Jeffrey+Ding+and+David+Huang

Last updated 8/2/10.

Advantage 1: The War Advantage 2: Hegemony
 * AFGHANISTAN**

TEXT: The United States federal government should reduce its military presence in Afghanistan to levels consistent with a counterterrorism strategy

ADVANTAGE ONE IS THE WAR.

Nationalism and the lack of a state structure makes sustainable stability impossible. Dorronsoro 9 - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (9/23/09, Gilles, The National Interest, “Afghanization,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22218) In addition, there is no state structure to speak of in the Pashtun belt. The military operations there are foreign alone, including no more than token Afghan National Army forces. No Afghan forces can effectively take charge of secured areas after the “clear” phase, as they are nowhere near numerous or well-trained enough, and the police are often corrupt or inefficient. In addition, the pro-government tribes or communities that are present in a few districts cannot venture outside their areas without great difficulty. The supposed “ink spot” strategy—whereby the coalition establishes control in a key part of a province and security radiates outward—is not working, because of the social and ethnic fragmentation. Stability in one district doesn’t necessarily bleed over into the neighboring one, since groups and villages are often antagonistic to one another, and compete for the resources provided by the war economy. In this context, to secure an area means essentially to stay there indefinitely, under constant attack by the insurgency. Even if only 20 percent of a village sympathizes with the insurgents, “clearing” cannot work. As long as the coalition persists in its current strategy, increasing the number of troops in country will not only be inefficient, it will be dangerously counterproductive. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said not so long ago, more troops would fuel opposition amongst the Afghan population. Considering the growing illegitimacy of the Karzai regime, more foreign troops will be resented as a military occupation. To this end, the coalition’s communiqués stating that the foreign presence in Afghanistan will go on for two generations—which were intended to reassure the Afghan partners—are staggering diplomatic blunders, especially in a country where feelings towards outsiders are at best ambiguous. The more foreign troops fight to take territory back from the Taliban, the more the population rejects them, because it sees them as the major provider of insecurity. In addition, more troops mean more casualties, leaving the coalition less time to do its work before public opinion turns too far against the war. Yet it is unrealistic to expect quick results, especially in training the Afghan National Army. And at the same time, it is more and more difficult to argue in support of the discredited Karzai regime.

COIN destabilizes Pakistan and risks nuclear terrorism Simon and Stevenson 9 * adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, AND **Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, (Steven and Jonathan, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, 51:5, 47 – 67, October 2009 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=7132409) Whatever US officials might concede privately, the White House, State Department and Pentagon have thus far not acknowledged publicly the possibility that greater American intrusiveness in Afghanistan might mean less Pakistani cooperation. That, however, appears to be the case. To be sure, Pakistan has pragmatically responded to US pressure to thwart the Taliban in its tribal areas. But it is more significant in the broader strategic context that Pakistan has objected to expanded US military operations in Afghanistan on two grounds. Firstly, they would cause a cross-border spillover of militants into Pakistan and increase the counter-insurgency burden on the Pakistani military. Secondly, they would foment political instability in Pakistan by intensifying popular perceptions of American military occupation of the region and the Pakistani government's complicity with the Americans in suppressing a group that was not even considered an enemy of Pakistan. Indeed, in a July 2009 briefing, Pakistani officials made it clear that, however concerned the United States was about the Taliban, they still regard India as their top strategic priority and the Taliban militants as little more than a containable nuisance and, in the long term, potential allies.5 Pakistani officials made clear that they still regard India as their strategic priority In this light, the realistic American objective should not be to ensure Afghanistan's political integrity by neutralising the Taliban and containing Pakistani radicalism, which is probably unachievable. Rather, its aim should be merely to ensure that al-Qaeda is denied both Afghanistan and Pakistan as operating bases for transnational attacks on the United States and its allies and partners. Pitfalls of the current policy The Obama administration's instincts favouring robust counter-insurgency and state-building in Afghanistan reflect the 1990s-era US and European predilection for peacekeeping, reconstruction and stabilisation, and the multilateral use of force for humanitarian intervention, deployed to positive effect in the Balkans and withheld tragically in Rwanda. To the extent that this mindset was premised on an expansion of the rule of law to hitherto poorly and unjustly governed areas, such as Somalia and Bosnia, it reflects the broader conception of counter-terrorism adopted after 11 September. Insofar as it favours collective action by major powers with the unambiguous endorsement of the UN Security Council, it is also consistent with the Obama administration's rejection of Bush-era unilateralism. And an aggressive internationalist approach to spreading democracy and the rule of law, notwithstanding the shortsightedness and inefficacy of the Bush doctrine, is admirable and in some instances appropriate.6 In this case, however, it is more likely to hurt than help. While a larger US military footprint might help stabilise Afghanistan in the short term, the effects of collateral damage and the aura of US domination it would generate would also intensify anti-Americanism in Pakistan. This outcome, in turn, would frustrate both core American objectives by rendering it politically far more difficult for the Pakistani government to cooperate with Washington (and easier for the quasi-independent Inter-Services Intelligence to collude with the Taliban and al-Qaeda), thus making it harder for the United States to defeat al-Qaeda. It would also increase radicalisation in Pakistan, imperil the regime and raise proliferation risks, increasing rather than decreasing pressure on India to act in the breach of American ineffectuality.

Pakistan instability causes nuclear conflict – draws in China, India and Russia Pitt 9 – a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183) But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world. The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that Pakistan could collapse under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

A terrorist attack is inevitable by 2013 – it’s only a question of magnitude Hall 10 (Mimi, USA Today, “Obama seeks front against nuclear terror”, 4/12, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-11-nukesummit_N.htm) WASHINGTON — President Obama is asking world leaders to commit to a new international offense against nuclear terrorism — a threat so dire that it could challenge "our ultimate survival." At a first-ever summit of 47 countries to address the problem of "loose nukes," Obama will push for specific steps toward his goal of securing in four years the world's vast quantity of vulnerable nuclear material, such as uranium that could be enriched for a weapon. The summit begins today, but discussions will start in earnest Tuesday. Obama said "the single biggest threat" to U.S. security is the possibility of a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. "If there was ever a detonation in New York City, or London, or Johannesburg, the ramifications economically, politically and from a security perspective would be devastating," he said Sunday before meeting with South African President Jacob Zuma, who is attending the summit. Also attending: presidents, prime ministers and kings from countries such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Jordan. Obama continues one-on-one meetings with leaders today, and on Tuesday, the group will sign a "high-level communiqué" that recognizes the seriousness of the threat and outlines efforts to secure or eliminate vulnerable stockpiles, according to Gary Samore, the White House senior adviser for non-proliferation. The summit is "intended to rally collective action," White House Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes says. The meetings will present their own security challenge for the Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies because there will be so many world leaders at one time in Washington. Samore says several countries will announce plans to eliminate or better protect their stockpiles. Securing nuclear material is a challenging but necessary job "because the global stockpile of nuclear weapons materials is large enough to build 120,000 nuclear bombs (and) because Osama bin Laden considers it his religious duty to obtain nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States," says Alexandra Toma of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a 40-member coalition dedicated to securing nuclear material. Five countries — the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China and France — are internationally recognized nuclear powers and have signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which pledges to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. India, Pakistan and North Korea also have nuclear weapons, and Israel is suspected of having warheads, according to the non-partisan Arms Control Association. Israel does not admit or deny having them. The United States and Russia hold the overwhelming majority of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the material that could be used to build a crude but devastating bomb. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nuclear-security group run by former Democratic senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, there is no comprehensive inventory of the world's nuclear material. But 672 research reactors have been built worldwide and 272 operate in 56 countries, most at universities or other research centers where security is lax, the group says. "Much of the nuclear materials that are potentially vulnerable or could be used for nuclear weapons are actually in the hands of private industry, so government regulation is a very important component," Samore says. Some of the material already has been stolen, according to Harvard University's Matthew Bunn, author of Securing the Bomb. "Nuclear theft is not a hypothetical worry," he says. "It's an ongoing reality." The International Atomic Energy Agency, a watchdog arm of the United Nations that monitors the use of nuclear power and technology, has documented 18 cases involving the theft or loss of plutonium or weapons-grade uranium, mostly occurring in the former Soviet Union. The IAEA says a majority of these cases have not had a pre-identified buyer and "amateurish character" and "poor organization" have been the hallmark of some of the cases involving unauthorized possession of materials. In Prague last year, Obama said, "Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound." Government efforts have been made to secure nuclear material in recent years. Last week, the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) worked with officials in Chile to remove nuclear material from reactors near Santiago and transport it to the USA. The agency has removed all significant amounts of highly enriched uranium from 18 countries, helped convert 60 reactors in 32 countries to the use of safer, low-enriched uranium and closed seven reactors. The NNSA also has secured highly enriched uranium in more than 750 buildings worldwide and safely stored 2,691 kilograms of nuclear material. Despite those efforts, in 2008, the Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction warned, "Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack" by 2013.

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction Morgan 9 - Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct) In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States’’ [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war. In other words, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

Winning the war is irrelevant – it’s simply a question of reducing radicalism Pena 9 - Senior Fellow, The Independent Institute (December 9, Charles, “Can the U.S. Withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq?” http://www.independent.org/events/transcript.asp?eventID=145 ) Here are the issues. Number one, both Peter and Ivan have talked about this, the Taliban is not monolithic. We here in the United States tend to equate the Taliban with Al Qaeda. They’re not one and the same. There are elements of the Taliban that would support Al Qaeda in wanting to attack the United States. There are other elements of the Taliban that are just interested in having a say in the government in Afghanistan. We’ve got to stop treating them monolithically as a single threat as if somehow they are a threat to the United States of America proper. They’re not. We have to be willing to live with less than perfect in terms of what happens in Afghanistan, and I also think that we have to be willing to concede at this point that what’s left of Al Qaeda, whether they’re operating out of Pakistan or coming across the boarder periodically into Afghanistan. And by the way I saw a news report that supposedly even Bin Laden—assuming he’s still alive—finds his way across the border into Afghanistan periodically. Al Qaeda isn’t the same Al Qaeda that existed, that attacked us on 9/11, and Bin Laden in particular does not have operational control over a group that has global reach that can attack the United States. Our larger problem is not Osama Bin Laden and what is left of Al Qaeda hiding out in Pakistan. Our larger problem is the ideology of radical Islam, which has seeped into the Muslim world in part because we’ve helped propagate that by our actions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. I would argue that whatever benefit there might be to getting Bin Laden at this point, and believe me I would love to be able to say that we got Osama Bin Laden, but strategically the costs required to try and get Bin Laden and contain Al Qaeda far outweigh any residual benefit at this stage. Bin Laden and the people surrounding him no longer represent operationally the real threat to the United States. The real threat is sort of everywhere within the Muslim world being fueled by ideology and anti-American sentiment. So this notion of denying Al Qaeda safe haven in Afghanistan, I think, is a pie-in-the-sky notion. Al Qaeda—there will be some safe havens. Why? Because there will always be people who have sympathies and decide they want to support groups like Al Qaeda. The question is, are they local threats or global threats? As long as they are local threats, then those are threats that the Afghan government has to deal with and ones that we may have to live with—again, less than perfect. It’s the global threat that Al Qaeda may represent that we have to worry about. I think we have to worry about that less now than we did eight years ago. I think we have to worry more that we are radicalizing Muslims around the world, as witnessed by the bombings in Madrid and London in particular. Our very presence in two Muslim countries at the moment, Iraq and Afghanistan, goes a long, long way to fueling that radicalism that it’s U.S. occupation that makes us a target. There may be a certain amount of anti-Western, anti-U.S. elements in radical Islamic ideology, but most of that is because we’re there in their territories, not necessarily that they want to come after the United States in the U.S.

Indicts of counterterrorism underestimate it – it is sufficient to provide force protection, intelligence, army training, and will gain the support of the population Long, 10 - assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Austin, “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Spring 2010, Science Direct) This insoluble problem is why the counterterrorism option is important. If even a costly effort in Afghanistan cannot fully achieve the goal against al Qaeda, then it is crucial to determine whether a less costly effort can achieve a similar effect by keeping Afghanistan inhospitable to al Qaeda. This would be a clear and cost-effective alignment of resources with goals, the essence of strategy. Determining the viability of the counterterrorism option requires detailing what it might look like. Most discussion of the counterterrorism option has been vague. Riedel and O’Hanlon sum it up as ‘‘a few U.S. special forces teams, modern intelligence fusion centers, cruise-missile-carrying ships and unmanned aerial vehicles...’’ But there has been little effort to put flesh on this skeleton in terms of numbers and locations of U.S. troops. The following section presents a possible counterterrorism force posture. Possible Counterterrorism Force Posture First, this posture would require maintaining bases in Afghanistan. Three airfields (see map below) would be sufficient: Bagram (about 50 kilometers north of Kabul), Jalalabad (in eastern Afghanistan) and Kandahar (in southern Afghanistan). This would enable forces to collect intelligence and rapidly target al Qaeda in the Pashtun regions where its allies would hold sway. In terms of special operations forces, this posture would rely on two squadrons of so-called ‘‘Tier 1’’ operators, one at Jalabad Air Field (JAF) and one at Kandahar Air Field (KAF). These would be drawn from classified U.S. special mission units (SMUs) attached to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), U.S. Army Special Forces’ Combatant Commanders in Extremis Forces (CIFs), and allied units such as the British Special Air Service (SAS) or Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2).9 In addition, the posture would require a battalion equivalent of U.S. Army Rangers, U.S. Navy SEALs, U.S. Marine Special Operations Companies (MSOCs), British Special Forces Support Group, or some mix, with basically a company with each Tier 1 squadron or equivalent and one in reserve at Bagram.10 These forces would work together as task forces, with the Tier 1 operators being tasked with executing direct action missions to kill or capture al Qaeda targets while the other units would serve as security and support for these missions. According to Sean Naylor’s reporting, these direct action task forces are structured like the regional task forces in Iraq in 2006 that were tasked to hunt al Qaeda in Iraq. Naylor also reports similar units are already in place in Afghanistan.11 In addition to these ground forces, a battalion task force from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) would be used to provide helicopter transport, reconnaissance, and fire support for the task forces. The battalion would bring some mix of MH-47 heavy lift helicopters and MH60 medium lift helicopters, including the MH-60L gunship.12 The helicopters have a combat radius of at least 300 kilometers (km), giving the task forces operational reach to almost any part of the Pashtun region.13 This battalion could be supplemented with additional aviation assets from other units, such as CV-22 tilt rotor aircraft from the Air Force’s 8th Special Operations Squadron or AH-64 attack helicopters from any one of several Army aviation units.14 The JAF based task force would likely need to operate principally in the heartland of the Haqqani network (Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces) as this would be where al Qaeda’s principal ally in the east could best protect its members (who are not generally Pashtun). For similar reasons, the KAF based task force would principally operate against targets in Kandahar, the home of the Quetta Shura Taliban, and some of the surrounding provinces such as Helmand and Oruzgan. Both task forces would nonetheless be capable of acting against targets elsewhere in the Pashtun regions. In addition to these two task forces, a counterterrorism option would retain the three Army Special Forces battalions and other elements that appear to be assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).15 This provides roughly 54 Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs), the basic unit of Army Special Forces. While the task forces would focus purely on direct action, ODAs would partner with local forces to collect intelligence and secure specific areas.16 Additionally, these ODAs would provide crucial support to critical Afghan allies and reassure them that the United States is not going to entirely abandon them. CJSOTF-A should, in addition, have a dedicated helicopter battalion for its own lift. This reassurance and support of local allies is a crucial and underappreciated part of a counterterrorism option, though such support to local allies could also be part of a counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed, the recently launched Community Defense Initiative (CDI) seeks to use Special Forces troops to build effective tribal militias to fight the Taliban and other militants.17 With 54 ODAs, the United States could potentially support local allies in roughly 50 Afghan districts, assuming one ODA per district with a few deployed in other roles.18 Logistics might prevent this upper limit from being reached but at a minimum several dozen districts could be supported by CJSOTF-A’s ODAs. These local allies would in many cases be from non-Pashtun groups (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras), which would limit their ability to be effective in Pashtun areas but would likely include at least a few other tribes that see more benefit working with the Afghan government and the United States than against them. The non-Pashtun groups were the critical allies of the United States in 2001 and remain staunchly against the Taliban and other militants. The Tajiks of the Panjshir Valley, for example, are probably even more anti-Taliban than the United States and have made the province one of the most secure in the country.19 With U.S. support, these groups will be able to prevent the expansion of militants outside Pashtun areas. Local allies in Pashtun areas will not only help contain militants but will also enable collection of intelligence to support the task force operations. One example is the Shinwari tribe in Nangarhar province, which has never valued the Taliban. Shinwari militias are reported to be working with Special Forces in the Achin district of Nangarhar.20 The Afghan Border Police commander on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border at Spin Boldak, General Abdul Razziq, also derives substantial revenue from cross-border trade and will likely continue to fight the Taliban to maintain this revenue, making him a probable local partner.21 Another potential ally is the Alokozai tribe in the Arghandab district of Kandahar province, which has a history of resisting the Taliban.22 Supporting local allies does not mean abandoning the Afghan government any more than supporting local allies in the Awakening movement in Iraq’s Anbar province meant abandoning the Iraq government. However, it does pose risks, as local allies interests may not always align with those of the central government.23 Balancing the two will require deftness which will be discussed later. In addition to the two task forces and CJSOTF-A, a few more ‘‘enablers’’ would be required. First, this posture would need additional special operations personnel focused on intelligence collection, along with a substantial complement of intelligence community personnel to collect both human and signals intelligence.24 Second, it would require a significant complement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) including Predators, Reapers, and other specialized types along with their support personnel, equivalent to perhaps three squadrons. Third, an AC-130 gunship squadron for air support would be needed, along with combat search and rescue teams from Air Force Special Operations Command. Clearly, ‘‘small’’ is a relative term. This special operations posture alone would be roughly five battalions of ground forces, eight aviation squadrons/ battalions, and a few odds and ends plus higher headquarters. This would be approximately 5,000 U.S. and Coalition troops.25 In addition, a conventional force component would be needed to serve as a quick reaction force, to provide security for the bases, and to protect convoys. A reasonable estimate for this force would be a brigade or regimental combat team, giving a battalion to each base with the higher headquarters at Bagram. This would add about another 3,500 troops.26 In addition, about 500 U.S. personnel would remain as advisers and liaisons to Afghan security forces, particularly the Afghan National Army where they would be attached at brigade and corps level. Additional air support besides the UAVs and AC-130s would also be needed. Two squadrons of fighter-bombers (F-15E, A-10, etc.) likely would be sufficient, adding another 2,000 personnel or so.27 Finally, this posture would require additional staff, logistics, and support personnel (medical for instance), some but not all of which could be contractors, adding another 2,000 military personnel.28 This would be a total force of about 13,000 military personnel and some supporting intelligence community personnel and contractors. This is a high-end estimate and the counterterrorism option could potentially be done with fewer troops. Some military personnel with Afghanistan experience believe this mission could be undertaken with half this number of troops but the posture described above errs on the side of caution.29 This is small compared to the current posture in Afghanistan, smaller still than the forces implied in General McChrystal’s report, and tiny compared to the peak number of forces in Iraq. On the other hand, it is vastly larger than any other counterterrorism deployment.

ADVANTAGE TWO IS HEGEMONY.

We’ll isolate three internal links.

First is credibility.

Obama’s July 2011 deadline is conditioned on the success of counterinsurgency, but is perceived as an unconditional withdrawal and has created global confusion. Rogin 10 - staff writer for Foreign Policy, Prior to that, Josh covered defense and foreign policy for Congressional Quarterly. Josh has also worked at the House International Relations Committee, and the Brookings Institution (Josh, “Petraeus: Withdrawal timeline does not mean "switching off the lights",” The Cable, 6/29, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switching_off_the_lights) When General David Petraeus testifies today on Capitol Hill, his main job will be to carefully define the timeline for the beginning of America's exit from Afghanistan, a timeline that has stakeholders in Washington and throughout the region confused and concerned. "As the President has stated, July 2011 is the point at which we will begin a transition phase in which the Afghan government will take more and more responsibility for its own security," Petraeus wrote in his advanced questions submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee and obtained by The Cable. "As the President has also indicated, July 2011 is not a date when we will be rapidly withdrawing our forces and -switching off the lights and closing the door behind us." His job will also be to defend President Obama's decision to set a public date for the beginning of the withdrawal in the first place, by arguing that having a time line in the public discussion helps pressure the Afghans to move faster toward being able to govern and secure their country on their own. "I believe there was value in sending a message of urgency -- July 2011... But it is important that July 2011 be seen for what it is: the date when a process begins, in which the reduction of US forces must be based on the conditions at the time, and not a date when the U.S. heads for the exits," he wrote to the committee. He stressed that multiple times that the pace of the drawdown would be "conditions based." But even in his own writing to the committee, Petraeus acknowledged that the enemy, the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan, are waiting out the coalition and biding their time until foreign forces decide to leave. "Insurgent leaders view their tactical and operational losses in 2010 as inevitable and acceptable. The Taliban believe they can outlast the Coalition's will to fight and believe this strategy will be effective despite short-term losses. The Taliban also believe they can sustain momentum and maintain operational capacity," he wrote. One of the main enablers of any U.S. exit is the development of the Afghan National Security Forces, which has not gone at the pace the coalition had hoped. Petraeus wrote that he would review the situation of the ANSF within four months of assuming command, if confirmed. As of the latest review, only 5 out of 19 Afghan National Army brigades can function without a majority of their functions supported by the U.S., according to Petraeus, and only 2 out of 7 major headquarters can function properly without significant coalition support. As of June 27, there are 7,261 ANA troops in the city of Kandahar and 6,794 Afghan soldiers in Helmand province, Petraeus wrote. He also said that a comprehensive plan to reintegrate some Taliban fighters is under final review with President Hamid Karzai and "offers the potential to reduce violence and provide realistic avenues to assimilate Pashtun insurgents back into Afghanistan society." Petraeus promised to take a look at the rules of engagement that U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan feel are tying their hands in the fight, but he didn't say whether he was leaning toward changing them or not. Meanwhile, confusion over the president's timeline persists both in Washington and abroad as interested parties try to interpret the July 2011 date in a way that serves their own political interests. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-CA, said Monday that there would be "a serious drawdown" next summer, seemingly getting ahead of the administration in an effort to appease the liberal wing of her caucus, which is threatening to not support more funding for the war. Two of the committee members Petraeus will face today, Sens. John McCain, R-AZ, and Lindsey Graham, R-SC, held a press conference Thursday to announce their opposition to setting any public date, no matter what the caveats. Foreign leaders are especially confused, particularly the Afghan and Pakistani governments, who see a difference between public promises of drawdowns and private assurances from the administration that the July 2011 date would not precipitate large scale troop reductions. One high level diplomatic source said that Pakistani and Afghan leaders believe that they were told by National Security Advisor Jim Jones that there was not going to be a big withdrawal and the there would be "no reduction in commitment" in July 2011. But regardless of whether the administration sent mixed messages, the nuance of their time line policy has been misunderstood or ignored in the region, as various actors start to plan strategies with the expectation that U.S. troops are leaving. "In retrospect, despite all the caveats, it was a mistake to put such a date certain for the beginning of withdrawal," said Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. "The word beginning was lost and it strengthens the ability of different interests to hedge, which is exactly what they've been doing."

COIN will fail, making the deadline impossible to meet – five reasons. Nelson 9 – former director of a Joint Task Force in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, retired naval officer with assignments at the National Counterterrorism Center and National Security Council, and Senior Fellow at the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Rick, “The Other Side of the COIN”, 10/1, http://csis.org/publication/other-side-coin) Q1: General McChrystal is expected to request up to 40,000 additional troops and recommend a greater focus on counterinsurgency operations. Is this approach likely to succeed in strengthening the Afghan state, defeating the Taliban, and advancing America’s fight against terrorism? A1: Probably not. Counterinsurgency doctrine, or COIN, has captured the hearts and minds of many in the D.C. policy community. Upon close inspection, however, it becomes clear that COIN, at least as applied to Afghanistan, is built on a number of shaky assumptions. Consider: 1. Even if General McChrystal gets all 40,000 troops he has requested, the combined International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Afghan contingent would still number less than 250,000—far fewer than the 670,000 troops the U.S. Army’s own Counterinsurgency Field Manual suggests is necessary to secure a state of Afghanistan’s size. 2. Widespread corruption in the August 20 election has widened the trust gap between the Karzai government and the Afghan people. Because successful counterinsurgency requires a government that is credible and responsive to its citizens, these developments threaten to derail the U.S. and NATO mission. And as our experience in South Vietnam made painfully clear, the White House is usually powerless to force any host nation to enact good-government reforms. 3. General McChrystal’s strategic review emphasizes “population protection” as the key to drying up support for the Taliban. The claim is based on the assumption that insurgencies require the backing, or at least acquiescence, of surrounding communities in order to function. But a recent article in the Washington Post noted that the Taliban rely primarily on foreign, rather than local, funding sources, a fact that suggests that population protection may ultimately do little to diminish the insurgency’s strength. 4. Public support for a counterinsurgency campaign of such massive proportions simply does not exist. Recent polls suggest that over 50 percent of Americans are against sending more troops to Afghanistan. And our European allies are even less enthusiastic about escalating the war. 5. Finally, the COIN framework is built on the larger assumption that eliminating the Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan is the best use of American resources in the broader effort to combat terrorism. Al Qaeda’s presence in a pre-9/11, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has convinced many officials that a Taliban takeover would result in al Qaeda’s inevitable return to the state. But al Qaeda already has established itself in Pakistan’s semi-governed spaces. Along with Taliban and other extremist militants, the group enjoys the relative safety of these territories, where Pakistani sovereignty precludes any substantive U.S. ground force. Even if al Qaeda were to reenter Afghanistan sometime in the future, the United States would face the same basic terrorist threats that it does today. Critics will argue that Afghanistan served as a base and planning center for 9/11. True enough; but al Qaeda, in establishing a presence in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen has already developed numerous “safe havens.” In short, our overwhelming focus on Afghanistan fails to serve a more nuanced counterterrorism strategy that acknowledges the many other areas in which al Qaeda operates. Q2: So how should the United States approach the war? A2: We need to reframe our thinking about U.S. goals and the means to achieve them. As outlined above, COIN in Afghanistan is only tenuously linked to counterterrorism, the original purpose of our efforts. The Obama administration should implement a more minimalist policy in the region, one that employs special operations forces and airstrikes to directly target terrorists, especially leaders of cells. Critics charge that these operations are mere tactical successes, detached from any larger strategy. This is a disingenuous assessment. Targeted strikes do, in fact, serve the greater strategic purpose of disrupting the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. Unlike COIN—which seems to harbor the grandiose notion of eliminating terrorism by transforming societies, regardless of cost—counterterrorism acknowledges that radicalism will always exist and that policymakers should directly seek to contain it. At the core of this shift is an acknowledgment that our best Afghanistan policy is no better than our best Pakistan policy. ISAF and Afghan forces can do everything imaginable to eliminate Taliban influence in the country, but any effort that does not address the presence of militants in Pakistan’s semi-governed spaces ultimately does little to reduce the threat posed by al Qaeda. At a most basic level, the Obama administration must change the calculus of the Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with regard to extremists in the country’s northwest. Doing so will force the United States to play a central role in rapprochement between Pakistan and India—and be a fair broker to both parties. What about Afghanistan? Proponents of an “all-in” approach tend to misrepresent a minimalist strategy as complete withdrawal, arguing that the United States abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet war and that doing so again would plunge the country into anarchy. But few serious analysts are talking about abandoning Afghanistan, and there is no reason to believe that a smaller, more specialized force would not be able to confront any resumption of al Qaeda activity in the country. As far as the Taliban are concerned, there is reason to believe that an ever-larger foreign troop presence simply swells the movement’s ranks (to wit: it has been dismaying to watch increased troop levels correlate with recent Taliban gains). Until the administration can convincingly demonstrate how additional troops will, in fact, support broader national security and counterterrorism goals, the United States is better served by a strategy that minimizes the loss of life and dizzying levels of expenditure that any “all-in” approach would entail.

Statistical models prove – large footprint strategies fail. Greig and Enterline 9 – (associate professors of political science at the University of North Texas and research associates at the Castleberry Peace Institute (J. Michael and Andrew, “No Good Choices,” 11/11, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/11/no_good_choices) We used forecasts from statistical models to determine how the two strategies under Obama's consideration might play out: the chances that insurgency will abate and democracy will strengthen, as well as the impact on the stability of Afghanistan's democratic government and its neighbors, like Pakistan. Unfortunately, we found that regardless of what the United States does, the chance of violent insurgency remains woefully high -- and that a larger force deployment might actually endanger the weak Afghan state. To perform this analysis, we studied similar efforts by foreign powers to establish democracy during the 20th century -- the Allied forces in Germany and Japan after World War II, for instance, and Sudan after the British colonial occupation. We studied the correlation between the occurrence of insurgency in foreign-created democracies and factors such as the level of economic development, social divisions, number of neighboring democratic states, and historical episodes of political violence. In turn, we studied how these characteristics and the insurgencies they spur influence the durability of democracy. We input data on historical conflicts and current conditions in Afghanistan to generate forecasts for each of the force deployment strategies under Obama's consideration. We studied the prospects for Afghanistan on a two-year time frame under several scenarios: a same-sized U.S. force, an increased U.S. force, and an increased Afghan force, for instance. In all of our models, regardless of the number of soldiers deployed, the probability of insurgency in the years after the force deployment -- and, thus, continued violence and instability in Afghanistan -- remains so high as to seem certain. The current cadre fighting al Qaeda and the Taliban includes 68,000 U.S. troops, 40,000 NATO troops, and 94,000 soldiers from the Afghan National Army (ANA). If that same force stays in place, there is a 93.6 percent probability of insurgency over the next year. Regardless of how many additional troops arrive -- or who sends them -- the chance of insurgency in 2010 and 2011 remains more than 90 percent. If the ANA achieves its force target of 134,000 troops, for instance, the probability of insurgency reduces negligibly. Deploying 15,000 more U.S. troops reduces the risk a scant 0.1 percent in 2010. Deploying 60,000 more -- the largest additional U.S. force suggested -- reduces the risk just 0.1 percent further than that. What explains the inability of any additional deployment to reduce the likelihood of insurgency in Afghanistan? Our analysis suggests that the U.S. counterinsurgency swims against two very strong currents. First, the combustible mix of Afghanistan's relatively immutable social and political characteristics -- its ethnic and religious divisions, low level of economic development, and large population -- almost guarantees continued insurgency. The country's poverty and large population encourage competition for scarce resources, and that competition gins up violence. Democracy itself seems to further destabilize the country: Our analysis shows that when foreign countries institute democracy in countries with deep ethnic and religious divisions (and Afghanistan is a tribal-based society), insurgency results. A second factor suggesting that additional U.S. troops won't do much to quell political violence is the length of the war in Afghanistan. Insurgency develops momentum and is more difficult to eliminate the longer it persists. A force that might nip a fledgling insurgency in the bud is unlikely to do so once it is embedded -- and the rebels in Afghanistan have been around for nearly a decade.

The U.S. is already seen as foreign occupancy and it’s impossible to secure the Pakistan border Dorronsoro 10 - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes (Gilles, “The Case for Negotiations,” In These Times, 5/24, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40863 The coalition's strategy in Afghanistan is at an impasse. The renewed efforts undertaken since the summer of 2009 have failed to temper the guerrilla war. A few tactical successes are possible, but this war cannot be won. The coalition cannot defeat the Taliban as long as Pakistan continues to offer them sanctuary. And increasing resources to wage the war is not an option. The costs of continuing the war--to use Ambassador Karl Eikenberry's expression in the leaked telegram to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton--are "astronomical." The entire U.S. strategy revolves around a swift Afghanization of the conflict, yet the coalition's Afghan partner is weaker than it was a year ago. The state's presence in the provinces has declined sharply and the legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai's government is contested. As a result of the massive fraud in the August 2009 presidential elections, the government has no popular legitimacy, and the legislative elections slated for fall 2010 will probably undermine the political system even further because fraud is inevitable. It is unlikely that the Afghan regime will ever be able to assume responsibility for its own security. As a result, the coalition faces an endless war accompanied by an intolerable loss of life and treasure. A less costly alternative would be to negotiate a broad agreement with the Taliban leadership to form a national unity government, with guarantees against al Qaeda's return to Afghanistan. But even if such negotiations might occur, they hold no guarantee of success. Yet the cost of their failure is negligible compared with the potential gain: a relatively swift way out of the crisis that preserves the coalition's essential interests. Time is not on the coalition's side. The United States should contact Taliban leaders as soon as possible rather than waiting for the situation to deteriorate further. In pursuit of a losing strategy The Taliban cannot be defeated militarily because the border with Pakistan is and will remain open for the insurgents. The Pakistani army, which refuses to launch an offensive against the Afghan Taliban, has never considered taking action against the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan. The February arrest of acting Taliban military commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is probably a sign that the Pakistani military wants more control over the insurgency to prepare for the negotiation process. What's more, the insurgency is now nationwide and cannot be contained by counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in two or three southern provinces. The COIN strategy cannot succeed because of the immense resources it requires. In a marginal, strategically unimportant district such as Marjah, the coalition would have to keep thousands of troops for years to prevent the Taliban's return. To replicate such strategy, even in one province, would overstretch the U.S. military. In addition to COIN, military strategists think they can quickly weaken the Taliban through the creation of militias, the co-opting of Taliban groups and targeted assassinations. These policies will not strengthen the Afghan government's legitimacy or influence; to the contrary, they are destroying the Karzai government's credibility. The effects of this strategy are irreversible, and with the acceleration of political fragmentation, the coalition is faced with the prospect of a collapse of Afghan institutions. The Karzai government is unlikely to engage in institutional reform, given that it is increasingly dependent on the networks that ensured its fraudulent re-election. Consequently, the coalition is having more and more trouble influencing Karzai. The weakness of the central political institutions means that the development of the army and the police force--the coalition's priorities--is occurring in a vacuum. Transferring security responsibilities to our Afghan partner will probably not be possible in the foreseeable future. Afghans perceive their representative institutions as illegitimate. Between 10 percent and 15 percent of Afghan voters are believed to have supported Karzai during the 2009 presidential elections. All indications point to a high level of cynicism among the people and their rejection of the government; in fact, they massively refrained from voting even in places where security was reasonably good. The legislative elections scheduled for September 2010 will further erode faith in the political system. The lack of security makes it impossible to hold credible elections in at least half of Afghanistan. And in February 2010, Karzai seized control of the ECC (Electoral Complaints Commission); there is no longer an independent institution to validate the process. Aside from fraud and corruption, Karzai's lack of legitimacy is linked to his presumed lack of autonomy vis-à-vis the coalition. Internal U.S. Army studies, and the experiences of numerous journalists and researchers indicate that a majority of the population in combat zones now considers the foreign forces as occupiers. Military operations are polarizing the population against foreign forces and further weakening Karzai's regime, which appears irreparably unpopular and illegitimate. The coalition is perceived as the main provider of insecurity. Villagers do not want to see the establishment of coalition outposts that can bring only bombings and IEDs. Furthermore, the coalition is hurt by the dependence of Karzai on his local allies, who generally oppose the coalition's objectives. The coalition is also undermined when the Afghan government aggressively distances itself from the coalition when civilians are killed by "friendly fire." The failed Karzai government The government in Kabul is now too weak to reassert control over the periphery of the country. As a result, the coalition is increasingly dependent on local strongmen who it helped put in place or with whom it has worked. The weakening of the Afghan regime is very bad news for the coalition, which is promoting Afghanization in order to reduce its own investment. It is hard to build a military that is independent of the institutional network that constitutes the state. Problems such as ethnic tensions, local and national corruption, and the lack of a clear purpose make it hard to motivate soldiers and officers. The coalition should recognize that an autonomous Afghan army is a very distant goal. The coalition's large offensive to "clear" Taliban territory will not work, because the Afghan army and the police are not ready. If the coalition tries to secure Taliban territory on a long-term basis, it will overstretch itself and casualties will increase significantly. Modest objectives would be more realistic. Most observers recognize the impossibility of a military solution. Nonetheless, different arguments have been put forward to reject negotiations. First, the coalition needs more time. Reinforcements are not yet fully in place, so talk of failure is premature. Second, experts such as Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid explain that the Taliban have reached the height of their influence, implying that the coalition would be in a stronger position in the future. One can counter that the coalition should begin negotiations now while it still has the means to exert military pressure. There is nothing to indicate that the Taliban are going to slow their advance. They are pursuing a strategy that includes expanding their influence in the cities. And nothing indicates that the Karzai regime won't be even weaker a year from now. From this perspective, the Afghan surge will have had the same result as all troop increases since 2003: a deterioration of security. Consequently, marginal military gains for the coalition in the next 18 months are the exact equivalent of a strategic defeat. Hence the need for a negotiated settlement.

Failure spills over to the entirety of US foreign policy and prevent Obama from exercising leadership Fernholz 10 – writing fellow at the American Prospect and Research Fellow at the New America Foundation (Tim, The American Prospect, “The Ultimate Test Case,” March, 2010, lexis) Katulis = security policy analyst at the Center for American Progress Obama's final decision in December offered something for everyone, or tried to: The U.S. would deploy an additional 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, fewer than McChrystal requested but still a tripling of the troop commitment to the conflict since Obama's inauguration. The strategy was virtually unchanged from what Obama had offered in the spring. The goal also remained the same: "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future." Obama's plan echoed the surge he opposed in Iraq: An escalation to protect civilians in population centers and train Afghan security forces that will, in theory, reverse the momentum of the insurgents and even co-opt those who are willing to lay down their arms. Along with aid from a "civilian surge" of U.S. officials and contractors with expertise in engineering, agriculture, justice, and local politics, the hope is that this will give the Afghan government time to recover from corruption and incompetence (the euphemism is "capacity building"). The one new development was a timeline: In July of 2011, the U.S. will start handing over responsibilities to the Afghans so that coalition forces can begin to withdraw. The president insisted on this timeline, and it remains the single most progressive aspect of the plan--a recognition that, in the greater scheme of things, the U.S. has better things to do for its national security than muck about in Afghanistan. "Any American president has to think about the political sustainability of his policies, and an American president that launches into policies that he can't sustain politically isn't doing his job," Hurlburt says. "That's true of Obama, that's true of Bush, it's true of everybody. You look at some of the things that Bush started and couldn't sustain--that's the worst of all possible worlds." OBAMA'S TINKERING AROUND THE EDGES--the timeline, the counterinsurgency strategy, the emphasis on development, the whole-of-government approach--marks a real departure from the previous administration's efforts. His rhetoric still holds the promise of the overhaul he campaigned on. But the president's failure to fundamentally reorient the Afghan conflict has broad ramifications for his promised foreign-policy reforms. Perhaps the most significant loss is the big picture. Nearly 100,000 troops are committed to pursuing Obama's "narrow goal" of defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. But is this extensive involvement in an Afghan civil war the best way to fight al-Qaeda and like-minded groups? After all, one of al-Qaeda leaders' stated goals is drawing the United States into expensive and intractable long-term conflicts. Even as we're leaving Iraq, doubling-down on Afghanistan plays into their hands. "We did not ask for this fight," the president said in a major speech on Afghanistan in December. "On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people." It was an explanation straight out of the Bush era. Much of the 9-11 operation was carried out not in Afghanistan or Pakistan (or Iraq, for that matter) but in places like Germany and Florida. And terrorism experts warn that officials should not take for granted that al-Qaeda could re-establish a safe haven in Afghanistan, or that such safe havens are threats to the United States. The administration admits that fewer than 100 al-Qaeda terrorists remain in Afghanistan--and that many insurgents aren't ideological opponents of the United States. Some are petty criminals, some are simply armed local groups tired of being pushed around by the central government, and others fight merely for pay. (The U.S. was embarrassed to find out in December that the Taliban paid its fighters more than the Afghan National Army paid its soldiers.) Many of these insurgents are angry at the U.S. simply because we're there. "The importance of a people not wanting to be occupied cannot be underestimated," says Matthew Hoh, a former Foreign Service officer who was the first person to resign a government post in protest of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. "National will or ethnic will cannot be downplayed or misunderstood or denied." Meanwhile, the transnational terrorists we're supposedly fighting don't need bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan to attack us. Officials concede that safe havens in other failed or failing states must be pressed as well. Just weeks after Obama announced his strategy, a Nigerian man obtained explosives from an al-Qaeda affiliate in Yemen--which, along with places like Pakistan, Algeria, and Somalia, provides a "safe haven" for the group--and attempted to destroy an international flight as it landed in Detroit. U.S. intelligence agencies, despite having some relevant information, didn't act in time to prevent the bomber from getting on the flight. Perhaps the billions of dollars dedicated to the new troops in Afghanistan would be better served fixing structural failures in intelligence-gathering. Instead, we're seeing the considerable militarization of intelligence-gathering. After a suicide bomber killed seven Central Intelligence Agency employees in Afghanistan, CIA Director Leon Panetta wrote that "like our military, CIA officers are on the front lines against al-Qaeda and its violent allies." The officers were stationed there to manage a drone program that hunts terrorists in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan. While fighting terrorists requires both intelligence-gathering and the kind of targeted strikes the CIA performs, there is a clear imbalance when a camp in Afghanistan has dozens of CIA employees but the National Counterterrorism Center has only eight or nine Middle East analysts. The focus on troops has also hampered Obama's goal of placing equal emphasis on civilian and military aspects of our foreign policy. The military, which has increasingly become America's primary presence abroad, is resisting the attempt to narrow the focus of the war. Despite the White House's goal of training just over 200,000 Afghan soldiers and police, Pentagon officials plan to train 400,000. And Holbrooke, intended to be the civilian counterpart to Petraeus, has seen his influence diminish commensurate with his lack of resources. Though his office is still an important center of coordination, he plays a smaller-than-expected role in the White House-driven decision-making process. Obama's foreign-policy vision professed a need to address the root causes of conflict by building up local infrastructure and actively fostering better lives for people in places like Afghanistan. Despite a consensus--which even includes Defense Secretary Robert Gates--that civilian development, medical access, and agricultural expertise are critical to counterinsurgency, the administration's budget request in March reflected a heavy emphasis on defense over development. Ambassador Eikenberry protested in a cable to Washington, asking for an additional $2.5 billion--60 percent more than he had been given. The military was receiving $68 billion. Even if civilian efforts were given more resources, overhauling the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to make them more effective remains a challenge--despite the fact that the State Department created a position to do just that. Although the administration expects to have 974 civilians on the ground by early 2010, beating a goal it set in March, this is a drop in the bucket: Afghanistan has a population of 28 million. Reports show a deep frustration from U.S. officials working on development projects, because they are almost entirely dependent on the military. Indeed, despite the growing acceptance of the need for civilian expertise, the military often finds itself trying to do the work of civilian agencies that aren't set up to operate in a war zone. "We're in a 'build the airplane while you're flying it' kind of situation," Hurlburt says. "If the effort to produce a better, much more energetic and smartly focused civilian effort in Afghanistan succeeds, it will become the template for broader reform of the institutions." That template could be useful, Hurlburt adds, or it could be detrimental, since the lessons U.S. development officers learn in Afghanistan may not apply so well to countries that need U.S. help but aren't in the middle of a war. This narrow focus on the military conflict also distracts from Pakistan, Afghanistan's nuclear neighbor, where an unstable government and the proliferation of extreme Islamist groups are of much more interest to the United States. "I am not sure what 40,000 additional troops in Afghanistan can do about the greater global security threat, instability in Pakistan," Katulis told me last fall. "You have nearly daily--and sometimes twice-a-day--attacks targeted inside of Pakistan, which is five times more populous and has nuclear weapons." Just consider the numbers: Obama is spending $1.5 billion a year on aid to Pakistan and over $68 billion fighting a war in Afghanistan. With Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visiting Pakistan, the administration has had some success in navigating the nation's complex politics. Clinton is trying to broaden the U.S.-Pakistan relationship from working with the government on national-security issues toward a holistic engagement with the entire country. It's exactly the kind of approach that Obama promised, but it is undermined by the use of drone strikes on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which have increased anti-American sentiment. The Obama team has set aside the Bush administration's end goal of installing a democracy and instead made a limited version of that aim the means to their central end: Everything comes down to eliminating the terrorist presence in Afghanistan. Vikram Singh, Holbrooke's defense adviser, says the region is the "epicenter" of al-Qaeda's action, which is why the administration has made preventing the group's re-establishment there a more pressing goal than dealing with al-Qaeda globally. With even John Kerry, now the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, using the distinctly Bush-administration phrase "global counterinsurgency" in his speeches on Afghanistan, progressive attempts to change the way we think about terrorism threats have taken a step back. THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE settled into the Washington consensus that he criticized as an up-and-coming senator. His Afghanistan strategy buys into the idea that American troops can defeat tenacious insurgencies, that our officials have the ability to build even the most basic state from the ground up, and that terrorists represent a monolithic enemy around the world. The cocky senator of last spring has been replaced by a cautious and tightly controlled president. There was a time when Obama could flout conventional wisdom, but now he must accommodate it. It's true that Obama did not start this war, did not under-resource it for eight years, and did not fail to pursue Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora. The credit for those dubious achievements goes to George W. Bush. But the new president has missed opportunities to shift how our government approaches these problems. Many of the campaign aides who helped craft Obama's forward-thinking foreign-policy vision remain in his inner circle, but are superseded by a group of veteran officials (Clinton, Gates, Petraeus, Holbrooke, National Security Adviser James Jones) whose commitment to new ideas varies. It remains to be seen how much they--and the responsibilities of being president--have shifted Obama's personal foreign-policy vision. The stakes are high in Afghanistan not only on the merits but because success buys him the credibility to advance other foreign-policy initiatives that don't tend to go over well with domestic audiences: closing Guantanamo Bay, engaging Iran, pressuring Israel toward peace, reaching out to the Muslim community, and reducing nuclear weapons in America and the world. Even given the daunting odds, it is still possible that a new mode of foreign policy--one that is executed by civilians and soldiers equally--could spring from the crucible of Afghanistan. The other scenario, though, is that using the military in Afghanistan as the central means of fighting terrorism leaves reform of law enforcement and intelligence out in the cold, hinders the transformation of the civilian agencies, and prevents Obama from spending resources on other projects. A failure in Afghanistan is a failure to change the way this country approaches foreign policy. Worse, if the next two years don't show an Afghan government that can handle basic governing and security, then all of Obama's ideas will be wrapped in that failure, hindering his ability to execute any of his other initiatives.

Obama will sell the plan as a drawdown to a lighter but permanent commitment to Afghanistan – this resolves confusion over the withdrawal deadline Stewart 10 - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3) But this moderate tone gains Obama the leverage that Bush lacked. As long as the US asserted that Afghanistan was an existential threat, the front line in the war on terror, and that, therefore, failure was not an option, the US had no leverage over Karzai. The worse Afghanistan behaved—the more drugs it grew and terrorists it fostered—the more money it received. If it sorted out its act, it risked being relegated to a minor charitable recipient like Tajikistan. A senior Afghan official warned me this year “to stop referring to us as a humanitarian crisis: we must be the number one terrorist threat in the world, because if we are not we won’t get any money.” By asserting convincingly that Afghanistan is not the be-all and end-all and that the US could always ultimately withdraw, Obama escapes this codependent trap and regains some leverage over the Afghan government. In his politer words: It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan. But perhaps even more importantly, defining a more moderate and limited strategy gives him leverage over his own generals. By refusing to endorse or use the language of counterinsurgency in the speech, he escapes their doctrinal logic. By no longer committing the US to defeating the Taliban or state-building, he dramatically reduces the objectives and the costs of the mission. By talking about costs, the fragility of public support, and other spriorities, he reminds the generals why this surge must be the last. All of this serves to “cap” the troop increases at current levels and provide the justification for beginning to reduce numbers in 2011. But the brilliance of its moderate arguments cannot overcome that statement about withdrawal. With seven words, “our troops will begin to come home,” he loses leverage over the Taliban, as well as leverage he had gained over Karzai and the generals. It is a cautious, lawyerly statement, expressed again as “[we will] begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.” It sets no final exit date or numbers. But the Afghan students who were watching the speech with me ignored these nuances and saw it only as departure. This may be fatal for Obama’s ambition to “open the door” to the Taliban. The lighter, more political, and less but still robust militarized presence that his argument implies could facilitate a deal with the Taliban, if it appeared semi-permanent. As the President asserted, the Taliban are not that strong. They have nothing like the strength or appeal that they had in 1995. They cannot take the capital, let alone recapture the country. There is strong opposition to their presence, particularly in the center and the north of the country. Their only hope is to negotiate. But the Taliban need to acknowledge this. And the only way they will is if they believe that we are not going to allow the Kabul government to collapse. Afghanistan has been above all a project not of force but of patience. It would take decades before Afghanistan achieved the political cohesion, stability, wealth, government structures, or even basic education levels of Pakistan. A political settlement requires a reasonably strong permanent government. The best argument against the surge, therefore, was never that a US operation without an adequate Afghan government partner would be unable to defeat the Taliban—though it won’t. Nor that the attempt to strengthen the US campaign will intensify resistance, though it may. Nor because such a deployment of over 100,000 troops at a cost of perhaps $100 billion a year would be completely disproportional to the US’s limited strategic interests and moral obligation in Afghanistan—though that too is true. Instead, Obama should not have requested more troops because doing so intensifies opposition to the war in the US and Europe and accelerates the pace of withdrawal demanded by political pressures at home. To keep domestic consent for a long engagement we need to limit troop numbers and in particular limit our casualties. The surge is a Mephistophelian bargain, in which the President has gained force but lost time. What can now be done to salvage the administration’s position? Obama has acquired leverage over the generals and some support from the public by making it clear that he will not increase troop strength further. He has gained leverage over Karzai by showing that he has options other than investing in Afghanistan. Now he needs to regain leverage over the Taliban by showing them that he is not about to abandon Afghanistan and that their best option is to negotiate. In short, he needs to follow his argument for a call strategy to its conclusion. The date of withdrawal should be recast as a time for reduction to a lighter, more sustainable, and more permanent presence. This is what the administration began to do in the days following the speech. As National Security Adviser General James Jones said, “That date is a ‘ramp’ rather than a cliff.” And as Hillary Clinton said in her congressional testimony on December 3, their real aim should be to “develop a long-term sustainable relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past, primarily our abandonment of that region.” A more realistic, affordable, and therefore sustainable presence would not make Afghanistan stable or predictable. It would be merely a small if necessary part of an Afghan political strategy. The US and its allies would only moderate, influence, and fund a strategy shaped and led by Afghans themselves. The aim would be to knit together different Afghan interests and allegiances sensitively enough to avoid alienating independent local groups, consistently enough to regain their trust, and robustly enough to restore the security and justice that Afghans demand and deserve from a national government. What would this look like in practice? Probably a mess. It might involve a tricky coalition of people we refer to, respectively, as Islamists, progressive civil society, terrorists, warlords, learned technocrats, and village chiefs. Under a notionally democratic constitutional structure, it could be a rickety experiment with systems that might, like Afghanistan’s neighbors, include strong elements of religious or military rule. There is no way to predict what the Taliban might become or what authority a national government in Kabul could regain. Civil war would remain a possibility. But an intelligent, long-term, and tolerant partnership with the United States could reduce the likelihood of civil war and increase the likelihood of a political settlement. This is hardly the stuff of sound bites and political slogans. But it would be better for everyone than boom and bust, surge and flight. With the right patient leadership, a political strategy could leave Afghanistan in twenty years’ time more prosperous, stable, and humane than it is today. That would be excellent for Afghans and good for the world. Meanwhile, Obama’s broader strategic argument must not be lost. He has grasped that the foreign policy of the president should not consist in a series of extravagant, brief, Manichaean battles, driven by exaggerated fears, grandiloquent promises, and fragile edifices of doctrine. Instead the foreign policy of a great power should be the responsible exercise of limited power and knowledge in concurrent situations of radical uncertainty. Obama, we may hope, will develop this elusive insight. And then it might become possible to find the right places in which to deploy the wealth, the courage, and the political capital of the United States. We might hope in South Asia, for example, for a lighter involvement in Afghanistan but a much greater focus on Kashmir.1

Second is overstretch.

Afghanistan will obliterate American primacy Pyne 9 - Vice Chair of the Utah State Legislative Compensation Commission and Vice President of the Association of the United States Army's Utah chapter and a Vice President of the Salt Lake Total Force Chapter of the Military Officers Association of America (David, “Obama failing our troops in Afghanistan,” 11/7, http://westernfrontamerica.com/2009/11/07/obama-failing-troops-afghanistan/) Since we invaded Iraq six and a half years ago and Afghanistan eight years ago, we have lost nearly 7,000 American soldiers and contractors killed in action with tens of thousands more severely wounded at the cost of a trillion dollars thus far. October has been the single deadliest month for US forces since the war began. It shouldn’t take a military strategist to realize that after fighting a war for over eight years without any real idea how to win, it might be time to consider a drastic change in strategy. This should include a sober assessment of the cost/benefit analysis of staying and fighting at a rising cost in American blood and treasure versus conserving our military strength and bringing our troops home to defend America from terrorist attack. The Soviets fought an eight year long war in Afghanistan before finally realizing that victory was not a possibility in a conflict which some say began a chain of events that resulted in the collapse of the Evil Empire thanks to Reagan’s support of proxy forces against the Soviet invaders. If the Soviet Union could not win after eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, what makes our leaders think that we can? The longer we keep large numbers of our troops fighting no-win counterinsurgency wars of attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan, the weaker and more vulnerable we will become to the point where eventually the American Empire, as some call it, may decline precipitously or perhaps even collapse altogether. Worse yet, America’s increasing military weakness highlighted further by Obama’s ongoing demolition of our nuclear deterrent might invite a catastrophic attack from our from our Sino-Russian alliance enemies. Already some of our retired generals have stated that they believe our Army and Marine Corps ground forces have been broken by their over-deployment in the desert sands of Iraq and Afghanistan. If the Soviet Union could not win after eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, what makes our leaders think that we can? The longer we keep large numbers of our troops bogged down fighting two no-win counterinsurgency wars of attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan, the weaker and more vulnerable we will become to the point where eventually the American Empire, as some call it, may decline precipitously or perhaps even collapse altogether. Worse yet, America’s increasing military weakness highlighted further by Obama’s ongoing demolition of our nuclear deterrent, might invite a catastrophic attack from our from our Sino-Russian alliance enemies. Already some of our retired generals have stated that they believe our Army and Marine Corps ground forces have been broken by their over-deployment in the desert sands of Iraq and Afghanistan. This high tempo of deployments has resulted in much of our military equipment to break down while procurement and readiness are at their lowest levels over the past quarter century. Our national security always suffers when we get bogged down in wars where our troops are asked to bleed and die, but are not permitted by our political leaders to win. Our brave soldiers should never be allowed to sacrifice in this way without the hope of victory! The best way to support our troops is to bring them home to their families and make a commitment that we will not let a week go by without thanking a soldier for their willingness to risk life and limb to defend us all. What is it going to take to get our political leaders to realize that the costs of staying and fighting the long war in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly outweigh the costs of redeploying out of theater? The same voices we hear calling for us to send another 40,000 to 100,000 troops to Afghanistan are the ones that would have called for us to keep surging and fighting in Vietnam in perpetuity at the cost of hundreds of thousands of our soldiers lives. It didn’t make sense to do that then and it doesn’t make sense to do so now. Ronald Reagan won the Cold War against the Evil Soviet Empire in part by employing proxies to fight and win our battles for us. We need to learn from Reagan and re-employ a strategy of arming and supporting proxies both states and insurgent movements to fight our wars so our troops don’t have to. America needs to conserve its military strength for a time when we they may be called upon to fight great power enemies, not waste it bogged down fighting Vietnams in the desert as we have been doing the past several years. Until we do, we will remain in a state of imperial overstretch and strategic paralysis with no reserve forces to fight new hypothetical wars of necessity and with a continuing window of vulnerability which our enemies will undoubtedly continue to exploit. North Korea has already been exploiting our window of vulnerability with their ongoing nuclear missile buildup as has the Islamic Republic of Iran is doing with its near imminent development of weaponized nukes. Even Russia has done so with their invasion of US-ally Georgia this past year.

The war is one of attrition, destroying morale and readiness. Kuhner 9 - the president of the Edmund Burke Institute for American Renewal (Jeffrey, Washington Times, “Obama’s quagmire; US should look to its own interests,” 9/7, Lexis Academic) America is losing the war in Afghanistan. Rather than change course, President Obama is sending 21,000 additional U.S. troops. This will bring the total to 68,000 American soldiers fighting in Afghanistan, bolstering coalition forces to 110,000. The troop surge, however, will not work. Afghanistan has become Mr. Obama's Vietnam - a protracted quagmire draining precious American blood and treasure. August was the deadliest month for U.S. forces, with 47 soldiers killed by Taliban insurgents. More than 300 coalition troops have died in 2009. This is the highest toll since the war began in 2001, and there are still four months to go. The tide of battle has turned against the West. The Taliban is resurgent. It has reasserted control over its southern stronghold in Kandahar. The Taliban is launching devastating attacks in the western and northern parts of the country - formerly stable areas. U.S. casualties are soaring. The morale of coalition forces is plummeting. Most of our allies - with the exception of the Canadians and the British - are reluctant to engage the Islamist militants. American public support for the war is waning. The conflict has dragged on for nearly eight years. (U.S. involvement in World War II was four years, World War I less than one.) Yet, America's strategic objectives remain incoherent and elusive. The war's initial aim was to topple the Taliban and eradicate al Qaeda bases from Afghan territory. Those goals have been achieved. Washington should have declared victory and focused on the more important issue: preventing Islamic fundamentalists from seizing power in Pakistan, along with its nuclear arsenal. Instead, America is engaged in futile nation-building. Mr. Obama, like President George W. Bush before him, believes Afghanistan must be transformed by erecting a strong central government, democracy and a modern economy. Washington argues this will prevent terrorism from taking root and bring about lasting "stability." Hence, following a recent reassessment of the war by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, U.S. commander in Afghanistan, the Obama administration is contemplating deploying 20,000 to 40,000 U.S. troops - on top of the 21,000 already pledged. Moreover, billions have been spent building irrigation canals, schools, hospitals and factories. Civilian advisers are being sent to encourage farmers to grow other cash crops besides opium poppies. Western aid money has been used to establish a massive Afghan army, a large police force and a swollen government bureaucracy. Gen. McChrystal said this week that the situation is "serious," but not impossible. He still believes victory is within reach. His new strategy is to protect Afghan civilians from Taliban attacks. He also wants to create a lucrative jobs programs and improve local government services. The goal is to win the "hearts and minds" of the Afghan people. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says we must combat Afghanistan's "culture of poverty." Call it humanitarian war through social engineering. Mr. Obama's policy will result in a major American defeat - one that will signal the end of America as a superpower and expose us to the world as a paper tiger. Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires. The mighty British and Russian armies were humiliated in drawn-out guerrilla campaigns. The country's mountainous geography and primitive tribal culture are ideally suited for insurgent warfare. By sending in more troops, Washington is playing right into the Taliban's hands: We are enabling the Taliban to pick off our forces one by one as they wage a campaign of attrition. The Taliban blend with the local population, making it almost impossible for U.S. forces to distinguish combatants from civilians. American counterinsurgency efforts are thus alienating some of the locals. Initially welcomed as liberators, we are now viewed in some quarters as occupiers. Moreover, much of the West's aid money is siphoned off by greedy politicians in Kabul. President Hamid Karzai's government is corrupt, venal and ineffective. It barely controls one-third of the country. It is despised by many Afghans for its brutality and incompetence. In addition, Mr. Karzai's vice-presidential running mate is a drug trafficker. The West's efforts to forge a cohesive national state based on federalism and economic reconstruction have failed. Warlords are increasingly asserting power in the provinces. The country is fractured along tribal and ethnic lines. The center cannot hold: Afghanistan remains mired in anarchy, blood feuds and weak, decentralized rule. U.S. troops should be deployed to defend U.S. national interests. Their lives should never be squandered for an experiment in liberal internationalism. In fact, such a policy is morally grotesque and strategically reckless. Mr. Obama should quickly withdraw most U.S. forces from Afghanistan. American air power and small, flexible Special Forces units are more than enough to wipe out al Qaeda terrorists. The Taliban is too hated to reoccupy the country - unless our huge military and economic footprint drives numerous Afghans into the evil, welcoming arms of extremists.

Afghanistan will end in a catastrophic military defeat for the U.S. Kuhner 10 - the president of the Edmund Burke Institute for American Renewal (Jeffrey, Washington Times, “Who lost Afghanistan? Obama's troop withdrawal timetable makes defeat inevitable,” 6/25, Lexis Academic) America is heading toward a colossal defeat in Afghanistan. Unless there is a dramatic change in policy and leadership, the United States will suffer the most calamitous military setback in its history - one that will mark the end of the American moment, the loss of superpower status in the eyes of the world. President Obama was correct to dismiss Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal as the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan. No military officer - no matter how capable or high-ranking - should be allowed to publicly disrespect his civilian bosses, especially the commander in chief and vice president. This demoralizes our troops in the field and fosters confusion between the civilian and military sectors of government. Gen. McChrystal exhibited extremely poor judgment in allowing a reporter from Rolling Stone magazine to gain almost unfettered access to his inner circle. He allowed his aides to shoot their mouths off to an antiwar reporter from a countercultural, antiwar magazine. He should have known he was setting himself up for a public-relations fiasco - a showdown with Mr. Obama's national security team. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. is mocked. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry is derided as a back-stabbing opportunist. The U.S. special envoy to the region, Richard Holbrooke, is viewed as incompetent. National Security Adviser James L. Jones is called a "clown." Aides close to Gen. McChrystal even admit that he was disappointed with his early meetings with Mr. Obama. Gen. McChrystal's first encounter with the new president was simply a "10-minute photo-op." He is described as saying the president was "disengaged" as well as "awkward and intimidated" in front of military brass in another meeting. This all may be true. But going public with it put Gen. McChrystal in an untenable position. He had to go. The norms of military culture dictate that one cannot openly criticize - never mind ridicule - superiors. Yet the dismissal of Gen. McChrystal reveals the profound failure of Mr. Obama's wartime leadership. Gen. McChrystal voted for Mr. Obama. He was the president's handpicked successor to lead the military campaign in Afghanistan. Along with Mr. Obama, it was Gen. McChrystal who formulated - and signed off on - the counterinsurgency strategy now being implemented. He agreed to the strict rules of engagement, which prevent our soldiers from effectively fighting the Taliban for fear of hurting civilians. In short, Gen. McChrystal was the president's man: the liberal warrior who was eager to implement nation-building and win the hearts and minds of the population in Afghanistan. He was to execute the postmodern, Obama way of war - transforming American troops into an armed Peace Corps. U.S. soldiers are not to kill terrorists and bomb their sanctuaries. Instead, they are engaged in building roads, ditches and water plants, helping with economic development projects and bonding with the locals. Call it war through social work. Meanwhile, the key battle for Marjah remains inconclusive. The major offensive of the war - to capture the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar - has been delayed (again). U.S. and NATO casualties are soaring. Afghan President Hamid Karzai no longer believes U.S. forces have the will and staying power to see the war to its end; he has lost trust in America. He is looking to cut power-sharing deals with Taliban factions. U.S. power and prestige is waning not only in Afghanistan, but throughout the region. Gen. McChrystal's frustration is a symptom of gross incompetence - his and, more important, that of the president. Mr. Obama and his team are incapable of winning the war. Having Gen. David H. Petraeus replace his former deputy as the commander in Afghanistan is an act of desperation. It is Mr. Obama's last stand, a desperate gambit to salvage the war effort by turning to the man who reversed the tide of defeat in Iraq. It is doomed to fail. Mr. Obama is changing the deck chairs on the Titanic - no matter what he does, however, the jihadist iceberg is about to sink the American juggernaut. Afghanistan is not Iraq. It is the graveyard of empires - a nation whose rugged terrain and collection of disparate warlords and tribes is ideally suited for guerrilla warfare. The vaunted Soviet Red Army was crushed in the 1980s. Imperial Britain was defeated - not once, but twice - during the 19th century. The reason: They got dragged into protracted wars of attrition. Eventually, the fierce, primitive mountains, caves and fighters of Afghanistan wore down much superior forces, slowly bleeding them to death. America is repeating the mistakes of the past. The problem in Afghanistan is not one of personnel. It is one of strategy. Whether it is Gen. McChrystal or Gen. Petraeus overseeing the war is irrelevant. A deeply flawed strategy will fail no matter who is in charge. Mr. Obama's decision to announce the start of a troop withdrawal in July 2011 has guaranteed the war cannot be won. The Taliban is simply waiting America out; their forces are escalating attacks, knowing that by killing more U.S. troops they will encourage an even quicker pullout. Moreover, the Afghan people have no incentive to cooperate with American and NATO forces because they know once the West is gone, they will be left in the lurch. The Taliban and al Qaeda are not going anywhere, while the Yanks are leaving; thus, Islamist retribution for collaboration with the infidels will be swift, brutal and merciless. Also, the decision not to deploy massive U.S. airpower and ground troops in neighboring Pakistan - especially the porous border areas along the North West Frontier Provinces - has assured the Taliban a safe haven from which to launch a sustained guerrilla campaign against the West. Until the Islamist insurgents are wiped out in Pakistan, the conflict in Afghanistan will grind on - senselessly, aimlessly, tragically. Mr. Biden has announced that "many troops" will be "leaving" Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. The administration already has, in essence, waved the white flag of surrender. The United States will leave Afghanistan in defeat - humiliated on the world stage as a paper tiger, a feckless and self-indulgent nation unable to carry the burden of global leadership. This will represent a historic victory for the forces of Islamic fascism; radical Islam will have brought the American giant to its knees - and in the very place, Afghanistan, where the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were imagined and planned. It will signify the death of American pre-eminence.

Withdrawal allows the US to replenish its strategic reserve. Friedman 10 - American political scientist. He is the chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratfor. Prior to Stratfor, Friedman spent almost twenty years in academia, teaching political science at Dickinson College. During this time, he regularly briefed senior commanders in the armed services as well as the U.S. Army War College (George, “The 30-Year War in Afghanistan,” Stratfor, 6/29, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100628_30_year_war_afghanistan) There is an anomaly in this strategy, however. Where the United States previously had devolved operational responsibility to allied groups, or simply hunkered down, this strategy tries to return to devolved responsibilities by first surging U.S. operations. The fourth phase actually increases U.S. operational responsibility in order to reduce it. From the grand strategic point of view, the United States needs to withdraw from Afghanistan, a landlocked country where U.S. forces are dependent on tortuous supply lines. Whatever Afghanistan’s vast mineral riches, mining them in the midst of war is not going to happen. More important, the United States is overcommitted in the region and lacks a strategic reserve of ground forces. Afghanistan ultimately is not strategically essential, and this is why the United States has not historically used its own forces there. Obama’s attempt to return to that track after first increasing U.S. forces to set the stage for the political settlement that will allow a U.S. withdrawal is hampered by the need to begin terminating the operation by 2011 (although there is no fixed termination date). It will be difficult to draw coalition partners into local structures when the foundation — U.S. protection — is withdrawing. Strengthening local forces by 2011 will be difficult. Moreover, the Taliban’s motivation to enter into talks is limited by the early withdrawal. At the same time, with no ground combat strategic reserve, the United States is vulnerable elsewhere in the world, and the longer the Afghan drawdown takes, the more vulnerable it becomes (hence the 2011 deadline in Obama’s war plan). In sum, this is the quandary inherent in the strategy: It is necessary to withdraw as early as possible, but early withdrawal undermines both coalition building and negotiations. The recruitment and use of indigenous Afghan forces must move extremely rapidly to hit the deadline (though officially on track quantitatively, there are serious questions about qualitative measures) — hence, the aggressive operations that have been mounted over recent months. But the correlation of forces is such that the United States probably will not be able to impose an acceptable political reality in the time frame available. Thus, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is said to be opening channels directly to the Taliban, while the Pakistanis are increasing their presence. Where a vacuum is created, regardless of how much activity there is, someone will fill it. Therefore, the problem is to define how important Afghanistan is to American global strategy, bearing in mind that the forces absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the United States vulnerable elsewhere in the world. The current strategy defines the Islamic world as the focus of all U.S. military attention. But the world has rarely been so considerate as to wait until the United States is finished with one war before starting another. Though unknowns remain unknowable, a principle of warfare is to never commit all of your reserves in a battle — one should always maintain a reserve for the unexpected. Strategically, it is imperative that the United States begin to free up forces and re-establish its ground reserves.

A rejection of COIN creates a doctrinal shift towards selective engagement and allows sustainable U.S. presence globally. Gventer 9 - Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. She served two tours in Iraq, including a year as a senior adviser to General Peter Chiarelli, the operational commander in Iraq in 2006 (Celeste, “False Promise of 'Counterinsurgency'”, 12/1, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/12/01/NYT.html) An effort to conduct "counterinsurgency" in Afghanistan is not just a costly business for still-unspecified strategic returns. It is likely to also prolong the U.S. defense establishment's preoccupation with military-led nation-building in unfamiliar cultures and perpetuate the deeply problematic assumption that chronic societal failure and social pathologies around the world are a form of warfare. This notion is built in part on what seems to be an oversimplified and glamorized—and thus dangerously misleading—pop history about the 'surge' in Iraq and the role it played in the still-unfolding outcomes there. The opportunity for the new strategy in Afghanistan was to form the beginning of a new era of American restraint in its foreign policy—one based on confidence in America's own values, protection of its borders, strong intelligence capabilities, and selective engagement of a strong, credible U.S. military capable of applying overwhelming force.

Third is financial leadership.

Afghanistan will bankrupt the U.S. and collapse our financial leadership Corn 9 – Ph.D. from the University of Paris and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, currently on leave from the US State Department (Tony, “Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan? Bounding Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, 10/21, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/10/toward-a-kilcullenbiden-plan/) Just do the math - with 63,000 troops on the ground, the cost for the U.S. of the Afghan War is already 6.7 billion dollars a month. With a hypothetical 40,000 troop increase, it would rise to more than 10 billion a month. For how long? Though it gives a time estimate for the possibility of failure (12 months), the report does not provide any timeline as to the possibility of actual success. Most counterinsurgency experts appear to be in agreement that it will take more than two years to know whether the plan has a chance of succeeding, and at least an additional three years for the plan to actually succeed. In short, the recommended jump is a 500 billion dollar gamble that would come on top of the Iraq trillion dollar war. In these conditions, any responsible Administration - be it Democrat or Republican - would be justified in taking a closer look. That “endless money forms the sinews of war” (Cicero) is a timeless truth. The question is to what extent does the U.S. have endless money at this particular juncture? Among the numerous analogies made between the wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam lately, the one that has yet to surface concerns the monetary dimension. The first casualty of the Vietnam War was not the Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society project – it was the mighty dollar itself. Though the dollar had been the undisputed currency of the world ever since WWII, the Vietnam folly eventually forced Nixon to decouple the dollar from gold. From 1971 until roughly 2001, the dollar’s new status did not seem to matter much, since the European Croesus could always be expected to bankroll the American Caesar.4 Not anymore. Today, Croesus no longer speaks German and French, but Mandarin and Arabic; and Croesus is increasingly vocal in its call to put an end to the status of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Ironically, the only people on earth who don’t seem to realize the incredible advantage derived by America from the dollar’s status are the American people themselves. In last instance, America’s military “command of the commons” rests on America’s monetary command of the common currency.5 The fact that, five years from now, the implementation of the McChrystal plan could actually lead to “victory” at the theater-strategic level is a distinct possibility. The fact that, five years from now as well, the dollar would no longer be the world’s reserve currency is a quasi-certainty. The end of America as a monetary superpower would spell the end of America as a superpower tout court – the ultimate defeat at the national-strategic level. Bottom line - on the one hand, the U.S. does not have 500 billion dollars to waste in an open-ended escalation in one of the many ungoverned sandboxes of the world. On the other hand, an incremental (“middle way”) strategy would fail to create the psychological effect required in both the West and Afghanistan at this point. That said, a temporary 40,000 surge remains a realistic option, but only so long as the White House strategy rests on two pillars “bounding” the counterinsurgency campaign - on the one hand, a convocation of a new loya jirga as advocated by counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen - on the other, a regional diplomatic settlement as advocated by Vice-President Joe Biden.

Hegemony de-escalates all conflict and solves great power wars Thayer 6 – Bradley A. Thayer, November/December, 2006 “In Defense of Primacy,” NATIONAL INTEREST Issue 86 THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why :democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.( n4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74 000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

The alternative to U.S. hegemony is apolarity and global nuclear wars. Ferguson 4 – Niall Ferguson, July/August 2004 “A World Without Power,” FOREIGN POLICY Issue 143 So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of aids and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

A multipolar world makes great power wars inevitable Wohlforth 9 – William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War” Project Muse The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

Even if the alternative were better, history proves that the transition away will cause lashout Khanna 9 – Director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation (Parag, The second world: how emerging powers are redefining global competition in the twenty-first century, p. 337-338) Even this scenario is optimistic, for superpowers are by definition willing to encroach on the turf of others—changing the world map in the process. Much as in geology, such tectonic shifts always result in earthquakes, particularly as rising powers tread on the entrenched position of the reigning hegemon.56 The sole exception was the twentieth century Anglo-American transition in which Great Britain and the United States were allies and shared a common culture—and even that took two world wars to complete.57 As the relative levels of power of the three superpowers draw closer, the temptation of the number-two to preemptively knock out the king on the hill grows, as does the lead power’s incentive to preventatively attack and weaken its ascending rival before being eclipsed.58 David Hume wrote, “It is not a great disproportion between ourselves and others which produces envy, but on the contrary, a proximity.”59 While the density of contacts among the three superpowers makes the creation of a society of states more possible than ever—all the foreign ministers have one anothers’ mobile phone numbers—the deep differences in interests among the three make forging a “culture of peace” more challenging than ever.60 China seas, hyperterrorism with nuclear weapons, an attack in the Gulf of Aden or the Straits of Malacca. The uncertain alignments of lesser but still substantial powers such as Russia, Japan, and India could also cause escalation. Furthermore, America’s foreign lenders could pull the plug to undermine its grand strategy, sparking economic turmoil, political acrimony, and military tension. War brings profit to the military-industrial complex and is always supported by the large patriotic camps on all sides. Yet the notion of a Sino-U.S. rivalry to lead the world is also premature and simplistic, for in the event of their conflict, Europe would be the winner, as capital would flee to its sanctuaries. These great tensions are being played out in the world today, as each superpower strives to attain the most advantageous position for itself, while none are powerful enough to dictate the system by itself. Global stability thus hangs between the bookends Raymond Aron identified as “peace by law” and “peace by empire,” the former toothless and the latter prone to excess.61 Historically, successive iterations of balance of power and collective security doctrines have evolved from justifying war for strategic advantage into building systems to avoid it, with the post-Napoleonic “Concert of Europe” as the first of the modern era.62 Because it followed rules, it was itself something of a societal system.* Even where these attempts at creating a stable world order have failed—including the League of Nations after World War I—systemic learning takes place in which states (particularly democracies) internalize the lessons of the past into their institutions to prevent history from repeating itself.63 Toynbee too viewed history as progressive rather than purely cyclical, a wheel that not only turns around and around but also moves forward such that Civilization (with a big C) could become civilized.64 But did he “give too much credit to time’s arrows and not enough to time’s cycle”?65 Empires and superpowers usually promise peace but bring wars.66 The time to recognize the current revolutionary situation is now—before the next world war.67

America will cling to a false unipolar reality post-transition Calleo 9 – David P. Calleo (University Professor at The Johns It is tempting to believe that America’s recent misadventures will discredit and suppress our hegemonic longings and that, following the presidential election of 2008, a new administration will abandon them. But so long as our identity as a nation is intimately bound up with seeing ourselves as the world’s most powerful country, at the heart of a global system, hegemony is likely to remain the recurring obsession of our official imagination, the id´ee fixe of our foreign policy. America’s hegemonic ambitions have, after all, suffered severe setbacks before. Less than half a century has passed since the “lesson of Vietnam.” But that lesson faded without forcing us to abandon the old fantasies of omnipotence. The fantasies merely went into remission, until the fall of the Soviet Union provided an irresistible occasion for their return. Arguably, in its collapse, the Soviet Union proved to be a greater danger to America’s own equilibrium than in its heyday. Dysfunctional imaginations are scarcely a rarity – among individuals or among nations. “Reality” is never a clear picture that imposes itself from without. Imaginations need to collaborate. They synthesize old and new images, concepts, and ideas and fuse language with emotions – all according to the inner grammar of our minds. These synthetic constructions become our reality, our way of depicting the world in which we live. Inevitably, our imaginations present us with only a partial picture. As Walter Lippmann once put it, our imaginations create a “pseudo-environment between ourselves and the world.”2 Every individual, therefore, has his own particular vision of reality, and every nation tends to arrive at a favored collective view that differs from the favored view of other nations. When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the world severely at odds with one another, the world grows dangerous.