurances that the AIIB would "abide by the highest international environmental and governance standards." U.S. officials cited concerns about the AIIB's governance standards as one of their primary concerns when its allies started joining the institution. When the UK joined, for example, the White House issued a statement noting that "We hope and expect that the UK will use its voice to push for adoption of high standards." The AIIB his its deadline for prospective founding members on March 31, 2015. A framework agreement for the bank's operations was signed on June 29, bringing some much-needed clarity on how the AIIB would manage capital and voting rights. The bank launched with 57 countries, comprising a quarter of the world's nations and 16 of the world's 20 largest economies. The United States, along with Japan, represent two notable economies that chose not to join the AIIB. The AIIB's appealing doesn't appear to be waning anytime soon too. Up to 20 countries are still waiting for their opportunity to join the AIIB, demonstrating that the institution's appeal is far from having achieved global saturation with its inaugural founding members. That Washington is coming around to the AIIB and softening its position on the institution is a good thing. With a bevy of pressing challenges in the U.S.-China relations, including cyber espionage, freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas, and growing military competition, the United States is better off expending less diplomatic capital on opposition to institutions like the AIIB–which could ultimately serve as a net positive for a region where infrastructure financing is very much needed–and focusing its efforts on other issues. If you're looking for a more general look at the outcomes of Xi's state visit, Shannon Tiezzi has a helpful compilation of the other issues discussed here. 2 AIIB won't produce strategic rivalry, regardless of US membership – narrow goals, uncertainty, external actors – and competition is net-positive for global coop. Chen, 15 (Dingding, an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany, "AIIB: Not a US Loss, Not a Chinese Win," http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/aiib-not-a-us-loss-not-a-chinese-win/, CMR) Too much ink has been spilled over China's seeming success in wooing away the United States' traditional allies to the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Many analysts (here, here, and here) see it as a 'China winning, U.S. losing' story, thereby implicitly highlighting the confrontational nature of Sino-U.S. relations. Such a view is not only too simplistic, but also dangerous for moving Sino-U.S. relations forward. While to some degree it is true that China has scored a political victory by successfully attracting some of America's traditional allies to the AIIB, there are three things we need to consider before we bandwagon with the cliché that China is rising while the U.S. is declining. The first thing to bear in mind is that the AIIB is an economic institution that may or may not carry strategic implications. While many might be tempted to view China's AIIB move as a direct threat to the U.S.-led global financial order, in reality the AIIB's goals are much more limited. It is very important for the U.S. not to view the AIIB as a new signal of strategic rivalry between China and the U.S.; such a distorted view would assign unnecessary strategic significance to the AIIB which is in reality is first and foremost about development. It is about funding more roads, railroads, airports, and pipelines for many developing countries in Asia. If the U.S. becomes hypersensitive to China's every effort in global governance, then it is possible that the U.S. might reach the wrong conclusion that China indeed is trying to overthrow U.S. hegemony and start taking countermeasures to curb China's rising influence. That would be a tragedy. In actuality, China cannot and will not challenge U.S. hegemony. Another thing that is worth remembering, as many have already pointed out, is that the AIIB's future is still uncertain. For one thing, it is the first time that Beijing has tried running a multilateral economic institution. Some internal challenges will not be fixed easily, and some external challenges are even harder to overcome. It is not clear how democratic and transparent the decision-making structure will be within the AIIB, especially now that many major economies like Germany and the U.K. have decided to join the bank. What is more likely is that Beijing's preferences will be constrained by such major players, which is not necessarily a bad thing. The reason is that these more experienced players can help Beijing make better decisions when allocating funds and thus ultimately improve the quality and reputation of the AIIB in the future. More importantly, a more democratic structure in the AIIB will reduce the suspicions and worries of smaller Asian countries that are already wary of China's future intentions. By delegating more power to other players, Beijing can send a strong and reassuring signal to countries like Vietnam and the Philippines thereby moderating tensions between these countries, stemming from maritime territorial disputes. Beijing must make a serious effort to show that the AIIB is not just another weapon to help China dominate Southeast Asia. Failing to do so would jeopardize not only the AIIB's goals but also China's project of a peaceful rise. Finally, it is misleading to claim that the U.S. is a loser in the AIIB project. While it was unwise for the U.S. to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB earlier, it would be equally unwise to underestimate the potential influence of the U.S. on the AIIB and development in Asia in general. Whether or not the U.S. eventually joins the AIIB remains to be seen. If the U.S. does join the AIIB, then we could very well see a different structure for the bank. Even if the U.S. chooses to stay outside of the AIIB in the future, competition between AIIB and the U.S.-led world bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) will ensure that American standards and will continue to dominate the global financial order in the foreseeable future. Needless to say, the China-led AIIB poses some challenges to U.S. influence in Asia. It is imperative for leaders from both China and the United States to avoid falling into a confrontational trap. Healthy competition between different global financial institutions is good for Asia and the world as a whole. To that end, analysts should stop the "China vs. the U.S." hype and pay more attention to how the quality of the AIIB as an institution can be improved. READ THIS No China rise impact – numerous checks on aggression. Eikenberry, 15 (Karl W, retired United States Army lieutenant general who served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from April 2009 to July 2011, "China's Place in U.S. Foreign Policy," www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/09/chinas-place-in-u-s-foreign-policy/, CMR) For all its ambition, China's strategic options are not unlimited. Indeed, its foreign policy choices are severely constrained both by formidable domestic problems and by unfavorable international factors that the United States would be wise to consider when formulating its response to China's increasing influence. Internally, Beijing's leaders face an interwoven array of daunting social, environmental, economic, and political problems that, left unresolved, will limit the state's ability to generate national power and could even threaten the Communist Party's monopolistic grip on political and societal control. A brief look at five of these issues makes clear the severity of the situation. Economic Restructuring: Some 100,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for about half of China's economic assets. Despite 15 years of reform efforts, only half of the SOEs have been corporatized, and their return on assets is not significantly different from those of the traditional SOEs. Overall, SOE financial performance has deteriorated significantly since 2008, becoming a major drag on economic growth. This drag serves as a source of serious political opposition to enterprise reform, thereby limiting the national leadership's effort to focus on strategic sectors such as aviation, energy, and telecommunications.13 Nevertheless, the impetus for reform has not slackened over the past year, as both state and local SOEs have been selling off non-strategic assets in accordance with Party policy direction. Serious political obstacles to economic reform remain, however, including the fact that, for all of their inherent inefficiencies, SOEs predictably provide jobs to workers, who, if unemployed, might question both Party wisdom and its unchallenged supremacy. At the same time, labor costs are rapidly rising. In 2013, for example, China's 269 million migrant workers earned an average of $410 per month, an increase of nearly 14 percent from 2012 and almost twice the rate of the nation's GDP.14 As a result, Chinese firms are being forced to change their enterprise models and export strategies as foreign companies choose lower-wage alternatives to China.15 The three-decade transition from an agrarian to industrial-service economy, which saw the transition of some 300 million people from rural to urban areas, will continue over the next two decades, with another 350 million people—a number in excess of the entire U.S. population—still to follow. The economic impact of this colossal resettlement has been staggering. Chinese investment in real estate, which was $120 billion in 2003, grew to $980 billion in 2011.Chinese investment in real estate, which was $120 billion in 2003, grew to $980 billion in 2011. The infrastructure required to support this exploding urban population is massive.16 Adding to these difficulties, PRC debt loads have exploded over the past decade. Government debt (a large percentage of which is higher-risk local government debt) to GDP ratio stood at 53.5 percent in 2012, up from 32.5 percent in 2005.17 Of greater concern is the recent rapid rise of total debt (encompassing that from the corporate, household, and financial sectors), which increased from 150 percent of GDP in 2009 to 250 percent in 2014.18 Included in these figures are loans to SOEs that have poor repayment records, but that are often protected by political patronage. Moreover, the recent and dramatic rise of China's shadow banking industry has complicated the central government's efforts to bring lending under control.19 Aging Population & Social Welfare Costs: The scope and pace of aging in China's population pose other significant economic problems for the Party. Over the next twenty years, the ratio of workers to retirees (at the current retirement age of sixty) will decrease from five-to-one to two-to-one. This dramatic demographic shift is both exacerbated and made more urgent by the success of the "one child policy" in place since 1979. It will not only erode the huge economic stimulus and advantage of a young working population, but it will also come at a point in China's modernization when it is more vulnerable to the "middle income trap."20Huge expenditures will be required to put into place more comprehensive national health care and pension systems to help avoid that potential pitfall. Unequal Income Distribution: China's gap between its rich and poor, measured by its Gini coefficient, has widened greatly since its opening to the world in 1979. In 2012, the head of China's National Bureau of Statistics, Ma Jiantang, pegged it at 0.47-0.49, which is slightly below that of the United States, but high for a developing country.21 The reasons for this growing gap in wealth distribution are well understood: rapid urbanization on the backs of migrant workers not offered basic social services (a variant of America's own illegal immigrant phenomenon, except that those affected are PRC citizens); the disparity in wealth between the coastal regions and China's interior provinces; the cumulative impact of quality education and health care disproportionally available to the Party, government, and urban elite; and widespread corruption (discussed below). In 2013, the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress noted the pressing need to attend to this problem, but failed to offer any concrete proposals for doing so.22 Environmental Degradation and Food Safety: China's economic miracle has occurred in tandem with environmental catastrophe. Air and water quality, especially in China's major urban areas, is among the worst in the world. In 2012, China's Vice Minister of Environmental Protection, Wu Xiaoqing, stated that 40 percent of the country's rivers and 55 percent of its groundwater were unfit for drinking. Moreover, he noted that in rural China some 320 million people lack access to safe drinking water.23 The cost of such economic externalities came to roughly $230 billion in 2010, or about 3.5 percent of GDP.24 The scale of investment needed to adequately address known environmental threats is extraordinary. For example, between 2011 and 2020, the government plans to spend $850 billion in water-related projects alone.25 Food safety is also a major issue and an increasingly politicized one. It was only in the face of mounting public pressure that the Ministry of Environmental Protection admitted (in 2014) that the acreage of soil contamination (from heavy metals, pesticides, and other toxins) of China's farmlands had reached a record high of 20 percent. Political Decay: Most worrisome to China's leaders is the danger of losing their monopoly on political power. President Xi (like his predecessors) routinely calls official corruption a cancer that, if unattended, will destroy the Party. But by insisting on exclusive occupation of China's commanding political heights, the Party itself becomes more vulnerable to dysfunction, corruption, and political decay as the number of political, economic, and social contradictions multiply. China witnessed approximately 180,000 protests in 2010. Reflecting Party anxieties, the state spends large sums of money to ensure "stability maintenance." As recently as 2013, China's expenditures for internal security exceeded those for its armed forces.As recently as 2013, China's expenditures for internal security exceeded those for its armed forces.26 Perhaps the Party leaders' greatest dilemma is that, while they understand the need to decentralize economic and resource allocation decision-making, they seem driven to pursue further political consolidation in hopes that political and economic power can somehow be disentangled. As a result, the development of an independent economic entrepreneurial spirit, the establishment of a more robust rule of law system, and the growth of civil society are all significantly retarded in China, even as pressure for change continues to mount. International Constraints on China's Rise PRC leaders also face daunting obstacles in the international arena. These include factors related to history and geopolitics, military potential, and ideological appeal. History and Geography: China shares land borders with 14 countries, three of which it has fought limited wars with during the past fifty years: Russia (as the Soviet Union), Vietnam, and India. A major land dispute with India remains unresolved, while China's historical influence in the Russian Far East dating back to the Qing Dynasty continues to cause unease in Moscow. China's expansive maritime claims in the East and South China Seas have not only stimulated increasingly fractious disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but have also led to disagreements with North Korea, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Pursuit of these claims has also excited responses in Washington because they involve two American treaty allies and potentially undermine the principle of freedom of navigation—a vital U.S. security interest.27 Indeed, even as Party leaders seek to restore the prestige and influence of dynastic empires in centuries past, China's neighbors show no desire to return to a tributary political order. Moreover, China is not an ethnically monolithic state. Its populace includes restive non-Han Muslim citizens in its northwest Xinjiang Province who have ethnic kin in Central Asia, as well as a large and culturally distinct Tibetan population in its southwest. Additionally, the PRC lays claim to ade facto independent, democratic Taiwan that evinces little desire to unify with the mainland. Even the full assimilation of Hong Kong has proven both politically and socially challenging, as demonstrated by the continuing pro-democracy movement. The tightening and expansion of Chinese power is consistently contested both within its borders and in its immediate neighborhoods. Military Limitations: Despite extensive modernization over the past 25 years, the People's Liberation Army still lacks extended force projection or sustained blue water naval capabilities. China's military can bring impressive power to bear at particular points along its border and near coastal areas. It can also impose increasing costs on U.S. forces operating near its territory. However, the PLA lags far behind U.S. armed forces in terms of aggregate Asia-Pacific regional, and especially global, capabilities. Moreover, given the costly political, economic, and social challenges that China's leaders must address over the next two decades, it seems unlikely that the Chinese armed forces will continue to enjoy the double-digit annual budget increases that it has been provided since the mid-1990s. In addition, problems with corruption, a lack of leadership initiative thanks to an over-centralized command structure, and the still unproven ability of the PRC research and development establishment to produce equipment and systems that rival those of the United States and its key allies all cast doubt on the PLA's ability to become a world-class military power in the near- to mid-term. Absence of Allies and Partners: A state's power is measured by its own usable capabilities and those of its relevant allies and partners in various contingencies.Competent allies magnify a state's power, and here China is at a tremendous disadvantage when compared with the United States. Competent allies magnify a state's power, and here China is at a tremendous disadvantage when compared with the United States. China has only one treaty ally—North Korea—and is sharply at odds even with that regime, whose interests are not always in line which those of the PRC. The one cooperative security organization it nominally leads, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, but no one takes it seriously as a functional military alliance. More important, the current warming relations between Moscow and Beijing will likely cool once Beijing intensifies its efforts to establish a new China-dominated Silk Road through Central Asia, a move the Kremlin views as Chinese encroachment on a traditionally Russian sphere of influence. Meanwhile, after losing its sway over its former quasi-ally Myanmar, China's most reliable source of influence within ASEAN is a struggling Cambodia. And to date, the PLA has yet to establish any foreign military bases of consequence. The contrast with U.S. capabilities and assets could not be more striking. In the Asia-Pacific region alone, America has active military alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and special relationships with Singapore, New Zealand, and Taiwan. It has some 80,000 servicemen and servicewomen stationed throughout the region. It also leads the 28-member NATO Alliance, the most powerful military coalition in the world. While China can unilaterally apply concentrated pressure at specific locations on its periphery, the United States can call upon a worldwide network of friends and allies to flexibly deal with a wide variety of regional and global security challenges. Weak Ideational Appeal: China's global economic power is significant but its growth trajectory is slowing. Even if Beijing can buy influence with its cash reserves, its political model is not one that many states (never mind Hong Kong and Taiwan) aspire to adopt, sharply limiting China's "soft power" appeal. The United States ranks ahead of China around the world (except in the Middle East) in favorability ratings, and significantly so among those 18–29 years of age.28 The once and very temporarily vaunted Beijing Consensus, a system that marries market mechanisms to authoritarian political control, remains a mirage. The Communist Party might yet develop a form of governance that is universally attractive, but for now, China finds itself at a distinct disadvantage in the battle of political ideas. Cooperation is strong in several key areas despite disagreements on economic issues —- and OBOR, not AIIB could determine evaluation of Chinese policy MS. SOLÍS: So let me ask a very big picture question. We talked about whether China is a revisionist or reformist power; we talked about whether established powers are making sufficient room to accommodate the change in relative capabilities or not in established Bretton Woods institutions but also having an open mind about new institutions. And I think when people discuss this they want to know if ahead of us we have a period of growing a strategic rivalry or whether we think that there could be successful communication, successful engagement, and therefore, that we can find a way to collaborate in the management of the world economy. So what would be the markers to tell us where are we going? I know this is an extremely challenging question but I think it's probably in the back of everybody's minds here. We care about this because what this may mean for the quality of governance in the future but also for the quality of interaction along the major powers in the world. So where are we heading? MR. LIEBERTHAL: I'll take an initial stab (laughter). MS. SOLÍS: Wise choice. MR. LIEBERTHAL: Every time you comment, Mireya, now I have a much bigger question, your questions do indeed keep getting bigger but the first of those I thought was big enough at the start (laughter). If you look at the U.S. and China we seek now to cooperate as much as we can on major global issues. Those are especially in areas now like climate change, nuclear nonproliferation; we are developing more cooperation in counterterrorism, in military to military relations, we are moving that forward. So when you talk about what the nature of the relationships will be in the future the economic side is a part of that but many of these other issues determine the degree of trust in the long term intentions of another country. My sense is at this point – this doesn't fully deal with your question obviously, but as a starting point my sense is at this point that the U.S. and China are able to have considerable confidence in the agreements that they reach in a number of different areas. We understand each other pretty well. What we are very unclear about is long term intentions of the other country and so how much you can trust them strategically down the road. And I think that's a work in progress. There is no single item that is going to flip a switch on that shy of some huge escalatory event. Very likely this is going to be a matter of, as this whole conversation has suggested, we focused primarily on the central issues of this panel, is how do these institutions develop? How do we react over time? Do we build confidence or on balance are things going to move in a different direction. One last comment I'd make is that — I know this is somewhat outside the scope of this panel – I think one of the big issues that will affect thinking about China's revisionism or not is going to be the one belt one road effort and how that plays out. And I'm frankly of – I have more confidence in the AIIB than I do in the one belt one road. 3 IMF reform was recently approved by Congress —- helps integrate China into international economic system and revives U.S. leadership Frankel, 4/13/16 —- professor at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government (Jeffrey, "The Domestic Threat to US Leadership," https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-imf-reform-global-leadership-by-jeffrey-frankel-2016-04, article downloaded 6/5/16, JMP) CAMBRIDGE – US President Barack Obama has racked up a series of foreign-policy triumphs over the last 12 months. But one that has gained less attention than others was the passage last December of legislation to reform the International Monetary Fund, after five years of obstruction by the US Congress. As the IMF convenes in Washington, DC, for its annual spring meetings on April 15-17, we should pause to savor the importance of this achievement. After all, if the United States had let yet another year go by without ratifying the IMF quota reform, it would have essentially handed over the keys of global economic leadership to China. The IMF reform was crucial: The allocation of monetary contributions and voting power among member countries had to be updated to reflect the shifts in global economic power in recent decades. Specifically, emerging-market economies like Brazil, China, and India gained a larger role, primarily at the expense of European and Persian Gulf countries. Obama managed to persuade the leaders of the other G-20 countries to agree to the reform at a 2010 summit in Seoul. The deal's subsequent approval should have been a no-brainer for Congress, as it neither increased America's financial obligations nor took away its voting dominance. More important, the reform represented a golden opportunity for the US to demonstrate global leadership, by recognizing that the existing international order must accommodate changing economic-power dynamics. Instead, Congress attempted to block IMF reform, effectively denying China its rightful place at the table of global governance. "Moving the goal posts" could succeed only in driving the Chinese to establish their own institutions. In this sense, Congressional intransigence may have undermined America's position in its competition with China for global power and influence. To most Asians, the US is a more attractive regional hegemon than a China that has been aggressively pursuing territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. But recent US behavior has caused some Asian countries to begin to question America's commitment to supporting regional security and prosperity. Against this background, many countries, both inside and outside Asia, were happy to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which promised to meet some of the region's financing needs. The AIIB's establishment in December was widely viewed as a severe diplomatic setback for the US. Fortunately, thanks to Obama's recent string of successes in terms of global engagement, the US now has a chance to get back into the game. Last April, his administration oversaw a breakthrough agreement with Iran over its nuclear program. Moreover, in October, Congress was persuaded to give it Trade Promotion Authority, enabling the completion of the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). More recently, the US has reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba, ending a 55-year policy of isolation that succeeded only in giving Cuba's leaders an excuse for economic failure and handicapping America's relationships throughout Latin America. Finally, representatives of the 195 parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change reached an agreement in Paris last December to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, spurred in no small part by earlier action by Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The two leaders are scheduled to sign the Paris agreement on April 22 on behalf of their respective countries, the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Add to that the ratification, at long last, of IMF reform, and the US does seem to be on a global winning streak. None of these five achievements could have been predicted a year ago. With the Republicans having taken full control of the Congress in November 2014, the overwhelming conventional wisdom was that the administration would be blocked from accomplishing much in its final two years. Making matters worse, internationalism attracts opposition from the far left as well as the far right. Though trade is the most obvious example, it is not the only one. Beyond opposing the TPP, US presidential candidate Bernie Sanders has historically joined with congressional Republicans in trying to block efforts to rescue emerging-market countries in Latin America and Asia at times of financial crisis. These rescues are invariably called "bailouts," even when they cost the US nothing – the US Treasury actually made a profit on the 1995 loan to Mexico that Sanders opposed – and help sustain economic growth. Similarly, New York Senator Chuck Schumer joined the Republicans in trying to block the Iran nuclear agreement. Obama's recent international successes are not unassailable. Although the IMF deal is done, Obama's other key initiatives could still be derailed by US politics, especially if the political extremes unite. Congress could reject the TPP, in effect telling Asia it is on its own. It could undermine the emerging relationship with Cuba; after all, it has yet to repeal the embargo. As for the Paris agreement, a federal appeals court will first hear a challenge to the administration's implementation strategy, the Clean Power Plan, on June 2. The Republican presidential campaign adds another element of uncertainty. The two leading candidates for the party's nomination, Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, both say that they would tear up the Iran nuclear deal, if elected. It is worth recalling the outcome of President George W. Bush's analogous decision to tear up Bill Clinton's "framework agreement" with North Korea: the Kim regime promptly and predictably developed a nuclear bomb. Whether the US will continue to lead the world remains unclear. What is clear is that US politics, not global developments, will be the main determinant. Solves the case —- sends positive signal to China that improves relations and minimizes future diplomatic clashes Boston Globe, 3/26/15 (The Editorial Board, "US should integrate China into existing institutions," http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/03/26/should-integrate-china-into-existing-institutions/OhuJ0Oa4HGndoaxPdNOb6L/story.html, article downloaded on 6/4/16, JMP) When most of the nation's closest allies are deserting the United States on a matter of global economic importance, US politicians of both parties should listen to the underlying message. Earlier this month, the British government defied the United States and announced it will join a new international development bank created and led by China. Germany, France, and Italy followed within days. And as the initial enrollment deadline for the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank approaches at the end of the month, Australia and South Korea are poised to sign up as well. Without doubt, the new bank exemplifies China's efforts to elbow its way into a global financial system long dominated by the United States, and to convert its economic muscle into diplomatic strength around the world. But with its growing GDP and vast financial reserves, China is bound to claim a larger role in one way or another. The United States should seek to accommodate that shift in a productive way, by enmeshing the world's second-largest economy more deeply in multilateral bodies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank — three institutions over which the United States has long exercised outsize influence. Instead, Republicans in Congress have stalled even modest reforms that would give China and other major emerging economies more influence over the IMF. The new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to be headquartered in Shanghai, is plainly a rival to older global financial institutions. While the US-led institutions have made a show of tying aid to transparency and political reforms, China has gained a reputation globally for giving money to repressive governments without strings attached. The European powers joining Beijing's bank argue that they can best promote good governance for the institution by working inside it. Still, it's obvious that Britain, Germany, and others are eager to get into a rising power's good graces. The Obama administration lobbied US allies not to join, while passive-aggressively insisting that the United States is worried only about the new bank's governance and not about any potential blow to American prestige. In doing so, the administration unnecessarily turned the issue into a US-China diplomatic battle — which the United States has now lost. All multilateral deals — trade treaties, international development banks, security arrangements — require sacrifices from all parties. Yet the end of the Cold War encouraged Americans of all ideological stripes to believe, for a generation, that the United States can and should dictate the terms of international relations. For the GOP leadership, delaying reforms at the IMF is a convenient way to inflict more political pain on Obama. For the Tea Party right, insisting upon the American way of doing everything is a matter of conviction. But Washington's inability to settle even straightforward matters is undermining the nation's ability to exercise leadership in the world. Making some room for China on the global scene wouldn't just be a magnanimous gesture by the United States. It will also help avoid future diplomatic fiascoes. The more China is integrated into existing institutions, the less the imperative to start its own.
 * Red+JMP)**
 * The problem isn't China's rise, but rather America's insistence on maintaining military and economic dominance right in China's backyard**
 * To avoid a violent militaristic clash with China, or another cold war rivalry, the United States should pursue a simple solution: give up its empire.**
 * Americans fear that China's rapid economic growth will slowly translate into a more expansive and assertive foreign policy that will inevitably result in a war with the US. Harvard Professor Graham Allison has found: "in 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years when a rising power challenged a ruling power, the outcome was war." Chicago University scholar John Mearsheimer has bluntly argued: "China cannot rise peacefully."**
 * But the apparently looming conflict between the US and China is not because of China's rise per se, but rather because the US insists on maintaining military and economic dominance among China's neighbors. Although Americans like to think of their massive overseas military presence as a benign force that's inherently stabilizing, Beijing certainly doesn't see it that way.**
 * According to political scientists Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Beijing sees America as "the most intrusive outside actor in China's internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China's neighbors." (All of which is true.) They think that the US "seeks to curtail China's political influence and harm China's interests" with a "militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish" foreign policy.**
 * China's regional ambitions are not uniquely pernicious or aggressive, but they do overlap with America's ambition to be the dominant power in its own region, and in every region of the world.**
 * Leaving aside caricatured debates about which nation should get to wave the big "Number 1" foam finger, it's worth asking whether having 50,000 US troops permanently stationed in Japan actually serves US interests and what benefits we derive from keeping almost 30,000 US troops in South Korea and whether Americans will be any safer if the Obama administration manages to reestablish a US military presence in the Philippines to counter China's maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea.**
 * Many commentators say yes. Robert Kagan argues not only that US hegemony makes us safer and richer, but also that it bestows peace and prosperity on everybody else. If America doesn't rule, goes his argument, the world becomes less free, less stable and less safe.**
 * But a good chunk of the scholarly literature disputes these claims. "There are good theoretical and empirical reasons", wrote political scientist Christopher Fettweis in his book Pathologies of Power, "to doubt that US hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability." The international system, rather than cowering in obedience to American demands for peace, is far more "self-policing", says Fettweis. A combination of economic development and the destructive power of modern militaries serves as a much more satisfying answer for why states increasingly see war as detrimental to their interests.**
 * International relations theorist Robert Jervis has written that "the pursuit of primacy was what great power politics was all about in the past" but that, in a world of nuclear weapons with "low security threats and great common interests among the developed countries", primacy does not have the strategic or economic benefits it once had.**
 * Nor does US dominance reap much in the way of tangible rewards for most Americans: international relations theorist Daniel Drezner contends that "the economic benefits from military predominance alone seem, at a minimum, to have been exaggerated"; that "There is little evidence that military primacy yields appreciable geoeconomic gains"; and that, therefore, "an overreliance on military preponderance is badly misguided."**
 * The struggle for military and economic primacy in Asia is not really about our core national security interests; rather, it's about preserving status, prestige and America's neurotic image of itself. Those are pretty dumb reasons to risk war.**
 * There are a host of reasons why the dire predictions of a coming US-China conflict may be wrong, of course. Maybe China's economy will slow or even suffer crashes. Even if it continues to grow, the US's economic and military advantage may remain intact for a few more decades, making China's rise gradual and thus less dangerous.**
 * Moreover, both countries are armed with nuclear weapons. And there's little reason to think the mutually assured destruction paradigm that characterized the Cold War between the US and the USSR wouldn't dominate this shift in power as well.**
 * But why take the risk, when maintaining US primacy just isn't that important to the safety or prosperity of Americans? Knowing that should at least make the idea of giving up empire a little easier.**
 * Case**
 * 1**
 * Obama softening U.S. stance to AIIB —- co-financing will reverse perception of containment and resolve diplomatic debacle**
 * Talley, 15 (3/22/15, Wall Street Journal (Online), "U.S. Looks to Work With China-Led Infrastructure Fund; Obama administration proposes co-financing projects with new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Proquest database, JMP)**
 * WASHINGTON—The Obama administration, facing defiance by allies that have signed up to support a new Chinese-led infrastructure fund, is proposing that the bank work in a partnership with Washington-backed development institutions, such as the World Bank.**
 * The collaborative approach is designed to steer the new bank toward economic aims of the world's leading economies and away from becoming an instrument of Beijing's foreign policy. The bank's potential to promote new alliances and sidestep existing institutions has been one of the Obama administration's chief concerns as key allies including the U.K., Germany and France lined up in recent days to become founding members of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.**
 * The Obama administration wants to use existing development banks to co-finance projects with Beijing's new organization. Indirect support would help the U.S. address another long-standing goal: ensuring the new institution's standards are designed to prevent unhealthy debt buildups, human-rights abuses and environmental risks. U.S. support could also pave the way for American companies to bid on the new bank's projects.**
 * "The U.S. would welcome new multilateral institutions that strengthen the international financial architecture," said Nathan Sheets, U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs. "Co-financing projects with existing institutions like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank will help ensure that high quality, time-tested standards are maintained."**
 * Mr. Sheets argues that co-financed projects would ensure the bank complements rather than competes with existing institutions. If the new bank were to adopt the same governance and operational standards, he said, it could both bolster the international financial system and help meet major infrastructure-investment gaps.**
 * No decision has been made by the new Chinese-led bank about whether it will partner with existing multilateral development banks, as the facility is still being formed, though co-financing is unlikely to face opposition from U.S. allies.**
 * Zhu Haiquan, a spokesman at China's embassy in Washington, said Beijing is open to collaboration with the existing institutions and that the new bank "is built in the spirit of openness and inclusiveness and will follow high standards.**
 * "It will effectively cooperate with and complement the existing multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to provide investment and financing for the infrastructure building in Asia," he said.**
 * World Bank President Jim Yong Kim said through a spokesman that he and his lieutenants are already in "deep discussions" with the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank "on how we can closely work together."**
 * The U.S. suffered a diplomatic embarrassment last week after several of its key European allies publicly rebuffed Washington's pleas to snub Beijing's invitations to join the bank and instead said they would be founding members.**
 * Backing the new bank through co-financing could also help the U.S. move past the diplomatic mess, reunite with its trans-Atlantic allies on this issue and counter any perceptions that the U.S. is wholly opposed to the institution as part of a China-containment strategy.**
 * "Our concern has always been...will it adhere to the kinds of high standards that the international financial institutions have developed?" U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew told U.S. lawmakers last week.**
 * Co-financing, combined with European membership, "will make it more likely this institution largely conforms to the international standards," said Matthew Goodman, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies adviser and former economics director at the U.S. National Security Council.**
 * The World Bank, forged out of World War II, remains the leading international development institution with 188 nations as members. But others have emerged amid concerns about drawing more investment and attention to fast-growing regions. Those include the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, European Investment Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.**
 * The banks' loans are designed to foster infrastructure and development projects that are often high-risk and long-term, helping to lower the costs for governments that couldn't afford borrowing from the private sector. For the most powerful lending countries, they cultivate regional growth prospects and can provide a political tool for influencing smaller countries.**
 * Beijing has struggled to increase its influence within the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the world's emergency lender, the International Monetary Fund. But as the founder and one of the new bank's largest shareholders, it will have the greatest say in which projects to pick.**
 * Infrastructure needs around the world are enormous. Emerging countries need new ports, railways, bridges, airports and roads to support faster growth. Developed economies, meanwhile, must replace aging infrastructure. The Asian Development Bank estimates its region alone faces an annual financing shortfall of $800 billion a year. The consulting firm McKinsey & Company estimates global infrastructure-investment needs through 2030 total $57 trillion.**
 * By comparison, the Asian Development Bank has just $160 billion in capital and the World Bank-which has co-financed with other regional institutions for years—has around $500 billion. The China-led bank plans to have a $50 billion fund to start.**
 * "We have every intention of sharing knowledge and co-investing in projects throughout Asia," said Mr. Kim, who was picked by President Barack Obama in 2012 as the U.S. nominee to lead the World Bank.**
 * "From the perspective simply of the need for more infrastructure spending, there's no doubt that we welcome the entry of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," Mr. Kim said.**
 * U.S. support for AIIB won't solve SCS conflict**
 * Dr. Kawai, 15 —- Professor at the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Public Policy (last modified on 8/7/2015, Masahiro Kawai, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK: CHINA AS RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDER?, "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in the Evolving International Financial Order," http://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/AIIB-Report_4web.pdf, downloaded 6/1/16, JMP)** *note —- this ev is footnote #15
 * OBOR = China's One Belt One Road policy**
 * Solis & Lieberthal, 15 —- Senior Fellow & Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies at Brookings, AND** Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings (9/30/15, Mireya & Kenneth, "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND CHINA'S RISE: HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN RESPOND?" http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2015/09/30-international-economic-governance-chinas-rise/20150930_china_economic_governance_transcript.pdf, article downloaded 6/12/16, JMP)