Skylar+Diamandis+and+James+Steiner

Affirmative
1. The United States Federal Government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China over a staged Framework Agreement, beginning with an offer of reciprocal reductions in military commitments over Taiwan.

2. 1ac – Taiwan v1

The risk of a US-China war over Taiwan is high. Blocking independence is China’s core national interest and outweighs economic ties
Kuntić, 15 – visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, "The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan-the United States relationship" CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280) As Taiwan is important to both China and the United States, conflict of interests AND bonds of commerce, trade, and military ties between the two powers.

The DPP’s election means Taiwan is moving towards de jure independence with US backing
Yin, 6/8/16 - Yin Chengde is a research fellow of China Foundation for International Studies ("Time for US to Change Its Taiwan Policy" http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/time-for-us-to-change-its-taiwan-policy/ The pro-independence DPP has returned to power in Taiwan. Despite repeated warnings AND of the Taiwan Strait and for the benefit of the US itself too.

This enraged China and ended relations
Tiezzi, 6/26/16 - Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation ("Did China Just Kill Cross-Strait Relations?" The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/did-china-just-kill-cross-strait-relations/ Well before Taiwan held its elections on January 20, Beijing made it clear that AND more damage done to cross-strait relations than either side can fix.

Nationalist pressure and nuclear insecurity make the risk of war high and nuclear escalation probable
Glaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC'a'00199 Although a number of regional sovereignty and maritime disputes have the potential to sour the AND Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses."67

Strategic ambiguity risks miscalculation
Colby and Slocombe, 16 - Mr. Colby is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Mr. Slocombe was U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001 (Elbridge and Walter, "U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous" Wall Street Journal, 5/23, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan-is-dangerous-1464022837 If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense AND not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals.

It’s the most probable cause of nuclear war – strategic mistrust makes escalation likely
Lowther, 13 – citing a CSIS report (William, Tapei Times, 3/16, "Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report," http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211) Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China AND arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating."

It risks extinction
Wittner, 12 - Professor of History emeritus, SUNY Albany (Lawrence, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?" Huffington Post, 1/30, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china'b'1116556.html But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear AND — destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Contention 2 – relations
====The US and China are locked an action-reaction cycle of hostility. Negotiating a staged Framework Agreement will de-escalate tensions and create a sustainable path towards relations and cooperation on global existential threats==== Gross, 13 - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, p. 152-155 To overcome the structural weaknesses in U.S.-China relations—which could AND conflict U.S. and Chinese military operations and avoid accidental confrontations.

Taiwan is the most important starting point to address strategic distrust – plan is the vital internal link to broader, sustainable cooperation
Glaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC'a'00199 More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current crossstrait relations AND of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.

Strategic distrust blocks Chinese support for Korean unification and undermines South Korean leadership
Gross, 13 - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, p. 218-219) China’s support for North Korea at the United Nations as well as its opposition to AND that nonetheless occurs and has an adverse impact on South Korea’s international prospects.

China’s leverage is necessary to force out North Korean leadership and ensure a peaceful transition

 * Kydd 2015** – Prof of Political Science at UW Madison

Andrew H, "Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?", The Washington Quarterly Volume 38, Issue 2, 2015, p 63-77 Finally, what about North Korea itself? Pyongyang's leadership would definitely be opposed to AND , the United States and China must first address their legacy of mistrust.

It is the only way to provide stability in North East Asia, prevent nuclear conflict, and lift 25 million people from poverty

 * Terry 2014** - former analyst at the CIA and a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute

Sue Mi, "A Korea Whole and Free," July/Aug 2014 Foreign Affairs The real fear of South Koreans, however, is not that Seoul won’t be AND the Soviet Union and the United States divided it at the 38th parallel.

A nuclear war on the peninsula would kill millions, involve massive amounts of fallout, and risk escalation

 * Mount 2015** - Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relation

Adam, The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Restraint, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 57, Issue 4, 2015, p. 53-76 As things stand today, the most plausible scenario for US nuclear use is in AND neighbouring countries. An invasion of North Korea would be all but impossible.

A staged Framework Agreement will create US-Sino cooperation for peaceful Korean unification and prevent the impact to collapse
Gross, 13 - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, p. 222-223) Because the underlying security competition between the United States and China is a major cause AND legitimate, interim political structure leading to the formation of a new government.

1ac – solvency
====Plan begins negotiations over a Framework Agreement with staged, reciprocal reductions of forces over Taiwan. China will say yes and it will build a foundation for larger cooperation that reduces the overall risk of nuclear war in Asia==== Gross, 13 - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, p. 159-165) Taiwan currently faces an overwhelming military threat from China, which uses its forces to AND be more than sufficient to deter and dissuade China from seeking regional dominance.

China says yes to greater diplomatic engagement; it’s verifiable and won’t destabilize relations with Taiwan or Asia
Swaine, 11 – senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, p. 359-363 Under such circumstances, avoiding future escalating Sino-American crises over People’s Liberation Army AND also not inconceivable that Beijing would permit or provide convincing levels of verification.

Say no arguments overlook the staged implementation of the negotiations – small acts of reciprocation in negotiations will lead to larger cooperation over Taiwan
Swaine, 15- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace( Micheal, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JS These obstacles clearly indicate that Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake, much AND , including any resort to nuclear weapons, would almost certainly be avoided.

Even if China says no, the plan boosts US resolve and reinforces regional alliances
Glaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC'a'00199 The preceding assessment lays bare the complexity of a U.S. policy of AND East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security.

Negotiated reciprocal concessions are vital to rapprochement and de-securitizing the conflict
Kupchan, 12 – Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University (Charles, How Enemies Become Friends, p. 41-45 During the second phase of the onset of stable peace, the trading of individual AND second phase, each state becomes confident that the other has benign motivations.

1ac Taiwan v2

The risk of a US-China war over Taiwan is high. Blocking independence is China’s core national interest and outweighs economic ties
Kuntić, 15 – visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, "The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan-the United States relationship" CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280) As Taiwan is important to both China and the United States, conflict of interests AND bonds of commerce, trade, and military ties between the two powers.

The DPP’s election means Taiwan is moving towards de jure independence with US backing
Yin, 6/8/16 - Yin Chengde is a research fellow of China Foundation for International Studies ("Time for US to Change Its Taiwan Policy" http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/time-for-us-to-change-its-taiwan-policy/ The pro-independence DPP has returned to power in Taiwan. Despite repeated warnings AND of the Taiwan Strait and for the benefit of the US itself too.

This enraged China and ended relations
Tiezzi, 6/26/16 - Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation ("Did China Just Kill Cross-Strait Relations?" The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/did-china-just-kill-cross-strait-relations/ Well before Taiwan held its elections on January 20, Beijing made it clear that AND more damage done to cross-strait relations than either side can fix.

Nationalist pressure and nuclear insecurity make the risk of war high and nuclear escalation probable
Glaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC'a'00199 Although a number of regional sovereignty and maritime disputes have the potential to sour the AND Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses."67

Strategic ambiguity risks miscalculation
Colby and Slocombe, 16 - Mr. Colby is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Mr. Slocombe was U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001 (Elbridge and Walter, "U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous" Wall Street Journal, 5/23, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-ambiguity-on-taiwan-is-dangerous-1464022837 If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense AND not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals.

It’s the most probable cause of nuclear war – strategic mistrust makes escalation likely
Lowther, 13 – citing a CSIS report (William, Tapei Times, 3/16, "Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report," http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211) Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China AND arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating."

It risks extinction
Wittner, 12 - Professor of History emeritus, SUNY Albany (Lawrence, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?" Huffington Post, 1/30, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china'b'1116556.html But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear AND — destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Contention 2 – relations
====The US and China are locked an action-reaction cycle of hostility. Negotiating a staged Framework Agreement will de-escalate tensions and create a sustainable path towards relations and cooperation on global existential threats==== Gross, 13 - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, p. 152-155 To overcome the structural weaknesses in U.S.-China relations—which could AND conflict U.S. and Chinese military operations and avoid accidental confrontations.

Taiwan is the most important starting point to address strategic distrust – plan is the vital internal link to broader, sustainable cooperation
Glaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC'a'00199 More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current crossstrait relations AND of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.

Strategic distrust blocks Chinese support for Korean unification and undermines South Korean leadership
Gross, 13 - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, p. 218-219) China’s support for North Korea at the United Nations as well as its opposition to AND that nonetheless occurs and has an adverse impact on South Korea’s international prospects.

China’s leverage is necessary to force out North Korean leadership and ensure a peaceful transition

 * Kydd 2015** – Prof of Political Science at UW Madison

Andrew H, "Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?", The Washington Quarterly Volume 38, Issue 2, 2015, p 63-77 Finally, what about North Korea itself? Pyongyang's leadership would definitely be opposed to AND , the United States and China must first address their legacy of mistrust.

It is the only way to provide stability in North East Asia, prevent nuclear conflict, and lift 25 million people from poverty

 * Terry 2014 **- former analyst at the CIA and a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute

Sue Mi, "A Korea Whole and Free," July/Aug 2014 Foreign Affairs The real fear of South Koreans, however, is not that Seoul won’t be AND the Soviet Union and the United States divided it at the 38th parallel.

A nuclear war on the peninsula would kill millions, involve massive amounts of fallout, and risk escalation

 * Mount 2015** - Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relation

Adam, The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Restraint, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 57, Issue 4, 2015, p. 53-76 As things stand today, the most plausible scenario for US nuclear use is in AND neighbouring countries. An invasion of North Korea would be all but impossible.

Korean instability leads to US-China escalation – loose WMDs, misclac, mistrust, uncontrolled engagement and heightened aggression
Alternatively, as apparently envisioned in public reports about the more recent 5029 plans developed AND other side in the event that crisis along the various lines described unfolds.
 * Steinberg and O’Hanlon 14** (James Steinberg is dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and professor of social science, international affairs, and law at Syracuse University, and former deputy secretary of state in the Obama administration. Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who specializes in national security policy. Both have published multiple books. Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton UP, c 2014, pg 125-128)//wm

Plan
The United States Federal Government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China over a staged Framework Agreement, beginning with an offer of reciprocal reductions in military commitments over Taiwan.

1ac – solvency
====Plan begins negotiations over a Framework Agreement with staged, reciprocal reductions of forces over Taiwan. China will say yes and it will build a foundation for larger cooperation that reduces the overall risk of nuclear war in Asia==== Gross, 13 - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, p. 159-165) Taiwan currently faces an overwhelming military threat from China, which uses its forces to AND be more than sufficient to deter and dissuade China from seeking regional dominance.

China says yes to greater diplomatic engagement; it’s verifiable and won’t destabilize relations with Taiwan or Asia
Swaine, 11 – senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, p. 359-363 Under such circumstances, avoiding future escalating Sino-American crises over People’s Liberation Army AND also not inconceivable that Beijing would permit or provide convincing levels of verification.

Say no arguments overlook the staged implementation of the negotiations – small acts of reciprocation in negotiations will lead to larger cooperation over Taiwan
Swaine, 15- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace( Micheal, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JS These obstacles clearly indicate that Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake, much AND , including any resort to nuclear weapons, would almost certainly be avoided.

Even if China says no, the plan boosts US resolve and reinforces regional alliances
Glaser, 15 - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC'a'00199 The preceding assessment lays bare the complexity of a U.S. policy of AND East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security.

Negotiated reciprocal concessions are vital to rapprochement and de-securitizing the conflict
Kupchan, 12 – Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University (Charles, How Enemies Become Friends, p. 41-45 During the second phase of the onset of stable peace, the trading of individual AND second phase, each state becomes confident that the other has benign motivations.

Negative
3. 1. Past 1ncs: elections, power projection, consult cp, japan da, appeasement da, t qpq, t categories, t uncondo, reform cp, co2 good, rising expectations, korean unification bad.

2. Past 2nrs: elections, consult cp, japan da, qpq, reform cp/co2 good, rising expectations/unification bad.