Lauren+Ernst+and+Wingel+Xue

aff - laurenernst00@gmail.com neg - wingelxue3@gmail.com
 * Questions?**

__T-QPQ__, Multiplank CP, Japan DA, Elections DA T-QPQ, Track 2 CP, Japan DA, __Elections DA__
 * Neg (underlined = 2NR) -**
 * AIIB:**

Space DA, T-QPQ, Multiplank CP, __Containment DA__
 * ISS:**

T-Uncondo, Secrecy CP, __Japan DA,__ Unification CP, Elections DA
 * Korean Unification:**

T-Uncondo, __Japan DA,__ Elections DA, PIC out of condition, __Multiplank CP__ T-Uncondo, Elections DA, Multiplank CP, __Rising Expectations DA__, Consult Japan CP
 * Arctic:**

T-QPQ, QPQ CP, __Elections DA__, PIC out of steel, Steel DA
 * MES:**

T-military, T-Uncondo, Alliances DA, Diplomacy/QPQ K, Military CP, __Elections DA__, Glaser CP
 * Taiwan:**

__Neolib K,__ T-gov-to-gov
 * Climate Co-op:**

AFF - Arctic SCS
===** Plan – the United States federal government should offer to fully support and pursue full membership in the Arctic Council for China if China agrees to submit its maritime claims in the South China Sea to United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea arbitration. **===

==== Agreeing to __lobby for full Council membership__ sends a __powerful signal__ that locks in __multilateral cooperation__ and defuses __instability__ in both the __Arctic__ and the __South China Sea__ ==== Dwyer, 15 — Commander William G. Dwyer III, United States Coast Guard, “China’s Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” NDU Press 3rd Place Paper, United States Army War College, Joint Force Quarterly, NDU Press, [], p. 18-20 The Arctic will continue AND for their mutual benefit.
 * Advantage one is credibility -**

This summer is the __trial of the century__ – American pushes to __recalibrate China’s position__ are key
Heydarian, 6-27 —Richard Javad, Prof of political science @ De La Salle University, and formerly served a policy adviser at the Philippine House of Representatives. “The South China Sea moment of truth is almost here,” Asia Times, [] --br //The Trial of the Century// “For the UNCLOS system—AND in disputed areas.

Giving China a diplomatic off-ramp to settle Law of the Sea disputes over maritime claims __preserves international law__ – failure __crushes it__
Cronin and Krejsa, 6-26 — Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Director and Harry Krejsa is Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). “How Will China React to the Gavel Coming Down in the South China Sea?” War on the Rocks – diplomats, officers, NCOs, intelligence professionals, and some of the most established scholars in the world studying war, conflict, and international politics, [] --br Rising tensions AND claimant state.

==== The plan is the perfect bargain to persuade China to arbitrate maritime claims through LOST – that locks in __multilateral cooperation__ and __Arctic peace__ – failing to push full member status ensures inevitable __proxy conflicts__ that __wreck stability__ ==== Dwyer, 15 — Commander William G. Dwyer III, United States Coast Guard, “China’s Strategic Interests in the Arctic,” NDU Press 3rd Place Paper, United States Army War College, Joint Force Quarterly, NDU Press, [], p. 15-17 China and America share a common interest AND to a realist view

==== __High Arctic Stability__ is __on the brink__ – our impact is __reverse causal__ – cooperation creates a __paradigmatic governance shift__ – that’s vital to preventing __US-Russia war__, __warming__ and __disease__ ==== Heinenen, 16 —Lassi, Professor of Arctic Politics @ University of Lapland, Finland. author of more than 200 scientific publications and is the editor of //The Arctic Yearbook//. “High Arctic Stability as an Asset for Storms of International Politics,” __Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate__, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 4-8 [] --br More importantly, the international community AND nationalistic security thinking.

US-China coop key to __mitigation and adaptation__ strategies globally---solves extinction
Li 14 – MA in Global Studies @ U Denver, Int’l Affairs Coordinator @ UN (Xiaoyu, “China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future,” China Institute of International Studies, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-01/13/content_6606656.htm) • Cooperation on climate change mitigation AND //widely disseminate clean energy technologies//.

__Expert consensus__ that warming is __real__ and __existential__
Treich and Rheinberger, 15 —Christoph Rheinberger (Professor of Health Policy and Management @ Harvard) and Nicolas Treich (Professor at the Toulouse School of Economics). Citing Weitzman (economist @ Harvard) and Bostrom (prof @ Oxford). “On the economics of the end of the world as we know it,” The Economist, [] -- br CLIMATE change //puts humanity at risk//. AND climate negotiations suffer from.

Independently, successful management of __proxy conflicts__ through __regional multilateral institutions__ prevents __existential threats__
Herd 10 — Graeme P., Head of the International Security Programme, Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010, “Great Powers: Towards a “cooperative competitive” future world order paradigm?,” in Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century, p. 197-198 Given the absence of immediate AND involved in the solution.24

==== Multilateral diplomacy is the __ only explanatory force __ behind global order – __ multiple theoretical perspectives __ and __ empirics __ confirm that we control the __ internal link to all global crises __ ==== Pouliot, 16 —Dr. Vincent, Scholar and Professor @ McGill U, Director of the Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, twice awarded the Lemieux Prize for the best thesis in AND //that makes the world go round.//


 * Advantage 2 is SCS -**

__South China Sea tensions__ are rising and will __escalate__ – the aff’s QPQ to abide by the Law of the Sea is __try or die__
Welch, 6-24 —David, Chair of global security and professor of political science @ University of Waterloo and Senior Fellow @ Centre for International Governance Innovation. “China's Curious South China Sea Negotiation Policy; What would China expect to achieve with bilateral negotiations on maritime disputes?” The Diplomat, [] --br There has been a great deal of AND //Fasten your seatbelts.//

War is __increasingly likely__ – quick diplomatic dialogue is key
Coonan, 7-9 -16—Chris, citing Jerome A Cohen, director of the US-Asia Law Institute at New York University, “Armed conflict threat as regional rivals await South China Sea ruling,” [] --br Days before an international AND Law Institute at New York University.

The SCS is the world’s __most dangerous hotspot__ – __regional multilateral norms__ are try or die
Gewirtz, 16 — Paul, Director @ Yale Law School’s China Center. Law Professor with a speciality in Chinese law, and American foreign policy, Online: “Limits of Law in the South China Sea,” The Brookings Institution: Center For East Asia Policy Studies, May 8, [] --AWW The vast South China Sea AND large and small—//are upheld.//

__All hell__ will break loose – __several scenarios for escalation__ – __A.D.I.Z__., __miscalc__, __nationalism__ and __security traps__
Harrison, 7-8- 16—interviewing Dr. Peter Navarro, Professor of Economics and Public Policy @ UC-Irvine, PhD @ Harvard University. Also speaking with James Bradley, author of the __The China Mirage__ and __Flags of Our Fathers__. Harrison is Host of Level Talk with John Harrison, “How Likely is War Between China and the US?” [] --br The Permanent Court of Arbitration AND international law when it invaded Iraq?”

South China Sea conflict goes __nuclear__ and is __existential__ – it also crushes cooperation on __other existential threats__
Kuo, 7-10 —Mercy Kuo interviewing Kaiser Kuo – founder of Sinica Podcast, director of international communications @ Baidu (Chinese Google) and columnist at The Beijinger. Part of a series where M. Kuo engages with subject-matter experts, policy practitioners and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. rebalance to Asia. “New Potus Brief: Getting US-China Relations Right,” The Diplomat, -us-china-relations-right/ --br The simple answer AND I truly fear the worst.

__ Independently __, moves like ADIZ to “secure Beijing’s air zone” guarantee full nuclear exchange
Billings, 15 Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, Citing Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center, and James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, The Scientific American, August 10, 2015, “War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever”, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/ The world’s most worrisome AND remain as yet unwritten.

China says yes—even thought they won’t abide now they have __every incentive__ to make a deal
Rosen, 6-21 —Mark, Prof @ George Washington University School of Law, “After the South China Sea Arbitration; Where do we go after the panel has spoken?” The Diplomat, [] --br What Next? James Kraska AND //basis for a deal.//

The Arctic is the best venue to solve SCS conflict but Chinese ascension is a __pre-requisite__
Chua, 16 —Grace, citing several qualified scholars, “To Ease the South China Sea Dispute, Look to the Arctic,” Hakai Magazine – Coastal Sciences and Societies, Mar 3, [] --br In climate, history, and culture, AND on the Law of the Sea ( //UNCLOS// ).

We’re at a turning point – __even if__ China says no, __initiating dialogue__ is vital to avoiding all-our war
Thompson 7/12 (Mark, American investigative reporter who won the 1985 Pulitzer Prize for public service journalism. “Showdown Now Looming Over the South China Sea” //TIME// [] 9:25 a.m. 2016)//masonw The showdown over the S outh C hina S ea AND All options must be on the table.”

China desperately wants in – that’s a direct quote from Dwyer – they have billions of dollars worth of incentives to join – more evidence with a __boatload__ of say yes warrants
Economy 14 --- US-Chinese relations analyst for Forbes (Elizabeth, 4/4/14, “The Four Drivers Of Beijing's Emerging Arctic Play And What The World Needs To Do,” [|http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabetheconomy/2014/04/04/the-four-drivers-of-beijings-emerging-arctic-play-and-what-the-world-needs-to-do/#16cf3e8270d8)//ernst] If you pay attention, AND The rest of the world needs to be prepared.

US China co-op accesses every impact and solves extinction
Watkins, 8-21-’15 -- advisor to the University of Michigan Confucius Institute, Michigan’s Economic Development Corporation and Detroit Chinese Business Association (Tom, U.S./China: The Most Important Bilateral Relationship in the World Today, China US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-china-the-most-important-bilateral-relationship-in-the-world-today/)


 * __ Our U.S.-China relationship AND __** . **__Let’s hope they get it right__**.

=Aff - S&ED= ====Plan: The United States federal government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China by offering to indefinitely extend and include higher-level officials at the Strategic & Economic Dialogue.====

War is __increasingly likely__ – diplomatic dialogue is key
Coonan, 7-9 -16—Chris, citing Jerome A Cohen, director of the US-Asia Law Institute at New York University, “Armed conflict threat as regional rivals await South China Sea ruling,” [] --br Days before an international AND Law Institute at New York University.

Mistrust is fueling multiple flashpoints within the region – high level talks are necessary to avoid they escalate
Zhao 2015 - Professor and Director of the Center for China–US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver

Suisheng, "A New Model of Big Power Relations? China–US strategic rivalry and balance of power in the Asia–Pacific," Journal of Contemporary China Volume 24, Issue 93, 2015, p 377-397 The Asia–Pacific region has AND flashpoints in the twenty-first century.

The SCS is the world’s __most dangerous hotspot__ – __regional multilateral norms__ are try or die
Gewirtz, 16 — Paul, Director @ Yale Law School’s China Center. Law Professor with a speciality in Chinese law, and American foreign policy, Online: “Limits of Law in the South China Sea,” The Brookings Institution: Center For East Asia Policy Studies, May 8, [] --AWW The vast South China Sea AND large and small— //are upheld.//

South China Sea conflict goes nuclear and is existential – it also crushes cooperation on other existential threats
Kuo, 7-10 —Mercy Kuo interviewing Kaiser Kuo – founder of Sinica Podcast, director of international communications @ Baidu (Chinese Google) and columnist at The Beijinger. Part of a series where M. Kuo engages with subject-matter experts, policy practitioners and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. rebalance to Asia. “New Potus Brief: Getting US-China Relations Right,” The Diplomat, -us-china-relations-right/ --br The simple answer is AND I truly fear the worst.

China won’t change its stance on UNCLOS, but has every incentive to cooperate
Rosen, 6-21 —Mark, Prof @ George Washington University School of Law, “After the South China Sea Arbitration; Where do we go after the panel has spoken?” The Diplomat, [] --br What Next? James Kraska and AND else use its findings as //the basis for a deal.//

Now is a unique moment – China is likely to use force post the Hague ruling in fishing disputes
Johnson 2016 - senior reporter covering energy for Foreign Policy

Keith, "Can Indonesia Afford a Fish War with China?," Jul 8, foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/08/can-indonesia-afford-a-fish-war-with-china/ In recent years, Indonesia AND “ that affects China’s strategic calculation.”

This //Maritime Militia// will spark a war that escalates
Chao 2016 - international relations doctoral student (Mellon Ethnopolitics Fellow) in Political Science @ UPenn

Brian C, "Coast Guards Could Accidentally Spark War in the South China S," Jun 28, nationalinterest.org/feature/coast-guards-could-accidentally-spark-war-the-south-china-16766?page=show Chinese activities in the China Sea s AND battleship grey or coast-guard white.

Only having open channels of communication can prevent this version of the Thucydides Trap from going nuclear
Lam Peng Er 2016 - Senior Research Fellow, East Asian Institute

"China, the United States, AND the United States and China.

SQ containment strategies inevitably fail – high level dialogue needed
Ilamn 2016 - Currently works in Pacivis (Global Civil Society Research Center) of U of Indonesia

Zidy, "Is the South China Sea the Stage for the Next World War?," Jul 3, nationalinterest.org/feature/the-south-china-sea-the-stage-the-next-world-war-16833?page=show What is happening todayA ND she surely has much to do.

S&ED creates the channels necessary to ensure cooperation in moments tension
Garrison 2016 – Director of International Studies @ University of Wyoming

Jean and Marc Wall, "The Rise of Hedging and Regionalism: An Explanation and Evaluation of President Obama's China Policy," Asian Affairs: An American Review Volume 43, Issue 2, 2016, p 47-63 With each flare-up in tensions, AND manage ongoing tensions.

SQ doesn’t solve – an extension of S&ED that includes higher level officials ensures that mistrust stays in check
Dai 2016 - Former State Councilor of China

Bingguo, "On Building a New Model of Major-Country Relations Between China and the United States," Jun 20, [|www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/bmdyzs_664814/xwlb_664816/t1350752.shtml] For the past decades, AND but it leads to a bright future.

By developing already existing mechanisms, the plan solves any alt causes
Yung 2016 - Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the U.S. Marine Corps University

Christopher and Wang Dang, "THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA CAN GET ALONG IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA," Jul 6, warontherocks.com/2016/07/the-united-states-and-china-can-get-along-in-the-south-china-sea/ China and the United States AND stability remains paramount.

Warming is anthropogenic and causes extinction
Adams 16 --- has a degree in agriculture and cites studies done by NASA and the IPCC

(Andrew, Prince George Citizen, 4/16/16, “There is no debating scientific facts,” http://www.princegeorgecitizen.com/opinion/columnists/there-is-no-debating-scientific-facts-1.2229437)//ernst Last week I wrote about the signs AND. The Earth is not flat.

Initiatives by the US and China are necessary to solve, but dialogue through the plan is necessary
Shi et al 2014 - Key Lab of Urban Environment and Health, Institute of Urban Environment, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Longyu Shi, Weichen Ma, Guofan Shao, Lina Tang, Yangyang Wang & Haowei Wang, "The US and China need to turn ongoing bilateral dialogue into immediate joint mitigation," International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology Volume 22, Issue 1, 2015, p 25-29 Climate change mitigation AND can happen without action.

Empirically, S&ED drives critical climate initiatives
Reynolds 2016 - writer and foreign policy analyst based in New York

Ben, "Climate Change Outcomes of the 2016 Strategic and Economic Dialogue," Jun 30, www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/climate-change-outcomes-of-the-2016-strategic-and-economic-dialogue/ At this year’s S&ED, AND the struggle for hegemony.

US-China climate cooperation facilitates __mitigation and adaptation__ strategies globally – solves extinction
Li 14 – MA in Global Studies @ U Denver, Int’l Affairs Coordinator @ UN (Xiaoyu, “China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future,” China Institute of International Studies, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-01/13/content_6606656.htm) • Cooperation on climate AND clean energy //technologies//.

Expert consensus that warming is real and existential – ignites a cascade that exceeds cost-benefit analysis
Treich and Rheinberger, 15 —Christoph Rheinberger (Professor of Health Policy and Management @ Harvard) and Nicolas Treich (Professor at the Toulouse School of Economics). Citing Weitzman (economist @ Harvard) and Bostrom (prof @ Oxford). “On the economics of the end of the world as we know it,” The Economist, [] -- br CLIMATE change //puts AND// climate negotiations suffer from.

The eighth and final round of Strategic and Economic Dialogue concluded in June, opening channels for communication and cooperation on a litany of issues
Shen 2016 - professor and Vice Dean at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University

Dingli, "Strategic Dialogue Advances Partnership, with a Limit," Jun 14, www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/strategic-dialogue-advances-partnership-with-a-limit/ China and the US have AND people-based cooperation.

Scheduling the next round now signals commitment and allows for changes making for more effective discussions
Reade 2016 - Senior Associate with the Freeman chair in China Studies @ CSIS

Claire, "The U.S.-China S&ED: Time to Tinker, Not to Toss," Jun 27, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-china-sed-time-tinker-not-toss The last U.S.-China Strategic AND effectiveness of the effort.

Upgrading the SED to include presidential dialogue sets a clear agenda and builds crisis management mechanisms
Rudd 2015 - Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs & Former Prime Minister, Australia

Kevin, "US-China 21: The Future of US-China Relations Under Xi Jinping," belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf Beyond the two countries’ embassies, AND stakes today are even higher.

= =



2ac nuclear coop solves china tech
====Current U.S.-China nuclear cooperation is piecemeal --- establishing coop on a __broad and strategic basis__ is crucial to establishing meaningful joint projects that can influence Chinese safety standards====
 * Cooke 13** [Merritt, “Sustaining U.S.-China Cooperation in Clean Energy,” published by Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 17, 2013, []]

Following the Three Mile Island incident in 1979, the general U.S. experience for the nuclear industry has been the cancellation of new orders, the postponement or abandonment of new construction, premature shutdown of plants before expiration of their 40–year operating license, or extension without plans for replacement. __Although improved design and technology advances have brought about significantly improved safety performance, public opposition to nuclear powe__r—__periodically galvanized by highly publicized international incidents__ such as Chernobyl and Fukushima, and persistently bedeviled by the nuclear waste disposal problem—__has kept the U.S. market virtually off-limits to new nuclear installations over the past three decades.__ China, by contrast, is the world’s most active site for new plant installations. National planning calls for nuclear power to provide 6 percent of China’s total electrical generation by 2020. __This will require a net increase in installed capacity__ of 60-70 GW, __roughly comparable to the entire__ 63 GW of __currently installed nuclear capacity__ in France, one of the world’s most active users. By 2030, China plans to match the nuclear output currently provided by all 104 installations in the United States. While the U.S. experience has been determined largely by public concerns over safety and waste disposal issues, __Chinese market acceptance has been driven more strategically by a governmental elite, many of whom were trained as engineers__. __Part of their strategic thinking appears to be motivated by the challenges of climate change and of transforming China’s industrial structure for electricity generation and moving it decisively toward lower-carbon sources.__ As the vice president of the China Nuclear Energy Association has pointed out, __nuclear power__—rather than solar, wind, or biomass—__is “the only energy source that can be used on a mass scale__” to achieve clean, low-carbon energy. Beyond this, however, __plans for the rapid expansion of nuclear power in China also appear designed to upgrade the capabilities of the Chinese nuclear industry by enticing foreign suppliers who want to participate in the market growth__ in China to share their advanced technology with Chinese partners. __Not only is the profit potential vast in China, but other big emerging economies, such as India and Brazil, will be coming on-stream for nuclear installations in the decades ahead as well__. To position itself to wrest some of that business away from the established incumbents, such as France’s Areva and Japan’s Westinghouse, //China has some strong advantages at its disposal//—//low-cost labor and deep experience with major infrastructure projects//. This means a Western-designed reactor can be built in China for //40 percent less// cost and //36 percent faster// __than that same installation in Europe__. For China to realize this ambition, its two major nuclear power companies—China National Nuclear Corporation and China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group—will need to break into the more knowledge-intensive parts of the business where they currently have only limited experience. __Of the 13 nuclear power plants currently operating in China, only three__—all at the original Qinshan site—__rely on an indigenously developed design. Likewise, China has only limited experience in selling its reactors in export__ markets, with Pakistan being the only known foreign buyer to date. Finally, to upgrade its industry to the point that it can compete in global markets with the established players, __China will need to develop the ability to manufacture specialized components, for which it is currently dependent on foreign suppliers. These include reactor vessels, steam generators, and large-forge nozzle__s. As for __U.S.-China strategic cooperation in the nuclear field__, __there have been important undertakings accomplished on a //piecemeal basis// but, to date, nothing attempted on a //broad and strategic basis// by the two governments__. There are interesting opportunities on the horizon, though. Former U.S. Ambassador to China, Jon M. Huntsman Jr., has reported discussing with Bill Gates a new kind of reactor “that runs for decades on a single fuel load, making and destroying plutonium as it runs” and thereby reducing the hazards of reprocessing and the dangers of proliferation. According to Ambassador Huntsman, //strategic cooperation// __between the two countries to develop this American-pioneered technology could bring //shared benefits//__. __The technology could__, for example, __be //certified// and //brought to commercial scale// in China in a //fraction of the time// required under the current U.S. regulatory climate__. __A partnership effort of this sort could be envisioned with a joint American-Chinese company to lead the construction, co-development and commercialization rights apportioned between the two partners, and with the end-result a cleaner and (marginally) safer form of energy being brought quickly and at scale to consumers__.

US-China nuclear cooperation exists now --- and it will for decades

 * Nakano 13** [Jane Nakano, senior fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S.-China Cooperation in Natural Gas and Nuclear Energy: Diverging Energy Profiles and Emerging Opportunities,” The Northeast Asian Economic Review Vol. 1, No. 2, December 2013]

2.3. Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation __The US and Chinese governments have enjoyed a wide scope of cooperation in the nuclear energy field,__ covering nuclear energy technology, safeguards and security, spent fuel management, emergency management, radiological security as well regulatory affairs. For example, under the auspices of the U.S.-China Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement, signed in 1998, the two countries cooperate on technology matters for the current fleet of operational reactors and the research and development of advanced civilian nuclear technologies, such as fast reactor technologies. Also, since 1981, __U.S. and Chinese nuclear regulators have been engaged in the exchange of information and specialists__, as well as collaborative research and joint seminars on matters including assessment and inspection of construction, operation and decommissioning, emergency preparedness and radiation protection (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2008). Bilateral cooperation is deepening and expanding especially since the Chinese purchase of Westinghouse designed AP-1000 reactors in 2007. For example, personnel training have always been a key part of the bilateral cooperation and the NRC has been hosting Chinese regulators, but following the AP-1000 sale, the NRC has also sent several resident inspectors to China to gain lessons learned from ongoing AP-1000 construction projects in China (Nuclear Energy Agency 2012). __The purchase in 2007 of Westinghouse developed AP-1000 reactors was a significant development for China. The decision to deploy reactors that had not yet been certified by the US regulators presented both a risk and opportunity to the Chinese. Yet, in the end, the Chinese determined that the value of the AP-1000 reactors to its ongoing efforts to develop advanced reactors outweighed the risks associated with serving as a test bed for this new reactor design.__ Construction of the advanced pressurized water reactor (PWR) thus started in 2009, and the Sanmen Unit 1 in China’s Zhejiang Province is slated to be the world’s first AP1000 reactor to commence operation in 2014. This development brought the nuclear industry of the two countries closer than ever before. For example, Westinghouse has been partnering with State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) and Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research & Design Institute to jointly develop a AP-1000-based reactor, which China hopes to begin exporting later in this decade (World Nuclear News 2012). Moreover, Westinghouse and SNPTC now have plans to develop SMRs that are based on Westinghouse’s SMR technology with the aspiration to market them globally. __The United States has the wealth of regulatory and operational expertise as well as the design capability, yet the US nuclear industry has lost the robustness it once had in manufacturing and deploying nuclear reactors. In contrast, China has a growing nuclear energy sector with a strong potential for exporting its domestically developed reactors yet is short of regulatory and operational expertise__. Notwithstanding the competition that will likely arise as China’s nuclear industry matures, the nuclear industries of the two countries are currently in a highly complementary situation, __yielding cooperation in both public and private sectors. //This cooperation will likely continue for some decades//__.

Lack of American reactor construction has already decimated American leadership --- Chinese nuclear innovation destroys American competitiveness

 * Cullinane 11** [Scott, graduate student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., “America Falling Behind: The Strategic Dimensions of Chinese Commercial Nuclear Energy,” September 28, 2011, []]

__America’s slow pace of reactor construction over the past three decades has stymied innovation and caused the nuclear sector and its industrial base to shrivel__. While some aspects of America’s nuclear infrastructure still __operate effectively, many critical areas have atrophied__. For example, one __capability that America has entirely lost is the means to cast ultra heavy forgings__ in the range of 350,000 – 600,000 pounds, __which impacts the construction of containment vessels, turbine rotors, and steam generators. In contrast, Japan, China, and Russia all possess an ultra heavy forging capacity and South Korea and India plan to build forges in this range__. Likewise, the dominance America enjoyed in uranium enrichment until the 1970s is gone. The current standard centrifuge method for uranium enrichment was not invented in America and today 40% of the enriched uranium US power plants use is processed overseas and imported. Another measure of how much the US nuclear industry has shrunk is evident in the number of companies certified to handle nuclear material. In the 1980s the United States had 400 nuclear suppliers and 900 holders of N-stamp certificates (N-stamps are the international nuclear rating certificates issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers). By 2008 that number had reduced itself to 80 suppliers and 200 N-stamp holders. A recent Government Accountability Office report, which examined data from between 1994 and 2009, found the US to have a declining share of the global commercial nuclear trade. However, during that same period over 60 reactors were built worldwide. __Nuclear power plants are being built in the world increasingly by non-American companies.__ The American nuclear industry entered the 1960s in a strong position, yet over the past 30 years other countries have closed the development gap with America. The implications of this change go beyond economics or prestige to include national security __. These changes would be less threatening if friendly allies were the ones moving forward with developing a nuclear export industry__ ;however, __the quick advancement of the PRC in nuclear energy changes the strategic calculus for America__. The shifting strategic landscape While America’s nuclear industry has languished, current changes in the world’s strategic layout no longer allow America the option of maintaining the status quo without being surpassed. The drive for research, development, and scientific progress that grew out of the Cold War propelled America forward, but those priorities have long since been downgraded by the US government. The economic development of formerly impoverished countries means that the US cannot assume continued dominance by default. __The rapidly industrializing PRC is seeking its own place among the major powers of the world and is vying for hegemony in Asia; nuclear power is an example of their larger efforts to marshal their scientific and economic forces as instruments of national power.__ The rise of China is a phrase that connotes images of a backwards country getting rich off of exporting cheap goods at great social and environmental costs. Yet, this understanding of the PRC has lead many in the United States to underestimate China’s capabilities. The Communist Party of China (CPC) has undertaken a comprehensive long-term strategy to transition from a weak state that lags behind the West to a country that is a peer-competitor to the United States. Nuclear technology provides a clear example of this. In 1978, General Secretary Deng Xiaoping began to move China out of the destructive Mao era with his policies of 'reform and opening.' As part of these changes during the 1980s, the CPC began a concerted and ongoing effort to modernize the PRC and acquire advanced technology including nuclear technology from abroad. This effort was named Program 863 and included both legal methods and espionage. By doing this, the PRC has managed to rapidly catch up to the West on some fronts. In order to eventually surpass the West in scientific development the PRC launched the follow-on Program 973 to build the foundations of basic scientific research within China to meet the nation’s major strategic needs. These steps have brought China to the cusp of the next stage of technological development, a stage known as “indigenous innovation.” In 2006 the PRC published their science and technology plan out to 2020 and defined indigenous innovation as enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and absorption of imported technology in order improve national innovation capability. __The Chinese seek to internalize and understand technological developments from around the world so that they can copy the equipment and use it as a point to build off in their own research__. This is a step beyond merely copying and reverse engineering a piece of technology. __The PRC sees this process of absorbing foreign technology coupled with indigenous innovation as a way of leapfrogging forward in development to gain the upper hand over the West__. The PRC’s official statement on energy policy lists nuclear power as one of their target fields. When viewed within this context, the full range of implications from China’s development of nuclear technology becomes evident. __The PRC is now competing with the United States in the areas of innovation and high-technology__, two fields that have driven American power since World War Two. __China’s economic appeal is no longer merely the fact that it has cheap labor, but is expanding its economic power in a purposeful way that directly challenges America’s position in the world__. The CPC uses the market to their advantage to attract nuclear technology and intellectual capital to China. __The PRC has incentivized the process and encouraged new domestic nuclear power plant construction with the goal of having 20 nuclear power plants operational by 2020__. The Chinese Ministry of Electrical Power has described PRC policy to reach this goal as encouraging joint investment between State Owned Corporations and foreign companies. 13 reactors are already operating in China, 25 more are under construction and even more reactors are in the planning stages. In line with this economic policy, China has bought nuclear reactors from Westinghouse and Areva and is cooperating with a Russian company to build nuclear power plants in Taiwan. By stipulating that Chinese companies and personnel be involved in the construction process, China is building up its own domestic capabilities and expects to become self-sufficient. China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation has partnered with Westinghouse to build a new and larger reactor based on the existing Westinghouse AP 1000 reactor. This will give the PRC a reactor design of its own to then export __. If the CPC is able to combine their control over raw materials, growing technical know-how, and manufacturing base, China will not only be a powerful economy, but be able to leverage this power to service its foreign policy goals as well.__ Even though the PRC is still working to master third generation technology, their scientists are already working on what they think will be the nuclear reactor of the future. China is developing Fourth Generation Fast Neutron Reactors and wants to have one operational by 2030. Additionally, __a Chinese nuclear development company has announced its intentions to build the “world’s first high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor” in Shandong province which offers to possibility of a reactor that is nearly meltdown proof. A design, which if proved successful, could potentially redefine the commercial nuclear energy trade__.

China will use enrichment and reprocessing tech --- risk global prolif

 * Cullinane 11** [Scott, graduate student at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C., “America Falling Behind: The Strategic Dimensions of Chinese Commercial Nuclear Energy,” September 28, 2011, []]

The PRC’s record of exporting risky items is well documented. It is known that during the 1980s the Chinese shared nuclear weapon designs with Pakistan and continues to proliferate WMD-related material. According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to Congress, China sells technologies and components in the Middle East and South Asia that are dual use and could support WMD and missile programs. Jane’s Intelligence Review reported in 2006 that China, Despite a 1997 promise to Washington to halt its nuclear technology sales to Iran, such assistance is likely to continue. In 2005, Iranian resistance groups accused China of selling Iran beryllium, which is useful for making nuclear triggers and maraging steel (twice as hard as stainless steel), which is critical for fabricating centrifuges needed to reprocess uranium into bomb-grade material. __China sells dangerous materials in order to secure its geopolitical objectives, regardless if those actions harm world stability. There is little reason to believe China will treat the sale of nuclear reactors any differently.__ __Even if the PRC provides public assurances that it will behave differently in the future, the CPC has not been truthful for decades about its nuclear material and weapons__ sales and hence lacks credibility. For example, in 1983 Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng said that China does not encourage or support nuclear proliferation. In fact, it was that same year that China contracted with Algeria, then a non-NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] state, to construct a large, unsafeguarded plutonium production reactor. In 1991 a Chinese Embassy official wrote in a letter to the The Washington Post that 'China has struck no nuclear deal with Iran.' In reality, China had provided Iran with a research reactor capable of producing plutonium and a calutron, a technology that can be used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade. It has been reported that even after United Nation sanctions were put on Iran, Chinese companies were discovered selling “high-quality carbon fiber” and “pressure gauges” to Iran for use in improving their centrifuges. In 2004 the PRC joined the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG), gaining international recognition of their growing power in the nuclear field. In spite of this opportunity for China to demonstrate its responsibility with nuclear energy, it has not fulfilled it NSG obligations. The PRC has kept the terms of its nuclear reactor sale to Pakistan secret and used a questionable legal technicality to justify forgoing obtaining a NSG waiver for the deal. Additionally, China chose to forgo incorporating new safety measures into the reactors in order to avoid possible complications. __A further consequence of China exporting reactors is that these countries may wish to control the fuel cycle which provides the uranium to power their new reactors. The spread of fuel cycle technology comes with two risks: //enrichment and reprocessing//__. Uranium can be enriched to between 3% and 5% for reactor use, but the process can be modified to produce 90% enriched uranium which is weapons-grade. Even if a country only produces low enriched uranium they could easily begin enriching at a higher level if they so choose. __Every new country that nuclear technology or information is spread to exponentially increases the risk of material being stolen, given to a third party or being used as the launching point for a weapons program. China’s history of proliferation and willingness to engage economically with very unsavory governments seems likely to increase the risks involving nuclear material__.

China nuclear exports coming now --- it’ll cause a global expansion of nuclear power --- lack of transparency and safety standards risks the __next Chernobyl__
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/06/22/will-china-export-the-next-chernobyl/#1a5b35accf56]
 * Chang 14** [Gordon G. Chang, two-term trustee at trustee of Cornell University, lived and worked in Shanghai and Hong Kong for almost two decades and now write primarily on China, Asia, and nuclear proliferation, writings have appeared in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, Commentary, and The Weekly Standard, among other publications, have given briefings in Washington and other capitals and have appeared on CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, Fox Business, Bloomberg, CNBC, and PBS, “Will China Export The Next Chernobyl?,” Forbes, June 22, 2014,

Not only are Chinese companies constructing reactor projects in China, they are beginning to export them. The first customer is neighbor Pakistan, which is buying an advanced Chinese model that will be the first of its kind. Pakistanis are worried that the untested reactors, based on a Westinghouse design and built largely with indigenized parts, will imperil Karachi’s 20 million inhabitants. And //China has ambitions that go far beyond Pakistan//, its decades-old friend. Chinese state enterprises will take up to a 40% interest in Hinkley Point C, a station with two EPR reactors to be built in the southwest of England, near Bristol. And last week Britain signed an agreement with China to allow that country’s companies to build, own, and operate Chinese-designed nuclear power plants in Britain. __Three Chinese state enterprises are also thinking of projects in Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, and Argentina__. Many think Chinese enterprises will eventually succeed. “ __China has //all the necessary ingredients// for success in //global nuclear power expansion//__ ,” says Kim Young-joon of law firm Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. “ __It has relatively strong operational safety records, strong government, and deep capital resources__ .” __China certainly has the money__, __but its safety record is unknown__ , at least to outsiders. Beijing officials have reported few problems in the 22 years China has been generating electricity from the atom, but it is not entirely clear they have told us everything. “The workings of China’s atomic safety authority are a total black box,” says Albert Lai of The Professional Commons, a think tank in Hong Kong. “ //China has no transparency whatsoever// .” Moreover, __China’s three nuclear enterprises would be stretched thin by an export push. They cannot provide the full “ecosystem” of post-completion support and do not have enough personnel even for the construction phase__. __It is__, therefore, __unlikely they can muster the resources for their full-court press overseas__. Even at home, there are big question marks. Li Yulun, a former vice president of China National Nuclear Corp., has expressed concern that Chinese companies working on reactor projects do not share Beijing’s emphasis on safety. Furthermore, the State Council Research Office has raised doubts about the accelerated pace of reactor construction in China. __China__, we have to remember, __is the country where everything gets built ahead of schedule, but “tofu” buildings fall down, new bridges collapse, and just-laid train tracks warp.__ So why are Chinese regulators not answering their phones when the French call to talk about Taishan? Maybe they’re overworked, as Jamet, the French nuclear safety commissioner, suggests. And maybe there are intractable problems at the plant that officials don’t want to talk about. From what little we know, Taishan has already had its share of difficulties. For instance, a French safety inspector during a visit last year saw steam generators and pumps not maintained “at an adequate level.” Or maybe Beijing’s regulators are merely displaying the arrogance that seems to typify Chinese officials recently. We can only speculate as to the reason Beijing does not want to talk about Taishan. __Yet we can be sure something is wrong, so we have to be concerned that there could be another Chernobyl in our future, either in China or at a Chinese plant soon to be built elsewhere__.

U.S. influence over global nuclear exports is crucial --- builds sustainable partnerships that solves nuclear security

 * Sukin 16** [Lauren Sukin is a Ph.D. student in political science at Stanford University, her work has appeared in Foreign Affairs, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, The Nonproliferation Review, and elsewhere, “How America Can Dominate Global Nuclear Energy,” National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-can-dominate-global-nuclear-energy-16274?page=2]

__The market for nuclear-energy technology is large, though the available providers are scarce__. Today there are 438 operational __nuclear reactors__ __and five hundred additional proposed plants across the globe__. Nevertheless, current __upper-end estimates for global production capacity for whole nuclear reactor units are still low__ : approximately six to eight units per year, though each plant usually has two or more reactors. Since global demand is notably higher than that capacity, __the U__ nited __S__ tates __could be the one to step in and offer faster construction times for countries that don’t want to wait for Russia or South Korea to finish dozens of other projects before beginning theirs__. This all goes to show that, even if the United States’ competitors are able to resolve their internal problems, __there’s still enough unclaimed space in the nuclear-energy market for the U__ nited __S__ tates __to expand its current export capacity__. (And if other exporters continue to face troubles, the United States could reach even further into the widening global nuclear market.) Moreover, __interest has picked up the most in areas where U.S. alliances remain strong: namely, Asia__. __The Far East has twenty-nine nuclear power plants currently under construction, more than twice as many as the next closest region__, central and eastern Europe, has under construction. The region coming in third, the Middle East and South Asia, also holds significant potential for U.S. export expansion. While the United States’ relationships in the Middle East are rockier than those in South and East Asia, the possibility of strengthened cooperation in the Middle Eastern nuclear realm could be the key to strengthening security and defense partnerships in the region—if the United States can take advantage of burgeoning interest. Yet the road to become a nuclear exporting powerhouse once again won’t be an easy one—so what’s in it for the United States? To start with, jobs. A rebuilt U.S. nuclear industry would provide jobs for high-skilled labor and be a significant economic investment. Estimates from the U.S. Department of Commerce suggest that the size of the international market for nuclear technology and services lies between $500 and $740 billion over the next decade, with five thousand to ten thousand jobs resulting from every $1 billion in U.S. nuclear exports. While financing for nuclear power plants varies from site to site, the burden is generally on the importer to provide public or find private backing for the plant’s costs. In some cases, the exporter will cover capital costs in exchange for control over the plant, allowing the exporter to recoup its investments after the plant begins generating and selling electricity. Because capital costs are the most significant chunk of a plant’s financing, the shape of the overall energy market has implications for the economic viability of nuclear power; for example, carbon taxes or carbon emissions trading can incentive investment in nuclear power, while high interest rates hurt the nuclear market. Fortunately, a global pattern of low interest rates and the increasingly possibility of stronger U.S. actions on climate changes might make for a bullish nuclear energy market in the upcoming years, one that the United States could capitalize on if it strengthened its industry. __The benefits of nuclear exporters aren’t just domestic__, either. __Nuclear power plants’ vast benefits for their host countries—comparatively low environmental impact, economically efficient energy production, suitability for powering desalination plants—make nuclear power a worthy industry for additional attention.__ __Nuclear-power exports would also provide the U__ nited __S__ tates __with a leg up when it comes to proliferation concerns__. First, __U.S. nuclear-energy partners must negotiate 123 agreements, which help monitor nuclear activities and limit countries’ abilities to develop offensive nuclear capabilities__. Second, the U.S. nuclear industry has high safety standards all along the nuclear supply chain, standards that other exporters do not necessarily meet. __By designing and exporting safer nuclear plants, the United States could reduce the global risk of nuclear accidents.__ Third, U.S. //nuclear exports// __would allow the United States to utilize //scientific diplomacy// to build //significant// and //sustainable partnerships// throughout the world; these //relationships// could translate not only to //cooperation// on additional nonproliferation issues, but on //other areas of security and scientific policy as well//__. __These relationships would also be //essential for nuclear security//__, in that __the United States could serve a helpful advisory role in importing states’ efforts to build the educational, regulatory and infrastructural institutions needed to sustain a safe nuclear industry__. Finally, U __.S. exporting capabilities would also provide intimate knowledge of international partners’ nuclear-energy industries, giving the United States a potential //guidance role// in the case of nuclear accidents as well as intelligence that could be useful for //nonproliferation// activities__.