Jordan+and%20Anthony


 * Japan - Leadership and US-Japan Alliance**

** Plan Text: **** The United States federal government ** **should implement a phased withdrawal of its military presence from Japan. **

= Contention One – Inherency =

**Bandow**, 20 0  **9,** senior fellow at the Cato Institute [Doug, November 29, “Policy Change for East Asia,” available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11015, accessed on 7/14/2010]
 * Obama is committed to maintaining the Status Quo on our policy toward Japanese bases**

U.S. President Barack Obama made his first official trip to Asia in November. The results were thin. Unfortunately, his agenda focused on reinforcing the status quo and "strengthening" the usual ties with the usual allies. Worse, the administration is dedicated to maintaining and even expanding Washington's Cold War-era security ties. The U.S. achieved its dominant position in East Asia after defeating Japan in World War II. Washington created a network of alliances to both prevent any imperial Japanese renaissance and contain Soviet and, later, Chinese expansion. But that world has largely disappeared. Japan has recovered and created the world's No. 2 economy. The Soviet Union is gone. Maoist China lives on only in propaganda images. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. Vietnam has joined the global economy. South Korea has raced past the decrepit Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Other countries, ranging from Australia to India, are expanding their regional roles. The potential for conflict remains. However, without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union, such instability would pose little threat to the U.S. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged. The U.S. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. That the U.S. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted. In Washington, the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military capable of deterring U.S. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U.S. foreign policy.

** Thus the Plan: The United States federal government ** **should implement a phased withdrawal of its military presence from Japan. **

= Contention Two – Japanese Leadership =


 * Japan is not fulfilling its leadership role – it does not have the military resources to match its economic potential**
 * Klingner,** 20**10**-is senior research fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation [Bruce, “Japan Risks Irrelevancy In Asia” March 24, accessed July 14, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/03/Japan-Risks-Irrelevancy-in-Asia]

Japan's international influence and relevance are diminishing due to a faltering economy, national indecisiveness, and constrained security policies. The current trajectory of Japan's future is disheartening, with little reason for optimism of a change in course. This disturbing trend long predates the election of the Democratic Party of Japan. Left unchecked, Japan risks devolving into a second-tier, middle-power nation. Japan's economic capacity and growing military capabilities enable it to be a strong alliance partner and a significant force to pursue global objectives. Yet, Japan is a powerful nation that consistently punches below its weight. Rather than implementing a strategic policy, Japan has followed a minimalist, cost-effective, and reactive approach designed to derive maximum security and economic benefits from its alliance with the U.S. while providing the minimal necessary reciprocal gestures.


 * The US military presence deters Japan from developing its own military capabilities due to dependence – withdrawal will encourage Japan to assume an international leadership role**


 * Preble,** 200**6**, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6335, accessed 7/14/10]

Although Japan’s defense spending is comparable to that of other advanced industrial democracies, it might still be insufficient relative to the threats Japan faces. Tokyo’s allocation of approximately 1 percent of its GDP to defense in 2004 contrasts with the 2.4 percent spent by the South Koreans, for example, and the more than 4 percent spent by the United States during the same period, and yet Japan is operating within the same strategic environment and is concerned about similar threats. It is logical to conclude, therefore, that the U.S. security guarantee has enabled the Japanese to refrain from spending more on their defense.31 On the other hand, military spending is hardly the only measure of a country’s international engagement. Japan remains a leading provider of foreign aid, contributing more than $6.7 billion in Official Development Assistance in 2003, more than any other country with the exception of the United States.32 These numbers make clear that Japan already plays an active role in world affairs, in spite of the constitutional restrictions on the use of military force. What Japan has lacked for much of its history since the end of World War II is the incentive and the will to take responsibility for its own security —and for regional security—to a degree commensurate with its economic power and interests. The U.S. security guarantee serves as a disincentive for change, and U.S. policy has therefore impeded the development of Japan’s indigenous military capabilities, capabilities that might prove useful to both countries in the future. The best way to break this cycle of dependence is to phase out the American security guarantee and replace it with a more equitable mutual defense pact. It is unlikely that Japan can assume its place among the community of great nations—despite its considerable wealth and foreign policy activism through financial aid—without a fundamental reorientation of the current patron-client security relationship with the United States.


 * America’s Military Presence locks in an outdated security arrangement – it prevents Japan from rethinking its constitution and expanding their military responsibilities.**
 * Bandow,** 20**10**, senior fellow at the Cato Institute [Doug, May 12, “Japan Can Defend Itself,” available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11804, accessed on 7/14/2010]

World War II ended 65 years ago. The Cold War disappeared 21 years ago. Yet America's military deployments have little changed. Nowhere is that more evident than on the Japanese island of Okinawa. Okinawans are tired of the heavy U.S. military presence. Some 90,000 — nearly 10 percent of the island's population — gathered in protest at the end of April. It is time for Washington to lighten Okinawa's burden. An independent kingdom swallowed by imperial Japan, Okinawa was the site of a brutal battle as the United States closed in on Japan in early 1945. After Tokyo's surrender, Washington filled the main prefecture island with bases and didn't return it to Japan until 1972. America's military presence has only been modestly reduced since. The facilities grew out of the mutual defense treaty between America and Japan, by which the former promised to defend the latter, which was disarmed after its defeat. The island provided a convenient home for American units. Most Japanese people also preferred to keep the U.S. military presence on Japan's most distant and poorest province, forcing Okinawans to carry a disproportionate burden of the alliance. It is time for Washington to lighten Okinawa's burden. Whatever the justifications of this arrangement during the Cold War, the necessity of both U.S. ground forces in Japan and the larger mutual defense treaty between the two nations has disappeared. It's time to reconsider both Tokyo's and Washington's regional roles. The U nited S tates imposed the so-called "peace constitution" on Japan, Article 9 of which prohibits the use of force and even creation of a military. However, American officials soon realized that Washington could use military assistance. Today's "Self-Defense Force" is a widely accepted verbal evasion of a clear constitutional provision. Nevertheless, both domestic pacifism and regional opposition have discouraged reconsideration of Japan's military role. Washington's willingness to continue defending an increasingly wealthy Japan made a rethink unnecessary.

Two Scenarios – First, China

 * Japanese leadership is necessary to prevent a Chinese attack on Taiwan**
 * Preble**, 200 **6**, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6335, accessed 7/14/10]

The Japan ese public appears to be generally sympathetic to the Taiwan ese cause, suggesting that Tokyo’s decision to show support for Taipei goes beyond narrow security concerns, and also beyond a desire to please Washington. An estimated 2.3 million tourists travel between Taiwan and Japan each year, and Japan is Taiwan’s largest trading partner.73 Favorable sentiment does not necessarily translate into support for independence among Japanese, however. In a September 2002 Japan Times survey, 71 percent of Japanese declared they were satisfied with the status quo on Taiwan; in other words, they favored neither reunification with the PRC nor independence from it.74 This may reflect a recognition on the part of the Japanese public that Taiwanese independence may provoke the Chinese to military action, which would certainly prove detrimental to Japanese security. But doubts and fears about the PRC do not completely overwhelm Japanese affinity for Taiwan and the Taiwanese. A Mainichi poll taken in 2001 asked Japanese citizens to identify countries and regions friendly to Japan. Taiwan ranked third, behind the United States and South Korea.75 On balance, the Japanese like Taiwan and the feeling is apparently mutual. “The Japanese built universities, roads, and other infrastructure. They educated us, they turned us into a more modern society,” said Hwang Kuan-hu, a national policy adviser to Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian, “We welcome Japan becoming more involved again with Taiwan.”76 Whether this mutual appreciation would translate into a formal Japanese pledge to assist Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression remains to be seen, but that should ultimately be a decision for the Japanese government, and the Japanese public, consistent with their own security concerns. The presumed wishes or desires of the United States should not be the determining factor. Given Taiwan’s strategic location across crucial Japanese lines of communication, the Japanese would view PRC control over the island as a security threat. Although Japan currently has only a limited capacity for blocking military annexation, a strong statement, building on the February 2005 joint declaration, may help deter Chinese military action against Taiwan. Even a position of deliberate ambiguity, holding out the possibility that Japan might employ military means to repel Chinese aggression, would likely be more credible coming from a regional military power than is the current ambiguous pledge originating with a U nited S tates that is struggling to sustain a host of commitments around the globe.


 * Japanese leadership is key to a regional multipolar system to stabilize East Asia – it serves as a strategic counter weight to China**
 * Carpenter**, 20**10**, vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute [Ted, April 7, “Tokyo Rising”, available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11665, accessed on 7/14/2010]

One very clear fact emerged from my recent meetings with officials and foreign-policy scholars in Australia and New Zealand: even though both countries have major economic stakes in their relationship with China, they are exceedingly nervous about the possibility of Chinese hegemony in East Asia. Since most of them also are reaching the (reluctant) conclusion that the U nited S tates will not be able to afford indefinitely the financial burden and military requirements of remaining the region's security stabilizer, a role the United States has played since the end of World War II, they are looking for other options to blunt China's emerging preeminence. Increasingly, policy makers and opinion leaders in Australia and New Zealand seem receptive to the prospect of both India and Japan playing more active security roles in the region, thereby acting as strategic counterweights to China. That is a major shift in sentiment from just a decade or two ago. The notion of India as a relevant security player is a recent phenomenon, but there did not appear to be any opposition in Canberra or Wellington to the Indian navy flexing its muscles in the Strait of Malacca in the past few years. That favorable reaction was apparent even in vehemently anti-nuclear New Zealand, despite India's decision in the late 1990s to deploy a nuclear arsenal, which dealt a severe blow to the global nonproliferation cause. The emergence of a multipolar power system in East Asia is the best outcome both for the U nited S tates and China 's neighbors.


 * The impact is Global nuclear war**


 * Hunkovic **, 0** 9 **- American Military University [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, [] ]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Second Scenario – North Korea

 * A more independent Japan would resolve North Korean provocation and proliferation better than America’s military presence – it would be more credible than US pressure which has empirically failed**
 * Preble,** 200**6**, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6335, accessed 7/14/10]

The North Korean crisis may have provided the catalyst for a fundamental shift in Japanese strategy and policy, but it cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Although the steps thus far taken by Koizumi against North Korea have not satisfied a segment of the Japanese population, many of whom remain more concerned about the emotional abductee issue than about the objective security threat, China’s rise poses a more important challenge to Japan’s security over the medium to long term.93 For now, given the urgency of the North Korean threat to Japan, and befitting Japan’s emergence as a normal power, it would be natural for Japan to take a leading role in attempting to end North Korea’s nuclear program. As other regional threats become more serious, however, many Japanese may come to resent U.S. policies that appear to impede their reasonable efforts to defend themselves. Continued strong opposition within Japan to the use of the military for offensive ends suggests that unilateral preemptive action by Japan against North Korea is highly unlikely. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect that Tokyo would wait for U.S. permission to respond to a direct attack. It is only slightly more plausible that the Japanese would refrain from using force in response to credible evidence of an imminent threat. Military action against North Korea, even if it were found to be a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense, would certainly stir regional animosity. That is a reflection of the difficult balancing act that Japan must play vis-à-vis other potential allies in the region, chief among them South Korea. North and South Koreans alike harbor deep resentment toward the Japanese. Koreans were the victims of horrible crimes at the hands of the Japanese, of which the notorious abuses inflicted on Korean “comfort women” were only the most infamous. Although U.S. policymakers should rightly be concerned about regional hostility toward Japan, such concerns are not more worrisome than the crisis in the here and now, when an impoverished and increasingly desperate North Korea might be tempted to sell nuclear materials to terrorists. Short of offensive military operations against Pyongyang, Japan has other means for defending itself from North Korean nuclear weapons independent of the United States. Japan has cooperated with the United States in the construction of an anti-ballistic missile system, but the further development and deployment of such a system need not depend on U.S. support. If active countermeasures for dealing with regional security threats were deemed insufficient, the Japanese might even take the fateful step of developing their own nuclear deterrent.94 In short, a Japanese military, operating independent of the United States but still constrained by the pacifist impulses of the Japanese public, could prove a credible deterrent to offensive actions by North Korea against Japan proper and might also succeed in convincing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions, in contrast to U.S. economic and diplomatic pressure, which has been completely ineffective. Beyond the North Korean crisis, Japanese military power might prove instrumental for dealing with future serious challenges to the regional security order.


 * Aggressive North Korean behavior makes the accidental or intentional use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Likely**
 * The International Crisis Group,** 0**9** (6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” [], JMP)

This report examines North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities in the context of its military doctrine and national objectives. It is based on open source literature, interviews and unpublished documents made available to Crisis Group. Companion reports published simultaneously assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and what the policy response of the international community should be to its recent nuclear and missile testing.[1] North Korea’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles pose serious risks to security. Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities are the greatest threat, but it also possesses a large stockpile of chemical weapons and is suspected of maintaining a biological weapons program. The Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) had been underway since August 2003 with the objective of ending the North’s nuclear ambitions, before Pyongyang announced its withdrawal in April 2009, but there is no direct mechanism for dealing with its chemical weapons and possible biological weapons. The North Korean leadership is very unlikely to surrender its WMD unless there is significant change in the political and security environments. The Six-Party Talks pro­duced a “Statement of Principles” in September 2005 that included a commitment to establish a permanent peace mechanism in North East Asia, but the structure and nature of such a cooperative security arrangement is subject to interpretation, negotiation and implementation. Views among the parties differ, and no permanent peace can be established unless North Korea abandons all its WMD programs. The diplomatic tasks are daunting, and diplomacy could fail. If North Korea refuses to engage in arms control and to rid itself of WMD, the international community must be prepared to deal with a wide range of threats, including those posed by Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Unclassified estimates of the chemical weapons (CW) arsenal are imprecise, but the consensus is that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) possesses 2,500-5,000 tons, including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun and V-agents (persistent nerve agents). The stockpile does not appear to be increasing but is already sufficient to inflict massive civilian casualties on South Korea. The North’s CW can be delivered with long-range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels. North Korean military doctrine emphasises quick offensive strikes to break through enemy defences in order to achieve national military objectives before the U.S. can intervene effectively on behalf of its South Korean ally. However, the North’s conventional military capabilities are declining against those of its potential foes, so the leadership is likely to rely on asymmetric capabilities for its national security objectives. This strategy poses a significant danger because it risks deliberate, accidental or unauthorised WMD attacks or incidents**.**


 * Even if a conflict won’t start intentionally, current high Korean tensions risk accidents that escalate to global nuclear war**
 * STRATFOR, 10** (5/26/10, “North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula,” [], JMP)

Managing Escalation But no one, of course, is interested in another war on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides will posture, but at the end of the day, neither benefits from a major outbreak of hostilities. And despite the specter of North Korean troops streaming under the DMZ through tunnels and wreaking havoc behind the lines in the south (a scenario for which there has undoubtedly been significant preparation), neither side has any intention of invading the other. So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could precipitate escalation — that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quite real. Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. For nearly 40 years, tensions on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War. During that time it was feared that a second Korean War could all too easily escalate into and a thermonuclear World War III, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But current tensions are quickly escalating to a level unprecedented in the post-Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.


 * Withdrawal causes the US to forge new relations with East Asia that encourage cooperation and diplomatic solutions**
 * Bandow**, 20**10**, senior fellow at the Cato Institute [Doug, March 25, “Okinawa and the Problem of Empire,” available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11617, accessed on 7/14/2010]

The Obama administration should pursue a different course, a transformational agenda, emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment. America still has a major economic role to play, but should increasingly devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China. Moreover, Washington must forge a cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula; it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U.S. engagement with the North. Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights, while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens. The president should treat Japan as a full partner. In economics, that means proposing a free trade agreement. On defense, rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement, Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. The U.S. also should encourage greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. World War II ended more than six decades ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wet-nurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. At the same time, the U.S. should inform the North that full international integration requires the participation of South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia as well. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea, Japanese, and U.S. policies regarding Pyongyang. However, Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the nonproliferation campaign. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula. As the U.S. steps back from its dominant military role, the ROK and its neighbors should step forward. At the same time, Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration. The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order, called the East Asian Community, apart from the U.S. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach. The U.S. will be most secure if friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability, promote respect for human rights, and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions. The U.S. will remain engaged in East Asia. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony.

= Contention 3 – US-Japan Alliance =


 * Base controversy kills the Security Alliance – it breeds suspicion and anger in both governments**
 * Klingner** 200**9**- Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation [Bruce, “U.S. Should Stay Firm on Implementation of Okinawa Force Realignment” December 16, Backgrounder #2352 accessed july 13, http://www.heritage.org/ Research/Reports/2009/12/US-Should-Stay-Firm-on-Implementation-of-Okinawa-Force-Realignment]

The Futenma controversy has caused the Obama and Hatoyama administrations' relationship to get off on the wrong foot. Frustration, suspicion, and anger are increasing in both capitals, threatening to create a crisis of confidence. The FRF controversy has, in the words of one U.S. official, "sucked the air out of the room" by redirecting alliance attention away from strategically important regional and global security issues. The Futenma dispute has already harmed the bilateral alliance. The extent of the damage will depend on the responses of both countries. The alliance is not yet in crisis, but if the situation is mishandled, the alliance could be headed for one. The U.S. and Japan need to keep in mind that the alliance is critically important for both countries and that the contentious issues are only one part of the broader relationship. Washington and Tokyo need to work together to reduce the current tension level and to refocus on transforming the alliance to address security challenges.


 * US military presence is the Key issue in the US Japan relationship – it will spill over to determine the entire state of relations**
 * Hornung **, 20** 10 **, professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu [postdoctoral researcher at the Eat Asian Studies Center at Ohio State University. Jeffery July 8, Jeffrey JUL 8, 2010 KAN HE DO IT? HTTP://CSIS.ORG/PUBLICATION/KAN-HE-DO-IT accessed: JULY 14, 2010.]

There is no question that Okinawa bears an enormous burden by hosting three-quarters of all U.S. forces in Japan. There is also no question that Futenma’s location in densely populated Ginowan poses innumerable hazards to the community. Given t hese facts, the people of Okinawa want to reduce the footprint of U.S. forces , particularly Futenma. These opinions are not new, but Hatoyama’s promise to listen to their concerns raised expectations that he would prioritize those concerns over U.S. priorities. Yet, this ended with Hatoyama’s apology for breaking his promise. Hatoyama’s handling of the relocation issue reawakened anti-base sentiment. This helped get Mr. Inamine elected, the first time an anti-relocation candidate was elected mayor of Nago. It is arguably the first time since the 1995 rape of a schoolgirl that the Okinawa people are openly calling for the relocation of bases out of the prefecture to the extent they are doing currently. There will be no return to stable alliance relations as long as the local communities hosting U.S. forces do not grant their understanding of the burden they are forced to bear.


 * The US Japan Alliance is crucial for Japan to expand its Multilateral leadership in East Asia – our cooperation on security issues will expand Japan’s international role**
 * Chanlett-Avery**, **9** Specialist in Asian Affairs Congressional Research Service [Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance Congressional Research Service; 11/25/09; “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress”; [|http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-in/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA511942& Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf] ; accessed: 7/14/10]

As the DPJ settles into its new role as the main ruling party, it may over time show greater confidence in following through on its long-promised vision of a more assertive foreign policy for Japan. Among some of the measures called for by the DPJ are expanding Japan’s role in U.N.sanctioned peacekeeping operations, deepening ties with Asia, taking greater responsibility for defending the Japanese homeland, expanding regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTA), and promoting an ambitious new set of global climate change standards. Although the move toward a U.N. and Asia-centered diplomacy may be perceived as a less U.S.-centric approach, such a trend may not necessarily signify a divergence from broader U.S. goals and interests. The DPJ’s vision of a “proactive” foreign policy that would enhance Japan’s international contributions is one that is likely to be broadly supported by Washington. Indeed, there are several areas where the new government in Tokyo may cooperate closely with Obama Administration initiatives, from setting new global warming standards to nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Several upcoming high-level events, including a planned bilateral summit in Tokyo in November 2009, will provide opportunities for President Obama to discuss issues of mutual interest with newly elected Prime Minister Hatoyama.


 * Expanding the US – Japan relations to include other regional players is key to address multilateral threats –prolif, and disease**
 * Tanaka 9** – Senior Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange [Hitoshi, “A New Vision for the US-Japan Alliance,” vol. 4 no. 1, pub JCIE, April 2009, accessed 7/14/10, http://www.jcie.or.jp/insights/4-1.html] Red

A New Approach to East Asia Threats to regional stability increasingly come from nontraditional areas such as WMD proliferation, human and drug trafficking, natural disasters, energy security, environmental degradation, maritime piracy, and infectious disease. All of these challenges will require multilateral and cooperative solutions. The scope of the US-Japan alliance must expand beyond bilateral military deterrence. It must become more inclusive and place greater emphasis on functioning more as a public good. Although Japan and the United States should lead this initiative, efforts will not make much progress without the support of other advanced democracies in the region such as South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The two allies should move to strengthen and expand existing trilateral strategic consultations (e.g. US-Japan-South Korea and US-Japan-Australia). It should be stressed, however, that the objective is neither to unilaterally impose western values upon East Asian nations nor to exclude non-democratic nations from reaping the benefits of regional stability and economic prosperity. Rather, the objective is for Japan and the United States to engage states in the region in rules-based communities through inclusive multilateralism. As states adopt standardized rules and norms of behavior, the transaction costs of interaction will decrease, which will in turn deepen trust, interdependence, and stability throughout East Asia. At the same time that Japan and the United States actively engage China in regional and global rules-based communities and bring it into multilateral dialogue on issues ranging from macroeconomic policy to talks on energy and the environment, they must also work with other US allies to hedge against the uncertainty surrounding China's future. Concerns abound about several aspects of China's foreign policy—including issues related to rapidly rising defense expenditures, military transparency, and its aggressive approach to energy security—and domestic policy—such as CO2 emissions and environmental damage, treatment of minorities, and income disparities. Japan and the United States should place priority on encouraging China to pursue economic policies that will make a constructive contribution to efforts to address the global economic crisis, make its military affairs more transparent, and agree to fully participate in the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. With respect to security issues, Japan and the United States should initiate and institutionalize regular trilateral security dialogue with China involving civilian and military personnel. This would provide a forum through which to advocate increased transparency, reduce mutual suspicions, and consolidate trust between the region's three great powers. Stable security ties among these three nations are a prerequisite for long-term peace and stability in the region. In recent years, the Six-Party Talks format has emerged as an effective sub-regional security forum for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, but we still have, unfortunately, a lengthy and bumpy ride ahead of us before the nuclear issue is resolved. This forum, which has succeeded in bringing together the five most powerful states in the region to openly discuss and cooperate in resolving a security issue of common concern, should remain active even after the nuclear issue is settled and be used to address remaining issues on the Korean Peninsula. Emerging nontraditional security issues pose an increasingly serious threat to regional stability. Building on the existing network of US security partners in the region, Japan and the United States should work with states in the region to establish an East Asia Security Forum to proactively address such security issues as human and drug trafficking, natural disasters, infectious disease, resource scarcity, maritime piracy, terrorism, and WMD proliferation. With ASEAN+6 member nations and the United States working in concert, this forum would adopt an action-oriented and functional approach to addressing these threats and carry out operations in a manner similar to the PSI.


 * Disease Pandemic leads to extinction**
 * Toolis,** the director of a major television series on the history of plagues, **9** (Kevin, The Express, April 28, 2009 U.K. 1st Edition “Pandemic Pandemonium” lexis)

It destroyed the Roman Empire, wiped out most of the New World and killed millions in Europe. How disease - not just Mexico's swine fever - has shaped the planet SCIENTISTS call it the Big Die Off, when a terrifying new virus rips through a species and kills up to a third of the entire population. And we all now could be facing a new apocalypse, though no one yet knows how potent the new strain of Mexican swine fever will be, or how many millions could die. Yet if history teaches us anything it tells us that the greatest danger the human race faces is not some crackpot North Korean dictator but a six-gene virus that could wipe out one third of the global population. Our real enemy, a new plague virus, is so small you can barely see it even with an advanced electron microscope. It has no morality, no thought or no plan. All it wants to do is reproduce itself inside another human body. We are just another biological opportunity, a nice warm place to feed and replicate. Viruses are as old as life itself. What is startling though is how vulnerable our globalised societies are to the threat of a new deadly plague. Before World Health Organisation scientists could identify this new H1N1 virus it had travelled halfway across the world via international flights.


 * Proliferation leads to extinction**
 * Utgoff**, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division **2** of Institute for Defense Analysis (Victor A., Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90 Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

US pressure on Okinawan bases threatens US Japan relations – it undermines the DPJ government and causes massive protests.

 * Bandow**, 20**10**, senior fellow at the Cato Institute [Doug June 18 “Get Out of Japan,” available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11928, accessed on 7/14/2010]

Candidate Barack Obama may have charmed foreign peoples, but President Barack Obama unashamedly cold shoulders foreign leaders he doesn't like. One of them was Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who sought to reduce the number of U.S. bases on the island of Okinawa. The Obama administration worked diligently to frustrate Hatoyama's efforts, which helped force his resignation barely eight months into his term. It was an impressive performance in raw political power. But it likely was a Pyrrhic victory. When World War II ended, the U.S. occupied Japan and effectively colonized the island of Okinawa, seized in a bitter battle shortly before Tokyo surrendered. The U.S. loaded Okinawa with bases and only returned it to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. Four decades later nearly 20 percent of the island remains occupied by American military facilities. The U.S. military likes Okinawa because it is centrally located. Most Japanese like Okinawa because it is the most distant prefecture. Concentrating military facilities on the island — half of U.S. personnel and three-quarters of U.S. bases (by area) in Japan are located in a territory making up just .6 percent of the country — is convenient for everyone except the people who live there. Okinawans have been protesting against the bases for years. In 1995 the rape of a teenage girl set off vigorous demonstrations and led to various proposals to lighten the island's burden. In 2006 the Japanese government agreed to help pay for some Marines to move to Guam while relocating the Futenma facility to the less populated Okinawan community of Henoko. But residents wanted the base moved off of the island and the government delayed implementation of the agreement. During last year's parliamentary election the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) promised to move the installation elsewhere. Prime Minister Hatoyama later said: "It must never happen that we accept the existing plan." However, the Obama administration refused to reconsider and threatened the U.S.-Japanese relationship. That unsettled a public which had voted the DPJ into power primarily for economic reasons. Prime Minister Hatoyama wanted to turn the unbalanced alliance into a more equal partnership but the Japanese people weren't ready1. Said Hatoyama as he left office: "Someday, the time will come when Japan's peace will have to be ensured by the Japanese people themselves." Washington's victory appeared to be complete. The Japanese government succumbed to U.S. demands. A new, more pliant prime minister took over. The Japanese nation again acknowledged its humiliating dependency on America. Yet the win may prove hollow. Although Hatoyama's replacement, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, gives lip service to the plan to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma within Okinawa, the move may never occur. There's a reason Tokyo has essentially kicked the can down the road since 1996. Some 90,000 people, roughly one-tenth of Okinawa's population, turned out for a protest rally in April.


 * Changing the US Japan alliance makes it more stable – Japanese independence would raise public support**
 * Preble**, 200**6**, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6335, accessed 7/14/10]

In each of the three crises discussed above, a Japanese prime minister less closely aligned with the United States might well have behaved in a different fashion. Indeed, the opposition DPJ has long advocated a more independent posture vis-à-vis the United States.90 The key to understanding the evolution of the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship depends, therefore, on more than the words and actions of a few individuals at the top; one must consider broader Japanese and American interests and domestic public opinion in both countries. A U.S.-Japan strategic relationship that more closely resembles an alliance in the traditional sense of the term, as opposed to the current patron-client relationship, is likely to be an enduring model for U.S.-Japanese security cooperation in the future, especially if it is based on popular support. Fortunately, popular sentiment within Japan offers still more clues about how the three cases discussed above might play out in a future in which Japan behaves as a normal country, that is, as a country responsible for defending its interests, and not dependent on the United States.

Missile Defense - US Japan cooperation is necessary for Joint Missile defense – it is key for ongoing tests

 * Payne, 10, Member of the Defense Science Board, the DoD Threat Reduction Advisory Committee,** [Keith Co-chairman of the Nuclear Strategy Forum, Thomas Scheber, Principal Associate Director for Nuclear Weapons Program; March “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia”; [] ; Accessed 7/16/10]

In recent years, joint cooperation on ballistic missile defense has been growing in importance and activity. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings typically included discussion of cooperative measures for BMD. In November 2007, the defense ministers from both countries met and agreed to advance joint efforts to cooperate on operational aspects. 154 In December 2007, a joint BMD test used a SM-3 interceptor fired from a Japanese destroyer, Kongo. This successful joint live-fire test marked a major milestone in missile defense cooperation with the United States. In November 2008, a subsequent BMD test involving an interceptor fired by a ship in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force was partially successful. On October 28, 2009, a Japanese destroyer, JS Myoko, fired an SM-3 interceptor missile which successfully impacted a medium-range ballistic missile about 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean.155 The United States and Japan are continuing to work together to increase the range and lethality of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.156 Japan hosts an X-band radar which is an integral part of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Japanese and U.S. forces cooperate in missile defense exercises and are continuing to improve interoperability between elements of each other’s defensive systems. The most recent Japan Defense White Paper calls for continued cooperation with the United States to further strengthen security arrangements on “defense operations.” Specifically, it calls for joint exercises and training to be enhanced, continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan (but a “realignment of those forces”), cooperation on ballistic missile defense, and close collaboration with the United States in international security efforts. Consistent with this goal, the United States and Japan recently expanded the size and complexity of the annual exercise, Yama Sakura (Mountain Cherry Blossom). The exercise, conducted in December 2009 on the northern island of Hokkaido, included over 5,000 troops and involved ballistic missile defense training.157

Joint missile defense is key – North Korean missile threat destabilizes Asia causing war

 * Klingner 2009-Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies** Center at The Heritage Foundation [Bruce, “North Korea's Missile Gambit” February 17, 2009 WebMemo #2295, accessed July 17, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/02/North-Koreas-Missile-Gambit]

What the U.S. Should Do Emphasize that North Korea's actions are provocative, counterproductive, and call into question Pyongyang's viability as a negotiating partner. Highlight that North Korea's threatening belligerence, not U.S. "hostile policy" as Pyongyang claims, has hindered negotiations. Affirm U.S. commitment to defend our allies against any North Korean provocation, including missile launches or naval confrontation in the West Sea. Underscore Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' pledge to shoot down the North Korean missile if it approaches U.S. territory. Emphasize that North Korea's missile threat demonstrates the continuing need for the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to develop and deploy missile defense systems. It is ironic that President Obama's Secretary of Defense has suggested using missile defenses that Obama would likely not have funded had he been in office during their development. Declare that the U.S. is willing to resume negotiations to eliminate North Korea's missile threats to its neighbors. Such negotiations, however, must comprehensively constrain missile development, deployment, and proliferation rather than simply seeking a quid pro quo agreement--cash payments in exchange for not exporting missile technology. Nor should such negotiations deflect attention from Pyongyang's denuclearization requirements in the Six Party Talks.