Nikhil+and%20Mustafa


 * 1AC OUTLINE:**

__**ADVANTAGES**__
 * KOREAN CONFLICTS**
 * - US-DRPK NUCLEAR WAR IMPACT**
 * - BIOTERROR IMPACT**
 * REGIONALISM/MULTILATERIALISM**
 * - TERRITORIAL DISPUTES SCENARIO**
 * - US-CHINA WAR SCENARIO**

=    = =  __ South Korea Aff __  = ** Plan:  ** ** The United States federal government should implement a phased withdrawal of its ground troops in the Republic of Korea. ** = __ ADV 1 --- The crisis  __ = ** The sinking of the South Korea’s ship makes conflict inevitable – retaliation will spark an escalatory war and failure to respond will only cause more North Korean provocations. **  ** Bandow, 10 ** – senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (4/18/10, Doug, “Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas,” [], JMP) It has been weeks since the South Korean ship Cheonan sank in the Yellow Sea near the disputed boundary between South and North Korea. As yet the cause is unknown--some government critics suspect a cover-up--but after raising the wreck South Korean officials said the explosion appeared to be external. Which implicates Pyongyang. If the cause was a mine, a North-South confrontation still could be avoided. The mine might have been left over from the Korean War. Or if of more modern vintage it could have broken loose from its moorings. If a torpedo was used, however, the threat of conflict rises. __ The __ __R __ epublic __o __ f __K __ orea __ could not __ easily __ ignore __ a __ North Korea __ n submarine stalking and __ sinking one of its vessels __. Seoul has promised "a firm response," though, argues Han Sung-joo, a former ROK foreign minister and U.S. ambassador, "that doesn't mean a military reaction or an eye-for-eye response." In fact, the South did not retaliate after earlier provocations, such as the terrorist bombing of a South Korean airliner and assassination attempt against former president Chun Doo-hwan which killed 16 ROK officials. A military reprisal then could have triggered a full-scale war. __ Responding __ in kind this time also __ could ** spark a dangerous escalatory spiral ** __ with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. However, Seoul has spent the last decade attempting to pacify the DPRK, providing aid, allowing investment, and hosting summits. __ To do nothing would __ seem to __ be __ abject __ appeasement, undermining ROK credibility and ** encouraging the North to act ** __ even ** __ more recklessly __ ** in the future. If the word "firm" has any meaning, the South Korean government would have to do more than protest. Still, the decision, though difficult, shouldn't concern the U.S. The South has gone from an authoritarian economic wreck to a democratic economic powerhouse. With a vastly bigger and more sophisticated economy, larger population, and greater access to international markets and support than the North, Seoul long has been able to defend itself. Pyongyang retains a numerical military edge, but its weapons are old, troops are undertrained, and industrial base is shrinking. Thus, the South should be able to decide on the action that best advances its security. However, Seoul long chose to emphasize economic development over military preparedness. As a result, the ROK remains dependent on America. Some 27,000 U.S. personnel are stationed in the South. The U.S. retains formal command of all forces, American and South Korean, during a war. Seoul expects substantial U.S. air and naval support and ground reinforcement in the event of war. Which means that ROK __ retaliation __ against the DPRK __ would draw the U.S. into __ any __ conflict __. So Washington cannot help but pressure South Korean decision-makers to act in accord with American as well as ROK interests. In fact, that's what happened in 1983, when the U.S. insisted that Seoul not retaliate militarily after the bombing attack on President Chun. The current situation also means that the destiny of America is essentially controlled by the North's __ Kim Jong-il. Ordering an attack on a South Korean ship could end up ** forcing Washington to go to war. ** __ Although the bilateral U.S.-South Korean defense treaty does not make American intervention automatic, __ it is unimaginable __ that an __ America __ n administration __ would stand aside __ in a conflict. This is a ludicrous position for both the U.S. and South Korea, six decades after Washington saved a far weaker ROK from a North Korean invasion in the midst of the Cold War. Neither country is well-served by Seoul's continuing defense dependency on America. Unfortunately, the policy incongruities only are likely to worsen. The ROK desires to wield increasing influence beyond its own shores. While relying on American military forces to defend its homeland, the South Korean government is crafting its navy for more distant contingencies and deploying ground personnel in the Middle East and Central Asia. Yet Seoul found that when the enemy struck at home, assuming the Cheonan was sunk by the North, the South Korean military was ill-prepared to defend its own personnel. ** Even if a conflict won’t start intentionally, current high tensions risk accidents that escalate to global nuclear war  ** ** STRATFOR, 10 ** (5/26/10, “North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula,” [], JMP) Managing Escalation But no one, of course, is interested in another war on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides will posture, but at the end of the day, neither benefits from a major outbreak of hostilities. And despite the specter of North Korean troops streaming under the DMZ through tunnels and wreaking havoc behind the lines in the south (a scenario for which there has undoubtedly been significant preparation), neither side has any intention of invading the other. So __ the __ real issue is the __ potential for escalation — or an accident __ that could precipitate escalation — that __ would be beyond __ the __ control __ of Pyongyang or Seoul. __ With both sides on high alert __, both __ adhering to their __ own national (and contradictory) definitions of where __ disputed boundaries __ lie and with rules of engagement loosened, the ** __ potential for sudden and rapid escalation is __ ** quite ** __ real __. ** Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. __ For __ nearly __ 40 years, tensions __ on the Korean Peninsula __ were managed __ within the context of the wider Cold War. During that time __ it was feared __ that __ a second __ Korean __ War could __ all too easily ** __ escalate into __ ** and a ** __thermonuclear World War III __ **, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But __ current tensions are ** quickly escalating to a level unprecedented ** __ in the post-Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further. ** The status quo is fundamentally different – nuclear use is now likely and deterrence won’t solve  ** ** Chung, 10 ** – Visiting Professor at the School of International Relations, Nanyang Technological University and former Professor of international relations at Seoul National University (6/1/10, Chung Chong Wook, “The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,” http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0352010.pdf) The sinking of the Cheonan, for which South Korea blames Pyongyang, has triggered a crisis in the Korean peninsula. Though there is every reason to be pessimistic about the future, there is also a need to look beyond the crisis for long-term regional stability. __ SHARPLY RISING __ military __ tensions following the sinking of a __ South Korean __ naval corvette are ** creating a crisis in the ** __ Korean ** __ peninsula. __ **__ It is not the first __ time that the Korean peninsula is engulfed in a crisis, __ but ** this one is different ** __. There are good reasons to view the current crisis with grave concern. One is the nature of the crisis. __ The current imbroglio __ is not an unintended consequence of an accident. Nor was it an act of terrorism. It __ was __ what could be __ a carefully planned __ and well-executed __ act of war __ where a 1,200-tonne naval ship, the Cheonan, was blown into half, killing 46 soldiers -- at least that is the conclusion in South Korea. The Nuclear Factor After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demanding the North’s apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. __ The two __ Koreas __ appear to be heading for __ a __ serious __ military __ confrontation. Another factor __ that adds to the severity of the current crisis __ is the nuclear capability of the North __ .. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. __ Its __ two __ nuclear tests __ so far __ reinforced the possibility of ** all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons ** __**. ** The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but ** __ North Korea has proven __ ** that ** __ the rational logic of deterrence may not __ ** necessarily ** __ hold __ **__. Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics __ often __ defy the strategic calculus of its neighbours __. The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable. ** Deliberate, accidental or unauthorized CBW use is likely  ** ** ICG, 09 ** (6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” [], JMP) This report examines North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities in the context of its military doctrine and national objectives. It is based on open source literature, interviews and unpublished documents made available to Crisis Group. Companion reports published simultaneously assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and what the policy response of the international community should be to its recent nuclear and missile testing.[1] North Korea’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles pose serious risks to security. __ Pyongyang __ ’s nuclear capabilities are the greatest threat, but it also __ possesses a ** large stockpile of chemical ** __ weapons __ and __ is suspected of maintaining a __ biological weapons __ program. The Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) had been underway since August 2003 with the objective of ending the North’s nuclear ambitions, before Pyongyang announced its withdrawal in April 2009, but __ there is no __ direct __ mechanism for dealing with its chemical __ weapons __ and __ possible __ biological weapons. The North __ Korean leadership __ is __ very __ unlikely to surrender its WMD __ ** __ unless there is significant change in the __ ** political and ** __ security environments __. ** The Six-Party Talks pro­duced a “Statement of Principles” in September 2005 that included a commitment to establish a permanent peace mechanism in North East Asia, but the structure and nature of such a cooperative security arrangement is subject to interpretation, negotiation and implementation. Views among the parties differ, and no permanent peace can be established unless North Korea abandons all its WMD programs. The diplomatic tasks are daunting, and diplomacy could fail. If North Korea refuses to engage in arms control and to rid itself of WMD, the international community must be prepared to deal with a wide range of threats, including those posed by Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Unclassified estimates of the chemical weapons (CW) arsenal are imprecise, but ** __ the consensus __ **__ is that the __ Korean People’s Army ( __ KPA) possesses 2,500-5,000 tons __, including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun and V-agents (persistent nerve agents). The stockpile does not appear to be increasing but is ** __ already sufficient __ **__ to inflict massive __ civilian __ casualties __ on South Korea. The North’s CW can be delivered with long-range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels. North Korean military doctrine emphasises quick offensive strikes to break through enemy defences in order to achieve national military objectives before the U.S. can intervene effectively on behalf of its South Korean ally. However, __ the North’s conventional military capabilities are declining __ against those of its potential foes, so __ the leadership is likely to rely on asymmetric capabilities __ for its national security objectives. __ This strategy __ poses a significant danger because it __ risks ** deliberate, accidental or unauthorised WMD attacks or incidents. ** __   **  Will spread globally within six weeks – greater risk that nuclear weapons  ** ** Levy, 07 ** (6-8-07, Janet Ellen, The American Thinking, “The Threat of Bioweapons,” [], JMP) Immediately following 9-11, an anthrax attack originating from letters containing anthrax spores infected 22 people, killing five. After almost six years, the case has not been solved. __ Intelligence analysts and academics report that North Korea has developed anthrax, plague __, and botulism toxin __ and conducted extensive research on smallpox, __ typhoid and cholera. A world-renowned bioweapons expert has confirmed that Syria has weapons grade smallpox resistant to all current vaccines developed under the cover of legitimate veterinary research on camelpox, a very closely related virus. The researcher further reports that Syria is suspected of testing the pathogen on prison populations and possibly in the Sudan. Although there are close to 50 organisms that could be used offensively, rogue nations have concentrated their bioweapons development efforts on smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulinum, tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers. With the exception of smallpox, which is exclusively a human host disease, all of the other pathogens lend themselves to animal testing as they are zoonotic, or can be transmitted to humans by other species. __ Biological weapons __ are among the most dangerous in the world today and __ can be engineered __ and disseminated __ to achieve a ** more deadly result than a nuclear attack ** __**. ** Whereas the explosion of a nuclear bomb would cause massive death in a specific location, __ a biological attack with smallpox could infect __ multitudes of people __ across the globe. With incubation periods of __ up to __ 17 days __, human __ disseminators could unwittingly cause widespread exposure __ before diagnosable symptoms indicate an infection and appropriate quarantine procedures are in place. Unlike any other type of weapon, __ bioweapons __ such as smallpox __ can replicate and infect a chain of people over an indeterminate amount of time from a single undetectable point of release __. According to science writer and author of The Hot Zone, Richard Preston, " __ If you took a gram of smallpox __, which is highly contagious and lethal, and __ for which there's no vaccine __ available globally now, and released it in the air and created about a hundred cases, the chances are excellent that ** __ the virus would go global in six weeks __ ** as people moved from city to city...... __ the death toll could __ easily __ hit __ the __ hundreds of millions __ .....in scale, that's like a nuclear war."[1] More so than chemical and nuclear research, __ bioweapons development __ programs __ lend themselves to ** stealth development ** __. They are difficult to detect, can be conducted alongside legimate research on countermeasures, sheltered in animal research facilities within sophisticated pharmaceutical corporations, disguised as part of routine medical university studies, or be a component of dual use technology development. Detection is primarily through available intelligence information and location-specific biosensors that test for the presence of pathogens. Biological weapons have many appealing qualities for warfare and their effects can be engineered and customized from a boutique of possibilities. Offensive pathogens are inexpensive compared to conventional weapons and small quantities can produce disproportionate damage. They have unlimited lethal potential as carriers and can continue to infect more people over time. ** __ Bioweapons are easy to dispense __ **__ through a variety of __ delivery __ systems from __ a missile, an __ aerosol or __ a __ food __ product. They can be placed into a state of dormancy to be activated at a later stage allowing for ease of storage. Pathogens are not immediately detectable or identifiable due to varying incubation periods and can be rapidly deployed, activated and impossible to trace. The technology to develop biological agents is widely available for legitimate purposes and large quantities can be developed within days. ** Impact is extinction  ** ** Ochs 02 ** – MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park [Richard, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” Jun 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html] Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered __ biological weapons __, many __ without a __ known __ cure __ or vaccine __ , are an extreme danger to the __ continued __survival of life on earth. __ Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of __ nuclear weapons __, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they __ are easier to control. Biological weapons __, on the other hand, __ can get out of control __ very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. __ There is no way to guarantee __ the __ security __ of these doomsday weapons __ because __ very __ tiny amounts can be __ stolen or accidentally __ released and then grow __ or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, __ bio-engineered agents __ by the hundreds __ with no known cure could wreck __ even __ greater calamity on the human race than __ could __ persistent radiation __. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. __ To preclude __ possibilities of human __ extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary __ and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes. ** CBW use would result in US nuclear retaliation  ** ** SCHNEIDER 1997 **(Barry, Director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Future Conflict Studies at the U.S. Air War College., Future War and Counterproliferation, 72-73) Calum As a result, today, in the minds of many, the only legitimate use of U.S. nuclear weapons would be in response to a direct nuclear attack on the United States, its forces, its allies, or its vital interests.13 A U.S. nuclear response to much less severe attacks likely would be seen as severely disproportionate to the provocation, even if __ chemical or biological __ attacks were launched. However, if enemy CBW __ attacks __ were directed against important target~ in the American homeland, or if they __ cause __ d __ horrific __ numbers of U.S. and allied __ casualties __ in the field, it might well be that U.S. __ public opinion __ then __ would sanction a U.S. nuclear retaliatory response __. In that case, __ an aroused __ American __ public might demand harsh nuclear retribution __. ** A US nuclear response destroys the nuclear taboo—this makes worldwide nuclear wars inevitable  ** ** GIZEWSKI 1996 ** (Peter, Senior Associate, Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, University of Toronto, International Journal, Summer, p. 400) Calum __ Absolute and all-encompassing, the prohibition sets __ all __ nuclear weapons apart __ as unique, __ regardless of size or power. Nuclear explosives – both large and small – are equally illegitimate __, and the latter remain so __ despite the existence of seemingly ‘legitimate’ conventional explosives of greater destructive power. __ The distinction stems in part from widely held but rarely questioned perceptions of nuclear arms as ‘different.’ Nuclear weapons are distinct simply because __ they are perceived __ to be __ distinct __. The distinction also has roots in legal reasoning and diplomacy. __ Traditions __ and conventions are crucial to the conduct of social relations. Once established, they __ render behaviour predictable __, help to __ co-ordinate actor expectations, and offer a gauge of intentions. __ If they are not held to be inviolate, these functions become more difficult. __ Transgression at any level threatens to erode __ shared understandings and __ expectations __ – increasing uncertainty and the inevitable costs and requirements of coping with it. __ One violation makes __ subsequent, perhaps more serious, __ actions of the same __ type __ easier __ to contemplate __ and __ thus __ more likely. __ Thus, __ any breach of the nuclear threshold threatens more than one isolated act of destruction: __ __ it sets a precedent signalling __ potential __ chaos, which may __ well __ include __ the prospect of __ more destruction to come. __   **  Withdrawing ground troops solves – stops North Korea from probing U.S. weakness to draw our forces into a wider conflict. **  ** Stanton, 10 ** – U.S. Army Judge Advocate in Korea from 98-02 and practicing attorney in Washington, D.C. (4/12/10, Joshua, The New Ledger, “It's Time for the U.S. Army to Leave Korea,” [], JMP) Proceeding against the advice of my cardiologist, I must concede that for once, Ron Paul is actually on to something. __ The ground component of U.S. Forces Korea __, which costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars a year to maintain, __ is a __ n equally unaffordable __ political liability __ on the South Korean street __. We should withdraw __ it. Every Saturday night off-post brawl is a headline in the muck-raking Korean press, for which the American soldier is inevitably blamed, and for which angry mobs perpetually demand renegotiations of the Status of Force Agreement to give Korea’s not-even-remotely-fair judicial system more jurisdiction over American soldiers. The South Korean people do not appreciate the security our soldiers provide. The way some of them treat our soldiers ought to be a national scandal. Many off-post businesses don’t even let Americans through their front doors. ** __ The __ ** degree of ** __ anti-Americanism __ ** in South Korea ** __ is sufficient to be a significant force protection issue in the event of hostilities. __ ** South Korea does not have our back. South Korea made much of the fact that it sent 3,000 soldiers to Iraq, where they sat behind concrete barriers in a secure Kurdish area of Iraq, protected by peshmerga, making no military contribution and taking no combat casualties. Their contribution to the effort in Afghanistan has been negligible, which is more than can be said of their contribution to the Taliban (previous President Roh Moo Hyun reportedly paid them a ransom of up to $20 million in 2007 to free South Korean hostages who took it upon themselves to charter a shiny new bus to bring Christianity to Kandahar). South Korea has been an equally unsteady ally against China. The American security blanket has fostered a state of national adolescence by the South Korean public. Too many of them (some polls suggest most) see America as a barrier to reunification with their ethnic kindred in the North. Maybe nothing short of a North Korean attack on the South can encourage more sober thinking by South Koreans about their own security, but I suspect a greater sense of self-reliance and even vulnerability might. During my service in Korea, as U.S. taxpayers subsidized South Korea’s defense, South Korea subsidized Kim Jong Il’s potential offense with billions of dollars in hard currency that sustained the very threat against which we were ostensibly helping to defend. South Korea never made North Korea’s disarmament a condition of this aid. Instead, that aid effectively undermined U.S. and U.N. sanctions meant to force North Korea to disarm. What does South Korea have to show for this colossal outlay now. Because South Korea, now one the world’s wealthiest nations, expects up to 600,000 American soldiers to arrive protect it from any security contingency, successive South Korean governments actually cut their nation’s defense rather than modernizing it and building an effective independent defense. Consequently, South Korea still has a 1970-vintage force structure, designed around a 1970-vintage threat, equipped with 1970-vintage weapons. This is partly the legacy of ten years of leftist administrations, but it’s also the legacy of military welfare that allowed South Korea to defer upgrading its equipment, building a professional volunteer army, and organizing an effective reserve force to deal with security contingencies. Worst of all, South Korea diverted billions of dollars that should have been spent on modernizing its military into regime-sustaining aid to Kim Jong Il, to be used, as far as anyone knows, for nukes, missiles, artillery, and pretty much everything but infant formula. To this day, South Korea continues to resist accepting operational control over its own forces in the event of war. The U.S. Army presence in Korea is an anachronism, defending against the extinct threat of a conventional North Korean invasion. The far greater danger is that if __ Kim Jong Il __ assesses our current president as weak, he __ will choose more limited __ or less __ conventional means to strike __ at __ our soldiers __ and their families. Given the reported presence of Taliban operatives in Seoul, he might even plausibly deny responsibility for an attack. Thus, while I don’t go so far as to accept the Princess Bride Doctrine (”never get involved in a land war in Asia”), I __ do not believe it is wise __ for us __ to have __ our __ forces within __ easy artillery __ range of Kim Jong Il, such that he may __ freely __ choose the time __, place, __ and manner __ of our __ involvement __ ** U.S. presence is useless to deter North Korea – withdrawal will motivate South Korea and China to stabilize and de-nuclearize the peninsula  ** ** Erickson, 10 ** – Executive Director of CenterMovement.org (5/6/10, Stephen, “End the Cold War in Korea: Bring American Troops Home Before it’s Too Late,” [], JMP) The US presence creates political dysfunction while it minimally protects South Korea. __ US soldiers on South Korean soil breed resentment. __ Thousands of nationalist South Korean students regularly take to the streets to protest the Americans soldiers in their country and to call for unification between North and South. South Korean and US government policies are often awkwardly out of step with each other, with America often having the far more hawkish posture, as it did during the W. Bush years. American __ security guarantees have __ perhaps sometimes __ led the government __ of the South __ to engage in policies of inappropriate appeasement toward the North __. __ The threat of South Korea investing in nuclear weapons to counter the North might __, for example, finally ** __ persuade China to put __ ** sufficient ** __ pressure of North Korea. __ **__ A South Korea determined to __ match North Korean nuclear __ weapons development might paradoxically ** further the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. ** __ Most crucially, from an American point of view, the US Army is stretched too thin to play much of a role in protecting South Korea. As things stand, __ American soldiers are little more than targets for North Korean artillery __ and missiles. A defense of Seoul, its re-conquest, and forcible regime change in the North are all beyond US military capabilities at this time, given its commitments elsewhere. US participation on the ground in a new Korean War would also stress the US federal budget beyond the breaking point. The United States never properly created a new foreign and defense policy when the Cold War ended. Instead, it has generally maintained its Cold War military posture, with bases and commitments strewn throughout the globe, even as new challenges since 911 have called American forces to new missions. The US military presence in Korea is a Cold War artifact that needs to be brought home before it’s too late. ** Also, North Korean aggression and nuclearization will cause intentional, miscalculated, or accidental nuclear conflict – even a limited nuclear war causes rapid cooling and ozone disruption, collapses the economy, and spills over to other hot spots  ** ** Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 ** – *Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND ** Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” []) The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The consequences of __ failing to address __ the __ proliferation __ threat posed __ by __ the __ No __ rth __ Ko __ rea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there __ is the ** possibility of nuclear attack ** __ 1, __ whether by ** intention, miscalculation, or ** __ merely ** __ accident __  **, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. ** __ Even a limited __ ** nuclear ** __ exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions __. ** But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The __ studies indicate __ that __ the soot __ from the fires produced __ would __ lead to a __ decrease __ in __ global temperature __ by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a __ deeper __ drop in temperature __ than __ at any time during __ the last 1000 years. __ The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more __ than __ the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater __ decrease __ in __ grain production __ than 5% and it will continue for many years... __ hundreds of millions __ of people __ will die from hunger __ …To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. __ Reactors __ might also be __ targeted, caus __ ing __ further __ mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct __ impacts __, and the follow-on impacts __ on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity __ , could make ** __ the present global financial crisis pale by comparison __ **. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, __ with ** subsequent nuclear breakout ** __ and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, __ and ** aftermath chain-reaction affects involving ** __ other ** __ potential proliferant states __. ** The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community. ** Withdrawal will spur peaceful negotiations and inter-Korean peace  ** ** Feffer, 04 ** – contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and the author of // North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis // (6/23/04, John, “Bring Our Troops Home (from Korea),” [], JMP) The vortex of Korean politics can make even Donald Rumsfeld sound like the most radical Korean peace activist. "After the cold war," he declared on June 3, "U.S. forces have been stationed in South Korea for too long." The occasion was the announcement of the largest U.S. troop reductions from the Korean peninsula since the Korean War armistice, which took place 51 years ago this month. The Pentagon is withdrawing one-third of its forces from South Korea and sending a portion of them to Iraq. Since this announcement comes at a time not of relative tranquility but rather of heightened tensions between the United States and North Korea, some critics have charged the Bush administration with sacrificing security in East Asia on the altar of its Iraq policy. "Scavenging troops from South Korea," writes Jon Wolfstahl in the International Herald Tribune, "sends exactly the wrong signal at the wrong time to U.S. allies and adversaries alike." These critics are missing the point. American troops are no longer needed on the Korean peninsula. The Bush administration's only mistake is in not going far enough. __ An even more dramatic withdrawal of U.S. troops would __ not compromise security and could even help ** __ unknot the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. __ ** The Pentagon announcement comes just before a third round of Six-Party Talks that bring together the United States, North and South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. The previous two rounds went nowhere and expectations for this third round are low. The United States is insisting on CVID or the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear programs – before any substantive compromise can be hammered out. Having declared North Korea beyond the pale, the Bush administration is stuck in a theological hole: any form of negotiations looks suspiciously like "supping with the Devil." North Korea, meanwhile, has broached various scenarios whereby they freeze and then dismantle their programs in exchange for energy, economic incentives, security guarantees, or a mixture of the three. It might seem strange that the United States is reducing its military footprint on the Korean peninsula at this juncture. The Pentagon points out that the current plan has been on the drawing board since the end of the Cold War. Troops in fixed positions with slow-moving tanks, according to the Pentagon, fight yesterday's wars. Today's conflicts require rapid response units that can move quickly and over long distances. U.S. military presence in Korea – as well as in Japan – is being refashioned for the instantaneous demands of the virtual age and to intervene in areas further south as part of the "war on terrorism." This restructuring was first delayed in the early 1990s during the first nuclear crisis between the United States and North Korea. Why, during a second and potentially more serious crisis, is the restructuring moving forward? Certainly the immediate need for troops in the Iraq occupation is one reason. The deeper issue, however, is the declining utility of American troops on the Korean peninsula. North Korea's conventional forces have deteriorated in strength over the last twenty years, even as Pyongyang has directed large portions of its stagnant government budget toward the military. South Korea's armed forces, which include 690,000 troops, have meanwhile steadily improved its capability. Because of the high cost of fuel and the lack of critical spare parts, North Korean military pilots train 13 hours a year, which is what an American pilot easily clocks in a month. Or to give another example of the growing disparity of forces, South Korea has the luxury to spend between ten and one hundred times more per soldier for their equipment and other needs. Given the dramatic reversal of comparative strength between North and South, the tiny U.S. contingent – around 5 percent of South Korean troop strength – does not bring much to the table. __ The __ U.S. __ decision in 2003 __ to redeploy U.S. forces away from the DMZ has __ eliminated their function as a tripwire __, the first line of defense against a North Korean invasion. Military boosters emphasize the symbolic value of U.S. troops in demonstrating the unwavering commitment of the United States to its alliance with South Korea and to deter any North Korean attack on the South. But even this symbolism has become drained of meaning. South Korea under Roh Moo-Hyun wants more equality in its relations with the United States, which translates into greater control over military affairs. Younger South Koreans now see the United States – or, to be more precise, the trigger-happy unilateralism of the Bush administration – as more dangerous than North Korea. U.S. deterrent capacity, meanwhile, now resides in firepower based largely outside the peninsula, such as the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Fleet, both based in Japan. As it did fifty years ago, U.S. airpower can reduce North Korea to rubble. North Korean leaders recognize that any attack they might launch across the DMZ would thus be suicidal. The presence of the remaining 25,000 U.S. troops does not alter this calculus. Although they have only a minor military function and declining symbolic value, __ the remaining __ U.S. __ troops __ on the Korean peninsula __ can play a vital new role: bargaining chip. North Korea __ has __ argued __ that __ it is under threat of U.S. attack and considers U.S. troops __ in South Korea __ a longstanding provocation. __ So let's try something new by putting U.S. troop presence on the negotiating table. With the advice and consent of our South Korean allies, the Bush administration should offer a timetable for the removal of all U.S. troops from the peninsula. A Democrat would be hard pressed to offer such a deal. When Jimmy Carter tried to withdraw U.S. troops from the peninsula, he hit major resistance from Washington insiders. Only the hawks in Washington have the political capital to push through a complete withdrawal. The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea would certainly have its drawbacks. South Korea is spending more now on its defense than ever before and the Defense Ministry has called for an additional 13 percent increase in the military budget to compensate for the disappearing U.S. troops. The peace movement in Japan and Okinawa also want to bid farewell to U.S. troops, so the shifting of U.S. forces eastward, while a boon for the Korean peace movement, would not necessarily be a plus for the region as a whole. Still, __ U.S. troop withdrawal __ from the Korean peninsula __ would be __ such an ** __ enormous step toward resolving inter-Korean tensions __ ** that the benefits outweigh the costs. Beset on all sides for its Iraq policy, the Bush administration needs a foreign policy victory. It needs to demonstrate that it isn't ignoring the Korean peninsula. And it needs to show the world that the United States, if only after 51 years, does eventually bring home its troops. = __ ADV 2 --- The alliance  __ = ** U.S. alliance relationships are unsustainable – Asian powers should develop a regional security strategy that does not rely on the U.S. – solves WMD terrorism, tames China, prevents Sino-Japan conflict, Japan imperialism, solve resource conflicts and stop major power domination  ** ** Francis, 06 ** – former Australian Ambassador to Croatia and fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University from 05-06 (Fall 2006, Neil, Harvard International Review, “For an East Asian Union: Rethinking Asia's Cold War Alliances,” [], JMP) At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States established bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific intended to contain Soviet and Chinese communist expansion in the region. US security strategy now focuses largely on combating terrorism and denying weapons of mass destruction to so-called rogue states. It is a strategy that cannot be implemented with geographic mutual defense treaties formed to address conventional military threats. Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq that it is prepared to pursue its global security interests unilaterally, even at the risk of its political relations with traditional alliance partners. __ What happened over Iraq between the __ __U __ nited __S __ tates __ and __ its European __ allies __ c __ ould __ equally __ happen between the __ __U __ nited __S __ tates __ and __ its __ Asian allies __ over Taiwan or North Korea with serious consequences for the interests of countries in that region. __ East Asian powers need __ to develop __ a __ collective __ security strategy for the region that ** does not rely ** on the __ __U __ nited __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates’ participation. Prudence suggests that East Asian countries need to take the opportunity offered by the recently inaugurated East Asian Summit (EAS) to begin the process of developing an East Asian community as the first step toward the realization of an East Asian Union. This will occur only if led by a strong, proactive Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China is now the world’s second-largest economy, almost two-thirds as large as the United States in terms of domestic purchasing power. In 2005 China overtook Japan to become the world’s third-largest exporter of goods and services. In 2004 it was the third-largest trading partner with ASEAN; the second largest with Japan, Australia, and India; and the largest with the Republic of Korea. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has estimated that in 2004, in purchasing power parity dollar terms, China’s military expenditure was US$161.1 billion, the second highest in the world. The Pentagon has estimated that in 2005 China’s military expenditure was two to three times larger than its official figure of US$29.9 billion. China’s growing economic and military strength along with the United States’ preoccupation with its new security agenda has made some East Asian countries increasingly apprehensive. Particularly __ since September 11, __ bilateral military __ alliances have become less relevant to US security interests, and __ the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates __ will __ likely __ reduce __ its military __ presence in __ the __ East Asia __ n region. Parts of Asia believe that Chinese hegemonic aspirations for East Asia could emerge if the United States were to disengage from the region. Fear of China and the possibility that it harbors hegemonic aspirations were among the factors that led to the creation of ASEAN in 1967 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. Engaging China in an East Asian union in the future would ensure it will pay a high price in loss of trade and investment if it acts against the interests of the union’s other members. Prospects for an East Asian Community In December 2005 ASEAN hosted an inaugural East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The summit involved the 10 ASEAN countries; the ASEAN+3 countries of China, Japan, and South Korea; as well as Australia, New Zealand, and India. The summit declaration of December 14, 2005, described the meeting as a forum for “dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.” The declaration also noted that the summit could “play a significant role in community building in this region.” ASEAN would work “in partnership with the other participants of the East Asian Summit,” but ASEAN was to retain leadership, preventing control of East Asian community building by either the ASEAN+3 countries, which China could dominate, or the 16 EAS countries, which some felt could steer the EAS toward what would be an unwelcome “Western” agenda. It remains to be seen whether an East Asian community can emerge under ASEAN leadership. ASEAN is an association: it is not a strong regional institution with common interests and objectives. It reflects the diversity of its membership, which has traditionally preferred an unstructured organization, a consensus approach to decision making, and avoidance of controversial issues or intervention in the affairs of its members. The ASEAN Way under Challenge ASEAN’s ways, however, may be changing. Since the late 1990s ASEAN’s non-intervention principle has come under challenge. In 1997 ASEAN was faced with an Asian economic crisis triggered by currency speculators and in 1997 to 1998 with a regional pollution haze problemcaused by illegal land-clearance fires in Indonesia. ASEAN’s ineffectiveness in these crises brought internal scrutiny to bear on ASEAN’s policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, since 1999 ASEAN foreign ministers have discussed these and other transnational problems—illegal migration, terrorism, and the drug trade—that call for collective responses. They have also considered allowing ASEAN to oversee electoral and governance processes within member states. In 1999 a number of ASEAN countries defied the long-standing ASEAN position that East Timor was an internal matter for Indonesia and sent peace-keeping forces to the island to help quell the violence instigated there by anti-independence militia backed by Indonesian armed forces. In 2005 ASEAN placed public pressure on the government of Myanmar to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit Myanmar and assess what progress had been made in human rights and democratization. With the aid of the United States and European Union, ASEAN also persuaded Myanmar to relinquish its role as ASEAN chair. ASEAN’s actions in the 1990s suggest increased sensitivity to the negative effects of individual member nations on the organization’s international standing as well as the beginning of openness toward intervention in the domestic affairs of its members. Toward Realization At its December 2005 summit, ASEAN agreed to institute an ASEAN Charter by 2020 to provide what Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi has called a “mini-constitution,” a document that will establish an institutional framework for ASEAN as well as a legal identity recognized by the United Nations. The older members—Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—want ASEAN to become something more than an association. Institutionally strong and mostly democratic, they might more readily welcome a rules-governed organization similar to the European Union. Others with institutionally weak, authoritarian governments, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, are wary of placing their domestic policies under greater international scrutiny and favor the status quo. If the former nations prevail it will augur well for the realization of an East Asian community with the potential to evolve into an East Asian Union. An East Asian community composed of the 16 EAS participants would represent more than 60 percent of the world’s population and possess a combined GDP greater than the European Union. __ It could __ provide significantly increased trade benefits to its members, help __ dampen Sino-Japanese rivalry __, __ ease __ the present __ tensions __ in the region __ over Japan’s Pacific War, encourage __ more __ cooperative attitudes toward __ the issue of natural __ resource exploitation __ in East Asia, promote engagement over containment, __ and ** prevent domination ** __ of the region ** __ by any major power __ **__. __ The determining factor will be ASEAN’s ability to provide the leadership necessary to create a strong, independent East Asian Union. ** Specially, withdrawal will reduce Korea’s veto of multilateral security mechanisms – yielding a peace system on the peninsula that prevents great power war  ** ** Lee, 09 ** – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” [|www.cfr.org], JMP) Korea’s Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. Since 1988, Korea has advocated regional security cooperation, and in 1994, Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism.6 From Korea’s perspective, a semi-regional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements. Second, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement, as it includes all the global powers except the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">E uropean <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nion. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. __ The high concentration of superpowers in __ Northeast __ Asia poses a threat __ to Korea __ because ** an outbreak ** __ of great-power conflict ** __ in the region will __ ** definitely ** __ devastate __ ** Korea, if not ** __ the world __. ** Therefore, ** __ Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism __ **__ that increases transparency among global powers __ and functions as a confidence-building measure. Third, voluntary or involuntary betrayal by the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts. Some Koreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chung-hee government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea, and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when the United States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in 1980. They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes against North Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy stance of the George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea. __ A multilateral __ security __ arrangement __ in Northeast Asia will __ mitigate the __ security __ concern of Korea when the __ __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates either voluntarily or involuntarily __ defects from its commitment to Korea __. Fourth, multilateral __ security cooperation __ in Northeast Asia __ is necessary to ** establish a peace system on the ** __ Korean ** __ peninsula __ ** and ultimately unify Korea. Many Korean people doubt that the major powers, including the United States, want the unification of the Korean peninsula. Korea wants to deal with these powers transparently through a multilateral security cooperation mechanism. Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Korea’s external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. Making __ exclusive ties with the __ __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __ may be __ a __ high-risk __ investment in a past hegemon, while exclusive ties with China would be a high-risk investment in an uncertain future. In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea. A multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia appeals to Korea, so ** __ if __ ** voice and ** __ loyalty in the __ ** U.S.-Korea ** __ relationship do not reveal positive correlations, then Korea will pay more attention to multilateral regional options __. ** Moreover, ** __ if the U.S. __ ** capability and credibility in delivering its ** __ security promises __ ** to alliance partners ** __ are questioned, there will be fewer veto powers in Korean politics against a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia __ **__, __ particularly when such an option still maintains a loose form of the U.S.-Korea alliance. ** Accelerating U.S. withdrawal is key to catalyze a multipolar balance of power in the region and pave the way for an off-shore balancing strategy. **  ** Espiritu, 06 ** – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” [], JMP) Can the U.S. live with the risk of an unstable Korean Peninsula? The obvious answer is “no.” It is clear that a stable Korean peninsula is more beneficial to the United States. Clearly North Korea is a major player to determining whether the Korean Peninsula remains stable. One would argue __ as long as the current regime __ of Kim Jung Il __ remains in power __ and continue to pursue WMD (i.e. Nuclear weapons) __ there will be a ** permanent unstable scenario ** __ in the region.62 On the other hand, __ as long as the __ __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates __ remains __ in the region and continues to be forward __ deployed in So __ uth __ Ko __ rea, that __ the U.S. is contributing to __ such __ instability __ in the region. According to Revere, if there is an unstable region (Korean Peninsula), the U.S. goals become harder to achieve.63 Should __ an unstable __ Korean __ Peninsula __ exist, this __ could __ possibly __ lead to conflicts __ in the region, most obvious between the Koreas; promote unhealthy economic competition in the region, whereas more developed nations (Japan, China) do not provide any form of economic assistance to the Koreas; __ and __ more dangerously a weapons/arms race (maybe to include __ more nuclear weapons in the region __ ) to maintain a power balance. In order to strengthen regional stability, the U.S. would need to succeed in countering terrorism, enhancing economic prosperity, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy, and addressing transnational issues.64 At what cost and risks is the U.S. willing to accept in order to achieve stability in the region? Conclusion The United States cannot live with the risks involved in an unstable region. The Korean Peninsula and the East-Asia Pacific region are home to many of the economic giants worldwide. Additionally, with the rising cost of economic commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. must rethink alternatives to bring stability in the East-Asia Pacific region more specifically, the Korean Peninsula. __ The U.S. must __ continue to __ pursue peace __ and stability using all elements of national power certainly __ using ** less emphasis on ** __** a __ military __ ** solution __.__ Additionally, the U.S. must selectively engage the Koreas to bring stability to the Korean Peninsula __ by pursuing a __ combined __ strategy of __ isolationism and __ off-shore balancing __. Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic solutions take time. Perhaps by using other __ countries __ particularly __ in the region would be beneficial __ to the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates but also to the other countries as well. Strategic positioning of U.S. troops not only around the Korean Peninsula but throughout the world is the key to pursuing the National Objectives. By pursuing a stable Korean Peninsula without heavy U.S. involvement is beneficial both internationally and economically. __ Accelerating __ the __ withdrawal __ of U.S. troops, __ could lead to a multi-polar balance __ of power __ in the region __ .65 Obviously, this would require a significant change in foreign policy and power position in the region; it would certainly __ cause __ other __ nations to reconsider their national security strategy __. All in all, in a speech given by James A. Kelley, stated that “Regional stability remains our overarching strategic goal and provides the underpinnings for achievement of other key goals and objectives.”66 Finally, as stated in the 2006 QDR, “Victory can only be achieved through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power.” 67 Perhaps by completely withdrawing all U.S. troops from South Korea could potentially lead to one of these successes and bring stabilization to the region without heavy U.S. involvement. It is possible by taking the “let them work it out” (the Koreas) approach would certainly be advantageous to the U.S. The time is now for the Eagle to head home. ** The plan eases the transition to a more multipolar world – trying to cling to the status quo makes hegemonic decline and conflict with China inevitable  ** ** Bandow, 09 ** – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (1/12/09, Doug,      “First Among Equals,” [], JMP) It’s the job of military planners to plot future contingencies, which is why the U.S. Joint Forces Command looked ahead in its newly published Joint Operating Environment 2008. Despite obvious foreign threats, America’s destiny continues to remain largely in its own hands. No other country could draft such a report with such a perspective. The Europeans, constrained by the European Union and their memories of World War II, must cast a wary eye towards Russia and have little military means to influence events much beyond Africa. For all of its pretensions of power, Moscow is economically dependent on Europe and fearful of an expanding China; Russia’s military revival consists of the ability to beat up small neighbors on its border. Countries like Australia, South Korea and Japan are not without resources, but they are able to influence their regions, no more. Brazil is likely to become the dominant player in South America, but global clout is far away. India and China are emerging powers, but remain well behind Russia and especially the United States. Every other nation would have to start its operational analysis with America, which alone possesses the ability to intervene decisively in every region. The main challenge facing the United States will be becoming more like other nations. That is, over time other states will grow economically relative to America. That will allow them to improve and expand their militaries. Washington will long remain first among equals, the most powerful single global player. But eventually it will no longer be able to impose its will on any nation in any circumstance. That doesn’t mean the United States will be threatened. Other countries won’t be able to defeat America or force it to terms. But the outcomes of ever more international controversies will become less certain. Other governments will be more willing in more instances to say no to Washington. Especially China. Much will change in the coming years, but as the JOE 2008 observes, The Sino-American relationship represents one of the great strategic question marks of the next twenty-five years. Regardless of the outcome—cooperative or coercive, or both—China will become increasingly important in the considerations and strategic perceptions of joint force commanders. What kind of a power is Beijing likely to become? Chinese policymakers emphasize that they plan a “peaceful rise,” but their ambitions loom large. Argues JOE 2008, while the People’s Republic of China doesn’t “emphasize the future strictly in military terms,” the __ Chinese __ do __ calculate __ “that eventually __ their __ growing __ strength will __ allow them to __ dominate Asia __ and the Western Pacific.” More ominously, argues the Joint Forces Command, “ __ The Chinese are working hard to ensure that if there is a military confrontation with the __ __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates sometime in the future, __ they will be ready. __ ” Yet this assessment is far less threatening than it sounds. The PRC is not capable (nor close to being capable) of threatening vital U.S. interests—conquering American territory, threatening our liberties and constitutional system, cutting off U.S. trade with the rest of the world, dominating Eurasia and turning that rich resource base against America. After all, the United States has the world’s most sophisticated and powerful nuclear arsenal; China’s intercontinental delivery capabilities are quite limited. America has eleven carrier groups while Beijing has none. Washington is allied with most every other industrialized state and a gaggle of the PRC’s neighbors. China is surrounded by nations with which it has been at war in recent decades: Russia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and India. Indeed, today Beijing must concentrate on defending itself. In pointing to the PRC’s investment in submarines, the JOE 2008 acknowledges: “The emphasis on nuclear submarines and an increasingly global Navy in particular, underlines worries that the U.S. Navy possesses the ability to shut down China’s energy imports of oil—80% of which go through the straits of Malacca.” The Chinese government is focused on preventing American intervention against it in its own neighborhood, not on contesting U.S. dominance elsewhere in the world, let alone in North America. __ Washington __ almost certainly __ will be unable to thwart Beijing, __ at least at acceptable cost __. __ China needs spend only a fraction of America’s military outlays to develop a deterrent capability—nuclear sufficiency to forestall nuclear coercion, submarine and missile forces to sink U.S. carriers, and anti-satellite and cyber-warfare weapons to blind and disrupt American forces. Washington could ill afford to intervene in East Asia against the PRC so equipped. Such a military is well within China’s reach. Notes JOE 2008: “by conservative calculations it is easily possible that by the 2030s China could modernize its military to reach a level of approximately one quarter of current U.S. capabilities without any significant impact on its economy.” Thus, absent the unlikely economic and social collapse of China, __ in not too many years Beijing will able to enforce its “no” to America __. Washington must reconsider its response. U.S. taxpayers already spend as much as everyone else on earth on the military. It’s a needless burden, since promiscuous intervention overseas does not make Americans safer. To maintain today’s overwhelming edge over progressively more powerful militaries in China, Russia, India and other states would require disproportionately larger military outlays in the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates. It’s a game Washington cannot win. A better alternative would be to more carefully delineate vital interests, while treating lesser issues as matters for diplomacy rather than military action. Equally important, the American government should inform its allies that their security is in the first instance their responsibility. Washington should act as an offshore balancer to prevent domination of Eurasia by a hostile hegemon. But the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates should not attempt to coercively micro-manage regional relations. __ Stepping back __ today __ would ** reduce pressure on Beijing to engage in a sustained arms buildup to limit U.S. intervention ** __ in the future. If the PRC nevertheless moved forward, its neighbors could take note and respond accordingly. Encouraging China to keep its rise peaceful is in everyone’s interest. Despite the many challenges facing U.S. policy, America retains an extraordinarily advantageous position in today’s global order. Eventually, the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates is likely to fall to merely first among many—the globe’s leading state, but no longer the hyper- or unipower, as America has been called. ** __ The sooner Washington begins __ ** preparing for this new role, ** __ the smoother will be the transition. __ **   **  Strengthening the East Asian regional security architecture key to solve terrorism, territorial disputes, Taiwan conflict, disease, environmental degradation, and maritime security –   ** ** Nanto, 08 ** – Specialist in Industry and Trade Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Services (1/4, “East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy,” www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf) __ A stronger ** regional security organization ** in East Asia could play a role in quelling terrorism __ by violent extremists. Since terrorism is a transnational problem, the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates relies on international cooperation to counter it. __ Without close multilateral cooperation, there are __ simply __ too many nooks and crannies for __ violent __ extremists to exploit. __ 1 01 Currently, most of that cooperation is bilateral or between the United States and its traditional allies. While the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3, for example, have addressed the issue of terrorism, neither has conducted joint counter-terrorism exercises as has the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Neither organization as a group, moreover, has joined U.S. initiatives aimed at North Korean nuclear weapons (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative). Meanwhile, __ tensions __ continue __ across the Taiwan Strait, and disputes over territory __ and drilling rights __ have flared up between China and Japan and between Japan and So __ uth __ Ko __ rea. (For the United States, __ there is __ a __ growing possibility of __ nationalist __ territorial conflicts between two or more U.S. allies __ .102) The North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved; North Korea has conducted tests of ballistic missiles and a nuclear weapon; and the oppressive military rule in Burma/Myanmar continues. __ Added to these concerns are __ several regional issues: __ diseases __ (such as avian flu, SARS, and AIDS), __ environmental __ degradation, __ disaster __ mitigation and prevention, high seas __ piracy __, __ and __ weapons __ proliferation __. Memories of the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis still haunt policy makers in Asian countries. These are some of the major U.S. interests and issues as the United States proceeds with its policy toward a regional architecture in East Asia. Since this policy is aimed at the long-term structure of East Asian nations, it can be separated, somewhat, from current pressing problems. A metric by which any architecture can be evaluated, however, is how well it contributes to a resolution of problems as they now exist or will exist in the future. ** Territorial disputes draw in great powers --- causes World War 3  ** ** Waldron, 97 ** – professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College and an associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard (March 1997, Arthur, Commentary, “How Not to Deal with China,” EBSCO) __ MAKING __ THESE __ flash-points __ all the __ more volatile has been a __ dramatic __ increase in __ the quantity and quality of __ China's weapons __ acquisitions. An Asian arms race of sorts was already gathering steam in the post-cold-war era, driven by national rivalries and the understandable desire of newly rich nation-states to upgrade their capacities; but the Chinese build-up has intensified it. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's current build-up is part and parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and international openness toward repression and irredentism. Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most importantly from Russia. The latest multibillion-dollar deal includes two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the much-feared SS-N-22 cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis anti-missile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American aircraft carriers. This is in addition to the Su-27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kilo-class submarines, and other force-projection and deterrent technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft, missiles, and submarines--and considering nuclear options. __ The __ sort of unintended __ escalation which started two world wars could arise from any of the conflicts around China's periphery. It nearly did __ so in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of intimidation, fired ballistic missiles __ in __ the __ Taiwan Straits __. It could arise from a Chinese-Vietnamese confrontation, particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the Chinese, as they did in 1979, and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should tip in the direction of Hanoi. It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among Tibetans, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China. __ Chains of alliance __ or interest, perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself **, __ could __ ** easily ** __ draw in neighboring states-- __ **__ Russia __ , or India, or __ Japan--or the __ __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S __ tates. ** Also, plan prompts South Korean conventional force modernization which allows it to deter Chinese aggression   ** ** Bandow, 09 ** – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (6/16/09, Doug, “A Tattered Umbrella,” [], JMP) South Korea’s foreign minister reports that Washington plans to guarantee his nation’s defense against a nuclear-armed North Korea in writing. The promise reportedly will be formalized when South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits the United States this week. It’s a bad idea. Washington should be shedding defense responsibilities, not increasing them. More than a half century after the Korean War, the Republic of Korea (ROK) remains surprisingly dependent on America. It’s as if the United States was cowering before the Mexican military, begging its friends in Europe for help. In fact, the ROK requires no assistance to defend itself from conventional attack. The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has a strong numerical military advantage over the South: about 1.1 million personnel under arms, compared to fewer than seven hundred thousand for Seoul. Pyongyang also has impressive numbers of other weapons, including more than four thousand tanks and roughly eighteen thousand artillery pieces. However, most of the North’s equipment is decades old, a generation or two behind even that of the long-gone Soviet Union. Training is minimal and many of the DPRK’s military personnel perform construction and similar tasks. The Korean peninsula’s rugged geography favors defense. Putting thousands of antiquated tanks backed by hundreds of thousands of malnourished soldiers on the move south would create a human “turkey shoot” of epic proportions. Anyway, the ROK’s numerical inferiority is a matter of choice, not an immutable artifact of geography. In its early years the South’s resources were sharply limited. But today, South Korea is thought to have upwards of forty times the North’s GDP. Seoul also possesses a substantial industrial base, sports high-tech expertise and enjoys a sterling international credit rating. The ROK’s population is twice that of the North. __ South Korea could spend more than __ the equivalent of __ North Korea’s entire economy on defense if __ the former __ wished. But it hasn’t wished to do so, __ ** __ preferring to rely on Washington __ ** instead **. ** The time for subsidizing wealthy allies has long passed. The financial crisis makes it imperative that the United States return to such nations responsibility for their own defense. Undoubtedly an __ American withdrawal would ** result in ** __ a far-reaching ** __ debate among South Koreans __ **__ over __ how much they felt threatened by the North and __ how much __ they believed necessary __ to spend __ in response. But that is precisely the debate they should have had years ago. The prospect of a nuclear North Korea obviously is more frightening than even one with ample numbers of artillery pieces targeting the city of Seoul. But there is little reason to believe that the North has any deliverable weapons at this point. Given present course, that time is likely, but not certain, to come. However, South Korea has time to prepare. Rather than relying on America for its protection, Seoul should invest in missile defense and enhance its air-defense capabilities. __ The South __ also __ should __ consider ** __ creat __ ** ing ** __ a conventional deterrent __ **__ : __ the ability to respond to a nuclear strike by eliminating the Kim regime. __ That means ** developing ** __ potent ** __ offensive missile and air attack capabilities __. ** (Japan, despite its quasi-pacifist constitution, should do the same.) __ Such forces would __ help fulfill a second function: __ deter an aggressive China __, if Beijing ever changed its policy from the oft-repeated “peaceful rise” to a more belligerent stance. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has much to gain from stability in East Asia and has worked to assure its neighbors of its peaceful intentions. However, the future is unknowable. The best way for Beijing’s neighbors to ensure China’s rise is peaceful is to maintain armed forces sufficient to deter the PRC from considering military action. Such a “dual use” capability would benefit the United States as well. The objective would not be a high-profile attempt at containment, but a low-profile capacity for deterrence, relieving Washington of any need to intervene. Most important, America should not reflexively extend its “nuclear umbrella” in response to the future possibility of a nuclear North Korea. Doing so would inevitably deepen American involvement in regional controversies, potentially turning every local dispute into an international crisis. ** Chinese aggression against Taiwan will escalate and go nuclear  ** ** Adams, 09 ** – reporter for global post and newsweek on China and Taiwan (3/31/09, Jonathon, Global Post, “The dragon sharpens its claws,” []) TAIPEI — It's the stuff of dark sci-fi scenarios; the war that nobody wants. But the most recent Pentagon report on China's military power — released last week — shows how high the stakes have become, in the unlikely event the <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates and China ever do come to blows. __ China has the world's fastest-growing military __. It is building state-of-the art fighter jets, destroyers, and anti-ship missiles worth billions of dollars. It's just confirmed it will build an aircraft carrier. And according to the Pentagon, __ it's now fielding a __ new __ nuclear force able to __ "inflict significant __ damage __ on __ most __ large __ American cities __ ." Most disturbing, Chinese military __ officials have __ publicly __ threatened to use that capability against the __ __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">U __ nited <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">S tates — __ in a conflict over Taiwan __. " __ China __ doesn't __ just __ threaten war, it ** __ threatens nuclear war __ **__ ," said __ John Tkacik, __ a China expert __ and former U.S. diplomat, at a forum in Taipei last weekend. "This is the kind of thing that rattles cages in the U.S." For now, ** __ Taiwan is the only plausible cause of military conflict between the __ ** world's ** __ superpower and the __ ** rising ** __ Asian giant. __ **   **  Extinction  ** ** Cheong, 2000 ** – East Asia Correspondent (Ching Cheong, The Straits Times, “No one gains in war over Taiwan,” 6-25-2000, Lexis-Nexis Universe) THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO __ THE __ high-intensity __ scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a ** <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">full-scale war between the US and China ** __. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">full-scale war becomes unavoidable. __ Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries ____far__ and near __ and __ __ - __ horror of horrors __ - ____ raise __ the __ possibility of __ a ** __<span style="background: aqua; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">nuclear war __ **** <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">. ** Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, __ there ____ is little hope of winning __ a war against China 50 years later, __ short of using nuclear weapons ____. __ The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. __ Beijing __ also __ seems prepared __ to go __ for the nuclear option ____. __ A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, __ we would see the ** <span style="border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; mso-border-alt: solid windowtext .5pt; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">destruction of civilisation ** __** __<span style="background: silver; border-bottom: windowtext 1pt solid; border-left: windowtext 1pt solid; border-right: windowtext 1pt solid; border-top: windowtext 1pt solid; padding-bottom: 0in; padding-left: 0in; padding-right: 0in; padding-top: 0in;">. __ ** There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.