Saul+&+Naman

1ac – plan
====The United States federal government should support the construction of an ocean-based space elevator located within the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone off the coast of Hawaii through a dedicated funding stream.====

1ac – pedagogy
Contention 1 is My Story

Extinction is inevitable if we stay on earth
- Asteroid - Gamma-ray Burst - Collapse of the Vacuum - Rogue Black Holes - Giant Solar Flares - Reversal of Earth’s Magnetic Field - Flood-Basalt Volcanism - Global Epidemics

FHE 14 [ a group of scientist and other professionals Future Human Extinction: Natural Disasters Asteroid impact The Future of Human Evolution http://futurehumanevolution.com/future-human-extinction-risks/future-human-extinction-natural-disasters] Extinction by Asteroid: The end of Future Human EvolutionThe explosion in the popularity of astronomy in the last few decades has paved the way for artistic representations of the end of the world. Novels like Lucifer’s Hammer and films like Armageddon make it seem like a catastrophic asteroid impact is not only possible, but probable. And while the odds are infinitesimal that an impact event will happen in our lifetime, there is no question that a cosmic interloper will hit Earth, and we won’t have to wait millions of years for it to happen. In 1908 a 200-foot-wide comet fragment slammed into the atmosphere and exploded over the Tunguska region in Siberia, Russia, with nearly 1,000 times the energy of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Astronomers estimatesimilar-sized events occur every one to three centuries. Benny Peiser, an anthropologist-cum-pessimist at Liverpool John Moores University in England, claims that impacts have repeatedly disrupted human civilization. As an example, he says one killed 10,000 people in the Chinese city of Chi’ing-yang in 1490. Many scientists question his interpretations: Impacts are most likely to occur over the ocean, and small ones that happen over land are most likely to affect unpopulated areas. But with big asteroids, it doesn’t matter much where they land. Objects more than a half-mile wide- which strike Earth every 250,000 years or so- would touch off firestorms followed by global cooling from dust kicked up by the impact. Humans would likely survive, but civilization might not. An asteroid five miles wide would cause major extinctions, like the one that may have marked the end of the age of dinosaurs. Kupier Belt: Will it source the end of Future Human Evolution?For a real chill, look to the Kuiper belt, a zone just beyond Neptune that contains roughly 100,000 ice-balls more than 50 miles in diameter. The Kuiper belt sends a steady rain of small comets earthward. If one of the big ones headed right for us, that would be it for pretty much all higher forms of life, even cockroaches. Gamma-ray Burst If you could watch the sky with gamma-ray vision, you might think you were being stalked by cosmic paparazzi. Once a day or so, you would see a bright flash appear, briefly outshine everything else, then vanish. These gamma-ray bursts, astrophysicists recently learned, originate in distant galaxies and are unfathomably powerful- as much as 10 quadrillion (a one followed by 16 zeros) times as energetic asthe sun. The bursts probably result from the merging of two collapsed stars. Before the cataclysmal event, such a double star might be almost completely undetectable, so we’d likely have no advance notice if one is lurking nearby. Once the burst begins, however, there would be no missing its fury. At a distance of 1,000 light-years- farther than most of the stars you can see on a clear night- it would appear about as bright as the sun. Earth’s atmosphere would initially protect us from most of the burst’s deadly X rays and gamma rays, but at a cost. The potent radiation would cook the atmosphere, creating nitrogen oxides that would destroy the ozone layer. Without the ozone layer, ultraviolet rays from the sun would reach the surface at nearly full force, causing skin cancer and, more seriously, killing off the tiny photosynthetic plankton in the ocean that provide oxygen to the atmosphere and bolster the bottom of the food chai n. All the gamma-ray bursts observed so far have been extremely distant, which implies the events are rare. Scientists understand so little about these explosions, however, that it’s difficult to estimate the likelihood of one detonating in our galactic neighborhood. Collapse of the Vacuum In the book Cat’s Cradle, Kurt Vonnegut popularized the idea of “ice-nine,” a form of water that is far more stable than the ordinary kind, so it is solid at room temperature. Unleash a bit of it, and suddenly all water on Earth transforms to ice-nine and freezes solid. Ice-nine was a satirical invention, but an abrupt, disastrous phase transition is a possibility. Very early in the history of the universe, according to a leading cosmological model, empty space was full of energy. This state of affairs, called a false vacuum, was highly precarious. A new, more stable kind of vacuum appeared and, like ice-nine, it quickly took over. This transition unleashed a tremendous amount of energy and caused a brief runaway expansion of the cosmos. It is possible that another, even more stable kind of vacuum exists, however. As the universe expands and cools, tiny bubbles of this new kind of vacuum might appear and spread at nearly the speed of light. The laws of physics wouldchange in their wake, and a blast of energy would dash everything to bits. “ It makes for a beautiful story, but it’s not very likely,” says Piet Hut of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey. He says he worries more about threats that scientists are more certain of- such as rogue black holes. Rogue Black Holes Our galaxy is full of black holes, collapsed stellar corpses just a dozen miles wide. How full? Tough question. After all, they’re called black holes for a reason. Their gravity is so strong they swallow everything, even the light that might betray their presence. David Bennett of Notre Dame University in Indiana managed to spot two black holes recently by the way they distorted and amplified the light of ordinary, more distant stars. Based on such observations, and even more on theoretical arguments, researchers guesstimate there are about 10 million black holes in the Milky Way. Future Human Extinction by Rogue Black HoleThese objects orbit just like other stars, meaning that it is not terribly likely that one is headed our way. But if a normal star were moving toward us, we’d know it. With a black hole there is little warning. A few decades before a close encounter, at most, astronomers would observe a strange perturbation in the orbits of the outer planets. As the effect grew larger, it would be possible to make increasingly precise estimates of the location and mass of the interloper. The black hole wouldn’t have to come all that close to Earth to bring ruin; just passing through the solar system would distort all of the planets’ orbits. Earth might get drawn into an elliptical path that would cause extreme climate swings, or it might be ejectedfrom the solar system and go hurtling to a frigid fate in deep space. Giant Solar Flares Solar flares- more properly known as coronal mass ejections- are enormous magnetic outbursts on the sun that bombardEarth with a torrent of high-speed subatomic particles. Earth’s atmosphere and magnetic field negate the potentially lethal effects of ordinary flares. But while looking through old astronomical records, Bradley Schaefer of Yale University found evidence that some perfectly normal-looking, sunlike stars can brighten briefly by up to a factor of 20. Schaefer believes these stellar flickers are caused by superflares, millions of times more powerful than their common cousins. Within a few hours, a superflare on the sun could fry Earth and begin disintegrating the ozone layer (see #2). Future Human Extinction by Giant Solar Flare Although there is persuasive evidence that our sun doesn’t engage in such excess, scientists don’t know why superflares happen at all, or whether our sun could exhibit milder but still disruptive behavior. And while too much solar activity could be deadly, too little of it is problematic as well. Sallie Baliunas at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics says many solar-type stars pass through extended quiescent periods, during which they become nearly 1 percent dimmer. That might not sound like much, but a similar downturn in the sun could send us into another ice age. Baliunas cites evidence that decreased solar activity contributed to 17 of the 19 major cold episodes on Earth in the last 10,000 years. Reversal of Earth’s Magnetic Field Every few hundred thousand years Earth’s magnetic field dwindles almost tonothing for perhaps a century, then gradually reappears with the north and south poles flipped. Th e last such reversal was 780,000 years ago, so we may be overdue. Worse, the strength of our magnetic field has decreased about 5 percent in the past century. Why worry in an age when GPS has made compasses obsolete? Well, the magnetic field deflects particle storms and cosmic rays from the sun, as well as even more energetic subatomic particles from deep space. Without magnetic protection, these particles would strike Earth’s atmosphere, eroding the already beleaguered ozone layer (see #5). Also, many creatures navigate by magnetic reckoning. A magnetic reversal might cause serious ecological mischief. One big caveat: “There are no identifiable fossil effects from previous flips,” says Sten Odenwald of the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. “This is most curious.” Still, a disaster that kills a quarter of the population, like the Black Plague in Europe, would hardly register as a blip in fossil records. Flood-Basalt Volcanism In 1783, the Laki volcano in Iceland erupted, spitting out three cubic miles of lava. Floods, ash, and fumes wiped out 9,000 people and 80 percent of the livestock. The ensuing starvation killed a quarter of Iceland’s population. Atmospheric dust caused winter temperatures to plunge by 9 degrees in the newly independent United States. And that was just a baby’s burp compared with what the Earth can do. Sixty-five million years ago, a plume of hot rock from the mantle burst through the crust in what is now India. Eruptions raged century after century, ultimately unleashing a quarter-million cubic miles of lava- the Laki eruption 100,000 times over. Some scientists still blame the Indian outburst, not an asteroid, for the death of the dinosaurs. An earlier, even larger event in Siberia occurred just about the time of the Permian-Triassic extinction, the most thorough extermination known to paleontology. At that time 95 percent of all species were wiped out. Sulfurous volcanicgases produce acid rains. Chlorine-bearing compounds present yet another threat to the fragile ozone layer- a noxious brew all around. While they are causing short-term destruction, volcanoes also release carbon dioxide that yields long-term greenhouse-effect warming.The last big pulse of flood-basalt volcanism built the Columbia River plateau about 17 million years ago. We’re ripe for another. Global Epidemics If Earth doesn’t do us in, our fellow organisms might be up to the task. Germs and people have always coexisted, but occasionally the balance gets out of whack. The Black Plague killed one European in four during the 14th century ; influenza took at least 20 million lives between 1918 and 1919; the AIDS epidemic has produced a similar death toll and is still going strong. From 1980 to 1992, reported the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, mortality from infectious disease in the United States rose 58 percent. Just about a decade ago, Infectious diseases killed 1/3 worldwide; AIDS was the top cause of death in developing regions. Old diseases such as cholera and measles have developed new resistance to antibiotics. Intensive agriculture and land development is bringing humans closer to animal pathogens. International travel means diseases canspread faster than ever. Michael Osterholm, an infectious disease expert who formerly worked at the Minnesota Department of Health, described the situation as “ like trying to swim against the current of a raging river.” The grimmest possibility would be the emergence of a strain that spreads so fast we are caught off guard or that resists all chemical means of control, perhaps as a result of our stirring of the ecological pot. About 12,000 years ago, a sudden wave of mammal extinctions swept through the Americas. Ross MacPhee of the American Museum of Natural History argues the culprit was extremely virulent disease, which humans helped transport as they migrated into the New World.

Reducing existential risk __by even a tiny amount__ outweighs __every other impact__—the math is //conclusively on our side//.
Bostrom 11 — Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, and Director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 (“The Concept of Existential Risk,” Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html, Accessed 07-04-2011)*we don’t endorse gendered language

Holding probability constant, risks become more serious as we move toward the upper-right region of figure 2. For any fixed probability, existential risks are thus more serious than other risk categories. But just how much more serious might not be intuitively obvious. One might think we could get a grip on how bad an existential catastrophe would be by considering some of the worst historical disasters we can think of—such as the two world wars, the Spanish flu pandemic, or the Holocaust—and then imagining something just a bit worse. Yet if we look at global population statistics over time, we find that these horrible events of the past century fail to register (figure 3). [Graphic Omitted] Figure 3: World population over the last century. Calamities such as the Spanish flu pandemic, the two world wars, and the Holocaust scarcely register. (If one stares hard at the graph, one can perhaps just barely make out a slight temporary reduction in the rate of growth of the world population during these events.) But even this reflection fails to bring out the seriousness of existential risk.What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is not that they would show up robustly on a plot like the one in figure 3, causing a precipitous drop in world population or average quality of life. Instead, their significance lies primarily in the fact that they would destroy the future. The philosopher Derek Parfit made a similar point with the following thought experiment: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. … The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may beonly a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second. (10: 453-454) To calculate the loss associated with an existential catastrophe, we must consider how much value would come to exist in its absence. It turns out that the ultimate potential for Earth-originating intelligent life is literally astronomical. One gets a large number even if one confines one’s consideration to the potential for biological human beings living on Earth. If we suppose with Parfit that our planet will remain habitable for at least another billion years, and we assume that at least one billion people could live on it sustainably, then the potential exist for at least 1018 human lives. These lives could also be considerably better than the average contemporary human life, which is so often marred by disease, poverty, injustice, and various biological limitations that could be partly overcome through continuing technological and moral progress. However, the relevant figure is not how many people could live on Earth but how many descendants we could have in total. One lower bound of the number of biological human life-years in the future accessible universe (based on current cosmological estimates) is 1034 years.[10] Another estimate, which assumes that future minds will be mainly implemented in computational hardware instead of biological neuronal wetware, produces a lower bound of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1071 basic computational operations).(4)[11] If we make the less conservative assumption that future civilizations could eventually press close to the absolute bounds of known physics (using some as yet unimagined technology), we get radically higher estimates of the amount of computation and memory storage that is achievable and thus of the number of years of subjective experience that could be realized.[12] Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 1018 human lives. This implies that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least ten times the value of a billion human lives. The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any “ordinary” good, such as the direct benefit of saving 1 billion lives. And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1 billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential risk—positive or negative—is almost certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.[13]

====Reducing the probability of existential disaster through space colonization is more valuable than preventing specific impact scenarios. Overly detailed impact predictions are __improbable__ and create __false perceptions of security__.==== ** Yudkowsky 6 ** —Co-founder and Research Fellow of the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence—a non–profit research institute dedicated to increasing the likelihood of, and decreasing the time to, a maximally beneficial singularity, one of the world’s foremost experts on Artificial Intelligence and rationality [Eliezer Yudkowsky, “Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment Of Global Risks,” Draft of a chapter in //Global Catastrophic Risks//, edited by Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, August 31st, 2006, Available Online at http://singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf, Accessed 11-11-2010]

According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety : "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios.

Err affirmative—the __availability heuristic__ and “//good story bias//” will make you undervalue our impact
Bostrom 11 — Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, and Director of the Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 (“The Concept of Existential Risk,” Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html, Accessed 07-04-2011)

Many kinds of cognitive bias and other psychological phenomena impede efforts at thinking clearly and dealing effectively with existential risk. [32] For example, use of the availability heuristic may create a “good-story bias” whereby people evaluate the plausibility of existential-risk scenarios on the basis of experience, or on how easily the various possibilities spring to mind. Since nobody has any real experience with existential catastrophe, expectations may be formed instead on the basis of fictional evidence derived from movies and novels. Such fictional exposures are systematically biased in favor of scenarios that make for entertaining stories. Plotlines may feature a small band of human protagonists successfully repelling an alien invasion or a robot army. A story in which humankind goes extinct suddenly—without warning and without being replaced by some other interesting beings—is less likely to succeed at the box office (although more likely to happen in reality).

A. Economically feasible transportation of resources
ISCE 12 [Wednesday, 11 April 2012 The International Space Elevator Consortium (ISEC) is composed of individuals scientists and organizations from around the world who share a vision of humanity in space, [|Why do I want a Space Elevator], []] What does a space elevator give us? In a nutshell, a Space Elevator provides us with a superior method to ship cargo (and eventually humans) into space. Right now, if you want to ship anything into space, you must use rockets. This will cost you several thousands of dollars per kilogram, the cargo will be subjected to severe ‘shake, rattle and roll’ and g-stress forces and you have to settle for a launch ‘success’ ratio in the 90-97% range (depending on which specific launch vehicle you’re talking about). Rockets also generate a tremendous amount of pollution. This is inherent with rockets. We’ve had lots of really smart people spending lots and lots of money developing rocket technology over the past several decades and this is the best they can do, and, due to the rocket equation, probably getting close to the best they ever can do. If you want to ship large quantities of anything into space, and you want to do so cheaply (relatively speaking to rockets) and reliably, you need to change the equation. Instead of using rockets, build a transportation infrastructure, a ‘railway line’ into space, Before the intercontinental railway was built, shipping humans and cargo between the east coast and west coast of America required a dangerous overland trip or else the use of ships to transport goods around the tip of South America. You could certainly do it, but it was expensive, often dangerous, and the amount of cargo was limited. The intercontinental railway changed all of that. Travel and Commerce between the eastern and western halves of America exploded now that there was a safe, reliable, and inexpensive way to ship large quantities of goods back and forth. As the intercontinental railway opened up all of America to the vast majority of her citizens, aSpace Elevator, a ‘carbon railway to outer space’, will open up space to a much larger part of corporate and private America than is possible today. What kind of specific benefits could we expect to see from a functioning Space Elevator? As with the intercontinental railway, it’s impossible to foretell all of the uses of such an infrastructure, but here are some possibilities. •Large scale manufacturing in a zero-g environment. If corporations can build manufacturing facilities in space at an affordable price, they will do so. Right now, the cost and weight penalties are too prohibitive to even consider the idea. A space elevator would change that. • Colonization of the moon, Mars and other planets and satellites. Currently, establishing and supplying a 6 or 8 person science station on the moon (let alone Mars or anywhere else) is probably at the very limit of our capabilities. Allowing hundreds (or even thousands) of tons to be launched into space every day wouldallow us to colonize these other worlds. This would provide an insurance policy for humanity, an outlet for those with a pioneering spirit and, almost certainly, increased benefits here on earth as commerce between our planet and others was established. •Space Tourism – A Space Elevator could provide a way that most of us could visit space, and even stay for a while if we wanted to. •Clean Power – Though there are many debates about the economics of establishing solar power satellites to provide earth with clean, limitless power, there is no doubt that to do so will require the capability to launch enormous quantities of materials into space. Only a Space Elevator can give us that capability. •More and cheaper satellites. Satellite technology has provided all of us with enormous benefits, from DirecTV to weather satellites to increased national security. Being able to lower the cost and increase the reliability of satellite launches will lead to new technologies that right now we can’t even imagine. Scalable, inexpensive and reliable access to space will benefit all of us and a Space Elevator is the way to provide this capability

B. Mars colonization
Hinton 09 [Gaylen he attended the University of Utahfocused on Research and Development management of complex multidisciplinary engineering projects. Gaylen's technical achievements include 16 U.S. Patents. dpufTHE COLONIZATION OF MARS VIA A MARTIAN SPACE ELEVATOR The Mars Society http://www.marspapers.org/papers/Hinton_2009.pdf] If a complete MSE was sent from earth with the first Mars colony, then all the equipment, supplies, habitats, and colonists could be lowered directly down to the basestation from ASO. A tremendous amount of effort would be saved because everything could come down to the surface with little or no concern for aerodynamics, reentry, landing, or protection. The fact that thecables of an MSE might have a mass of 200,000 kg or more seems daunting. All of the mass of the equipment, supplies, habitats and colonists would be added to those 200,000 kg. Such a large amount of mass would be prohibitive if it had to be sent to Mars via chemical rockets. However, if there was an SE on earth first, then all of that mass could be easily sent toMars to provide the first colony with everything they need to succeed. 8 With anSE on earth, there is no energy cost to send a spacecraft to Mars beyond getting it to GSO. In fact, energy is gained by sending a load from GSO to the release point where it would be slung toward Mars. Typically, a load bound for Mars would need to be released about 25,000 km beyond GSO. That would give it the delta V necessary to escape earth and travel to Mars. At 25,000 km past GSO the net force on any object is only about 1/40 g. A 200,000 kg load would only apply 5,000 kg-­ ‐ force on the cable at the release point. Therefore huge loads, assembled at GSO, could be sent to Mars with minimal loading on the SE cable. Also, multiple loads could be sent and collected together in transit. Therefore, the initial colony could be composed of hundreds of people, the MSE, and all their supplies and equipment. A drawing of the complete Mars colony en route to Mars is shown below in Fig. 3. Dozens or even hundreds of loads of equipment, supplies, and people could be sent up the SE to be assembled together at a space station at GSO. Once assembled and prepared, the much larger colonial loads could be sent to Mars via the SE. The same technology used to create a SE (carbon nanotubes?) could also create large, inflatable, rotating space craft that would bring the colonists to Mars with artificial gravity, and all the comforts of home. Also, this same technology could be used to make lightweight habitats for the Martian colonists on the surface. The cables and equipment necessary to make the MSE would be sent along with the rotating space habitat, or be sent in separate loads and collected together in transit. In any event, by the time the colonists reached Mars, everything would be assembled together in one large load. As shown in Fig. 3, there would be a reel of cable to lower a mobile base station to Mars and another reel to extend the counterweight further out. That large colonial assembly would be aero-­ ‐ captured into a large elliptical orbit around Mars. Then, using a bi-­ ‐ elliptic transfer, the assembly would be moved into an ASO around the equator using less than 600 m/s of delta V. Using common fuels, that orbital maneuver could be accomplished by having less than 20% of the initial mass as fuel. Once in ASO, a base station would be lowered towards Mars at the same time the counterweight was sent further out. The two processes would be coordinated in order to keep the assembly at ASO until the base station reached earth. Unfortunately the base station would reach Mars at the equator, but it needs to be located about 600 km north or south of the equator. Therefore, after a mobile base station reached the surface, it could be driven to the proper location, although that would require a 600 km free path. Another possibility would be to have thrusters on the base station, and those thrusters would move the station into its position before it even touched the ground. Even large propellers could serve as the thrusters to locate the base station at its correct longitude. Once in the correct location, the base station would be firmly anchored in place. Then the correct tension could be adjusted on the MSE cables with the counterweight, and 9 the colony would be ready to start unloading. At that point the MSE would be fully operational. While the equipment in the assembly at ASO was being unloaded down to the surface, the majority of the colonists would remain in the rotating space craft. That rotating craft would remain as a permanent part of the ASO space station. It could have a permanent manned presence, or simply be an empty station waiting for occupants to arrive. However, the colonists would likely leave it as an empty shell, taking everything they can down to the surface. One of the first loads to come down the MSE would have to be a crane. Unlike loading and unloading in zero-­ ‐ g, people in space suits could not man-­ ‐ handle large objects on Mars. A 10,000 kg piece of equipment on Mars would weigh the same as a 3800 kg load on earth. Therefore, the crane would have to move and position each load that came down the MSE. Once the habitats came down the MSE and were assembled by the initial crew, then the rest of colonists could begin to come down and also work on the surface. Each person could then start setting up his own work and living areas. Having a large initial colony greatly enhances the possibility of success. First of all, with more people there could be more professions and disciplines, with their respective equipment, represented. Therefore there would be more likelihood that all needed skills and materials would be present on Mars. Also, with larger numbers, the possibilities of personality conflicts are reduced. The only practical way to set up an MSE is to send it in its completed form from earth. Even a colony of one million people on Mars would still be so resource-­ ‐ limited that it is unlikely that they could ever build an MSE on their own. The MSE would facilitate much more economical transportation to and from earth because no rockets would be needed. A load would simply be sent out on the MSE cable about 20,000 km farther than the ASO station and released. That would give the load sufficient delta V to get back to earth. The initial cost of the MSE would be part of the setup cost of the colony, and would probably be paid for by the elimination of the reentry/landing vehicles that would otherwise be required. Martian landing vehicles are very costly, complicated, and risky machines comprised of heat shields, parachutes, thrusters, aerodynamic surfaces, and maneuvering devices. Eliminating landing vehicles would eliminate a tremendous complication and cost for a Mars colony. The landing vehicles would be one the most difficult parts of a non-­ ‐ MSE colonization effort. Also any provision for vehicles to return to space from the surface would add a great deal more to the complication. 10 In addition, using an MSE to lower the colony to the surface would eliminate anypossibility that a load missed its landing site and ended up in an unretrevable location. Even if every landing hit its designated site, there would still be transportation issues in bringing each load to the colony site. On the other hand, the MSE would deliver every load to the exact same spot. With a 200,000 kg MSE, and a location of 12° north or south latitude, the initial mass of the whole colony assembly could be 540,000 kg. With an even larger initial mass, the MSE could be located farther away from the equator, or the equipment and habitats could be in separate loads from the colonists. After the majority of the colonists and the equipment on the first load were lowered to the surface, those additional loads could dock with the ASO station. Those loads would initially be in a non-­ ‐ equatorial synchronous orbit. Near the point of maximum departure from the equatorial plane, they would be captured as needed by the ASO station and their cargo lowered down to the Martian surface. Even with a mass of 200,000 kg, the MSE could still end up being only be a small portion of the total mass of the initial colony. Therefore, the MSE could end up having less total mass than the mass of the required reentry vehicles for landing the same colony. //The bottom line is that an MSE could end up being simpler, cheaper, less risky, and require less mass than using reentry vehicles for colonizing Mars//. Because the MSE would have already paid for itself in the initial colonization effort, any subsequent use would just involve the incremental cost of operating it. Therefore, goods and materials could be shipped from Mars to earth rather cheaply. The primary cost would be a container capable of surviving earth reentry. Future transports from earth could dock with the ASO station by entering a non-­ ‐ equatorial synchronous orbit, just like any multiple loads from the original colony. After unloading its cargo, the earth transport could then be reloaded with cargo and passengers from Mars, and then be sent back to earth. However, even with an MSE and an SE on earth, the practical launch windows would still be about two years apart. Therefore, there would be a flurry of activity around those launch windows, but little use between them.
 * (MSE)=Martian space elevator

There are plenty of places to colonize
-The moon -Mars -Venus - Asteroids - Exoplanets Markert 14 [July 14 Jennifer Jen earned a writer’s certificate and Bachelor’s degree in English at Temple University, and has since moved to Brooklyn, NY, where she's written for several web publications Oh, The Places We’ll Go: 5 Potential Space Colonization Locations http://curiousmatic.com/oh-places-well-go-5-potential-space-colonization-locations/] [|Jennifer Markert] Many believe that this century – perhaps as soon as the next several decades – will see a marked change in space exploration, notably in colonization of other planets or near-earth objects. Multiple private companies already offer space travel, including Space Adventures, whose co-founder Eric Anderson has stated that the establishment of space colonies is the next step once the economics are worked out: “In the next generation or two—say the next 30 to 60 years—,” Anderson told the Atlantic, “there will be an irreversible human migration to a permanent space colony.” Anderson is placing his bets on Mars, but the question of if and when are up for the debate of other space optimists. Here are the current possible location for space colonies– and the likelihood of their future existence. 1. The MoonTo many, our beloved natural satellite, the moon, seems the obvious choice for colonization as our closest neighbor. Russia, anxious to beat out competitors, has proposed to begin lunar colonization by 2030. The three-step plan, outlined in a paper by the Russian Academy of Science, Moscow University, and Russian space research institutes, would begin preparing as soon as 2016. Though Russia’s deputy Prime Minister has stated of the goal that “ we are going to the moon forever,” professionals doubt the feasibility of this plan in terms of time and cost. 2. Mars As we’ve written about previously, private company Mars One plans to begin establishing — and televising — the first colony on neighboring planet Mars starting in 2024. Over 700 applicants are currently in the running for this one-way trip. Elon Musk’s SpaceX company is also anticipating human travel to Mars in similar timeframe as Mars One, perhaps as soon as 2026, while NASA’s more cautious goal is 2035. NASA, which has the most expertise, has also said that it would review the technology and safety of private companies’ missions, offering advice, but not assets to assure their attempts won’t cause any human endangerment. 3 . Venus Though our sun-side neighbor Venus has no habitable land, a recent proposal by science fiction writer Charles Stross has been fleshed out by fellow writer and scientist Geoffrey Landis in what has been called a“surprisingly strong case” for colonization. Due to the planet’s hostile atmosphere, cities could in theory (pfd) be built 50 kilometers from the surface, where the atmosphere is more earth-like than anywhere in the solar system, besides, well, Earth. Also unlike the moon and Mars, Venusian gravity would be less likely to deteriorate human bones and muscles with extreme pressure. 4 . AsteroidsAsteroids have long been suggested as possible colonization grounds, especially a more stable asteroid belt like the one between Mars and Jupiter. With much lower gravity than the moon or Mars, landing would be easier and more cost-efficient. Asteroids are also ideal for mining purposes, a process that could begin as early as 2015. It has been suggested that the hollowing of asteroids would be ideal for space colonies, as they contain all the resources needed and could be inhabited by many. 5. Exoplanets Lastly, exoplanets remain the literally most far-out locations for potential colonization. NASA and other space organizations have been on the hunt for potentially habitable exoplanets for decades, having already discovered nearly 2000. The closest, Gliese 832c, was only recently identified. At only 16 light years from Earth, it orbits a star less bright than our sun, and receives about the same amount of energy from it. Obviously, interstellar travel comes with serious challenges, if it will ever be possible at all. Still, as wild as it seems, the transport of cryonically preserved human embryos to exoplanets has been theorized as a potential solution. The planet would be colonized by robots before the unfreezing and subsequent human takeover began.

Portable farms means space colonization is possible
Davis 13 [Colle and Phyllis He is the founder and co-inventor at the Portable Farms company. As an inventor, he has designed systems that are used commercially. He also provides consulting and training to those willing to pay his fee for his many years of expertise. There are probably not all that many people that have more years of relevant first hand experience than Colle Davis. Portable Farms Makes Space Colonization Possible 12/2013 http://portablefarms.com/2012/space-colonization/ In order to colonize the Moon and Mars, the colonists will eat the food they brought with them which is VERY expensive to transport. This means that the food needed for the Moon and Mars stations will have to be Portable Farms Aquaponics Systems, or some similar systems. Not only is transporting food expensive, soil itself is too heavy to be transported. However, because both bodies appear to be covered with at least some gravel, the perfect medium for aquaponics is already there to be used in the Portable Farms Aquaponics Systems Grow Trays. A recent article carefully explains how there is really no choice but for the astronauts to raise their own food immediately upon to set up a permanent colony. Even the journey to Mars may allow some space farming. From the moment they arrive and have even a tiny amount of space to plant food, they will have to be farming to stay alive. Portable Farms is the answer to this modern space dilemma. A Portable Farms Aquaponics System can raise very large quantities of food in a very small space, all the water is recycled, very little electrical power needed and the ‘waste’ can be used to grow other plants. WOW, what a deal and it’s already available. Interestingly enough, this combination of qualities is also extremely well suited for earthly folks. Imagine having all of the advantages of one of the most highly intense food growing facilities next to your kitchen. It is now possible to harvest your meals from only a few yards (meters) away from the dining table. Just imagine not having to go to the store to buy all the food that you and your family need each day to stay healthy. Now imagine all of that in your backyard, or on your roof, or in your basement. That is a very nice thought. Let’s play with the Moon/Mars base food growing facilities for a few moments. The gravel is there. The moment there is an enclosed and pressurized space and a few solar panels are erected, the planting can begin. Tiny very light cubes are used to start the initial plantings. The gravel is graded into ½ to ¾ inch ( 8 to 19mm) size plus or minus a bit, and then placed in easily assembled waterproof grow beds. The fish can have been transported as tiny fry or as a breeding colony (six females and a male produce 30,000 babies per year) along with a few ounces of flake fish food and a small container of duckweed (which doubles in amount every 36 hours in still water)to have a food supply for the fish from day one. The water supposedly is available on the surface or very near the surface both places and the ‘waste’ water from the colonists can be used to supplement the tiny amount needed for the system. Their spacestation system can be up and running in a few hours. This means the Portable Farms Aquaponics Systems will be producing food for the colonists in a matter of weeks and go on producing food forever. The starter medium can be changed over to local dust/rock, the water stays in the system, and the fish can be brought in as a breeding colony and some of the plants can be allowed to mature so they always have new seeds. Imagine a few hundred pounds of supplies can be turned into a perpetual food production facility on the surface of the Moon or Mars. What is even more exciting is when you realize that you can duplicate this feat in your own backyard, rooftop or basement. Imagine the excitement of the future colonist as they take the skills of Certified Aquaponist to the far reaches of the Solar System and beyond. You may not be able to blast into space, but you can prepare for the future by owning your own Portable Farms Aquaponics System and growing your own food in a new and unprecedented way through the technology of aquaponics.

1ac – solvency

 * Contention two is solvency:**

Only an ocean based elevator solves
- Weather because of the equator - Safety because of currents - City island Smitherman 2k [David V, August. Smitherman is Architect, Technical Manager in the Advanced Projects Office, Flight Projects Directorate, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama. Space Elevators: An Advanced Earth-Space Infrastructure for the New Millennium.[] 7/14. Pg 23]//kmc// //4.1 Environmental Issues In this section, environmental issues will be addressed by examining the Earth’s environmental effects on the ground segment, the tower, and the space environmental effects on the space segment of the space elevator. Potential debris impacts and collisions in space are covered primarily as part of the safety issues in section 4.2. 4.1.1// Equatorial Ocean Platform // The baseline concept for the space elevator, illustrated on the cover and in figure 2, is located at the equator on an ocean platform. Initial analysis made the ocean platform attractive for both safety, transportation, and political related reasons. Land locations on islands or mountaintops along the equator are also possible.// The ocean platform provides one of the most remote locations possible for space elevator construction. //This is desirable, especially for the first elevator, in the event of catastrophic failure. As described in earlier sections, the center of mass for the entire space segment of the space elevator would be located at a geostationary orbit directly over one point on the Earth’s equator. In addition, the worst-case weather conditions at the equator are milder than anywhere else on Earth. This makes the equatorial location important from both a construction and stability standpoint .// The location off land is not necessarily detrimental to construction and operational access. If the base is developed as a major port for shipping and air transportation, then it can develop as a city island //(fig. 24). In addition, if the base can be constructed as a floating platform and not be anchored or structurally supported from the ocean floor, then the entire structure would be mobile, such that adjustments in its final location might be possible. A system of this scale will have both international appeal and international issues to be resolved. For that reason, its location in international waters may be an advantage for the space elevator developers by providing freedom from the many additional constraints and safety concerns that might otherwise be imposed by governmental bodies on land. 4.1.//2 Ocean Environmental Issues// Ocean currents at the equator move from east to west except near the surface where there is an equatorial counter current that moves from west to east. Water temperatures from 24–28 °C (75–82 °F) are typical with cold water up-wells along western coastlines near 20 °C (68 °F) periodically. Precipitation is greater than evaporation at the equatorial region, making the ocean less salty at the equator than at higher and lower latitudes .13 Ocean depth along the equator varies to a maximum depth <8 km.21 4.1.3 Atmospheric Conditions Wind conditions in the equatorial regions are calm, varying from near 0 to 16 km/hr year round. Higher wind speeds in the jet stream are <54 km/hr, and have minimal impact due to the low air pressure at higher altitudes. At altitudes of the highest stratospheric balloons, 35–45 km, the wind speed generally does not exceed 180 km/hr. At 25-km altitude the wind speed is <72 km/hr. Lower altitudes have lower wind speeds and higher altitudes have less air pressure, which results in a maximum dynamic pressure at ≈10 km in altitude.22 Of particular interest is that hurricanes are not possible at the equator. The rotation of the Earth causes all winds in hurricanes, tornados, and cyclones to rotate counterclockwise in the Northern Hemisphere and clockwise in the Southern Hemisphere. At the equator the rotation can occur in either direction, but cannot sustain the high concentrations of angular momentum required for the formation of destructive windstorms.13 Rainfall can vary widely from 0.04 to 7.3 m per year, depending on the location along the equator. This has produced some of the most arid lands and tropical rain forests in the world in the equatorial regions.13

More ev—Hawaii is uniquely key—the position in the ocean is key to weather conditions a repairs
van Pelt 09 [Michel, 6/12. van Pelt works as an engineer at ESTEC, the technical centre of the European Space Agency (ESA). Space Tethers and Space Elevators. [|http://books.google.com/books?id=539QDxp-rtQC&pg=PA151&lpg=PA151&dq=equators+key+spot+for+space+elevators&source=bl&ots=T-o2aAY3UO&sig=moplba34imbtC1Yc6w3uj_xg08o&hl=en&sa=X&ei=kMHKU_ukLIH17AaTg4HIBg&ved=0CEAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=equator&f=false] pg 151. 7/19]//kmc// // An important decision in the development of any space elevator is where to connect it to Earth—that is, the location of the anchoring point. As we have seen in Chapter 1 //, this point has to be located on the equator//. A location on land in South America or Africa seems to be a logical choice. However, using a mobile oceangoing platform has many advantages over a ﬁxed location. One is that it makes it possible to move the cable out of the way of major storms and even orbital hazards. Another is that most of the equator runs through the ocean, so that a ﬂoating anchoring point offers a much wider range of possible locations than a land-based connection. It enables the lower end of a space elevator to be put in an area with a maximum of fair weather, a minimum risk of lightning strikes and severe storms, and well away from aircraftroute s//. The equatorial region of the Paciﬁc Ocean appears to be attractive in this respect.// Remote locations on the ocean are also easier to protect againstunwanted visitors such as terrorists seeking to cut a space elevator cable, although setting up a defended no-go zone around the platform in international waters will require new international treaties (Fig. 6.3).

1ac – war

 * Contention 3 Is war:**

No miscalc or escalation—every crisis ever disproves and neither side would launch
Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modem delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forcesinvulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear-weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither sidecan have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is togo on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, thisjudgementwould begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken —that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesi, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. If vital interests have been defined in a way that is dear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably .so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is `If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would meancatastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which 1 a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed —it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it, to a tolerable outcome--the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger, and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor volib wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security ofnuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, Dr the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons , from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried ( in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangementsit no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technicallydemanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which theworld has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in whichknowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, aswell as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by, indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch-- extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolutionimposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of it initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.
 * Quinlan 9** (Michael, Former Permanent Under-Sec. State – UK Ministry of Defense, “Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects”, p. 63-69) *we don’t endorse gendered language

counter-forcing solves escalation of wars

 * Mueller 09 –** Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies and Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University (John, “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda” p. 8, Google Books)

To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations as societal annihilation, a full-out attack with hundreds, probably thousands, of thermonuclear bombs would be required. __Even in__ such __extreme cases, the area actually devastated__ by the bombs' blast and thermal pulse effective __would be limited: 2,000__ 1-MT __explosions__ with a destructive radius of 5 miles each __would__ directly __demolish less than 5 percent of the territory of the United States__, for example. Obviously, if major population centers were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, a number of __studies were conducted to estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks__. One of the most prominent of these considered several probabilities. __The__ most __likely scenario__ --one that could be perhaps considered at least to begin to approach the rational-- __was a "counterforce" strike in which__ well over 1,000 thermonuclear __weapons would be targeted at__ America's ballistic missile __silos__, strategic __airfields__ , __and__ nuclear __submarine bases__ in an effort __to destroy the country’s__ strategic __ability to retaliate. Since the attack would not directly target population centers__, most of the ensuing __deaths would be from__ radioactive __fallout__ , and the study estimates that from __2 to 20 million, depending__ mostly __on__ wind, weather, and __sheltering, would perish__ during the first month.15

No scenario for great power war – laundry list

 * Deudney and Ikenberry, 09–** Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins AND Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (Jan/Feb, 2009, Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival: Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail,” Foreign Affairs, NG)

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, __the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the **intensification of economic globalization**, **thickening institutions**, and shared problems of **interdependence**. The overall structure__ of the international system today __is__ quite __unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities-of pushes and pulls-that **reduce the likelihood of severe conflict** while creating strong imperatives for **cooperative problem solving**.__ Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which __war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely **obsolete.**__ Most important, __nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war__ from a routine feature of international politics __into an exercise in **national suicide**. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons__ and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, __warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts__. Furthermore, __the **diffusion of small arms** and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory__ inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, __states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control__ ; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today __the **density of trade**, **investment**, and **production networks** across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international.__ Taken together, __these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more **primed for peace**__ than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge.

Even the creators of nuclear winter theory acknowledge that nuclear war could never wipe out everyone
** Robock, 10 – ** Professor in the Department of Environmental Scienes at Rutgers University (Alan, May/June 2010“Nuclear Winter”, WIREs Climate Change, (Alan, Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, “Nuclear Winter,” WIREs Climate Change, May/June, Wiley Online Library via University of Michigan Libraries) __While it is important to point out the consequences of nuclear winter, it is also important to point out what will **not** be the consequences__ . __Although extinction of our species was not ruled out in initial studies by biologists, it **now seems** that this **would not take place**. Especially in Australia and New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive__ . Also, __Earth will not be plunged into an ice age. Ice sheets__, which covered North America and Europe only 18,000 years ago and were more than 3-km thick, __take many thousands of years to build up__ from annual snow layers, __and the climatic disruptions would not last long enough to produce them__. The __oxygen consumption by the fires would be inconsequential, as would the effect on the atmospheric greenhouse by carbon dioxide production__. The consequences of nuclear winter are extreme enough without these additional effects, however.

studies assume 5,000 megatons are used and produce 150 teragrams of smoke—that’s 95% of the total world arsenal
We do not conduct detailed new studies of the smoke and dust emissions from nuclear attacks here. Rather, we chose emissions based on previous studies so as to make our results comparable to them. Toon et al. [2007] point out that cities around the world have grown in the past 20 years, so that we would expect smoke emissions to be larger than before for the same targets. We encourage new analyses of the exact amount of smoke that would result, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. Roughly 150 Tg would be emittedby the use of the entire current global nuclear arsenal, with 5000 Mt explosive power , about 95% of which is in the arsenals of the United States and Russia (Table 2), and 50 Tg would be emitted by the use of 1/3 of the current nuclear arsenal.
 * ROBOCK et al 2007** (Alan Robock Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA Luke Oman Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA Now at Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA Georgiy L. Stenchikov Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA, “Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences,” JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH, July 6, American Geophysical Union via University of North Carolina Libraries)

But we won’t use them all and some won’t detonate
What fraction of the 11,000Mt would be exploded in a major nuclear war? This is hard to assess, but almost certainly much will not be exploded. Both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union place a high priority on targeting their opponent's military forces, nuclear forces in particular. A sizable fraction of nuclear arsenals is likely to be destroyed before use (attacks on nuclear submarines, airfields, missile silos), be unavailable for use (submarines in port, missiles cut off from communications) orfail to perform properly.[47] One estimate is that one sixth to one third of superpower arsenals will be used, depending on whether the war occurs suddenly or builds up gradually.[48]
 * MARTIN 1982** (Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modelling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, Current Affairs Bulletin, December, http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/82cab/index.html)

No nuclear winter—150 teragrams of smoke is the key threshold
Figures 5 and 7 also show temperature and precipitation time series for the 50 Tg case for the Iowa and Ukraine locations. The effects here are approximately half those of the 150 Tg case. While these temperature responses are not cold enough tobe classified as nuclear “winter ,” they would still be severe and unprecedented.
 * ROBOCK et al 2007** (Alan Robock Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA Luke Oman Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA Now at Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA Georgiy L. Stenchikov Department of Environmental Sciences, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA, “Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences,” JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH, July 6, American Geophysical Union via University of North Carolina Libraries)

Nuke winter won’t happen even if the theory is correct—arsenals have changed
Other cataclysmic events have proven that the nuclear winter scenario is not at all far-fetched. __The eruption of Mt. Pinatubo__ in the Philippines, also in 1991, threw some 17 million tons of particulates into the upper atmosphere that caused global temperatures to drop by about a degree for several months. Sunlight dropped by 10%. This temperature drop __did not__, however, __have any long-term effect on agriculture__. __Pinatubo was only a blip compared the the K-T extinction event__ of some 65 million years ago, when a theorized asteroid hit us with one hundred million megatons of destructive force, lighting virtually the entire world on fire. The evidence of this is called the K-T boundary, a layer of clay found all around the world. Sunlight was reduced by 10-20% for ten years, which caused a massive cascading extinction of species from plants to herbivores to carnivores. __But we shouldn't expect anything like this to happen from a nuclear war. Times continue to change, including the nature of warfare. Nations no longer stockpile__ the __megaton class weapons__ popular in the 1950s and 1960s; __typical yields now are a fraction of a megaton. The United States' conventional capability is now so good that it can effectively destroy an entire nation's ability to wage large-scale war overnight, using only conventional weapons.__ But that doesn't mean the nuclear forces are no longer needed. Should a superpower strike first against the United States with nuclear weapons, the response would more than likely be nuclear, bringing Mutually Assured Destruction into play. But what about a small nation striking first? What about nukes in the trunks of cars parked in major cities? __In the modern era, it's much less clear that any superpower would necessarily have anyone to shoot back at__. Increasingly, non-superpower nations are building nuclear stockpiles. India and Pakistan might get into it with one another. Israel's foes might surprise it with nuclear weapons. Who knows what North Korea and Iran might do. Smaller regional nuclear wars remain a very real possibility. According to the worst-case estimates in the TTAPS papers, about one million tons of smoke would be expected from the fires resulting from each nuclear strike. And these smaller regional nuclear combats are expected to use about 50 nuclear weapons (compare this to 150 nuclear weapons for a broader global nuclear war). Thus, __today's most likely nuclear scenario would be expected to produce climate effects similar to three Pinatubo events, according to the **worst estimates**, and still **many orders of magnitude** less than the K-T extinction__. And so, while the nuclear winter scenario is a good prediction of the effects of a worst-case scenario, when all the variables are at their least favorable, __the strongest probabilities favor a much less catastrophic nuclear autumn; and even those effects depend strongly on variables like whether the war happens during the growing season__. A bomb in Los Angeles might result in history's worst firestorm, while a bomb in the mountains of Pakistan might create no fires at all. The simple fact is that __there are too many unpredictable variables to know what kind of climate effects the smoke following nuclear fires will produce__, until it actually happens. Obviously we're all very mindful of the many terrible implications of nuclear combat, and if it ever happens, the prospect of a nuclear autumn will likely be among the least of our concerns. The physicist Freeman Dyson perhaps described it best when he said "( __TTAPS is) an absolutely atrocious piece of science__, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight... Who wants to be accused of being in favor of nuclear war?"
 * DUNNING 2011** (Brian, Computer Scientist and award-winning science writer/blogger, “Nuclear War and Nuclear Winter,” Skeptoid #244, Feb 8, http://skeptoid.com/episodes/4244)

=NEG STUFF= AFF: Ocean Drones - 1-off psychoanalysis k / pan k, competitiveness k, environmental security k on case - 2NR: Psychoanalysis AFF: Arctic Mapping - Asia Pivot DA, T-Military, Military CP, Space Tradeoff DA 2NR: Dedevelopment AFF: Aquaculture - T-Its, fronteir k, china da, dedev on case - 2NR: Dedevelopment AFF: NOPP - T-Its, military cp, fronteir k, oil da, export-import politics da - 2NR: Oil DA AFF: Offshore Wind - Consumption K, T-Its, Military CP, Case Defense - 2NR: Consumption K

Camp tournament: AFF: Ocean Drones - Midterms DA, nasa tradeoff da, t-its, prizes cp, consumption k - 2NR: Consumption K AFF: Icebreakers - Midterms DA, navy cp/coast guard tradeoff da, t-military, consumption k - 2NR: Consumption K