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====In May, Cuba was renamed a State sponsor of terror on the State Department list of state sponsors of terror. The designation is totally unjustified – The list is used as just used ineffectively as a coercive political weapon==== Bolender, research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 5-31 -13 [Keith, “Cuba is hardly a 'state sponsor of terror'”, 31 May, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/31/cuba-us-terror-sponsors-list] The long-awaited annual report on international terrorism from the State Department was released Thursday, and confirmed what officials had already indicated – that Cuba is staying on the list along with Iran, Sudan and Syria. State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell confirmed the administration "has no current plans to remove Cuba ". The decision came as a disappointment for those who were expecting new Secretary of State John Kerry, a long-time critic of America's counter-productive policy against the Castro government, might recommend Cuba's removal. The fact he hasn't demonstrates how difficult it is to change the dynamics of the antagonistic relationship between these two ideological adversaries. Cuba was originally included on the list in 1982, replacing a then-friendly Iraq. ... has led State Department officials to utilize her changed status as justification to keep Cuba on the list. There is no legitimate reason to use the arbitrary terrorism list as a political weapon against Cuba. To continue to do so simply exposes the State Department to charges of hypocrisy and manipulation of a serious threat based solely on ideological differences. Most importantly, it gives insult to all those who have been actual victims of terrorism.

====The notion of a terrorist is socially constructed and societally bound – it is not based in truth or objective analysis, but in discourse. Efforts to create effective counterterrorism policies are thwarted when this sociality is overlooked.==== Spencer and Hulsse 8 (Rainer Hulsse, professor and lecturer at the Geschwister Scholl Institute for Poltical Science at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, and Alexander Spencer, Assistant Professor at the Geschwister Scholl Institute for Poltical Science at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, “The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist Turn,” Security Dialogue, 2008, [] ) If terrorism is a social construction, the terrorist itself can no longer be the primary source for terrorism scholars. The terrorist is a consequence of discourse, rather than vice versa. Hence, the primary source of terrorism research must be the discourse in which the social construction of terrorism takes place, that is, the discourse that constitutes a particular group of people as ‘terrorists’. In the case of Al-Qaeda, for example, this would be the post-9/11 Western discourse on Islamic terrorism. To be sure, what members of Al-Qaeda say, what they do, and how they present themselves feeds into this Western terrorism discourse, but it is always mediated by Western interpretations. Hence, the construction of Al-Qaeda in the Western terrorism discourse will not be disconnected from Al-Qaeda itself, but the discourse certainly does not mirror any kind of ‘ reality’ or ‘truth’ about the organization. The discourse gives Al-Qaeda’s words and deeds a certain kind of meaning, and it is this meaning that constitutes our relevant reality. This is obvious if we consider counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism policies are not – they cannot be – based on objective knowledge about Al-Qaeda, but rather on the understanding of Al-Qaeda that has been produced in political, scientific, and media discourse. Hence, counter-terrorism policies can be understood and explained only if one takes account of the discourse on which they are based.

====We are not arguing that no actual terrorism exists in the world. Rather that, in the post 9/11 U.S., the term “terrorism” has taken on magical qualities – invocation of the word terror justifies unquestioned US policy==== Marcopoulos 09 (Alexander J., lawyer at Shearman and Sterling llp J. D at Tulane, unpublished manuscript, “Terrorizing Rhetoric: The Advancement of U.S. Hegemony Through the Lack of a Definition of ‘Terror’” January 2009, [] accessed 7/16/13 DG) When discussions arise concerning the status of U.S. ¶ hegemony vis-à-vis the rest of the world, the subjects touched ¶ upon are usually what academics have termed “hard power ¶ hegemony,” (i.e. the ability of a nation to project its military ¶ force upon others), and “soft power hegemony,” (i.e. the ability ¶ of a nation to persuade others by diplomatic or other means).4 ¶ Rarely does such a discussion touch upon a nation’s rhetoric as ¶ a source of power. However, as the usage of the word “terror ” ¶ and its variants became increasingly universal in, and thus ¶ important to, foreign affairs post-September 11, the usage of ¶ the word has itself become a source of power .5 Specifically, the ¶ ability of certain nations such as the United States to invoke ¶ the word “terror” to justify their actions and persuade ¶ organizations and nations of the world to cooperate with them has given rise to a unique form of hegemony that warrants ¶ analysis outside of the traditional forms of hard power and soft ¶ power.6 This aim of this Paper is to analyze the implications on ¶ U.S. hegemony of the use of the word “terror” and its variants ¶ in the construction of U.S. policy. In examining the rhetoric of the U.S. War on Terror, this ¶ Paper will argue that U.S. definitions of “terror” have ¶ supercharged U.S. hegemony in the short term in a few key ways. ¶ First, this Paper will examine the various U.S. definitions of ¶ terror and contrast them with international definitions. In ¶ doing so, it will demonstrate that both a lack of consensus on a ¶ definition and the trend in viewing “terror” as an act of war ¶ have afforded the U.S. much flexibility in pursuing an antiterror policy that is self-serving and that provided the Bush ¶ Administration with the flexibility to allow the U.S. to ¶ proactively project its power. The argument will then proceed ¶ to a discussion of how the rhetoric of terrorism compares to the ¶ “red scare” rhetoric used during the Cold War in order to create ¶ an existential threat to justify U.S. policies. Finally, the ¶ Paper will examine the sustainability of the U.S.’s use of ¶ terror rhetoric to bolster its hegemony – namely, whether theinvocation of “terror” to justify unilateral policies is a ¶ sustainable enterprise in the post-Bush United States.

====The discursive construction of rogue terror states serves as pretext for the unilateral use of military force and expansionist warfare – Continued use of the terror list replicates aggressive imperial violence==== Marino 5, Senior Researcher and Professor at the Center for the Study of the United States at the University of Havana, Cuba, author of numerous articles in scholarly journals and anthologies on U.S.-Cuban relations (Soraya Castro, The Cuba-U.S. Conflict: Notes for Reflection in the Context of the War Against Terrorism, Pg 13-14, excerpt from book //Foreign Policy Toward Cuba: Isolation or Engagement? http://www.uh.cu/centros/cemi_old/documentos/The%20Cuba-U.S.%20Conflict%20Notes%20for%20Reflection%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20the%20War%20Against%20Terrorism.pdf//) The invasion of Afghanistan initially, and the intervention and occupation of Iraq ¶ by March 2003, showed an element of force, and in particular, military force and ¶ its array of technology as the brainpower behind U.S. national might. Force was ¶ reborn as the instrument of power most notably in foreign and security policy ¶ against those states, which unilaterally , the U.S. government defines as rogue ¶ states. Its emphasis is to stop emerging threats before they materialize through ¶ preventive attacks, for which Iraq became a test case. ¶ This overbearing philosophy with origins in neoconservatism increases the ¶ potential for a rapid and lethal show of power. This projection of power is combined with significant restructuring of the executive branch in matters of security and defensive reinforcement within the continental United States. The most significant components of this restructuring are : the Department of Homeland ¶ Security at the cabinet level, and the creation of the Northern Command, whose ¶ responsibility covers the continental territory of the United States and a broadened version of its surrounding border areas, which includes Cuba. ¶ The unscrupulous use of pretexts, as was the supposed threat which the Iraqi ¶ regime posed for U.S. security, under the presumption of the existence of an arsenal of WMDs, illustrates that the doctrine of “regime change” was hidden from ¶ U.S. and international public opinion and camouflaged within the global war on ¶ terrorism. These deceptive actions by policymakers and the White House in ¶ order to justify the war in Iraq, as well as manipulation and importance given to ¶ information from the intelligence agencies, particularly the Central Intelligence ¶ Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency ¶ (NSA), and the Pentagon Office of Special Projects, in the fabrication of evidence to justify the aggression , demonstrate that the essence of the Iraqi problem ¶ results from what the Bush administration really held as a doctrinal proposition: ¶ regime change in Iraq. However, this idea was not sellable, nor justified by such ¶ bellicose U.S. actions abroad and, consequently, the subject of WMDs, and the ¶ danger that these would constitute for the United States, were used to justify military intervention. The designated rogue states, just like those considered part of the “Axis of ¶ Evil” ( Iraq, Iran, North Korea ) as well as those considered “Beyond the Axis of ¶ Evil” ( Cuba, Syria, Libya ), are together with Sudan , states which are also considered by the State Department as state sponsors of terrorism. They are all are ¶ part of the South, which is a different variable in U.S. strategic thought, above all ¶ if we compare it to the Cold War period when an East-West axis was the main ¶ reference point. ¶ Deemed a rogue state, Cuba finds itself on five black lists which were unilaterally created by the U.S. government as an instrumental part of its use of rhetoric and propaganda. It also constitutes the basis to justify its present security ¶ policy to increase hostility as part of an openly aggressive policy based on the ¶ doctrine of regime change. These lists can be described as follows: ¶ 1. Cuba finds itself on the list of countries which possess “at least a limited, developmental biological weapons research and development ¶ effort.”46 ¶ 2. Cuba is on the list of state sponsors of international terrorism.47 ¶ 3. Cuba is among the states on the list of flagrant human rights violators. ¶ 4. Cuba is on the list of countries with aggressive intelligence operations on U.S. territory.48 ¶ 5. Cuba was included for the first time in June 2003 on the U.S. government black list for trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation and ¶ forced labor. This raises the specter of slavery (Victims of Trafficking ¶ and Violence Protection Act). 49Following the war in Iraq, the gravest consequence for Cuba results from the ¶ U.S. government’s projection of a new aggressive and expansionist discourse ¶ which it is willing to put into practice. Without being a direct strategic threat for ¶ Cuba, the invasion of Iraq establishes a clear warning that the United States has ¶ moved to the ultimate extreme in its range of options against its unilaterally ¶ defined enemy government, operates within the margins of the UN and its ¶ Security Council, and that there is no force capable of stopping it. At the same ¶ time, it should be emphasized that it uses the war on terrorism unilaterally, to its ¶ discredit, to achieve foreign policy objectives, even though there are no real links ¶ with terrorism for the country against which it applies the use, or threat, of force.

====Listing Cuba as a state-sponsor of terror is emblematic of continually vague and arbitrary expansions of terrorism’s meaning to serve pre-existing imperialist political goals. The “state-sponsor” label is used to obscure mass terrorism caused by western governments in the name of American exceptionalism.==== Jackson, Professor in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, 2007 [Richard, “Critical reflection on counter-sanctuary discourse”, In: M. Innes, ed. //Denial of sanctuary: understanding terrorist safe havens,// p.30-33] A related problem for the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse is that it has always been characterized by a certain political bias and selectivity. For example, an analysis of the mainstream terrorism literature during the Cold War demonstrates that terrorism experts regularly identified Iran, Libya, //Cuba//, the Soviet Union and many other mainly communist countries //as "state sponsors" of// "international //terrorism// ," but failed to include countries like Israel or South Africa —despite the fact that South Africa, for example, not only engaged in numerous acts of terrorism against dissidents in neighbouring states but also sponsored movements like Unita and Renamo who engaged in extensive terrorism. The "terrorist sanctuaries" literature from this period also focused heavily on the assistance provided by states like Libya and Syria to groups like the PLO, but //failed to discuss U.S. support for groups like// the Afghan Mujahaddin. //anti-Castro groups//, and the Contras , despite the fact these groups engaged in numerous acts of terrorism , including planting car bombs in markets, kidnappings, civilian massacres, and blowing up civilian airliners.51 Many would argue that from this perspective, the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse has functionedideologically to distract from and deny the long history of the West's direct involvement in state terrorism and its support and sanctuary for a number of anticommunist terrorist groups. Western involvement in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the U nited S tates, and other colonial powers in numerous countries throughout the colonial period ; U.S. support and sanctuary for a range of right-wing insurgent groups like the Contras and the Mujahideen during the Cold War 53; U.S. tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the United States54: U.S. support for systematic state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia. and Iran 55; British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern Irelands 56 and various other "Islamist" groups in Libya and Bosnia, among others57; Spanish state terror during the "dirty war" against ETA58; French support for terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with terrorists following the end of several high profile wars59—among many other examples. In short. there is no denying that the discourse has often been used in a highly selective manner to highlight some acts of terror whilst selectively ignoring others. Arguably, this political bias continues today : the Taliban forces in Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists than insurgents, while various warlords, including General Rashid Dostum, are rarely,' called terrorists. despite overwhelming evidence of their use of terror and intimidation against civilians. This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al Itihad Al Islam iya group is typically described as a terrorist organization with links to al Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali warlords who also use violence against civilians arc exempted from the terrorist label.61 Similarly, //Cuba remains on the State Department's list of "state sponsors of terrorism," but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,62 former Latin American state terrorists63 and other assorted Asian anticommunist groups64 is completely ignored//. Most glaringly, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, Colombia, and Indonesia—and continued tolerance and support for it from the U.S.65—is hardly ever discussed in the mainstream "terrorist sanctuaries" literature. From a discourse analytic perspective, it can further be argued that the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse often functions to promote a set of partisan political projects. For example, the discourse describes an almost infinite number of potential "terrorist sanctuaries" or " havens," including : all failed, weak, or poor states; the widely accepted list of state sponsors of terrorism : a much longer list of passive state sponsors of terrorism; states with significant Muslim populations ; Islamic charities and NGOs; informal, unregulated banking and economic systems ; the media; the Internet; diasporas in Western countries; groups and regions characterized by poverty and unemployment; the criminal world; radical Islamist organizations; mosques and Islamic schools; insurgent and revolutionary movements ; and "extremist" ideologies—among others. The identification of these groups and domains as "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens" then functions to permit a range of restrictive and coercive actions against them —all in the name of counterterrorism. The point is that there may be other political reasons for taking action against such groups which the "terrorist sanctuary" label obscures. From this perspective, the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse can be shown to support a range of discrete political projects and interests, including: limiting expressions of dissent; controlling the media; centralizing executive power; creating a surveillance society ; expanding state regulation of social life; retargeting the focus of military force from dissident groups and individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the powerful military-industrial complex); legitimating broader counterinsurgency programmes where the real aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order66; de-legitimizing all forms of counterhegemonic or revolutionary struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the liberal international order;and selectively justifying projects of regime change , 67 economic sanctions , military base expansion, military occupation , military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political movements. In short, the discourse functions —in its present form— //to permit the extension of Western state hegemony both internationally and domestically.// I Ineffectual Policies A final criticism of the "terrorist sanctuaries" discourse is that it has proved in its prescriptions to be largely ineffectual and in many cases, counterproductive. In particular. the policy of employing military force against "terrorist sanctuaries" or "havens," a reasonable policy within the confines of the discourse, actually has an astonishing record of failure. For example, Israel has mounted military strikes and targeted assassination against "terrorist sanctuaries" in the Palestinian territories and surrounding states for over fifty years without any significant reduction in the overall level of terrorism. The apartheid regime in South Africa adopted a similarly futile policy against its neighbours during the 1980s. U.S. military strikes on Libya in 1986, Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and the use of force in the current War on Terror against Afghanistan and Iraq, have also failed to noticeably reduce the overall number of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. More broadly, the use of military force against "terrorist sanctuaries" in Colombia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka. the Philippines, Turkey, and elsewhere has in every case failed to appreciably affect the level of antistate terrorist violence. It could be argued that the attempts since September 11 to eliminate "terrorist sanctuaries" in Afghanistan. Iraq, and South Lebanon in particular, have in fact, had the opposite effect. In many respects, these military interventions have solidified and greatly strengthened various Middle Eastern insurgent and "terrorist" groups, reinforced new militant movements and coalitions, provided new regions of conflict where dissident groups can gain military experience and greatly in creased overall levels of anti-Western sentiment across the region." It is probable that the price of these policies will be many more years of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an ongoing international terrorist campaign against U.S. interests and its allies. The main problem of course, is that the discourse focuses on the symptoms and enablers of dissident terrorism, rather than its underlying drivers and poses a palliative remedy rather than a curative one. From this viewpoint, it is actually an impediment to dealing with terrorism because it functions as //a closed system of discourse,// preventing discussion of the political grievances which cause individuals and groups to seek out places of sanctuary from where they can launch attacks in the first place. CONCLUSION There is a need for researchers and public officials to be far more reflective and critical of the language they employ and the "knowledge" they produce, because discourse and knowledge is never neutral; it always works for someone and for something. In this case, the language and knowledge of the "terrorism sanctuaries" discourse frequently works to maintain the hegemony of certain powerful states and a particular international order which is beneficial to a few, but violent and unjust to many more. It also works to obscure the much greater violence and suffering caused by current Western counterterrorism policies (which have cost the lives of well over 40,000 civilians69 and caused incalculable material destruction since September 11. 2001), the double standards and selectivity of Western approaches to terrorism and the ongoing problem of civilian-directed state terror.

The terrorism justification has empirically been used for oppressive foreign policy in Latin America
LeoGrande, government professor at American University, ‘6 [William, “From the Red Menace to Radical Populism U.S. Insecurity in Latin America”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Winter, 2005/2006), pp. 25-35] U.S. policy toward Latin America has been eclipsed by the post- September 11 war on terrorism because there is virtually no threat of Islamic terrorism in the region. As General Craddock testified in March 2005, there are no known Islamic terrorist cells operating in Latin America, though there are some supporters willing to provide financial and logistical assistance.20 The dearth of a real terrorist threat and the con- sequent tendency of senior policymakers to focus on the Islamic East has allowed mid- level policymakers to gain attention for their favorite policy initiatives in Latin America by recasting them as ancillary to the war on terrorism. Thus, the war in Colombia, which before September 11, was justified as a war on drugs, has been reframed as a new front in the war on ter- rorism, with the main guerrilla movements and paramilitaries - the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ( farc ), the National Liberation Army (eln), and the United Self Defense Forces (auc) - added to the State Department s list of terrorist organizations. Congressional restrictions that prevented U.S. military aid from being used to fight the guerrillas were lifted and aid to the Colombian military increased.21 This linguistic legerdemain constitutes a serious confusion of threats. No doubt the Colombian groups have all engaged in acts of terrorism, including kidnappings, extra- judicial executions, massacres, and planting bombs in public places. However, they are not "international terrorists" in the sense that members of al-Qaeda are. The aim of the Colombian groups is to achieve political ends inside Colombia, and the targets of their violence are Colombian. Unlike al- Qaeda, they have no intention of attacking the United States, and their aims are not in- ternational. Their threat to U.S. interests is therefore fundamentally different. Guerrillas and paramilitaries in Colombia pose a threat to Colombians and their state. They may pose a threat to neighboring states as a re- sult of the internal conflict "spilling over" borders. But they do not pose a physical threat to the United States as do Islamic ter- rorist groups. Ignoring this distinction by lumping all violent actors under the label "terrorist" is simply an attempt to transfer the legitimacy enjoyed by the real war on terrorism to less popular policies. Similarly, hardliners in the Bush admin- istration also seized on the terrorism threat as a rationale for their confrontational policy toward Cuba. Cuba remains on the State Department's list of state sponsors of inter- national terrorism, despite a dearth of evi- dence that the Cubans have actually done anything recently to actively support foreign revolutionaries, let alone terrorists.22 This is not to say that there are no in- ternational terrorists in the Western Hemi- sphere. The most persistent campaign of international terrorism in the Americas has been the series of paramilitary attacks against Cuba conducted by a small num- ber of Cuban exiles. These attacks date to the early 1960s, when they were organized by the U.S. government, acting through the Central Intelligence Agency. The end of U.S. support for such activities did not end the attacks, however. The most notori- ous was the bombing of a Cuban civilian airliner off Barbados in 1976, which killed 73 people. In 1997, a series of bombs were detonated in Cuban tourist hotels and nightspots, injuring dozens and killing an Italian tourist - bombings for which the Cuban exile Luis Posada Carriles took re- sponsibility.23 Posada Carriles is currently in the United States fighting deportation. In 2000, Panamanian authorities thwarted an assassination plot against Fidel Castro (also involving Posada Carriles), and the U.S. Coast Guard foiled another apparent exile plot to assassinate Castro in Venezuela in 1997.24

====The designation constructs Cuba as a foil for a fantasy of American innocence and benevolence. Locating blame for terrorism in foreign “others” like Cuba is designed to play to racist predispositions and sanitize brutal American foreign policy==== Grosscup, International Relations Professor at CSU-Chico, 2000 [Beau, Terrorism-at-a-Distance: The Imagery That Serves US Power, GLOBAL DIALOGUE, Volume 2, Number 4, Autumn] For nearly two centuries the rationalisation system of American foreign policy was based on the moral constructs of American benevolence and the “uniqueness” of the American social and political experiment. From the late 1960s, a politicised image of terrorism was added to that system. The product of a closed system of discourse dominated by researchers and security analysts with close ties to government and private institutions—labelled the “terrorism industry” by Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan—this image encourages Americans to view terrorism as the most dastardly of evil deeds. More to the point, it portrays the terrorist as “an enemy of the Western establishment, somebody who stands in the way of the realization of Western aims”.1 This jingoistic imagery has been highly effective in rallying public support for US foreign policy for nearly three decades.2 Initially, American policy makers took advantage of terrorism’s pejorative connotations to undermine public support for various anti-colonial nationalist movements by linking them, and them alone, to the terrorist label. The Palestine Liberation Organisation in the Middle East, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, the African National Congress in South Africa and Namibia’s South West African People’s Organisation were all affected by this effort. In the 1980s, the Reagan administration and its terrorism industry experts insisted that anyone opposed to Western, in particular American, interests was a Soviet-sponsored terrorist. Restricted to this jingoistic analysis, Americans rallied behind the administration’s revitalised Cold War agenda against an evil Soviet empire and its international terrorist network. The same is true in the post–Cold War era. Terrorism industry experts, who continue to monopolise the terrorism discourse,argue that rogue state , Islamic, narco and “ad hoc” terrorism are central components of a New World “Disorder” threatening the American way of life. Their efforts have not been in vain. During the Persian Gulf War, linking Saddam Hussein to anti-American terrorism heightened American support for the slaughter of Iraqi military and civilians, much as linking Manuel Noriega with narco-terrorism rallied public support for the illegal invasion of Panama in 1989. Terrorism imagery also produced public acquiescence in American military interventions in Somalia and Haiti, interventions which were presented as “humanitarian” missions. In the mid-1990s, revitalised images of Iranian-backed Islamic terrorism dominated foreign policy discussions of the threats to American initiatives in the Middle East and beyond. By the end of the 1990s, the evil terrorism of Osama bin Laden and Slobodan Milosevic provided rationales for the “humanitarian” use of American air power. Essential to the success of the jingoistic concept of terrorism is a carefully constructed imagery labelled here “terrorism-at-a-distance”. Two assertions combine to produce this imagery. The first contends that terrorism occurs “over there”, that it is a product of foreign cultures and a sinister act of foreign adversaries whose treachery victimises Americans who live in or travel to far-off lands. The second, reinforcing the first, is the warning that although Americans have been spared the horrors of contemporary terrorism at home, our luck is running out, our day is coming. It is only a matter of time before America’s global pursuit of freedom and democracy and its open society make enemies of foreign terrorists and draw them to the United States, both as a land of exile and as a potential target of terrorist actions. Thus, unless preventative foreign and domestic policy measures are taken, the stage is set for the “victimisation” of America. The Foreign-Policy Factor Richard Falk argues that the concept of terrorism has been useful in sanitising US foreign policy: “This process is aided by locating ‘terrorism’ in the foreign other, a process that can build on the racist convenience of non-Western challenges.” 3 Locating terrorism in the “foreign other” has been a consistent theme of American “expert” analysis of contemporary terrorism. In its Cold War construction, terrorism was the work of the Soviet Union, both in its own actions (Afghanistan) and via its control and/or sponsorship of foreign states, namely Cuba , Libya, Syria, East Germany, North Korea, Nicaragua and Iran. The Soviets were said to be behind the non-state terrorism of the PLO, the Baader–Meinhof gang, the IRA, ANC, Swapo and individuals such as Carlos, Abu Nidal and Mehmet Ali Agca. Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, terrorism has not disappeared, and the terrorism-at-a-distance thesis continues to underlie American analysis. State-sponsored terrorism is now the work of foreign “rogue” states (retitled “states of concern” by the Clinton administration in June 2000), namely Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria and North Korea. The centre of the international terrorist network, allegedly headquartered in Moscow during the Cold War, is said to have moved three times, initially to Baghdad in August 1990, then after the Persian Gulf War to Tehran. In August 1998, President Clinton informed the world that under Osama bin Laden, the international terrorist network was now headquartered in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan. Non-state terrorism is described as multifaceted, complex and foreign-based. Among its agents are leftist groups newly orphaned by the demise of their Soviet parent. In the post–Cold War climate they frantically search the political landscape for foster parents to supply them with the materials of terrorism. Even more dangerous to the American-led new world order are the dual foreign threats of Islamic terrorism and narco-terrorism. Islam is portrayed as a monolithic menace and a universal threat to Western civilisation in general and to the United States in particular. This contemporary consensus about Islam is built upon historical images of “Islamic militancy”, of an “Islamic mentality”, of “Islamic fundamentalism” or “the Shi’a penchant for martyrdom”, all of which helped provoke the fervently hostile Western response to the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. Commenting on the media coverage of that crisis, Edward Said writes: We were back to the old basics. Iranians were reduced to “fundamentalist screwballs” by Bob Ingle in the Atlanta Constitution, Claire Sterling in the Washington Post argued that the Iran story was an aspect of “Fright Decade I” while Bill Green on the same pages of the Washington Post wrote of the “Iranian obscenity” aimed directly at the heart of American nationalism and self-esteem.4 In the 1990s, the Persian Gulf War against Iraq, the New York World Trade Center bombing, the Hamas–Hizbollah challenge to the US-sponsored Middle East peace process, and the terrorism tied to Osama bin Laden and his “fundamentalist” colleagues have re-ignited the fires of anti-Islamic sentiment in the United States. New Forms of Terrorism A by-product of the Cold War, narco-terrorism, too, has survived the end of the Soviet Union. According to terrorism industry experts, its growing presence is connected to central features of the emerging political order. First, with the loss of Soviet support, the modern terrorist, in need of financial resources, seeks to gain huge profits from illegal activities. How else, American terrorism experts ask, but through the sale of drugs could terrorists afford the costly weapons of mass destruction they ardently desire? Second, the politically constructed image of the lawless rogue state directly supports former Secretary of State George Shultz’s claim that “drug trafficking requires an environment of lawlessness and corruption to enhance the production and marketing of illicit drugs”. Conversely, the insidious imagery of narco-terrorism exaggerates the nature of the threat, providing the American architects of the new world order with the pretext for intervention in the affairs of the designated “rogue regimes” in direct violation of the right to national sovereignty. Although the United States is the major market for “insidious drugs”, the plague of narco-terrorism is located exclusively in the foreign “other”. Its origins are found either in the Islamic “fundamentalist” regimes of Iran, Iraq and Libya, or in the drug cartels of South America, Asia and the Middle East. In August 1995, terrorism industry experts discovered a new form of foreign-instigated terrorism threatening America and its friends. In this “decentralised” or “ad hoc” model, specialist guerrillas are brought together to commit a specific terrorist act and then quickly returned to their country of refuge. The new modus operandi is allegedly followed by Muslim extremist groups and possibly by those who bombed the World Trade Center. It is a new operational design in which there are no clear patterns, associations or the traditional cell structure used by terrorist organisations in the past. “Ad hoc” terrorism is difficult to counter and even to analyse as it involves general guidelines coming from religious leaders, rather than precise commands. Terrorism industry experts say the new model has probably been seen in Argentina, the United Kingdom, Egypt, France, Algeria and Israel. American Jingoism Firmly established in Cold War and post–Cold War constructs, the imagery of terrorism-at-a-distance serves the US national security establishment by reinforcing American ethnocentricity and jingoism. First, insisting that terrorism is the dastardly deed of foreigners strengthens the high moral opinion American citizens hold of themselves, their society and their benevolent role in the world. Armed with this view and believing US foreign policy to occupy the firmest of moral ground, Americans see their nation’s adventures abroad as beyond reproach, deserving support with vigour and righteous indignation. In this bipartisan, jingoistic climate, the assessments of foreign policy analysts, particularly terrorism experts, are held in high esteem as “moral truths” and as making “moral sense”. Typical of these “moral truths” is a distinction made by revered terrorism expert Brian Jenkins. Jenkins argues it is morally defensible to drop American bombs on Iraqi cities from twenty thousand feet, or to lob sixteen-inch shells for six months into Druse and Shi’ite towns in Lebanon from the battleship New Jersey. Yet the suicidal car bomb terrorist who killed 241 marines in Beirut committed a cowardly and morally indefensible deed. Typical also was the climate of official and public moral outrage evident in February 1996 when Cuba shot down two private planes belonging to “Brothers to the Rescue”, a Cuban-American anti-Castro organisation. Despite diplomatic objections by the Cuban government, the group’s planes had been violating Cuban airspace and dropping anti-communist leaflets over Havana for nearly a year. Yet for most Americans, Cuba’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism (a US State Department designation) and the alleged innocence of the “humanitarian” Brothers to the Rescue overrode Cuba’s claims to sovereignty and national self-determination. As a result, the crimes of the Brothers were sanitised, while the intensified US embargo and the UN censure of Cuba captured the moral high ground. Second, the imagery of terrorism-at-a-distance connects with American views about foreigners, the inferiority of their culture and the danger they pose to the American way of life. The construction of a heightened “foreign threat” to Americans at home and abroad permits US policy makers to pursue means and measures that would otherwise be highly controversial with the full approval of most Americans.

====The moralistic fundamentalism endemic to this method of counter-terrorism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Filtering the world through the dichotomy of our exceptional “innocence” and the “terrorist” enemy’s absolute “evil” simplifies political complexity and reproduces terrorism, causing endless violence.==== Zulaika, director of the Center for Basque Studies at the University of Nevada, Reno, 20 03 [Joseba, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecies of Counterterrorism”, Radical History Review 85 (2003) 191-199] Welcome to the promised land of terrorism. At the turn of the eighties, the problem with the terrorism industry might have been to convince the rest of us that a phenomenon that for years had not produced one single fatality was still the most dangerous threat to national life. Soon the problem is going to be to convince the rest of us that not everything is terrorism. The self-fulfilling prophecies of the 19 80s and 19 90s pale compared with the new scenario between "Good and evil " that George Bush has laid down for us, apparently to everyone's approval. The danger with such morality plays is that by constantly repeating them, one ends up believing them.Splitting the world radically in Good/Evil terms, calling all Evil terrorism, and declaring that the destiny of the Good side is to combat the Evil one to death, must surely be a preface to political silliness. As he told Congress, the Bush doctrine states that "from this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." The problem is, of course, that the very "evildoer" blamed for sending suicide bombers to kill innocent Israelis, and the very nations supporting such "martyrs" (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan), are also the ones we need as partners in the war. And the great morality play reveals itself for what it is— an intellectual and political sham. A painful example of this is translating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict into one more chapter in the new global war on terror. From the outset, this has forced the Bush administration into simultaneously trumpeting the "moral clarity" of the war against terror, according to which "there is no such a thing as a good terrorist," while at the same time having to dispatch the secretary of state to meet with the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, often labeled by his enemies a world-class archterrorist. As in other prominent cases (Nelson Mandela, Sean McBride, Menachem Begin), the terrorist Arafat is also the Nobel Peace Prize winner Arafat. So much for Bush's proclamations that "my job isn't to try to nuance" between good guys and bad guys, while his secretary of state Powell will soon be having "constructive" meetings with the archterrorist. Of course, as everyone agreed, Powell's mediation had nothing much to do with the perpetual tragedy of the Middle East per se and everything to do with removing the obstacle for Bush the son to complete his father's unfinished war against Iraq. As Benjamin Netanyahu put it, "Saddam Hussein is driving United States foreign policy." 9 Netanyahu knows what he is talking about. He is the man to the right of Ariel Sharon, waiting to replace him as the next prime minister of Israel. Sharon is a warrior hawk who sees everything in actual military terms. Netanyahu is something [End Page 194] much worse: a hawk whose only assets are the windmills of terrorism. Is there a better example than Netanyahu of the interdependencies between the terrorist and the counterterrorist? Bush should learn from Netanyahu about the fables and follies that inevitably accompany terrorism as idée fixe. His political career heavily dependent on terrorism from the very beginning, Netanyahu is "a sort of Israeli Rambo," who has never had "anything particularly interesting or authoritative to say about terror, or anything else," but who, nevertheless, has "built a successful career in the United States as a regular and articulate participant in talk shows, much sought after because of his reputation as a leading expert on the 'war on terrorism.'" 10 One of his "students" was Ronald Reagan, who decided to attack Libya after he read in Time magazine excerpts from a conference that Netanyahu organized at the Jonathan Institute, an action censured by a General Assembly resolution at the United Nations. Antonio Cassesse devoted an entire book to the complex legal implications of this entire affair, including the United States interception of an Egyptian airliner "in a way that was totally unjustified under international law" and concluded that "the United States preferred violence to law, leaving behind an unfortunate legacy that has polluted international law and aggravated political and diplomatic relations between states." 11 Thus it is not surprising that some critical legal scholars have had no qualms indescribing the U nited S tates counterterrorism policy as "itself both terroristic and illegal ." 12 The criticalpoint, one that can be illustrated with countless examples from Great Britain, Spain, Israel, Chechnya, South America, India, and other nation-states, has to do with the inevitable tendency of how the semantics of terrorism work in relation to law. By charging the other with terrorist lawlessness, it allows oneself todispense with the rule of law. The final result is what Agamben describes as " the state of exception ," in which " it is impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from the execution of the law, such that what violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any reminder." 13 To the post-September 11 question of "why they hate us," a generalized response was "because of our freedoms," rather than because of the legal, political, and social justice implications of our policies, and because of our main ally in the Middle East, Israel. By letting terrorism become the main U nited S tates public discourseand by thus enshrining categorical totalization and moral fundamentalism, we are blinded so as ... now even the USA and its citizens can be regulated by terrorist discourse. . . . Now the North American territory has become the most global and central place in the new history that terrorist ideology inaugurates." 29 Resisting the temptation of innocence regarding the barbarian other implies an awareness of a point Hegel made and that applies to the contemporary and increasingly globalized world more than ever: evil, he claims, resides also in the innocent gaze itself, perceiving as it does evil all around itself. Derrida equally holds this position. In reference to the events of September 11, he said: "My unconditional compassion, addressed to the victims of September 11, does not prevent me from saying it loudly: with regard to this crime, I do not believe that anyone is politically guiltless." 30 In brief, we are all included in the picture, and these tragic events must make us problematize our own innocence while questioning our own political and libidinal investment in the global terrorism discourse.

This reproduction of insecurity necessitates escalation – the endpoints of the exceptionalist violence at the heart of the war on terror are total wars of annihilation and mass imperialist violence.
Lifton, professor of psychiatry, 2003 [Robert Jay, “American Apocalypse”, The Nation, Dec 22nd, http://www.thenation.com/article/american-apocalypse] War itself is an absolute, its violence unpredictable and always containing apocalyptic possibilities. In this case, by militarizing the problem of terrorism, our leaders have dangerously obfuscated its political, social and historical dimensions. Terrorism has instead been raised to the absolute level of war itself. And although American leaders speak of this as being a “diﬀerent kind of war,” there is a drumbeat of ordinary war rhetoric and a clarion call to total victory and to the crushing defeat of our terrorist enemies. When President Bush declared that “this conﬂict was begun on the timing and terms of others [but] will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing,” he was misleading both in suggesting a clear beginning in Al Qaeda’s acts and a decisive end in the “battle” against terrorism. In that same speech, given at a memorial service just three days after  /  at the National Cathedral in Washington, he also asserted, “Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.” Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, not a man given to irony, commented that “ the president was casting his mission and that of the country in the grand vision of God’s master plan.” At no time did Bush see his task as mounting a coordinated international operation against terrorism, for which he could have enlisted most of the governments of the world. Rather, upon hearing of the second plane crashing into the second tower, he remembers thinking: “They had declared war on us, and I made up my mind at that moment that we were going to war.” Upon hearing of the plane crashing into the Pentagon, he told Vice President Cheney, “We’re at war.” Woodward thus calls his account of the President’s ﬁrst hundred days following  /  Bush at War. Bush would later recall, “I had to show the American people the resolve of a commander in chief that was going to do whatever it took to win.” With world leaders, he felt he had to “look them in the eye and say, ‘You’re either with us or you’re against us.’ ” Long before the invasion of Iraq—indeed, even before the invasion of Afghanistan—Bush had come to identify himself, and be identiﬁed by others, as a “wartime president.” Warmaking can quickly become associated with “war fever, ” the mobilization of public excitement to the point of a collective experience of transcendence. War then becomes heroic, even mythic, atask that must be carried out for the defense of one’s nation , to sustain its special historical destiny and the immortality of its people. In this case, the growth of war fever came in several stages: its beginnings, with Bush’s personal declaration of war immediately after September  ; a modest increase, with the successful invasion of Afghanistan; and a wave of ultrapatriotic excesses—triumphalism and labeling of critics as disloyal or treasonous—at the time of the invasion of Iraq. War fever tends always to be sporadic and subject to disillusionment. Its underside is death anxiety, in this case related less to combat than to fears of new terrorist attacks at home or against Americans abroad—and later to growing casualties in occupied Iraq. The scope of George Bush’s war was suggested within days of  /  when the director of the  made a presentation to the President and his inner circle, called “Worldwide Attack Matrix,” that described active or planned operations of various kinds in eighty countries, or what Woodward calls “a secret global war on terror.” Early on, the President had the view that “this war will be fought on many fronts” and that “we’re going to rout out terror wherever it may exist.” Although envisaged long before  / , the invasion of Iraq could be seen as a direct continuation of this unlimited war; all the more so because of the prevailing tone among the President and his advisers, who were described as eager “to emerge from the sea of words and pull the trigger.” The war on terrorism is apocalyptic , then, exactly because it is militarized and yet amorphous, without limits of time or place, and has no clear end. It therefore enters the realm of the inﬁnite.Implied in its approach is that every last terrorist everywhere on the earth is to be hunted down until there are no more terrorists anywhere to threaten us, and in that way the world will be rid of evil. Bush keeps what Woodward calls “his own personal scorecard for the war” in the form of photographs with brief biographies and personality sketches of those judged to be the world’s most dangerous terrorists, each ready to be crossed out if killed or captured. The scorecard is always available in a desk drawer in the Oval Oﬃce. War and Reality The amorphousness of the war on terrorism is such that a country like Iraq—with a murderous dictator who had surely engaged in acts of terrorism in the past—could, on that basis, be treated as if it had major responsibility for 9/11. There was no evidence at all that it did. But by means of false accusations, emphasis on the evil things Saddam Hussein had done (for instance, the use of poison gas on his Kurdish minority) and the belligerent atmosphere of the overall war on terrorism, the Administration succeeded in convincing more than half of all Americans that Saddam was a major player in 9/11. The war on terrorism, then, took amorphous impulses toward combating terror and used them as a pretext for realizing a prior mission aimed at American global hegemony. The attack on Iraq reﬂected the reach not only of the “war on terrorism” but of deceptions and manipulations of reality that have accompanied it. In this context, the word “war” came to combine metaphor (as in the “war on poverty” or “war on drugs”), conventional military combat,justiﬁcation for “pre-emptive” attack and assertion of superpower domination. Behind such planning and manipulation can lie dreams and fantasies hardly less apocalyptic or world-purifying than those of Al Qaeda ’s leaders, or of Aum Shinrikyo’s guru. For instance, former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey, a close associate of Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in the Pentagon, spoke of the war against terrorism as a Fourth World War (the Third being the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union). In addressing a group of college students, he declared, “This Fourth World War, I think, will last considerably longer than either World Wars I or II did for us. Hopefully not the full four-plus decades of the cold war.” That kind of apocalyptic impulse in warmaking has hardly proved conducive to a shared international approach. Indeed, in its essence, it precludes genuine sharing. While Bush has frequently said that he prefers to have allies in taking on terrorism and terrorist states worldwide, he has also made it clear that he does not want other countries to have any policy-making power on this issue. In one revealing statement, he declared: “At some point, we may be the only ones left. That’s OK with me. We are America.” In such declarations, he has all but claimed that Americans are the globe’s anointed ones and that the sacred mission of purifying the earth is ours alone. The amorphousness of the war on terrorism carries with it a paranoid edge, the suspicion that terrorists and their supporters are everywhere and must be “ pre-emptive ly” attack ed lest they emerge and attack us. Since such a war is limitless and inﬁnite— extending from the farthest reaches of Indonesia or Afghanistan to Hamburg, Germany, or New York City, and from immediate combat to battles that continue into the unending future— it inevitably becomes associated with a degree of megalomania as well. As the world’s greatest military power replaces the complexities of the world with its own imagined stripped-down, us-versus-them version of it, our distorted national self becomes the world. Despite the constant invocation by the Bush Administration of the theme of “security,” the war on terrorism has created the very opposite—a sense of fear and insecurity among Americans, which is then mobilized in support of further aggressive plans in the extension of the larger “war.” What results is a vicious circle that engenders what we seek to destroy: Our excessive response to Islamist attacks creates more terrorists and more terrorist attacks, which in turn leads to an escalation of the war on terrorism, and so on. The projected “victory” becomes a form of aggressive longing, of sustained illusion, of an unending “Fourth World War” and a mythic cleansing—of terrorists, of evil, of our own fear. The American military apocalyptic can then be said to partner and act in concert with the Islamist apocalyptic.

Vote aff to endorse that the United States federal government should remove Cuba from the list of countries subject to economic penalties governed by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act.
====Voting affirmative means more than imagining the adoption of a simple policy – it’s an endorsement of a critical interrogation that destabilizes hegemonic knowledge about terrorism. As activist-scholars we have an obligation to uncover subjugated knowledge hidden by the War on Terror.==== Jackson, Professor in International Politics at Aberystwyth University, ‘8 [Richard, “State terror, terrorism research and knowledge politics”, paper presented at the British International Studies Association, []] In contrast to first order critique, second order critique involves the adoption of a critical standpoint outside of the discourse. In this case, based on an understanding of discourse as socially productive or constitutive, and fully cognisant of the knowledge-power nexus, a second order critique attempts to expose the political functions and ideological consequences of the particular forms of representation enunciated by the discourse. In this case, we want to try and understand what some of the political effects and consequences of the silences of state terrorism are. A number of such effects can be identified. First, the discourse naturalises a particular understanding of what terrorism is, namely, a form of illegitimate non-state violence. Such an understanding of terrorism functions to restrict the scholarly viewpoint to one set of actors and to particular kinds of actions, and functions to distract and obscure other actors and actions which should be named and studied as „terrorism‟. It also narrows the possibilities for understanding terrorism within alternative paradigms, such as from the perspective of gender terrorism (see Sharlach 2008). In other words, it has a restrictive and distorting effect within the field of knowledge which gives the impression that terrorism studies is more of a narrow extension of counter-insurgency or national security studies than an open and inclusive domain of research into all forms and aspects of terrorism. Consequently, Andrew Silke (2001) concludes that //terrorism studies „is largely driven by policy concerns‟ and „largely limited to government agendas‟// (p. 2). In addition, the broader academic, social, and cultural influence of terrorism studies ( through the authority and legitimacy provided by „terrorism experts‟ to the media and as policy advisers, for example), means that this restrictive viewpoint is diffused to the broader society, which in turn generates its own ideological effects. Specifically, the distortedfocus on non-state terrorism functions to reify state perspectives and priorities, and reinforce a //state-centric, problem-solving paradigm// of politics in which „terrorism‟ is viewed as a n identifiable social or individual //problem in need of solving by the state, and not as a practice of state power// , for example. From this perspective, it functions to maintain the legitimacy of state uses of violence and delegitimize all forms of non-state violence (which has its own ideological effects and is problematic in a number of obvious ways). This fundamental belief in the instrumental rationality of political violence as an effective and legitimate tool of the state is open to a great many criticisms, not least that it provides the normative basis from which non-state terrorist groups frequently justify their own (often well-intentioned) violence (see Burke 2008, Oliverio and Lauderdale 2005). There is from this viewpoint //an ethical imperative// to try and undermine the widespread acceptance that political violence is a mostly legitimate and effective option in resolving conflict – for either state or non-state actors. Political violence is in fact, a moral and physical disaster in the vast majority of cases. From an ethical-normative perspective, such a restricted understanding of terrorism also functions to obscure and silence the voices and perspectives of those who live in conditions of daily terror from the random and arbitrary violence of their own governments, some of whom are supported by Western states. At the present juncture, it also functions to silence the voices of those who experience Western policies – directly, as in those tortured in the war on terror, and indirectly, as in those suffering under Western-supported regimes – as a form of terrorism. That is, it deflects and diverts attention from the much greater state terrorism which blights the lives of tens of millions of people around the world today. Related to these broader normative and ideological effects, the treatment of state terrorism within the discourse – the silences on it and the narrow construction of „statesponsored terrorism‟ – also functions to position state terrorism (should it even exist within the dominant framework) as seemingly less important than non-state terrorism, and as confined to the actions that states take in support of non-state terrorism. This also distorts the field of knowledge and political practice by suggesting that the sponsorship of Palestinian groups by Iran for example, is an infinitely more serious and dangerous problem than the fact that millions of Colombians, Uzbeks, Zimbabweans, and so on, are daily terrorised by death squads, state torture, and serious human rights abuses. Within this discursive terrain, it can also function to provide legitimacy to Western policies such as sanctions, coercive diplomacy, and pre-emptive war against politically determined „state-sponsors of terrorism‟ which may be terroristic themselves, and which ignore the involvement in state-sponsorship by Western states. From a political-normative viewpoint, the silence on state terrorism, and in particular the argument of many terrorism scholars that state actions can never be defined as „terrorism‟, actually functions to furnish states with a rhetorical justification for using what may actually be terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens without fear of condemnation. In effect, it provides them with greater leeway for applying terror-based forms of violence against civilians, a leeway exploited by many states such as Israel, Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Zimbabwe, and others who try to intimidate groups with the application of massive and disproportionate state violence. From this perspective, a discourse which occludes and obscures the very possibility of state terrorism can be considered part of the conditions that actually makes state terrorism possible. In addition, the silence on state terrorism within the field also functions to undermine the political struggle of human rights activists against the use of terror by states by disallowing the delegitimizing power and resources that come from describing state actions as „terrorism‟. It is pertinent to note in this context that the world‟s leading states have continually rejected any and all attempts to legally define and proscribe a category of actions which would be called „state terrorism‟, arguing instead that such actions are already covered by other laws such as the laws of war (see Becker 2006). The silence on state terrorism has another political effect, namely, the way in which it has functioned, and continues to function, to distract from and deny the long history of Western involvement in terrorism , thereby constructing Western foreign policy as essentially benign – rather than aimed at reifying existing structures of power and domination in the international system, for example. That is, by preventing the effective criticism of particular Western policies it works to maintain the dangerous myth of Western exceptionalism. This sense of exceptionalism and the supportive discourse of terrorism studies permits Western states and their allies to pursue a range of discrete political projects and partisan interests aimed at maintaining international dominance. For example, by reinforcing the notion that non-state terrorism is a much greater threat and problem than state terrorism and by obscuring the ways in which counter-terrorism can morph into state terrorism, the discourse functions to legitimise the current war on terror and its associated policies of military intervention, extraordinary rendition, reinforcement of the national security state, and the like. More specifically, the discourse can provide legitimacy to broader counter-insurgency or counterterrorism programmes where the actual aims lie in the maintenance of a particular politicaleconomic order such as is occurring in Colombia at present (see Stokes 2006). Importantly, the silence on state terrorism also functions to de-legitimise all forms of violent counterhegemonic or revolutionary struggle (by maintaining the notion that state violence is automatically legitimate and all non-state violence is inherently illegitimate), thereby maintaining the liberal international order and many oppressive international power structures (see also Duffield 2001). Lastly, the discourse can be used to selectively justify particular projects of regime change,14 economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political movements such as Hamas or Hezbollah. In the end, the discourse functions to permit the reification and extension of state hegemony both internationally and domestically, and perhaps more importantly, the belief in the instrumental rationality of violence as an effective tool of politics. Despite the intentions of terrorism scholars therefore, who may feel that they engage in objective academic analysis of a clearly defined phenomenon, the discourse actually serves a number of distinctly political purposes and has several important ideological consequences for society. Conclusion As noted above, there is a real puzzle revealed through this analysis, namely, why there is such a deep and pervasive silence on state terrorism within the discourse, especially given the genealogical origins of the term and the mountain of empirical examples of the phenomenon? There are a number of likely answers to this puzzle. In the first place, there may be cases in which scholars have been co-opted through various means into state perspectives and projects. Given the benefits that can accrue from close association with state power, it is not surprising that some scholars choose to participate directly in such projects. Related to this, some scholars may be intimidated by state power, fearing the ways in which state officials and state apologists can punish and harm scholars who apply the term „terrorism‟ to state actions. This could be a major reason why the silence on Israeli state terrorism is so pervasive. In the U.S. at least, scholars who criticise Israeli policies in public are regularly attacked and intimidated as anti-Semitic. Alternately, many scholars who joined the field following the terrorist attacks in 2001 did so out of a genuine desire to work with the U.S. government to prevent further occurrences of such atrocities. Another reason is likely to be simply the failure of academic procedure and scholarly reflection – the failure to interrogate and question the assumptions and accepted knowledge of the field. This is related to a broader process of socialisation into the accepted discourse and practices of the field; scholars are trained into viewing terrorism in a particular light. Related to this, most scholars feel an inherent affinity to the values and interests of their own societies, which may make facing the reality of their government‟s involvement in terrorist atrocities difficult and disturbing. Finally, it may be related to the inherent difficulties involved in studying state terrorism: not only is obtaining primary data a challenging exercise, especially in cases where state agents may want to prevent potentially damaging international publicity, but a great deal of conceptual and theoretical work often has to be done to determine which acts constitute state terrorism (Blakeley forthcoming). In the end however, the puzzle of why state terrorism has been so neglected in the field is less important than recognising that there are important reasons for „bringing the state back into terrorism studies‟ (Blakeley 2007). First, there are obvious analytical reasons for taking state terrorism seriously, including the imbalances and distortions which a narrow focus on non-state terrorism introduces. Second, there are normative reasons for studying state terrorism in a rigorous and systematic manner, notably that such knowledge furnishes a powerful means of holding states to account for their actions and reinforcing norms of behaviour that exclude the use of violence to intimidate and terrorise civilians. By any measure, states have been responsible for infinitely more human suffering and terror than any other actor; the promotion of human security therefore depends on protecting citizens from the abuses and predations of states. In conclusion, //exposing the ideological effects and political technologies of the discourse has the potential to open up critical space for the articulation of alternative and potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice//. The good news is that discourses are never completely hegemonic; there is always room for counter-hegemonic struggle and subversive forms of knowledge. In this case, not only is the discourse inherently unstable and vulnerable to different forms of critique, but the continual setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, ongoing revelations of state torture and rendition by Western forces, and increasing resistance to government attempts to restrict civil liberties suggest that the present juncture provides an opportune moment to engage in deliberate and sustained critique of a dominant discourse which focuses on non-state actors and obscures the much greater terrorism of state actors

Terrorism policy is performative. The process of discourse and deliberation matters more than a policy’s outcome because it frames the terms of debate.
de Graaf, Associate professor Associate Professor at the Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism at Leiden University, andde Graaff , history professor at Utrecht University, ’10 [Beatrice, and Bob, “Bringing politics back in: the introduction of the ‘performative power’ of counterterrorism”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 3:2, 261-275] In sum, it is almost impossible to measure arithmetically the outcome of counterterrorism efforts. However, this does not mean that we cannot and should not try to assess the effect of governmental policies. The issues outlined above suggest that it is not necessarily the policy measures and their intended results as such, but much more the way in which they are presented and perceived that determinethe overall effect of the policy in question. The key question is therefore really: What do counterterrorism policy-makers want? They set the agenda with respect to the phenomenon of terrorism, define it in a certain way and link it to corresponding measures. Subsequently, they execute these measures, behind closed doors, and with the tacit permission of the public – or, conversely, they feel forced to ‘market’ their measures first, in order to generate a substantial level of public and political support. The way in which they perform, or in other words carry out the process of countering terrorism, can have more impact than the actual arrests being made (or not being made ). This is what we call theperformativity of counterterrorism, or its ‘performative power’. The authors would like to introduce the concept ‘performativity’1 in this discussion, expressing the extent to which a national government, bymeans of its official counterterrorism policy and corresponding discourse (in statements, enactments, measures and ministerial remarks), is successful in ‘selling’ its representation of events, its set of solutions to the terrorist problem, as well as being able to set the tone for the overall discourse regarding terrorism and counterterrorism – thereby mobilising (different) audiences for its purposes .2 There is of course a difference between threat assessment and threat perception, and there are other players in the field apart from official state actors. Here, however, our focus is on the government’s attempts to persuade public opinion of the legitimacy and accuracy of its threat assessment. In terms of developing counterterrorism policies, this is particularly relevant because counterterrorism officials – and we as academics and advisers – can exert influence particularly on this field (see also the introduction and conclusion in Forest 2009). Counterterrorism measures (in statements, enactments, activities, expressions made by cabinet members) set the tone for the political and public debate. Government statements and memoranda are not mere texts: they create reality. This is certainly the case when the presentation and definition of new policy dovetails with existing threat perceptions in the population (on communism, immigration or new religions, for instance); when they tune in to historical experiences (such as previous conflicts, attacks or major disasters); if they depict the alleged terrorist threat as foreign, radically ‘different’ and alien orfundamentally hostile; or if they succeed in promoting terrorism as a central issue in a political game or campaign (by portraying the opposition as being ‘soft on terrorism’ or by presenting themselves as the nation’s saviour from all evil).3 When these implicitly or explicitly formulated representations of ‘threats’, ‘ enemies’ and ‘security’ are accepted by the majority of the population, political and social conflicts could be heightened. Consensus subsequently gives way to polarisation, acceptance of the limitation of civil liberties and stigmatisation of radical ideas. Counterterrorism measures therefore clarify which radical ideas are still tolerated, what level of sympathy with revolutionary terrorists is still permitted and which infringements on civil liberties are accepted for the sake of national security. ====Cuba is a crucial starting point. First, it strikes an unnerving chord because of its persistent, decades-long confrontation with imperialism and potential to set an example of resistance for the global South.==== Whitney, Cuba solidarity activist and member of Veterans for Peace, 5-8 -13 [W.T., “Reflections on Anti-Cuban Terror”, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2013/whitney080513.html] The U.S. government itself is a purveyor of terrorism. Its wars, drones, economic sanctions, puppet insurgencies, torture regimens, and prison abuses terrorize peoples throughout the world. The United States exports spies and informants and supports the militarized police forces and national armies of puppet governments. Terror fostered by the United States aggravates hostilities and swells enemy ranks. Vicious cycles ensue and conflicts expand. Openings then multiply for the U.S. government to claim victimization and to rationalize its own terror attacks. Cuba, however, stands apart from this deadly interchange seen elsewhere. Terror strikes in only one direction -- against Cuba. Cuban sources indicate that U.S.-based terrorists have killed almost 3,500people over 50 years, either Cubans or friends of Cuba. By contrast, U.S. military and intelligence officials now and then reiterate that Cuba represents no military or economic threat to the United States. Yet the U.S. government maintains Cuba on its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Apologists point to Basque separatists welcomed in Cuba and to sanctuary given leftist Colombian guerrillas. But Spain asked that Cuba take in the Basques, and Colombia embraced Cuba's offer to host government negotiations with the guerrillas. So, political refuge provided for Assata Shakur has long been cited. Having escaped from a U.S. prison, the black liberation combatant moved to Cuba. The United States recently simultaneously announced that Cuba will remain on its list of terror-sponsoring states and that, conveniently enough, Assata Shakur was being placed on the FBI's ten "most wanted terrorist" list, as well as that the bounty for her capture and return to the United States was raised to $2 million. Many legal observers, however, remain highly critical of the prosecution and trial in 1977 through which she was convicted of murdering a New Jersey policeman. Considering that Cuba is quite blameless, refusing to engage in tit-for-tat, one may ask: Why have terror attacks against Cuba continued? One answer is that the U.S. government, as minder of an empire, is serious about its duty to counter revolutionary and anti-imperialist movements from their earliest stirrings to their takings of power and beyond. U.S. governments have been dealing with Cuban revolutionaries for almost 150 years. In reaction to anti-annexationist, anti-racist independence struggles led by Jose Marti and Antonio Maceo, the United States ended up invading Cuba. U.S. troops helped beat down an Afro-Cuban uprising in 1912. Then in the early 1930s came Cuban student and labor mobilizations, anti-imperialist in nature -- harbingers of a socialist revolution that took charge in 1959. Special treatment for Cuba may stem, in part, from enmity to an anti-imperialism that never quits. Cuban anti-imperialism is not all U.S. power brokers have to worry about. Despite bashings, Cuba poses the threat of a good example. The socialist state has ensured long life expectancy, low infant mortality, ready access to high quality education, jobs, adequate nutrition and housing, and inculcation of ethical, communitarian values and cultural heritages. Cubans even weather natural disasters in exemplary fashion. Cuba's adventures in international solidarity add insult to injury. Beleaguered Cuba contested apartheid in southern Africa, cares for the sick and injured throughout the world, and educates young people from all over. And annoyingly Cuba defends itself against terror in targeted, non-violent ways. Cuban volunteers moved to Florida to monitor U.S.-based terrorists so that Cuba could prepare against attacks and maybe prevent them. For their pains, the Cuban Five, as they are known, were subjected to a biased trial and long, cruel sentences. A worldwide movement is demanding that U.S. President Obama release them.

====Second, persecution of Cuba in the name of fighting terror is the continuous thread between the current War on Terror and the original one started by Reagan. Cuba has consistently been portrayed as a threat throughout the modern history of American exceptionalism.==== Chomksy, Professor of Philosopy and Linguistics at MIT, ‘6 [Noam, “The Terrorist in the Mirror”, Counterpunch, JANUARY 24, http://www.counterpunch.org/2006/01/24/the-terrorist-in-the-mirror/] Suppose, then, that we accept these simple guidelines. Let’s turn to the "War on Terror ." Since facts matter, it matters that the War was not declared by George W. Bush on 9/11, but by the Reagan administration 20 years earlier. They came into office declaring that their foreign policy would confront what the President called "the evil scourge of terrorism," a plague spread by "depraved opponents of civilization itself" in "a return to barbarism in the modern age" (Secretary of State George Shultz). The campaign was directed to a particularly virulent form of the plague: state-directed international terrorism. The main focus was Central America and the Middle East, but it reached to southern Africa and Southeast Asia and beyond. A second fact is that the war was declared and implemented by pretty much the same people whoare conducting the re-declared war on terrorism. The civilian component of the re-declared War on Terror is led by John Negroponte, appointed last year to supervise all counterterror operations. As Ambassador in Honduras, he was the hands-on director of the major operation of the first War on Terror, the contra war against Nicaragua launched mainly from US bases in Honduras. I’ll return to some of his tasks. The military component of the re-declared War led by Donald Rumsfeld. During the first phase of the War on Terror, Rumsfeld w as Reagan’s special representative to the Middle East. There, his main task was to establish close relations with Saddam Hussein so that the US could provide him with large-scale aid, including means to develop WMD, continuing long after the huge atrocities against the Kurds and the end of the war with Iran. The official purpose, not concealed, was Washington’s responsibility to aid American exporters and "the strikingly unanimous view" of Washington and its allies Britain and Saudi Arabia that "whatever the sins of the Iraqi leader, he offered the West and the region a better hope for his country’s stability than did those who have suffered his repression" — New York Times Middle East correspondent Alan Cowell, describing Washington’s judgment as George Bush I authorized Saddam to crush the Shi’ite rebellion in 1991, which probably would have overthrown the tyrant. Saddam is at last on trial for his crimes. The first trial, now underway, is for crimes he committed in 1982. 1982 happens to be an important year in US-Iraq relations. It was in 1982 that Reaganremoved Iraq from the list of states supporting terror so that aid could flow to his friend in Baghdad. Rumsfeld then visited Baghdad to confirm the arrangements. Judging by reports and commentary, it would be impolite to mention any of these facts, let alone to suggest that some others might be standing alongside Saddam before the bar of justice. Removing Saddam from the list of states supporting terrorism left a gap. It was at once filled by Cuba, perhaps in recognition of the fact that the US terrorist wars against Cuba from 1961 had just peaked, including events that would be on the front pages right now in societies that valued their freedom , to which I’ll briefly return. Again, that tells us something about the real elite attitudes towards the plague of the modern age. Since the first War on Terror was waged by those now carrying out the redeclared war, or their immediate mentors, it follows that anyone seriously interested in the re-declared War on Terror should ask at once how it was carried out in the 1980s. The topic, however, is under a virtual ban. That becomes understandable as soon as we investigate the facts: the first War on Terror quickly became a murderous and brutal terrorist war, in every corner of the world where it reached, leaving traumatized societies that may never recover. What happened is hardly obscure, but doctrinally unacceptable, therefore protected from inspection. Unearthing the record is an enlightening exercise, with enormous implications for the future. These are a few of the relevant facts, and they definitely do matter. Let’s turn to the second of the guidelines: elementary moral principles. The most elementary is a virtual truism: decent people apply to themselves the same standards that they apply to others, if not more stringent ones. Adherence to this principle of universality would have many useful consequences. For one thing, it would save a lot of trees. The principle would radically reduce published reporting and commentary on social and political affairs. It would virtually eliminate the newly fashionable discipline of Just War theory. And it would wipe the slate almost clean with regard to the War on Terror. The reason is the same in all cases: the principle of universality is rejected, for the most part tacitly, though sometimes explicitly. Those are very sweeping statements. I purposely put them in a stark form to invite you to challenge them, and I hope you do. You will find, I think, that although the statements are somewhat overdrawn–purposely — they nevertheless are uncomfortably close to accurate, and in fact very fully documented. But try for yourselves and see. This most elementary of moral truisms is sometimes upheld at least in words. One example, of critical importance today, is the Nuremberg Tribunal. In sentencing Nazi war criminals to death, Justice Robert Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, spoke eloquently, and memorably, on the principle of universality. "If certain acts of violation of treaties are crimes," he said, "they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us….We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well." That is a clear and honorable statement of the principle of universality. But the judgment at Nuremberg itself crucially violated this principle. The Tribunal had to define "war crime" and "crimes against humanity." It crafted these definition very carefully so that crimes are criminal only if they were not committed by the allies. Urban bombing of civilian concentrations was excluded, because the allies carried it out more barbarically than the Nazis. And Nazi war criminals, like Admiral Doenitz, were able to plead successfully that their British and US counterparts had carried out the same practices. The reasoning was outlined by Telford Taylor, a distinguished international lawyer who was Jackson’s Chief Counsel for War Crimes. He explained that "to punish the foe–especially the vanquished foe–for conduct in which the enforcing nation has engaged, would be so grossly inequitable as to discredit the laws themselves." That is correct, but the operative definition of "crime" also discredits the laws themselves. Subsequent Tribunals are discredited by the same moral flaw, but the self-exemption of the powerful from international law and elementary moral principle goes far beyond this illustration, and reaches to just about every aspect of the two phases of the War on Terror. Let’s turn to the third background issue: defining "terror" and distinguishing it from aggression and legitimate resistance. I have been writing about terror for 25 years, ever since the Reagan administration declared its War on Terror. I’ve been using definitions that seem to be doubly appropriate: first, they make sense; and second, they are the official definitions of those waging the war. To take one of these official definitions, terrorism is "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature …through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear," typically targeting civilians. The British government’s definition is about the same: "Terrorism is the use, or threat, of action which is violent, damaging or disrupting, and is intended to influence the government or intimidate the public and is for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause." These definitions seem fairly clear and close to ordinary usage. There also seems to be general agreement that they are appropriate when discussing the terrorism of enemies. But a problem at once arises. These definitionsyield an entirely unacceptable consequence: it follows that the US is a leading terrorist state, dramatically so during the Reaganite war on terror. Merely to take the most uncontroversial case, Reagan’s state-directed terrorist war against Nicaragua was condemned by the World Court, backed by two Security Council resolutions (vetoed by the US, with Britain politely abstaining). Another completely clear case is Cuba, where the record by now is voluminous, and not controversial. And there is a long list beyond them. We may ask, however, whether such crimes as the state-directed attack against Nicaragua are really terrorism, or whether they rise to the level of the much higher crime of aggression. The concept of aggression was defined clearly enough by Justice Jackson at Nuremberg in terms that were basically reiterated in an authoritative General Assembly resolution. An "aggressor," Jackson proposed to the Tribunal, is a state that is the first to commit such actions as "Invasion of its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State," or "Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection." The first provision unambiguously applies to the US-UK invasion of Iraq. The second, just as clearly, applies to the US war against Nicaragua. However, we might give the current incumbents in Washington and their mentors the benefit of the doubt, considering them guilty only of the lesser crime of international terrorism, on a huge and unprecedented scale. It may also be recalled the aggression was defined at Nuremberg as "the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole"–all the evil in the tortured land of Iraq that flowed from the US-UK invasion, for example, and in Nicaragua too, if the charge is not reduced to international terrorism. And in Lebanon, and all too many other victims who are easily dismissed on grounds of wrong agency–right to the present. A week ago (January 13), a CIA predator drone attacked a village in Pakistan, murdering dozens of civilians, entire families, who just happened to live in a suspected al-Qaeda hideout. Such routine actions elicit little notice, a legacy of the poisoning of the moral culture by centuries of imperial thuggery. The World Court did not take up the charge of aggression in the Nicaragua case. The reasons are instructive, and of quite considerable contemporary relevance. Nicaragua’s case was presented by the distinguished Harvard University law professor Abram Chayes, former legal adviser to the State Department. The Court rejected a large part of his case on the grounds that in accepting World Court jurisdiction in 1946, the US had entered a reservation excluding itself from prosecution under multilateral treaties, including the UN Charter. The Court therefore restricted its deliberations to customary international law and a bilateral US-Nicaragua treaty, so that the more serious charges were excluded. Even on these very narrow grounds, the Court charged Washington with "unlawful use of force"–in lay language, international terrorism–and ordered it to terminate the crimes and pay substantial reparations. The Reaganites reacted by escalating the war, also officially endorsing attacks by their terrorist forces against "soft targets," undefended civilian targets. The terrorist war left the country in ruins, with a death toll equivalent to 2.25 million in US per capita terms, more than the total of all wartime casualties in US history combined. After the shattered country fell back under US control, it declined to further misery. It is now the second poorest country in Latin America after Haiti–and by accident, also second after Haiti in intensity of US intervention in the past century. The standard way to lament these tragedies is to say that Haiti and Nicaragua are "battered by storms of their own making," to quote the Boston Globe, at the liberal extreme of American journalism. Guatemala ranks third both in misery and intervention, more storms of their own making. In the Western canon, none of this exists. All is excluded not only from general history and commentary, but also quite tellingly from the huge literature on the War on Terror re-declared in 2001, though its relevance can hardly be in doubt. These considerations have to do with the boundary between terror and aggression. What about the boundary between terror and resistance? One question that arises is the legitimacy of actions to realize "the right to self-determination, freedom, and independence, as derived from the Charter of the United Nations, of people forcibly deprived of that right…, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation…" Do such actions fall under terror or resistance? The quoted word are from the most forceful denunciation of the crime of terrorism by the UN General Assembly; in December 1987, taken up under Reaganite pressure. Hence it is obviously an important resolution, even more so because of the near-unanimity of support for it. The resolution passed 153-2 (Honduras alone abstaining). It stated that "nothing in the present resolution could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom, and independence," as characterized in the quoted words. The two countries that voted against the resolution explained their reasons at the UN session. They were based on the paragraph just quoted. The phrase "colonial and racist regimes" was understood to refer to their ally apartheid South Africa, then consummating its massacres in the neighboring countries and continuing its brutal repression within. Evidently, the US and Israel could not condone resistance to the apartheid regime, particularly when it was led by Nelson Mandela’s ANC, one of the world’s "more notorious terrorist groups," as Washington determined at the same time. Granting legitimacy to resistance against "foreign occupation" was also unacceptable. The phrase was understood to refer to Israel’s US-backed military occupation, then in its 20 th year. Evidently, resistance to that occupation could not be condoned either, even though at the time of the resolution it scarcely existed: despite extensive torture, degradation, brutality, robbery of land and resources, and other familiar concomitants of military occupation, Palestinians under occupation still remained "Samidin," those who quietly endured. Technically, there are no vetoes at the General Assembly. In the real world, a negative US vote is a veto, in fact a double veto: the resolution is not implemented, and is vetoed from reporting and history. It should be added that the voting pattern is quite common at the General Assembly, and also at the Security Council, on a wide range of issues. Ever since the mid-1960s, when the world fell pretty much out of control, the US is far in the lead in Security Council vetoes, Britain second, with no one else even close. It is also of some interest to note that a majority of the American public favors abandonment of the veto, and following the will of the majority even if Washington disapproves, facts virtually unknown in the US, or I suppose elsewhere. That suggests another conservative way to deal with some of the problems of the world: pay attention to public opinion. Terrorism directed or supported by the most powerful states continues to the present, often in shocking ways. These facts offer one useful suggestion as to how to mitigate the plague spread by "depraved opponents of civilization itself" in "a return to barbarism in the modern age": Stop participating in terror and supporting it. That would certainly contribute to the proclaimed objections. But that suggestion too is off the agenda, for the usual reasons. When it is occasionally voiced, the reaction is reflexive: a tantrum about how those who make this rather conservative proposal are blaming everything on the US. Even with careful sanitization of discussion, dilemmas constantly arise. One just arose very recently, when Luis Posada Carriles entered the US illegally. Even by the narrow operative definition of "terror," he is clearly one of the most notorious international terrorists, from the 1960s to the present. Venezuela requested that he be extradited to face charges for the bombing of a Cubana airliner in Venezuela, killing 73 people. The charges are admittedly credible, but there is a real difficulty. After Posada miraculously escaped from a Venezuelan prison, the liberal Boston Globe reports, he "was hired by US covert operatives to direct the resupply operation for the Nicaraguan contras from El Salvador"–that is, to play a prominent role in terrorist atrocities that are incomparably worse than blowing up the Cubana airliner. Hence the dilemma. To quote the press: "Extraditing him for trial could send a worrisome signal to covert foreign agents that they cannot count on unconditional protection from the US government, and it could expose the CIA to embarrassing public disclosures from a former operative." Evidently, a difficult problem. The Posada dilemma was, thankfully, resolved by the courts, which rejected Venezuela’s appeal for his extradition, in violation of the US-Venezuela extradition treaty. A day later, the head of the FBI, Robert Mueller, urged Europe to speed US demands for extradition: "We are always looking to see how we can make the extradition process go faster," he said. "We think we owe it to the victims of terrorism to see to it that justice is done efficiently and effectively." At the Ibero-American Summit shortly after, the leaders of Spain and the Latin American countries "backed Venezuela’s efforts to have [Posada] extradited from the United States to face trial" for the Cubana airliner bombing, and again condemned the "blockade" of Cuba by the US, endorsing regular near-unanimous UN resolutions, the most recent with a vote of 179-4 (US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau). After strong protests from the US Embassy, the Summit withdrew the call for extradition, but refused to yield on the demand for an end to the economic warfare. Posada is therefore free to join his colleague Orlando Bosch in Miami. Bosch is implicated in dozens of terrorist crimes, including the Cubana airliner bombing , many on US soil. The FBI and Justice Department wanted him deported as a threat to national security, but Bush I took care of that by granting him a presidential pardon. There are other such examples. We might want to bear them in mind when we read Bush II’s impassioned pronouncement that "the United States makes no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support them, because they’re equally as guilty of murder," and "the civilized world must hold those regimes to account." This was proclaimed to great applause at the National Endowment for Democracy, a few days after Venezuela’s extradition request had been refused. Bush’s remarks pose another dilemma. Either the US is part of the civilized world, and must send the US air force to bomb Washington; or it declares itself to be outside the civilized world. The logic is impeccable, but fortunately, logic has been dispatched as deep into the memory hole as moral truisms. The Bush doctrine that "those who harbor terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists themselves" was promulgated when the Taliban asked for evidence before handing over people the US suspected of terrorism–without credible evidence, as the FBI conceded many months later. The doctrine is taken very seriously. Harvard international relations specialist Graham Allison writes that it has "already become a de facto rule of international relations," revoking "the sovereignty of states that provide sanctuary to terrorists." Some states, that is, thanks to the rejection of the principle of universality. One might also have thought that a dilemma would have arisen when John Negroponte was appointed to the position of head of counter-terrorism. As Ambassador to Honduras in the 1980s, he was running the world’s largest CIA station, not because of the grand role of Honduras in world affairs, but because Honduras was the primary US base for the international terrorist war for which Washington was condemned by the ICJ and Security Council (absent the veto). Known in Honduras as "the Proconsul," Negroponte had the task of ensuring that the international terrorist operations, which reached remarkable levels of savagery, would proceed efficiently. His responsibilities in managing the war on the scene took a new turn after official funding was barred in 1983, and he had to implement White House orders to bribe and pressure senior Honduran Generals to step up their support for the terrorist war using funds from other sources, later funds illegally transferred from US arms sales to Iran. The most vicious of the Honduran killers and torturers was General Alvarez Martínez, the chief of the Honduran armed forces at the time, who had informed the US that "he intended to use the Argentine method of eliminating suspected subversives." Negroponte regularly denied gruesome state crimes in Honduras to ensure that military aid would continue to flow for international terrorism. Knowing all about Alvarez, the Reagan administration awarded him the Legion of Merit medal for "encouraging the success of democratic processes in Honduras." The elite unit responsible for the worst crimes in Honduras was Battalion 3-16, organized and trained by Washington and its Argentine neo-Nazi associates. Honduran military officers in charge of the Battalion were on the CIA payroll. When the government of Honduras finally tried to deal with these crimes and bring the perpetrators to justice, the Reagan-Bush administration refused to allow Negroponte to testify, as the courts requested. There was virtually no reaction to the appointment of a leading international terrorist to the top counter-terrorism position in the world. Nor to the fact that at the very same time, the heroine of the popular struggle that overthrew the vicious Somoza regime in Nicaragua, Dora María Téllez, was denied a visa to teach at the Harvard Divinity School, as a terrorist. Her crime was to have helped overthrow a US-backed tyrant and mass murderer. Orwell would not have known whether to laugh or weep. So far I have been keeping to the kinds of topics that would be addressed in a discussion of the War on Terror that is not deformed to accord with the iron laws of doctrine. And this barely scratches the surface. But let us now adopt prevailing Western hypocrisy and cynicism, and keep to the operative definition of "terror." It is the same as the official definitions, but with the Nuremberg exception: admissible terror is your terror; ours is exempt.. Even with this constraint, terror is a major problem, undoubtedly. And to mitigate or terminate the threat should be a high priority. Regrettably, it is not. That is all too easy to demonstrate, and the consequences are likely to be severe. The invasion of Iraq is perhaps the most glaring example of the low priority assigned by US-UK leaders to the threat of terror. Washington planners had been advised, even by their own intelligence agencies, that the invasion was likely to increase the risk of terror. And it did, as their own intelligence agencies confirm. The National Intelligence Council reported a year ago that "Iraq and other possible conflicts in the future could provide recruitment, training grounds, technical skills and language proficiency for a new class of terrorists who are `professionalized’ and for whom political violence becomes an end in itself," spreading elsewhere to defend Muslim lands from attack by "infidel invaders" in a globalized network of "diffuse Islamic extremist groups," with Iraq now replacing the Afghan training grounds for this more extensive network, as a result of the invasion. A high-level government review of the "war on terror" two years after the invasion `focused on how to deal with the rise of a new generation of terrorists, schooled in Iraq over the past couple years. Top government officials are increasingly turning their attention to anticipate what one called "the bleed out" of hundreds or thousands of Iraq-trained jihadists back to their home countries throughout the Middle East and Western Europe. "It’s a new piece of a new equation," a former senior Bush administration official said. "If you don’t know who they are in Iraq, how are you going to locate them in Istanbul or London?"’ ( Washington Post). Last May the CIA reported that "Iraq has become a magnet for Islamic militants similar to Soviet-occupied Afghanistan two decades ago and Bosnia in the 1990s," according to US officials quoted in the New York Times. The CIA concluded that "Iraq may prove to be an even more effective training ground for Islamic extremists than Afghanistan was in Al Qaeda’s early days, because it is serving as a real-world laboratory for urban combat." Shortly after the London bombing last July, Chatham House released a study concluding that "there is `no doubt’ that the invasion of Iraq has `given a boost to the al-Qaida network’ in propaganda, recruitment and fundraising,` while providing an ideal training area for terrorists"; and that "the UK is at particular risk because it is the closest ally of the United States" and is "a pillion passenger" of American policy" in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is extensive supporting evidence to show that — as anticipated — the invasion increased the risk of terror and nuclear proliferation. None of this shows that planners prefer these consequences, of course. Rather, they are not of much concern in comparison with much higher priorities that are obscure only to those who prefer what human rights researchers sometimes call "intentional ignorance." Once again we find, very easily, a way to reduce the threat of terror: stop acting in ways that–predictably–enhance the threat. Though enhancement of the threat of terror and proliferation was anticipated, the invasion did so even in unanticipated ways. It is common to say that no WMD were found in Iraq after exhaustive search. That is not quite accurate, however. There were stores of WMD in Iraq: namely, those produced in the 1980s, thanks to aid provided by the US and Britain, along with others. These sites had been secured by UN inspectors, who were dismantling the weapons. But the inspectors were dismissed by the invaders and the sites were left unguarded. The inspectors nevertheless continued to carry out their work with satellite imagery. They discovered sophisticated massive looting of these installations in over 100 sites, including equipment for producing solid and liquid propellant missiles, biotoxins and other materials usable for chemical and biological weapons, and high-precision equipment capable of making parts for nuclear and chemical weapons and missiles. A Jordanian journalist was informed by officials in charge of the Jordanian-Iraqi border that after US-UK forces took over, radioactive materials were detected in one of every eight trucks crossing to Jordan, destination unknown. The ironies are almost inexpressible. The official justification for the US-UK invasion was to prevent the use of WMD that did not exist. The invasion provided the terrorists who had been mobilized by the US and its allies with the means to develop WMD — namely, equipment they had provided to Saddam, caring nothing about the terrible crimes they later invoked to whip up support for the invasion. It is as if Iran were now making nuclear weapons using fissionable materials provided by the US to Iran under the Shah — which may indeed be happening. Programs to recover and secure such materials were having considerable success in the ’90s, but like the war on terror, these programs fell victim to Bush administration priorities as they dedicated their energy and resources to invading Iraq. Elsewhere in the Mideast too terror is regarded as secondary to ensuring that the region is under control. Another illustration is Bush’s imposition of new sanctions on Syria in May 2004, implementing the Syria Accountability Act passed by Congress a few months earlier. Syria is on the official list of states sponsoring terrorism, despite Washington’s acknowledgment that Syria has not been implicated in terrorist acts for many years and has been highly cooperative in providing important intelligence to Washington on al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups. The gravity of Washington’s concern over Syria’s links to terror was revealed by President Clinton when he offered to remove Syria from the list of states sponsoring terror if it agreed to US-Israeli peace terms. When Syria insisted on recovering its conquered territory, it remained on the list. Implementation of the Syria Accountability Act deprived the US of an important source of information about radical Islamist terrorism in order to achieve the higher goal of establishing in Syria a regime that will accept US-Israeli demands. Turning to another domain, the Treasury Department has a bureau ( OFAC, Office of Foreign Assets Control ) that is assigned the task of investigating suspicious financial transfers, a central component of the "war on terror." In April 2004, OFAC informed Congress that of its 120 employees, four were assigned to tracking the finances of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, while almost two dozen were occupied with enforcing the embargo against Cuba. From 1990 to 2003 there were 93 terrorism-related investigations with $9000 in fines; and 11,000 Cuba-related investigations with $8 million in fines. The revelations received the silent treatment in the US media, elsewhere as well to my knowledge. Why should the Treasury Department devote vastly more energy to strangling Cuba than to the "war on terror"? The basic reasons were explained in internal documents of the Kennedy-Johnson years. State Department planners warned that the "very existence" of the Castro regime is "successful defiance" of US policies going back 150 years, to the Monroe Doctrine; not Russians, but intolerable defiance of the master of the hemisphere, much like Iran’s crime of successful defiance in 1979, or Syria’s rejection of Clinton’s demands. Punishment of the population was regarded as fully legitimate, we learn from internal documents. " The Cuban people [are] responsible for the regime," the Eisenhower State Department decided, so that the US has the right to cause them to suffer by economic strangulation, later escalated to direct terror by Kennedy. Eisenhower and Kennedy agreed that the embargo would hasten Fidel Castro’s departure as a result of the "rising discomfort among hungry Cubans." The basic thinking was summarized by State Department official Lester Mallory: Castro would be removed "through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship so every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba in order to bring about hunger, desperation and the overthrow of the government." When Cuba was in dire straits after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington intensified the punishment of the people of Cuba, at the initiative of liberal Democrats. The author of the 1992 measures to tighten the blockade proclaimed that "my objective is to wreak havoc in Cuba" (Representative Robert Torricelli). All of this continues until the present moment. The Kennedy administration was also deeply concerned about the threat of Cuban successful development, which might be a model for others. But even apart from these standard concerns, successful defiance in itself is intolerable, ranked far higher as a priority than combating terror. These are just further illustrations of principles that are well-established, internally rational, clear enough to the victims, but scarcely perceptible in the intellectual world of the agents.

====Finally, just as policy makers rely on the discourse of existential threat of terrorism to justify genocide and bad policy, the neg will use existential risk as a reason to vote against us. Reject the try or die logic at the heart of their argument and in the War on Terror. Counter-terrorists and the neg distort rational risk analysis by relying on high-magnitude impacts based on decontextualized internal-link chains.==== Kessler ‘8 [Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, “From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox ofSecurity Politics” //Alternatives// 33 (2008), 211-232] If the risk of terrorism is defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improb- ability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity .^oThe mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends tooverestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequencesbeyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and executionof "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then thereis no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk manage- ment as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical con-dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons couldbe balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could beachieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the newcondition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible sinceknowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largelyabsent.The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter-rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. Itrepresents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk managementframed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty .Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncer- tainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata-strophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major impli-cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for theformulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes hap-pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political actioncould possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions thatcan be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio- nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre- empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro-phe in various commissions dealing with the question of who wasresponsible and whether it could have been prevented.This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, thereare no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measur-ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex-ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the USadministration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success ofcountermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessmentof specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur-rency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of thesecurity dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob-lem of security analysis then becomes the question how to integratedangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simplynothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study entitled "NewChallenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that"most striking is the fact that we do not even know who or what willconstitute the most serious future threat, "^i In order to cope withthis challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote,to break free from the "tyranny" of plausible scenario planning. Thedecisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... inwhich there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from currentevents"52 These nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards"and became important in the current US strategic discourse. Theyjustified the transformation from a threat-based toward a capability-based defense planning strategy.53The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that even the most absurd scenarios can gain plausibility. By construct- ing a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into the realm of the possible, if not even the probable. "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the residual impression is one of plausibility. " 54 This so-called Oth- ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq. The connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that theUS government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin-ning. False evidence was again and again presented and refuted, but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as themain rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yetpossible proliferation of an improbable yet possible nuclearweapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld famously said: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer-tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations wheresecurity problems can be assessed with relative certainty.

Activism allows for discussion of how a policy is implemented and then the eventual implementation of a strategic plan
Lambie, 10 – Ph.D., joint-editor of the International Journal of Cuban Studies, and Lecturer in Public Policy at De Montfort University (George Lambie, “The Cuban Revolution in the 21st Century”, Pluto Press, pg. 60-61)//eek To explore ideology, one has to be aware that there are no immutable or ‘correct’ positions, but only sets of ideas and theories which are historically and socially variable. Ideas, and their presentation in formalised modes such as theory, are the ways in which humans make sense of the environment they inhabit – ‘ reality’. But in a world of competitive social relations, there is always an ideological struggle : one which reflects the economic and social conflict that decides ‘who gets what’, and how the present and future should be organised. The ruling groups that control economic and productive power always seek to present an ideology that favours and supports their material advantage and worldview. The creation and control of this ideological vision, and its presentation as ‘normal’ and for the general good, is what Gramsci termed hegemony. This concept was referred to in Chapter 1 and will be explored in more detail later in this chapter. ¶ According to Cox (1981:168), ‘ Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’. Although theory is constructed in ‘reality’, it also constructs ‘reality’ : the human mind, and the way it interprets and acts upon the world, set the parameters of our existence. Theory, therefore, can serve different purposes and takes two principal forms. The first is what Cox terms ‘problem solving’ theory, which aims to support, interact with, or adjust the dominant order. The second is ‘ critical’ theory, which examines why the dominant order came into being and the contradictions that manifest themselves as that order evolves. It then employs such knowledge to consider how change can take place, and, in its more activist forms, how strategies may be devised to precipitate such change. ¶ Most of contemporary academia is locked into the mode of ‘problem solving’ theory, supported by grants and scholarships from government and business in order to provide theoretical and ideological legitimacy for their actions. This process is further confirmed by publications in ‘approved’ journals as well as academic competitions such as the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in Britain, which rates academic performance according to mainstream criteria. The classification of academic subjects themselves also contributes to this model of knowledge production, because specialisation and insularity of the various ‘disciplines’ encourages seeking narrowly defined solutions to problems. This detracts from, and obscures, the roots of such problems, which lie in a much wider social and economic matrix. While history evolves as an interactive process, a totality that cannot be understood through its component parts alone, academia is heading in the opposite direction towards greater fragmentation. Such artificial organisation of knowledge obfuscates rather than reveals the workings of society, but it serves an ideological purpose by depoliticising problems and avoiding difficult questions.