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��npk130@gmail.com (2A)

 * Aff: Natural Gas**

The shale boom is unsustainable—US reserves and productivity are decreasing rapidly

 * Gopinath 9-3-13**—New Dehli economist writing for YaleGlobal Online (Deepak, “Shale Energy No Quick Solution,” YaleGlobal Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/shale-energy-no-quick-solution)BC

The speed and scope of the shale-led energy renaissance in the US has been nothing short of remarkable. Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing opened hitherto inaccessible oil and gas deposits locked away in relatively impermeable shale rock formations and rapidly boosted energy production, particularly of gas. After years of being a natural gas importer, the US now suffers from a glut that has depressed prices. Drillers have shifted focus to more-profitable shale oil, production of which has expanded by almost a third since 2008 – and accounted for 29 percent of total US oil production in 2012 – holding out the tantalizing prospect of energy independence. But shale may yet fail to live up to its promise. The peculiar geology and economics of shale energy production, compared to conventional oil and gas, make the US experience both unsustainable and difficult to replicate. US shale oil and gas production growth has started to slow on the back of fast rising costs and rapidly depleting reservoirs. Meanwhile attempts to produce commercial-scale shale energy in countries such as China, which boasts the world’s biggest shale gas resources – and the third-largest recoverable shale oil deposits, after Russia and the US – are running into technological, regulatory, political and economic problems. The cost of drilling in the US has soared over the last decade, in part because of higher expenses associated with fracking and horizontal drilling. Fracking entails pumping combinations of water, sand and chemicals into shale at high pressures to create fissures along which gas or fluids can reach a well. Sourcing and transporting water to the well and disposing of wastewater is expensive. The cost for drilling a crude oil well quadrupled from US$1 million in 2003 to more than US$4 million in 2007, according to the US Energy Information Administration. Wells drilled recently in North Dakota’s Bakken formation, the largest US shale oil deposit, have cost between US$8 million to$10 million. Similar cost escalation is reported for natural gas wells. In addition to soaring costs, energy companies must contend with steep decline rates unique to shale deposits. Oil and gas trapped in relatively impermeable and less porous shale rock formations do not flow unaided to the well. As a result, production at shale wells tends to fall off steeply after an initial few months of high output. Decline rates in the Bakken formation run at more than 50 percent in the first year of production. Kodiak Oil & Gas estimates that its shale oil wells in Bakken will experience declines of 75 to 85 percent in the first five years of production. That compares to annual decline rates of 5 to 8 percent in conventional oilfields. These steep decline rates require ever-larger investments in new wells to maintain production levels.Leonardo Maugeri, a fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, estimates that it required 90 new wells per month to maintain oil production at the Bakken formation at its December 2012 level of 770,000 barrels/day. At US$10 million per well, that adds up to an additional investment of a staggering $900 millionper month or US $11 billion per year. The Post-Carbon Institute estimates that maintaining the entire country’s shale oil production would require more than 6,000 new wells annually at a cost of US$35 billion per year. So far, Wall Street has been efficient in channeling investment into shale oil and gas plays, but the scale of additional investment required to keep the boom going appears unsustainable absent new technological breakthroughs. Indeed, there are signs emerging that exploration and production firms are, if not stepping off the treadmill of ever-rising drilling intensity, at least starting to fall behind. After three years of rapid gains, the number of horizontal drilling rigs used in the U S, a good proxy for shale gas and oil exploration and production activity, started to decline in early 2012. Much of that decline is due to firms cutting back on production on the back of lower gas prices as the market became oversupplied. Shale gas output in the US, which makes up 40 percent of total gas production, is now flat and will remain so unless prices increase enough to prompt significant new drilling activity. That may not happen given the difficulties involved in converting the US gas glut into economically viable substitutes for liquid transport fuels and the fact that a global market for natural gas, with demand for exports, does not yet exist. Shale oil drilling intensity and production growth are also slowing. The number of rigs operating in North Dakota, where most of the Bakken shale deposit is located, has been falling since mid-2012. The field used 174 rigs in June 2013, from a high of 203 a year earlier. Although some of that decline is due to increased efficiencies in drilling technologies and rig management, production growth has been affected. As of May, annual production growth at Bakken was approximately 30 percent, compared to more than 90 percent in 2012. The slowdown in shale oil production growth will continue as the biggest fields decline and if exploration and production firms fail to find new economic shale deposits to exploit. The US shale boom may be more short-lived than many had expected,and shale’s global potential may also be overstated. In a report on global shale released in June, the US Energy Information Administration estimated worldwide technically recoverable reserves of shale gas at 7,300 trillion cubic feetof shale gas, the equivalent to almost a third of global gas resources. World shale oil resources could be as high as 345 billon barrels, equivalent to 10 percent of estimated global oil resources.

Natural gas prices will keep increasing despite flat consumption—that impacts sectors throughout the economy
Schwartzel, 13 [Erich Schwartzel, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Expert on Fracking, visited Pappas’ Public Policy Class and was part of a round table discussion that consisted of Barry Rabe, professor at UM and others, really funny too, “U.S. report predicts rising natural gas prices in 2013-14”, []]

The average price of natural gas is expected to //increase// by almost a dollar in //2013//, hitting $3.74 per million British thermal units. That's a //significant// jump from the $2.75 average seen last year, when accelerated drilling created a glut in supply that caused prices to drop and made drilling in many places unprofitable. Increases are expected to //continue////into////2014//, when prices are predicted to hit $3.90. The EIA report released Tuesday is the first look into 2014 for the domestic and international energy scene, and it includes projections that could affect gas and coal activity in Pennsylvania and surrounding states. Higher gas prices would //send reverberations////across multiple sectors//, helping coal become competitive with natural gas again as an electricity source and allowing drillers to broaden their focus beyond shale formations that are rich in oil. In addition, the federal energy agency projects increased domestic oil production will break new records over the next couple of years and eventually lead to lower prices at the gasoline station. The report is the latest set of tea leaves for an industry that's been in flux: Enthusiasm for drilling was tempered in recent years by economic realities that made it risky for every rig to turn a profit. The low prices made natural gas an easy sell to large, industrial customers who consume a lot of energy, but slowed lease activity as companies waited for prices to rebound. If natural gas prices continue an upward trend toward $4 per mcf, companies that had drilled wells but weren't bringing the gas to market could decide it is worth hooking those wells up to pipelines and selling the gas, said Adam Sieminski, the EIA administrator. Natural gas consumption, meanwhile, is expected to be relatively flat in 2013, though the EIA forecasts an increase in its use to heat homes and offices over the next two years. Consumption in 2012 was low due to an unnaturally warm winter. Over the next several years, the EIA's projectionscall for a //steady rise// in natural //gas prices//, said Mr. Sieminski, " continuing to go up to $5 or $6 in the longer term ." That would be welcome news to drillers who found the bargain-basement prices unsustainable for rapid-fire drilling in the Marcellus region, which includes much of Pennsylvania, and in other shale formations around the country. Companies in recent years have concentrated on shale regions where more lucrative oil and natural gas liquids are housed, and a rise in regular natural gas prices "might turn the drift from natural gas to oil around," said Mr. Sieminski. Pennsylvania gets one shout-out in the administration's Short-Term Energy Outlook, with researchers saying Marcellus production "continues at a strong pace as producers target oil-and-gas wells." Nationwide, the natural gas rig count was at 431 at the end of 2012 -- almost half of the 811 rigs seen in the beginning of the year. But domestic gas production is expected to remain relatively steady despite the drop in rig count, which the EIA said suggests greater rig efficiency in extracting more gas from a single location.

The impact is price spikes
Maize, 12/1/12 [“Is Shale Gas Shallow or the Real Deal?”, Kennedy, Veteran Journalist¶ Kennedy Maize has spent the past 40 years working as a journalist, analyst, and manager in the private sector and federal government, with over 35 years of that focused on energy and environmental topics. Over that time, he has seen myriad examples of how group think, policy fads, and bad judgment can result in colossal failures, particularly in the field of atomic energy. Maize has seen, up close and personal, the demise of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the arrival of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the birth of the U.S. Department of Energy, the failures of nuclear flight, the hubris of atomic earthmoving, the boom and bust uranium market, the birth and death of breeder reactors, and the 60-year wandering in the wilderness of nuclear waste policy. After graduating from Penn State and graduate study at the University of Maryland, Kennedy Maize worked for newspapers in Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia and the Associated Press in Baltimore. He then spent five years in management at the National Institute of Health and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission before taking a job covering energy, environment, and business topics for Editorial Research Reports, a division of Congressional Quarterly, where his work appeared in over 1,000 daily newspapers in the U.S. during the mid-to-late 1970s. Maize became a staff writer and editor at The Energy Daily, a preeminent energy trade paper, on March 28, 1979, the day the Three Mile Island accident began outside Harrisburg, Pa. Over more than 10 years at The Energy Daily, he covered the nuclear and coal industries, including stories involving the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corp., the Powder River Basin coal leasing scandal, and the Chernobyl explosion. In 1993, he founded The Electricity Daily, where he was the editor for 14 years, writing about changes in the electricity business, the rise and fall of Enron, the stagnation of the nuclear power business, and the arrival of market forces in the utility field. Since 2006, he has been an editor at POWER magazine, and the founder of MANAGING POWER magazine, where he has written about the Fukushima catastrophe, the emergence of shale gas and decline of coal, and the often ill-advised push for renewable electricity technologies¶ http://www.powermag.com/gas/Is-Shale-Gas-Shallow-or-the-Real-Deal_5188.html]

In an interview with POWER, Berman argued that the boom in drilling shale gas wells has obscured a long-term decline in conventional gas supply. But __a coming rapid decline in shale production__, he said, __will soon reveal the overall limits to____the gas boom__ , __and //volatility// and //upward pressure// could //return to natural gas prices//.__ “It’s not a problem for today or tomorrow,” Berman said, “but it is coming. Once we work through the current oversupply, if capital is not forthcoming,” // prices will spike //. The gas supply bubble will burst. ¶ Because of the current gas glut, with long prices in the range of $3 per million cubic feet (mcf), drilling shale gas wells has tanked, noted Berman. Chesapeake Energy, the most bullish of the shale gas players, is selling assets and shifting rigs to drilling for oil because the company just can’t make money on $3 gas. “ I can see a time not too many months away when we could see gas supply in rather serious decline ,” Berman said, noting that “there is plenty of gas, but it takes a long time to shift momentum back” to gas drilling. At a 2010 meeting in Washington, as low gas prices were resulting in a decline in new drilling, Berman commented, “ Shale plays are marginally commercial at best .” ¶ Greatly complicating the supply equation, said Berman, is the nature of shale gas wells. “ __Shale wells decline 30 to 40% per year,”__ he said. “ __Conventional wells decline 20 to 25%.____What most don’t grasp is how many wells it takes just to keep supply flat.”¶__ In the Barnett Shale in Texas, where Berman is most familiar with the geology, he calculates that the annual decline in the gas resource is 1.7 bcf/day. In order to add to the net Barnett production, Berman says, companies would have to drill 3,880 wells, at a cost of $12 billion. ¶ “ __We are setting ourselves up for a //potential reduction in supply// and //price will go up,////”//__ said Berman. “I don’t know how much it will go up, and there is a check-and-balance with coal. __There will be gas-coal switching if prices do go much higher than now.”__

Robust __domestic__ production is key to __manufacturing__ growth—that’s the basis for economic recovery
Duesterberg, 12 [Tom is Executive Director of the Manufacturing and Society in the 21st Century program at the Aspen Institute. He recently retired as President and CEO of The Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI, an economic research and executive education organization based in Arlington, Virginia with more than 500 manufacturing firms as members. Previous positions include: Director of the Washington Office of The Hudson Institute, Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy at the U.S. Department of Commerce, chief of staff to two members of Congress, and associate instructor at Stanford University. His commentary and analysis on manufacturing, economic performance, globalization, and related policy issues can be found in major news outlets. He holds a B.A. degree from Princeton and M. A. and Ph.D. degrees from Indiana University, “Impact of the Energy Boom on US Manufacturing”, []]

The manufacturing //sector//has been leading the US economic recovery since the end of the Great Recession in 2009. One of the //key drivers// in the manufacturing recovery is the renaissance indomestic production of natural gas and, to a lesser extent, oil. On November 28, the Institute’s program on Manufacturing and Society in the 21st Century will host an event exploring the ramifications of recent developments in energy and manufacturing, and the sustainability of the production boom for the future. ¶ Growth in domestic energy production, driven by the deployment of new exploration and drilling technologies, has been an**//economic turning point//** in the US for a //number of reasons//. Not the least of these is the possibility of reaching the US’ long-term goal of energy independence, a goal which arguably has already been reached, if North America is considered the proper unit for determining independence. The substitution of natural gas for coal in electricity production and process heat in manufacturing, as well as the growing use of natural gas in transportation, also contribute to lowering greenhouse gas emissions. The Department of Energy’s estimates of future carbon emissions show a 69 percent drop in expected emissions from 2002 to 2030 compared to projections from 1990. Finally, //overall economic growth is strengthened considerably by the energy boom////.// Not only is the United States producing more energy, it will also bebuilding more petrochemical refineries, will supply the equipment needed to build the exploration and refining infrastructure, and almost every energy user —from households to large manufacturers— will benefit from //more secure////supplies// and //lower costs.// ¶ Manufacturing is at a //pivotal point// in this emerging energy economy. It uses about one-third of all energy produced inthe United States, so lower prices and more secure supply give almost all firms in the sector a competitive advantage overfirms in other nations. Relative to the United States, the spot price of natural gas is nearly three times more expensive in Europe and four times more expensive in most of Asia. This advantage is especially important in the chemicals industry, which is the second largest subsector of US manufacturing. Natural gas and associated liquidsrepresent over 80 percent of the feedstock for US refineries, whereas in Europe and Asia the ratios are roughly two-thirds oil and one-third natural gas. When the price differential between natural gas and oil is taken into account, the advantage to the American chemicals sector comes into much sharper relief. The US manufacturing sector benefits in many other ways: lower process heat costs, a globally competitive advantage in building the energy and refinery infrastructure //driving the renaissance//, a nd the stability of supply which will help //attract long-term investment// in subsectors like steel, glass, aluminum, and metal working. Finally, a larger share of GDP for a growing manufacturingsector helps to improve living standards, since productivity growth is so strong in this sector. Since 1998, manufacturing productivity has grown at an annual rate of 3.5 percent, over twice as much as the 1.4 percent in the services sector. ¶ In the last few decades, manufacturing -- which faces steadily growing foreign competition and must innovate to protect itsmarket share -- has steadily improved the energy efficiency of production. Total carbon emissions in this sector have fallen by nearly one-fourth since 1998, even though total output has increased by about a third. As a result, carbon emissions per dollar of output in manufacturing have fallen by 36 percent since 1998, compared to only 20 percent in the overall economy. This is due in part to the //substitution of natural gas//, in part due to productivity increases, and in part due to higher use of renewable energy—manufacturing uses 90 percent more renewables than the transportation sector.

__Maintaining low prices__ through adequate supply is key to lock in a massive economic benefit—that __galvanizes key industries__
Pirog and Ratner 12- *Energy specialist in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies International Economics Program, **specialist in energy policy for the Congressional Research Service (Robert and Michael, “Natural Gas in the U.S. Economy: Opportunities for Growth” Congressional News Service, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42814.pdf)//WK Expanded supply, coupled with low natural gas prices, has the potential to contribute to a transformation of important sectors of the U.S. economy. Increased output and employment, expanded investment, income growth, improved competitiveness, and a reduction in the foreign trade deficit are likely outcomes. These conditions in the natural gas markets are likely to benefit certain key industries directly, while many other industries could experience indirect benefits. Direct beneficiaries are those industries that use natural gas as a raw material or as an important input in a production process. Industries whose output is directly related to the expansion of natural gas exploration, development and production are also direct beneficiaries. Examples of industries that use natural gas directly are petrochemicals and fertilizers. T he steel industry is an example of an industrywhose output is linked to the pace of natural gas resource development. Industries experiencing indirect benefits might include construction and capital goods producers that contribute to the supply chain for the investment projects undertaken by expanding natural gas consumers. In addition, more spending by workers in all of these industries could increase the growth of a wide variety of consumer goods and retail firms. The economic benefits of shale gas development and production will also open areas not recently accustomed to natural gas production, for example, the Marcellus field in parts of Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland, Virginia, and New York. In the international economy, those U .S. industries directly affected by expanded supply and low natural gas prices are likely to experience a competitive advantage over the producers of similar goods in other countries, resulting in increased exports from, and decreased imports to the United States. These effects would likely improve the U.S. trade deficit position. This advantage is likely to be maintained over time if the U.S. price of natural gas remains below those observed in other world regional markets (see Figure 5).13 U.S. industry’s advantage could be reduced through a process of world natural gas price convergence, especially in the three leading regional markets. However, for this to occur, traditional long-run contract terms, specifically linking natural gas prices to oil prices, would need to be changed to a more market-oriented method.

Natural gas production directly correlates with growth and innovation—unique spillover effects
Carey, 12/13/12 [Julie M, Julie M. Carey is an energy economist with Navigant Economics who provides consulting and testifying services Navigant’s unconventional oil and gas offerings include advisory services for strategic business decision analysis, construction risk management, economic and antitrust analyses, investment banking and restructuring advisory services, and expert services for disputes and investigations, “How Unconventional Oil And Gas Is Supercharging The U.S. Economy”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2012/12/13/how-unconventional-oil-and-gas-is-transforming-the-u-s-economy/]

It’s an exciting time to be in the energy industry in America. The impact of unconventional oil and gas development __on the ____U.S. economy is considerable, with potentially hundreds of billions__ of dollars in investments, millions of __new jobs, and a renaissanceof__ American //ingenuity//__and__innovation. In thinking about what is to come, __looking back five years helps set the stage__. __January 2008__ : The energy sector was facing the great recession, high current and future expected natural gas prices, and job losses to China. __There was a generally____poor outlook for the energy industry__ and the economy. Few could have predicted the changes that were to come. Unforeseen happenings include the North Dakota oil rush, liquefied natural gas facilities being used as export facilities (instead of as import facilities as originally planned), railroads hauling crude oil, and jobs coming back from China. And, this is just the beginning. The commencement of the crude oil and natural gas revolution can be boiled down to one simple equation: [|Surprise Side Effect Of Shale Gas Boom: A Plunge In U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions]Forbes Staff Contributor Abundant resources + cost effective extraction = high production levels of unconventional oil and gas. The net effect is a reshaping of the U.S. energy industry and our economy. Additionally, the country’s increased reliance on natural gas (displacing coal) has already benefited the environment, and will continue to do so in the future. Carbon emissions hit a 20-year low (in the first quarter 2012 according to EIA) and some industry observers believe that the U.S. could meet the Kyoto agreement standards by 2020 (even though the U.S. did not sign it). The emergence of unconventional oil and gas will have tremendous impacts on both the energy industry and the economy. The outlook for unconventional gas is exceptionally bright—with expectations for relatively low future natural gas prices, enough supply to meet domestic needs, and surplus enough to export to other countries. While the unconventional oil story continues to unfold and evolve, an abundance of domestic crude oil is expected. And, thus, an opportunity to not only significantly reduce the country’s dependence on oil imports, but to also increase energy security. Currently, crude oil prices are out of balance as new supply regions are isolated, making it difficult to get crude oil to market. That is expected to change once the necessary infrastructure is built to handle the new-found supply. As a result of these infrastructure needs, and the tremendous opportunities associated with unconventional oil and gas, U.S. economic activity is rising. Rising levels of economic activity can be divided into three distinct but overlapping waves of capital investment. The first wave of capital investment targets new and expanding oil and gas production areas. Sustained investment in the upstream sector – including wellheads, drilling and production – will be required to keep pace with increases in demand for the foreseeable future. The second wave of investment will focus on infrastructure to address new supply locations, delivering the product to market, and capitalizing on the near term opportunities arising from lower energy costs. Billions of dollars of investments specifically targeting capital projects in this wave are being announced weekly. Substantial investment in crude oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids pipelines will be required in order to build, expand, and reverse pipelines to address the new supply source locations. Natural gas processing plants that separate natural gas liquids (NGL) from natural gas will be required to address the growing production levels and new supply regions. In addition, LNG facilities will begin to export natural gas, and there is a potential opportunity for natural gas-to-diesel plants. In addition to these traditional areas of investment, creative market solutions are also emerging, such as rail transportation of crude oil. While railroads may serve primarily as a near to mid-term solution in the wake of long-lead time pipeline solutions, they are nimble competitors with small capital requirements that can be quickly deployed to utilize the country’s far-reaching rail networks. With only a few years needed to recover capital costs on investment, the competitive landscape changes and rail transportation rates could be reduced after pipelines enter the market to keep railroads competitive and still profitable. These factors suggest that railroads could be in the crude oil transportation business for the long haul. During this second wave, __there will be a //manufacturing resurgence//__, in part __because of lower //expected// energy //costs//__. __Other macroeconomic factors will also be at work—including relative improvement in U.S. labor rates__ as labor markets tighten in China and other countries. __Petrochemical plants will //become cost effective competitors//____in the__//worldwide market//__and will be a significant component of the manufacturing investment story.__ Manufacturing facilities will be built to manufacture pipes, drill bits, valves and other required infrastructure materials. In addition, other __manufacturing plants will likely be built //solely as a play on the expectation of// relatively //low// energy //costs// into the future__. __Such suspects could include those whose energy costs are large portion of production costs: semiconductors,____plastics, and LCD televisions.__ The trend includes linking production and energy resources in an efficient manner, and moving production closer to market demand in order to minimize transportation related costs. The last wave of investment – which won’t begin to heat up for a few years – focuses on the consumers segment. In this wave, additional natural gas-fired power plants will be built to replace retiring coal plants and meet future increases in demand. Of course, new gas fired power plants will initially be built in regions with less excess capacity (post coal plant retirement). Another impact of U.S. unconventional oil and gas development will be increased in electricity demand (occurring more dramatically in various localized pockets), directly resulting from investment in waves one and two. New production areas and locations for processing and manufacturing plants will observe higher load growth. For example, localized areas within the Bakken region expect energy demand to double in the next five years. As a result of very specific changes to the economic activity and corresponding energy consumption levels, a more granular analyses will be required than is previously provided by traditional load forecasting methods. This third wave will also see a significant number of new heavy-duty natural gas vehicles, including bus and truck fleets. Greater reliance on natural gas-fueled light duty vehicles is possible but will require more time due to greater infrastructure requirements and technological innovation. Other creative opportunities being explored include natural gas pumps (hooked up to the home) to fuel natural gas vehicles, and light duty vehicles relying on fuel cells (which manufacturers hope to begin building by 2015). While it’s not currently clear who the winners will be, it’s safe to say that positive market forces and ample opportunity will lead to innovative solutions. The near-term outlook for total capital investment (from primarily first and second wave projects) is immense. The table below provides a snapshot analysis of the short term outlook (through 2020) for domestic (lower 48 state) based capital investment. These estimates are conservative and based largely on publicly reported company business plans. For example, Table 1 includes only a portion of expected U.S. LNG projects going forward, as compared to the full list of DOE applications. The estimate also excludes the massive $65 billion proposed Alaska pipeline/export facility project and third wave investments targeting natural gas fired power plants and natural gas vehicles. Even with just a portion of total investment included, the conservative estimate of short term investment reaches more than $300 billion. ** Estimate of U.S. Unconventional Oil and Gas Capital Expenditures and Job Creation (Through 2020) ** __These investments have a //huge economic impact on the U.S. economy//__ — //impacting jobs//, economic //growth//__and__ energy //security//. Some __studies indicate that the U.S. has //avoided retreating into an economic recession as a result of//____activity in the__ unconventional oil and //gas sector//. Production areas for unconventional oil and gas have observed very low unemployment and stronger GDP and tax revenues as compared to the rest of the U.S. As a result of the significant near term investments associated with unconventional oil and gas, it’s possible that up to __3.5 million jobs will be____created from the infrastructure build out and related opportunities__ (including both direct and indirect jobs).

Domestic manufacturing is key to overall __resilience__
Ettlinger, 11 [Michael, Vice President for Economic Policy at the Center for ¶ American Progress Prior to joining the Center, he spent six years at the Economic ¶ Policy Institute directing the Economic Analysis and Research Network. ¶ Previously, he was tax policy director for Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute ¶ on Taxation and Economic Policy for 11 years. He has also served on the staff of ¶ the New York State Assembly. “The Importance and Promise¶ of American Manufacturing Why It Matters if We Make It in America and Where We Stand Today”, http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf]

__Manufacturing is //critically important// to the //American economy//__. For generations, ¶ the strength of our country rested on the power of our factory floors—both the ¶ machines and the men and women who worked them. __We need manufacturing__ ¶ __to continue to be a //bedrock of strength//__ for generations to come. __Manufacturing__ ¶ __is //woven into the structure of our economy//__ : Its importance goes far beyond what ¶ happens behind the factory gates. __The strength or weakness of__ American __manufacturing__ ¶ __carries implications for the //entire economy//__, our national security, __and__ the ¶ well-being of all Americans. ¶ __Manufacturing__ today __accounts for 12 percent of the__ U.S. __economy__ and about ¶ 11 percent of the private-sector workforce. But its significance is even greater ¶ than these numbers would suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing is only a ¶ part of the picture. ¶ First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of ¶ Americans. Those jobs serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to ¶ hard-working, middle-skill workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens ¶ and strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire economy. ¶ What’s more, __U.S.-based manufacturing //underpins a broad range of jobs// that¶ are quite different from the usual image of manufacturing__. __These are higher-skill¶ service jobs__ that include the accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated ¶ with any industry, as well as __a broad range of other jobs__ including basic research ¶ and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations ¶ and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work. ¶ Many of these jobs are critical to //American//tech//nology//and innovation leadership//.// ¶ The problem today is this: Many multinational corporations may for a ¶ period keep these higher-skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing ¶ elsewhere in response to other countries’ subsidies, the search for cheaper ¶ labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually ¶ many of these service jobs will follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves,//the feedback loop// __from the manufacturing floor to the rest of a manufacturing¶ operation__ — a critical element in the innovative process—is eventually broken. ¶ __To maintain that feedback loop__, __companies need to move higher-skill jobs to¶ where they do their manufacturing__. __And with those jobs goes American leadership in____technology and innovation__. __This__ ¶ __is why having a__ critical __mass of__ both __manufacturing and__ associated __service jobs in¶ the United States matters.____The “industrial commons” that comes from the crossfertilization__ ¶ __and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and¶ government is //vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness//__. ¶ Manufacturingalsois important__ for the nation’s //economic// stability __. __The experience__ ¶ __of the Great Recession exemplifies this point__. Although __manufacturing__ ¶ plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the rest of the economy, __it is on the__ ¶ __rebound today while other key economic sectors__, such as construction, still ¶ __languish__. __Diversity in the economy is important__ — __and manufacturing is a particularly__ ¶ __important part of the mix.__ Although manufacturing is certainly affected ¶ by broader economic events, the sector’s internal diversity—supplying consumer ¶ goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and external markets— ¶ gives it great potential resiliency. ¶ Finally, __supplying our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector__ ¶ __protects us from international economic and political disruptions__. This is most ¶ obviously important in the realm of national security, even narrowly defined ¶ as matters related to military strength, where the risk of a weak manufacturing ¶ capability is obvious. But __overreliance on imports and substantial manufacturing¶ trade deficits weaken us in many ways, making us vulnerable to everything from¶ exchange rate fluctuations to trade embargoes to natural disasters__.

Economic collapse causes competition for resources and instability that escalates and goes nuclear
Harris and Burrows, 9 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)**

__Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices__. __Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies__. In the worst case, __this could result in interstate conflicts__ if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. __Maritime security concerns__ are providing a rationale for naval buildups and __modernization efforts__, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to __increased tensions, rivalries, and__ counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in __a more dog-eat-dog world.__
 * Increased Potential for Global Conflict **
 * Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, thelessons to be drawn from that period __include__ the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for __greater conflict could grow __ would seem to be even more apt __in a constantly volatile economic environment__ as they would be if change would be steadier. **
 * In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. __Terror__ ist __groups__ in 2025 __will likely be__ a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become __self-radicalized__, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower __in an economic downturn__ . **
 * __The most dangerous casualty__ of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence __would__ almost certainly __be the Middle East.__ Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, __worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider__ pursuing their own __nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship__ that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. __The lack of strategic depth__ in neighboring states like Israel, __short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of__ Iranian __intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially__** __leading to escalating crises**__.

Our impact has a strong statistical basis – rally around the flag
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict__.__ Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that __rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next __. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, __increasing the risk of miscalculation__ (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the __likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could __ potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) __find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn__. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence ofa recession tends to //amplify// //the// //extent//to which internationaland external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. " Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline __, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect.__ Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science __scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic __, dyadic and national levels .5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Low natural gas prices key to domestic steel manufacturing
James 12- Correspondent for Reuters (Steve, “Analysis: Steelmakers eye gas to cut costs, drive exports”, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/16/us-steel-gas-idUSBRE82F12Y20120316)//WK

America's steel industry, for decades a symbol of industrial decline , is betting on natural gas to make it more competitive against foreign producers. U.S. Steel Corp (X.N) and Nucor Inc (NUE.N), the two largest U.S. steel producers, are changing their traditional manufacturing processes as relatively cheap domestic natural gas supplies become more plentiful. Some experts believe the new techniques will not only allow steelmakers to cut costs and lower selling prices at home, but also give U.S. companies a chance to compete with Japanese, South Korean and European rivals for a slice of the export pie. "Gas is very positive for steel; it really lowers the cost of the product," said Michael Locker of Locker Associates, a consultant for steel companies. U.S. Steel Chief Executive John Surma said in an interview that using natural gas in some stages of production can cut the use of more expensive coking coal by some 10 percent. He estimated that factoring in costs such as labor, energy and transportation, the overall savings would be $6 to $7 per ton of steel. U.S. Steel produces 23 million tons per year. Christopher Plummer, managing director of Metal Strategies, an industry consultant in West Chester, Pennsylvania, said the global average cost of producing a ton of steel is about $600 to $700. Russian steelmakers produce at the bottom of the cost curve, averaging about $500 per ton. Americans are in the middle at about $625 to $675 per ton. The most expensive are the Japanese and Koreans, at $650 to $750 per ton. While a savings of about 1 percent may not sound like much, every little bit counts for companies in an industry that has been struggling with steep rises in raw material costs, such as coking coal, iron ore and scrap metal. "You do an analysis of our costs and they are much higher than five years ago," said Surma, whose company posted a net loss of $226 million for the fourth quarter -- its fifth in the last eight quarters. " The capital cost to increase our ability to inject greater quantities of natural gas into our blast furnaces is minimal, but the potential savings certainly start to add up when you are producing 20 million tons or more of steel every year ." With natural gas prices at 10-year lows because new fracking technology has opened up huge deposits in the Northeast United States, most domestic steelmakers are looking to use more of it. "There is a new focus on natgas, " said Larry Kavanagh, president of the American Iron and Steel Institute's Steel Market Development Institute. "Until the recent discovery, we believed coal-based technologies would dominate the future. Now the game has changed in the near term." Nucor, for instance, has dropped plans to build a traditional blast furnace in Louisiana and instead is constructing a gas-fired plant to produce direct reduced iron, or DRI, a key ingredient in its steel-making process. The $750 million facility will convert natural gas and iron ore pellets into high-quality DRI used by Nucor's steel mills, along with recycled scrap, to produce 2.5 million tons of steel a year. Like U.S. Steel, Nucor produces about 23 million tons of steel a year. According to Nucor officials, the DRI offers a carbon footprint that is one-third of that for the coke oven/blast furnace, and at less than half the capital cost. Nucor may be better placed than U.S. Steel to reap the benefits of lower-cost gas because it is a so-called mini-mill operator, which melts recycled steel or pig iron in electric arc furnaces. Electricity is expensive, but costs can be cut by substituting natural gas to fire the furnace. U.S. Steel is an integrated manufacturer that largely makes steel the old-fashioned way, by cooking iron ore and coking coal in a blast furnace. Thus, there is a limit on the amount of natural gas it can substitute for coal. Nucor has not said how much it expects to save on the cost of a ton of steel by using more natural gas. Of course, there is no guarantee that natural gas prices will stay low forever; but increases are likely to be more limited than in the past because of the increased production. In the past, prices were volatile and in 2005 were as high as $14 per million British thermal units (BTU), compared with slightly above $2 per million BTU today. But John Anton, director of steel services for the global forecasting company IHS, said he believes there is little risk that steel companies will get burned should gas prices rise again. "DRI cannot stand high gas prices; but with fracking technology, we see low prices around $4 lasting for 30 years and under $8 for the next 80 years." Nucor, which posted a $137 million profit for the fourth quarter, is using a variety of measures to lock in current low prices. President and Chief Operating Officer John Ferriola said the company has long-term gas contracts at its DRI plant in Trinidad with an average cost of about $2 per million BTU. In addition, Nucor and U.S. Steel are using hedging techniques to protect themselves against potential price rises. Surma said t he shift to natural gas could give U.S. Steel, a 110-year-old symbol of American industrial power, a competitive edge in the 21st Century.

Low steel prices are the vital internal link to primacy
AISI et al. 7- (*American Iron and Steel Institute, **Specialty Steel Industry of North America,** *Steel Manufacturers Association, Steel Manufacturer’s Association, *United Steel Workers, “Steel and the National Defense”, http://www.ssina.com/news/releases/pdf_releases/steel_and_national_defense_0107.pdf)//WK// //This analysis presented by the U.S. steel industry addresses the importance of domestically-produced steel to our nation’s overall national defense objectives and the increased need for steel to bolster our economic and military security. The President and other U.S. government leaders have recognized repeatedly the critical interdependence of steel and national security. The American steel industry and the thousands of skilled men and women who comprise its workforce produce high quality, cost-competitive steel products for military use in applications ranging from aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines to Patriot and Stinger missiles, armor plate for tanks and field artillery pieces, as well as every major military aircraft in production today. These critical applications require consistent, high quality on-shore supply sources. While leading-edge defense applications represent only a small portion of overall domestic sales of steel products, defense-related materials are produced on the same equipment, using some of the same technology, and are developed by the same engineers who support the larger commercial businesses of steel companies in the U.S. Thus, the companies are not typical defense contractors who derive the majority of their sales and profits from their defense business. //It is the overall financial health of U.S. steel producers//, and not simply the profitability of their defense business, //that is essential to their ability to be reliable defense suppliers//. The domestic steel industry also believes that, over an extended period of time, the United States could lose much of its steel-related manufacturing base if U.S. steel consumers continue to move production offshore due to market-distorting foreign government incentives and due to unsound economic policies at home.If we continue to lose our manufacturing base due to market-distorting foreign competition or U.S. economic policies that are hostile to domestic investment and U.S.-based manufacturing, it could become impossible to produce here ; the U.S. military would lose its principal source of strategic metals; and we as a nation would become dangerously dependent upon unreliable foreign sources of supply. The U.S. steel industry, consisting of all carbon and alloy steel producers and specialty metal producers, employs more than 160,000 highly skilled workers who produce over $60 billion of high quality steel and high-technology specialty alloy products annually. The industry includes state-of-the-art, large and small electric arc furnace producers (or “mini mills”) that make steel from recycled scrap, and highly efficient large “integrated” steel producers who make steel from virgin materials and recycled steel. Steel is produced in many forms, including flat-rolled and long products, carbon pipe and tube products, wire and other fabricated products. Carbon and alloy steel is used in all major end-use markets, including construction, automotive, machinery, appliance and containers. Specialty steels are high technology, high value materials, produced by small and medium-sized companies. These specialty metals are used in extreme environments that demand exceptional hardness, toughness, strength and resistance to heat, corrosion and abrasion, such as in the aerospace and chemical processing industries. All segments of the domestic steel industry contribute directly or indirectly to the defense industrial base. The U.S. carbon/alloy and specialty steel industries are vital partners to American defense contractors and to the DOD. Domestic and specialty metals are found in virtually every military platform. Whether it is missiles, jet aircraft, submarines, helicopters, Humvees® or munitions, American-made steels and specialty metals are crucial components of U.S. military strength. A few examples follow: 1. The Joint Strike fighter F135 engine, the gears, bearings, and the body itself, will use high performance specialty steels and superalloys produced by U.S. specialty steel companies. 2. Land based vehicles such as the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Abrams Tank, and the family of Light Armored Vehicles use significant tonnage of steel plate per vehicle. 3. Steel plate is used in the bodies and propulsion systems of the naval fleet. 4. The control cables on virtually all military aircraft, including fighter jets and military transport planes, are produced from steel wire rope. Numerous additional examples illustrating how steel and specialty metals directly support the U.S. defense industrial base are provided in Appendices 1 and 2. These materials are an integral part of many diversified military applications and, as such, are in a continuing state of technological development. Steel’s importance to the military must also be looked at in a broader context to include both direct and indirect steel shipments to the military infrastructure that are needed to support our defense efforts, both at home and overseas -- e.g., all of the steel that goes into the rails, rail cars, ground vehicles, tanks, ships, military barracks, fences and bases , which are not classified as shipments to ordinance, aircraft, shipbuilding or other military uses. The September 11 attacks on the United States made it clear that (1) steel will be needed to “harden” existing U.S. infrastructure and installations and (2) a strong and viable domestic steel industry will be needed to provide immediate steel deliveries when and where required. Consider the potential difficulties the U.S. would face in defending, maintaining and rebuilding infrastructure in an environment where our nation is largely dependent upon foreign steel. By becoming even more dangerously dependent upon offshore sources of steel, the United States would experience sharply reduced security preparedness in the face of: • Highly variable, and certainly higher, costs; • Uncertain supply, impacted by unsettled foreign economies and politics; • Quality, design and performance problems; • Inventory problems, long lead times and extended construction schedules.

Hegemony solves conflict escalation and great power war
Brooks, et al, 13 [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment Stephen G. Brooks (bio), [|G. John Ikenberry] (bio) and William C. Wohlforth (bio), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, [|International Security] Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse]

Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement Even if deep engagement's costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy's major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States' security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars. A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far [End Page 33] more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the //U// nited //S// tates' overseas presence gives it the //leverage//to restrain partners from taking //provocative action//. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemonyfrom contemplating expansion and make its partnersmore secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus //stoke security dilemmas//. Thecontention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the "American Pacifier" is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecastsdangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations , regionalrivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and //full-scale great power war// .72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia's security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected [End Page 34] costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia's major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays.[|74] The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington—notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region's prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and [End Page 35] Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism's sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism's optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives.76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in thesecurity environment in at least some of the world's key regions. We have already [End Page 36] mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a //competitive regional multipolarity//completewith associated //insecurity//, //arms racing// , //crisis instability// , //nuclear////prolif// eration, and the like , or bids for regional hegemony , which may bebeyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional //great power war// ). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world's core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regionalproxy wars and arming of client states — all of which would be concerning , in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose tocreate nuclear forces .[|78] It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressurelocally for //more proliferation//. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem.79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate [End Page 37] over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned aboutthe destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation — including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have trulysurvivable forces — seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of "unforeseen crisis dynamics" that could spin out ofcontrol is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and "pass the buck" to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century. The problem is that China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, "The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves."81 [End Page 38] Therefore, unless China's rise stalls, "the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War."[|82] It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia—just what the United States is doing.83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world's key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners fromramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States' formidable military machine may//deter entry by// potential //rivals//. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powershave shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the "focused enmity" [End Page 39] of the United States.84 All of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America's alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking.85 In the end, therefore, deep engagement reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States. This in turn makes it easier to sustain the policy over the long term. The Wider Benefits of Deep Engagement The case against deep engagement overstates its costs and underestimates its security benefits. Perhaps its most important weakness, however, is that its preoccupation with security issues diverts attention from some of deep engagement's most important benefits: sustaining the global economy and fostering institutionalized cooperation in ways advantageous to U.S. national interests. Economic Benefits Deep engagement is based on a premise central to realist scholarship from E.H. Carr to Robert Gilpin: economic orders do not just emerge spontaneously ; they are created and sustained by and for powerful states .[|86] To be sure, the sheer size of its economy would guarantee the United States a significant role in the politics of the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the fact that it is the leading military power and security provider also enables economic leadership. The security role figures in the creation, maintenance, and expansion of the system. In part because other states—including all but one of the world's largest economies—were heavily dependent on U.S. security protection during the Cold War, the United States was able not only to foster the economic order but also to prod other states to buy into it and to support plans for its progressive expansion.87 Today, as the discussion in the [End Page 40] previous section underscores, t he security commitments of deep engagement support the global economic order by reducing the likelihood of security dilemmas, arms racing, instability, regional conflicts and, in extremis, //major power war//. In so doing, the strategy helps to maintain a stable andcomparatively open world economy — a long-standing U.S. national interest. In addition to ensuring the global economy against important sources of insecurity, the extensive set of U.S. military commitments and deployments helpsto protect the "global economic commons."One key way is by helping to keep sea-lanes and other shipping corridors freely available for commerce .88 A second key way is by helping to establish and protect property/sovereignty rights in the oceans. Although it is not the only global actor relevant to protecting the global economic commons, the United States has by far the most important role given its massive naval superiority and the leadership role itplays in international economic institutions. If the United States were to pull back from the world, protecting the global economic commons would likely be much harder to accomplish for a number of reasons : cooperating with other nations on these matters would be less likely to occur ; maintaining therelevant institutional foundations for promoting this goal would be harder ; and preserving access to bases throughout the world — which is needed to accomplish this mission—would likely be curtailed to some degree. Advocates of retrenchment agree that a flourishing global economy is an important U.S. interest, but they are largely silent on the role U.S. grand strategy plays in sustaining it.89 For their part, many scholars of international political [End Page 41] economy have long argued that economic openness might continue even in the absence of hegemonic leadership.[|90] Yet this does not address the real question of interest: Does hegemonic leadership make the continuation of global economic stability more likely? The voluminous literature contains no analysis that suggests a negative answer; what scholars instead note is that the likelihood of overcoming problems of collective action, relative gains, and incomplete information drops in the absence of leadership.91 It would thus take a bold if not reckless leader to run a grand experiment to determine whether the global economy can continue to expand in the absence of U.S. leadership. Deep engagement not only helps to underwrite the global economy in a general sense, but it also allows the United States to structure it in ways that serve the United States' narrow economic interests. Carla Norrlof argues persuasively that America disproportionately benefits from the current structure of the global economy, and that its ability to reap these advantages is directly tied to its position of military preeminence within the system.92 One way this occurs is via "microlevel structuring"—that is, the United States gets better economic bargains or increased economic cooperation on some specific issues than it would if it did not play such a key security role. As Joseph Nye observes, [End Page 42] "Even if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."93 Although Nye is right that such linkage will generally be implicit, extensive analyses of declassified documents by historians shows that the United States directly used its overseas security commitments and military deployments to convince allies to change their economic policies to its benefit during the Cold War.[|94] The United States' security commitments continue to bolster the pursuit of its economic interests. Interviews with current and past U.S. administration officials reveal wide agreement that alliance ties help gain favorable outcomes on trade and other economic issues. To the question, "Does the alliance system pay dividends for America in nonsecurity areas, such as economic relations?," the typical answer in interviews is "an unequivocal yes."95 U.S. security commitments sometimes enhance bargaining leverage over the specific terms of economic agreements and give other governments more general incentives to enter into agreements that benefit the United States economically—two recent examples being the 2012 Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and the United States-Australia FTA (which entered into force in 2005).96 Officials across administrations of different parties stress that the desire of Korea and Australia to tighten their security relationships with the United States was a core reason why Washington was able to enter into free [End Page 43] trade agreements with them and to do so on terms favorable to U.S. economic interests. As one former official indicates, "The KORUS FTA—and I was involved in the initial planning—was attractive to Korea in large measure because it would help to underpin the US-ROK [South Korea] alliance at a time of shifting power in the region."97 Korean leaders' interest in maintaining a strong security relationship with the United States, another former official stressed, made them more willing to be flexible regarding the terms of the agreement because "failure would look like a setback to the political and security relationship. Once we got into negotiations with the ROK, look at how many times we reneged even after we signed a deal. . . . We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses and the Koreans took it all."[|98] U.S. security leverage is economically beneficial in a second respect: it can facilitate "macrolevel structuring" of the global economy. Macrolevel structuring is crucial because so much of what the United States wants from the economic order is simply "more of the same"—it prefers the structure of the main international economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund; it prefers the existence of "open regionalism" 99; it prefers the dollar as the reserve currency; and so on. U.S. interests are thus well served to the extent that American allies favor the global economic status quo rather than revisions that could be harmful to U.S. economic interests. One reason they are often inclined to take this approach is because of their security relationship with the United States. For example, interviews with U.S. officials stress that alliance ties give Washington leverage and authority in the current struggle over multilateral governance institutions in Asia. As one official noted, "On the economic side, the existence of the security alliance contributes to an atmosphere of trust that enables the United States and Japan to present a united front on shared economic goals—such as open markets and transparency, for example, through APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]."100 Likewise, Japan's current interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important long-term economic initiative in East Asia, is widely understood to be shaped less by specific Japanese [End Page 44] economic interests than by the belief of Yoshihiko Noda's administration that it will strengthen alliance ties with the United States.101 As one former administration official stressed, this enhanced allied interest in supporting U.S. favored economic frameworks as a means of strengthening security ties with the United States helps to ensure against any shift to "a Sino-centric/ nontransparent/more mercantilist economic order in Asia."[|102] The United States' security leverage over its allies matters even if it is not used actively to garner support for its conception of the global economy and other economic issues. This is perhaps best illustrated by the status of the dollar as the reserve currency, which confers major benefits on the United States.103 For many analysts, the U.S. position as the leading superpower with worldwide security commitments is an important reason why the dollar was established as the reserve currency and why it is likely to retain this status for a long time.104 In the past, Washington frequently used direct security leverage to get its allies to support the dollar.105 There are a number of subtler mechanisms, however, through which the current U.S. geopolitical position serves the same end. First, Kathleen McNamara builds on the logic of focal points to argue that the U.S. global military role bolsters the likelihood that the dollar will long continue to be the currency that actors converge upon as the "'natural' dominant currency."[|106] Second, Norrlof emphasizes the significance of a mechanism that U.S. officials also stress: the United States' geopolitical position gives it the ability to constrain certain forms of Asian regionalism that, if they were to eventuate, could help to promote movement away from the dollar. 107 Third, Adam Posen emphasizes that the EU's security dependence on the United States makes it less likely that the euro countries will develop a true [End Page 45] global military capacity and thus "that the dollar will continue to benefit from the geopolitical sources of its global role" in ways that the euro countries will never match.108 In sum, the United States is a //key pillar// of the global economy, but it does not provide this service for free: it also extracts disproportionate benefits. Undertaking retrenchment would place these benefits at risk. Institutional Benefits What goes for the global economy also applies to larger patterns of institutionalized cooperation. Here, too, the leadership enabled by the United States'grand strategy //fosters cooperation// thatgenerates diffuse benefits for many states but often disproportionately reflects U.S. preferences. This basic premise subsumes three claims. First, benefits flow to the United States from institutionalized cooperation to address a wide range of problems. There is general agreement that a stable, open, and loosely rule-based international order serves the interests of the United States. Indeed, we are aware of no serious studies suggesting that U.S. interests would be better advanced in a world that is closed (i.e., built around blocs and spheres of influence) and devoid of basic, agreed-upon rules and institutions. As scholars have long argued, under conditions of rising complex interdependence, states often can benefit from institutionalized cooperation.109 In the security realm, newly emerging threats arguably are producing a rapid rise in the benefits of such cooperation for the United States. Some of thesethreats are transnational and emerge from environmental, health, and resource vulnerabilities, such as those concerning pandemics. Transnational nonstate groups with various capacities for violence have also become salient in recent decades, including groups involved in terrorism, piracy, andorganized crime .[|110] [End Page 46] As is widely argued, these sorts of nontraditional , transnational threats //can be// realistically //addressed only through//various types of //collective action// .111 Unless countries are prepared to radically restrict their integration into an increasingly globalized world system, the problems must be solved through coordinated action. 112 In the face of these diffuse and shifting threats, the United States is going to find itself needing to work with other states to an increasing degree, sharing information, building capacities, and responding to crises .113 Second, //U////.S. leadership increases the prospects that such cooperation will emerge// in a manner relatively favorable to U.S. interests. Of course, the prospects for cooperation are partly a function of compatible interests. Yet even when interests overlap, scholars of all theoretical stripes haveestablished that //institutionalized cooperation does not emerge effortlessly// : generating agreement on the particular cooperative solution can often be elusive. And when interests do not overlap, the bargaining becomes tougher yet: not just how, but whether cooperation will occur is on the table. Many factors affect the initiation of cooperation, and under various conditions states can and have cooperated without hegemonic leadership .[|114] As noted above, however, scholars acknowledge that the likelihood of cooperation drops in the absence of leadership. Finally, U.S. security commitments are an integral component of this leadership. Historically, as Gilpin and other theorists of hegemonic order have shown, the background security and stability that the United States provided facilitated the creation of multilateral institutions for ongoing cooperation across policy areas.115 As in the case of the global economy, U.S. security provision [End Page 47] plays a role in fostering stability within and across regions, and this has an impact on the ability of states to engage in institutional cooperation. Institutional cooperation is least likely in areas of the world where instability is pervasive. It is more likely to flourish in areas where states are secure and leaders can anticipate stable and continuous relations—where the "shadow of the future" is most evident. And because of the key security role it plays in fostering this institutional cooperation, the United States is in a stronger position to help shape the contours of these cooperative efforts. The United States' extended system of security commitments creates a set of institutional relationships that foster political communication. Alliance institutions are in the first instance about security protection, but they are also mechanisms that provide a kind of "political architecture" that is useful beyond narrow issues of military affairs. Alliances bind states together and create institutional channels of communication. NATO has facilitated ties and associated institutions—such as the Atlantic Council—that increase the ability of the United States and Europe to talk to each other and do business.116 Likewise, the bilateral alliances in East Asia also play a communication role beyond narrow security issues. Consultations and exchanges spill over into other policy areas.117 For example, when U.S. officials travel to Seoul to consult on alliance issues, they also routinely talk about other pending issues, such as, recently, the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This gives the United States the capacity to work across issue areas, using assets and bargaining chips in one area to make progress in another. It also provides more diffuse political benefits to cooperation that flow from the "voice opportunities" created by the security alliance architecture.[|118] The alliances provide channels and access points for wider flows of communication—and [End Page 48] the benefits of greater political solidarity and institutional cooperation that follow. The benefits of these communication flows cut across all international issues, but are arguably enhanced with respect to generating security cooperation to deal with new kinds of threats — such as terrorism and health pandemics — that require a multitude of novel bargains and newly established procedures ofshared responsibilities among a wide range of countries. With the existing U.S.-led security system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it otherwise would be to strike bargains and share burdens of security cooperation in such areas. The challenge of rising security interdependence is greater security cooperation. That is, when countries are increasingly mutually vulnerable to nontraditional, diffuse, transnational threats, they need to work together to eradicate the conditions that allow for these threats and limit the damage. The U.S.-led alliance system is a platform with already existing capacities and routines for security cooperation. These assets can be used or adapted, saving the cost of generating security cooperation from scratch. In short, having an institution in place to facilitate cooperation on one issue makes it easier, and more likely, that the participating states will be able to achieve cooperation rapidly on a related issue.119 The usefulness of the U.S. alliance system for generating enhanced non-security cooperation is confirmed in interviews with former State Department and National Security Council officials. One former administration official noted, using the examples of Australia and South Korea, that the security ties "create nonsecurity benefits in terms of support for global agenda issues," such as Afghanistan, Copenhagen, disaster relief, and the financial crisis. "This is not security leverage per se, but it is an indication of how the deepness of the security relationship creates working relationships [and] interoperability that can then be leveraged to address other regional issues." This official notes, "We could not have organized the Core Group (India, U.S., Australia, Japan) in [End Page 49] response to the 2004 tsunami without the deep bilateral military relationships that had already been in place. It was much easier for us to organize with these countries almost immediately (within forty-eight hours) than anyone else for a large-scale humanitarian operation because our militaries were accustomed to each other."120 The United States' role as security provider also has a more direct effect of enhancing its authority and capacity to initiate institutional cooperation in various policy areas. The fact that the United States is a security patron of Japan, South Korea, and other countries in East Asia, for example, gives it a weight and presence in regional diplomacy over the shape and scope of multilateral cooperation not just within the region but also elsewhere. This does not mean that the United States always wins these diplomatic encounters, but its leverage is greater than it would be if the United States were purely an offshore great power without institutionalized security ties to the region. In sum, the deep engagement strategy enables U.S. leadership, which results in more cooperation on matters of importance than would occur if the United States disengaged—even as it pushes cooperation toward U.S. preferences.

CO2 emissions will run away in the status quo—natural gas is the only effective alternative to coal—U.S. development is modeled globally and prevents extinction
Riley 8/13 —BA, LL.M., PhD, professor of energy law at The City Law School at City University London (Alan, 8/13/12, “Shale Gas to the Climate Rescue,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/14/opinion/shale-gas-to-the-climate-rescue.html, RBatra)

The battle against runaway climate change is being lost. The green movement and the energy industry — while engaged in a furious debate on issues from nuclear power to oil sands — are missing the bigger picture.There is little recognition by either side that current policies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions are inadequate for dealing with the threat that they pose. It is the coal-fueled growth of countries like China and India that generates much of these emissions. Unless a cheap, rapidly deployable substitute fuel is found for coal, then it will be next to impossible to safely rein in rising carbon dioxide levels around the world. Although the green movement might at first see shale gas as an enemy in this fight, it may in fact turn out to be a friend. Broad development of shale gas resources — with proper ecological safeguards — could be the best way to achieve the quick cuts in carbon dioxide emissions that we need //to maintain a habitable environment// on Earth. The International Energy Agency has made it clear that, under current energy policies, the door is closing on our attempts to contain the carbon-driven rise in global temperatures to within 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 Fahrenheit) by the middle of the century. In fact, worldwide carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels reached a record high of 31.6 gigatons in 2011. With emissions rising by one gigaton per year, it appears the temperature-increase target will most likely be missed.The shale gas revolution could be the means of blunting the rise of carbon dioxide emissions and give new hope for staying within the 2 degrees Celsius scenario. This resource is widely dispersed across the planet, cheap to develop and offers many of the same energy benefits as coal. If exploited properly, it could replace coal within a couple of decades as a primary fuel.By developing shale gas as a replacement fuel for coal we retrieve the prospect of blunting — and possibly reversing — the upward climb of carbon dioxide emissions. Shale gas emits 50 percent less carbon dioxide than coal, and so if countries like China and India made the switch on a large scale, then we have a chance to reset the trajectory of global carbon dioxide emissions. A widespread turn to the use of shale gas would give the planet precious time to develop other, renewable solutions to further lower our output of carbon dioxide. Current renewableenergy sources cannot in any way deliver the same savings in carbon emissions that we canachieve by replacing coal with shale gas. One only has to look to China to see the strong potential of this solution. With the world’s largest shale gas resources, the country has set out a vast gas development program in its latest five-year economic plan. Output would rise from 6.5 billion cubic meters of shale gas by 2015 to 100 billion cubic meters by 2020. And if China can produce that much by 2020, is there any reason to think it cannot pump out 800 billion cubic meters by 2030?Such a development program would be similar in scale to that undertaken in the United States, which has seen shale gas rise from 1 percent of gas production in 2001 to 37 percent last year. China can surely achieve these goals, especially given all the new technology available to the shale gas industry, along with abundant state capital. That the government is focusing its efforts in this direction is another reason to believe that China can reach these production levels. An output of 800 billion cubic meters a year — combined with far-higher levels of energy efficiency — would allow China to slow, and then terminate, its coal-expansion plans and ultimately end its reliance on coal -fired energy altogether. The U nited S tates could play a key role in encouraging China and other developing nations to switch from coal to shale gas. The State Department has launched a Global Shale Gas Initiative to facilitate the transfer of technical expertise to other countries to ensure safe development of this new resource. The U nited S tates could also lead the way in creating a credible, alternative climate change strategy in which the use of shale gas becomes the driver of radical cuts in carbon dioxide emissions over the short and medium term.

And, natural gas acts as a bridge fuel—spurring broad renewable development
Ju 12 – Anne Ju (senior science writer for the Cornell Chronicle) July 17, 2012 “Study Proves Natural Gas Can Bridge the Gap to a Clean Energy Economy” []

Natural gas is a good transition step on the road to greener energy sources like wind, solar, and nuclear power, says a new study. Lawrence M. Cathles, Cornell University professor of earth and atmospheric sciences, says natural gas is a smart move in the battle against global climate change. Published in the most recent edition of the journal Geochemistry, Geophysics and Geosystems, Cathles’ study reviews the most recent government and industry data on natural gas “leakage rates” during extraction, as well as recently developed climate models. He concludes that regardless of the time frame considered, substituting natural gas energy for all coal and some oil production provides about 40 percent of the global warming benefit that a complete switch to low-carbon sources would deliver. “From a greenhouse point of view, it would be better to replace coal electrical facilities with nuclear plants, wind farms, and solar panels, but replacing them with natural gas stations will be faster, cheaper, and achieve 40 percent of the low-carbon-fast benefit ,” Cathles writes in the study. “ Gas is a natural transition fuel that could represent the biggest stabilization wedge available to us .” Cathles’ study includes additional findings about expanding the use of natural gas as an energy source, as well as the climate impact of “unconventional” gas drilling methods, including hydraulic fracturing in shale formations. They include the following: • Although a more rapid transition to natural gas from coal and some oil produces a greater overall benefit for climate change, the 40 percent of low-carbon energy benefit remains no matter how quickly the transition is made, and no matter the effect of ocean modulation or other climate regulating forces. • Although some critics of natural gas as a transition fuel have cited leakage rates as high as 8 percent or more of total production during drilling —particularly hydraulic fracturing extraction— more recent industry data and a critical examination of Environmental Protection Agency data supports leakage rates closer to 1.5 percent for both conventional and hydrofractured wells. • Even at higher leakage rates, using natural gas as a transition to low-carbon energy sources is still a better policy than “business as usual” with coal and oil, due to the different rates of decay (and hence long-term global warming effect) of carbon dioxide released in greater amounts by burning coal and oil and any methane released during natural gas extraction. • Using natural gas as a transition fuel supports the push to low-carbon sources by providing the “surge capacity” when needed, or a buffer when solar and wind production wanes. “The most important message of the calculations reported here is that substituting natural gas for coal and oil is a significant way to reduce greenhouse forcing, regardless of how long the substitution takes,” Cathles writes. “ A faster transition to low-carbon energy sources would decrease greenhouse warming further, but the substitution of natural gas for other fossil fuels is equally beneficial in percentage terms no matter how fast the transition.”

And, that means only the plan solves global emissions
Riley, 12 [August, Alan Riley is a professor of energy law at The City Law School at City University London, “Shale Gas to the Climate Rescue”, []] By developing shale gas as a replacement fuel for coal we retrieve the prospect of blunting — and possibly //reversing// — the upward climb of carbon dioxide emissions. Shale gas emits 50 percent less carbon dioxide than coal, and so if countries like China and India made the switch on a large scale, then we have a chance to reset the trajectory of global carbon dioxide emissions. A widespread turn to the use of shale gas would give the planet precious time to develop other, renewable solutions to further lower our output of carbon dioxide. Current renewable energy sources cannot in any way deliver the same savings in carbonemissions that we can achieve by replacing coal with shale gas. One only has to look to China to see the strong potential of this solution. With the world’s largest shale gas resources, the country has set out a vast gas development program in its latest five-year economic plan. Output would rise from 6.5 billion cubic meters of shale gas by 2015 to 100 billion cubic meters by 2020. And if China can produce that much by 2020, is there any reason to think it cannot pump out 800 billion cubic meters by 2030? Such a development program would be similar in scale to that undertaken in the United States, which has seen shale gas rise from 1 percent of gas production in 2001 to 37 percent last year. China can surely achieve these goals, especially given all the new technology available to the shale gas industry, along with abundant state capital. That the government is focusing its efforts in this direction is another reason to believe that China can reach these production levels. An output of 800 billion cubic meters a year — combined with far-higher levels of energy efficiency — would allow China to slow, and then terminate, its coal-expansion plans and ultimately end its reliance on coal-fired energy altogether. The United States could play a key role in encouraging China and other developing nations to switch from coal to shale gas.The State Department has launched a Global Shale Gas Initiative to facilitate the transfer of technical expertise to othercountries to ensure safe development of this new resource. The United States could also lead the way in //creating a credible, alternative climate change strategy//in which the use of shale gas becomes the driver of //radical cuts in// carbon dioxide //emissions// over the short and medium term. Such a strategy would include establishing a series of Shale Gas Trusts around the world to disseminate information, know-how and assist in building regulatory capacity. A second part of the strategy would press for the gradual suppression of coal use and the global trade in coal, with compensation outlays for the coal industry as a whole. Suppressing the production and trade in coal would be vital for three reasons. First, it would demonstrate the West’s commitment to replacing coal. Second, we would be able to transfer the social, regulatory and business know-how to other nations to encourage coal suppression. Third, it would push up the price of coal to encourage states to switch from coal to shale gas. Of course the coal industry in the West would resist suppression. But the reality of rising access to cheap shale gas will in any event increasingly undermine the profitability of coal. A compelling business case can be made to the coal industry that compensation and access to the shale gas industry is a better option than remaining in coal. Successful worldwide cooperation in suppressing coal could provide the basis for building a //credible international coalition// to further decarbonize the energy system beyond shale gas and into a fully renewable economy.

The plan solves warming – most recent and comprehensive study
Levi, 1/3/13 [Climate consequences of natural gas as a bridge fuel ¶ Michael Levi, David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change, Climate Consequences of Natural Gas As a Bridge Fuel, []] 5 Conclusions and discussion ¶ Beginning with well known stabilization scenarios that feature direct transitions from a coaldominated ¶ world to one featuring zero-carbon energy (“traditional stabilization scenarios”), ¶ we have constructedscenarios that feature a natural gas “bridge” to a zero-carbon world ¶ while leaving carbon dioxide emissions the same at all points in time, and ones that differ ¶ from those only by replacing that bridge with coal. ¶ Comparing bridge and traditional stabilization scenarios aimed at stabilizing CO2 concentrations ¶ near 450 ppm with closely related scenarios in which a transition from coal is ¶ Climatic Change ¶ delayed, we find that the differences in peak temperatures between the variousscenarios is ¶ relatively small. This remains true regardless of methane leakage rates. //The greatest differences////occur for// those //scenarios where coal use// in the reference case //is highest//. ¶ In contrast with the 450 ppm cases, in the scenarios explored here, pathways that stabilize ¶ CO2 concentrations near 550 ppm using natural gas as a bridge fuel promisesubstantially ¶ lower peak temperatures than similar ones that differ only by delaying the transition away ¶ from coal until zero carbon energy rises in its place. ¶ Moreover, in most cases where stabilization is near 550 ppm CO2, even high rates of ¶ methane leakage do not fundamentally alter the conclusion that replacing coal with gas ¶ can substantially lower peaktemperatures relative to what they would be if a transition ¶ away from coal were instead delayed. In particular, if so-called “ tipping points” can be ¶ triggered by exceeding particular temperature thresholds, methane leakage in the context ¶ of bridgefuel scenarios will have at most a very small impact on the odds that ¶ those thresholds will be crossed. This is true even if steps to reduce methane leakage ¶ can yield benefits exceeding costs. ¶ Collectively, these results suggest that it may be useful to think of a natural gas bridge as a ¶ potential hedging tool against the possibility that it will be more difficult to move away from ¶ coal than policymakers desire or can achieve, rather than merely (or primarily) as a way to ¶ achieve particular desired temperature outcomes. ¶ In addition, the results show that scenarios featuring natural gas as a bridge fuel can, in ¶ principle, result in precisely the same CO2 concentrations, and similar warming rates, to ¶ scenarios in which a transition to zero-carbon energy from coal is direct and begins sooner. ¶ This does not mean that the various scenarios have identical climatic results or that they are ¶ equally plausible, nor does it mean that other plausible scenarios might not have superior ¶ climate outcomes. ¶

OCS expansion key to solve warming – the impact is extinction
Lamborn, 08 [Path of wisdom: Open up Outer Continental Shelf to gas drilling, House Representative Doug Republican Colorado, []] Many years ago that great philosopher Woody Allen wrote, “More than any other time in history, mankind faces acrossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness. The other, to //total extinction//. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.” That quip reminds me of the current debates on climate-change legislation. It seems that no matter what direction Congress takes, someone is ready to shout that the end is near. One side says that if we do not act immediately and reduce greenhouse gases to zero, the earth will burn up, the seas will rise, and millions will die. On the other side are those shouting that costly changes in regulation will damage the American way of life and have little, if any, significant impact on air quality or global warning. Whichever side is right, and I personally think the second side is much nearer the truth, the fact is that any climate-change legislation will dramatically change the way we generate power in this country. The U.S. Senate is considering S. 2191, which seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions nearly 20 percent by 2020, and by over 60 percent by 2050. While it may not pass this year, it will undoubtedly serve as a basis for climate-change legislation in the future. As we continue to discuss climate change on the Hill, I hope that my colleagues will consider the impact on energy supplies, especially the natural gas sector. Demand for natural gas for electricity generation shot up 42 percent from 1997 to 2005. Climate-change legislation will only turn that dramatic upward trend into a stampede. Last year the Natural Gas Council — which represents all segments of the natural gas industry — analyzed the McCain-Lieberman climate change legislation. The study reported that the bill would cause natural gas demand to go up 20 percent. Utilities have been turning away from traditional coal-fired generation to create electricity because of public concerns about clean air, including the cost of controlling emissions with current technology. While nuclear power will help meet clean air demands and electricity requirements, thoseare costly to build and take a long time to bring on line.That leaves natural gas-fired generation plants.They can be built //quickly// and are //relatively inexpensive// when total costs are considered.In addition, natural gas-firedgenerators create the reliable electricity loads that cannot yet be met by wind and solarpower.If natural gas prices were holding steady even as demand has grown, we could continue toafford this course and not worry about the impact of climate change legislation. But natural gas prices have gone from just over $2 per million BTUs in 2000, to nearly $10 today because of continuing demand and flat supplies. That high cost has been blamed in large part for the loss of nearly three million manufacturing jobs. Imagine what will happen when the natural gas stampede hits full stride. To meet the needs of a cleaner Earth and the electricity demands of a prosperous nation, we will need more generation from solar, wind, biofuels and other fuels. But //we will// also //need more natural gas//, and to get there , we need to open up the great areas off ourcoasts , which hold an enormous amount of natural gas ( 250 trillion cubic feet ). We set aside the Outer Continental Shelf to both protect the environment and for a rainyday. Now that rainy day has already arrived, and we can protect the environment with natural gas. If we don’t open the Outer Continental Shelf for natural gas exploration, the words of another great philosopher, John Fogerty, come to mind : “ I see a bad moon rising / I see trouble on the way.”

Extinction—GHG emissions are the proximate cause
Costello 11 –, Anthony, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Mark Maslin, Department of Geography, University College London, Hugh Montgomery, Institute for Human Health and Performance, University College London, Anne M. Johnson, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Paul Ekins, Energy Institute, University College London [“Global health and climate change: moving from denial and catastrophic fatalism to positive action” May 2011 vol. 369 no. 1942 1866-1882 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society]

Advocacy about the health consequences will ensure that climate change is a high priority. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change was set up in 1992 to ensure that nations worked together to minimize the adverse effects, but McMichael and Neira noted that, in preparation for the Copenhagen conference in December 2009, only four of 47 nations mentioned human health as a consideration [1]. With business as usual, __global warming caused by__ rising greenhouse gas ( __GHG) emissions____will threaten mass populations____through__ increased transmission of some __infections__, __heat stress__ , __food and water insecurity__ , increased deaths from more frequent and extreme climate events, threats to shelter and security, and through population migration [2]. On the one hand it is necessary in the media to counter climate change sceptics and denialists, but on the other __it is__ also __important not to allow climate catastrophists __, who tell us it is all too late, to deflect us from pragmatic __ and positive action. ____Catastrophic scenarios are possible in the long__ er __term__, and effective action will be formidably difficult, but evidence suggests that __we__ do __have__ the tools, __the time and__ the __resources to bring__ about the __changes needed for climate stability__. 2. Climate change evidence and denial Given the current body of evidence, __it is surprising that__ global __warming and__ its causal __relationship with__ atmospheric __GHG__ pollution __is disputed____any more than the relationship between__ acquired immune deficiency syndrome ( __AIDS) and__ human immunodeficiency virus ( __HIV__ ) infection, __or__ lung __cancer and cigarette smoking__. The basic principles that determine the Earth’s temperature are, of course, relatively simple. Some of the short-wave solar radiation that strikes the Earth is reflected back into space and some is absorbed by the land and emitted as long-wave radiation (heat). Some of the long-wave radiation is trapped in the atmosphere by ‘greenhouse gases’, which include water vapour, carbon dioxide and methane. Without GHGs the Earth would be on average 33◦C colder. Over the last 150 years, since the Industrial Revolution, humans have been adding more carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. The result is that the Earth’s atmosphere, ocean and land are indeed warming—due to increased atmospheric ‘greenhouse gas’ concentrations [3]. Gleick et al. [4], from the US National Academy of Sciences, wrote a letter to Science stating ‘ __There is compelling, comprehensive, and consistent objective evidence that humans are changing the climate in ways that threaten__ our __societies__ and the ecosystems on which we depend’. The most recent __report__ by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [5], amounting to nearly 3000 pages of detailed review and analysis of published research, also declares that the __scientific uncertainties__ of global warming __are__ essentially __resolved__. This report states that there is clear evidence for a 0.75◦C rise in global temperatures and 22 cm rise in sea level during the twentieth century. The IPCC synthesis also predicts that __global temperatures could rise further__ by between 1.1◦C and 6.4◦C by 2100, and sea level could rise by between 28 and 79 cm, or more if the melting of Greenland and Antarctica accelerates. In addition, weather patterns will become less predictable and the occurrence of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, heat waves and droughts, will increase. There is also strong evidence for ocean acidification driven by more carbon dioxide dissolving in the oceans [6]. Given the current failure of international negotiations to address carbon emission reductions, and that atmospheric warming lags behind rises in CO2 concentration, there is concern that global surface temperature will rise above the supposedly ‘safe limit’ of 2◦C within this century. Each doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration alone is expected to produce 1.9–4.5◦C of warming at equilibrium [7]. Of course, climate modelling is an extremely complex process, and uncertainty with projections relating to future emissions trajectories means that the time scale and magnitude of future climate change cannot be predicted with certainty [8]. These uncertainties are magnified when future climate predictions are used to estimate potential impacts. For example, the environmental impacts of climate change are also uncertain, but could underestimate such impacts because they detrimentally interact with habitat loss, pollution and loss of biodiversity due to other causes. There is also the additional problem that switching from biome to biome may not be directly reversible. For example, rainforest recycles a huge amount of water so it can survive a significant amount of aridification before it burns and is replaced by savannah. But the region then has to get much wetter before rainforest can return, as there is greatly reduced water cycling in savannah [9]. In the policy arena, further uncertainty surrounds the desire for international agreements on emission cuts, and the possible routes to such agreement and implementation. The feasible speed of technological innovation in carbon capture and provision of renewable/low-carbon energy resources is also uncertain. __Denying the__ causes or the current weight of __evidence__ for anthropogenic climate change __is irrational__, just as the existence of ‘uncertainties’ should not be used to deny the need for proportionate action, when such uncertainties could underestimate the risks and impact of climate change. There is no reason for inaction and there are many ways we can use our current knowledge of climate change to improve health provision for current and future generations. 3. Catastrophism At the other end of the scale are doom-mongers who predict catastrophic population collapse and the end of civilization. In the early nineteenth century, the French palaeontologist Georges Cuvier first addressed catastrophism and explained patterns of extinction observed in the fossil record through catastrophic natural events [10]. We know now of five major extinctions: the Ordovician–Silurian extinction (439 million years ago), the Late Devonian extinction (about 364 million years ago), the Permian–Triassic extinction (about 251 million years ago), the End Triassic extinction (roughly 199 million to 214 million years ago) and the Cretaceous– Tertiary extinction (about 65 million years ago). These mass extinctions were caused by a combination of plate tectonics, supervolcanism and asteroid impacts. The understanding of the mass extinctions led Gould & Eldredge [11] to update Darwin’s theory of evolution with their own theory of punctuated equilibrium. Many scientists have suggested that the current human-induced extinction rates could be as fast as those during these mass extinctions [12,13]. For example, one study predicted that 58 per cent of species may be committed to extinction by 2050 due to climate change alone [14], though this paper has been criticized [15,16]. Some people have even suggested that **__human extinction may not be a remote risk__** [17–19]. Sherwood & Huber [7] point to continued __heating effects__ that __could make the world__ largely __uninhabitable__ by humans and mammals within 300 years. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature (used because it reflects both the ambient temperature and relative humidity of the site), is surprisingly similar across diverse climates and never exceeds 31◦C. They suggest that if it rose to 35◦C, which never happens now but would at a warming of 7◦C, __hyperthermia in humans__ and other mammals __would occur as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible,__ therefore __making__ many __environments uninhabitable.__

Plan text
The United States federal government should substantially increase necessary leasing for offshore natural gas production in all appropriate and feasible locations in the Outer Continental Shelf in the United States

OCS restrictions must be lifted but federal action is key – Congress has to fund DOI leasing projects
Lieberman 08 – senior policy analyst for Energy and Environment for the Heritage Foundation (Ben, “Listing the Offshore Drilling Ban: A Positive Step in the Fight against High Energy Prices”, The Heritage Foundation, 7/14/2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/07/lifting-the-offshore-drilling-ban-a-positive-step-in-the-fight-against-high-energy-prices)//BD Washington must do something about the increasing price of gasoline, now topping $4 per gallon. One important step would be to tap our own supplies of oil. Yet for decades, overlapping congressional and presidential restrictions on drilling for energy in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) have stood in the way of lower prices for oil and natural gas. The President took a positive step today by rescinding the executive moratorium on exploration and production in American waters. However, Congress still needs to act in order to make this oil available. ** Congressional Restrictions on Drilling ** Many of America's offshore areas are off-limits to energy production. Beginning in 1982, Congress restricted more and more offshore areasthrough annual Department of the Interior (DOI) appropriations. The DOI has authority over the OCS, which includes most areas more than three miles offshore. Through this annual process, Congress chose to deny DOI the funding necessary to conduct leasing of new offshore areas to oil and natural gas companies. These off-limits areas comprise 85 percent of the OCS-almost everywhere except the central and western Gulf of Mexico-and the congressional moratoria have become a standard feature of each year's DOI appropriations bil l. Until recent years, these restrictions were easily renewed with little controversy, but with the dramatic rise in oil and natural gas prices, as well as the desire to reduce oil imports from unfriendly foreign countries, there have been several legislative efforts to roll them back. Thus far, none of these efforts has been successful.

85% of gas is off limits now
Luthi, 11/9/12 [Luthi is the president of the National Ocean Industry Association, representing more than 275 companies engaged in all aspects of the exploration and production of both traditional and renewable energy resources on the nation’s outer continental shelf, “Let's find agreement on new offshore access”, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/267089-lets-find-agreement-on-new-offshore-access]

Now that the election is (finally) behind us, President Obama has an opportunity to set the nation more forcefully on the road to energy independence. __We__ ’re well on our way thanks in large part to new techniques and technologies that __have //unlocked// //vast deposits of//__ shale oil and //natural gas////.// But we could and //should be// __doing much more__. Back __in June__, __the Interior Department issued its five-year__ Outer Continental Shelf ( __OCS__ ) oil and __gas__ leasing __plan__. Despite high expectations encouraged by President Obama’s self-described “all-of-the-above” approach to the nation’s energy policy and the absence of long-standing Administrative and Congressional exploration bans that were lifted in 2008, __the____plan //failed to open// any new offshore areas //to//__ oil and //natural gas// exploration and //production//. __The industry is still____limited to the same 15 percent of the acreage on the OCS that’s been available for decades__, __leaving //85 percent untouchable//__. Don’t get me wrong. That 15 percent has been incredibly productive. In fact, the Gulf of Mexico region, which is the heart of America’s offshore oil and gas industry, has yielded six times more oil than 1980s resource estimates predicted it held. Production in the Gulf is finally ramping back up now that permitting rates are bouncing back from historic lows following the Macondo spill in 2010. We have every reason to believe that the areas where we can explore and produce will continue to support and create jobs and contribute to America’s energy security for years and even decades to come. For this reason, __we will continue to advocate that__ the __Obama__ Administration streamline and //accelerate permitting// __on these acres of the____OCS__. We will also fight to put to rest once and for all the erroneous claims that the industry is “sitting on” offshore tracts, a red herring that surfaced again during the presidential debates. In fact, the success industry has crafted out of the 15 percent of the OCS currently open to exploration and production underscores why the Interior Department’s 5-Year Leasing Plan was so disappointing. Think of how much energy awaits us in the 85 percent of the offshore areas where we currently cannot explore or produce. One report by the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, conducted several years ago, estimates recoverable resources in “U.S. moratorium areas” of 19.29 billion barrels of oil and 83.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. If history is any guide, these estimates will prove to be very conservative. The frustrating truth is we have no idea how much is waiting for us there, because we’re not allowed to go look.

And, the plan creates certainty for offshore production—balances supply
Griles 3 [Lisa, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Interior, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate]

Mr. GRILES. __America’s__ public __lands have an abundant opportunity for exploration and //development//____of__ renewable and nonrenewable __energy resources__. __Energy reserves contained on the Department of the Interior’s__ onshore and __offshore__ Federal __lands are very //important//____to //meeting//____our____current and future estimates of what it is going to take to continue to__//supply////America’s////energy demand//. Estimates suggest that __these lands contain__ approximately 68 percent of the undiscovered U.S. oil resources and //74 percent of// the __undiscovered__//natural gas resources//. President Bush has developed a national energy policy that laid out a comprehensive, long-term energy strategy for America’s future. That strategy recognizes __we need to raise domestic production of energy__, both renewable and nonrenewable, __to meet our____dependence for energy__. For oil and gas, the United States uses about 7 billion barrels a year, of which about 4 billion are currently imported and 3 billion are domestically produced. The President proposed to open a small portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to environmentally responsible oil and gas exploration. Now there is a new and environmentally friendly technology, similar to directional drilling, with mobile platforms, self-containing drilling units. These things will allow producers to access large energy reserves with almost no footprint on the tundra. Each day, even since I have assumed this job, our ability to minimize our effect on the environment continues to improve to where it is almost nonexistent in such areas as even in Alaska. According to the latest oil and gas assessment, ANWR is the largest untapped source of domestic production available to us. The production for ANWR would equal about 60 years of imports from Iraq. The National Energy Policy also encourages development of cleaner, more diverse portfolios of domestic renewable energy sources. The renewable policy in areas cover geothermal, wind, solar, and biomass. And it urges research on hydrogen as an alternate energy source. To advance the National Energy Policy, the Bureau of Land Management and the DOE’s National Renewable Energy Lab last week announced the release of a renewable energy report. It identifies and evaluates renewable energy resources on public lands. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this for the record.* This report, which has just come out, assess the potential for renewable energy on public lands. It is a very good report that we hope will allow for the private sector, after working with the various other agencies, to where can we best use renewable resource, and how do we take this assessment and put it into the land use planning that we are currently going, so that right-of-ways and understanding of what renewable resources can be done in the West can, in fact, have a better opportunity. The Department completed the first of an energy inventory this year. Now the EPCA report, which is laying here, also, Mr. Chairman, is an estimate of the undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Part one of that report covers five oil and gas basins. The second part of the report will be out later this year. Now this report, it is not—there are people who have different opinions of it. But the fact is we believe it will be a good guidance tool, as we look at where the oil and gas potential is and where we need to do land use planning. And as we update these land use plannings and do our EISs, that will help guide further the private sector, the public sector, and all stakeholders on how we can better do land use planning and develop oil and gas in a sound fashion. Also, I have laying here in front of me the two EISs that have been done on the two major coal methane basins in the United States, San Juan Basis and the Powder River Basin. Completing these reports, which are in draft, will increase and offer the opportunity for production of natural gas with coal bed methane. Now these reports are in draft and, once completed, will authorize and allow for additional exploration and development. It has taken 2 years to get these in place. It has taken 2 years to get some of these in place. This planning process that Congress has initiated under FLPMA and other statutes allows for a deliberative, conscious understanding of what the impacts are. We believe that when these are finalized, that is in fact what will occur. One of the areas which we believe that the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Management is and is going to engage in is coordination with landowners. Mr. Chairman, the private sector in the oil and gas industry must be good neighbors with the ranchers in the West. The BLM is going to be addressing the issues of bonding requirements that will assure that landowners have their surface rights and their values protected. BLM is working to make the consultation process with the landowners, with the States and local governments and other Federal agencies more efficient and meaningful. But we must assure that the surface owners are protected and the values of their ranches are in fact assured. And by being good neighbors, we can do that. In the BLM land use planning process, we have priorities, ten current resource management planning areas that contain the major oil and gas reserves that are reported out in the EPCA study. Once this process is completed, then we can move forward with consideration of development of the natural gas. We are also working with the Western Governors’ Association and the Western Utilities Group. The purpose is to identify and designate right-of-way corridors on public lands. We would like to do it now as to where right-of-way corridors make sense and put those in our land use planning processes, so that when the need is truly identified, utilities, energy companies, and the public will know where they are __Instead of taking two years to amend a land use plan, hopefully this will expedite____and have future opportunity so that when the need is there, we can go ahead and make that investment through the private sector. It should speed up the process of__//right-of-way// __permits__ for both pipelines and electric transmission. Now let me switch to the offshore, __the Outer Continental Shelf. It is a huge contributor to our____Nation’s energy and economic security__. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, everything you have talked about so far is onshore. Mr. GRILES. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. You now will speak to offshore. Mr. GRILES. Yes, sir, I will. Now we are keeping on schedule the holding lease sales in the areas that are available for leasing. __In the past year__, __scheduled sales in____several areas were either delayed__ , __canceled, or put under moratoria, even though they were in the 5-year plan. It//undermined certainty//__. //It made investing//, particularly in the Gulf, //more risky//. __We have approved a 5-year oil and____gas leasing program in July 2002 that calls for 20 new lease sales__ in the Gulf of Mexico __and several other areas of the offshore, specifically in Alaska__ by 2007. Now our estimates indicate that these areas contain resources up to 22 billion barrels of oil and 61 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. We are also acting to raise energy production from these offshore areas by providing royalty relief on the OCS leases for new deep wells that are drilled in shallow water. These are at depths that heretofore were very and are very costly to produce from and costly to drill to. __We //need to encourage//__ that //exploration//. __These deep wells__, which are greater than 15,000 feet in depth, __are expected to access between 5 to 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and //can be developed quickly// //due to existing infrastructure// and the shallow water. We have also issued a final rule in July 2002 that allows companies to apply for a lease extension, giving them more time to analyze complex geological data__ that underlies salt domes. That is, where geologically salt overlays the geologically clay. And you try to do seismic, and the seismic just gets distorted. __So we have extended the lease terms, so that hopefully those companies can figure out where and where to best drill__. __Vast resources of__ oil and __natural gas lie,__ we hope, __beneath these____sheets of salt in the OCS__ in the Gulf of Mexico. But it is very difficult to get clear seismic images. We are also working to create a process of reviewing and permitting alternative energy sources on the OCS lands. __We have sent legislation to____Congress that would give the Minerals__ Management __Service__ of the Department of the Interior //clear authority to lease////parts of the OCS// for renewable energy. The renewables could be wind, wave, or solar energy, and related projects that are auxiliary to oil and gas development, such as offshore staging facilities and emergency medical facilities. __We need this authority in order to be able to truly give the private sector what are the rules to play from and buy, //so they can have certainty about where to go////.//__

And, that sustains low prices and ensures adequate supply
Hastings, 12 [House Representative Doc, Republican Washington, President Obama's offshore drilling plan must be replaced, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/239529-president-obamas-offshore-drilling-plan-must-be-replaced]

__Though__ President __Obama uses lofty rhetoric to claim support for__ American oil and __natural gas production__, __the administration chose____to bury the announcement of this plan__ under mountains of news coverage. It’s no surprise that during an election year __the__ president doesn’t want to hype a __plan__ that __represents a__ giant __step backwards for__ American //energy// __//production// and //keeps 85 percent of our offshore areas off-limits////.//__ Fortunately, Congress now has the responsibility to act and make clear that __the president’s plan is //inadequate to meet the U//__ nited //S// tates’ //energy needs//. Under current law, the president must submit the five-year plan to Congress for a mandatory 60-day review before it goes into effect. While in the past, this 60-day review has been treated as just a formality, it is an opportunity to reject the president’s plan and offer a better alternative for job creation and energy production.H.R. 6082, the Congressional Replacement of President Obama’s Energy-Restricting and Job-Limiting Offshore Drilling Plan, would replace President Obama’s plan with an environmentally responsible, robust plan that supports new offshore drilling. This plan passed out of the House Natural Resources Committee with bipartisan support and will be considered by the full House this week. It sets up a clear choice between the president’s drill-nowhere-new plan and the Congressional replacement plan to responsibly expand offshore American energy production. President __Obama’s plan doesn’t open one new area for__ leasing and //energy production//. __The Atlantic Coast, the Pacific Coast____and most of the water off Alaska //are all// placed //off-limits//__. This is especially frustrating for Virginians who had a lease sale scheduled for 2011, only to have it canceled by President Obama. The president added further insult to injury by not including the Virginia lease sale in his final plan, meaning the earliest it could happen is late 2017. The president’s plan only offers 15 lease sales limited to the Gulf of Mexico and, very late in the plan, small parts of Alaska. It doesn’t open one new area for leasing and energy production. According to the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, President Obama’s 15 lease sales represent the lowest number ever included in an offshore leasing plan. President Obama rates worse than even Jimmy Carter. Thanks to President Obama, it’s as if the bipartisan steps to lift the drilling moratoria in 2008 never happened. Crippling $4 gasoline prices sparked Americans’ outrage and pressured the Democrat-controlled Congress to allow legislation to pass opening up new offshore areas to drilling. Unfortunately, four years later, American families and small businesses are experiencing the pain of higher gasoline prices and yet no progress has been made to expand production of our offshore resources. The Congressional moratorium on drilling has simply been replaced by the “Obama moratorium” on drilling.Gasoline prices were $1.89 when President Obama took office, and prices today are nearly double. Americans will continue to face volatile price spikes as long as we continue to keep the United States’ energy resources under lock-and-key.In stark contrast to the president, __the Congressional replacement__ plan includes 29 lease sales and opens new areas previously under moratoria. __It’s a targeted effort towards those areas where we know we have //the most//__ oil and //natural gas// resources – like the mid-Atlantic, the Southern California Coast and Alaska. __This is a__ drill smart __plan that would create thousands of new__ American __jobs__, //help lower prices// at the pump __and //strengthen our//__ national and //economic// security. Congress has a choice – to either support the president’s plan that re-imposes the drilling moratorium and places the vast majority of offshore areas off-limits, or support using American energy to __create__ American __jobs and //strengthen America’s economy//__.

Nearly 100 new projects are capable of development
Paul Hillegeist et al (President and COO at Quest Offshore Resources, Inc, Sean Shafer, Project Director, Andrew Jackson, Project Manager, Leslie Cook, Senior Research Consultant) December 2011 “The State of the Offshore U.S. Oil and Gas Industry” http://energytomorrow.org/images/uploads/Quest_2011_December_29_Final.pdf

__If drilling permits going forward were to be issued at pre____ ‐ moratorium rates, the number of shallow water projects delayed could be significantly reduced from 85 under the current path to 37 over the 2012 to 2015 period, and from 48 to 9 for the deepwater__. The increased number of projects would increase investment in the Gulf of Mexico offshore oil and gas industry by over $15.6 billion dollars from 2012 ‐ 2015. This additional investment would increase average annual U.S. employment between 17,000 and 49,000 thousand jobs per year over that time period. __Offshore oil production would be higher over the next decade__, for example, by 2017 offshore oil production would rise by approximately 13 percent __relative to its current projected path. A regulatory environment that eliminates unnecessary permitting delays and maintains competitiveness with development opportunities in other regions of the world would provide a first step to revitalizing the offshore oil and gas industry. Additional access to offshore areas currently off____ ‐ limits remains a key missing component of U.S. energy policy, and would provide substantial additional gains__ to the nation in terms of energy security, employment and government revenue.

Otherwise, restrictions crush predictability and timing of projects
Curry L. Hagerty (Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy at the Congressional Research Service) June 15, 2010 “Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development” http://crs.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/10Jul/R41132.pdf

__One legacy of congressional moratoria is their impact on the timing of possible OCS development. From a developer’s point of view, predictability in the pace, timing, and sequence of OCS development projects is key to strategic business decisions__. From a regulator’s standpoint, agency discretion for OCS development is tied to program planning horizons set by statutory or regulatory timetables. __Features of the annual congressional moratoria varied from year to year, and from region to region__, as reflected in Table 1, __and the resultant uncertainty had a disruptive effect on the pace of OCS activity__ , which was viewed negatively by those in favor of OCS drilling. Among those opposed to OCS drilling, the disruptive effect was considered a positive outcome.23 __Changes to the specific provisions of annual moratoria measures created tensions due to the unpredictability of the bans on leasing activities, timeframes, and locations__ .24 __It was not uncommon for developers to engage in litigation against the federal government and to claim damages related to reliance on leases and federal OCS policies that were disrupted by the annual congressional moratoria__ .25 Although observers agreed that appropriations measures were out of sync with the timetable used to coordinate federal OCS planning functions, proponents of annual congressional moratoria provisions countered that restrictions were defensible in the absence of more permanent alternatives for similar leasing prohibitions

1NC: T non mil, Sec K, Midterms; 2NR: Sec K 1NC: T its, Midterm, States CP, Sec K; 2NR: Sec K 1NC: T its, Midterms, Fem K; 2NR: Fem K 1NC: T its, Midterms, Fem K; 2NR: Midterms
 * Neg:**