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1ac Plan Text

 * The United States federal government should expand United States Maritime Administration Title XI loan guarantee funding for short sea transportation infrastructure in the United States.**

1AC Economy Adv.

 * Contention one is the __economy__**

The **global economy** has embarked on a //fragile recovery //, which might be derailed by the crisis hovering over the eurozone, warned the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Tuesday. In its latest economic outlook, the Paris-based organization pointed out that regions have been recovering at different speed worldwide, with the United States and Japan taking lead over the sluggish euro area, while large emerging economies saw a moderate upswing. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth across the OECD is projected to slow from an annual rate of 1.8 percent in 2011 to 1.6 percent in 2012, before recovering to 2.2 percent in 2013, according to the outlook. Meanwhile, the organization forecast a mild recession in the eurozone this year, with GDP growth rate declined by 0.1 percent before rebound to 0.9 percent in 2013. "The crisis in the euro zone remains the single biggest downside risk facing the global outlook," said OECD chief economist Pier Carlo Padoan. "We need a euro area compact with 3 main goals: to avoid downside scenario, create sustained growth, build or rebuild monetary union ... ," Padoan told a press conference at the launching of the biannual report. The report found that business and household confidence is rising in the United States, flat in Japan, but weak or even falling in Europe where financial markets are tight and the adverse impacts of fiscal consolidation on near-term growth may be significant, particularly in countries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Similar trends were seen in labor markets, as unemployment is edging down in the United States, but rising in Europe, said the report. A //downside scenario // **may materialize and** //spill over // outside the euro area with very serious consequences for the global economy, the OECD warned. " The global economic outlook is still cloudy ," saidOECD Secretary -General Angel Gurria, adding that " the global economic recovery is weak, considerabledownside risks remain and sizeable imbalances remain to be addressed ." " **We need decisive** policy **action now** ," the OECD chief stressed, urging government leaders to find new approaches to pave ways for economic growth by "go structural, go social, go green" to foster an inclusive society and promote social equity as "these structural reforms are not only good at creating growth, they can help address the problem of income inequality."
 * Economic recovery is __on the brink now__ – action is __now__ is critical**
 * Xinhua News, 5/23/12** [OECD: Global Economy Recovery Fragile, reprinted, []]

Traffic congestion is **costing billions every year****,**further //threatening the nation’s economic recovery // and highlighting the need for a boost in infrastructure investment, a new report finds. Rush-hour delays are costing the nation more than $100 billion year, about $750 for every U.S. commuter, as commute times have more than doubled in 30 years, according to the Urban Mobility  Report released  Tuesday  by theTexas Transportation Institute .  Rep. Nick Rahall (D-W.Va.), ranking member on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, said the report demonstrates the need for Congress to pass a robust surface transportation bill. “ The cost of congestion continues to cripple our nation’s economic competitiveness and productivity, causing companies and consumers to needlessly lose billions of dollars stuck in traffic each year ,” Rahall said. “This report is further evidence that Congress must reject Republican efforts to slash transportation investment and get to work crafting a surface transportation bill that is large enough in size and scope to put Americans back to work and tackle the backlog of transportation needs in this country.” President Obama has proposed a boost in infrastructure spending as part of the $447 billion job-creation plan he has touted most of the month. “If you invest in roads and transit, you get better service and access to more jobs,” said Tim Lomax, one of the study’s authors. “Traffic management and demand management should be part of the mix, too. Generally speaking, mobility investments in congested areas have a high return rate.” The report found that delays for the average commuter have increased to 34 hours annually, up from 14 hours in 1982. Congestion is becoming a //bigger problem // outside of rush hours, with about 40 percent of delays occurring in the afternoon and overnight, creating “an increasingly serious problem for businesses that rely on efficient production and deliveries.” The economic recession has only provided a temporary respite from the growing congestion problem. When the economic growth returns, the average commuter is estimated to see an additional three hours of delay by 2015 and seven hours by 2020. By 2015, the cost of gridlock will rise from $101 billion to $133 billion per year — more than $900 for every commuter, and the amount of wasted fuel will jump from 1.9 billion gallons to 2.5 billion gallons — enough to fill more than 275,000 gasoline tanker trucks, the study found. “ Congestion does more than choke our highways, it chokes our economy, making it harder to buy what we need and harder to keep or find a job,” Lomax said. “ That’s a bad thing — **especially when our economic recovery is so fragil**e .” The report suggests several solutions, including traditional road building and transit use, combined with traffic management strategies such as signal coordination and rapid crash removal. Telecommuting and flexible work hours also can play a role in reducing traffic. While there’s no silver bullet to fixing the problem, the report suggests that answers will have to come from all involved. “The solution mix may be different for each city, but the one thing they all share in common is urgency, Lomax said. “ If we want a strong economy, doing nothing is not a productive option .”
 * Congestion __underlies__ this risk – creates a __multibillion dollar drag__ on the economy – this __stifles__ any chance for recovery**
 * Needham, 11** [Report: Traffic congestion costs billions, weighs on the economic recovery, Vicki, The Hill, []]

3. Mitigating highway congestion. SSS can //alleviate // traffic //congestion //by shifting freight from the highways to inland and coastal waterways. Majorhighways, along the three US coasts (east coast, west coast and the Gulf of Mexico), suffer from congestion. Trucks currently carry about 60% of the domestic general cargo tonnage and contribute significantly to this problem. Trucksdelivering their cargo **compete with** **cars** for space on highways. This congestion is costly as well. According to the annual urban mobility report from the Texas Transportation Institute [2], traffic congestion continues to worsen in American cities of all sizes, creating a $78 billion annual drain on the US economy in the form of 4.2 billion lost hours and 2.9 billion gallons of wasted fuel for 2007. The congestion cost of an //additional truck trip // is the added delay that it causes to other users of the highway. The added delay occurs because the average speed of the vehicles will begin to decrease progressively once the density of vehicles on the road reaches high volume to capacity ratios. This congestion, which is generally associated with peak-hour traffic, is referred to as recurring congestion. A solution to the highway congestion problem couldbe a change in transportation patterns from shippers, especially for long-haul trips, with distances greater than 500 miles. Shippers should explore alternative modes of transportation, such as SSS, and consider using SSS instead of truck transportation. Trucks will do the short-haul, pick-up and delivery, at the start and the end of the transportation chain.
 * The plan solves – the internal link is __linear__**
 * Perakis and Denisis, 08** [A survey of short sea shipping and its prospects in the USA, ANASTASSIOS N. PERAKIS* and ATHANASIOS DENISIS Department of Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, University of Michigan, 213 NAME Building, 2600 Draper Dr., Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2145, USA, []]

In order to remain **competitive in a global economy**, improving domestic infrastructure as well is a sound strategy to **promote growth** and efficiency , support increased manufacturing , feed the American marketand serve as an export platform for manufactured goods around the world. Our economicprosperity is **closely tied to** and heavily dependent upon international trade. Since approximately 99 percent by volume of this overseas trade is moved bywater, it underscores how pivotal the M aritime T ransportation S ystem is to our goal of supply chains and consequently to our economic and nationalsecurity. You have noted the numbers with regard to waterborne cargo, Mr. Chairman, that contributes $649 billion annually to the U.S. gross domestic product and more than 13 million jobs. An anVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:51 Jan 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\6-14-1~1\66919.TXT JEAN nouncement last week from the Commerce Department reaffirmed these numbers. New trade figures for U.S. exports of goods and services for April revealed a 1.3-percent increase from March to a record $175.6 billion, still with a trade deficit but causing the trade deficit to decline by 6.7 percent from the preceding month. However, because of much of the system’s infrastructure is aging and constrained bycapacity limitations, this projection raises the fundamental question : Will the MTS be able to meet these new demands and continue to provide a seamless , integrated multimodal transportation system. In response to the 2004 Ocean Action Plan, the Committee on the Marine Transportation System did release in 2008 a national strategy that offered 34 recommendations to maintain and enhance the MTS, especially the system’s capacity, safety and security, environmental stewardship, resilience and reliability, and long-term financing. In general, progress towards fulfilling the national strategy is incomplete at best. Certainly efforts by this Administration to establish a pilot program for marine highways and to designate the marine highway corridors and grants awarded under the Recovery Act to fund MTS infrastructure investments have been positive steps, but **they don’t seem to be enough and much more needs to be done**. Unfortunately, the prospects don’t seem to be very good under present Federal budget constraints for finding new resources to maintain necessary infrastructure investments to maintain, enhance and expand the system to meet its future challenges. Nevertheless, we must find a way forward. With this in mind, I look forward to hearing the recommendations from our witnesses on how we might creatively and constructively address the needs of the Marine Transportation System. I will learn how we might leverage greater public and private investments to improve the efficiency and reliability of the system and how we can utilize the system to drive job creation and revitalize our maritime industries. The overarching reality is that **our economic future** and the Maritime Transportation System are **closely intertwined****.**To think that our economy can fully recover and grow if we fail toinvest in this critical infrastructure is both unrealistic and shortsighted. We must summon the world to invest in this system or we risk choking off the very conduit that makes our economy hum, that drives job creation and that ensures the U.S. market remains pre-eminent in global trade. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 * __Capacity limitations__ will also collapse the economy – the plan is key**
 * Lobiondo, et al 11** [Congressional Testimony, Frank A. LoBiondo is the U.S. Representative for New Jersey's 2nd congressional district, serving since 1995. He is a member of the Republican Party, CREATING JOBS AND INCREASING U.S. EXPORTS BY ENHANCING THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2011 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, []]

Currently, the U nited S tates is experiencing //low levels of investment // in transportation, clean air, manufacturing, fuel-efficiency and family-wage jobs. Instead ofspending billions of dollars bailing out financial institutions, the U nited S tates needs to invest in those specific areas to //jumpstart the economy ////. // A "**U.S. Marine Highway" achieves those objectives** as new, fuel-efficient U.S.-built ships can take thousands of trucks off U.S. roads and reduce truckcarbon emissions that contribute to global warming , while also generating cargo-handling jobs at U.S. ports and jobs on U.S. ships. This green marine highway can be built **using [|__Maritime Administration__] Title XI loan guarantees rather than outright grants**. Using Title XI, taxpayers would spend only $165 million to guarantee $3.3 billion in bank loans for construction. That equates to $50 million for a ship that will carry 300 53-foot truckloads of cargo. With those funds, 66 fuel-efficient ships can be built to carry the cargo of 20,000 truckloads along the East and West Coast corridors, creating thousands of new , high-paying job s for welders, fitters and crane operators at shipyards. Thanks to the Title XI loan guarantee program, banks can finance the construction of ships backed by a 5 percent taxpayer-financed loan loss reserve , whichamounts to 5 cents for every dollar of bank loans. The loan guarantee **lowers the risks** to financial institutions and the ship owner pays a premium for the guarantee to defray the cost to taxpayers. Another taxpayer savings can be seen in the proposed $5.5-billion widening of one highway, the 710 freeway in Southern California that connects the ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach. That $5.5 billion is a great deal more than the $165 million in taxpayer guarantees for 66 new ships. In addition, the 710 road widening may not be necessary if a majority of the daily truckloads traveling on that road were shifted onto ships. The risk is further reduced because U.S. law, the Jones Act, requires that all coastal ships be built in the United States and manned by U.S. crews so the work cannot be outsourced to foreign competitors. A proposal to add default insurance to the program further reduces risk. One heavy truck carrying 25 tons of freight consumes 370 percent more fuel per ton than a tug and barge carrying 1,750 tons of freight. A similar size truck consumes 400 percent to 500 percent more fuel than a ship. Using ultra-low sulfur diesel, ships can reduce carbon emissions by 75 percent or more compared with a truck traveling the same distance. Funding ships that consume only 25 percent of the fuel required to transport a truckload of freight would //generate a national economic stimulus // by loweringtransportation costs for shippers and consumers. From an environmental standpoint, ships can be powered by ultra-low sulfur diesel, just like new, cleaner trucks. Further, batteries from solar or wind sources can soon power these ships and create zero carbon freight corridors. Truckers can then focus on short-haul harbor pick-ups and deliveries rather than wasting time and fuel in long-haul traffic. The marine highway will provide a more integrated transport system that can remove 20,000 truckloads of cargo from the East and West Coast corridors and reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. That would generate a national economic stimulus by lowering transportation costs for shippers and consumers.
 * Only the plan can __jumpstart__ the economy – creates a __tidal wave__ of jobs and __boosts the private sector__**
 * Margaronis, 08** [Marine highway would ride wave of economic benefits, Stas, Guest Columnist Seattle Pi, [|http://www.seattlepi.com/local/opinion/article/Marine-highway-would-ride-wave-of-economic-1293286.php#ixzz1yY1CGarw]]

For the U nited S tates **to compete in the global market** it is imperative that it have dependable, //efficient //, and current infrastructure for the transport of goods. Infrastructure for that transport needs to be overhauled so that it is in keeping with a larger populace leading to heavier use, and with the sustainable principles of lesser dependence on fossil fuels. Transportation must be made more efficient and impose fewer external costs. For more than a decade, Europe and the United States have been seeing highway traffic congestion from transport of goods by trucks stagger their economies. Europe moves roughly 40% of it freight through container and roll on/roll off transport. The U nited S tates //needs a federal program to //encourage using ocean coastal waters to help address this problem here. In the U.S., short sea shipping has yet to be utilized to the extent it is in Europe. However, there has been a start, but there are still some hurdles to implementation here. Implementation of America’s Marine Highway In part to address this concern, in 2007 the Bush Administration passed the Energy Independence and Security Act,(1)(“Energy Act”) which included an initiative to develop America’s Marine Highway (“AMH”) specifically addressing waterborne movement of passengers and non-bulk freight between origins and destinations that would otherwise be served by roads and highways. (Also known as Short Sea Shipping(2), and Trucking by Water(3)). As required by the Energy Act, the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration (“ MARAD ”) has released its Report to Congress in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency, dated April 2011. Although this report is long overdue,(4) it cites many possible positive outcomes from this project. It shows a tentative start to this program that will have long-term positive effects, and **demonstrates the need for government action and refunding** .(5) AMH specifically addresses routes that MARAD has designated marine corridors along the Northeast, Atlantic, Gulf, Pacific, Mississippi River and St. Lawrence waterway.(6) These corridors correspond with some of the most congested highways in this country, particularly the I-95 corridor on the east coast, and I-5 corridor on the west coast. Without waterborne transport, these **highways will become progressively more congested** over time. Improved cost-effectiveness 1 gallon of fuel is burned to move 1 ton of cargo 70 miles by truck vs. 420 miles by rail vs. 575 miles by barge. All of these forms of transport should interconnect and be used to maximum efficiency. Fuel efficiency is being improved for all forms of transportation, including that which will reduce marine engine sulfur, carbon and particulate emissions.(7) Regulations require that the fuel efficiency of marine vehicles must improve.(8) The MARAD report cites The Environmental Protection Agency, in “Nonroad Engines, Equipment and Vehicles: Diesel Boats and Ships"(9) regarding the Clean Air Nonroad Diesel Rule requirements to decrease allowable levels of sulfur in fuel used in marine vessel by 99 percent compared to levels allowed before the effective date of 2007. Further developments have required still better fuel efficiency and reduction of green house gas emissions. Addressing these external costs is rightfully the role of government, because external costs are not necessarily within the purview of private business.(10) Marine transport is the most efficient means, yet it is not used to its optimum capacity.(11) Costs of Not Increasing Marine Transport The costs of not fully implementing a marine highway have been documented in many articles and informational sources for over a decade, and are addressed in the MARAD report. Pollution, reliance on foreign oil, lost time/productivity due to highway congestion, stress, effects on populations that live near highways, waste, national security vulnerability and exposure during crises are all products of the transportation system as it functions today, and have been for some time. MARAD reports on studies regarding the cost-effectiveness of specific Marine Highway services. For example, the Institute for Global Maritime Studies found that “medium-sized, uncongested ports could be inexpensively modified to handle ro/ro ships at an investment of about $5 million each."(12) Compare $5 million per port modification with the cost of infrastructure maintenance to keep the same system in place. The I-95 Corridor Coalition estimates that the investment along Interstate Highway 95 on the length of the United States east coast would be a whopping $47 billion per year to respond to the expected increase in activity.(13) Federal Funding Part of the initiative of the Energy Act was the extension of Capital Construction Funds to owners to create incentive to build vessels for containers and ro/ro shipping through tax deferrals. Another incentive was the authorization of $2 billion for MARAD’s Title XI loan guarantee program(14) MARAD’s April 2011 report concludes that “ the full range of public benefits of Marine Highways services **will not be realized based solely on market-driven transportation choices** **.** "(15) The funding was intended to address this problem. The external costs and benefits make the involvement of government //necessary // and //vital //. Financing multiple vessels in order to be able to service actual transportation needs will almost certainly require federalassistance. However, the final version of the Act //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">does not // provide additional Title XI authorization .(16) This 25-year term debt is too important to lose. The use of CCF funding works in collaboration with the Title XI program. As for the FY 2012 Budget, $54.1 million of the $76.6 million of the existing Title XIauthority is slated for cancellation because of the state of the economy .(17) //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">Without adequate funding //, the Marine Highway idea is just that, a good idea. In abad economy, long-term investments that bring the kind of return which will be realized by AMH are essential. The budget cuts to this program demonstrate a shortsightedness that is disheartening at best.
 * Federal action is key**
 * Zimmer, 11** [Nancy, August, “Progress on America’s Marine Highway” graduated from Smith College (B.A., cum laude, 1998), and City University of New York School of Law, (J.D., 2001). She is admitted to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, and is a trained mediator. She is also a former commercial fisherman and commercial fishing boat owner. She is a member of the Maritime Law Association of the United States. Nancy can be contacted on +1 508 432-2121 or by email at zimmer@sealaw.org, []]

We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The **__closing__** of **__the gap__** between the United States and its rivals **__could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers__**, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, __and undercut our will to__ preclude or __respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.__ The stakes are high. In modern history, **__the longest period of peace__** among the great powers **__has been the era of U.S. leadership__**. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, **__there would be__** a heightened possibility of **__arms races, miscalc__** ulation, **__or__** __**other crises spiraling** **into** **all-out conflict**__. Alternatively, __in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the U__ nited __S__ tates. Either way, __hostile states would__ be emboldened to __make aggressive moves__ in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing's economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China's strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China's expansive territorial claims -- and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea -- have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, __the U__ nited __S__ tates __must focus on restoring its economic__ and fiscal __condition____while checking__ and managing the rise of __potential adversarial regional powers__ such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world's GDP. American institutions -- particularly those providing enforceable rule of law -- set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today.
 * Getting our economic house back in order __sustains deterrence__ and prevents __great power war__**
 * Khalilzad, 11** (Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, “ The Economy and National Security”, 2-8-11, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/259024)

In the postwar period, __US power and prestige, beyond the nation's military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success. These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration__. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), __this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home__ and abroad, and __underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American rules__. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. __With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades__. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. __The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed.__ In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, __the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements__. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries' economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from over-represented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries' leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis' apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, __American__ __global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the short-term by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism__. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US' traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). __Is there an alternative economic model?__ The preceding description would seem to confirm __the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature__. __The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises__, while painful, __is doable even by the poorest countries__ , and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. __Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category__. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. __Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power.__ These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. __This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing - communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part__ the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part __mercantilism__. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart __. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict__ with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets - and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea - are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico's continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany's and Japan's obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that __adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself__. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. __The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis.__ Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. __Failure to act__ __affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks__ (to every country's detriment), __reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts__. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.
 * US economic decline collapses the US economic model – that leads to global mercantilism – makes warfare and environmental destruction inevitable**
 * Posen 9** – Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,” http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA_FINAL_LR_1.pdf)

1AC Navy Adv.

 * Contention two is the __navy__**

As President Obama announced his robust infrastructure investment program touting an immediate infusion of $50 billion for improvements to the nation’s infrastructure, images of a newly revitalized U.S. maritime industry swirled around me in a twilight zone moment. The six-year plan is estimated to cost about $350 billion to fix 150,000 miles of broken roadways, 233,000 miles of dilapidated railroad track, and 150 miles of aging airline runways. Yet not aword was uttered about **increasing funding** for America’s Marine Highway Program or rejuvenating the shipbuilding industry.Perhaps the president ’s advisors had forgotten to remind him about the **gridlock stifling the nation** ’s cities and highways. Or about the car and truck pollution that kills an estimated three percent of the population each year. In an era of rising fuel costs, dense smog and roadway congestion, personnel at the Department of Transportation (DOT) should have pointed out to Obama that there are 15.5 million commercial trucks on U.S. highways, of which two million are tractor trailers, and that they log about 435 billion miles each year while consuming approximately 53.9 billion gallons of fuel. Now add the estimated 136 million registered cars and about one million buses to the highway equation and you have a horrific traffic jam of 152.5 million motorized, fuel-burning vehicles bogging down freedom of the roadways and polluting the populace. As the president deals with the 2010 $1.3 trillion budget deficit calculated to be 9.2 percent of GDP, which is slightly less than the shortfall of 9.9 percent of GDP ($1.4 trillion) posted in 2009, he is also confronted with $130 billion (2010) for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates will cost the nation $745 billion between 2011 and 2020. With unemployment hovering around 10 percent due to the Great Recession that began in late 2007, federal revenues from corporate income taxes fell by 55 percent ($166 billion) in 2009, and individual income taxes declined by 20 percent ($230 billion). Additionally, for the first time since 1946, taxes from Social Security and Medicare declined 1 percent or $9 billion. And, of course, there is the $7.5 trillion owed by the government to domestic investors ($4 trillion-52%) and foreign investors ($3.6 trillion-48%) at the end of 2009. With this bleak economic picture staring the nation in the face like a double-barrelled shotgun, it’s no wonder that **America’s shipyards are closing at record numbers** and the number of U.S. mariners is declining rapidly. And forget the Jones Act, because if there are no U.S. yards or mariners there won’t be any need for U.S. cabotage laws. To all the anti-Jones Act folks screaming protectionism costs consumers too much and that American shipyards and ships cannot be competitive in the new global economy, I say the U.S. government will have to beef up its police forces, Coast Guard and National Guard to ensure a catastrophic event by terrorists or criminals doesn’t shut down U.S. ports or waterways. Because freedom isn’t free and a bigger government means more taxes. Really, grandma can pay the extra dollar for the iron at Walmart. Besides, if the U.S. maritime industry ceases to exist, who will run the supply lines the next time the U.S. military isdeployed overseas ? DOT’s budget in 2010 is $73.2 billion and it’s scheduled to increase to $79 billion for 2011. In 2011, highways will get $42.1 billion and rail will receive $11 billion. Meanwhile, theMaritime Administration’s (MARAD) budget **gets smaller** : $433 million in 2009, $363 million this year, and $352 million allocated for 2011. The vast majority of MARAD’s budget goes to the Military Security Program, which stays constant at $174 million. Assistance to small yards in 2011 is zero, while getting rid of the Ready Reserve Fleet has been allocated $10 million. An additional $49.3 million currently goes for operations and programs. Does that mean there might be some loose change rattling around for America’s Marine Highway Program ? The U. S. is exceptional among nations as it has 95,000 miles of coastline and 25,000 miles of navigable inland waterways and lakes. In moving domestic cargo, the math is simple: Move a ton of freight by truck and a gallon of fuel will get 155 miles down the road; by rail, that gallon will go 413 miles; but by towed barge that gallon will move the ton of freight nearly 576 miles. Furthermore, trucks are the dirtiest form of ground transport. In the past decade, automotive emissions have risen 3.3 percent, while truck emissions have risen nearly 77 percent. The evidence is clear, and throwing more money at thecrumbling highway system so that more and more trucks can clog the roadways to move a few tons of freight seems ludicrous. America’s Marine Highways are **plentiful** and **renewable**. A barge moving over 400,000 tons of cargo 2,300 miles would only consume 9,000 gallons of fuel, whereas that same cargo being moved by trucks would require 53,000 gallons. Since the mid-1990s, more than 40,000 U.S. merchant mariners, 38,000 longshoremen and 200,000 shipyard workers have lost their jobs. And over the last 50 years more than 60 shipyards have gone out of business. Northrop Grumman is closing its Tallulah yard in Louisiana by the end of 2010 and its much bigger Avondale yard by 2013…and another shipyard closes. Recently, the internal Revenue Service did an “Audit Techniques Guide” for its agents regarding inland waterway transportation. The report concluded, “Barge shipping is by far the most energy-efficient mode of transportation, extremely safe, causes little congestion, produces little air/noise pollution, has minimal land use or social impact.” The report went on to say, “The goods exchanged between states using the waterways exceeds $100 billion, and the industry supports 70,000 jobs while supporting 800,000 jobs in related industries. River states represent 54 percent of the population, 56 percent of heavy manufacturing, and 61 percent of agricultural jobs. And the waterways’ transportation industry provides $1.6 billion in fuel tax.” The CBO study cited earlier declared that national highway congestion resulted in 4.2 billion hours of delay and 2.9 billion gallons of additional fuel used at a cost of $78 billion. The proposed remedy is for the federal government to impose a policy of “congestion pricing.” This policy would charge drivers to use highways-roadways. More money out of your pocket during heavy traffic and lower prices in opposite circumstances, and check this one out: “Nationwide implementation of congestion pricing could provide governments a ‘social benefit’ of $19 billion to $45 billion per year.” President Obama needs to realize that we cannot pave our way or railroad our way to inevitable growth. The cost would probably be around $350 billion over six years. Obama and Secretary LaHood need to sit down with a few of us in the maritime industry so we can explain to them that the way to alleviatecongestion and pollution and save billions of dollars in fuel costs is by transporting goods over water. Think of the creation of jobs at shipyards, on vessels, and in ports.Imagine a budget surplus for the arts, education, mass transportation, and health care for the poor. Imagine….
 * Shipyard closings now will __decimate__ the industry – MTS is key – only marine highways are __functionally limitless__**
 * Munoz, 11** [January 11, The Obama Infrastructure Plan, and Another Shipyard Closes, OP-ED by Tony Munoz, Editor-in-Chief of the Maritime ExecutiveMagazine and the MarEx Newsletter, []]

**<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">The plan is ****__<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">critical __****<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;"> to save the shipbuilding industry – ****__<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">consistent federal funding __****<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;"> is key ** **<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">AMO 12 ** <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;"> [American Maritime Officer “Title XI loan guarantees generate U.S. shipbuilding jobs,” May 2012, http://www.amo-union.org/News/2012/201205/201205.pdf, AZhang] <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">As the subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies devel- ops appropriations legislation for FY 2013, we ask that it provide funding for<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">the Maritime Administration’s loan guarantee program, known as the “ Title XI Program .” <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">This program warrants continued support even as Congress understandably reviews all accounts carefully. This is not a large, top down government program but a small program based on private sector initiative and applications. <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">The program guarantees commercial loans for privately financed commercial ship construction and shipyard modernization – all in the United States. <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">Demand for program guarantees has consistently exceeded available resources. Funding <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">and implementation of the Title XI program will<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">help grow the U.S. economy and create and maintain American jobs in the domestic shipbuilding<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">and related service and supply industries, as well as aboard United States- flag commercial vessels. It will<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">help maintain the nation’s defense shipbuilding industrial base and an active U.S.-flag merchant marine, which is essential to U.S. defense sealift requirements. <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">The program has created and maintained tens of thousands of well-paying seagoing and shoreside jobs, and helped to ensure<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">that an adequate pool of vessels and mariners and a shipyard industrial base, <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">including associated supply industries, is available to meet U.S. <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">economic, homeland and national sealift needs. <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">Maintaining commercial vessel construction in U.S. shipyards can also<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">help reduce overhead charges assessed to DOD on military ship- building contracts,<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;"> as some overhead could be assessed to commercial work.The program also provides a strong return for the government, as each Title XI dollar leverages 15- 20 dollars of private investment.<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">Moreover, the resulting overall economic activity <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">has been estimated to be several times the shipyard output. <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">For vessel operators and shipyards seeking to utilize the program, it is critically important that the program be funded on a regular basis. Sporadic funding for Title XI makes it difficult to develop even short term plans, much less multi-year strategies, and inhibits critical economic activity in the maritime sector. On the other hand, a consistently funded program will help grow the maritime industry and the economy as ship owners and shipyards invest in their enterprises. <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;">Moreover, the risk premiums collect- ed in the course of administration of the program help ensure that the program is paid for. For all these reasons, we urge you to include funding for new commitments for the Title XI program in appropriations leg- islation for Fiscal Year 2013.

In conclusion, our study found that the tremendous advantage the US enjoys in naval power directly supports our national security through global power projection and maintaining freedom of the seas. Our ability to build large, highly capable naval ships is a vital part of our naval superiority and is therefore inexorably linked to our national security. **The US must maintain it lead in naval power by protecting its domestic shipbuilding industry**. It is our conclusion that the number one issue facing the American military shipbuilder today is the uncertainty in future orders for ship construction. The year to year fluctuation in the projected naval order book adds uncertainty for the shipbuilder wanting to invest in capital and labor improvement, and adds cost to the vessels actually being delivered. This fluctuation is exacerbated when the US Navy cancels entire ship classes or severely limits procurement of vessels that have been programs of record, programs which the shipbuilders have used to make labor and capital investment decisions. We feel it is imperative for the Navy to identify the force of the future and commit to a stable procurement plan to implement that force. The concept of Seabasing must mature at least to the point where the major yards can invest in the infrastructure necessary to build the force. In this area, we also conclude that the requirement for full funding of naval vessels in the year of authorization hampers the ability of the Navy and the industry to maintain a steady shipbuilding plan. It is apparent to us that the US Navy shipbuilding program is often used as a “bill payer” for other DoD priorities. In addition to the reality that the money is not obligated in the year of funding, the temptation to use the US Navy shipbuilding account to pay current year expenses is greater if significant procurement dollars are available to pay the full cost of individual ships. While we are convinced the nation must maintain sufficient shipbuilding capacity to allow for surge in national emergencies, we feel that the current and projected naval order book does not support the capacity being carried by the six largest shipyards. Restructuring of the industrial base is necessary. This restructuring may entail the politically difficult decision to allow some yards to close, but if the naval order book does not increase and the restructuring does not occur, unit cost will continue to skyrocket out of proportion to the value to the nation of the vessel.
 * This is the vital internal link into overall naval power**
 * Alberto, et al., 5** (Lieutenant Colonel Ronald P., U.S. Army, Colonel Michael G. Archuleta, U.S. Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Steven H. Bills, U.S. Air Force, Commander William A. Bransom, U.S. Navy, Mr. Kenneth Cohen, Department of State, Commander William A. Ebbs, U.S. Navy, George Manjgaladze, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Georgia, Commander Elizabeth B. Myhre, U.S. Navy, Audrea M. Nelson, DA, Robert L. Riddick, Department of Defense, Colonel Christopher M. Ross, U.S. Army, Julia N. Ruhnke, DA, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory M. Ryan, U.S. Marine Corps, Colonel David D. Thompson, U.S. Air Force, Commander Hugh D. Wetherald, U.S. Navy, Dr. Mark Montroll, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Dr. Michael Farbman, USAID, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Captain David B. Hill, U.S. Coast Guard, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, “SHIPBUILDING”, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2005, http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/programs/academic/industry/reports/2005/pdf/icaf-is-report-shipbuilding-2005.pdf, Deech)

This dichotomy— being the current world leader in naval construction at the same time being insignificant in the global commercial market—puts great stress on the US shipbuilding industry. Naval vessel costs have skyrocketed in the last few years, and the lack of a viable and vibrant commercial shipbuilding industry has played a role. The excess capacity of our large yards is reflected in the higher cost of the few vessels currently being ordered by the US Navy. The few ships currently being built in US yards barely maintain this vital industrial capacity. Worse still, shipyards depend on throughput— large numbers of ships—to maintain the proficiency of their highly skilled workforce and to train the next generation of workers. The skills of the US workforce are suffering in the current climate. We note that the lack of stability in planned naval ship procurement is also causing upward pressure on delivered vessel cost. The US Navy is increasingly unable to define future operational concepts and materiel requirements. The constant changes in the shipbuilding plan make it more and more difficult for shipyards to plan for future requirements. The capital investment both in infrastructure and human resources required in this industry is vast. Because of this, only a stable procurement rate can make it fiscally viable to invest in modernization and efficiency initiatives necessary for modern construction.
 * The plan also prevents __costs from skyrocketing__ – that prevents naval decline**
 * Alberto, et al., 5** (Lieutenant Colonel Ronald P., U.S. Army, Colonel Michael G. Archuleta, U.S. Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Steven H. Bills, U.S. Air Force, Commander William A. Bransom, U.S. Navy, Mr. Kenneth Cohen, Department of State, Commander William A. Ebbs, U.S. Navy, George Manjgaladze, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Georgia, Commander Elizabeth B. Myhre, U.S. Navy, Audrea M. Nelson, DA, Robert L. Riddick, Department of Defense, Colonel Christopher M. Ross, U.S. Army, Julia N. Ruhnke, DA, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory M. Ryan, U.S. Marine Corps, Colonel David D. Thompson, U.S. Air Force, Commander Hugh D. Wetherald, U.S. Navy, Dr. Mark Montroll, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Dr. Michael Farbman, USAID, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Captain David B. Hill, U.S. Coast Guard, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, “SHIPBUILDING”, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2005, http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/programs/academic/industry/reports/2005/pdf/icaf-is-report-shipbuilding-2005.pdf, Deech)

NLUS, 12 – a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating our citizens about the importance of sea power to U.S. national security and supporting the men and women of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine and their families (Navy League of the United States, “Maritime Primacy & Economic Prosperity: Maritime Policy 2012-13”, Navy League of the United States, 1/21/12, [] | AK) Global engagement is critical to the U.S. economy, world trade and the protection of democratic freedoms that so many take for granted. The guarantors of these vital elements are hulls in the water, embarked forward amphibious forces and aircraft overhead. The Navy League of the United States’ Maritime Policy for 2012-13 provides recommendations for strategy, policy and the allocation of national resources in support of our sea services and essential to the successful execution of their core missions. We live in a time of complex challenges — //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">terrorism //, //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">political // and //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">economic turmoil //, //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">extremism //, //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">conflicts // over environmental resources, manmade and natural //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">disasters // — andpotential //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">flash points // exist //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">around the globe //. It is the persistent **forward presence** and engagement **of maritime forces that keep these flash points in** **check**, **prevent conflict** **and crisis escalation**, and allow the smooth flow of goods in a global economy. The United States has fought multiple wars and sacrificed much to ensure un challenged access to sea lanes and secure the global commerce upon which the U.S. economy depends. The “persistent naval presence” provided by our forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps ships, aircraft, Sailors and Marines is the guarantor of that hard-won maritime security and the critical deterrent against those who might seek to undermine that security. Maintaining naval forces that can sustain our national commitment to global maritime security and dissuade transnational aggression in the future must be a national imperative. The No. 1 challenge to that imperative is the lack of a fully funded, achievable Navy shipbuilding program that produces the right quantity and quality of ships, with the right capabilities, for the right costs, in economically affordable numbers over the next 25 years. A shipbuilding plan must be defined and agreed upon by the Navy, the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security, Congress and the administration — and executed now. Recognizing that hard choices must be made in a reduction of the defense budget, the Navy League is reducing its recommended funding for the Department of the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), account to $20 billion or more per year. This reduced funding leads to a recommended reduced force level of 305 ships to meet our nation’s global security challenges. This also recognizes that the worldwide commitment of ship deployment must be reduced. America’s amphibious expeditionary force is prepared to engage today’s threats — today. Our Marines remain heavily engaged in Afghanistan and support numerous other small-unit operations that enable nation-building with allies around the globe. The Marine Corps needs the authorization to reduce to an end strength of 186,800 Marines, and this force level must be properly resourced to maintain a balanced air-ground logistics team. The Corps must regain its expertise in amphibious operations and maintain that capability in force structure. The service also must be provided the resources to reset the force, to restore or acquire new equipment and capabilities consumed in the ongoing wars. The Coast Guard is a multimission, worldwide-deployed armed force with broad law enforcement authorities. It operates seamlessly with the DoD services as prescribed by the National Command Authority and is the lead agency for maritime homeland security and law enforcement support to the Navy in deployed operations. In addition, it fulfills several legally mandated missions, including its most employed mission of search and rescue, plus protection of living marine resources, drug interdiction, illegal migrant interdiction, defense readiness, marine safety, ice operations, aids to navigation, marine environmental protection, and ports, waterways and coastal security. The substantial breadth of operations, which has increased markedly in tempo since the 9/11 attacks, continues to overstress aging equipment, resulting in rising maintenance costs and a greater workload for Coast Guard personnel. The Coast Guard must increase its active-duty military strength to at least 45,000, have an operational expense budget of at least $6.7 billion and an Acquisition, Construction and Improvements (AC&I) budget resourced at no less than $2.5 billion per year, of which $2 billion should be dedicated to continuing the recapitalization of the fleet. Skilled Mariners are more critical than ever to ensuring our ability to sustain U.S. national and global security interests. Ninety-five percent of the equipment and supplies required to deploy the U.S. armed forces is moved by sea. The base of skilled U.S. Merchant Mariners is shrinking. The shipping capabilities of the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force and the DoD’s Military Sealift Command are sized to support routine and some surge logistics and specialized mission requirements. This critical capability must be maintained by ensuring an active commercial U.S.-flag Merchant Marine to support efficient and cost-effective movement of DoD cargo. //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">The U.S. shipbuilding industry is in crisis //. Finding a solution must be an imperative if our nation is to maintain a Navy capable of supporting the nation’s defense. Jobs lost in this sector mean precious ground lost in capability and capacity that cannot be regained. The current production levels for ship construction and the manufacturing of the other critical systems, equipment and weapons that we install in our ships, submarines and aircraft are at critically low levels. Sustaining and upgrading our nation’s critical, defense-related industrial base must be an essential element of our National Security Strategy. Personnel must train as they will fight to remain operationally ready. This all-volunteer military also must receive highly competitive compensation in the way of salary as well as health care, retirement and quality-of-life benefits to remain an effective fighting force. Taking care of our wounded warriors is fundamental.
 * And the shipbuilding industry solves every transnational threat**

// Introduction "Strategy is to war what the plot is to the play; Tactics is represented by the role of the players; Logistics furnishes the stage management, accessories, and maintenance. The audience, thrilled by the action of the play and the art of the performers, overlooks all of the cleverly hidden details of stage management" - LtCol George C. Thorpe, Pure Logistics (1917) From the coasters and privateers of the American Revolution to the gas turbine powered container ships of today, the civilian Merchant Marine has always been an integral part of American security strategies. In the 21st century, success in regional and major theater wars hinges on the ability to rapidly deploy and employ sufficient military power to overwhelm any adversary and achieve a favorable political solution. More than 90 percent of the petroleum products, ammunition, unit equipment, and sustaining material required by military forces abroad must be moved by merchant ships. In the last 30 years the number of American merchant vessels available for strategic sealift has dropped precipitously, and the number of skilled, licensed mariners who man these ships has likewise plummeted. This paper will examine the feasibility of establishing __an offshore coastal trade system__ that __will__ simultaneously __increase the number of militarily useful vessels__ under U.S. flag, __rejuvenate America's ailing ship__ construction and repair __industry, and provide a pool of professional mariners to support national security__ requirements. The Solution - A Domestic Waterborne Superhighway __There are many possible solutions to the sealift problem.__ These range from doing nothing and hoping everything works itself out to having the U.S. government purchase new cargo ships to add to the military inventory manned by uniformed personnel. Unfortunately, of these two extremes the latter is cost prohibitive at best, and the former is pure folly; as one Naval War College professor was heard to say "hope is not a strategy." **__The best option is__** for U.S. shipping and ground transport industries to work together **__to establish an intermodal coastal shipping system.__** __This waterborne__ cargo super __highway will require new ships, more men to sail them, and the infrastructure to support and build them.__ The debate begins when one tries to define what types of ships are needed, who will build and pay for them, and how will they be used. //
 * The plan __makes or breaks__ the __foundation__ of strategic sealift and strategic shipbuilding – __other methods fail__**
 * McCain 03** (Scott T., “Bolstering U.S. strategic sealift through coastal shipping,” Navy Supply Corps, 2003, proquest)//mat//

//**__Sealift__ solves great power war and is __critical to naval power__**// //**Conway et al 7** [James T., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf] // // Deter major power war **.** __No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers__. __Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of **deterring major power war**__. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, __the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power.____The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options__. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. __In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. __ This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by **__a robust sealift capability__** that **__can concentrate and sustain__** forces, **__sea control and power projection__** enable extended campaigns ashore. //

//**Sealift is the __foundation__ of USPACOM effectiveness**// //**Gulledge and Keating 10** [Jay Gulledge, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, served on the faculties of Tulane University and the University of Louisville, Timothy J. Keating, retired United States Navy admiral of PACOM, 2010 “Future Naval Operations in Asia and the Pacific” in “Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010”, Johns Hopkins University, page 344-345, [], DMintz] // // The instrument of foreign policy that works best in that part of the world is the U.S. Navy. The junior officers at the command coined a phrase, “virtual presence equals actual absence.” That is the one point I would emphasize to you when you talk about climate and energy. __There is no substitute, in both my personal and my professional opinion, for American forces being present. And as the Navy works through the challenges, and the Air Force works through the challenges, and, to a lesser extent, our Army and Marine Corps, because those forces that are generally in garrison are of less utility to the commander of USPACOM, **unless we have the lift capability to move those forces** out of garrison and be present for exercises and training in the countries of the AOR. If we do not have a Navy of sufficient numbers and an Air Force of sufficient numbers and lift capability, we are not present. We are absent.__ You can do all of the video teleconferencing you want. You can have as many meetings as you want. But you have to be out there and train with, and develop the trust and confidence of, and build relationships with, the younger men and women in the armed forces of the AOR so that they can grow up knowing that we are not going to leave them high and dry. A great way of manifesting that faith, trust, and confidence that they should have in us is through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations like those after Katrina. I cannot recount for you the number of times that a hurricane, a typhoon, a cyclone, or an earthquake has hit, or a cold snap has affected hundreds of thousands of people in the USPACOM AOR, and because we are there, because we are present, or we have sufficient reach and lift, we can provide assistance immediately. Such operations have dramatic impact. Several years ago, a devastating tsunami hit the western tip of Indonesia. Although the first forces to get on scene came by air, the second forces and the most sustainable forces came by sea. When Myanmar was hit by a tropical cyclone, I flew out there to offer the use of some of our medium- and heavy-lift helicopters and C-130s. We and our allies had deployed four ships off the coast. But the Myanmar government said, “No thanks, we don’t need the help.” Thousands of lives were lost as a result; it was one of the significant regrets I have in my tour there. When an earthquake and a bout of extremely cold weather occurred in China, the first American expression of support came in the form of two C-17s loaded with relief supplies. We had to get permission to let them land, but that is the authority that we enjoyed at USPACOM. __So it is presence. It is readiness.__ It is partnership. __These__ three __essential elements of USPACOM strategy, I am convinced, provide the basis for success in the region.__//

//**That solves __multiple__ crises and scenarios for war – specifically, Korea, China, and pandemics – only sea-based __power projection__ sends a __credible__ signal**// //**Willard 11** [Robert F. Willard, //US navy commander, USPACOM, //April 12, 2011, “STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT F. WILLARD, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE, [], DMintz]// // The __USPACOM__ Area of Responsibility (AOR) __is vital to U.S. national interests__. It spans half the earth and is home to more than three billion people living in three dozen nations—five of which are allied with the U.S. and many more of which are important economic and security partners. The region contains the world’s three largest economies, and almost one-third (over $1 trillion) of U.S. two-way trade in goods and services is with nations in the region. Moreover, much of the world’s trade and energy that fuels the world economy moves on Asia’s sea and air lines of communication. __The vastness of the region makes permanent and rotational U.S. force presence essential to enabling security and strategic deterrence throughout the region while protecting and defending the homeland. Military construction provides necessary facilities for new weapon systems, supports the Services’ evolution to become more efficient and effective, offers warfighters and their families quality-of-life facilities while at home, and renovates existing facilities__ that are beyond their useful lives. Thus the MILCON projects in this testimony enhance the capabilities of USPACOM forces that underpin security in this increasingly important and dynamic region. While the region remains relatively secure and stable, th __e strategic environment also includes traditional and asymmetric challenges that drive the need for forward presence__ and the subsequent MILCON recommendations in this testimony. __Sustaining the conditions that have underpinned unprecedented prosperity for over six decades remains challenging for a variety of reasons, including the following:__// //__ The threat to the United States and its allies posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies, and its potential for instability__// //  Transnational violent extremist organizations (VEOs) undermine stability and threaten traditional Allies and emerging partners // //  __China’s significant military modernization associated with its unclear intent__// //  __Territorial disputes, and increasingly assertive actions to resolve them, present the potential for conflict and instability__// //  Increasingly persistent and sophisticated cyber threats that challenge unencumbered operations. // //  Transnational criminal activity—to include piracy and trafficking in narcotics and persons—that rejects the rule of law and challenges international order // //  __Humanitarian crises such as pandemics and famines, __ as well as natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, and volcanoes // //  Environmental degradation caused by poor resource management, the pillaging of natural resources, and disputes over resource sovereignty // // Despite these many challenges, __the region remains one of immense opportunity for peaceful growth, cooperation, and prosperit__ y. __Realizing such opportunity relies upon continued U.S. ability and willingness to underwrite security, extend deterrence, and protect the global commons upon which the region’s livelihood depends. U.S. military strength, presence, and engagement provide the means to ensure security and peace and avoid confrontation and conflict. __ Secretary of Defense Gates emphasized this point in Singapore in June 2010: ― __The strength of the U.S. commitment and deterrent power will be expressed through the continued forward presence of substantial U.S. forces in the region.__//

//**North Korean prolif and war goes nuclear**// //**De Luce 10** [Dan de Luce, November 25, 2010, “War with North Korea Poses Nightmare Scenarios” AFP, []] // //__ A full-blown war on the Korean peninsula offers up a nightmare scenario that would __ cause appalling casualties and potentially __ trigger a nuclear exchange, ____ experts __ and former officials __ say __. The crisis provoked by __ North Korea's artillery attack __ on a South Korean island this week __ makes the prospect of an all-out conflict look less remote, __ and US officials -- mindful of the high-stakes -- have carefully avoided talk of military action. With an array of artillery trained on Seoul, North Korea could easily blast the glass towers of the South's booming capital for days and kill huge numbers of civilians before US and South Korean forces prevailed, experts said. "Official Pentagon models assume __ it would take months to win the war at a cost approaching one million casualties or more, __ all told, including dead and wounded," Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, told AFP. "And __ that's without nuclear weapons __ being used," said O'Hanlon, who wrote a book looking at the effects of a potential war. US and allied __ military planners __ have long believed that the North would be overwhelmed in a conventional war, but they __ worry __ how __ Seoul would use ____ its arsenal of chemical and biological weapons __, as well __ as its __ small cache of __ atomic bombs __, said Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corporation. "The key question is whether or not they can use their WMD (weapons of mass destruction) effectively," Bennett said. "That's the part which we don't really know." Bennett and some other analysts say __ North Korea __ likely __ will have ____ the ability to fit a nuclear warhead onto one of its missiles within months, and may already have succeeded __. In the first hours and days of a conflict, US warplanes would be focused on taking out nuclear sites, missiles and chemical weapons before the North Koreans had a chance to use them. Under one war game played out in 2005 by The Atlantic magazine, former military officers and officials concluded that US fighter aircraft would have to carry out up to 4,000 sorties a day to prevent a WMD catastrophe for Seoul and the region. South Korea has said it believes the __ North has about 100 nuclear facilities __, but in the event of a war, __ Pyongyang would __ likely __ move weapons and atomic material to other locations, including a vast network of underground sites, __ Bennett said. "__ We may not have surveillance that's adequate over all of North Korea in time to monitor where things get moved to __," he said. If the North chose to fire __ chemical shells into Seoul __ or strike at air fields with special forces armed with biological weapons, it __ would run the risk of a massive retaliation from the US __military -- __ raising the danger of the world's first nuclear war __.//

//**China war guarantees extinction**// //**Cheong 2k** (Ching, Senior Writer at the Strait Times, “No one gains in a war over Taiwan,” June 25th, Lexis) // //THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China , 50 years later , short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. //

//**Pandemics trigger extinction**// //**Yu 09** — Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science (Victoria, Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate, 22 May 2009, http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/spring-2009/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate) // //__A pandemic will kill off all humans. __ In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). __While vaccines have been developed__ for the plague and some other infectious diseases, __new viral strains are constantly emerging — a pro cess that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction__. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the kening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. __The__ simultaneous __occurrence of a__ ntigenic drift ( __point mutations that lead to new strains__ ) __and__ antigenic shift ( __the inter-species transfer of disease__ ) __in the____influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic, ” __ according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10). //

//**Sealift is also key to AFRICOM effectiveness – that’s key to African stability**// //**Ward** 10 (General William, March 9, 2010, “AFRICOM Posture Statement: General Ward reports annual testimony to Congress”, http://www.usaraf.army.mil/NEWS/NEWS_100310_WARD_AFRICOM_REMARKS_CONGRESS.html ///TS) __<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">The level of funding for programs under the authority of DOS that are available to Africa has increased since the creation of U.S. Africa Command, and we request continued funding to allow us to fully pursue the defense aspects of the President's stated priorities. __ The countries in our AOR are among the poorest in the world. Many of their militaries are inappropriately trained, equipped, and prepared for their primary missions-the defense of their state or participation in peacekeeping operations. __ Movement of U.S. and African military personnel and equipment to meet emergent threats, conduct capacity building activities, and respond to crises, is heavily dependent on U.S. military __ <span style="font-family: Georgia,serif; font-size: 8pt;"> air and __ sealift __. Fully funding DOS-led programs is necessary to assist our partners in maintaining stability that fosters development, while helping them transform their security sectors. The greatest needs include the following:

Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few __countries__ in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is amajor exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the __Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states__ there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, __an African war can__ attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African __nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration__, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
 * Escalates and goes nuclear**
 * Deutsch 02** (Dr. Jeffrey Deutsch, Founder, Rabid Tiger Project, November 2002 “the rabid tiger project's major prediction for 2025” http://users.rcn.com/jeff-deutsch/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html)

Operations in time of peace encompass routine activities, homeland security, protection of the country’s economic interests at sea, enforcement of maritime treaties, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In general, routine duties include maritime border laws/customs enforcement, hydrographic surveys, oceanographic research, salvage, search and rescue, ordnance disposal, and marine pollution control. For the most part, these tasks are the responsibility of the coast guard, with naval forces employed in a supporting role. The threats to homeland security from across the sea are increasing in both intensity and sophistication. Specifically, these threats include ballistic missiles, maritime terrorism, illicit fishing, cross-border illegal immigration, criminal activity in ports/ harbors and at critical installations/facilities ashore, piracy, and trafficking in narcotics, humans, and weapons. The threat of ballistic missiles against ports/airfields and coastal installations/facilities can be countered by creating seabased ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, as the U.S. Navy is doing. BMD systems detect and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles by physically and electronically attacking bases, launch sites, and associated command and control systems. As part of homeland security, they are intended to provide defense against ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of their flight. 3 Maritime terrorism has emerged as a formidable threat to both civilian and naval vessels. Large commercial ships are easy targets for determined terrorists, and the value of these vessels and cargoes makes them attractive to both regional terrorist groups and international organizations that desire to disrupt the economic lifelines of the industrial world. Compounding the threat is the use of commercial vessels by criminals who are often allied with terrorists. **There is** also **a possibility that weapons of mass destruction** (WMD) **could be used as terrorist weapons**.
 * Independent of sealift, overall US naval power solves nuclear terrorism**
 * Vego, 8** — professor of operations at the Naval War College, former commanding officer in the former Yugoslav Navy and former West German merchant marine (Milan N., “On Naval Power”, Joint Forces Quarterly, July 2008, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-50/JFQ-50.pdf, Deech)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of **__terrorist attack__**, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, **__could__** precipitate a chain of events **__lead__** ing **__to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons__** between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) __suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors__. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in __Washington would be left with a very short list__ consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But __at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out__ in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? __Washington’s early response__ to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil __might__ also __raise the possibility of__ an unwanted (and nuclear aided) __confrontation with Russia and__ /or __China__. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) __Washington might__ decide to __order a__ significant conventional (or __nuclear) retaliatory__ or disarming __attack against__ the __leadership__ of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, __Russia and/or China might interpret such__ action __as__ being __far too close for__ their __comfort,__ and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, __what__ would happen __if the U__ nited __S__ tates __wished to__ discuss its right to __retaliate__ against groups based in their territory? __If__, for some reason, __Washington found the responses of Russia and China__ deeply __underwhelming__ , (neither “for us or against us”) __might it__ also __suspect that they__ secretly __were in cahoots with the group, increasing__ (again perhaps ever so slightly) __the chances of a major exchange__ If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. __If__ some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. __Russia__, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, __is subjected to an attack__ of nuclear terrorism. In response, __Moscow places its nuclear forces__ very visibly __on a high__ er state of __alert__ and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, __would the U__ nited __S__ tates __and Russia be happy to__ sit back and __let this occur?__ In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.
 * Global nuclear war**
 * Ayson, 10** — Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, InformaWorld)

1AC Solvency

 * Contention three is __solvency__**

***Note: SST = short sea transportation, CCF = capital construction fund**
 * A comprehensive federal expansion of Title XI loan guarantees mitigates congestion and creates conditions favorable for private investment – the plan reverse the only barrier to short sea transportation**
 * Cook, 11** — former General Counsel of the Maritime Administration, Counsel to Seward and Kissel LLP (H. Clayton, “Dead in the Water”, Maritime Executive, 7/8/2012, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/dead-in-the-water, Deech)
 * For more than a decade, Europe and the U.S. have witnessed increasing highway traffic congestion and considered the possible use of water transport as a highway supplement and alternative. The European Community has moved to embrace water transport for its container and ro/ro traffic using programs like the Marco Polo and Motorways of the Sea initiatives. In the U.S., there has been general agreement that our ocean coastal waters could provide additional transportation capacity and that a comprehensive federal program would be required to achieve it . But no such program has been initiated, and the multiple " choke points " and miles of bumper-to-bumper traffic that have characterized travel on major highways, such as I-95, I-10 and I-5, have simply grown more pronounced year by year. These issues remain unaddressed today . With the December 2007 enactment of the Marine Transportation sections of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (Act), Congress and the Bush Administration provided the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) with the authority for a European-style Motorways of the Sea program to facilitate federal and local government collaborations and attract public and private sector investment for short sea transportation infrastructure projects to access the potential of our nation's ocean highways. The Short Sea Transportation Program The Act directed the Secretary to establish a short sea transportation program (SST) to mitigate landside congestion and provide a favorable legal regime for public and private sector investment to create the infrastructure necessary for new coastwise and other domestic waterborne services. The program was intended to expand the use of the Great Lakes/Saint Lawrence Seaway System as well as inland, intracoastal and coastal waterways for the transportation of freight loaded in containers and trailers to mitigate landside congestion. Section 1121 mandated actions to create an environment that would foster federal, state and local cooperation in the planning and financing of shore-side infrastructure and attract private sector investment to finance vessel fleet requirements. The House version of Section 1122 addressed the need for U.S. government-assisted financing for the vessels that would be involved by extending the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) Capital Construction Fund’s (CCF) tax-deferral program to container and ro/ro services nationwide and authorizing $2 billion for MARAD’s Title XI loan guarantee program. Section 1123 mandated a report to be made not later than one year after the December 19, 2007 enactment to detail progress in the implementation of SST and provide recommendations for further administrative or legislative action as appropriate. Certain actions in the Act are mandated as "shall" while others are merely permitted as "may." The Act provides that the Secretary "shall establish a short sea transportation program and designate short sea transportation projects to be conducted under the program to mitigate landside congestion and encourage the use of short sea transportation through the development and expansion of: (1) documented vessels; (2) shipper utilization; (3) port and landside infrastructure; and (4) marine transportation strategies by state and local governments." In administering the program, the Secretary "shall": • Designate SST routes as extensions of the surface transportation system to focus public and private efforts to use the waterways to relieve landside congestion along coastal corridors; • Enter into memorandums of understanding with the heads of other federal entities to transport federally owned or generated cargo using program-designated SST projects when practical or available; • Consult with shippers and other participants in transportation logistics and develop proposals for short-term incentives to encourage the use of SST in consultation with federal entities and state and local governments; • Develop strategies to encourage the use of SST for passengers and cargo; • Assess the extent to which states and local governments include SST and other marine transportation solutions in their transportation planning, and encourage state departments of transportation to develop strategies, where appropriate, to incorporate SST, ferries, and other marine transportation solutions for regional and interstate transport of freight and passengers in their transportation planning; • Encourage groups of states and multi-state transportation entities to determine how SST can address congestion, bottlenecks, and other interstate transportation challenges; • Establish a board to identify and seek solutions to impediments hindering effective use of SST, with representatives of the Environmental Protection Agency and other federal, state, and local governmental entities and private sector entities; and • Issue temporary SST program regulations for the implementation of the SST program not later than 90 days after December 19, 2007, and to issue final regulations not later than October 1, 2008. MARAD was assigned responsibility for implementation of SST, which it renamed America's Marine Highway Program. Two Years Late and $2 Billion Short The report to Congress on the implementation of SST and any recommendations for further legislative or administrative action, which was due not later than December 19, 2008, was finally issued on April 5 of this year. It addresses the "shall" tasking assigned under Section 1121 point by point and confirms – without noting DOT’s failure to meet the mandated deadlines of March 18 and October 1, 2008 for the publication of regulations or the December 19, 2008 deadline for filing the report – that the congressionally assigned tasks have been completed or are otherwise well underway. The report's organization and content are explained in an Executive Summary which commences: "The first section of this report provides the justification for expanding the utilization of Marine Highway services. It describes the interests of the federal government in encouraging greater use of Marine Highways and, through the example of Europe, shows that government policy can be successful in achieving this result. An important point of this section is that the full range of public benefits of Marine Highways services will not be realized based solely on market-driven transportation choices." The report confirms the Secretary's apparent compliance with the Act's directions. In the Conclusion it acknowledges that: "The private sector will ultimately be the key to the success of America's Marine Highway through innovation, outreach and investment,” and goes on to state: "Without strong leadership from the federal government, however, the nation's rivers and coastal waterways will continue to be underutilized for domestic container and trailer freight transportation. It is difficult for private operators to support the scale of investment needed to initiate large-scale operations. Private operators are particularly disadvantaged by the fact that many of the important public benefits of water transportation . . . cannot be captured in the form of higher revenues or lower costs . . . . Government action is required to help overcome these challenges and assist the expansion of Marine Highway services in a significant manner." The report confirms the Secretary's apparent compliance with the Act's directions. In the Conclusion it acknowledges that: "The private sector will ultimately be the key to the success of America's Marine Highway through innovation, outreach and investment,” and goes on to state: " W ithout strong leadership from the federal government, however, the nation's rivers and coastal waterways will continue to be underutilized for domestic container and trailer freight transportation. It is difficult for private operators to support the scale of investment needed to initiate large-scale operations . Private operators are particularly disadvantaged by the fact that many of the important public benefits of water transportation . . . cannot be captured in the form of higher revenues or lower costs . . . . Government action is required to help overcome these challenges and assist the expansion of Marine Highway services in a significant manner." But there are no "recommendations [to the Congress] for further legislative or administrative action that the Secretary of Transportation considers appropriate." Instead, the report provides only: "suggestions from the transportation community. . . which are under consideration by the Administration and thus not necessarily endorsed by MARAD, US DOT, or the Administration, that stakeholders say could induce increased waterborne freight traffic on America's Marine Highways." We are assured that MARAD will work to “incorporate America's Marine Highway more completely into the national transportation system . . . fund research and study the commercial market . . . [and] evaluate the outcomes of Marine Highway projects already underway . . . .” Where are the outlines of any MARAD process to address and prioritize the "suggestions from the transportation community," or of Administration support for the modification of the Harbor Maintenance Tax, or of support for a well-funded, multiyear MARAD Title XI program for the financing necessary for the creation of the container and ro/ro fleets of $150-to-$200 million vessels that will required to achieve SST’s objectives? One only need review the MARAD Administrator's FY 2012 budget testimony on March 1 and the March 10 testimony of the Secretary to understand that there will be no America's Marine Highway Program. Instead of a request for some portion or all of the Act's authorization of $2 billion for Title XI vessel financing, the MARAD Administrator requested the cancellation of $54.1 million of the $76.6 million of its existing Title XI authority "because the maritime industry must share in the national sacrifice during these challenging economic times." And while the Secretary spoke of multibillion-dollar investments for six-year authorizations in high-speed rail, road and bridge improvements, and rehabilitation of existing transit systems, the entire MARAD operating budget request was only $357.8 million. So we have a delayed December 2008 report to Congress, delivered in April 2011, and not much else. End of the Highway? From discussions too numerous to count over the past dozen years, it is clear that two of the most important impediments to the initiation of coastwise blue water services have been (1) the absence of the two federal support programs that have proven essential to the financing of the nation's existing blue water container and ro/ro fleets in prior decades, and (2) the imposition of the Harbor Maintenance Tax. Financing the multiple vessel commitments to meet the service frequencies that will be needed to attract cargoes from interstate highways to coastal waterways will almost certainly require federal assistance . The congressional sponsors of the Act were mindful of this need, which is why the original versions of the Act , as reported by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and later passed by the House, provided access to two important MARAD financing assistance programs: the Title XI loan guarantee program , authorizing $2 billion of new financing, and the CCF tax deferral program , extending these deferrals to SST project use. These programs, which enable vessel owners to obtain long-term commercial financing and purchase vessels with tax-deferred dollars over periods of up to 25 years, have been used in combination in the financing of virtually all of the container and ro/ro vessels in current U.S. domestic service. The final version of the Act does not provide additional Title XI authorization but does extend CCF program availability . The CCF extension to coastwise services has been a long-time maritime community objective. The extension was included in congressional initiatives in the 1990s, in the SEA 21 congestion mitigation proposals in 2002, and in congressionally sponsored legislation in 2003. The CCF program is made up of individual tax deferrals based on MARAD contracts; its extension has already become effective for existing MARAD contract holders and should be available upon application and approval for others. The availability of Title XI 25-year term debt is of equal transaction importance. The two programs are complementary and designed for joint use.** Title XI** or similar debt financing support **will be necessary for meaningful SST developments** . Title XI program opponents have called it a "corporate subsidy." But, in fact, it is simply "mortgage insurance," as it was termed in its 1938 enactment, that is being purchased by the vessel owner and included as a transaction cost. **

And, marine infrastructure is key – other networks have reached maximum capacity – ineffective coordination precipitates wider congestion Jackson, 07 ** [LEVERAGING THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE U.S. INLAND WATERWAY SYSTEM, Colonel Donald E. Jackson, Jr. United States Army Professor John F. Troxell Project Adviser, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0K7n92gvqk0J:www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD%3DADA469583+&hl=en&gl=us] **
 * As our road and rail networks have become** increasingly congested **and near** maximum capacity**, we must look to the inland waterway system as a solution.12 The inland waterway system provides an //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">alternative to overland transportation // , **reducing congestion plaguing existing road and rail infrastructure** . Inland waterways account for approximately 11% of total domestic freight (as measured in ton-miles), third behind road and rail.13 Principal commodity groups include coal, petroleum, farm products, chemicals and crude materials such as aggregates for construction and other minerals. Total volume ranges around 630 million tons annually, and about 300 million ton-miles. Coal is used to generate over half the electricity produced in the U.S. and the inland waterways transport about 20% of this energy source.14 The Mississippi River System is the most important commercial navigation corridor, consisting of the Mississippi River and its multiple connecting tributaries. The majority of U.S. navigable rivers and canals are in the eastern half of the country. The Columbia, Sacramento, and San Joaquin Rivers are the only major navigable rivers on the West Coast. The Department of the Army, with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as its executive agent, has statutory responsibility for operating and maintaining all U.S. navigable waterways, excluding the Saint Lawrence Seaway. The Corps maintains more than 12,000 miles of inland waterways, owning or operating 196 commercially active lock sites with 241 lock chambers for the federal government. These waterways integrate a system of rivers, lakes, and coastal bays improved for commercial and recreational transport. Locks provide the essential infrastructure that allow tows to “stairstep” their way through the system and reach distant inland ports such as Minneapolis, Chicago, and Pittsburgh.15 Most of the locks supporting the inland waterway system are antiquated and in need of repair, expansion, and modernization. Many of the Corps-owned or operated locks are well past their planned design life of 50 years. Of the locks still in use in the United States, 30 were built in the 19th Century and another 92 locks are more than 60 years old.16 Nearly 50% of all Corps-maintained locks were considered to be functionally obsolete by the beginning of 2005. Assuming no new locks are built in the next 20 years, by 2020, another 93 existing locks will be obsolete. This means that 80 percent of locks now in service are beyond their planned design life, casting doubt of the reliability of the system as a whole. The physical condition of the inland waterway infrastructure recently received a grade of D- from the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in their 2005 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, released in March 2005.17 The report highlights the concern that lock condition is declining at the same time waterway usage is increasing. This is a significant challenge facing the inland waterway system, indicative of problems facing other industry sectors as well, casting doubt on the future viability of our national freight transportation system. Historically, the transportation infrastructure of the United States has allowed this country to become the world economic powerhouse it is today by providing a high quality, inexpensive, and expansive network of roads, bridges, rails, inland waterways, and ports.18 This expansive system requires full integration of all transportation modes through a n efficient national intermodal network . Intermodal freight transportation defines the transit of cargo through two or more modes from origin to its final destination. As the U.S freight transportation system advances further into the 21st Century, the need for managing the demand on the system and monitoring the volume of freight handled by each transportation mode becomes more critical .19 Each mode contributes to meet strategic freight transportation requirements, improving the efficiency of the U.S. national economy holistically . Individual industries offer unique capabilities historically preferable to various commodity shippers; however, advances in technology and operating procedures now open opportunities for more flexible origin to destination transportation planning. Adopting a more balanced approach among transport modes should be a national objective, potentially leading to increased throughput and lower costs to shippers and potential customers. Transportation infrastructuresupports our national security as well as our economy . The Defense Transportation System (DTS) is an integral part of the U.S. national transportation system. //<span style="font-family: Georgia,serif;">Close coordination // among a wide variety of military and federal agencies **is essential **to meeting national wartime or contingency transportation requirements . The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides the process for Defense Department (DOD) global transportation management. This process establishes an integrated transportation system that is used across the range of military operations, providing the most effective use of all transportation modes from origin to destination.20 In 2003 the Secretary of Defense designated USTRANSCOM the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). As the DPO, USTRANSCOM develops and directs the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to globally project national security capabilities.21 Future distribution requirements are not limited to contingency operations in distant lands. The Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative is a distribution initiative that contributes to logistics transformation. This concept identifies use of a transportation coordinator to integrate and synchronize movement of freight within the continental United States.22 This coordinator leverages the entire transportation industry, streamlining the process of moving a variety of DOD cargo. In 2005, USTRANSCOM’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) synchronized 212 vessel operations and the related land movement by truck, rail, and barge in support of DOD operations worldwide, moving over 22,239,700 square feet of unit cargo.23 Since USTRANSCOM works with a variety of commercial assets, services, and systems, it must continually grow the partnership with industry to incorporate current technology, anticipate trends, and develop future capabilities.24 **

Only the federal government solves – it’s key to coordination and multi-jurisdictional integration U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration 11** (“America’s Marine Highway Report to Congress” April 2011 http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/MARAD_AMH_Report_to_Congress.pdf)//NJain// **
 * //__The correct valuation of such benefits in planning and investment decisions could justify a much greater role for America’s Marine Highway as part of a balanced national transportation system__ . __USDOT, with its responsibility to develop and implement national freight and passenger transportation strategies and target public resources to satisfy public needs across State and other jurisdictional lines, is best positioned to see that this role is realized. The Federal government is also well-situated to coordinate the development of national standards to ensure the compatibility of infrastructure and equipment throughout the Marine Highway system.____MARAD is currently working closely with other USDOT modal administrations and the Office of the Secretary of Transportation to develop national transportation strategies that maximize the positive contributions of Marine Highway services.__//**

//Federal action is key to solve congestion and coordination – conflicting agencies leads to fragmentation// //U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 04** (“An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century,” [], ch. 13) **//**AS**
 * For the nation’s marine transportation system to meet current and future demands, ongoing maintenance, improvement, and expansion will be required . **A key prerequisite** for a robust system **is better coordination, planning, decision making, and allocation of resources at the federal level**. In particular, it will be essential to enhance the connections between this system and other modes of transportation, such as highways, railways, and airports. At the same time, in moving toward an ecosystem-based management approach, planning for the movement of cargo and passengers should be coordinated with the management of many other ocean and coastal uses and activities , and with efforts to protect the marine environment. Environmentally sound management of port operations is critical to the viability of port areas as natural resources as well as economic engines and to the integration of ports into an ecosystem-based management approach. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Green Ports Program is an example of an existing mechanism that incorporates environmental stewardship into port operation practices and that has been implemented by numerous U.S. ports along the Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, Atlantic, and Great Lakescoasts. One issue that may have specific consequences for marine transportation is climate change, whether gradual or abrupt, and the changes in environmental conditions that might result, such as decreased polar ice coverage, increased frequency or intensity of storms, and changes in sea-level. Federal Roles Within the federal government, responsibility for marine commerce and transportation is spread among numerous agencies, primarily the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, NOAA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and EPA. These agencies have many roles, including vessel traffic management, national security, marine safety, waterway maintenance, environmental protection, and customs. In 2004, a National Research Council (NRC) report concluded that federal responsibilities for the marine transportation system are highly dispersed, decentralized, poorly coordinated, and do not correspond well with the structure and function of such system. 13 Unlike the highway system, which is primarily the responsibility of DOT’s Federal Highway Administration, and the U.S. aviation system, which is the responsibility of DOT’s Federal Aviation Administration, the marine transportation system does not have a clearly defined lead federal agency . Statutory, regulatory, and policy differences among federal agencies with roles in marine transportation lead to fragmentation, competition, and in some cases, an inability to work collaboratively due to conflicting mandate s. The NRC report was based on an analytical framework that examined four key federal interests: safety, security, commerce, and environmental protection. Federal policy makers can use this framework to identify critical needs within the system and target efforts to meet those needs most efficiently.**National leadership and support will be needed**to achieve better integration within the federal government, better links with the rest of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, and coordination between marine transportation and other important ocean and coastal uses and activities . The logical agency to assume this responsibility, as it does for the highway, aviation, and railway systems, is DOT. Even with one clearly mandated lead federal agency, coordination will be needed among the federal and non-federal participants in the marine transportation system, given the significance of domestic and international trade to the nation and the complexity of the components that make up the system. In an effort to address this, eighteen federal agencies with responsibilities for various aspects of the U.S. marine transportation system (Box 13.1) signed a memorandum of understanding in 2000 that created the Interagency Committee for the Marine Transportation System. 14 The committee’s goal is to enhance information exchange among the member agencies; its safety, security, and environmental subcommittees also serve as forums for the resolution of shared issues. However, the ability of the committee to engage in more substantive policy or budgetary planning is very limited. To become more effective, the responsibility and accountability of the committee will need to be elevated. Because marine transportation also involves many actors outside the federal government, the Marine Transportation System National Advisory Council was created to serve as a forum for coordination among nonfederal participants in the marine transportation system and a venue for providing input to the federal government on important national issues (Box 13.2). This nonfederal advisory body can play a useful role as an advisor to the National Ocean Council as well as to DOT, where its charter resides. It could also be helpful in improving collaborations between coastal management programs and the transportation planning and priority setting process. An important step in allowing the U.S. marine transportation system to grow , while minimizing increased congestion, delays, and costs to U.S. businesses and consumers, is to improve the movement of cargo into and out of ports.Existing intermodal connections are inadequate to meet the expected increase in foreign and domestic trade . The nation’s transportation infrastructure is largely an agglomeration of competing transportation modes, each focusing on its own priorities. While this approach has produced an extensive infrastructure, **a national strategy is needed to enhance the connections among these modes, including the nation’s ports, and ensure greater overall effectiveness** . In developing the national freight transportation strategy, DOT should emphasize strategic planning with states, regions, and the public sector, as is currently being carried out for the U.S. highway system. The movement of cargo by inland and coastal waterways, known as short sea shipping, is an emerging mode of transporting cargo. Significant increases in short sea shipping between U.S. ports would help to alleviate highway and landside port congestion by decreasing the volume of truck and railway cargo entering and leaving U.S. ports. It would also serve to bolster the U.S. shipbuilding industry and the U.S. Merchant Marine as demand increased for U.S. port-to-port conveyance. **

States alone don’t solve – they focus on the rate of return rather than mobility need GAO 05** – Government Accountability Office (“Freight Transportation: Short Sea Shipping Option Shows Importance of Systematic Approach to Public Investment Decisions” July 2005, [|www.gao.gov/new.items/d05768.pdf])//aberg **
 * __Improving the efficiency of the nation’s surface transportation system__ is a particularly complex challenge because it __encompasses many modes__ — water, highway, transit, and rail—on systems __owned__, funded, and operated __by both the public and private sectors__ . As primary decision makers, state and local governments have significant and broad responsibilities. On the front lines of transportation decision making, state and local governments must address multiple and sometimes competing priorities, such as maintaining the safety and condition of the transportation system while, at the same time, improving the efficiency of the system. __Addressing these transportation challenges in light of federal and state budget constraints will require__ an understanding of existing transportation program constructs and __financing mechanisms to ensure that__ limited public __dollars are wisely and effectively spent.__ For example, __ the __ __current method of dispersing federal____ transportation funds to the states does not __ necessarily __ encourage __ __transportation decision makers to address the needs of the system in a systematic or rational manner__ . Much of the __public funding__ for system maintenance and improvement for surface transportation projects __comes from federal programs established under Title 23 of the United States Code__ , with funds from the Highway Trust Fund apportioned to the states by formula __without regard to the needs or capacity of the recipients__ . __ Because decisions are __ primarily __ made by state __ __and local governments, there____ is little assurance that the projects __ selected and funded __best meet the nation’s mobility needs__ . Improving __freight__ mobility in particular __is hampered__ by __the__ highly __compartmentalized structure__ and funding __of federal transportation programs. The structure and funding of these programs give state and local transportation agencies little incentive to systematically compare the trade-offs between investing in different transportation alternatives to meet mobility needs because funding can be tied to certain programs or types of projects__ . For example, while passenger and freight travel occurs on all modes, federal funding and planning requirements focus largely on highway and transit. This framework makes it difficult for freight projects to be integrated into the transportation system. **

Commerce Clause means only the federal government has jurisdiction – any bypassing attempt will __get struck down__ Prum and Catz, 11 ** – * Assistant Professor, The Florida State University AND ** Director, Center for Urban Infrastructure; Research Associate, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Irvine (Darren and Sarah, “GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION TARGETS AND MASS TRANSIT: CAN THE GOVERNMENT SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH BOTH WITHOUT A CONFLICT?” 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 935, lexis) While the federal government appears as a late participant, many states have taken leadership positions to forge ahead towards a solution. The approaches taken by Florida and California to force local governments to directly evaluate and determine environmental impacts from transportation sources that require reductions in VMTs demonstrate that the dual goals are compatible. California takes these requirements a step further by monitoring compliance against identifiable targets. The approaches of both Florida and California show regulatory actions can start the process of identifying the best opportunities for mass transit alternatives and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Likewise, the regional "cap-and-trade" initiatives demonstrate the willingness across international borders and amongst states to work collectively to affect climate change. While the current targets for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions mainly focus on electricity generators, the indirect benefit for some mass transit alternatives, such as fixed guideway systems, will also contribute. Meanwhile, the federal government still holds all of the cards from a legal perspective. Upon considering the constitutional aspects, Congress could easily render the actions taken by states meaningless by passing its own [*987] legislationand then enforcing it by either the commerce clause or preemption. Likewise, many of the federal agencies may do the same through their regulatory functionsand by setting policies that conflict with aggressive actions taken by the states.

Glass, 11 – is a Washington, D.C., correspondent for WorkBoat. She reports on the decisions and deliberations of congressional committees and federal agencies that affect the maritime industry, including the Coast Guard, U.S. Maritime Administration and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Prior to coming to WorkBoat, she covered coastal, oceans and maritime industry news for 15 years for newspapers in coastal areas of Massachusetts and Michigan for Ottaway News Service, a division of the Dow Jones Company (Pamela Glass, “No money for marine highways”, WorkBoat – Washington Watch, 4/15/11, [] | AK)
 * The status quo takes out your disads but not the aff – current funding is insufficient**

Appearing before the North American Marine Highways and Logistics Conference in Baltimore recently, DOT Secretary Ray LaHood offered some very good reasons why developing new marine highways (aka short-sea shipping) is good for the U.S. economy, the environment and international trade. And he gave assurances that “America’s maritime transportation system is a major priority for President Obama’s administration,” especially as oil and gas prices rise. “ Marine highways are one crucial ingredient in the recipe for energy efficiency and energy independence ,” he said, adding that these coastal transport links must be part of a “seamlessly integrated network” with roads, rails, airports and ports. But what should happen and what is likely to happen are two different things. LaHood truly believes in the advantages of marine highways. And his department has taken some important steps to smooth the way, approving grants for marine highway and port projects over the past two years, designating 18 marine highway corridors, and integrating these routes into the national transportation system. In addition, DOT sent a report to Congress last week outlining what LaHood calls a “road map” (probably not the best choice of words!) for successful development of marine highways. **But the DOT secretary’s hands are tied, at least when it comes to money**. Even as his report to Congress acknowledges the need for “strong leadership from the federal government ” including continuation of matching capital grants for marine highway projects, the president’s fiscal year 2012 budget included no funding for the grants program. Administration officials point out, however, that they are requesting $5 billion for a National Infrastructure Bank that would provide grants, loans and a blend of both for projects including ports and maritime initiatives. But there are no guarantees that the budget cutters in Congress will go along, and no guarantees that marine highways will get some of the money if it is ever appropriated. As a result, marine highway supporters won’t likely see federal funds for start-ups anytime soon. But there are things that Uncle Sam can do in the meantime.

Isaac, 2002 [Jeffrey, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, Dissent, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring] As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; ( 2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
 * Single issue focus’ of moral issues turns on itself and undermines political effectiveness**

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