Mahnvee and+Marlene

=Ports Dredging =

Contention one is Inherency
===Obama has expedited approval for dredging projects, but not allocated funds – increase action is necessary but there’s no link uniqueness for disads === Morgan and Rabin 7/19 – Miami Herald reporter, environment reporter (Curtis and Charles, “White House Speeds Up Permits, Offers No New Cash For PortMiami Dredge Project”, The Miami Herald, July 21 2012, [])//CB The White House ......remaining federal reviews.”

The executive order came with no guarantees
Dawers 7/19 – JULY 19, 2012 1:44 AM by [|BILL DAWERS]-Savannah Morning News ([]) MK We were already.....been previously promised. = = =Plan Text : The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in expedited port deepening projects in the United States. =

The Panama Canal expansion fundamentally changes trade
Bridges 2011 – Chairman of the Board of the American Association of Port Authorities and Executive Director of Virginia Port Authority (Jerry A., “Testimony of Jerry A. Bridges Chairman of the Board of the American Association of Port Authorities and Executive Director of Virginia Port Authority before the United States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee Hearing: the Economic importance of Seaports: Is the United States Prepared for 21st Century Trade Realities?”, October 26, 2011, [])MM Since the birth.....We cannot wait. Two internal links – first is foreign customers

The plan is key to retain them
Calhoun 11-- President of Cargo Carriers (Cargill) and Chairman of Waterways Council, Inc (Rick, “DREDGING FOR PROSPERITY”, Marine Log, August, ProQuest,[]:search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/889143450?accountid=14667”) EL Just like the nation itself.....inland waterways transportation system.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Uncertain commitment prevents projects – currents funds are not sufficient
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Szakonyi 12— associate editor of the Journal of Commerce (Mark, “The Hill Ramping Up Dredging Efforts”, Journal of Commerce, 5/7, ProQuest) EL <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">The push by U.S. ports.....more meaningful long-term decisions.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Lack of port deepening necessitates it – it will break the US shipping industry
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Weakley 8 – Realize America’s Maritime promise, Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Fairness Coalition, testimony of James Weakley the president of the Lake Carriers’ Association (James, “Realize America’s Maritime Promise”, Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Fairness Coalition, 4/30/08,[])MM <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Port-related jobs are critical to.....and not merely for deficit reduction.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">And, the plan is the key internal link to seaport competitiveness
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Kiefer et al, 2k – principal investigator for Planning and Management Consultants– study authorized by Section 401 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1999, report to the US Army Corps of Engineers (Jack, Planning and Management Consultants, “The National Dredging Needs Study of Ports and Harbors Implications to Cost-Sharing of Federal Deep Draft Navigation Projects Due to Changes in the Maritime Industry”, May 2000, []) CB <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">2.2.2 Other Tangible Benefits Indirect.....to a handful of coastal states.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Exports represent a quarter of our GDP – ports are key
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Nagle, 11 --- president and chief executive officer of the American Association of Port Authorities (December 2011, Kurt, Industry Today, “Association: American Association of Port Authorities; Port-Related Infrastructure Investments Can Reap Dividends,” vol. 14, no. 3, []) <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">It seems the United States.....maintain federal navigation channels.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Economic decline triggers nuclear conflict
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Harris and Burrows 9 (Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” [], AM) <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Increased Potential for Global Conflict.....in a more dog-eat-dog world.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Growth eliminates the only incentives for war
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Gartzke 11 – associate Professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego PhD from Iowa and B.A. from UCSF Erik, "SECURITY IN AN INSECURE WORLD" [|www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/09/erik-gartzke/security-in-an-insecure-world/] <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Almost as informative as the decline.....that war becomes a durable anachronism.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Second is protectionism –
===<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Competitiveness is key to promoting an American economic model – the alternative is mercantilism which destroys cooperation and creates protectionism === <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Posen 9 – Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,”[]) <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">In the postwar period, US power and.....on the following priority measures.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Protectionism causes terrorism and global wars
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Panzner 8 – faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” p. 136-138) <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Continuing calls for curbs on the.....beginnings of a new world war.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">And independently, a collapse of US trade leadership causes trade blocs creating multiple scenarios for global conflict
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Bergsten 97– Peterson Institute for International Economics (Fred C., “Global Trade and American Politics”, September 27, 1997, The Economist,[]) <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Second, thetrade policy credibility.....in its staying power in other respects.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Advantage 2 is LNG
The Panama Canal expansion means the US will try to export liquid natural gas to Europe Eaton, 2012 – reporter for the Houston Business Journal (Collin, “Economists differ on Panama Canal expansion's impact “, Houston Business Journal, May 29 2012, []) // MGD

Economists at a recent forum disagreed about the potential impact of the Panama Canal expansion set for 2014, arguing in turns that it could greatly boost energy trade or that it needs to improve its depth and width before it can attract new traffic. Last week, I covered an economic panel and watched as three economists discussed Houston’s economic future. The canal expansion was just one piece of the discussion, and it wasn’t the only point of contention. Michael Economides, a professor of chemical and biomolecular engineering at the University of Houston, told an audience of about 100 that the Panama Canal expansion would be a defining moment for the U.S.’s energy sector, especially in its competition with Russia and China. “The reason for that is LNG, liquid natural gas,” Economides said. “The Panama Canal expansion will allow for super tankers to be able to traverse (the canal). We would be exporting energy from the U.S. Some of it's going to go east to Europe, primarily.” Patrick Jankowski, regional economist at the Greater Houston Partnership, said the expansion will boost trade, but it won’t necessarily be a game-changer. This requires increasing US harbor deepening to be successful Ebinger et al. 12 -- Task Force Co-Chair of Brookings Institution Natural Gas Task Force("Evaluating the Prospects for Increased Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas from the United States", January, p. 15, Brookings, www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/natural%20gas%20ebinger/natural_gas_ebinger_2.pdf)//GP Shipping Capacity The successful export of LNG will depend upon the necessary shipping infrastructure and capacity being in place. Cheniere Energy is looking to export up to 2.2 bcf/day of gas from its Sabine Pass LNG terminal in Louisiana. 39 Depending on the size of the LNG vessel, this would require between three and five supertankers per week. In order to accommodate this volume of large ships, some domestic U.S. ports will require additional dredging. Other shipping-related concerns include security of vessels and the adequacy of Coast Guard capacity to provide that security (exporters must meet Coast Guard Waterway Suitability, Security, and Emergency standards prior to approval); and the capacity of sea lanes, particularly to Asia. Increasing shipments to Asia will depend on the capacity of the Panama Canal, which is currently too small to accommodate most LNG tankers. However, after the planned expansion of the canal is completed—expected to be in 2014—roughly 80 percent of the world’s LNG tankers will be able to pass through the isthmus, resulting in a dramatic decline in shipping costs to Asia. 40 Increasing US LNG exports breaks European dependence on Russia Ratner et al, 2012 specialist in energy policy, other authors include ***Paul Belkin, analyst in European affairs, ***Jim Nichol, specialist in Russian and Eurasian affairs, and ***Steven Woehrel, specialist in European Affairs (Michael, “Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification,” Congressional Research Service, 3/13/12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf)//AM The 27 member-state European Union (EU) has been a growing natural gas consumer and importer for decades. However, as Europe’s natural gas production has declined in recent years, its dependence on imported natural gas has increased. This has left it more dependent as a whole on its primary supplier, Russia, which has shown some inclination to use its resources for political ends. Natural gas, unlike oil which is a global commodity, is a regional commodity with regional buyers and sellers exerting more influence. Over the past decade, some European officials have become increasingly concerned about the potential for cutoffs or curtailments of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe. Most Russian natural gas exports to Europe flow through Ukraine and Belarus. Fragile and sometimes hostile relations between Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow have in the past resulted in interruptions in the flow of natural gas to parts of Europe, as happened in 2006 and 2009. Some countries in Eastern Europe, which are in some cases almost exclusively reliant on Russian gas imports, have been particularly susceptible to these fluctuations. Despite its growing dependence on Russian natural gas, Europe is well positioned geographically to benefit from recent changes in global natural gas development. Since the advent of shale gas in the United States, the world appears to be potentially awash in natural gas. A 2011 study commissioned by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) showed that technically recoverable shale gas resources worldwide may exceed current global natural gas reserves.1Other key developments and possible alternatives to Russian natural gas are outlined below: Taken as a whole, North Africa could pose a credible alternative to Russian natural gas supplies. The change of regimes in Libya, in particular, and in Egypt as a result of the wave of regional unrest known as the “Arab Spring,” poses a potential opportunity to increase natural gas production and exports from these countries. Both Libya and Egypt have large natural gas reserves, but production and exports have been hampered by domestic policies. Algeria, the largest exporter of natural gas in North Africa and the third largest supplier to Europe behind Russia and Norway, may also hold large volumes of shale gas yet to be developed in addition to their substantial conventional reserves. Central Asia may hold the greatest potential for new natural gas supplies for Europe, but currently those supplies would have to transit Russia to arrive in the European market. The delays in developing a southern corridor natural gas pipeline route to Europe have forced Central Asian countries to look east instead of west to bypass Russia and open new markets.2 Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports pose an additional alternative to Russian natural gas. In 2010, LNG comprised almost 20% of the EU’s natural gas imports and over 15% of its consumption. The EU has LNG import capacity to meet its peak winter demand for natural gas, but during most of the year the facilities are underutilized. Nevertheless, some countries are considering building additional LNG import terminals to diversify their sources of natural gas. In addition to LNG import terminals, the EU could benefit from increased natural gas storage facilities in order to manage their import capacity during non-peak periods, as well as more pipeline interconnections to move natural gas where it is needed. EU officials have identified both improvements as priorities and they are being pursued, but not without some difficulty. The prospect of significant U.S. LNG exports may pose an opportunity for the United States to play a bigger role in European energy security and global natural gas markets. 3 Most of the proposed U.S. LNG export projects are located on the Gulf coast or east coast of the United States, making shipments, at least initially, more likely to go to Europe than Asia. Additionally, the U.S. natural gas market is one of the only markets in the world where natural gas is not priced against oil, giving it a cost advantage in most of Europe. Should future U.S. LNG contracts not include an oil-indexed formula, pressure would be added for other countries, including Russia, to follow suit. Russian companies, including state-controlled natural gas giant Gazprom, have adamantly defended oil-indexed natural gas prices. Russia’s monopoly on natural gas threatens Eurasian security and pro-democracy efforts Baran, 7 - senior fellow and director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. (Zenyo, “ EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage,” THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY AUTUMN 2007, []) The lack of reliable and sustainable European access to energy represents a clear threat to the continent’s security. Under the leadership of Putin, the Kremlin has pursued a strategy whereby Europe’s substantial dependence on Russian energy is leveraged to obtain economic and political gains. If this situation continues, the EU will find itself in further danger, as its dependence leaves it beholden to Russian interests. There simply is no readily available alternative to the supplies the EU receives from Russia, particularly natural gas. Unlike oil, gas is extremely difficult and costly to ship via tankers; pipelines are the preferred method of transportation. Thus, if a supplier refuses to provide gas or charges an unreasonable price, the consumer cannot quickly or easily turn to another source. The consumer state would have no choice but to accept the supplier’s conditions or go without natural gas, an option that is all but unacceptable for most. The unjust manipulation or interruption of energy supplies is as much a security threat as military action is, especially since the EU relies on Russia for more than 30 percent of its oil imports and 50 percent of its natural gas imports. 1 This dependence is not distributed evenly. As one heads eastward, Russia’s share of the energy supply grows ever larger. No fewer than seven eastern European countries receive at least 90 percent of their crude oil imports from Russia, and six EU nations are entirely dependent on Russia for their natural gas imports. The Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2006 catapulted energy security to the forefront of the EU agenda. On the very day it took over the presidency of the Group of Eight (G-8)—a presidency that had announced energy security as its key theme—Russia halted natural gas deliveries to Ukraine. Because the gas pipelines crossing Ukraine carry supplies destined for EU markets, this shutdown resulted in significant supply disruptions for several member states, raising awareness that dependence on Russia has increased Europe’s geopolitical vulnerability. Several EU states have experienced the misfortune of Russian supply cuts directly. Disputes between Russia and the Baltic states have led to the halt of pipeline deliveries of oil multiple times. In January 2003, Russia ceased supplying oil via pipeline to Latvia’s Ventspils Nafta export facility. This embargo, which followed Riga’s unwillingness to sell the facility to a Russian energy company, continues to this day. In July 2006, Moscow shut down a pipeline supplying Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafta refinery, which is the largest company in Lithuania and one of the biggest oil refineries in central and eastern Europe. As with Ventspils Nafta, this shutdown came after a Russian company failed to obtain the energy infrastructure it coveted. Moscow has further sought to increase Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies by acquiring significant stakes in the energy distribution companies and infrastructure of EU member states, typically through its proxy, Gazprom. This massive energy company—the world’s largest—has control over the Russian gas pipeline network and consequently handles all Russian and Central Asian exports, either directly or through wholly owned subsidiaries. Such a preponderance of power would be troubling enough if the company were transparent, privately owned, and played by the rules of the free market, but Gazprom is none of those things. It is majority state owned and has deep ties to the Russian government. Many of the company’s executive management and board members also occupy or previously occupied key positions within the Kremlin. For many years, Gazprom has owned significant portions of energy companies throughout the former Soviet Union. It is the largest or second-largest shareholder in the gas utilities of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Recently, Gazprom has been expanding its influence even further into the domestic gas distribution networks of western Europe. In the past two years, Gazprom has signed deals with Eni (Italy), Gasunie (the Netherlands), BASF (Germany), E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany), and Gaz de France. Desperate for access to energy and the profits it brings, European companies are played against each other by the Kremlin in order to secure more advantageous conditions for Russia. If one company does not want to agree to Moscow’s terms, a competitor will gladly accept them, leaving the first company with nothing. In addition to the economic disadvantages of such dependence, the broader foreign policy goals of EU states also suffer. Specifically, EU members limit their criticisms of Moscow, lest they be given a raw deal at the negotiating table. Russia’s increasingly tainted record on transparency, responsible governance, and human rights is thus allowed to stand unchallenged and unquestioned. Dependency also erodes EU support for key allies in Europe and Asia. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine—all crucial energy producers or transit countries—have each been subject to intimidation by Moscow. Instead of standing up to this harassment, Europe’s dependence compels its leaders to look the other way. Most disturbing of all is that this dependence even leads the EU to turn a blind eye when Moscow utilizes these tactics against fellow EU members. The July 2006 shutdown of the Lithuanian pipeline, for example, drew little protest outside of Poland and the Baltic states. Russia claimed that this cutoff was the result of technical difficulties yet refused all offers from third parties to examine the damaged pipe or assist repairs in any way. Although this incident is suspicious enough on its own, it becomes a clear case of political manipulation given Russia’s status as a repeat offender. Many times over the past decade, Moscow has utilized near-identical tactics in countries it considers to be its near abroad. It has repeatedly cut off energy supplies during a political dispute, smugly blamed technical difficulties for the problem, and eventually shifted supplies to another destination unless the victim acceded to the Kremlin’s demands. Despite this history and repeated pleas from President Valdas Adamkus, the response from most western European countries was rather muted during the Lithuanian shutdown. The countries of the West have never experienced these strong-arm tactics firsthand and fail to view it as anything more than an economic dispute. Moreover, they were too concerned that standing up for Lithuania would ruin their chances to get preferential access to Russian oil and gas resources. By design, the Russian strategy is driving a wedge between eastern and western Europe, exacerbating the challenges the EU faces in devising a common energy policy, as was seen during the dispute between Poland and Germany ahead of the June EU summit. This diplomatic row was ostensibly over Russia’s failure to remove its embargo on Polish meat products but more broadly involved the perceived reluctance of Berlin to stand up to Moscow on a whole host of issues, not the least of which was energy. The EU’s inability to take Russia to task for its illiberal market actions threatens European energy security in another way. It decreases efficiency in an already inefficient Russian energy industry, raising costs for consumers. Russia’s increasingly state-owned energy industry is largely unregulated. Without competitive market forces, companies such as Gazprom have no reason to behave like commercially minded entities. The absence of market stimuli is having detrimental effects on Russian productivity. Between 1998 and 2005, output in Russia’s then-mostly privately owned oil sector rose by 50 percent. 2 During that same period, production in the gas sector (Gazprom) barely grew at all. Since 2004, when the Kremlin began its consolidation over the oil sector in earnest, Russian oil production has leveled off as well. The lack of reliable and sustainable access to energy is a clear threat to European security. Due to the extremely close relationship between the energy industry and the Kremlin, Russia’s oil and gas companies can pursue strategies that make little economic sense but that serve the long-term interests of the Russian state, namely, ensuring European dependence on Russian energy supplies. For example, Russia’s undersea Nord Stream pipeline will cost at least three times more than a proposed overland route through Lithuania and Poland would have. Given the environmental sensitivity of the Baltic Sea, some industry insiders are predicting costs as high as $10 billion or even $15 billion. By divorcing western Europe’s gas supply from eastern Europe’s, however, the undersea route grants Moscow the ability to manipulate the European energy market more effectively. Needless to say, the unnecessarily high cost of the pipeline’s construction will be passed on to European consumers. Many industry experts have expressed concern that corruption and inefficiency, coupled with Moscow’s refusal to allow significant foreign investment in the energy sector, will soon lead the Russian oil and gas industry to burn out. Instead of developing new oil and gas fields or investing in its energy infrastructure, Russia has utilized windfall profits to pursue the aggressive policy of expansion and acquisition described above. Unless Moscow is able to secure additional gas supplies from fields in Central Asia, it may struggle to meet its commitments to Europe, which is why maintaining full control over Central Asia’s export routes is so critical for the Kremlin. Engaging the Caspian Enshrined as the second of the three pillars of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) states that the EU should seek to promote democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights within its borders and abroad. Yet, dependence on Russian energy supplies undermines Europe’s efforts to foster the ideals of good governance, market transparency, and democracy both in Russia and in Russia’s neighbors. Although the establishment of these principles in energy suppliers is a worthy goal in its own right, doing so will also create a more stable environment for energy sector development, thereby improving European security. Diversifying oil and gas supplies by constructing pipelines directly from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe would not only decrease Russia’s influence on EU countries but would also loosen Moscow’s grip on Europe’s neighbors. If the EU wishes to foster true reform within former Soviet states, it must offer them a non-Russian perspective, which can best be done through cooperation on joint energy projects. In the Caspian region, this strategy has been pursued with success by the United States. In the late 1990s, the United States pushed hard for the construction of several oil and gas pipelines that would carry Caspian energy westward without transiting Russia. It did so to break Russia’s monopoly on the region’s energy transportation system, thereby giving the Caspian countries greater economic and political independence from Moscow. Naturally, this proposal prompted strong objections and high pressure tactics by the Russian government. Determined support from the United States and from NATO ally Turkey was eventually successful in countering this Russian pressure. Two pipelines for oil and natural gas were eventually completed from the Azerbaijani capital of Baku across Georgia to Turkey. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline stretches from Baku all the way to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) follows the same route as BTC but terminates in the central Turkish city of Erzurum. The United States devoted a great deal of time and energy to make these routes a reality. The time has now come for the EU to take the lead in bringing neighboring states closer to the West through a concerted engagement effort. The BTC and SCP pipelines are positive precedents. The construction of these pipelines has substantially decreased Moscow’s leverage over Azerbaijan and Georgia, allowing them to resist political and economic pressure from Russia. When Gazprom demanded a higher price for the gas it provided to Azerbaijan, Baku decided not to import any Russian gas. Later, when Transneft (Russia’s state-owned oil pipeline monopoly) refused to offer a market price for Azerbaijani oil, Baku decided not to export oil via Russian pipelines. Azerbaijan did not have these options prior to the construction of the two East-West pipelines. The construction of these projects has also led to significant reforms in both countries. The international consortium behind these pipelines did not agree to the construction of either project until contracts assured the needed legal protection. Ongoing involvement with Western companies and gentle prodding from Western governments have prompted further political and market reform. Azerbaijan’s most recent parliamentary elections in November 2005, while far from perfect, were the country’s freest and fairest since independence. Georgia has been free to continue down the reform path it started during the Rose Revolution in 2003 and is expected to join NATO by the end of the decade. Years of positive interaction with the West have allowed Azerbaijan and Georgia to reorient themselves toward a future in European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Yet, this westward orientation is not guaranteed. In Azerbaijan, as in many states on the cusp of reform, there are a number of hard-liners within the government who are fiercely resisting these changes and would rather reach energy deals with Russia in order to obtain Moscow’s support to maintain the status quo. Moreover, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are still l 137 almost completely dependent on Russian-controlled export pipelines, leaving them vulnerable not only to political manipulation but also to economic extortion. Until late 2006, Russia purchased natural gas from the Central Asian republics at a rate of about $45 to $65 per thousand cubic meters (tcm). It then sold that gas (and/or Russian-produced gas) to western European countries for around $230 per tcm. Even the tremendous distances that must be traveled cannot account for the increase. Per kilometer, this markup is far higher than that which occurs between Canadian supply hubs and distant American consumers. To be fair, part of this disparity arises because of the horrific inefficiency of Gazprom. The rest is simply a rent that Moscow is able to extract because of its near-monopoly power. This becomes blatantly obvious when one considers that Russia currently sells gas to Georgia for $230 per tcm, despite paying only $100 per tcm for gas purchased from nearby Turkmenistan. It is Tbilisi’s commitment to the West, not the market, that is determining the price of gas in Georgia. Despite the danger of inaction, many in the EU are hesitant to engage in energy deals with countries such as Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan because of their rather poor record on human rights or rule of law. Although the EU’s intention is good, the strategy is not. Without incorporating the energy sector into its engagement strategy, the EU simply lacks the proper leverage to encourage these states to change. The EU is often perceived as admonishing its neighbors, calling for too much political and social reform too fast, and offering too little in return. If political reform were undertaken without the necessary improvements in economic, political, and physical infrastructure, governments would lose control of their states; and the dangers of terrorism, extremism, and drug trafﬁcking in Central Asia and the Caucasus would increase. Russia is looking to destroy the west-relations give them the opportunity to do so Nyquist 9- a WorldNetDaily contributing editor and a renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, is the author of "Origins of the Fourth World War. (J.R., "Marina Kalashnikova's warning to the West" 7/17/09, [])/AP Meet Marina Kalashnikova: a Moscow-based historian, researcher and journalist. Last August she criticized foreign “experts” for suggesting that a conflict with Moscow will not happen because Russia’s elite is too closely associated with the West. According to Kalashnikova, “The West does not care to wake from the dream of its wishful thinking, even when Moscow turns to … reanimating Stalin’s cult of personality together with the ideology of the Cheka [i.e., the secret police].” I’m afraid that Marina Kalashnikova is right. The West has been dreaming, and the West will suffer the consequences. If the Kremlin likes Stalin, then there will be trouble. If KGB officers have established a sophisticated form of dictatorship in Russia, they have done so for a reason. We should remind our politicians, with their short memories, that Stalin and his secret police did not run a Sunday school. Furthermore, the recent trail of blood and radiation leading back to the Kremlin is like a finger pointing to the greatest danger of our time – nixed from the news media’s prattle of the hour. (A retired KGB officer recently told me that “nobody is easier to buy than a Western journalist.”) Russia has built an alliance of dictators, what Kalashnikova calls an “alliance of the most unbridled forces and regimes.” Extremists of all kinds serve the purpose of breaking the peace, damaging Western economies, and setting the stage for a global revolution in which the balance of power shifts from the United States and the West to the Kremlin and its Chinese allies. “Among the ideas that animate general staff analysts in the Kremlin, there is the idea of diffusion,” says Kalashnikova, “It is not that the Kremlin should strive for territorial expansion and the dissemination of its [political] model. The critical thing is power and the fulcrum of an overall strategic context. In that case, even if the Americans appear influential in the post-Soviet countries, Moscow remains in charge. The [Russian] General Staff therefore has successfully expanded Moscow’s position beyond and above the old Soviet position in Africa and Latin America.” What prevails, she says, is Moscow’s “assertiveness and determination without fear of a reaction from the West.” In other words, the West has already been outmaneuvered. The KGB and the Russian General Staff have taken our measure, and they are laughing at us. Our leaders do not realize the sophistication of their enemy. They cannot see or understand what is happening. They blink, they turn away, continuing to use concepts gifted to them long ago by Soviet agents of influence. As a nation we are confused and disoriented, believing that the world is beholden to the West’s money power – and therefore, peace can be purchased. “The Kremlin has activated a network of extremists in the Third World,” wrote Kalashnikova. “[At the same time] Russia has managed to shake off nearly all international conventions restricting the expansion of its military power.” In this situation, the only counter to Russian power is American power. Yet the American president is preparing to surrender that power in a series of arms control agreements that will leave the United States vulnerable to a first strike. Placing this in context, nuclear weapons are ultimate weapons, so that the West’s superiority in conventional weapons is therefore meaningless. Whoever gains strategic nuclear supremacy will rule the world; and the Russian strategic rocket forces are in place, ready to launch, while America’s nuclear forces are rotting from neglect. The Russian historian sees that the West relies on the greed of Russia’s elite to keep the Kremlin in line. But this is a foolish conceit. Mao Zedong said that political power “flows from the barrel of a gun.” Therefore, the Kremlin’s logic is ironclad: Let the West keep its worthless currency. Moscow will have weapons, and in the end Moscow and its allies will control everything. The liberal may believe that protests and appeals to humanity are the ultimate trump cards. The financiers may believe that money makes the world go ‘round. Let them try to stop a salvo of ICBMs with liberal sentiment and cash. As far as the laws of physics are concerned, their favored instruments cannot stop a single missile.

That Causes Eurasian instability Asmus, 8 - Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in Brussels, From 1997 to 2000, he served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Ronald, “ Europe's Eastern Promise; Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement,” Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2008. []) IN THE early 1990S, after the Iron Curtain lifted, Western leaders seized a historic opportunity to open the doors of NATO and the EuropeanUnion (EU)to post communist central and eastern Europe. By consolidating democracy and ensuring stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea, they redrew the map of Europe. As a result, the continent today is more peaceful, democratic, and free. This accomplishment was the result of a common U.S.-European grand strategy that was controversial and fiercely debated at the time. The goal was to build a post-Cold War Europe "whole, free, and at peace"; to renew the transatlantic alliance; and to reposition the United States and Europe to address new global challenges. But as successful as the strategy of enlargement has been, the world has changed dramatically since it was forged. The United States and Europe face new risks and opportunities on Europe's periphery and need to recast their strategic thinking accordingly for a new era. Current policy toward Europe's periphery is increasingly out of date, for three reasons. First, the West has changed. The 9/11 attacks pulled U.S. attention and resources away from Europe and toward the Middle East. The reservoir of transatlantic goodwill and political capital accumulated during the 1990S has evaporated in the sands of RONALD D. As MU s is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in Brussels. From 1997 to 2000, he served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. [95] Ronald D. Asmus Iraq. In Europe, enlargement fatigue has set in thanks to stumbling institutional reforms and the mounting expense of integrating new EU members. It was widely assumed that the western Balkan states (Albania and the former Yugoslav republics) would all eventually join the EU and NATO, but even that can no longer be taken for granted. Turkey's chances of gaining EU membership are fading. Indeed, the window of opportunity to expand the democratic world that opened with the end of the Cold War is now at risk of closing. Second, the East has changed. The challenge of the 1990S was to consolidate democracy in central and eastern Europe along a north south axis from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today's even more difficult challenge is to stabilize the countries of Eurasia, the region where Europe and Asia meet, along a new axis extending eastward from the Balkans across the Black Sea region. The Wests policy to the southern Caucasus and including Turkey, toward Europe, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan toward Europe's Sandwiched between an unstable Middle periphery cannot East to the south and a hostile Russia to the north, these countries are the new flank of remain on cruise the Euro-Atlantic community. Old may still work in the Balkans, but countries have changed such as Georgia and Ukraine-let alone Moldova and Belarus, if and when the latter opens up to the outside world-are weaker, poorer, and more politically problematic than the central and eastern European countries NATO and the EU sought to integrate earlier. Their claim to be part of Europe is more tenuous, and the perceived Western imperative to help is less obvious. The policy tools developed for central and eastern Europe a decade ago are, accordingly, no longer as effective. Finally, Russia has changed. In the 1990S, it was a weak, quasi democratic state that wanted to become part of the West. Now, a more powerful, nationalist, and less democratic Russia is challenging the West. Moscow sees itself as an independent Eurasian power, offering its own authoritarian capitalist model of development as an alternative to democratic liberalism. It practices a form of mercantilist geo political hardball that many in Europe thought was gone for good. Nowhere is this more clear than in its policies toward Europe's [96] Europes Eastern Promise periphery, where it is seeking to halt or roll back democratic breakthroughs in places such as Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow's willingness to use its energy resources as a political weapon has made European countries reluctant to confront Russia over its antidemocratic behavior. Until the EU can liberalize its energy markets and diversify its supplies, Moscow will have the upper hand. In this new strategic environment, Western policy toward the nations on Europe's periphery cannot remain on cruise control as if nothing has changed. NATO and the EU need to articulate a new strategic rationale for expanding the democratic West and devise a new approach to dealing with Russia. There is another opportunity today to advance Western values and security and redraw the map of Europe and Eurasia once more. But new ideas will be necessary to seize it-and to reinvent the transatlantic alliance in the process. OUT WITH THE OLD THE GRAND strategy of democratic enlargement that lay behind the opening up of NATO and the EU early in the 1990S grew out of the twin imperatives of reuniting Europe following communism's collapse and reinventing the transatlantic alliance for the post-Cold War era. The goal was to consolidate democracy across the eastern half of the continent by anchoring central and eastern European countries to the West. It reflected the vision of a peaceful Europe expanding its foreign policy horizons and sharing global leadership and responsibility with the United States. At the time, Washington concluded that the EU alone was too weak to lead the enlargement process. Thus NATO took the lead in bringing central and eastern Europe into the fold. NATO'S membership could more easily be expanded, and extending NATO'S security umbrella to countries in those regions was critical to the consolidation of democracy. NATO also contributed to reform by raising its requirements for new members, a "tough love" policy designed to reinforce positive transformation. As NATO played a key role in taking the security issue off the table and opening its doors to the East, the EU assumed most of the burden of transforming post-communist societies into liberal democratic ones. E.U. enlargement policy was an asymmetric negotiation. Candidate countries simply had to accede to the EU'S existing acquiscommunautaire the full range of its laws, regulations, and institutions. The newcomers had little say in anything but the timeline under which the EU'S requirements would be implemented. Nevertheless, it was this transformation that fundamentally tied these countries to the West and thus created enduring security on the continent. Great care was taken to ensure that countries not included in the initial round of enlargement would not be destabilized. The West did not want to repeat the mistake that U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made in 1950, when he appeared Expanding the reach to sketch a new Western security perimeter and thereby invited the conclusion that of NATO and the EU countries on the other side of the line were once again does not of no interest to the West. Therefore, NATO and EU Policy sought to blur the lines between mean starting a new members, potential future members, and Cold War partners. In practice, this meant finding new ways to embrace and deepen cooperation with countries that did not seek membership or were not yet realistic candidates for it. NATO explicitly left open the possibility of further expansion down the road. The EU was more circumspect, but it, too, expanded its outreach to countries on Europe's periphery whose future stability and orientation it wanted to shape. The West's desire to mitigate any negative fallout was perhaps most visible in its handling of Russia. In different yet reinforcing ways, the Americans and the Europeans signaled their strategic desire to pull Russia toward the West in the hope that Moscow would eventually evolve into a partner and perhaps even a de facto ally. NATO and EU enlargement were accompanied by an unparalleled effort to engage Moscow and work for Russia's own democratic trans formation, while still taking what were seen as its legitimate interests into account. This strategy was not a new effort to contain Russia but an attempt to integrate it-albeit in a looser form and on a different timeline than that of its smaller western neighbors. And it was not merely rhetoric. NATO rethought its military strategy and force posture in order to underscore that it had no offensive intentions. Moreover, it offered to expand political and military cooperation and plan for future joint military operations with Russia. The EU set out its own far-reaching plans to deepen cooperation. The West took such steps despite uncertainty over where Russia was headed and despite the fear that Moscow would take advantage of these openings to paralyze Western institutions rather than cooperate with them. Looking back, Western policy achieved two of its goals-anchoring much of central and eastern Europe and preventing instability in those countries remaining outside NATO and the E u-and was partially successful in dealing with Russia. These successes were not inevitable, and their importance should not be underestimated. Had NATO and the EU not acted, Europe today would be a messier, less stable, and more inward-looking place. And Washington would have even fewer allies in dealing with crises beyond Europe, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, it is only too easy to forget that a decade ago there were concerns that enlargement would create new and sharper divisions between those countries joining NATO and the EU and those remaining on the outside. It has done the opposite. The success of NATO and EU enlargement, and the inclusion of countries such as the Baltic states, set a positive precedent for the former Soviet republics. Following the Rose and Orange Revolutions, democratic leaders in Georgia and Ukraine became more serious about seeking to tie their countries to the West. After all, if the Baltic states could do it, why should they not dare to do the same? The results in Russia were mixed, however. On the one hand, the train wreck that was so frequently predicted by enlargement critics never happened. New arrangements for cooperation with NATO and the EU were set up, and a breakdown of relations with Moscow was avoided. But the West's broader hopes of establishing deeper relations with a more democratic Russia never materialized. Instead of becoming more democratic and cooperative, Moscow has become more authoritarian and adversarial. Hopes that the West and Russia could find common strategic ground after 9/11 have largely gone unfulfilled, and the two are even further apart now on issues such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Kosovo. The Orange and Rose Revolutions were interpreted in Moscow not as democratic breakthroughs but as threatening developments that needed to be challenged and reversed. Who or what is responsible for these trends is, of course, an issue of considerable dispute. Was it a lack of U.S. and European imagination and will that allowed Russia to drift in this anti-Western direction? Or was it the result of internal Russian dynamics over which the West had little, if any, influence? Did NATO and EU enlargement push Russia in the wrong direction, or was the West fortunate to act when it did given what has followed? Enlargement has created more democratic stability on Russia's western border than at any time since Napoleon. Yet today, the Kremlin's spin doctors are creating a new stab-in-the-back legend of how the West betrayed Moscow during the 1990s. The gap in historical narratives mirrors the increasingly tense relationship between the West and Russia. ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT? IN LIGHT of these new circumstances in Russia, enlargement needs to be rethought from the ground up, starting with its strategic rationale. [1oo] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume87No.i Europe’s Eastern Promise After the accession of a band of countries from the Baltic states in the north to Bulgaria and Romania in the south, many in the West assumed that the enlargement project was almost complete, with the western Balkans constituting the last piece of unfinished business. They were surprised to suddenly find new countries from Eurasia, and specifically the wider Black Sea region, starting to knock on the doors of NATO and the EU-and unsure how to respond. In dealing with these new candidate countries, the West must stick to the values and diplomatic principles it laid down in the l990s, including the notion that countries are free to choose their alliances. But that alone is unlikely to be enough, because although these countries clearly consider themselves European, many Europeans do not feel the same historical or moral commitment to them or see a compelling strategic need to integrate them. Thus, in addition to moral and political arguments, the United States and Europe need to articulate a strong strategic rationale for anchoring them to the West. That argument is straight forward. The challenge of securing Europe's eastern border from the Baltics to the Black Sea has been replaced by the need to extend peace and stability along the southern rim of the Euro Atlantic community-from the Balkans across the Black Sea and further into Eurasia, Russia needs friends region that connects Europe, Russia, and the Middle East and involves core security and allies and the interests, including a critical energy corridor. United States and Working to consolidate democratic change and build stability in this area is as important Europe can and for Western security today as consolidating should be among them. Democracy in central and eastern Europe was in the 1990s. It is not only critical to expanding the democratic peace in Europe but also vital to repositioning the West vis-a-vis both Central Asia and the Middle East. This strategy presents an opportunity to redraw the strategic map of Europe and Eurasia in a way that enhances the security of countries on Europe's periphery as well as that of the United States and Europe. The United States and Europe also need to rethink what anchoring means in practice. In the 1990s, it meant pursuing membership in NATO and the EU roughly in parallel. Now the West needs to be more flexible and take a long-term view. The goal is to tie these countries as closely to the West as politics and interests on both sides allow. For some countries, this may mean eventual membership in both NATO and the EU; for others, it may mean membership only in NATO; and for the rest, it may mean membership in neither but simply much closer relations. Policy will have to be much more "ala carte than prix fixe. The link between NATO membership and EU membership should be relaxed, if not dropped. The EU has enough on its plate sustaining its commitments to the western Balkans and Turkey; anything beyond that is probably a nonstarter for the time being. NATO will once again have to take the lead in anchoring countries such as Georgia and others in the wider Black Sea region. The West must also rethink how it should engage and reach out to these countries. If membership is less plausible as a short-term option, then the quality of ties short of membership must be improved to compensate. Outreach must grow in importance and may increasingly become the centerpiece of U.S. and European strategy. At the moment, the fear of future enlargement is one factor actually holding allies back, with institutions afraid of taking even small steps down what some fear could be a slippery slope. Yet precisely because the countries in question are weaker and more endangered, NATO and the EU should actually be reaching out and engaging them earlier. They need the security umbrella and engagement of the West as much, if not more, than the countries of central and eastern Europe did. The way out of this dilemma is to consider membership a long-term goal and focus in the meantime on strengthening Western outreach and engagement. This means recasting policy tools to address the different needs of the countries that are less developed politically and economically. Tools such as NATO's" membership action plan" should be extended earlier and tied less closely to actual membership commitments, thus allowing these countries to benefit from guidance and engagement while downplaying the question of the end goal. At the same time, the EU needs to enhance its own tools, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Neighborhood Policy, as well as reach out to these countries more directly by offering them political and economic support. When communism collapsed, NATO and the EU had little idea how to reach out to post-communist countries [102] Europe’s Eastern Promise and anchor them to the West. Bureaucrats in both institutions said it could not be done. But political will and strategic imagination prevailed, and fresh approaches were developed. Political will can do the same today. As for Russia, neither Washington nor Brussels wants a confrontation with Moscow at a time when they face daunting challenges beyond Europe. But this does not mean the West should abandon its belief that the spread of democracy along Russia's borders contributes to peace and stability just because the current authoritarian rulers in Moscow disagree. Nor should the West abandon its principles and succumb to the sphere-of-influence thinking currently emanating from Moscow. If the United States and Europe still hope that democracy will eventually take root in Russia, they must recognize that consolidating a pro-Western, democratic Ukraine would indirectly encourage democratization in Russia. Of course, antidemocratic forces in Russia will oppose such a move. After all, Moscow only acquiesced in previous rounds of NATO and EU enlargement because it concluded that the United States and Europe were determined to carry them out and that its efforts to oppose the West would be futile. Western unity on issues such as the future of Ukraine is therefore of the utmost importance. Still, holding true to NATO'S and the EU'S core principles and expanding these organizations' reach does not mean starting a new Cold War. The West and Moscow should look for other areas in which their interests are more aligned, such as expanding trade and investment or controlling nuclear proliferation and building a new arms control regime. The key question is whether Russia--when faced with a unified West-will start to look for common ground. As strong as Russia may appear at the moment, it remains a country with real long-terms structural weaknesses and problems. It, too, needs friends and allies, and the United States and Europe should be among them. UNCERTAIN FUTURES THREE VERY different scenarios for the future of Western policy toward Europe's periphery reveal just how high the stakes are in this region. In the best-case scenario, the United States and Europe would regroup under the next U.S. president and launch a new era of transatlantic operation by overcoming differences on Iraq, avoiding disagreements over Iran, and stabilizing Afghanistan. This renaissance would include a new and ambitious democratic-enlargement strategy, and the results would be significant. Securing independence for Kosovo without turning Serbia against the West would facilitate the successful integration of the western Balkans into NATO and the EU. In Turkey, the AKP-led government would continue democratic reforms, bringing the country closer to EU accession. Georgia and Ukraine would continue to move closer to the West as well. That prospect would help create positive pressure for democratic change in Azerbaijan and encourage Armenia's reorientation toward the West. By 2012, a reunified West would have begun to build an arc of democratic stability eastward into Eurasia and especially the wider Black Sea region. Realizing that its real adversaries lie elsewhere, Russia would eventually have no choice but to reassess its policy and seek a new rapprochement with the West. A less optimistic scenario is stagnation. In this case, the United States and Europe would regain some political momentum after 2008 but fail to achieve any significant democratic breakthroughs. A new U.S. administration would manage to stabilize and then extricate itself from Iraq, but transatlantic tensions over Iran and other Middle Eastern issues would persist. Kosovo would achieve independence, but in a manner that leaves Serbia alienated and unable to find its way back onto the path toward EU accession. In the western Balkans, only Croatia would remain on track for both EU and NATO membership. Turkey's prospects for joining the EU would fade, and reforms in Georgia and Ukraine would stall. Azerbaijan would remain an autocratic pro-Western ally increasingly vulnerable to growing radicalization from within. By 2012, the West would have patched up relations across the Atlantic but without breakthroughs in the Balkans or Turkey-let alone in Ukraine or the wider Black Sea region. All of this would lead to a more competitive relationship with Russia, resulting in stalemate and a new chill in relations with Moscow. In the worst-case scenario, rather than the West consolidating new democratic breakthroughs, Russia would succeed in a strategy [104] Europe' Eastern Promise of rollback. The United States and Europe would not achieve a meaningful rapprochement, and they would fail to consolidate democracy in the western Balkans. Kosovo would become independent, but without agreement from all sides. This would launch Serbia on a new nationalist trajectory, bringing further instability to the region. U.S. failure in Iraq would lead to partition, estranging Turkey and prompting Ankara to invade northern Iraq and further loosen its ties to the West. This, in turn, would badly damage Turkey's already strained relations with both Washington and Brussels. Ukraine would drift back to autocracy, and Georgia, the one liberal democratic experiment in the Black Sea region, would lose reform momentum and teeter toward failure. Last November's declaration of a state of emergency in Tbilisi was a reminder of how fragile and vulnerable this experiment is. Using its energy supplies and influence, Russia would emerge as an authoritarian capitalist alternative to the West, attracting autocratic leaders throughout Europe and Eurasia. Rather than a renaissance of the transatlantic alliance, the result would be a retreat of democracy and a further splintering of the democratic West. As these scenarios make clear, the western Balkans, Georgia, Ukraine, and the wider Black Sea region are less stable and more at risk today than central and eastern Europe were a decade ago. And the stakes are high. A world in which Ukraine has successfully anchored itself to the West would be very different from one in which it has failed to do so. A world in which Georgia's success has sparked democratic progress in the region and helped stabilize the southern flank of the Euro-Atlantic community would be a much safer one than a world in which Georgia has become an authoritarian state in Russia's sphere of influence. And a world in which the democratic West is ascendant would be very different from one in which an autocratic, nationalist Russia is on the rise.

That results in Nuclear War Mcdermott 11 - specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues and is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, Senior International Research Fellow for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. McDermott is on the editorial board of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. He recently wrote The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges and Policy Implications (Roger, “General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict”, 12/6/11, The Jamestown Foundation, [])//GP

In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov may be replaced, possibly by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed Forces. The latest rumors also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, offered widely reported comments on the potential for nuclear conflict erupting close to the country’s borders. His key observation was controversial, based on estimating that the potential for armed conflict along the entire Russian periphery had grown dramatically over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, November 28; Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the Defense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked the potential for local or regional conflict to escalate into large-scale warfare “possibly even with nuclear weapons.” Many Russian commentators were bewildered by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective. However, they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing conflict escalation (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks, particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues (Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy” pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with NATO. Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color revolutions” similar to the Arab Spring and the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18). Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17). The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria. Potential escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have few options at its disposal (Interfax, November 17). There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath of the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian General Staff takes Central Asian security much more seriously in this regard. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently possesses, which may compel early nuclear first use likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to “de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention – especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities. Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actors close to its borders. In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context. Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Current federal investment is unpredictable – only a strong federal signal leverages private investment
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Brinson, 2012 – former president of the American Association of Ports Authorities and former president of the Port of New Orleans (Ryan, “Federal ‘reforms’ for port upgrade are long overdue”, The Post and Courier, April 21 2012, []) MGD <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">In 2012, as many U.S. ports plan.....national security and economic progress.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Federal regulations prevent other actors – only federal action to streamline the process and increase funding solves
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Anderson, 11 –Chief Executive Officer of the Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) (A. Paul, “testimony of A. Paul Anderson Chief Executive Officer of the Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) for the Record of the united States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment Hearing: “The Economic Importance of Seaports: Is the United States Prepared for 21st Century Trade Realities?””, October 26, 2011, [])MM <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">With increasingly larger ships.....infrastructure projects is fundamentally broken.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Federal leadership is vital to expediting new projects and coordinating federal agencies – it creates faster infrastructure development
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Woodley Jr. 8— Chairman – PIANC (Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses) USA (John Paul, “Dredging key to keeping nation’s economy afloat”, Seaports Magazine, [], Summer) EL <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Like many nations, the United States.....economy strong for generations to come.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Projects will take decades without federal expedition
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Nagle, 2012- President and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities (Kurt J., “Testimony of Kurt J. Nagle President and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities Before the United States House of Representatives Appropriations Committee Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies Subommittee”, Budget Hearing- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Assistant Secretary, Chief of Engineers, March 7, 2012, [])MM <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">First, the funding level of the Corps.....can meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">And, expedition solves
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Leone, 11 – Port Director of the Massachusetts Port Authority (Michael, Letter to the Federal Maritime Commission, 12/21,[])DH <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">There are several actions the.....operating in all trade lanes.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">The federal government is key – port infrastructure is under federal jurisdiction and federal action is vital to leadership
<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">AAPA, 11 - AAPA represents 160 of the leading seaport authorities in the United States, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean and more than 300 sustaining and associate members, firms and individuals with an interest in seaports (American Association of Port Authorities, “The U.S. Government’s Historic Role in Developing and Maintaining Landside and Waterside Connections to Seaports”, March 2011, [])GP <span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">Over time these constitutional responsibilities.....global competitiveness, be recognized and prioritized.

<span style="font-family: Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;">This is an outline of the 1AC. We often take out/ or add a card or two from round to round. Please email Mahnvee (2A) at mahnveed@gmail.com if you have any questions.