Anish+and+Faith


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 * 1ac NSA**


 * ===1ac – leadership===**

The NSA's PRISM program is being used to collect surveillance data from US companies – this overreach undermines US soft power and credibility on internet freedom
Wheeler, 14 - Marcy Wheeler is an independent journalist and PhD from the University of Michigan. She specializes in civil liberties, technology, and national security. (Marcy, "The Drama Ahead: Google versus America" 6/16, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/06/16/marcy-wheeler/drama-ahead-google-versus-america This leaves one central drama to play out, in which Google and other tech AND from doubling down on hard power bring the United States any greater security.

Soft power solves a laundry list of impacts
Stanley, 7 (Elizabeth Stanley, Ass Prof @ Georgetown, 7 "International Perceptions of US Nuclear Policy" Sandia Report, http://www.prod.sandia.gov/cgi-bin/techlib/access-control.pl/2007/070903.pdf) How important is soft power, anyway? Given its vast conventional military power, AND multi-lateral cooperation that will be necessary to address such threats effectively.


 * ====It also collapses Legitimacy – Two internal links ====**

Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America's Open Technology Institute (Danielle, "Surveillance Costs: The NSA's Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity" July, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsas-impact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-cybersecurity/ Broader Foreign Policy Costs Beyond Internet Freedom, the NSA disclosures "have badly undermined AND some cases, completely undermine—U.S. foreign policy goals.
 * ====First –** the **perception of NSA overreach destroys US legitimacy broadly ====**

//**I. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NSA PROGRAMS** The NSA programs, and public awareness of// //AND// //by U.S. firms, gaining market share in the process.//
 * ====Second, NSA surveillance is crushing U.S. cloud-computing – decks competitiveness and spills over to the entire tech sector====**
 * Donohue 15 – Professor of Law, Georgetown Law and Director, Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown Law (Lauren, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, CONSUMER PRIVACY, AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, Symposium Articles, 4 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 11 p.15-18, 2015, Hein Online)//JJ//**

//**====*The best and newest research confirms the link ====**// //Marthews and Tucker, 15 – * National Chair at Restore the Fourth AND **PhD in economics and professor of Marketing at MIT (Alex and Catherine, "Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior", 29 April 2015, file:**//**/C:/Users/17GGonzalez/Downloads/SSRN-id2412564%20(2).pdf)//gg//**
 * //This study is the first to provide substantial empirical documentation of a chilling effect,//**
 * //AND//**
 * //potential for effects of government surveillance practices on commercial outcomes and international competitiveness.//**

//====That undermines US global technological leadership====// //**Castro and McQuinn 15, Daniel Castro works at the Center for Data Innovation, Government Technology, The Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, worked at the U.S. Government Accountability Office, went to Carnegie Mellon. Alan McQuinn works at the Federal Communications Commission, previously had the Bill Archer Fellowship at the University of Texas, (June 2015, "Beyond the USA Freedom Act: How U.S. Surveillance Still Subverts U.S. Competitiveness", file:**//**/C:/Users/Mark/Downloads/2015-beyond-usa-freedom-act.pdf)//AK//**
 * //CONCLUSION When historians write about this period in U.S. history it could//**
 * //AND//**
 * //. government enable its tech industry to effectively compete in the global market.//**

//====Tech leadership is the primary driver of hegemony – ====// //Weiss 14 – Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, Professor Emeritus in Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, Honorary Professor of Political Science at Aarhus University. (Linda, America Inc.?: Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State, Cornell University Press, 4/1/14, p. 1-3)//JJ So what accounts for America's transformative capacity? AND primarily) a commercial matter—even when the NSS "goes commercial.
 * NSS=National Security State**

The pursuit of hegemony is inevitable – realism dictates state action – states are self-interested and want nothing else other than survival
Great powers, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over AND of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.
 * Mearsheimer 14** — Professor of political science at the University of Chicago, PhD in international relations (John J., "Realism Reader," edited by Colin Elman and Michael A. Jensen, London ; New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, p. 179-188, tony)

Hegemony is good and solves cooperation
Still, China's relative rise and the United States' relative decline carries significant risks, AND powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for effective global governance.
 * Keck 14** – the Assistant Editor at The Diplomat, a researcher at the Middle East Desk at Wikistrat, and an M.A. candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. Former Deputy Editor at e-International Relations; a foreign policy reporter at the Washington, D.C. edition of Examiner.com, a Joseph S. Nye, Jr. National Security Research Intern at the Center for a New American Security, a Research Assistant at the Center for Research, Regional Education and Outreach, (Zach, "America's Relative Decline: Should We Panic? The end of the unipolar era will create new dangers that the world mustn't overlook," 1-24-14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/)


 * ===1ac – plan===**


 * Plan: The United States federal government should limit domestic surveillance of information in the custody of United States’ corporations exclusively to authority under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, subject to the additional use restrictions in Presidential Policy Directive 28.**

The perception that the NSA is using Executive Order 12333 to circumvent section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act is causing a backlash against US tech companies and driving global data localization
Eoyang, 14 - Mieke Eoyang is the Director of the National Security Program at Third Way, a center-left think tank. She previously served as Defense Policy Advisor to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, and a subcommittee staff director on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as as Chief of Staff to Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-Palo Alto) ("A Modest Proposal: FAA Exclusivity for Collection Involving U.S. Technology Companies" Lawfare, 11/24, http://www.lawfareblog.com/modest-proposal-faa-exclusivity-collection-involving-us-technology-companies Beyond 215 and FAA, media reports have suggested that there have been collection programs AND to provide their customers with some sense of how many requests are made.

That will collapse the global internet
Chandler and Le, 15 - * Director, California International Law Center, Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School AND **Free Speech and Technology Fellow, California International Law Center; A.B., Yale College; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law (Anupam and Uyen, "DATA NATIONALISM" 64 Emory L.J. 677, lexis) The era of a global Internet may be passing. Governments across the world are AND surveillance, while at the same time increasing the risks of domestic surveillance.

A free internet is vital to combating every existential threat
Eagleman, 10 - American neuroscientist and writer at Baylor College of Medicine, where he directs the Laboratory for Perception and Action and the Initiative on Neuroscience and Law (David, "Six ways the internet will save civilization" Wired, 9/10, http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/12/start/apocalypse-no Many great civilisations have fallen, leaving nothing but cracked ruins and scattered genetics. AND to suggest that the net may just be the technology that saves us.

Data localization destroys cloud computing
Chandler and Le, 15 - * Director, California International Law Center, Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar, University of California, Davis; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School AND **Free Speech and Technology Fellow, California International Law Center; A.B., Yale College; J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law (Anupam and Uyen, "DATA NATIONALISM" 64 Emory L.J. 677, lexis) Cloud Computing. Data localization requirements will often prevent access to global cloud computing services AND data flow, but this will depend on the specifics of the law.

Cloud computing is also critical to space situational awareness – solves asteroids and debris
Johnston et al 9 [Steven, PhD in computer engineering and MEng degree in software engineering, specializes in cloud-based architecture, Kenji Takeda, Solutions Architect and Technical Manager for the Microsoft Research Connections EMEA team, has extensive experience in Cloud Computing, Hugh Lewis, professor at University of Southampton, specialist in space situational awareness, Simon Cox, professor of Computational Methods and Director of the Microsoft Institute for High Performance Computing at University of Southampton, Graham Swinerd, professor at University of Southampton, specializes in space situational awareness, "Cloud Computing for Planetary Defense", http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/71883/1/John_09.pdf, October 2009, 3/31/15] Abstract In this paper we demonstrate how a cloud-based computing architecture can AND NEO trajectory and impact analysis to help improve planetary defencs capability for all.

Asteroid strikes are likely and cause extinction
Casey, 6/30/15 – environmental, scientific, and technological reporter for CBS News (Michael, "On Asteroid Day, raising awareness that Earth could get hit again", CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/asteroid-day-raising-awareness-earth-could-be-hit-by-asteroids/, //11) "Asteroids are the only natural disaster we know how to prevent and protecting our AND out any time because we just don't know enough about what's out there."

The plan's amendment to 702 solves the risk of abuse without ending programmatic surveillance
Goitein and Patel 15 - Elizabeth (Liza) Goitein co-directs the Brennan Center for Justice's Liberty and National Security Program. Served as counsel to Sen. Russell Feingold with a particular focus on government secrecy and privacy rights. Was a trial attorney in the Federal Programs Branch of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice. Graduated from the Yale Law School and clerked for the Honorable Michael Daly Hawkins on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Faiza Patel serves as co-director of the Brennan Center for Justice's Liberty and National Security Program. Clerked for Judge Sidhwa at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Ms. Patel is a graduate of Harvard College and the NYU School of Law. (Elizabeth and Faiza, "What went wrong with the FISA court", Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2015 //DM) As the above discussion makes clear, the key to reforming the FISA Court is AND already collected information) in cases that fall below that low bar.290

Intellectual property theft is expanding on a massive scale —- disclosing zero-days builds trust with companies
Jaffer 15 [Jamil N., Adjunct Professor of Law and Director, Security Law Program, George Mason University Law School, Occasional Papers Series, published by the Dean Rusk Center for International Law and Policy, 4-1-2015, "Cybersecurity and National Defense: Building a Public-Private Partnership," http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=rusk_oc] //khirn JAMIL N. JAFFER: Thank you Dr. Johnson. Well, I'll actually AND trust between the government and private sector to share that kind of information.

Russian IP theft now —- they can't be deterred —- bolstering cyberdefense is key
Russia has ramped up cyber attacks against the United States to an unprecedented level since AND future," he said. "So we've got some work to do."
 * Bennett 4/12**/15 cybersecurity reporter for The Hill (Cory, "Russia's cyberattacks grow more brazen" 4/12/15, http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/238518-russias-cyberattacks-grow-more-brazen) ~| js

That's crucial to Russian modernization efforts
Booz Allen Hamilton 13 [Leading provider of management and technology consulting services to the U.S. government, Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist, "Cyber Theft of Corporate Intellectual Property: The Nature of the Threat," July 2013, http://www.boozallen.com/insights/2013/07/Cyber-Theft-of-Corporate-Intellectual-Property] //khirn Russia's own espionage effort is also driven by a desire to diversify its economy and AND industry and government networks could give China and Russia military advantages worth billions.

That causes Russian aggression
Isachenov 15 [Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press, Business Insider, Feb. 4, 2015, "Russia continues massive military modernization despite economic woes," http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-continues-massive-military-modernization-despite-economic-woes-2015-2#ixzz3eVw3maaO] //khirn MOSCOW (AP) — Hundreds of new Russian aircraft, tanks and missiles are AND the massive military buildup will stretch the nation's economic potential beyond the limit.

That escalates—we're already on the brink of nuclear war
In waging such a limited war, furthermore, Putin would rely not on ICBMs AND must make sure such threats do not emanate again from a world leader.
 * Reid 15** Professor of Law at University of St. Thomas School of Law (Charles J., University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy, "VLADIMIR PUTIN'S CULTURE OF TERROR: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?" p. 53–5) ~| js

Cyber arms race now —- the US is rapidly expanding offensive capabilities under the guise of surveillance
Correa 15 [Gordon, security correspondent, BBC News, "Rapid escalation of the cyber arms race," 29 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32493516] //khirn Rapid proliferation What surprised cyber-experts is the speed with which cyber-attack AND long before the Chinese had also not just caught up but moved ahead.

Disclosing vulnerabilities instead of using them for surveillance prevents arms races —- builds legitimacy to negotiate international cyberdefense agreements
The implications of U.S. policy can be felt on a variety of AND fix almost all the vulnerabilities we find. But not all, yet.
 * Schneier 14** (Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, called a "security guru" by The Economist. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute. "Should U.S. Hackers Fix Cybersecurity Holes or Exploit Them?", May 19, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/should-hackers-fix-cybersecurity-holes-or-exploit-them/371197/)//CLi

That spurs international coop and mitigates offensive use
The potential utility of international cybersecurity agreements deserves to be carefully examined. International agreements AND more secure cyber environment through measures that go beyond conventional forms of deterrence.
 * Clark et. al. 9** (David Clark, Senior Research Scientist at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Whitfield Diffie, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Abraham Sofaer, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and then a Legal Adviser to the United States State Department, "Cyber Security and International Agreements", http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/lec17/Sofaer.pdf)//CLi

Eliminating offensive cyberattacks allows the US to set global norms in cyberspace —- that's key to prevent cyber arms races
Goldsmith 10 [Jack, teaches at Harvard Law School and is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, "Can we stop the Cyber Arms Race," Washington Post, February 1, 2010, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks] //khirn In a speech this month on "Internet freedom," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton AND arms race in an arena where the offense already has a natural advantage.

That goes nuclear due to command and control hacking, crisis instability, and fracturing nuclear agreements
Austin 13 [Director of Policy Innovation at the EastWest Institute, "Costs of American Cyber Superiority," 8/6, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/costs-of-american-cyber-superiority/] //khirn The United States is racing for the technological frontier in military and intelligence uses of AND be every bit as reasonable given their anxiety about unconstrained American cyber superiority.

Independently risks miscalc —- hair-trigger status causes nuclear war
Japan Times 15 [May 1, 2015, "U.S., Russian 'hair-trigger' nuclear alert urged ended, especially in age of cyberattack," http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/01/world/u-s-russian-hair-trigger-nuclear-alert-urged-ended-especially-age-cyberattack/#.VZIjlflVikp] //khirn WASHINGTON – Former U.S. and Russian commanders Thursday called for scrapping " AND systems are subject to false alarms," Cartwright said at a news conference.

Cyber war is real and unpredictably dangerous—four reasons
Cyber war is real. What we have seen so far is far from indicative AND and economic relations. And it will suggest ways to reduce that unpredictability.
 * Clarke 10** former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States (Richard A., Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It, p.21, 4/20/10) ~| js

That escalates and is uniquely dangerous—miscalculation and misattribution
We sit at a similar historical moment. War fighting is forever changed. Though AND in Abkhazia, might have launched the denial-of-service attacks.
 * Clarke 9** former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States (Richard A., The National Interest, "War from Cyberspace" p. 32-3, Nov/Dec 2009, http://users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/coursereading2011/Clarkecyber.pdf) ~| js

And, low response times means there's a greater timeframe and probability than traditional nuclear escalation
Dycus 10 [Stephen is a Professor of national security law at Vermont Law School, former member of the National Academies committee on cyber warfare, LLM, Harvard University, LLB, BA, Southern Methodist University, "Congress' Role in Cyber Warfare," Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 4(1), 2010, p.161-164, http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol4no1/11_Dycus.pdf] //khirn In other ways, cyber weapons are critically different from their nuclear counterparts. For AND before launching a counterstrike, if that were U.S. policy.

Uniquely true because of misperception fostered by offensive dominance
Rosenzweig 9 [Paul, founder of Reid Branch Consulting, specializing in homeland security, senior advisor to the Chertoff Group, Carnegie Fellow at Northwestern, professor at National Defense University, Editorial board at the Journal of National Security Law & Policy, deputy assistant secretary for policy at the US Department of Homeland Security, "National Security Threatsin Cyberspace" merican Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security And National Strategy Forum, September 2009, www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf] //khirn Offensive dominance creates a great risk of cyber arms races. State and non- AND it came from a third party, could also ignite a conflict.124

1ac plan
The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance of computer software vulnerabilities or exploits unknown to relevant vendors.

1ac solvency
====The plan solves effective information sharing between the government and private sector —- a signal of clear commitment and a steady flow of actionable disclosure is key to cooperative cyberdefense —- overcomes legal barriers==== Rosenzweig 12 [Paul, leading cybersecurity expert, founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company, and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group, "Cybersecurity and Public Goods: The Public/Private "Partnership," An Emerging Threats Essay, Hoover Institution, Stanford] //khirn Information Sharing, Public Goods, and the Law This economic understanding of cybersecurity suggests AND problems are not likely to be ones of law, but of commitment.

Disclosing vulnerabilities amounts to disarming the NSA —- zero-days are key
Kehl et al. 14 [Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New America's Open Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI, New America is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy institute that invests in new thinkers and new ideas to address the next generation of challenges facing the United States, Policy Paper, "Surveillance Costs: The NSA's Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity," July 2014, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsas-impact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-and-cybersecurity/] //khirn In April 2014, Bloomberg reported that the NSA had known for at least two AND are documented, subject to full analysis, and acted upon promptly."296

Obama's recent policy statement doesn't solve—carves out broad loopholes that enable stockpiling zero days—leaves industries vulnerable
Federal agencies served with a Freedom of Information Act request are refusing to release documents AND documents like the ones we have requested, this debate cannot take place.
 * Soghoian and Roubini** 20**15** (Chris Soghoian, Principal Technologist and Senior Policy Analyst, American Civil Liberties Union Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project & Sonia Roubini, ACLU Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, "Feds Refuse to Release Documents on "Zero-Day" Security Exploits", March 3, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/blog/feds-refuse-release-documents-zero-day-security-exploits)//CLi

Disclosing zero-days disarms cyberattackers globally
Masnick 14 [Mike, founder and CEO of Floor64 and editor of the Techdirt blog, "Obama Tells NSA To Reveal, Not Exploit, Flaws... Except All The Times It Wants To Do The Opposite," Techdirt, April 14, 2014, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140413/07094726892/obama-tells-nsa-to-reveal-not-exploit-flaws-except-all-times-it-wants-to-do-opposite.shtml] //khirn However, the NY Times had a story this weekend about how this move has AND do that. Because they're not about protecting anyone — other than themselves.

Additionally, loopholes let the NSA stockpile zero-days purchased from the grey market
Zetter 14 [Kim, award-winning journalist who covers cybercrime, civil liberties, privacy, and security for Wired, "Obama: NSA must reveal bugs like Heartbleed, unless they help the NSA," Wired, http://www.wired.com/2014/04/obama-zero-day/] //khirn Healey notes that the public statements on the new policy leave a lot of questions AND or to the arsenal of zero-day vulnerabilities the government already possesses.


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t - domestic t - curtail terror da politics da ex post cp hsw da (vs borders) state bars cp (vs islamaphobia) heg bad
 * common 1nc arguments**

t hsw da and case politics da and case terror da and case
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