Joseph+&+Alex+(GRAMS-HJPV)

1NC: Commercial Crew DA, Space Mil DA, Prizes CP, Tech Thought K, T-its, case 2NC: Space Mil DA, Prizes CP, Case + yes war 1NR: K 2nr: tech thought K/space col bad
 * r2 v damien LL (space elevators)**

1NC: Oil DA, China REM DA, Navy CP (FoN), Tech Thought K, T-Its, CO2 Ag, case 2NC: CO2 Ag 1NR: Oil DA 2NR: OIl DA + case d
 * r3 v Nick/Tony (OTEC - warming, indo-pak, tech leadership, us-china war)**

1ac -- icebreakers w/ polar science/arctic conflict -- cites will be uploaded in the next day

Russian Arctic militarization is expanding rapidly – the lack of ice-capable ships prevents a US response
As the U.S. and E.U. keep a very close eye on the situation with Russia and Ukraine, Russia is also increasing its presence and influence elsewhere: the Arctic – a melting region that is opening up prime shipping lanes and real estate with an estimated $1 trillion in hydrocarbons.[1] With the opening of two major shipping routes, the North Sea route and the Northwest Passage, the potential for economic competition is fierce , especially among the eight members of the Arctic council: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Russia, and the United States. [2] President Putin made statements this week concerning Russia’s national interests in the Arctic region: chiefly, militarization and the preparation of support elements for commercial shipping routes .[3] TheRussian President called for full government funding for “socio-economic development” from 2017-2020, including a system of Russian naval bases that would be home to ships and submarines allocated specifically for the defense of national interests that involve the protection o f Russian oil and gas facilities in the Arctic.[4] Russia is also attempting to accelerate the construction of more icebreakers to take part in its Arctic strategy .[ 5] The Russian Federation recently staked a territorial claim in the Sea of Okhotsk for 52,000 square kilometers ,[6] and is currently preparing an Arctic water claim for 1.2 million square kilometers.[7] The energy giant owns 43 of the approximate 60 hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic Circle.[8] With Russian energy companies already developing hydrocarbon deposits and expanding border patrols on its Arctic sea shelf (in place by July 1, 2014),[9] Putin is actively pursuing a strong approach to the Arctic region. //Russian// //oil fields////, which significantly contribute to the country’s revenue,// //are in decline – forcing Russian oil companies to actively explore the Arctic// region .[10] While the U.S. Defense Secretary called for a peaceful and stable Arctic region with international cooperation, //the Arctic has created increased militarization efforts, particularly by Russia//. Already the Arctic has seen powerful warships of Russia’s Northern Fleet, strategic bomber patrols, and airborne troop exercises.[11] In fact, Russian military forces have been permanently stationed in the Arctic since summer 2013.[12] According to a source in the Russian General Staff, a new military command titled Northern Fleet – Joint Strategic Command, will be created and tasked to protect Russian interests in its Arctic territories; a strategy that was approved in 2009.[13] Furthermore, weapons developers are being tasked with creatingproducts that can face the harsh Arctic environment. According to an RT report, “ Putin ordered the head of the Russian arms industry, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, to concentrate the efforts on creation of Arctic infrastructure for the soonest deployment of troops. Rogozin reported that all Russian weapons systems can be produced with special features needed in the extreme North and the weapons companies were ready to supply such arms to the Defense Ministry.”[14] The “Arctic infrastructure” that Rogozin refers to will include Navy and Border Guard Service bases.[15] These bases are part of Putin’s aim to strengthen Russian energy companies and military positions in the Arctic region. In 2013, a formerly closed down base was reopened in the Novosibirsk Islands and is now home to 10 military ships and four icebreakers – a move that Reuters called “a demonstration of force.”[16] The Defense Ministry is also planning on bringing seven airstrips in the Arctic back to life.[17] Russia’s militarization in the Arctic region is only a part of its increasing activity throughout the globe. Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said, “ It’s crucially important for us to set goals for our national interests in this region. If we don’t do that, we will lose the battle for resources which means we’ll also lose in a big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independence .”[18] On the contrary, Aleksandr Gorban, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry is quoted saying that a “war for resources”[19] in the Arctic will never happen. But what was once a more hands-off region of the world that provided international cooperation and stability is now turning into a race for sovereignty and resources claims – as evidenced not only by Russia’s increasing military presence, but also Canada and the United States. Canada is now allocating part of its defense budget towards armed ships that will patrol its part of the Arctic Circle,[20] while the United States has planned a strategy of its own. In addition to conducting military exercises with other Arctic nation members, the U.S. Navy has proposed a strategy titled The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030 that was released in February 2014. The 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, cited in the Arctic Roadmap, provides the Navy’s two specific objectives for the Arctic: 1) advance United States’ security interests; and 2) strengthen international cooperation.[21] According to the strategy, the Navy’s role will primarily be in support of search and rescue, law enforcement, and civil support operations.[22] However, this may grow to a more militarized strategy depending on the U.S. government’s view of Russia’s increased military activity in the Arctic region over the next few years. In either case, the U.S. is falling behind in Arctic preparation. It has very few operational icebreakers for the Arctic region where its only primary presence is seen through nuclear submarines and unmanned aerial vehicles, according to an RT article.[23] Until 2020, the Navy will primarily use its submarines and limited air assets in the Arctic, while its mid-term and far-term strategy emphasizes personnel, surface ships, submarines, and air assets that will be prepared for Arctic conditions and operations.[24] Despite its mid and long-term strategy, the U.S. will already be lagging in establishing a military presence to compete with Russia’s, who already has strategies in motion until 2020 and later. Last month, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a united Canadian-U.S. counterbalance to Russia’s Arctic presence, pointing out “they have been aggressively reopening military bases .”[25] While the U.S. cannot legitimately criticize Putin for opening military bases and simultaneously avoid blatant hypocrisy, it is worth noting that Russia is developing a strong military presence in a potentially competitive region. Russia’s plans to reopen bases and create an Arctic military command fosters the conclusion that Russia wants to be the first established dominant force in a new region that will host economic competition and primary shipping lanes, albeit in a harsh environment that makes it difficult to extract resources. Nicholas Cunningham aptly stated “ both Russia and the West fear losing out to the other in the far north, despite what appears to be a small prize.”[26] Although the Arctic holds a mass of the world’s oil and gas deposits, the extreme environment and remote location makes it difficult to produce energy quickly and efficiently. Despite this, the Russian Federation is focused on developing disputed hydrocarbon areas that it claims are part of the country’s continental shelf. In addition, Russia is allocating funds and forces to the Arctic to protect its interests. While the U.S. is currently lacking in natural resource development and exploitation in the Arctic Circle, it desires to display a show of strength in the cold region to compete with potential Russian domination and influence. But because the Defense Department faces constant budget cuts, preparing an Arctic naval force will be slow and difficult. For now, the United States can only show strength through nuclear submarines and drone technology. Putin and the Russian Federation are laying disputed claims to territories both inside and outside the Arctic while creating the foundation for a potential military buildup in the Arctic – provided that the U.S. and Canada can even allocate sufficient budgets for Arctic military expansion. One thing is sure: if the Arctic region continues to melt and open up vital shipping lanes, there must be international cooperation to provide security and rescue elements for commercial shipping. Since Russia has significant territorial claims and the most coastlines in the Arctic Circle, it would be natural for the Russian Federation to have a wide security presence in the region, but this must be coupled with international cooperation in commercial shipping lanes and by providing support elements, such as search and rescue. The United States will not be able to fully compete with a country that is heavily investing in the Arctic region – particularly due to budget constraints and lack of Arctic-prepared vessels. If the U.S. desires to limit Russian influence and territorial claims, it must do so by partnering with other members of the Arctic council – not by entering into a military buildup simply to dominate Russia in the Arctic.
 * Mitchell ‘14 ** – independent author for Foreign Policy Journal, citing Naval Statements and Nicholas Cunningham, an expert in the field (Jon, “Russia’s Territorial Ambition and Increased Military Presence in the Arctic” April 23rd, []) zabd

Icebreaker capabilities are deteriorating – now is key
Koren 7/11 – Staff Writer for National Journal (Marina, “What Happened to America's Most Important Arctic Ships?” []) //J.N.E The U.S. Coast Guard is facing a dilemma at the North Pole. The service's fleet of icebreakers, ships designed to navigate and cut through ice-covered waters in the Arctic and Antarctic regions, is getting older. The vessels themselves are slowly deteriorating, and by 2020, naval experts say the country's icebreaking capabilities will run out. The powerful ships, which can break through ice up to 6 feet thick, monitor sea traffic, conduct scientific research, and carry out search-and-rescue missions for other nation's ships at both ends of the world. Their presence alone allows the U.S. defend its national security, economic, and environmental interests in the Arctic region, whose vast natural resources have several countries vying for more control. The Coast Guard currently has four polar icebreaker s. The Polar Star, commissioned in 1976, was reactivated in late 2012, after spending eight years getting repairs for worn-out motors. The Polar Sea, commissioned in 1977, has been docked in Seattle since 2011, inoperative because of engine problems. Share This Story A third icebreaker, the 14-year-old Healy, has less ice-cutting capability; it mostly supports research. The nation's fourth and final icebreaker is the Nathaniel B. Palmer, a small research vessel built for the National Science Foundation in 1992. Because of their speed and strength, the polars Star and Sea are the most crucial vessels of the U.S. presence in the polar regions. But both are several years beyond their intended life service of 30 years, and Coast Guard officials are unsure how much life the Polar Star has left. A Coast Guard study in 2011 found that the military service needs at least three active, heavy-duty icebreakers to properly carry out its North Pole duties. For the next few years, if nothing changes, it will have only one. The timeline for getting a brand new icebreaker appears to be less certain than ever. In its budget submission for fiscal 2013, the Homeland Security Department said it planned to award a construction contract for the ship within the next five years. In its submission for fiscal 2015, there's no mention of a construction contract at all. A January 2011 report from the DHS inspector general found that the Coast Guard "does not have the necessary budgetary control" over its polar icebreakers, "nor does it have a sufficient number of icebreakers to accomplish its missions in the polar regions. " The budgetary control lies with Congress, which must determine how to modernize the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet: repair the ships, or build new ones? But the push to address the aging fleet isn't exactly moving at breakneck speed. A House reauthorization bill for Coast Guard spending for the next two years passed in April. A Senate version, which includes funding for reactivating the Polar Sea, remains in committee. Late last month, Reps. Rick Larsen, D-Wash., and John Garamendi, D-Calif., wrote a letter to the Coast Guard, asking the service to reactivate the Polar Sea so the U.S. doesn't fall behind in the Arctic. Repairing and reactivating the Polar Sea for another seven to 10 years of service would take three years and cost about $100 million. A new icebreaker designed to last 30 years would cost $852 million. In its latest budget proposal, the Coast Guard requested $6 million for a preliminary plan to acquire a new icebreaker. Last year, it was granted just $2 million for the project. In March, Adm. Robert Papp, then the commandant of the Coast Guard, told Congress, "It's going to be tough to fit a billion-dollar icebreaker in our five-year plan without displacing other things." No country has yet laid full claim to the Arctic region, which is home to 15 percent of the world's oil and a third of its undiscovered natural gas. But the U.S. is about to gain a lot more responsibility there, thanks to its turn as the chair of the Arctic Council, a forum of polar nations, next year. A young and capable fleet of icebreakers would certainly come in handy then.

Militarization causes conflict with rising Arctic powers – draws in the US
realism theory – secure resources – proves threat here is real, countries defend their resources no dispute mechanism militarization makes countries more likely to pre empitvely attack causes build up of rhetoric Aerandir ‘12 (Mate Wesley Aerandir Lieutenant United States Navy B.A., “BREAKING THE ICE: POTENTIAL U.S.-RUSSIAN MARITIME CONFLICT IN THE ARCTIC” December 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a573497.pdf)//HA// // There is ample reason and precedent suggesting that countries will resort to armed conflict to secure their interests, especially when those interests are regarded as vital to their national security. While war in the Arctic appears unlikely at present, this thesis has analyzed why an escalation of territorial and resource disputes in the Arctic up to and //including the use of force cannot and should not be ruled out. The potential for U.S.- Russian maritime conflict in the region is genuine//. A. SUMMARY OF THE THREAT Opportunity, capability, and perceived intent on their own do not cause conflict, but they do serve to increase anxiety about an apparent threat to national interests. It is when these three factors combine that the potential for conflict emerges. All that remains for a n otherwise benign event to quickly escalate into a militarized interstate dispute is a sufficient motive or misunderstanding. In the fog before war, an ostensibly banal event could quickly escalate into a political power play between navies in the presence of historical mistrust, a perception of vulnerability, and nationalist sentiment. In the Arctic, such motives include Russia’s critical reliance on hydrocarbon resources to maintain its political and economic stability, and therefore its national security. For the U nited S tates and its NATO allies, the need to maintain and credibly defend their sovereignty and their own economic interests provides ample incentive to act decisively, if necessary. When national security is challenged or threatened by another power, //the potential for militarized conflict can quickly become an actual conflict//. Despite the sub-zero physical climate, //the Arctic is a hotbed of competing interests//. Receding ice cover in the north ern cryosphere presents Arctic nations, and others, with considerable economic opportunities. Whether to exploit a potential “treasure trove” of natural resources or simply to capitalize on time- and money-saving transportation routes, political leaders are under increasing pressure to resolve previously frozen or otherwise insignificant disputes and make these resources available as soon as possible to their constituents. Lack of resolution is bad for business: it creates a “wild west ” (or, in this case, a no-law north) of uncertainty as to the legal standing of enterprises and exposes countries and companies alike to unnecessary harassment and possible prosecution by rival interests. //Increasing economic opportunities go hand-in-hand with an increased presence in the region, creating an environment for potential conflict//. Economic expansion is triggering a n associated build-up in military and law enforcement capability in order to protect, defend, and regulate interests and claims. If economic encroachment were not enough to cause anxiety among the Arctic powers, the subsequent militarization of the Arctic has also caused alarm, making countries feel increasingly vulnerable to conventional military pressure from a previously ice-obstructed front. At present, only Russia is capable of defending its claims in the Arctic militarily. Given Russia’s economic dependence on hydrocarbon resources—which the Arctic promises to offer in abundance— Moscow’seconomic claims in excess of its recognized EEZ are likely to encroach on, or overlap with , the legitimate claims of neighbors. But it stands alone. Russia’s overwhelming might in this domain may eventually make “right” in its favor if NATO is unable to deter assertive uses of force similar to those to which the Russian Coast Guard continually subjects Japan near the Kuril Islands. Any loss in this regard would be much more damaging to NATO’s deterrence credibility than its current inaction. Unless Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States can come together under the NATO banner and make the Arctic a centerpiece of the Alliance’s collective defense 93 agenda for the twenty-first century, they each risk standing alone in the Arctic as well, and with a significantly smaller troop-to-task capability than their geopolitical rival. Simon Ollivant’s 1984 warning of the dangers of internal dispute within the Alliance is perhaps even more salient today. Analyzing the effects of the latest developments in military technology, force dispositions, and resource and sovereignty claims on the military stability of the region, Ollivant concluded that the greatest dangers to NATO unity were an unbalanced American hegemony in the region and increased political conflict among allied members over contested economic interests in the region.207 Denmark and Canada have yet to officially resolve their dispute over Hans Island. Canada and the United States continue to argue over the legal status of the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. Either one of these disputes could undermine decades of Alliance cohesion. Meanwhile, Russia’s actions and rhetoric in the Arctic leave no room to deduce anything but a firm and committed intent on the part of its leadership to secure its claims. There have been scant, if any, peaceful actions undertaken by the Putin and Medvedev administrations to back up their peace-seeking rhetoric. Calls for diplomatic resolution of territorial disputes in the Arctic and for working “within existing international agreements and mechanisms” have only been operationalized through agreements to cooperate on search and rescue efforts and on (competitive) scientific exploration and research for submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a forum that has no binding authority to settle such disputes. All the while, however, Russia’s ambitious militarization of the Arctic has been clearly reinforced with explicit rhetoric proclaiming its intent to defend its national security interests. For Russia, the natural resources in the Arctic are a national security asset of strategic importance. //Canada, too, beats the drum of sovereign defense in the Arctic. Though its rhetoric is significantly less militaristic than that of Russia, it is nevertheless increasingly nationalistic//. Actions, in this case, speak for themselves. The Canadians have expressed an intention to build up forces in the region to the extent necessary to defend their sovereignty. If Prime Minister Stephen Harper had his way, this build-up would be happening more quickly than it has been. Indeed, financial constraints constitute the only reason that the four NATO countries in the Arctic have not been building up their Arctic capabilities more rapidly. The bottom line is that the intent of the Arctic nations to defend their regional and broader security interests is real. The capabilities, while in some cases only planned or very slowly coming into service, are materializing, and the economic opportunity has never been greater and will only increase in the future. //The threat of a militarized conflict in the Arctic is therefore real as well.//

That would draw in the US – Ukraine creates a brink for conflict
Robbins ’14 – Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. (James S., “Would America Go to War with Russia?” March 22nd, []) //J.N.E// //Vice President Biden was in Warsaw last week to reassure our eastern NATO allies that they have the support of a “steadfast ally.” But if Russia moved against Poland or the Baltic States, would the United States really go to war? Or would we do nothing and effectively destroy the NATO alliance? President Obama has ruled out a “military excursion” in Ukraine. America is not obligated legally to take action against Russia for annexing Crimea. We would not go to war if Russia mounted a large-scale invasion of Ukraine to restore the ousted, pro-Moscow government of Viktor Yanukovych, currently under U.S. sanctions. And we would not even send troops if Ukraine was partitioned, or absorbed by Russia. Americans have no interest in such a conflict, and no stomach for it. NATO allies are a different matter. The North Atlantic Treaty is a mutual-defense pact, and Article 5 says that an armed attack against one member state “shall be considered an attack against them all.” This is a clear red line. The only time Article 5 has been invoked was in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and most NATO allies sent troops to support the efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Could the current crisis expand to touch NATO? The developing situation in Ukraine has been compared to Germany’s absorption of Austria in 1938, or the subsequent partition and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Hillary Clinton compared Russian president Vladimir Putinto Adolf Hitler, which by extension puts President Obama in the role of British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, who famously failed to achieve “peace in our time” at Munich. Push the analogy further. The Second World War was sparked by Warsaw’s resistance to Berlin’s demand to annex the Polish Corridor, a small stretch of land—smaller than Crimea—separating the German provinces of Pomerania and East Prussia. Hitler responded by invading Poland and partitioning it with the Soviet Union. Britain and France had pledged to defend Polish independence, and two days after Germany invaded, they declared war. In his war message, Chamberlain explained that Hitler’s actions showed “there is no chance of expecting that this man will ever give up his practice of using force to gain his will. He can only be stopped by force.” This may or may not describe Mr. Putin, as Mrs. Clinton alleged. But if similar circumstances arise in the near future, will the United States honor security guarantees made to Poland and the Baltic States when the Russian threat was only a theory? Mr. Biden stood with Estonian president Toomas Ilves Tuesday to “reconfirm and reaffirm our shared commitment to collective self-defense, to Article 5.” He wanted to make it “absolutely clear what it means to the Estonian people” and that “President Obama and I view Article 5 of the NATO Treaty as an absolutely solemn commitment which we will honor—we will honor.” Shortly thereafter, Moscow “expressed concern ” about the treatment of ethnic Russians in Estonia. Mr. Putin justified his actions in Crimea as “restoring unity” to Russian people. Estonia’s population is 25 percent ethnic Russian, compared to 17 percent in Ukraine, mostly in the north and east part of the country. Suppose anti-Russian riots “spontaneously” broke out in Estonia. What would the United States do if Moscow invoked a “responsibility to protect” these people and bring them “back” to the Motherland? Would President Obama take military action against Russia over a small, secluded piece of a tiny, distant country? Would it be like the Polish Corridor in 1939? This is highly doubtful—highly doubtful. Aren’t we obligated by treaty to intervene? Mr. Biden mentioned the “absolutely solemn commitment which we will honor.” It was so important he said it twice. However, Article 5 says that NATO members pledge to come to the assistance of the attacked state using “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.” It doesn’t take a White House lawyer to see the gaping loophole—President Obama can simply deem that the use of U.S. force isn’t necessary. He can walk back the red line, as he did with Syria. Stern talk and minimal sanctions would follow, but Estonia would lose some, if not all of its territory. And in practical terms it would mean the end of NATO, which is one of Moscow’s longstanding strategic objectives.// Mr. Putin’s chess game does not end in Crimea. //

Conflict goes nuclear
Wallace & Staples ‘10 – *Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia, **President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa (Michael, Steven, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”) //J.N.E// // The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water por t. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with ship- based helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 60 9 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could//, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons// .” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly.

That is the only scenario for nuclear extinction
Vestergaard ’10 – visiting fellow with the CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program, researching uranium governance, specialist in nuclear weaponry for DIIS (“Conference on an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Copenhagen, 10-11, 2009”, Danish Institute for International Studies, *note: the document was released in 2010) //J.N.E// // Global climate consequences of a regional nuclear war a certain number of small weapons will have much greater consequences, both in the number of people killed from the explosions and in the amount of soot produced, than a smaller number of larger bombs with the same total explosive force (Robock et al 2007a ). The new insights into the circulation of the atmosphere have also shown that a limited nuclear war, such as a war between India and Pakistan, where about 100 Hiroshima-size, 15 kt bombs are used, mostly over population centres, would result in the release of about 5 Tg of soot. This soot, mostly from burning cities, would decrease the global temperature by about 1.25 degrees C, over 6-8 years. That is not nuclear winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow (Figs. 2 & 3). The growing season would be shortened by 10 to 20 days in many of the most im - portant grain producing areas in the world, which might completely eliminate some crops that have insufficient time to reach maturity (Fig. 4). An accurate evaluation of the global decrease in food production has yet to be done, but there will be substantial deficits (Helfand 2007). In earlier periods we have seen that a global decrease in grain production of 5% over a couple of years brought about a sharp increase in prices, and that starvation increased in countries that are normally dependent on the import of food. The period of nuclear darkness would cause a much greater decrease in grain production than 5%, and it would continue over many years. The reserves of the most important grains in the world have, in recent years, been corresponding to less than six weeks of consumption (see ref: Wikipedia 2007-2008; World hunger facts 2009). There are currently more than 800 million people in the world who are chronically malnourished. Several hundred million more live in countries which are dependent on imported grain for their survival. In a situation of severe food shortage globally, can we expect that the wealthy countries will accept tightening their belts to such an extent that the poor and undernourished survive these seven years of famine? If not, hundreds of millions of people in many continents, in particular Africa, will die from hunger (Helfand 2007). In the war zone of India and Pakistan it can be expected that 20 million people will die from blast and fire, millions more from the radioactive fallout. Many tens of millions will flee the contaminated areas. And many will die from epidemics and hunger, maybe more than from the bombs. But the greater number of fatalities will occur in countries far away, of those who will succumb to starvation because of the global nuclear darkness (Toon et al 2007a, 2007b). Severe ozone depletion To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone (Mills et al 2008). A study published two years ago by the National Academy of Sciences, using a similar nuclear war scenario involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs, showsozone losses in excess of 20% globally, 25-45% at mid latitudes and 50-70% at northern high latitudes, persisting for five years and with substantial losses continuing for five additional years (Fig. 5). The resulting increases in UV radiation would have serious consequences for human health. Here in Copenhagen we would be advised not to be outdoors for several hours around the middle of the day. The effects on agriculture, on animals, on the economy and on the human population of this unprecedented increase in ultraviolet radiation have not yet been evaluated. The effects would undoubtedly be serious. A //regional nuclear war would result in an unprecedented global catastrophe// I have decided to present this material at this conference because it shows the global consequences of any nuclear war, even a war in which less than one half a per cent of all the nuclear weapons in existence are used. //Nuclear proliferation is a threat to all of us//. //Nuclear weapons in the Arctic zone would increase the danger of a nuclear confrontation//. And, most importantly, it is not sufficient to decrease the number of nuclear weapons to a few hundred. They must be abolished. Also shown for comparison, in the lower panel, is the global average change in downward shortwave radiation for the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the largest volcanic eruption of the 20th century, as compared to the nuclear war scenarios. Figure 1. Change of global average surface air temperature, precipitation, and downward shortwave radiation reaching the surface of the Earth for the 5 Tg ( Robock et al 2006), 50 Tg and 150 Tg cases. DIIS REPORT 20 10:03 49 Figure 2. The decrease in average global temperature after a regional nuclear war with 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons, compared to the development of the temperature over the recent century. The decrease in temperature will be much more pronounced (Robock et al 2007b). Figure 3. Changes in global temperature and precipitation after a regional nuclear war using 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons, producing 5 million tons of soot (Robock et al 2007b). DIIS REPORT 20 10:03 50 Figure 4. Changes in the growing season – frost free days – in the northern and southern hemispheres in the first year after a regional nuclear war using 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons (after Robock et al 2007a). Acknowledgement: PowerPoint graphs made available by Dr Alan Robock at http: // climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/nuclear Figure 5. Time evolution of the total ozone column after a 5 Tg soot injection into the upper troposphere at 30°N latitude. Changes in ozone are given as a per cent devia - tion of the integrated column from the control run, or baseline value, as a function of time since soot injection. The global mean total ozone variation is shown along with zonal average changes at four specific latitudes (as labelled) (Mills et al 2008).

A) Icebreakers are key to regional power projection
projects global power – polar icebreakers look like we assertin’ – allows us to have intenraitnoal influence NRC 7 – working arm of the United States National Academies, which produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine (National Research Council, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of US Needs,” []) mj Economic activity is predicted to increase and move northward as a result of sea-ice retreat. Those deploying fishing fleets, cruise ships, mining, and the associated ore transit ships , as well as petroleum recovery and tanker ship transport, anticipate increased operations in the region. When current orders for ice-strengthened tankers have been filled, the worldwide fleet of these vessels will double in number. Ice retreat increases the cost-effectiveness of using the Northern Sea Route (primarily north of Russia) and the Northwest Passage (primarily north of Canada) for transporting petroleum, ore, and cargo. Both routes include U.S. Arctic waters. The potential for increased human activity in northern latitudes will likely increase the need for the U nited S tates to assert a more active and influential presence in the Arctic not only //to// //protect its territorial interests//, but also to //project its presence as a world power// concerned with the security, economic, scientific, and international political issues of the region. Over the past decades the U.S. Coast Guard has not conducted routine patrols in ice-covered waters due to a lack of funding. The growing human presence and increased economic activity in the Arctic will be best served by reinstating patrols in U.S. coastal waters and increasing U.S. presence in international waters of the north. To assert U.S. interests in the Arctic, th e nation needs to be able to access various sites throughout the region at various times of the year, reliably and at will. While the southern extent of the Arctic ice pack is thinning and becoming less extensive during the summer, //there is no question that polar icebreakers will be required// for many decades for egress to much of the Arctic Basin. Ice conditions in the U.S. Arctic are among the most variable and occasionally challenging through the circum-Arctic. National interests require icebreakers that can navigate the most formidable ice conditions encountered in the Arctic. Recommendation 1: The U nited S tates should continue to project an active and influential presence in the Arctic to support its interests. This requires U.S. government polar icebreaking capability to ensure year-round access throughout the region.

That solves Russian aggression – US leadership is key
no heg d – arctic is different multipolarkity == conflict, leads to broader conflict – rise to the top! uq – tensions bc multipolar unipolar card Murray, 12 – Vice President of Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta. He holds a senior fellowship at the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, a research fellowship at the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, and a research fellowship at the University of Alberta’s European Union Centre of Excellence.(Robert, “Arctic politics in the emerging multipolar system: challenges and consequences” The Polar Journal, June, Taylor & Francis)//DH// // The Arctic in the unipolar moment One of the cornerstones of America's unipolar moment has been the remarkable decline in interstate conflict. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system has not been on the verge of any major war, nor have great powers aggressively pursued policies that would balance against American power in a way that would be taken seriously. According to many scholarly studies, the world since the end of the Cold War has become far more secure in the interstate sense, and security and defence policies of states are now preoccupied more with human- centric and intrastate variables than anything else. Though it is difficult to deny that the world has become more stable at the systemic level, the role of hard power and military capabilities did not disappear with the Soviet Union; instead, the use of militarism to achieve national goals in the unipolar moment greatly decreased as a direct result of the values and grand strategy of the U nited S tates. The impact of a unipolar systemic arrangement on state behaviour is best explained by the hegemonic stability theory.18 According to this theory, a unipolar structure is able to pacify the relations of states because there is recognition of the hegemon's ability to control or intervene in conflicts that may threaten its power, or the order of the system. Wohlforth summarizes the basic precept of hegemonic stability theory by contending: The theory stipulates that especially powerful states ("hegemons") foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisfied state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be [...] If the system is unipolar, the great power hierarchy should be much more stable than any hierarchy lodged within a system of more than one pole. Because unipolarity is based on a historically unprecedented concentration of power in the United States, a potentially important source of great power conflict - hegemonic rivalry - will be missing .19 It is essential to note two things about the status of the United States as systemic hegemon throughout the immediate post-Cold War era - first, that its preponderance of power in every area of capability measurement created a stable and less tense system in which states were able to interact; and second, that the United States' time as hegemon has fostered the growth of multilateral institutions and agreements rather than a bullying type of unipolarity.20 From a systemic standpoint, it would seem that there is little reason to be concerned about military aggression, arms racing and distrustful competition in the modern system, but one vital concern to note is that much of the unipolar and //hegeomic stability literature completely ignores the role of the Arctic in state security calculations//. Throughout an era of institutional binding, regional integration, humanitarianism and soft power growth, the competition for the Arctic was following much of the same pattern, with states preferring to make their claims in institutional or legal settings. Yet, as the unipolar moment has started to decline, and multipolarity is on the horizon, the competition in the circumpolar region has taken on a very different tone. Competing claims over Arctic territories, such as the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea and other maritime boundaries, and the use of the region as a space for military exercises are by no means new and they have not come to the forefront of the strategic security agendas of states since the post-9/11 era. Rather, throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was a realm of constant supervision, not because either superpower wanted to develop the region, but more because of the mutual fear each side had of offensive attacks being launched over the pole. Even throughout the unipolar moment, the Arctic has been a space for sovereignty competition, but the nature of the competition had been mostly legal, institutional or soft power focused .21 Worth noting as well is the very complex nature of reasons for state interests in the Arctic. Mark Nuttall effectively summarizes the complexities of the high north as he claims: In the post-Cold War world [the Arctic] is seen as a natural scientific laboratory, under- stood as a homeland for indigenous peoples, a place of sovereignty conflicts, an emerging hydrocarbon province with which the world is coming to think of as one of the last major frontiers for oil and gas, and a region of dramatic environmental change.22 Though the intricacies of Arctic competition are intriguing to note, it is how states are strategically asserting their claims that is of particular importance. The start of America's hegemonic decline has allowed states to revisit their approaches to the Arctic as nations jockey for position by balancing or rivalling American preferences. As a result, the nature of Arctic competition has incorporated both soft power and hard power elements. Further, the nature of militarism and hard power tension has increased due to the recent spending and strategic shifts by many Arctic states in recent years, including Canada, Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 The reasons for America's decline are relatively unsurprising - military overextension in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of international support for American foreign policy objectives throughout the Bush era; the 2008 economic recession; and the utter distrust by most states, including close American allies, of the United States' political objectives.24 The system remains unipolar, of course, but as stated above, the preponderance of power capabilities has substantially diminished, opening the door for others to balance and rival American power in the coming years. Coincidentally, it has also been the revelations of science in recent years that have also promoted a faster pace for those states making Arctic claims. The role of climate change and its impact over the Arctic has allowed for states to more freely move into the region and pursue strategies previously unavailable.25 According to Lotta Numminen, climate change has recently affected states' perceptions of the possible economic opportunities in the Arctic in four ways: first, that the subsurface of the Arctic Ocean floor is assumed to contain substantial oil and gas reserves, to which there will be increased access; second, that melting waters will provide new waters for international fisheries; third, the increase in research strategies; and fourth, is the greater access to sea passages.26 One of the main reasons states see the Arctic region as such a lucrative area is the potential for increasing their respective economic and natural resource capabilities. Previously, the northern ice caps prevented states from entering most of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding areas, but as these environmental situations change, states have readily identified the high north as a priority in both their security and economic strategies. Among the main reasons the Arctic has not been more readily seen as a potential area for security competition and conflict is the interpretation that the United States has little or no interest in the circumpolar region at all. According to Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, American hegemony throughout the post-Cold War era was seen as passive, stable and enduring because of the lack of counterpower being demonstrated in the system: Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, mean- while - China, Russia, Japan, and Germany - are in the opposite position. They can- not augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat.27 Almost completely omitted from such interpretations, however, are America's northern borders over Alaska and into the Arctic. Latitudinal thinking would seem to indicate that Brooks and Wohlforth are correct in terms of America's interests in many areas of the globe, but this ignores what has been happening at the top of the world in the high north. It is not as if the United States has been ignorant of its own decline in power, especially regarding the Arctic. In 2009, the United States issued National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 that deal exclusively with American Arctic policy. According to these directives, the altera- tions to national policies of other states regarding the Arctic compelled the United States to clearly outline the security and development strategies they would use to protect its Arctic interests. Among the first, and most clear, elements of the directives is the clear intention of the United States to defend their national security interests. According to Article III, subsection B 1 of the directives: The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.28 The contemporary changes to the international system as the era of American hegemony has begun to wane, the effects of climate change and greater access, and the increasingly militaristic strategies of most every Arctic state have led to a situation where tensions are at an all time high, and that legal or institutional processes are unlikely to resolve anything amicably. As the system continues its transition away from unipolarity, observers are left to ponder what might come next after an era of relative interstate stability. Multipolarity and the circumpolar In their 2002 article on the nature of United States primacy and the enduring aspects of American hegemony, Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the United States would have to act as a benevolent hegemon in order to prevent counterbalancing and to be able to build effective regimes worldwide. They argue: Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are tenets of successful statecraft that have proved their worth from classical Greece onward. Standing taller than leading states of the past, the United States has unprecedented freedom to do as it pleases. It can play the game for itself alone or for the system as a whole; it can focus on small returns today or larger ones tomorrow. If the administration truly wants to be loved as well as feared, the policy answers are not hard to find.29 The problem with such analyses of American hegemony is that the Bush administration chose to ignore utterly such warnings and, rather than acting magnanimously, post-9/11 American foreign policy did precisely what it should not have. Pre-emption, coercion and irrational interventions, combined with a major economic recession, all serve to explain why American hegemony began to decline by 2005 in terms of both actual power levels and perceptions of legitimate hegemonic status.30 The clearest sign that American exceptionalism has been decreasing is the aggressive and regional balancing dynamics taking place between states in the Arctic region. Security strategy in the circumpolar region has altered dramatically since 2005, with more states showing interest, hard power spending increasing, and legal processes being coupled by at times overtly offensive strategy.31 Russia, Canada and a number of European states, especially Norway and Sweden, exemplify this line of argument about how sovereignty claims have become focused on traditional inter- state arms racing and militarism while soft power components, like governance structures and legal processes, continually evolve.32 As mentioned previously, even the United States has woken up to see that, as their hegemony declines, other states have begun to balance against them in the Arctic, thus provoking the 2009 Presidential Directives. Even so, Arctic interested nations have not yielded to American claims, nor has there been any evidence of America's closest allies backing down in the face of its Arctic assertions, most clearly evidenced by Canada's continued claims over the Northwest Passage.33 In the international relations canon, most observers point to either India or China as emerging great powers that are the most likely to counterbalance Ameri- can power. The 2004 American National Intelligence Council report highlights this theory by stating: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players - similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century - will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own.34 Both China and India have recently expressed their interest in Arctic affairs, but no power is as close to rivalling or challenging American power in hard power terms than Russia. This is especially true in the Arctic, as Russia's Arctic policies have made its intentions towards asserting its control over territory it deems to be sover- eign very clear. The role of the Arctic in Russian foreign policy cannot be understated. According to Russia's 2008 Arctic policy document, the region is seen as the epicentre of Russia's military and socio-economic development. The top two priorities for Russian Arctic interests are defined as follows: (a) In the sphere of socio-economic development - the expansion of the resource base of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, in order to substantially satisfy Russia's needs in hydrocarbon resources, hydro-biological resources, and other types of strate- gic raw materials; (b) In the sphere of military security, defense, and safekeeping of the state borders of the Russian Federation located in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation - the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federa- tion, including the maintenance of the required combat potential of military groupings under the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and agencies in this region [...]35 In order to achieve these goals, the Russians have created a unique military brigade to be permanently posted in the Arctic, have placed a Russian Federation flag on the Arctic Ocean seabed, have conducted various missile tests, have sailed their nuclear submarines through contested waters and have openly challenged the abilities of other states to enforce their own claims. In response to Russian offensive posturing and the inability of the United States to dissuade security competition in the area, middle and minor powers have begun to use hard power as a means of trying to enforce their sovereignty. Perhaps the best example here is Canada, whose military capabilities are extremely weak, but strong rhetoric and a drastically increased level of high-north military spending since 2006 seems to indicate that the Canadian government cannot rely on its American alliances to protect its interests, and that posturing by states like Russia or even Denmark clearly threaten Canada's national interests. As Norway, Sweden and Denmark have begun to put an emphasis on hard power capabilities to extend or defend northern claims, Canada has done the same. Worth noting as well in the Canadian context is that, while great powers like Russia and the United States can easily defeat any middle or minor power, Canada's capabilities are being either rivalled or surpassed by European states like Norway.36 Canada's realization of the evolving security and environmental climate in the Arctic has compelled changes to its domestic and foreign security policies, each seeking to assert Canadian sovereignty over areas of the Arctic, especially the Northwest Passage. One of the main components of now Prime Minister Harper's 2005-06 campaign was to bolster Arctic security resources, as many Canadians have identified the region as an essential part of Canada's national security and identity.37 Rob Huebert argues: The Harper government has increasingly recognized the significance of maintaining a strong presence in the Arctic and has vigorously begun to improve Canada's northern abilities [...] The Harper government has also made a series of promises to consider- ably expand Canada's northern capability [...] If these promises are implemented, Canada will have significantly improved its ability to control activity in its Arctic.38 In virtually any other area of the world, Canadian national security cannot be divorced from the United States, which is a partial explanation for why Canada has traditionally been considered a middle power since the end of World War II.39 Yet, since the start of American decline, the Canadian government has recognized that its fate in the Arctic will be its own, and not intrinsically tied to the protection of the United States, as the Americans have their own interests in the region and have shown a complete disregard for Canadian claims over the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. As the world moves towards multipolarity, it has become increasingly obvious that the Arctic region represents an area of increased security competition and a potentially conflictual region in the future. Multipolar systems are the most unstable, and history has shown these to produce military conflict due to the natural effects brought by a larger number of self-interested powers vying for power and security. Further, as new great powers begin to emerge, American strategic considerations will be spread so thin that they will be unable to prevent against their eventual loss of hegemony. The largest mistake being made at this time by international security scholars and policymakers is their normal obsession with China, India and latitudinal thinking. The next area of major war is not likely to be the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea, due to traditional security balancing, deterrence and economic interests in each of these areas. Multipolarity naturally brings the possibility of war. Mearsheimer contends that war is far more likely in multipolar systems for three reasons : First, there are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multipolar system. Second, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential for miscalc ulation is greater in multipolarity : states might think they have the capability to coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not.40 Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the outbreak of war in the near future. That said, as America's influence continues to wane, other states have show n their desire to take full advantage of the U nited S tates' inability to control northern affairs. If the United States does lose its hegemony, which many commentators believe is inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in security calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fra y, and two of those states have Arctic borders and a historical legacy of conflict. Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and the United States as great powers, while the other Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power from doing as it pleases. Lastly, miscalculation is evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are both arming for possible Russian aggression, though Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies towards Nordic nations. Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades the probability of northern conflict is ever increasing. The shift to hard power strategies, the effects of climate change, and the decline of the United States all speak to the fact that multipolarity can increase levels of tension and mistrust, thus altering the currently stable nature of Arctic affairs. Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as the system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly difficul t. As such, observers must be mindful of the systemic variables at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics, as changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies.

B) Arctic counterbalancing – realism proves Russia will cooperate
power power power Dowd 11 – Senior Fellow of the Fraser Institute and Senior Editor of Fraser Insight. In addition to conducting research into defence and security, he has contributed to the Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America Annual Report.Dowd is an adjunct professor at Butler University; was as a founding member of the Sagamore Institute leadership team, where he continues to hold a senior fellow post; and was director of Hudson Institute’s corporate headquarters (Alan, “The Big Chill: Energy Needs Fueling Tensions in the Arctic,” []) zabd The United States devotes much of its diplomatic and military energies to the Middle East today for a very simple reason: The Middle East is the source of much of the world’s energy, and not coincidentally, much of the world’s tensions. Tomorrow’s source of energy reserves and geopolitical tensions may not be the deserts and densely populated urban areas of the Middle East, but rather the icy waters and desolate tundra of the Arctic. Supply and Demand Before we get to the simmering tensions in the Arctic, it’s important to discuss why the United States, Canada, Russia, Europe and others are so interested in the region. First, there is the matter of supply. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic may hold 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil—30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13 percent of undiscovered oil (USGS). About a third of the oil is in Alaskan territory (Carroll). These oil and gas deposits were always there, of course, but today the cost of extracting them is increasingly justifiable due to market realities. Growing demand, along with decreasing and undependable supplies in the Middle East, are conspiring to push energy prices upwards, which is encouraging exploration in the Arctic. The Energy Information Agency forecasts a 20-percent increase in daily world oil consumption by 2030, owing largely to demand in China and India (EIA). Another important factor in the Arctic energy rush relates to shipping. The fabled Northwest Passage, once frozen throughout most of the year, is thawing. “ Opening up the Northwest Passage cuts 4,000 nautical miles off the trip from Europe to Asia,” NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen observes. “You can bet a lot of companies have done that math.” Zone of Peace? Given the Arctic’s vast supply of energy resources and the world’s growing energy demands, it’s neither surprising nor alarming that Arctic nations are beginning to stake their respective claims. What is alarming is how one Arctic nation is going about this. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin expressed his desire in 2010 “ to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation” (Carbonnel). But actions speak louder than words : In 2011, Russia announced plans to deploy two army brigades —10,000 troops— to defend its Arctic claims (AP). U.S. and Canadian fighters intercepted Russian bombers 45 times between 2007 and 2010, up from just eight between 1999 and 2006 (Elliott). In 2009, Moscow announced plans to build a string of military bases along Russia’s northern tier (UPI). In 2008, a Russian general revealed plans to train “troops that could be engaged in Arctic combat missions, ” ominously adding, “Wars these days are won and lost well before they are launched” (AFP). During a 2007 expedition, after Russia provocatively planted its flag under the North Pole, the lead explorer declared, “The Arctic is ours.” In fact, Russia brazenly claimed almost half the Arctic Circle and all of the North Pole in 2001 (Clover and Idov). It seems Putin is far closer to that view today than he is to his 2010 “zone of peace” promises. “Russia intends without a doubt to expand its presence in the Arctic,” he recently boasted. “We are open to dialogue…but naturally, //the defense of our geopolitical interests will be hard and consistent// ” (Shuster). In short, Moscow is signaling its seriousness about claiming most of the Arctic as its own. Fundamental Interests All of this is getting the attention of the United States and its Arctic allies. At the end of the Bush administration, the U.S. issued a new Arctic Region Policy, declaring that “The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests” (White House). Similarly, the Obama administration has emphasized that “The United States has an inherent national interest in knowing, and declaring to others with specificity, the extent of our sovereign rights with regard to the U.S. extended continental shelf” (U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project). Together, the U.S. and Canada are conducting missions to map the continental shelf. Demarcating the shelf is vital to determining how the Arctic pie is divided. As my Fraser Institute colleague Alex Moens and I have written elsewhere, “Russia’s outsized Arctic claims rest on a dubious interpretation of an underwater ridge linking to the Russian landmass. Russia argues that this ridge is an extension of its own continental shelf.” Some observers contend that joining the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will help America secure its Arctic claims—and limit Russia’s. Unlike its Arctic neighbors, the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, even though the treaty has support in the military and among leaders from both parties. “The Arctic is changing,” observes Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations from 2007 to 2011. “The most important thing is to become party to the Convention of the Law of the Sea. If we are not party to that treaty, we will not have a seat at the table as this unfolds” (Cavas). Vice President Joseph Biden has argued that UNCLOS “allows us to secure and extend our sovereign rights” (Abrams). The Bush administration’s Arctic policy called on the Senate to pass the treaty “promptly.” Critics, however, worry that the treaty could limit U.S. sovereignty and freedom of action. Zone of Conflict? With or without the treaty, it’s only prudent for the U.S. and its Arctic allies to develop some sort of security component to the Arctic puzzle. “We can’t wish away the security implications,” Rasmussen observes. “An entire side of North America will be much more exposed.” The United States already maintains some 20,000 active-duty forces in Alaska and holds routine exercises in the region. “Northern Edge” exercises, for example, have featured airborne drops, close-air support, port security, harbor defense, supply-route protection and critical-infrastructure protection—just the sort of operations that might be necessary to keep the Arctic and its waterways open (Elmendorf AFB). The U.S. is not alone. Spurred by Russian adventurism, Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay talks about “enlarging the footprint and the permanent…presence we have in the North” (Cummins). Toward that end, Canada is building new bases and conducting annual maneuvers to defend its Arctic territories. “Our government is committed to protecting and asserting Canada’s presence throughout our Arctic,” Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared in 2010 (Comte). Assets from the U.S. 2nd Fleet, U.S. Coast Guard and Danish navy have joined the Canadian military for Arctic maneuvers (Comte). In 2009, Norway led Arctic maneuvers enfolding 13 nations. The scenario: Repel an attack on oil rigs by the fictional country of “Northland,” a thinly disguised euphemism for Russia (Weber). Sweden followed with its own Arctic war games, featuring 12,000 troops. Norway, Sweden and Finland are developing what The Economist magazine calls a “Nordic security partnership” as a hedge against Russian activity in the Arctic. Denmark is standing up an Arctic military command and beefing up its military presence in Greenland. In response to Russia’s Arctic claims, made in a blatant military context, NATO officials envision a “military presence” in the Arctic and have pointedly declared the Arctic a region “of strategic interest to the alliance” (de Hoop Scheffer). One reason a military presence will be necessary is the possibility of accidents caused by drilling and shipping. In addition, competition for Arctic resources could lead to confrontation. Adm. James Stavridis, who serves as NATO’s military commander, concedes that the Arctic could become “a zone of conflict” (UPI). To brace for that possibility and thwart Russia’s Arctic fait accompli, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway—all NATO members and Arctic nations—should follow the Cold War playbook: build up the assets needed to defend their interests, use those assets to deter aggression, and deal with Moscow from a posture of strength and unity. The challenge is to //remain open to cooperation// while //bracing for worst-case scenarios//. After all, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Even as Putin and his puppets make mischief, Moscow is open to making deals. Russia and Norway, for instance, recently resolved a long-running boundary dispute, paving the way for development in 67,000 square-miles of the Arctic. Moreover, the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway have agreed on Arctic search-and-rescue responsibilities (Cummins). In a world of increasingly integrated markets, we know there is much to gain from Arctic cooperation and much to lose from protracted military standoff. But we also know that dealing naively with Moscow carries a heavy cost—and that integration is a two-way street. “Russian leaders today yearn not for integration,” the Brookings Institution’s Robert Kagan concludes, “but for a return to a special Russian greatness.” In short, Russia is more interested in recreating the autarky of some bygone era than in the shared benefits of globalization. Framework for Partnership //Dealing with Russia is about power//. As Churchill once said of his Russian counterparts, “ There is nothing theyadmire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have //less respect than for weakness// .” //When// //the message is clear// —or “hard and consistent,” to use Putin’s language— //Russia will take a cooperative posture//. When the message is unclear, Russia will take what it can get. Just consider Russia’s contrasting treatment of its neighbors : Moscow blusters about Poland and the Baltic states but keeps its hands off, largely becausethey are protected by the U.S.-NATO umbrella. Conversely, Russia bullies Ukraine, garrisons its troops —uninvited— in Moldova, and occupies Georgian territor y. //The// //common denominator of these unfortunate countries: They have no U.S. security guarantee//. Russia should be given an opportunity to participate as a responsible partner in Arctic development. But if Russia continues to take Putin’s hard line, the U.S. and its allies are left with few other options than standing together or allowing Russia to divide and conquer. To avoid that, the allies may need to agree among themselves on lines of demarcation, transit routes and exploration rights—and then pool their resources to protect their shared interests. This will require investment in Arctic capabilities. For instance, the U.S. has only three //polar icebreakers//, two of which have exceeded their projected 30-year lifespan (O’Rourke). Russia can deploy 20 icebreakers. “ We have extremely limited Arctic response capabilities ,” explains Adm. Robert Papp, USCG commandant. Noting that the Coast Guard has “the lead role in ensuring Arctic maritime safety, security and stewardship,” Papp urges Congress “to start building infrastructure up there” (Joling and Papp).

The plan retrofits current icebreakers as a stopgap solution – solves timeframe issues
Song, 14 (Kyung, The Seattle Times, “Coast Guard makes case to refurbish idled icebreaker” 6/18 [])//DH// // WASHINGTON — The U.S. Coast Guard’s No. 2 commander said refurbishing the aging Polar Sea icebreaker now idled in Seattle would allow it to meet the nation’s Arctic mission for the next decade until a replacement ship can be built. The comment Wednesday by Vice Admiral Peter Neffenger is the Coast Guard’s clearest endorsement yet for fixing up the 1970s-era Polar Sea, which in 2012 was on the verge of being decommissioned and used for spare parts for its sister ship, the Polar Star. In an interview at a seminar on Arctic shipping hosted by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Washington, D.C., Neffenger said salvaging the Polar Sea would be a “viable alternative ” to a new heavy-duty icebreaker that could cost up to $1 billion. “We think that would be adequate (to meet the mission) for the next 10 years ,” Neffenger said. In March, then-Admiral Robert Papp offered a more tepid embrace during a congressional hearing. Papp testified that returning the Polar Sea to service was an option, but noted for the record that “I didn’t say a good option.” Neffenger, who began serving as vice commandant in May, said retrofitting the Polar Sea would be a stopgap solution. It can take a decade to build a new icebreaker, and the United States needs to act quickly. //“That window is now// ,” he said.

Reliance on foreign icebreakers undermines the credibility and quality of US science leadership
climate studies – black carbon/sea ice/ climare forcers/levels of methane stretched- relying on foreign icebreakers too much – arctic is key region Conley, 12 - director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).(Heather, “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: an American perspective” January, csis.org)//DH// //Although the United States lacks an overarching Arctic economic development strategy and suffers from insufficient security assets, it does maintain a competitive edge in the field of research and science. Northern Alaska has always been a region of particular interest to scientists with its unique climate, flora, and fauna. The Greenland Ice Sheet Project Two, initiated in 1998 by the Office of Polar Programs of the NSF, provided the world with what was then the deepest ice core ever recovered as well as the clearest outline of climate history.47 The discoveries of this project piqued the interest of the scientific community and made clear that the Arctic is one of the most important places to study climatic changes, global temperatures, sea ice extent, and short-lived climate forcers, such as black carbon and levels of methane. The United States has been at the vanguard of international climate research with established institutions like the National Science Foundation, U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC, part of the NSF),48 the U.S. Geological Survey,49 and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee,50 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,51 and the National Snow and Ice Data Center.52 The National Science Foundation had an annual budget of $6.8 billion for FY 2011, with the Office of Polar Programs receiving $493.4 million and USARC research receiving $1.58 million.53 The USARC has laid out its research goals in its Report on Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research, stressing five main themes: environmental change of the Arctic, Arctic Ocean, and Bering Sea; Arctic human health; civil infrastructure; natural resource assessment; and indigenous languages, cultures, and identities.54 These goals are broad based, and while they may not directly address security concerns, they do have an impact on U.S. Arctic policy because all future decisionmaking related to the Arctic—be it economic development or aligning security assets—is completely dependent on a strong scientific understanding of this fragile milieu. There can never be too much scientific data or understanding about this largely unknown region, and the current level of U.S. science and research in the Arctic is a critical and foundational element of a proactive U.S. leadership model. Unfortunately, strong capabilities as an Arctic science power do not make up for the deficiency in the rest of U.S. coastal and security capabilities. As stated in the Coast Guard’s own report to Congress in 2008, “Although the NSF is a global leader in scientific research, the //Coast Guard believes that the NSF would lack the staff and expertise to direct the multi-mission deployment of icebreakers employed for other USCG missions.”//55 In addition, the N ational O ceanic and A tmospheric A dministration is unable to collect and provide all the information on weather forecasting, oceanography, and navigational charting requested by the Coast Guard, the industries, and the local communities.56 In fact, the NSF has repeatedly made use of Canadian, Russian, and Swedish icebreakers to transport U .S. scientists in the U.S. Arctic, where U.S. capabilities were nonexistent.57 This kind of arrangement has proven both risky and inefficient. In July 2011, Sweden decided to recall its icebreaker Oden, leased to the NSF every winter since 2006–07, due to worsening ice conditions in the Baltic Sea. This recall left the United States without the technical ability to reach and resupply McMurdo station in Antarctica.58 Further examples illustrate U.S. dependence on other nations as a result of its own lack of capabilities. In December 2011, officials from Nome, Alaska, requested a Russian fuel tanker to deliver an emergency shipment when the city was blocked by sea ice. Originally, the Healy was unavailable to assist with this operation as it was returning from a previously scheduled scientific mission.59 However, the Healy is now scheduled to break an ice channel for the tanker once the Russian vessel is cleared to enter the Alaskan port and will facilitate the tanker’s return to open water.60 As U.S. capabilities are stretched between critical missions and its ongoing yet equally critical scientific work, the need to address these shortfalls in capabilities is urgen t, as Alaskan Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadw ell stated in his December 2011 congressional testimony: “Without action, America is putting its national security on the line, and we are going to miss the opportunities of the Arctic while watching other nations advance.”61

Leadership solves a laundry list of impacts and guides scientific cooperation
creates cooperation which checks war k2 science advances adapt to environment/global warming/crop failure/water scarcity/prolif Federoff 8 – professor of biology at Penn State University known for her research on biology and life sciences, president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) (April 2008, “International Science and Technology Cooperation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Research and Science Education,” Committee on Science and Technology, []) mj Chairman Baird, Ranking Member Ehlers, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss science diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State. The U.S. is recognized globally for its leadership in science and technology. Our scientific strength is both a tool of ``soft power'' --part of our strategic diplomatic arsenal-- and a basis for //creating partnerships// //with countries as they move beyond basic economic and social development.// Science diplomacy is a central element of the Secretary's transformational diplomacy initiative, because science and technology are essential to achieving stability and strengthening failed and fragile states. S&T advances have immediate and enormous influence on national and global economies, and thus on the international relations between societies. Nation states, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations are largely shaped by their expertise in and access to intellectual and physical capital in science, technology, and engineering. Even as S&T advances of our modern era provide opportunities for economic prosperity, some also challenge the relative position of countries in the world order, and influence our social institutions and principles. America must remain at the forefront of this new world by maintaining its technological edge, and leading the way internationally through science diplomacy and engagement. The Public Diplomacy Role of Science Science by its nature facilitates diplomacy because it strengthens political relationships, embodies powerful ideals, and creates opportunities for all. The global scientific community embraces principles Americans cherish: transparency, meritocracy, accountability, the objective evaluation of evidence, and broad and frequently democratic participation. Science is inherently democratic, respecting evidence and truth above all. Science is also a common global language, able to bridge deep political and religious divides. Scientists share a common language. Scientific interactions serve to keep open lines of communication and cultural understanding. As scientists everywhere have a common evidentiary external reference system, members of ideologically divergent societies can use the common language of science to cooperatively address both domestic and the increasingly trans-national and global problems confronting humanity in the 21st century. There is a growing recognition that science and technology will increasingly drive the successful economies of the 21st century. Using Science Diplomacy to Achieve National Security Objectives The welfare and stability of countries and regions in many parts of the globe require a concerted effort by the developed world to address the causal factors that render countries fragile and cause states to fail. Countries that are unable to defend their people against starvation, or fail to provide economic opportunity, are susceptible to extremist ideologies, autocratic rule, and abuses of human rights. As well, the world faces common threats, among them //climate change, energy and water shortages,// public health emergencies, //environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity//, and religious extremism. These threats can undermine the national security of the United States, both directly and indirectly. Many are blind to political boundaries, becoming regional or global threats. The United States has no monopoly on knowledge in a globalizing world and the scientific challenges facing humankind are enormous. Addressing these common challenges demands common solutions and necessitates scientific cooperation, common standards, and common goals. We must increasingly harness the power of American ingenuity in science and technology through strong partnerships with the science community in both academia and the private sector, in the U.S. and abroad among our allies, to advance U.S. interests in foreign policy. There are also important challenges to the ability of states to supply their populations with sufficient food. The still-growing human population, rising affluence in emerging economies, and other factors have combined to create unprecedented pressures on global prices of staples such as edible oils and grains. Encouraging and promoting the use of contemporary molecular techniques in crop improvement is an essential goal for U.S. science diplomacy. An essential part of the war on terrorism is a war of ideas. The creation of economic opportunity can do much more to combat the rise of fanaticism than can any weapon. The war of ideas is a war about rationalism as opposed to irrationalism. Science and technology put us firmly on the side of rationalism by providing ideas and opportunities that improve people's lives. We may use the recognition and the goodwill that science still generates for the United States to achieve our diplomatic and developmental goals. Additionally, the Department continues to use science as a means to reduce the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and prevent what has been dubbed `brain drain.' Through cooperative threat reduction activities, former weapons scientists redirect their skills to participate in peaceful, collaborative international research in a large variety of scientific fields. In addition, new global efforts focus on improving biological, chemical, and nuclear security by promoting and implementing best scientific practices as a means to enhance security, increase global partnerships, and create sustainability.

New polar research is the biggest internal link to US science diplomacy
ehhhhh Collins 11 – Center for Global Sustainability Studies and major sponsor of the 22nd Pacific Science Congress (June 2011, “Founded on science, world cooperation in Antarctica a model for meeting climate, other challenges,” []) mj The success of world co-operation based on science and practiced since the Cold War by nations operating in Antarctica offers a model to humanity as it confronts challenges to common interests __like climate change, biodiversity loss and overfishing__, says the editor of a new book on science diplomacy. Since the end of the Second World War //science has become an important tool of diplomacy, not only for issues involving environmental management, but for peace in the world we live in//, says Paul Berkman, former Head of the Arctic Ocean Geopolitics Programme, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, UK, and Research Professor at the Bren School of Environmental Science & Management at the University of California Santa Barbara. Says Dr. Berkman, keynote speaker at an international conference on Antarctica being held in Malaysia: "For half a century__, it has become increasingly obvious that we face planetary-scale phenomena that cannot be solved by any one nation or region, nor solved quickly. Today and forever after, national and international interests need to find the type of balance practiced today __ under the Antarctic Treaty." In a new book published by the Smithsonian Institution, Science Diplomacy: Antarctica, Science and the Governance of International Spaces, Dr. Berkman writes: "The two world wars of the 20th Century underscored animosity on a global scale. In contrast, reflecting unparalleled international cooperation, institutions have evolved since 1945 to prevent or resolve disputes transcending national boundaries __.__ Most of these institutions relate to issues that cross national boundaries. However, there is a suite of institutions that has emerged to manage regions beyond the reach of national jurisdiction in the high seas (1958), Antarctica (1959), outer space (1967), and the deep sea (1971)." The origin, development and success of the Antarctic Treaty offers hope and inspiration applicable to the challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss, overfishing and a host of similarly vexing environmental problems, he writes. "Any lessons we are able to glean from the Antarctic experience will be relevant not only to those interested in traditional international spaces but also to those in search of effective approaches to governing an expanding range of issues (e.g., climate change)…that are destined to become even more important in the future." "Perhaps __the broadest legacy of the first 50 years of the (Antarctic Treaty) is the development of a suite of practices that are useful in any effort to ensure that interactions between science and policy produce positive results __ for both communities in addressing a wide range of large-scale issues for the benefit of humankind and the world we inhabit." "The parts of the planet that fall under national jurisdiction constitute just 30% of the world," says Dr. Berkman. "We're still in infancy in terms of how to work as a civilization. The extent of humanity's common interests and inter-connectedness has only become truly apparent in the second part of the 20th Century." The fundamental role of science in international governance as exemplified in the Antarctic Treaty includes such responsibilities as monitoring and assessing change over time and space, the discovery of new beneficial health and other products derived from biological resources, and prioritizing and framing issues for consideration. " Science is free of such time-bound blinders and therefore is fundamental to environment-related diplomacy at a global scale ," says Dr. Zakri, who co-chairs as well the Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT). "The world is changing always. //Science provides the common language, culture and foundation for nations and people to work together in decision-making on shared global interests."//

Icebreakers are uniquely key – they guide climate research and adaptation strategies
creating freeze resistant crops/cryopreservation/ice cores/ice sheets/how the solar wind and earth intereact NRC 7 – working arm of the United States National Academies, which produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine (National Research Council, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of US Needs,” []) mj Fundamental advances resulting from polar research have directly benefited society. Polar research led to the identification of the presence and cause of the “ozone hole” and has resulted in coordinated worldwide actions to discontinue the use of chlorofluorocarbons. Understanding how the polar regions affect ocean circulation is leading to a better understanding of global climate. The study of Weddell seals, which dive to great depths and cease breathing for long periods, led to better understanding of how such mammals handle gas dissolved in blood during and after deep diving events. This has contributed to advances in understanding sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). The study of mammals, insects, and plants that endure freezing temperatures, yet prevent the formation of ice crystals in their internal fluids, is aiding in the design of freeze-resistant crops and improved biomedical cryopreservation techniques.The Arctic and Antarctic are natural laboratories whose extreme, relatively pristine environments and geographically unique settings enable research on fundamental phenomena and processes that are //feasible nowhere else//. Today, researchers seek a better understanding of how new ocean crusts form, how organisms adapt to the extremes of temperature and seasonality (light conditions), how ice sheets behave, and how the solar wind and the earth interact. Unexplored, subglacial lakes in the Antarctic that have been sealed from the atmosphere for millions of years are soon to be explored and entered. Beneath the South Pole Station a cubic kilometer of clear ice is being instrumented with 5,000 detectors to observe high-energy neutrinos that may tell us about phenomena such as supernovae. Pr i stine ice cores that span centuries give direct data about temperature changes and atmospheric gas concentrations in the past. As global climate has garnered worldwide attention, the polar regions have been found to react acutely to fluctuations in climate and temperatures. The 40 percent reduction in Arctic sea-ice thickness over the past four decades is one of the most dramatic examples of recent changes. Because ice tends to reflect solar radiation and water absorbs it,melting in the polar regions can exert a strong influence on both atmospheric climate and ocean circulation. Huge reservoirs of water are held in massive ice sheets and glaciers; substantive release may create major climate and social dislocations. Thus, research in these regions plays a pivotal role in the global Earth system exerting influences of critical importance. Scientists have declared 2007-2008 the International Polar Year. Multinational collaboration and new polar research activities are planned. The health and continued vitality of polar research are intimately linked to the availability of the appropriate infrastructure and logistical support to allow scientists to work in these harsh environments. Access to the polar regions is essential if the U nited S tates is to continue to be a //leader in polar science////.//To operate reliably and safely in these regions //necessitates a national icebreaking capability//. Icebreakers enable resupply of land-based stations and field camps in the south. The availability of polar icebreakers with greater icebreaking capability would enable important new research in the Southern Ocean in locations where ice is thick. While other assets and platforms such as airplanes and spaceborne sensors are useful tools, surface ground-truth and in situ sampling will not be replaced in the near future. Because there are no land sites in the central Arctic, an icebreaker is an essential platform to support sustained scientific measurements in the Arctic Ocean. The availability of adequate icebreaking capabilities will be essential to advancing research in both polar regions.

Research-driven adaptation strategies build in resilience to prevent total ecosystem collapse
gaps in understanding prevent development approaches short term experiments – no long term commitment research program would inform policy makers about adaptation Doney, 8 **-** Senior Scientist Marine Chemistry & Geochemistry Department Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (Scott, **“**The Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act: H.R. 4174” Written testimony presented to the Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, United States House of Representatives6/5, [] Major gaps exist in our current scientific understanding, limiting our ability to forecast the consequences of ocean acidification and //hinder////ing// //the development of adaptation approaches// for marine resource managers. Thus far, most of the elevated CO2 response studies on marine biota, whether for calcification, photosynthesis or some other physiological measure , have been short-term lab oratory or mesocosm experiments ranging in length from hours to weeks. Chronic exposure to increased CO2 may have complex effects on the growth and reproductive success of calcareous and non-calcareous plants and animals and could induce possible adaptations that are not observed in short term experiments. Our present understanding also stems largely from experiments on individual organisms or a species in isolation; consequently, the response of populations and communities to more realistic gradual changes is largely unknown. Other aspects of ocean biogeochemistry may be strongly influenced by rising CO2 levels. Recent experim+ents with one of the most abundant types of phytoplankton, Synechococcus, showed significantly elevated photosynthesis rates under warmer, high CO2 conditions. Elevated CO2 also enhanced nitrogen fixation rates (production of biologically useful nutrients from dissolved nitrogen gas) for a key tropical marine cyanobacteria, which would in effect fertilize the surface ocean and offset predicted reductions in tropical biological production due to climate warming and stratification. Further, a major but underappreciated consequence of ocean acidification will be broad alterations of inorganic and organic seawater chemistry beyond the carbonate system. Acidification will affect the biogeochemical dynamics of calcium carbonate, organic carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus in the ocean as well as the seawater chemical speciation of trace metals, trace elements and dissolved organic matter. A fully-integrated research program with in-water and remote sensing observing systems on multiple-scales, laboratory, mesocosm (large volumes of seawater either in tanks or plastic bags), and field process studies, and modeling approaches is required to //provide policymakers with informed management strategies////that address how humans// //might best// //mitigate or adapt to these// //long-term// //changes//. This program should emphasize how changes in the metabolic processes at the cellular level will be manifested within the ecosystem or community structure, and how they will influence future climate feedbacks. A program should include the following components: Systematic monitoring system with high resolution measurements in time and space of atmospheric and surface water carbon dioxide partial pressure (pCO2), total dissolved inorganic carbon, alkalinity, and pH to validate model predictions and provide the foundations for interpreting the impacts of acidification on ecosystems; In regions projected to undergo substantial changes in carbonate chemistry, tracking of abundances and depth distributions of key calcifying and non-calcifying species at appropriate temporal and spatial scales to be able to detect possible shifts and distinguish between natural variability and anthropogenic forced changes; Standardized protocols and data reporting guidelines for carbonate system perturbation and calcification experiments; Manipulative laboratory experiments to quantify physiological responses including calcification and dissolution, photosynthesis, respiration, and other sensitive indices useful in predicting CO2 tolerance of ecologically and economically important species; New approaches to investigate address long-term subtle changes that more realistically simulate natural conditions; Manipulative mesocosm and field experiments to investigate community and ecosystem responses (i.e., shifts in species composition, food web structure, biogeochemical cycling and feedback mechanisms) to elevated CO2 and potential interactions with nutrients, light and other environmental variables; Integrated modeling approach to determine the likely implications of ocean acidification processes on marine ecosystems and fisheries including nested models of biogeochemical processes and higher trophic-level responses to address ecosystem-wide dynamics such as competition, predation, reproduction, migration, and spatial population structure; Robust and cost effective methods for measuring pH, pCO2, and dissolved total alkalinity on moored buoys, ships of opportunity, and research vessels, floats and gliders; Studies on the human dimensions of ocean acidification including the socio-economic impacts due to damaged fisheries and coral reefs; Assessment of potential adaptation strategies needed by resource managers including reducing other human stresses (over-fishing, habitat destruction, pollution) to //increase ecosystem resiliency// as well as local-scale mitigation efforts.

Warming risks extinction
melt planet etc etc Costello 11 –, Anthony, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Mark Maslin, Department of Geography, University College London, Hugh Montgomery, Institute for Human Health and Performance, University College London, Anne M. Johnson, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Paul Ekins, Energy Institute, University College London [“Global health and climate change: moving from denial and catastrophic fatalism to positive action” May 2011 vol. 369 no. 1942 1866-1882 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society] Advocacy about the health consequences will ensure that climate change is a high priority. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change was set up in 1992 to ensure that nations worked together to minimize the adverse effects, but McMichael and Neira noted that, in preparation for the Copenhagen conference in December 2009, only four of 47 nations mentioned human health as a consideration [1]. With business as usual, global warming caused by rising greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will threaten mass populations through increased transmission of some infections, heat stress, food and water insecurity , increased deaths from more frequent and extreme climate events, threats to shelter and security, and through population migration [2]. On the one hand it is necessary in the media to counter climate change sceptics and denialists, but on the other it is also important not to allow climate catastrophists, who tell us it is all too late, to deflect us from pragmatic and positive action. Catastrophic scenarios are possible in the longer term, and effective action will be formidably difficult, but evidence suggests that we do have the tools, the time and the resources to bring about the changes needed for climate stability. 2. Climate change evidence and denial Given the current body of evidence, it is surprising that global warming and its causal relationship with atmospheric GHG pollution is disputed any more than the relationship between acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, or lung cancer and cigarette smoking. The basic principles that determine the Earth’s temperature are, of course, relatively simple. Some of the short-wave solar radiation that strikes the Earth is reflected back into space and some is absorbed by the land and emitted as long-wave radiation (heat). Some of the long-wave radiation is trapped in the atmosphere by ‘greenhouse gases’, which include water vapour, carbon dioxide and methane. Without GHGs the Earth would be on average 33◦C colder. Over the last 150 years, since the Industrial Revolution, humans have been adding more carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. The result is that the Earth’s atmosphere, ocean and land are indeed warming—due to increased atmospheric ‘greenhouse gas’ concentrations [3]. Gleick et al. [4], from the US National Academy of Sciences, wrote a letter to Science stating ‘ There is compelling, comprehensive, and consistent objective evidence that humans are changing the climate in ways that threaten our societies and the ecosystems on which we depend’. The most recent __report__ by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [5], amounting to nearly 3000 pages of detailed review and analysis of published research, also declares that the __scientific uncertainties__ of global warming __are__ essentially __resolved__. This report states that there is clear evidence for a 0.75◦C rise in global temperatures and 22 cm rise in sea level during the twentieth century. The IPCC synthesis also predicts that global temperatures could rise further by between 1.1◦C and 6.4◦C by 2100, and sea level could rise by between 28 and 79 cm, or more if the melting of Greenland and Antarctica accelerates. In addition, weather patterns will become less predictable and the occurrence of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, heat waves and droughts, will increase. There is also strong evidence for ocean acidification driven by more carbon dioxide dissolving in the oceans [6]. Given the current failure of international negotiations to address carbon emission reductions, and that atmospheric warming lags behind rises in CO2 concentration, there is concern that global surface temperature will rise above the supposedly ‘safe limit’ of 2◦C within this century. Each doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration alone is expected to produce 1.9–4.5◦C of warming at equilibrium [7]. Of course, climate modelling is an extremely complex process, and uncertainty with projections relating to future emissions trajectories means that the time scale and magnitude of future climate change cannot be predicted with certainty [8]. These uncertainties are magnified when future climate predictions are used to estimate potential impacts. For example, the environmental impacts of climate change are also uncertain, but could underestimate such impacts because they detrimentally interact with habitat loss, pollution and loss of biodiversity due to other causes. There is also the additional problem that switching from biome to biome may not be directly reversible. For example, rainforest recycles a huge amount of water so it can survive a significant amount of aridification before it burns and is replaced by savannah. But the region then has to get much wetter before rainforest can return, as there is greatly reduced water cycling in savannah [9]. In the policy arena, further uncertainty surrounds the desire for international agreements on emission cuts, and the possible routes to such agreement and implementation. The feasible speed of technological innovation in carbon capture and provision of renewable/low-carbon energy resources is also uncertain. __Denying the__ causes or the current weight of __evidence__ for anthropogenic climate change __is irrational__, just as the existence of ‘uncertainties’ should not be used to deny the need for proportionate action, when such uncertainties could underestimate the risks and impact of climate change. There is no reason for inaction and there are many ways we can use our current knowledge of climate change to improve health provision for current and future generations. 3. Catastrophism At the other end of the scale are doom-mongers who predict catastrophic population collapse and the end of civilization. In the early nineteenth century, the French palaeontologist Georges Cuvier first addressed catastrophism and explained patterns of extinction observed in the fossil record through catastrophic natural events [10]. We know now of five major extinctions: the Ordovician–Silurian extinction (439 million years ago), the Late Devonian extinction (about 364 million years ago), the Permian–Triassic extinction (about 251 million years ago), the End Triassic extinction (roughly 199 million to 214 million years ago) and the Cretaceous– Tertiary extinction (about 65 million years ago). These mass extinctions were caused by a combination of plate tectonics, supervolcanism and asteroid impacts. The understanding of the mass extinctions led Gould & Eldredge [11] to update Darwin’s theory of evolution with their own theory of punctuated equilibrium. Many scientists have suggested that the current human-induced extinction rates could be as fast as those during these mass extinctions [12,13]. For example, one study predicted that 58 per cent of species may be committed to extinction by 2050 due to climate change alone [14], though this paper has been criticized [15,16]. Some people have even suggested that human extinction may not be a remote risk [17–19]. Sherwood & Huber [7] point to continued heating effects that could make the world largely uninhabitable by humans and mammals within 300 years. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature (used because it reflects both the ambient temperature and relative humidity of the site), is surprisingly similar across diverse climates and never exceeds 31◦C. They suggest that if it rose to 35◦C, which never happensnow but would at a warming of 7◦C, hyperthermia in humans and other mammals would occur as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible, therefore making many environments uninhabitable.

Data sets are conclusive – global warming is real and human induced
ipcc statement – anthro Nuccitelli, 14 --- master’s degree in physics, an environmental scientist and risk assessor (1/9/14, Dana, “Global warming is being caused by humans, not the sun, and is highly sensitive to carbon, new research shows”, [], RE) Over the past few weeks, several important new papers related to human vs. natural climate change have been published. These papers add clarity to the causes of climate change, and how much global warming we can expect in the future. First, a paper published in the Journal of Climate by Jara Imbers, Ana Lopez, Chris Huntingford, and Myles Allen examines the //recent IPCC statement// //that// //expressed with 95 percent confidence that humans are the main cause of// //the current global// //warming////.// One of the main challenges in attributing the causes of global warming lies in the representation of the natural internal variability of the Earth's climate. The study used two very different representations of natural variability. The first model assumed that the present climate has a short and finite memory, and is mostly determined by the recent past. The second model assumed that the climate's internal variability has long memory and the present climate is influenced by all the previous years. The authors then incorporated each of these representations of natural variability with a statistical approach to estimate the individual contributions of the various factors (e.g. the sun, volcanoes, greenhouse gases) to the increase in average global surface temperature. In each case, the study found that the greenhouse gas-global warming signal was statistically significant, supporting the robustness of the IPCC statement on human-caused global warming. As lead author Jara Imbers told me, "...we investigate two extreme cases of the plausible temporal structures of the internal variability, and we find that the anthropogenic signal is robust and significant." Second, a paper published in Nature Geoscience by Andrew Schurer, Simon Tett, and Gabriele Hegerl investigates the sun's influence on global climate changes over the past 1,000 years. Although we know the sun can't be causing the current global warming because solar activity has declined slightly over the past 50 years, "it's the sun" nevertheless remains one of the most popular climate contrarian arguments. However, in recent years, research has pointed in the direction of a relatively small solar impact on the Earth's climate changes. It's important to realize that while the Earth is bombarded by a lot of heat from the sun, the amount of solar energy reaching the planet is relatively stable. According to the best recent estimates, it's only increased by about 0.1 percent over the past 300 years, causing a global energy imbalance less than 10 percent as large as that caused by humans over the same period. In this study, the authors tested reconstructions that incorporated relatively large and small changes in solar activity, and compared them to northern hemisphere temperature reconstructions over the past millennium. The reconstruction using a stronger solar influence (green) was a worse fit to the temperature data (blue) than the reconstruction with the weaker solar influence (red), especially around the 12th century. As in the Imbers paper, this study used a statistical approach to determine the contribution of each factor in the measured temperature changes. The authors conclude, "Volcanic and GHG [greenhouse gas] forcings seem to contribute most to pre-twentieth-century climate variability, whereas the contribution by solar forcing is modest, agreeing with the simulations with low solar forcing." //The study finds that the sun is unlikely to have caused more than 0.15°C of the observed approximately 1°C warming over the past 300 years//. The authors find a detectable greenhouse gas influence on the climate before the 20th century, and consistent with the IPCC and Imbers, they conclude that //humans are the dominant cause of recent global warming//. //"Over the twentieth century, anthropogenic forcings dominate with GHGs the largest forcing, offset by the effect of anthropogenic aerosols and land use changes"// However, the authors note that while the sun has little impact on average hemispheric and global temperatures, it does have a significant influence on regional temperatures, for example in Europe. Finally, a paper published in Nature by Steven Sherwood, Sandrine Bony, and Jean-Louis Dufresne examines the role that c louds will play in the sensitivity of the global climate to the increased greenhouse effect. To this point, //cloud responses to global warming have remained a key uncertainty.// We know that a doubling of the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will cause a bit more than 1°C global surface warming by itself, and we know that //there are several feedbacks that will amplify// //that// //warming//. The amount of water vapor in the atmosphere – another greenhouse gas – increases as the planet warms, amplifying that warming. This is the single largest feedback, and is increasing as climate scientists expect. We also know that melting ice makes the planet less reflective, causing it to absorb more sunlight , also amplifying global warming.And carbon released from various sources like beneath melting permafrost and from burning peatlands will also increase the greenhouse effect as another positive feedback in a warming world. However, we know of few significant negative feedbacks that will offset these effects and dampen global warmin g. The reckless contrarian approach is dependent upon the climate being relatively insensitive to the increased greenhouse effect, which requires that something offset all of these warming feedbacks. Clouds, whose responses in a warming world have been difficult to pin down, were the contrarians' last and best hope. An increase in cloud cover in response to global warming would reflect more sunlight back out to space, thereby cooling the Earth and offsetting some of those positive warming feedbacks. The authors of the Nature study examined cloud change simulations in relatively low and high sensitivity climate models. As summarized by Rob Painting, they found that the less sensitive models were incorrectly simulating water vapor being drawn up to higher levels of the atmosphere to form clouds in a warmer world. In reality (based on observations) warming of the lower atmosphere pulls water vapor away from those higher cloud-forming levels of the atmosphere and the amount of cloud formation there actually decreases, //resulting in another amplifying global warming feedback//. Lead author Steven Sherwood describes the study in the video below. These results are consistent with Fasullo & Trenberth (2012), who found that only the higher sensitivity climate models correctly simulated drying in key cloud-forming regions of the atmosphere. Likewise, preliminary results by scientists at the California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory presented at the 2013 AGU meeting showed that higher sensitivity models do the best job simulating observed cloud changes. These results are also consistent with Lauer et al. (2010) and Clement et al. (2009), which looked at cloud changes in the Pacific, finding the observations consistent with a positive cloud feedback. To summarize, the evidence that humans are the dominant cause of the current global warming is overwhelming (which is the reason behind the 97 percent expert consensus ), and continues to grow. And while the media has lately tended to focus on the few papers that suggest climate sensitivity is relatively low, there is a growing body of evidence based on cloud observations that it's actually on the high end, above 3°C warming in response to doubled CO2, which under business as usual would lead to more than 4°C warming by 2100 – a potentially catastrophic scenario. //In short – it's us, it's bad, and if we don't change course, it's a potential catastrophe.//

We’re already past the tipping point – adaptation and engagement is key
Guterl ‘09 **–**Fred Guterl 9, Executive Editor of Scientific American, Will Climate Go Over The Edge?” [] Since the real world is so messy, climate scientists Gerard Roe and Marcia Baker turned for insight to the distinctly neater world of mathematics. Last year, they published an analysis in the journal Science arguing that climate models were skewed in the direction of underestimating the warming effect of carbon. The report reasoned that carbon emissions have the potential to trigger many changes that amplify the warming effect—water absorbs more sunlight than ice, humidity traps more heat, and so on—but few that would mitigate it. The odds, they figure, are about one in three that temperatures will rise by 4.5 degrees C (the top of the IPCC's range), but there's little chance at all that they'll rise by less than 2 degrees C. "We've had a hard time eliminating the possibility of very large climate changes," says Roe. The answer is still couched in probabilities, but they've shifted in a worrying direction.¶ What can be done? Can a diplomatic miracle in Copenhagen save the planet from the dreaded tipping point? Sea ice in the Antarctic was supposed to last for 5,000 years until scientists found that the melting was proceeding at a faster pace than expected. Now it will all be gone in a mere 850 years. Bringing it back would require something like 10,000 years of cooler temperatures//.// //Is there any way to halt the process before it goes too far?¶ No////,// says Susan Solomon, a climate scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in Boulder, Colorado. In a recent study in the Proceedings of the National Academies of Science, she found that most of the carbon we've already released into the atmosphere will hang around for another 1,000 years. Even if world leaders somehow managed to persuade everybody to stop driving cars and heating their homes—bringing carbon emissions down to zero immediately— the Earth would continue to warm for centuries. The effect of rising temperatures on rainfall patterns is also irreversible, says Solomon. Parts of the world that tend to be dry (Mexico, north Africa, southern Europe and the western parts of Australia and the United States) will continue to get drier, while wet areas (the South Pacific islands, the horn of Africa) will keep getting wetter. " You have to think of it as being like a dial that can only turn one way," she says. "We've cranked up the dial, and we don't get to crank it back." The point of a climate treaty, then, isn't so much to roll things back as to keep them from getting a whole lot worse—a worthy and important goal, if not a particularly inspiring one.

Reliance on foreign icebreakers jeopardizes US commitment to Antarctic
The U.S. inventory of icebreakers relevant to McMurdo resupply operations is effectively limited to three USCG ships —the medium icebreaker Healy and two polar class icebreakers, Polar Sea and the Polar Star17. Healy, commissioned in 2000, participated in the McMurdo break-in mission in 2002/03. Healy is more ice-capable, albeit less maneuverable, than the Russian Vladimir Ignatyuk that successfully conducted the 2011/12 breakin under the very light ice conditions that prevailed prior to the arrival of Iceberg B15 in the McMurdo Sound area and again over the past two years. The Healy does not possess either the power or the maneuverability required for unassisted break-in operations in heavy, multiyear ice. In addition, Healy is typically fully engaged in Arctic science operations for its entire annual operating schedule (approximately 185 days per year) and is expected to be committed to such duties indefinitely into the future. Healy could, at least in principle, be made available as a backup vessel to assist another vessel with the break-in under exigency situations, or, if deemed in the national interest and other options are unavailable, to conduct the break-in at McMurdo under light ice conditions (much as it did for a fuel delivery to Nome, Alaska, in early 2012). The relevant studies assume that the Healy will eventually undergo a service life extension that would permit it to remain in operation for the foreseeable future. Polar Sea, commissioned in 1978, is in “commissioned, inactive” status and has been incapable of operating since May 2010, when it experienced an unexpected catastrophic failure of five of its recently refurbished engines. It is not decided whether the Polar Sea will return to active status. Polar Star, commissioned in 1976, is undergoing a $60 million service life extension that should provide an additional seven to ten years of operating life. Polar Star would not be available for operational icebreaking services until 2013/14 at the earliest, and is unlikely to be operational much past the 2020/21 season. At present, and perhaps again in the future, the USAP is in the position of being principally or totally reliant upon foreign sources for icebreaking support for the annual resupply. Additionally, it is not clear that the Swedish and Russian icebreakers used in recent years will be available in the futur e. This approach to resupply of U.S. operations in Antarctica is unsatisfactory in the long term. The lack of a U.S. capability to conduct the McMurdo break-in //severely jeopardizes the U.S. commitment// to its stated policies regarding the Antarctic Continent. As soon as possible, the break-in should again be supported by icebreaking services reliably controlled by the U.S. government, preferably an icebreaker //owned and operated by the USCG//.
 * Augustine, 12** - Report of the U.S. Antarctic Program Blue Ribbon Panel; Augustine was the chair of the Panel (Norman, “More and Better Science in Antarctica Through Increased Logistical Effectiveness” July, [|http://www.nsf.gov/od/opp/usap_special_review/usap_brp/rpt/antarctica_07232012.pdf)//DH] **USAP = US Antarctic Program**

That threatens the stability of the Antarctic Treaty
Setting aside the ambiguities associated with the federal budgeting process, logistics planning in Antarctica is complicated by the shortness of the season during which the continent can be reliably accessed for logistical purposes, nominally 21 weeks by air at McMurdo Station and 15 weeks at South Pole Station. Using U.S.-owned heavy icebreakers, McMurdo Station could be accessed by ship during about ten weeks each year. As these ships have become unavailable and less-powerful icebreakers are used, the time in which to accomplish resupply by sea has been reduced to the four-week annual sea ice minimum—a challenging and unreliable practice. In Antarctica, weather changes frequently and abruptly, necessitating contingency plans for most activities, particularly those in remote areas. The cost of energy is high and uncertain, and the behavior of the ice pack can hinder the delivery of energy and other critical supplies. During late 2011, a series of storms affecting harbor conditions left too little time for the McMurdo ice pier to thicken to sufficient strength, thus requiring deployment of a portable modular causeway system loaned by the Department of Defense (DoD). The Panel itself made the final landing of the season at the Sea Ice Runway, the airfield closest to McMurdo Station, before sea ice conditions deteriorated to the point that air operations had to be moved to a more solid but more remote location. At the Pegasus Runway, constructed on glacial ice, temperatures now rise more frequently to within a few degrees of the point where air operations are precluded. Long-term uncertainties abound. Some Antarctic research activity will continue to shift from relatively simple to more highly integrated research that requires more complex support. Further, the impact on the Antarctic region of greatly expanded tourism remains to be determined. Many nations do not participate in the Antarctic Treaty. Seven countries have made claims to parts of Antarctica that remain in abeyance while the Treaty is in force—pointing to the importance of maintaining an //influential U.S. science presence as a stabilizing influence//. Finally, climate change in Antarctica could significantly complicate future runway and ice pier construction and thereby impact both air and sea operations
 * Augustine, 12** - Report of the U.S. Antarctic Program Blue Ribbon Panel; Augustine was the chair of the Panel (Norman, “More and Better Science in Antarctica Through Increased Logistical Effectiveness” July, []

Effective Antarctica treaty is key resolve the South China Sea
Shicun and Hong 14 – Shicun Wu is President of the China National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, a sole national-level think-tank in China specializing in South China Sea studies. His research focuses on history and geography on the South China Sea, ocean boundary delimitation, international relations and regional security issues. Nong Hong is Assistant President at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS), with responsibility for the NISCSS Beijing Office.Her research takes an interdisciplinary approach to examining international relations and international law, with focus on International Relations and Comparative Politics in general; ocean governance in East Asia; law of the sea; international security, particularly non-traditional security; and international dispute settlement and conflict resolution. – “Recent Developments in the South China Sea Dispute: The Prospect of a Joint Development Regime” -http://books.google.com/books?id=tBuvAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA237&lpg=PA237&dq=antarctic+treaty+south+china+sea&source=bl&ots=AyyHDSat7N&sig=W-b_IQDeH4E0dWyU8ADO0J_NBds&hl=en&sa=X&ei=U3PMU8brA8nfPdvigZgN&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=antarctic%20treaty%20south%20china%20sea&f=false //pg 237// JV The Antarctic Treaty is an excellent model from which marine scientists in the South China Sea may learn many lessons4" and can serve as a practical model for resolving disputes in the South China Sea . The Antarctic Treaty, which was signed in 1939, calls for the eventual demilitarization of the area . //The 12 claim¬ant states are strongly urged to prohibit ‘any measures of military rule//, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out military maneuvers, and the testing of any types of weapon’ in the demilitarized Antarctic Ocean.13 The Antarctic Treaty also upholds the collective utilization of the resources in Antarctica. For any disputes that may arise, it mandates the use of‘negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice’ to manage conflicts in the area. 44 What is notable in the Antarctic Treaty model is the vital //role played by experts and scientists in convincing political leaders to eschew political issues in the area and to start cooperating in functional areas//. //Through their reliable scientific findings, experts and scientists push for the collective protection of the Antarctic Ocean for the benefit of all claimant states.// Instead of competing for the resources of the Antarctic, experts and scientists propose a model that upholds the collective utilization of Antarctica and its resources through ‘joint management.’ Experts and scientists also uphold the idea of making the Antarctic a pristine world park and ‘a center for peaceful scientific inquiry .’ Thus, the Antarctic Treaty guarantees the collective governance of the Antarctic Ocean.

Military escalation is inevitable absent effective treaty solutions
Glaser, 12 - senior fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Bonnie S., “Armed Clash in the South China Sea Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14” April 2012 http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)//gingE// // Introduction The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas.Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping —and being shaped by— rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily. The Contingencies Of the many conceivable contingencies involving an armed clash in the South China Sea, three especially threaten U.S. interests and could potentially prompt the United States to use force. The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A //miscalculation// or misunderstanding could then result in a //deadly exchange of fire//, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult.

Extinction
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war ? Not necessarily. And yet, //there are signs that it could.// After all, both the United States and China possess //large numbers of nuclear weapons.// The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations ; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack ? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred , for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars ” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive —and probably unworkable— military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might ? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would //blot out the sun// and bring on a //“nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.//
 * Wittner 11** - Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany (Lawrence S. Wittner, 11/28, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?" [|www.huntingtonnews.net/14446])

The Antarctica treaty is modelled globally – stability is key
Yin 6-19-12 (Wenquin Yin, Chinese Journal of International Law, Moratorium in International Law, June 29th, 2012, []) The intent and purpose of the moratorium on performance or furtherance of conflicting claims are not to make any judgment on the claims, or to settle dispute resulting from the conflicting claims, but to freeze, shelve or set aside dispute and postpone the final settlement of dispute. The Antarctic Treaty is a case in point. According to Article IV(1) of the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty will have neither positive nor negative effects on the asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica as well as on positions of any contracting party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of such asserted rights or claims. Under Article IV(2), the status quo relating to claims is frozen, “acts or activities taking place” while the Treaty is in force have nothing to do with claims, and no new claims and enlargement of existing claims are permissible. In negotiating the Antarctic Treaty, “claimants do not generally favour any solutions that involve a renunciation of their claims”,33 and at the same time, they had no idea of settling their respective claims. In achieving the fundamental objectives of the peaceful uses of the continent and the promotion of scientific research and co-operation, negotiating parties tended to “sidestep particularly contentious issues relating to territorial jurisdiction .”34 As it stands today, //the Antarctic Treaty successfully suspends disputes of claims and counterclaims on Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty has been generally considered a precedent for co-existence, and provided the framework for international activities and a basis for stability in Antarctica//.35 “ The key to reaching this desirable result was Article IV in the Antarctic Treaty .”36 However, the territory claims are far from dead. The seven claimants have maintained their positions.37 For example, the United Kingdom, as a claimant, claimed that “appurtenant to Antarctica there exist areas of continental shelf the extent of which has yet to be defined”, and reserved the right to submit information to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf thereof, when it submitted information relating to the continental shelf of Ascension Island on 9 May 2008.38 Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty “just postpones the question of settlement of territorial sovereignty but does not exclude in principle the application of the concept of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica .”39 //In case the Antarctic Treaty system collapses, the issue of territorial claim disputes will definitely arise again.//