Jake+and+Naoli

We are running the South Korea aff with the Korean war and regionalism advantages, plus some preempts.

Naomi-1A/2N Jake- 2A/1N =Plan – 1ac=


 * Plan:**


 * The United States federal government should implement a phased withdrawal of its ground troops in the Republic of Korea.**

=Korea War Adv – 1ac=


 * Advantage _ is Korean Conflict**


 * U.S. presence makes North Korean provocations inevitable and guarantees our draw in**
 * Bandow, 10** – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/3/10, Doug, “Taming Pyongyang,” [], JMP)

Suspicions continue to mount that North Korea torpedoed the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette which sank more than a month ago in the Yellow Sea to the west of the Korean peninsula. Policy makers in both Seoul and Washington are pondering how to respond. __The potential__, even if small, __of renewed conflict on the peninsula demonstrates that today’s status quo is unsatisfactory for all of the North’s neighbors.__ The Korean War ended in an armistice nearly six decades ago. No peace treaty was ever signed; over the years the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea committed numerous acts of war, most dramatically attempting to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a visit to Burma and seizing the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo. Conflict was avoided because the United States, long the senior partner to the Republic of Korea in their military alliance, refused to risk igniting a new conflict. __In recent years the DPRK’s conduct has remained predictably belligerent but constrained__ : fiery threats, diplomatic walk-outs, policy reversals, and unreasonable demands have mixed with occasional cooperative gestures as Washington and Seoul attempted to dissuade the North from developing nuclear weapons. __North Korean relations **recently have been in a down cycle.** Pyongyang has walked out of the__ long-running __Six Party talks__ and failed in its attempt to engage Washington. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy,” which essentially entailed shipping money and tourists north irrespective of the DPRK’s conduct, causing North Korea to downgrade economic and diplomatic contacts and even recently confiscate South Korean investments. Japan’s relations with the North remain stalled over the lack of accounting over the kidnapping of Japanese citizens years ago. __Still, for at least two decades Pyongyang had eschewed military action.__ Shots were fired between South and North Korean ships last November near the disputed boundary in the Yellow Sea, but no harm was done. __Brinkmanship was the DPRK’s standard diplomatic strategy. Triggering a new war was not. Why the North would sink a South Korean vessel is a matter of speculation.__ More critical is the response. Now what? The issue is most pressing in Seoul. South Korean officials say the investigation continues as they seek definitive evidence that a torpedo sunk the Cheonan. The tragedy would be no less if the cause was a mine, but the latter could be dismissed as an unfortunate occurrence rather than deliberate attack. If the sinking was intentional, however, the ROK must respond. To do nothing would reward the North and encourage additional irresponsible action. President Lee Myung-bak has said: “I’m very committed to responding in a firm manner if need be.” One South Korean diplomat suggested to me that __the South will seek Security Council condemnation of the DPRK.__ This is in line with President Lee’s promise “to cooperate with the international community in taking necessary measures when the results are out.” But even if Seoul won Chinese support for a UN resolution, __the ROK would have to take bilateral measures. That certainly would end investment and aid, likely would prevent negotiations and **possibly would entail military retaliation**__**.** __The result__ not only __would__ mean a serious and prolonged worsening of bilateral relations and increase in bilateral tensions, but could __end any chance__ —admittedly today very slim— __of reversing North Korean nuclear development.__ Moreover, a military strike would entail a chance of war. **__Tit-for-tat retaliation might spiral out of control.__** The potential consequences are horrifying. __The ROK nevertheless might be willing to take the risk. Not Washington.__ The United States is cooperating in the investigation and reportedly urging the Lee government to wait for proof before acting. But even if the DPRK is culpable, the last thing the Obama administration wants is another war. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last month: “I hope that there is no talk of war, there is no action or miscalculation that could provoke a response that might lead to conflict.” From America’s standpoint, avoiding a potentially bloody war on the Korean peninsula while heavily involved in Afghanistan and still tied down in Iraq is far more important than South Korean concerns over justice and credibility. The People’s Republic of __China__ also __would be a big loser in any war: refugees would and conflict could spill over the Yalu.__ The North Korean state likely would disappear, leaving a united Korea allied with America and hosting U.S. troops near China’s border. Beijing’s international reputation would suffer as its policy of aiding the North was fully and dramatically discredited. __Japan__ would be less vulnerable to the consequences of war but __could be the target of North Korean attempts to strike out.__ Undoubtedly, Tokyo also would be asked to contribute to the peninsula’s reconstruction. Of course, North Korea and its people would suffer the most. The former would cease to exist. That would be an international good, but **__millions of North Koreans likely would die__** or otherwise suffer along the way. War would be a tragic end to decades of hardship and isolation. What to do? Seoul needs some degree of certainty before acting. So long as the sinking might have been caused by a mine, the ROK cannot act decisively. If a torpedo attack is the most likely cause, however, winning Security Council backing would be a useful step. Then finding the right level of response, including possibly closing the Kaesong industrial park in the North or targeting a North Korean vessel for destruction, would be necessary. If it chooses the latter, the ROK would need Washington’s backing and China’s understanding. Finally, a lot of people in several countries would have to cross their fingers and say some prayers. In any case, the six-party talks would seem kaput. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said the Obama administration remained committed to the negotiations despite the sinking, stating that “I wouldn’t necessarily link those directly.” Yet __the likelihood that Pyongyang would yield its nuclear weapons while sinking South Korean vessels seems **vanishingly small.** Even a minimal possibility of a negotiated settlement should be pursued, but at some point **the effort simply looks foolish.**__ That’s the short-term. Two longer-term issues require attention, however the current controversy is resolved. First, __the__ __U __ nited __S __ tates __and ROK must reconsider their alliance relationship__. Even on the issue of defending against the DPRK their interests differ: Seoul must satiate an angry public desiring vengeance as well as preserve its credibility in confronting the North. **__America must avoid another war at most any cost.__** __Given the South’s level of development, it makes no sense for its defense decisions to be subject to Washington’s veto. Nor does it make any sense for the__ __U __ nited __S __ tates __to **risk being drawn into a war** as a result of acts between other nations. These **bilateral differences are only likely to grow**, especially if the relationship between America and China grows more contentious.__ __Then South Korea could find itself risking involvement in Washington’s war.__ Also involved is the ROK’s self-respect. In two years the U.S. plans on devolving operational control of the combined forces to South Korea. Yet some South Koreans fear their nation won’t be ready to lead its own defense. That Washington took military command in underdeveloped, impoverished South Korea in 1950 is understandable. To argue that America must continue doing so in 2010 is bizarre.

=Korea War Adv – 1ac=


 * Even if a conflict won’t start __intentionally__, current high tensions risk __accidents__ that __escalate__ to global nuclear war**
 * STRATFOR, 10** (5/26/10, “North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula,” [], JMP)

Managing Escalation But __no one, of course, is interested in another war on the Korean Peninsula__. Both sides will posture, but at the end of the day, __neither benefits from a major outbreak of hostilities.__ And despite the specter of North Korean troops streaming under the DMZ through tunnels and wreaking havoc behind the lines in the south (a scenario for which there has undoubtedly been significant preparation), neither side has any intention of invading the other. __So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could precipitate escalation — that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, **the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quite real.**__ Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. __For nearly 40 years, tensions on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War.__ __During that time it was feared that a second Korean War could all too **easily escalate into and a thermonuclear World War III **__, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But __current tensions are **quickly escalating to a level unprecedented** in the post-Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.__

=Korea War Adv – 1ac=


 * The status quo is fundamentally different – nuclear use is now likely and deterrence won’t solve**
 * Chung, 10** – Visiting Professor at the School of International Relations, Nanyang Technological University and former Professor of international relations at Seoul National University (6/1/10, Chung Chong Wook, “The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,” http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0352010.pdf)

The sinking of the Cheonan, for which South Korea blames Pyongyang, has triggered a crisis in the Korean peninsula. Though there is every reason to be pessimistic about the future, there is also a need to look beyond the crisis for long-term regional stability. __SHARPLY RISING military tensions following the sinking of a South Korean naval corvette are **creating a crisis in the Korean peninsula.** It is not the first time that the Korean peninsula is engulfed in a crisis, but **this one is different **. There are good reasons to view the current crisis with grave concern.__ One is the nature of the crisis. __The current imbroglio__ is not an unintended consequence of an accident. Nor was it an act of terrorism. It __was__ what could be __a carefully planned and well-executed act of war__ where a 1,200-tonne naval ship, the Cheonan, was blown into half, killing 46 soldiers -- at least that is the conclusion in South Korea. The Nuclear Factor After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demanding the North’s apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. __The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation.__ __Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North__ .. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. __Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of **all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons.**__ The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but **__North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold__**__. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbours.__ The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable.


 * Reinforcing deterrence just makes __miscalculation__ more likely**
 * Armstrong, 10 –** Professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University (Charles, 5/26/10, CNN, “The Korean War never ended” [])

New York (CNN) -- The Korean War began 60 years ago on June 25, 1950, and it still hasn't ended. Fighting on the Korean Peninsula may have stopped with a cease-fire in July 1953, but North and South Korea have remained in a tense state of armed truce ever since, with open warfare just a hair-trigger away. The sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan on March 26 -- which an international investigation team concluded last week to be the result of a North Korean torpedo attack -- shows how volatile the situation remains between North and South. __There is a real danger of the current war of words escalating into a shooting war, which would be a catastrophe for Korea and the surrounding region. But if all sides, including the United States, pull back from the brink, this tragedy may also present an opportunity to defuse tensions with North Korea and resume talks that have been on hold for the last two years.__ The Cheonan disaster caused an outcry of grief and anger in South Korea. On May 24, South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak gave a forceful speech to his countrymen, asserting that South Korea would not tolerate any provocation from the North and would pursue "proactive deterrence." South Koreans, Lee vowed, "will immediately exercise our right of self-defense" if their territorial waters, airspace or territory are violated." Lee called the sinking of the Cheonan, in which 46 sailors died, a violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Korean War Armistice and said he would turn to the U.N. Security Council for international support in condemning North Korea. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has demanded North Korea face "consequences" for this attack. But North Korea denies involvement in the incident, claiming the whole investigation is a fabrication designed to undermine North-South Korean relations and ignite a war against the North. The North Koreans have said any retaliation against them for the incident would be met with a forceful and immediate response, up to and including all-out war. China has so far been neutral about the investigation's findings, calling the incident a "tragedy" but refusing to blame North Korea and calling for calm on all sides. Without China's support, no call for action against North Korea will make it through the U.N. Security Council. (China is one of the five nations that hold veto power on the Council.) China supported two rounds of U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang, after North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, but is unlikely to support sanctions this time. North Korea denies responsibility for the incident and China regards the evidence as inconclusive. Besides, __it's hard to see what further economic or diplomatic pressure can be put on North Korea, which already faces tough previous sanctions.__ Contrary to common belief, North Korea is not facing internal political disarray or economic decline. Kim Jong Il appears to be fully in charge, and harvests for the last two years have been relatively good. Chinese sources estimate a substantial increase in North Korean industrial production over the last year. Whatever may have motivated the attack on the Cheonan, it was not the act of a desperate or divided regime, and the strong sanctions called for by President Lee -- even if China would agree to support and enforce them -- are not likely to get North Korea to admit responsibility for the attack or to change its behavior. On the other hand, __there is a real danger of this war of words escalating into a shooting war.__ With well over a million Korean troops facing each other across the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South, along with 29,000 U.S. troops in the South, and North Korea now armed with nuclear weapons, the consequences of a renewed Korean War would be catastrophic for the Korean peninsula and the entire Northeast Asia region. __The Cheonan incident has reinforced U.S.-South Korean and U.S.-Japanese cooperation in deterring the North. But **deterrence can look like provocation from the other side, and in such a tense and volatile environment, a slight miscalculation can lead to disaster.** Anger and outrage may be understandable, but cooler heads must prevail. Millions of lives are at stake. Rather than lead to deepening confrontation, this tragedy may be an opportunity to re-engage North Korea in talks__ to scale back and ultimately eliminate its nuclear program, and to promote security and economic cooperation with its neighbors. North Korea has never admitted to acts of terrorism in the past, and we cannot expect it to acknowledge responsibility and apologize for the sinking of the Cheonan as a precondition for such talks. Instead, the international community should take advantage of Kim Jong Il's stated willingness to return to multilateral negotiations, suspended since 2008, as a way of reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. It is time to end the Korean War, not start it anew.

=Korea War Adv – 1ac=

This report examines North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities in the context of its military doctrine and national objectives. It is based on open source literature, interviews and unpublished documents made available to Crisis Group. Companion reports published simultaneously assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and what the policy response of the international community should be to its recent nuclear and missile testing.[1] North Korea’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles pose serious risks to security. __Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities are the greatest threat, but it also possesses a **large stockpile of chemical weapons** and is suspected of maintaining a biological weapons program.__ The Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) had been underway since August 2003 with the objective of ending the North’s nuclear ambitions, before Pyongyang announced its withdrawal in April 2009, but __there is no direct mechanism for dealing with its chemical weapons and possible biological weapons. The North Korean leadership is very unlikely to surrender its WMD **unless there is significant change in the political and security environments.**__ The Six-Party Talks pro­duced a “Statement of Principles” in September 2005 that included a commitment to establish a permanent peace mechanism in North East Asia, but the structure and nature of such a cooperative security arrangement is subject to interpretation, negotiation and implementation. Views among the parties differ, and no permanent peace can be established unless North Korea abandons all its WMD programs. The diplomatic tasks are daunting, and diplomacy could fail. If North Korea refuses to engage in arms control and to rid itself of WMD, the international community must be prepared to deal with a wide range of threats, including those posed by Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities. __Unclassified estimates of the chemical weapons__ (CW) __arsenal are imprecise, but **the consensus** is that the__ Korean People’s Army __(KPA) possesses 2,500-5,000 tons,__ including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun and V-agents (persistent nerve agents). __The stockpile__ does not appear to be increasing but __is **already sufficient** to inflict massive civilian casualties on South Korea.__ The North’s CW can be delivered with long-range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels. North Korean military doctrine emphasises quick offensive strikes to break through enemy defences in order to achieve national military objectives before the U.S. can intervene effectively on behalf of its South Korean ally. However, __the North’s conventional military capabilities are declining against those of its potential foes, so the leadership is likely to rely on asymmetric capabilities for its national security objectives. This strategy poses a significant danger because it risks **deliberate, accidental or unauthorised WMD attacks or incidents.**__
 * Deliberate, accidental or unauthorized CBW use is likely**
 * ICG, 09** (6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” [], JMP)


 * Will __spread globally__ within __six weeks__ – greater risk that nuclear weapons**
 * Levy, 07** (6-8-07, Janet Ellen, The American Thinking, “The Threat of Bioweapons,” [], JMP)

Immediately following 9-11, an anthrax attack originating from letters containing anthrax spores infected 22 people, killing five. After almost six years, the case has not been solved. __Intelligence analysts and academics report that North Korea has developed anthrax, plague, and botulism toxin and conducted extensive research on smallpox, typhoid and cholera.__ A world-renowned bioweapons expert has confirmed that Syria has weapons grade smallpox resistant to all current vaccines developed under the cover of legitimate veterinary research on camelpox, a very closely related virus. The researcher further reports that Syria is suspected of testing the pathogen on prison populations and possibly in the Sudan. Although there are close to 50 organisms that could be used offensively, rogue nations have concentrated their bioweapons development efforts on smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulinum, tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers. With the exception of smallpox, which is exclusively a human host disease, all of the other pathogens lend themselves to animal testing as they are zoonotic, or can be transmitted to humans by other species. __Biological weapons are among the most dangerous in the world today and can be engineered and disseminated to achieve a **more deadly result than a nuclear attack.**__ Whereas the explosion of a nuclear bomb would cause massive death in a specific location, __a biological attack with smallpox could infect multitudes of people across the globe. With incubation periods of up to 17 days, human disseminators could unwittingly cause widespread exposure before diagnosable symptoms indicate an infection and appropriate quarantine procedures are in place.__ Unlike any other type of weapon, __bioweapons__ such as smallpox __can replicate and infect a chain of people over an indeterminate amount of time from a single undetectable point of release. According to__ science writer and author of The Hot Zone, Richard __Preston, "If you took a gram of smallpox__, which is highly contagious and lethal, and __for which there's no vaccine available globally now, and released it in the air and created about a hundred cases, the chances are excellent that **the virus would go global in six weeks**__ as people moved from city to city...... __the death toll could easily hit the hundreds of millions.....**in scale, that's like a nuclear war."**__** [ ** 1] __More so than chemical and nuclear research, bioweapons development programs lend themselves to **stealth development**.__ They are difficult to detect, can be conducted alongside legimate research on countermeasures, sheltered in animal research facilities within sophisticated pharmaceutical corporations, disguised as part of routine medical university studies, or be a component of dual use technology development. Detection is primarily through available intelligence information and location-specific biosensors that test for the presence of pathogens. __Biological weapons have many appealing qualities for warfare and their effects can be engineered and customized from a boutique of possibilities.__ Offensive pathogens are inexpensive compared to conventional weapons and small quantities can produce disproportionate damage. They have unlimited lethal potential as carriers and can continue to infect more people over time. **__Bioweapons are easy to dispense__** __through a variety of delivery systems from a missile, an aerosol or a food product.__ They can be placed into a state of dormancy to be activated at a later stage allowing for ease of storage. __Pathogens are not immediately detectable or identifiable due to varying incubation periods__ and can be rapidly deployed, activated and impossible to trace. The technology to develop biological agents is widely available for legitimate purposes and large quantities can be developed within days.

=Korea War Adv – 1ac=


 * Impact is extinction**
 * Ochs 02** – MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park [Richard, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” Jun 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html]

__Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. __ Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. __While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily__, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. __There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions.__ The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. __With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever.__ Potentially worse than that, __bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation.__ AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. __To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute.__ Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. __We__ truly __hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life.__ Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes. =Korea War Adv – 1ac=


 * And, North Korean aggression and nuclearization will cause intentional, miscalculated, or accidental nuclear conflict – even a limited nuclear war causes rapid cooling and ozone disruption, collapses the economy, and spills over to other hot spots**
 * Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10** – *Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND **Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” [])**

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. __Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years.__ This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. __The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious__, not only for the Northeast Asian region but __for the whole international community.__ At worst, **__there is the__** possibility of nuclear attack 1, **__whether by__** intention, miscalculation, or merely accident **, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities.** On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. __Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.__
 * But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas). __The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees__ Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: **
 * That is not global winter, but __the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years.__ The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow… __The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger__ …To make matters even worse, __such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.__ 4 **
 * These, of course, are not the only consequences. __Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use__ . Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. __The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could__** make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison__**.**__ How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. __There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships__ 5, __with__ subsequent nuclear breakout **and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and** aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

=Korea War Adv – 1ac=

Withdrawing troops is the best response to North Korea’s perception of U.S. weakness – stops it from drawing U.S. forces into a wider conflict Stanton, 10** – U.S. Army Judge Advocate in Korea from 98-02 and practicing attorney in Washington, D.C. (4/12/10, Joshua, The New Ledger, “It's Time for the U.S. Army to Leave Korea,” [], JMP) **

Thus, while I don’t go so far as to accept the Princess Bride Doctrine (”never get involved in a land war in Asia”), __I do not believe it is wise for us to have our forces within easy artillery range of Kim Jong Il, such that he may freely choose the time, place, and manner of our involvement__ I offer two qualifications here. First, __this is not to suggest that we unilaterally abrogate the alliance with South Korea.__ Our air and naval installations in Korea provide useful power-projection capability __**and are far more secure**__, ironically, than our many scattered and isolated Army posts. I can imagine any number of contingencies for which we’d want to have the ability to move people and supplies into South Korea in a hurry. Second, this is not to suggest that Ron Paul is not an anti-Semitic crypto-racist advocate of a thoughtlessly escapist foreign policy, and broadly speaking, an imbecile. This is just one occasion in which he inadvertently, in the fashion of a stopped clock, aligns with the correct result.
 * Proceeding against the advice of my cardiologist, I must concede that for once, Ron Paul is actually on to something. __The ground component of U.S. Forces Korea__, which costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars a year to maintain, __is an__ equally __unaffordable political liability on the South Korean street. We should withdraw it.__ Every Saturday night off-post brawl is a headline in the muck-raking Korean press, for which the American soldier is inevitably blamed, and for which angry mobs perpetually demand renegotiations of the Status of Force Agreement to give Korea’s not-even-remotely-fair judicial system more jurisdiction over American soldiers. **
 * __The South Korean people do not appreciate__ the security __our soldiers__ provide. The way some of them treat our soldiers ought to be a national scandal. Many off-post businesses don’t even let Americans through their front doors. **__The degree of anti-Americanism in South Korea is sufficient to be a significant force protection issue in the event of hostilities.__
 * South Korea does not have our back. South Korea made much of the fact that it sent 3,000 soldiers to Iraq, where they sat behind concrete barriers in a secure Kurdish area of Iraq, protected by peshmerga, making no military contribution and taking no combat casualties. Their contribution to the effort in Afghanistan has been negligible, which is more than can be said of their contribution to the Taliban (previous President Roh Moo Hyun reportedly paid them a ransom of up to $20 million in 2007 to free South Korean hostages who took it upon themselves to charter a shiny new bus to bring Christianity to Kandahar). South Korea has been an equally unsteady ally against China. **
 * __The American security blanket has fostered a state of national adolescence by the South Korean public.__ Too many of them (some polls suggest most) see America as a barrier to reunification with their ethnic kindred in the North. Maybe nothing short of a North Korean attack on the South can encourage more sober thinking by South Koreans about their own security, but I suspect a greater sense of self-reliance and even vulnerability might. **
 * During my service in Korea, as U.S. taxpayers subsidized South Korea’s defense, South Korea subsidized Kim Jong Il’s potential offense with billions of dollars in hard currency that sustained the very threat against which we were ostensibly helping to defend. South Korea never made North Korea’s disarmament a condition of this aid. Instead, that aid effectively undermined U.S. and U.N. sanctions meant to force North Korea to disarm. What does South Korea have to show for this colossal outlay now. **
 * __Because South Korea, now__ one the world’s wealthiest nations, __expects__ up to 600,000 __American soldiers to__ arrive __protect it__ from any security contingency, __successive South Korean governments actually cut their nation’s defense rather than modernizing it and building an effective independent defense.__ Consequently, South Korea still has a 1970-vintage force structure, designed around a 1970-vintage threat, equipped with 1970-vintage weapons. **
 * This is partly the legacy of ten years of leftist administrations, but it’s also the legacy of military welfare that allowed South Korea to defer upgrading its equipment, building a professional volunteer army, and organizing an effective reserve force to deal with security contingencies. Worst of all, South Korea diverted billions of dollars that should have been spent on modernizing its military into regime-sustaining aid to Kim Jong Il, to be used, as far as anyone knows, for nukes, missiles, artillery, and pretty much everything but infant formula. To this day, South Korea continues to resist accepting operational control over its own forces in the event of war. **
 * __The U.S. Army presence in Korea is an anachronism, defending against the extinct threat of a conventional North Korean invasion.__** The far greater danger is that if Kim Jong Il assesses our current president as weak, he will choose more limited or less conventional means to strike at our soldiers and their families. Given the reported presence of Taliban operatives in Seoul, he might even plausibly deny responsibility for an attack.

=Korea War Adv – 1ac=

Independently, withdrawal will motivate South Korea and China to stabilize and de-nuclearize the peninsula Erickson, 10** – Executive Director of CenterMovement.org (5/6/10, Stephen, “End the Cold War in Korea: Bring American Troops Home Before it’s Too Late,” [], JMP) **

South Korea today might well be able to ultimately defend itself against the North, but the bloodshed would be horrific. A key factor in any future conflict is Seoul’s location so near the North. Experts suggest (See “Is Kim Jong-il Planning to Occupy Seoul?” ) that a recently revised North Korean military strategy consists of swiftly taking Seoul and holding the city’s millions of people as hostages. All of this begs a couple of important questions. How many more South Korean ships can be torpedoed before the South retaliates, surely starting a larger war? And, what are 28,000 American troops doing in the middle of this Korean powder keg? As the sinking of the Cheonan clearly indicates, the sparks are already flying. __The permanent US military deployment__ in South Korea __is a Cold War anachronism. There is__ absolutely no reason __**that a nation as advanced and prosperous as South Korea cannot defend itself from its pathetically backward northern brothers and sisters.**__ A well-known night-time satellite image taken from space shows a brilliant South and a North languishing in the Dark Ages. The US presence creates political dysfunction while it minimally protects South Korea. __US soldiers on South Korean soil breed resentment.__ Thousands of nationalist South Korean students regularly take to the streets to protest the Americans soldiers in their country and to call for unification between North and South. South Korean and US government policies are often awkwardly out of step with each other, with America often having the far more hawkish posture, as it did during the W. Bush years. __American security guarantees have perhaps sometimes led the government of the South to engage in policies of inappropriate appeasement toward the North.__ __The threat of South Korea investing in nuclear weapons to counter the North might,__ for example, __finally__ persuade China to put sufficient pressure of North Korea. **A South Korea determined to match North Korean nuclear weapons development might paradoxically** further the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. __Most crucially__, from an American point of view, __the US Army is stretched too thin to play much of a role in protecting South Korea.__ As things stand, __American soldiers are little more than targets for North Korean artillery and missiles. A defense of Seoul,__ its re-conquest, __and forcible regime change in the North are all beyond US military capabilities at this time, given its commitments elsewhere.__ US participation on the ground in a new Korean War would also stress the US federal budget beyond the breaking point. The United States never properly created a new foreign and defense policy when the Cold War ended. Instead, it has generally maintained its Cold War military posture, with bases and commitments strewn throughout the globe, even as new challenges since 911 have called American forces to new missions. __The US military presence in Korea is a Cold War artifact that needs to be brought home before it’s too late.__
 * On the night of March 26 the South Korean 1,200-ton warship Cheonan patrolled the boundary waters between North and South Korea. At 10:45 an explosion near the bow rocked the vessel and sank the Cheonan, taking the lives of 46 crew members with it. Although the investigation is still ongoing, the South Korean Defense Minister has declared that a torpedo is the likeliest source of the blast. __North Korea appears to have destroyed the South Korean warship.__**
 * Normally such an unprovoked attack would start a war, but the Korean peninsula is not a normal place. The Koreans, with their strong sense of nationalism, remain divided along the 38th parallel, with a 2.5 mile “demilitarized zone” between them. Meanwhile approximately 28,000 US troops still help guard the border. An armistice formally ended hostilities in Korea in 1953, but officially the war never ended. No peace treaty was ever signed. One year ago, the North formally and ominously withdrew from the armistice. **
 * North Korea, a tiny country with the world’s 4th largest standing army, is the most militarized society in the world. It has a standing army of 1.2 million soldiers, and a peasant militia with as many as 4 million reserves. Some 13,000 artillery pieces, dug into the hills within range of the South Korean capital of Seoul, are poised to obliterate the South’s most important city upon “The Dear Leader’s” command. Some estimates suggest that as many as one million South Koreans could die under such an assault. Then there’s the matter of North Korea’s several nuclear weapons. **
 * __South Korea__, officially the “Republic of Korea,” __has about half as many soldiers as the North, but they are__** better trained and far better equipped. South Korea is wealthy and technologically advanced. North Korea has half the population and 1/30th the economy of the South. While the rulers of the North live lavishly, famine killed a million people in the 1990s, and the United Nation’s World Food Program is worried that this year may witness the worst food shortages since then. Starving people can be dangerous people. Historically North Korea uses its military, its only strength, as leverage to obtain outside assistance.

__ Regionalism Adv – 1ac __

Advantage _ is Regionalism

U.S. alliance relationships are unsustainable – Asian powers should develop a regional security strategy that __does not__ rely on the U.S. – solves WMD terrorism, tame China, prevents Sino-Japan conflict, Japan imperialism, solve resource conflicts and stop major power domination Francis, 06** – former Australian Ambassador to Croatia and fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University from 05-06 (Fall 2006, Neil, Harvard International Review, “For an East Asian Union: Rethinking Asia's Cold War Alliances,” [], JMP) **

China is now the world’s second-largest economy, almost two-thirds as large as the United States in terms of domestic purchasing power. In 2005 China overtook Japan to become the world’s third-largest exporter of goods and services. In 2004 it was the third-largest trading partner with ASEAN; the second largest with Japan, Australia, and India; and the largest with the Republic of Korea. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has estimated that in 2004, in purchasing power parity dollar terms, China’s military expenditure was US$161.1 billion, the second highest in the world. The Pentagon has estimated that in 2005 China’s military expenditure was two to three times larger than its official figure of US$29.9 billion. China’s growing economic and military strength along with the United States’ preoccupation with its new security agenda has made some East Asian countries increasingly apprehensive. __Particularly since September 11, bilateral military alliances have become less relevant to US security interests, and the__ __U __ nited __S __ tates __will likely reduce its military presence in the East Asian region.__ Parts of Asia believe that Chinese hegemonic aspirations for East Asia could emerge if the United States were to disengage from the region. Fear of China and the possibility that it harbors hegemonic aspirations were among the factors that led to the creation of ASEAN in 1967 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. Engaging China in an East Asian union in the future would ensure it will pay a high price in loss of trade and investment if it acts against the interests of the union’s other members. Prospects for an East Asian Community In December 2005 ASEAN hosted an inaugural East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The summit involved the 10 ASEAN countries; the ASEAN+3 countries of China, Japan, and South Korea; as well as Australia, New Zealand, and India. The summit declaration of December 14, 2005, described the meeting as a forum for “dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.” The declaration also noted that the summit could “play a significant role in community building in this region.” ASEAN would work “in partnership with the other participants of the East Asian Summit,” but ASEAN was to retain leadership, preventing control of East Asian community building by either the ASEAN+3 countries, which China could dominate, or the 16 EAS countries, which some felt could steer the EAS toward what would be an unwelcome “Western” agenda. It remains to be seen whether an East Asian community can emerge under ASEAN leadership. ASEAN is an association: it is not a strong regional institution with common interests and objectives. It reflects the diversity of its membership, which has traditionally preferred an unstructured organization, a consensus approach to decision making, and avoidance of controversial issues or intervention in the affairs of its members. The ASEAN Way under Challenge ASEAN’s ways, however, may be changing. Since the late 1990s ASEAN’s non-intervention principle has come under challenge. In 1997 ASEAN was faced with an Asian economic crisis triggered by currency speculators and in 1997 to 1998 with a regional pollution haze problem caused by illegal land-clearance fires in Indonesia. ASEAN’s ineffectiveness in these crises brought internal scrutiny to bear on ASEAN’s policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, since 1999 ASEAN foreign ministers have discussed these and other transnational problems—illegal migration, terrorism, and the drug trade—that call for collective responses. They have also considered allowing ASEAN to oversee electoral and governance processes within member states. In 1999 a number of ASEAN countries defied the long-standing ASEAN position that East Timor was an internal matter for Indonesia and sent peace-keeping forces to the island to help quell the violence instigated there by anti-independence militia backed by Indonesian armed forces. In 2005 ASEAN placed public pressure on the government of Myanmar to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit Myanmar and assess what progress had been made in human rights and democratization. With the aid of the United States and European Union, ASEAN also persuaded Myanmar to relinquish its role as ASEAN chair. ASEAN’s actions in the 1990s suggest increased sensitivity to the negative effects of individual member nations on the organization’s international standing as well as the beginning of openness toward intervention in the domestic affairs of its members. Toward Realization At its December 2005 summit, ASEAN agreed to institute an ASEAN Charter by 2020 to provide what Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi has called a “mini-constitution,” a document that will establish an institutional framework for ASEAN as well as a legal identity recognized by the United Nations. The older members—Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—want ASEAN to become something more than an association. Institutionally strong and mostly democratic, they might more readily welcome a rules-governed organization similar to the European Union. Others with institutionally weak, authoritarian governments, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, are wary of placing their domestic policies under greater international scrutiny and favor the status quo. If the former nations prevail it will augur well for the realization of an East Asian community with the potential to evolve into an East Asian Union. __An East Asian community__ composed of the 16 EAS participants would represent more than 60 percent of the world’s population and possess a combined GDP greater than the European Union. It __could provide significantly increased trade benefits to its members, help dampen Sino-Japanese rivalry, ease the present tensions in the region over Japan’s Pacific War, encourage more cooperative attitudes toward the issue of natural resource exploitation in East Asia, promote engagement over containment, and__ prevent domination of the region by any major power__**.**__ The determining factor will be ASEAN’s ability to provide the leadership necessary to create a strong, independent East Asian Union.
 * At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States established bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific intended to contain Soviet and Chinese communist expansion in the region. __US security strategy now focuses largely on combating terrorism and denying weapons of mass destruction to so-called rogue states. It is a strategy that cannot be implemented with geographic mutual defense treaties formed to address conventional military threats.__ Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq that it is prepared to pursue its global security interests unilaterally, even at the risk of its political relations with traditional alliance partners. __What happened over Iraq between the__ __U __ nited __S __ tates __and its European allies could equally happen between the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __and its Asian allies over__ Taiwan or __North Korea with serious consequences for the interests of countries in that region. East Asian powers need to develop a collective security strategy for the region that__** does not rely __**on the**__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates’ __participation.__ Prudence suggests that East Asian countries need to take the opportunity offered by the recently inaugurated East Asian Summit (EAS) to begin the process of developing an East Asian community as the first step toward the realization of an East Asian Union. This will occur only if led by a strong, proactive Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

__ Regionalism Adv – 1ac __

Regionalism is currently halfhearted – only a __clear sign__ of U.S. withdrawal can motivate __sustainable__ regional security cooperation Carpenter and Bandow 4 - * ** Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND **Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute ** ( ** Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 160-161)DR

__The security treaties with the United States and the U.S. troop presence allow the diversion of financial resources to domestic priorities. And relying on the United States for security **avoids painful debates about what kind of policy those countries need to pursue.**__ The U.S. security blanket is entirely too comfortable for Washington’s clients. **__Without a decisive move by the United States__** __to take away that security blanket by a certain date, changes in the security posture of South Korea and Japan will be very slow to occur.__ Second, __the United States should encourage the various nations of East Asia to take greater responsibility for the security and stability of their region. In **limited and at times hesitant ways** that process is taking place even without U.S. encouragement. ASEAN has begun to address security issues,__ most notably taking an interest in the disorders in Indonesia that threatened to spiral out of control in the late 1990s and that continue to pose a problem. Australia assumed a leadership role in helping to resolve the East Timor crisis. It was revealing that Canberra became more proactive after the United States declined to send peacekeeping troops or otherwise become deeply involved in that situation. 37 __According to the conventional wisdom that U.S. leadership is imperative lest allies and client states despair and fail to deal with regional security problems, Australia’s actions suggest just the opposite. **When countries in a region facing a security problem cannot offload that problem onto the United States, they take action to contain a crisis and defend their own interests.**__ More recently, Australia has developed a more defined and robust regional strategy. In a June 2003 speech, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that Australia would not necessarily turn to the United Nations before acting in crises that could affect its security. Instead, Canberra was prepared to join— and sometimes even lead— coalitions of the willing to address urgent regional challenges. Downer spoke as Australia prepared to send 2,000 police officers and supporting military personnel to the Solomon Islands, which had experienced such an epidemic of violence and corruption that it verged on being a failed state. Earlier, Prime Minister John Howard had told Australian lawmakers that having failed states in its neighborhood threatened Australia’s interests, because such states could become havens for criminals and political extremists. 38 Perhaps most revealing, the Australian government plans to double its defense spending over the next three years with the intent of becoming a much more serious military player. 39 Third, Washington should indicate to Tokyo that it no longer objects to Japan’s assuming a more active political and military posture in East Asia. Quite the contrary, U.S. officials ought to adopt the position that, as the principal indigenous great power, Japan will be expected to help stabilize East Asia, contribute to the resolution of disputes, and contain disruptive or expansionist threats that might emerge. Washington also should use its diplomatic influence to encourage political and security cooperation between Japan and its neighbors, but __U.S. policymakers must not let East Asian apprehension about a more assertive Japan dictate American policy and keep the United States in its role as regional policeman. It is reasonable to explore with Tokyo avenues of cooperation in those areas where there is a sufficient convergence of interests__. That cooperation should not, however, take the form of a new alliance. __Proposals to reform and strengthen the alliance are unwise.__ 40 __They will perpetuate Japan’s unhealthy dependence on the United States even as they arouse China’s suspicions of a U.S.–Japanese attempt to contain the People’s Republic.__ An ongoing security dialogue and occasional joint military exercises would be more appropriate than a formal alliance for East Asia’s security needs in the twenty-first century. Elaborate, formal treaty commitments are a bad idea in general. They are excessively rigid and can lock the United States into commitments that may make sense under one set of conditions but become ill-advised or even counterproductive when conditions change. Beyond that general objection, a U.S.–Japanese alliance would be likely to create special problems in the future. Such an alliance would provide tangible evidence to those in the People’s Republic who contend that Washington is intent on adopting a containment policy directed against China. 41 __The United States should retain the ability to work with Japan and other powers if Beijing’s ambitions threaten to lead to Chinese dominance of the region, but Washington must be wary of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. An informal security relationship with Japan would preserve the flexibility to block China’s hegemony, if that danger emerges, without needlessly antagonizing Beijing. **America still can have a potent power projection capability with a reduced military presence based in Guam and other U.S. territories in the central and west-central Pacific.**__

**__ Regionalism Adv – 1ac __**


 * Specially, withdrawal will reduce Korea’s veto of multilateral security mechanisms – yielding a peace system on the peninsula that prevents great power war**
 * Lee, 09** – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” [|www.cfr.org], JMP)

Korea’s Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. __Since__ 19 __88__, __Korea has advocated regional security cooperation, and in__ 19 __94__ , __Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue__ (NEASED) __at the ASEAN Regional Forum__ (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism.6 From Korea’s perspective, a semi-regional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements. Second, __a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement, as it includes all the global powers except the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">E __ uropean __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nion. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. __The high concentration of superpowers in Northeast Asia poses a threat to Korea because **an outbreak of great-power conflict in the region will definitely devastate Korea, if not the world.** Therefore, **Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism** that increases transparency among global powers and functions as a confidence-building measure.__ Third, __voluntary or involuntary betrayal by the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts.__ Some Koreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chung-hee government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea, and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when the United States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in 1980. They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes against North Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy stance of the George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea. __A multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia will mitigate the security concern of Korea when the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __either voluntarily or involuntarily defects from its commitment to Korea.__ Fourth, __multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is necessary to **establish a peace system on the Korean peninsula** and ultimately unify Korea.__ Many Korean people doubt that the major powers, including the United States, want the unification of the Korean peninsula. __Korea wants to deal with these powers transparently through a multilateral security cooperation mechanism.__ Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Korea’s external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. __Making exclusive ties with the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __may be a high-risk investment in a past hegemon__, while exclusive ties with China would be a high-risk investment in an uncertain future. __In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea.__ __A multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia appeals to Korea, so **if voice and loyalty in the U.S.-Korea relationship do not reveal positive correlations, then Korea will pay more attention to multilateral regional options.**__ Moreover, **__if the U.S. capability and credibility in delivering its security promises to alliance partners are questioned, there will be fewer veto powers in Korean politics against a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia__**__, particularly when such an option still maintains a loose form of the U.S.-Korea alliance.__

**__ Regionalism Adv – 1ac __**


 * Accelerating U.S. withdrawal is key to catalyze a multipolar balance of power in the region and pave the way for an off-shore balancing strategy.**
 * Espiritu, 06** – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” [], JMP)

Can the U.S. live with the risk of an unstable Korean Peninsula? The obvious answer is “no.” It is clear that a stable Korean peninsula is more beneficial to the United States. Clearly North Korea is a major player to determining whether the Korean Peninsula remains stable. One would argue __as long as the current regime of Kim Jung Il remains in power and continue to pursue WMD__ (i.e. Nuclear weapons) __there will be a **permanent unstable scenario** in the region.__ 62 On the other hand, __as long as the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __remains in the region and continues to be forward deployed in South Korea__, that __the U.S. is contributing to such instability in the region.__ According to Revere, if there is an unstable region (Korean Peninsula), the U.S. goals become harder to achieve.63 __Should an unstable Korean Peninsula exist, this could possibly lead to conflicts in the region, most obvious between the Koreas__ ; promote unhealthy economic competition in the region, whereas more developed nations (Japan, China) do not provide any form of economic assistance to the Koreas; __and more dangerously a weapons/arms race (maybe to include more nuclear weapons in the region) to maintain a power balance.__ In order to strengthen regional stability, the U.S. would need to succeed in countering terrorism, enhancing economic prosperity, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy, and addressing transnational issues.64 At what cost and risks is the U.S. willing to accept in order to achieve stability in the region? Conclusion The United States cannot live with the risks involved in an unstable region. The Korean Peninsula and the East-Asia Pacific region are home to many of the economic giants worldwide. Additionally, __with the rising cost of economic commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. must rethink alternatives to bring stability in__ the East-Asia Pacific region more specifically, __the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. must continue to pursue peace and stability__ using all elements of national power certainly __using **less emphasis on a military solution**.__ Additionally, __the U.S. must selectively engage the Koreas to bring stability to the Korean Peninsula by pursuing a combined strategy of isolationism and off-shore balancing.__ Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic solutions take time. __Perhaps by using other countries particularly in the region would be beneficial to the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __but also to the other countries as well.__ Strategic positioning of U.S. troops not only around the Korean Peninsula but throughout the world is the key to pursuing the National Objectives. __By pursuing a stable Korean Peninsula without heavy U.S. involvement is beneficial both internationally and economically.__ __Accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. troops, could lead to a multi-polar balance of power in the region.__ 65 Obviously, this would require a significant change in foreign policy and power position in the region; __it would certainly cause other nations to reconsider their national security strategy.__ All in all, in a speech given by James A. Kelley, stated that “Regional stability remains our overarching strategic goal and provides the underpinnings for achievement of other key goals and objectives.”66 Finally, as stated in the 2006 QDR, “Victory can only be achieved through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power.” 67 __Perhaps by completely withdrawing all U.S. troops from South Korea could potentially lead to one of these successes and bring stabilization to the region without heavy U.S. involvement. It is possible by taking the “let them work it out” (the Koreas) approach would certainly be advantageous to the U.S.__ The time is now for the Eagle to head home.

=Regionalism Adv – 1ac=


 * Independently, U.S. presence saps South Korea’s desire to develop its own independent defense and diplomatic strategy and boost morale to effectively deter North Korea**
 * Wook-Sik, 06** – representative of the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea (Cheong, 4/4/06, “ROK-U.S. Alliance: More Harm Than Good” [])

Considering all these figures, we can estimate that South Korean contributions during 2001 to 2010 will amount to a total of 32 billion dollars! This is more than twice the value of the American military equipment in South Korea. Thirdly, __there is also an invisible cost.__ Namely, __we have to consider the **psychological factor** that the ROK-U.S. alliance has on the Korean military and Korean elite groups.__ These individuals' belief that it is America that salvaged Korea from the debris of the Korean War and it is America that is the almighty superpower in the world has led to their almost blind dependence on America. __It is **particularly noticeable** in two aspects. One is the so-called notion that "without America, Korea can do nothing." The other is their addiction to the advanced American weapons. **The psychological reliance** on the U.S. has paved the way for their obsequious willingness to accept the American demands in an irrationally desperate desire to keep the alliance. Unfortunately, it fundamentally nipped in the bud the South Korean military's plans of **forming its own independent defense strategy.**__ __Marveling at the state-of-the-art American weaponry, these Koreans also began to **display a pathological envy syndrome.** Instead of thinking "how to make better use of our own arms," Korean military elites are now more inclined to think "how can we get those glitzy weapons that America has?"__ This is like a child who hangs out with another boy from a rich family background and starts to beg his parents to buy him the expensive toys that his rich friend has without considering his family's economic situation. This obsessive dependence on and kowtowing to what America stands for is widespread among many South Korean elites and military personnel. __This irrational reliance on America consequently has taken a heavy toll on the military's most important__, yet invisible __asset__ , i.e., **__morale__**__.__ While __South Korea__ has among the world's finest military tactical capacities, it __lacks the mental readiness to go about establishing its own independent strategic map. While South Korean soldiers are equipped with better arms, are better trained and better fed than their Northern counterparts, they are **brainwashed** into believing that they cannot defeat North Korea without U.S. help.__ The criticism that "the ROK-U.S. alliance spoiled the Korean military" came from this context. Fourthly, __if South Korea continues to remain trapped in its American alliance, it will **<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">significantly limit ** it from exploring other avenues of security planning.__ In economic terms, this is the opportunity cost of the alliance. This opportunity cost can be discussed in two parts. One is defense and the other is diplomacy. With regard to defense, as mentioned before, __the tremendous cost for hosting the U.S. military bases and the ensuing psychological reliance on America has become a conscious or unconscious rationale that has **<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">made it impossible for South Korea to establish its own independent defense strategy.**__ For example, South Korea provided 20 billion dollars from 1991 to 2000 for the hosting of the USFK. This amount is well over the 14 billion dollars for the U.S. military equipment value. If the 32 billion dollars, which is the South Koreas estimated cost to keep the U.S. military bases during 2001-2010, are re-channeled to upgrade South Koreas own military capacity, the map of South Korea's military would be much different from the one that we see now. Another front is on the diplomatic side. __Security can be gained by two means -- defense and diplomacy. South Korea's security__, however, __has not been able to detach itself from relying on the U.S. alliance frame, resulting in the downgraded roles of its own diplomacy. For the ROK, enhancing security through diplomatic channels means first, to remove the existing threats from North Korea through reconciliation, cooperation and peaceful coexistence. **Secondly, it means preparing for an East Asia regional cooperative security mechanism by improving relations with neighboring countries, including China, Japan and Russia.**__ __It also means Korea's contribution to world peace by actively participating in international diplomacy, including the United Nations. Unfortunately, the U.S.-Korea alliance has been more of a source that consumed the latter's potential to enhance its own security through diplomacy. **It has also led to the downfall of its diplomacy to be a mere rubber stamp for Washington.**__ When the former Kim Dae Jung administration attempted to improve its relations with North Korea and other neighboring countries, it created a cacophony in the Korea-America alliance. This speaks volumes. __Generally speaking, when diplomacy becomes larger, it tends to decrease the role of defense. However, in South Korea, where the ROK-U.S. alliance is de-facto all the security it has, we saw a case in which an increase in its diplomacy led to a strain of its alliance with America.__

**__ Regionalism Adv – 1ac __**


 * Strengthening the East Asian regional security architecture key to solve terrorism, territorial disputes, disease, environmental degradation, and maritime security**
 * Nanto, 08** – Specialist in Industry and Trade Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Services (1/4, “East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy,” www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf)

__A stronger **regional security organization** in East Asia could play a role in quelling terrorism__ by violent extremists. Since terrorism is a transnational problem, __the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __relies on international cooperation to counter it. Without close multilateral cooperation, there are simply too many nooks and crannies for violent extremists to exploit.__ 101 Currently, most of that cooperation is bilateral or between the United States and its traditional allies. While the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3, for example, have addressed the issue of terrorism, neither has conducted joint counter-terrorism exercises as has the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Neither organization as a group, moreover, has joined U.S. initiatives aimed at North Korean nuclear weapons (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative). Meanwhile, __tensions continue across the Taiwan Strait, and disputes over territory and drilling rights have flared up between China and Japan and between Japan and South Korea.__ (For the United States, __there is a growing possibility of nationalist territorial conflicts between two or more U.S. allies.__ 102) The North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved; North Korea has conducted tests of ballistic missiles and a nuclear weapon; and the oppressive military rule in Burma/Myanmar continues. __Added to these concerns are__ several regional issues: __diseases__ (such as avian flu, SARS, and AIDS), __environmental degradation, disaster mitigation and prevention, high seas piracy, and weapons proliferation__. Memories of the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis still haunt policy makers in Asian countries. These are some of the major U.S. interests and issues as the United States proceeds with its policy toward a regional architecture in East Asia. Since this policy is aimed at the long-term structure of East Asian nations, it can be separated, somewhat, from current pressing problems. A metric by which any architecture can be evaluated, however, is how well it contributes to a resolution of problems as they now exist or will exist in the future.


 * Territorial disputes draw in great powers --- causes World War 3**
 * Waldron, 97** – professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College and an associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard (March 1997, Arthur, Commentary, “How Not to Deal with China,” EBSCO)

__MAKING THESE flash-points all the more volatile has been a dramatic increase in the quantity and quality of China's weapons acquisitions.__ An Asian arms race of sorts was already gathering steam in the post-cold-war era, driven by national rivalries and the understandable desire of newly rich nation-states to upgrade their capacities; but the Chinese build-up has intensified it. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's current build-up is part and parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and international openness toward repression and irredentism. Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most importantly from Russia. The latest multibillion-dollar deal includes two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the much-feared SS-N-22 cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis anti-missile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American aircraft carriers. This is in addition to the Su-27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kilo-class submarines, and other force-projection and deterrent technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft, missiles, and submarines--and considering nuclear options. __The sort of unintended escalation which started two world wars could arise from any of the conflicts around China's periphery. It nearly did so__ in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of intimidation, fired ballistic missiles __in the Taiwan Straits. It could arise from a Chinese-Vietnamese confrontation__, particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the Chinese, as they did in 1979, and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should tip in the direction of Hanoi. __It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among Tibetans__, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China. __Chains of alliance or interest, perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself**, could easily draw in neighboring states--**Russia, or India, or Japan--or the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates.


 * Withdrawal will spur peaceful negotiations and inter-Korean peace**
 * Feffer, 04** – contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and the author of //North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis// (6/23/04, John, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” [], JMP)

The vortex of Korean politics can make even Donald Rumsfeld sound like the most radical Korean peace activist. "After the cold war," he declared on June 3, "U.S. forces have been stationed in South Korea for too long." The occasion was the announcement of the largest U.S. troop reductions from the Korean peninsula since the Korean War armistice, which took place 51 years ago this month. The Pentagon is withdrawing one-third of its forces from South Korea and sending a portion of them to Iraq. Since this announcement comes at a time not of relative tranquility but rather of heightened tensions between the United States and North Korea, some critics have charged the Bush administration with sacrificing security in East Asia on the altar of its Iraq policy. "Scavenging troops from South Korea," writes Jon Wolfstahl in the International Herald Tribune, "sends exactly the wrong signal at the wrong time to U.S. allies and adversaries alike." These critics are missing the point. American troops are no longer needed on the Korean peninsula. The Bush administration's only mistake is in not going far enough. __An even more dramatic withdrawal of U.S. troops would__ not compromise security and could even **__help unknot the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang.__** The Pentagon announcement comes just before a third round of Six-Party Talks that bring together the United States, North and South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. The previous two rounds went nowhere and expectations for this third round are low. The United States is insisting on CVID or the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear programs – before any substantive compromise can be hammered out. Having declared North Korea beyond the pale, the Bush administration is stuck in a theological hole: any form of negotiations looks suspiciously like "supping with the Devil." North Korea, meanwhile, has broached various scenarios whereby they freeze and then dismantle their programs in exchange for energy, economic incentives, security guarantees, or a mixture of the three. It might seem strange that the United States is reducing its military footprint on the Korean peninsula at this juncture. The Pentagon points out that the current plan has been on the drawing board since the end of the Cold War. Troops in fixed positions with slow-moving tanks, according to the Pentagon, fight yesterday's wars. Today's conflicts require rapid response units that can move quickly and over long distances. U.S. military presence in Korea – as well as in Japan – is being refashioned for the instantaneous demands of the virtual age and to intervene in areas further south as part of the "war on terrorism." This restructuring was first delayed in the early 1990s during the first nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea. Why, during a second and potentially more serious crisis, is the restructuring moving forward? Certainly the immediate need for troops in the Iraq occupation is one reason. The deeper issue, however, is the declining utility of American troops on the Korean peninsula. North Korea's conventional forces have deteriorated in strength over the last twenty years, even as Pyongyang has directed large portions of its stagnant government budget toward the military. South Korea's armed forces, which include 690,000 troops, have meanwhile steadily improved its capability. Because of the high cost of fuel and the lack of critical spare parts, North Korean military pilots train 13 hours a year, which is what an American pilot easily clocks in a month. Or to give another example of the growing disparity of forces, South Korea has the luxury to spend between ten and one hundred times more per soldier for their equipment and other needs. Given the dramatic reversal of comparative strength between North and South, the tiny U.S. contingent – around 5 percent of South Korean troop strength – does not bring much to the table. __The U.S. decision in 2003 to redeploy U.S. forces away from the DMZ has eliminated their function as a tripwire__, the first line of defense against a North Korean invasion. Military boosters emphasize the symbolic value of U.S. troops in demonstrating the unwavering commitment of the United States to its alliance with South Korea and to deter any North Korean attack on the South. But even this symbolism has become drained of meaning. South Korea under Roh Moo-Hyun wants more equality in its relations with the United States, which translates into greater control over military affairs. Younger South Koreans now see the United States – or, to be more precise, the trigger-happy unilateralism of the Bush administration – as more dangerous than North Korea. U.S. deterrent capacity, meanwhile, now resides in firepower based largely outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, both based in Japan. As it did fifty years ago, U.S. airpower can reduce North Korea to rubble. North Korean leaders recognize that any attack they might launch across the DMZ would thus be suicidal. The presence of the remaining 25,000 U.S. troops does not alter this calculus. Although they have only a minor military function and declining symbolic value, __the remaining U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula can play a vital new role: bargaining chip.__ __North Korea has argued that it is under threat of U.S. attack and considers U.S. troops in South Korea a longstanding provocation.__ So __let's try something new by putting U.S. troop presence on the negotiating table.__ With the advice and consent of our South Korean allies, the Bush administration should offer a timetable for the removal of all U.S. troops from the peninsula. A Democrat would be hard pressed to offer such a deal. When Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula, he hit major resistance from Washington insiders. Only the hawks in Washington have the political capital to push through a complete withdrawal. The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea would certainly have its drawbacks. South Korea is spending more now on its defense than ever before and the Defense Ministry has called for an additional 13 percent increase in the military budget to compensate for the disappearing U.S. troops. The peace movement in Japan and Okinawa also want to bid farewell to U.S. troops, so the shifting of U.S. forces eastward, while a boon for the Korean peace movement, would not necessarily be a plus for the region as a whole. Still, __U.S. troop withdrawal from the Korean peninsula would be such an **enormous step toward resolving inter-Korean tensions** that the benefits outweigh the costs.__ Beset on all sides for its Iraq policy, the Bush administration needs a foreign policy victory. It needs to demonstrate that it isn't ignoring the Korean peninsula. And it needs to show the world that the United States, if only after 51 years, does eventually bring home its troops.


 * Troops in South Korea not key to U.S. heg**
 * Bandow, 06** – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (9/8/06, Doug, “The Korean Imbroglio: Disengage and Ignore,” [], JMP)

More broadly, __U.S. Troops are said to cement U.S. influence or prevent a regional arms race. However, there’s no evidence that the garrison in the South adds anything to the influence that comes naturally from being the globe’s sole superpower. Nor has America’s force presence stopped__ the People’s Republic of __China from upgrading its military__ ; better that front-line allied states take responsibility for their region’s security rather than rely on Washington.


 * Air Force and Navy presence preserve deterrence**
 * Feffer, 04** –contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and the author of //North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis// (6/23/04, John, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” [], JMP)

__U.S. deterrent capacity__, meanwhile, __now resides in firepower based largely outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, both based in Japan.__ As it did fifty years ago, __U.S. airpower can reduce North Korea to rubble. North Korean leaders recognize that any attack they might launch across the DMZ would thus be suicidal. The presence of the remaining 25,000 U.S. troops does not alter this calculus.__


 * Troops have already been reduced – U.S. doesn’t see them as key to deterrence**
 * Bandow, 05** – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (Fall 2005, Doug, National Interest, “Seoul Searching,” vol. 81, EBSCO, JMP)

The __Bush__ Administration __also seems to think that South Korea is better prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forces south__ --essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fifty years-- __and cutting the American garrison by one-third suggest that Washington no longer believes its military presence to be central to the ROK's security.__ As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly taking the lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missions and some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship going forward." __Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be more complicated but would **not be aided by conventional troop deployments.**__ To the contrary, __America's force presence exacerbates the problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostages within range of Pyongyang's weapons.__ Whether Washington ended up holding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Korea to create its own nuclear deterrent, __the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __would gain nothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in the South.__


 * U.S. will still preserve deterrence through long-range strike capabilities**
 * Espiritu, 06** – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” [], JMP)

Even though we are already reducing the number of U.S. troops in the region, one alternative to the current policy is to accelerate the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in the region. resident Bush announced a major restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War.27 This restructuring essentially decreases the U.S. military footprint on foreign soil to allow better flexibility for the military of the challenges of the 21st century. A plan to withdraw as well as to reduce troops over the next 10 years will give “our service members more time on the home front and fewer moves over a career.” 28 __A more aggressive alternative to the current policy would be to completely withdraw all U.S. troops in the region.__ There are certain risks involved if U.S. troops completely withdraw in the Korean Peninsula. One risk of complete withdrawal would result in an immediate power struggle in the region. Nations such as China, Japan, and even South Korea will certainly have to rethink their own National Security policy therefore contributing to regional fallout. __Any rapidly changing relationship between North and South Korea will more than likely lead to a regional power struggle among the__ __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates, __China, Japan, and even Russia.__ 29 __This strategy seems feasible because **the U.S. will “improve our ability to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in Asia through strengthened long-range strike capabilities**, streamlined and consolidated headquarters, and a network of access arrangements.__ 30