Mia+&+Madeleine 

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__Plan__

 * The United States federal government should expand United States Maritime Administration Title XI loan guarantee funding for short sea transportation in the United States.**

__Economy__

 * Advantage one is the** **__Economy__** **–**


 * Two Internal Links –**


 * __First is stimulus__**

Currently, the United States is experiencing low levels of investment in transportation, clean air, manufacturing, fuel-efficiency and family-wage jobs. Instead ofspending billions of dollars bailing out financial institutions, the United States needs to invest in those specific areas to jumpstart the economy. A "U.S. Marine Highway" achieves those objectives as new, fuel-efficient U.S.-built ships can take thousands of trucks off U.S. roads and reduce truckcarbon emissions that contribute to global warming, while also generating cargo-handling jobs at U.S. ports and jobs on U.S. ships. This green marine highway can be built using Maritime Administration Title XI loan guarantees rather than outright grants. Using Title XI, taxpayers would spend only $165 million to guarantee $3.3 billion in bank loans for construction. That equates to $50 million for a ship that will carry 300 53-foot truckloads of cargo. With those funds, 66 fuel-efficient ships can be built to carry the cargo of 20,000 truckloads along the East and West Coast corridors, creating thousands of new, high-paying jobs for welders, fitters and crane operators at shipyards. Thanks to the Title XI loan guarantee program, banks can finance the construction of ships backed by a 5 percent taxpayer-financed loan loss reserve, whichamounts to 5 cents for every dollar of bank loans. The loan guarantee lowers the risks to financial institutions and the ship owner pays a premium for the guarantee to defray the cost to taxpayers. Another taxpayer savings can be seen in the proposed $5.5-billion widening of one highway, the 710 freeway in Southern California that connects the ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach. That $5.5 billion is a great deal more than the $165 million in taxpayer guarantees for 66 new ships. In addition, the 710 road widening may not be necessary if a majority of the daily truckloads traveling on that road were shifted onto ships. The risk is further reduced because U.S. law, the Jones Act, requires that all coastal ships be built in the United States and manned by U.S. crews so the work cannot be outsourced to foreign competitors. A proposal to add default insurance to the program further reduces risk. One heavy truck carrying 25 tons of freight consumes 370 percent more fuel per ton than a tug and barge carrying 1,750 tons of freight. A similar size truck consumes 400 percent to 500 percent more fuel than a ship. Using ultra-low sulfur diesel, ships can reduce carbon emissions by 75 percent or more compared with a truck traveling the same distance. Funding ships that consume only 25 percent of the fuel required to transport a truckload of freight would generate a national economic stimulus by loweringtransportation costs for shippers and consumers. From an environmental standpoint, ships can be powered by ultra-low sulfur diesel, just like new, cleaner trucks. Further, batteries from solar or wind sources can soon power these ships and create zero carbon freight corridors. Truckers can then focus on short-haul harbor pick-ups and deliveries rather than wasting time and fuel in long-haul traffic. The marine highway will provide a more integrated transport system that can remove 20,000 truckloads of cargo from the East and West Coast corridors and reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil. That would generate a national economic stimulus by lowering transportation costs for shippers and consumers.
 * The plan generates a massive economic stimulus and reduces oil dependence – loan guarantees are the most effective catalyst for widespread investment**
 * Margaronis, 08** [Marine highway would ride wave of economic benefits, Stas, Guest Columnist Seattle Pi, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/opinion/article/Marine-highway-would-ride-wave-of-economic-1293286.php#ixzz1yY1CGarw]

For the United States to compete in the global market it is imperative that it have dependable, efficient, and current infrastructure for the transport of goods. Infrastructure for that transport needs to be overhauled so that it is in keeping with a larger populace leading to heavier use, and with the sustainable principles of lesser dependence on fossil fuels. Transportation must be made more efficient and impose fewer external costs. For more than a decade, Europe and the United States have been seeing highway traffic congestion from transport of goods by trucks stagger their economies. Europe moves roughly 40% of it freight through container and roll on/roll off transport. The United States needs a federal program to encourage using ocean coastal waters to help address this problem here. In the U.S., short sea shipping has yet to be utilized to the extent it is in Europe. However, there has been a start, but there are still some hurdles to implementation here. Implementation of America’s Marine Highway In part to address this concern, in 2007 the Bush Administration passed the Energy Independence and Security Act,(1)(“Energy Act”) which included an initiative to develop America’s Marine Highway (“AMH”) specifically addressing waterborne movement of passengers and non-bulk freight between origins and destinations that would otherwise be served by roads and highways. (Also known as Short Sea Shipping(2), and Trucking by Water(3)). As required by the Energy Act, the U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration (“MARAD”) has released its Report to Congress in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency, dated April 2011. Although this report is long overdue,(4) it cites many possible positive outcomes from this project. It shows a tentative start to this program that will have long-term positive effects, and demonstrates the need for government action and refunding.(5) AMH specifically addresses routes that MARAD has designated marine corridors along the Northeast, Atlantic, Gulf, Pacific, Mississippi River and St. Lawrence waterway.(6) These corridors correspond with some of the most congested highways in this country, particularly the I-95 corridor on the east coast, and I-5 corridor on the west coast. Without waterborne transport, these highways will become progressively more congested over time. Improved cost-effectiveness 1 gallon of fuel is burned to move 1 ton of cargo 70 miles by truck vs. 420 miles by rail vs. 575 miles by barge. All of these forms of transport should interconnect and be used to maximum efficiency. Fuel efficiency is being improved for all forms of transportation, including that which will reduce marine engine sulfur, carbon and particulate emissions.(7) Regulations require that the fuel efficiency of marine vehicles must improve.(8) The MARAD report cites The Environmental Protection Agency, in “Nonroad Engines, Equipment and Vehicles: Diesel Boats and Ships"(9) regarding the Clean Air Nonroad Diesel Rule requirements to decrease allowable levels of sulfur in fuel used in marine vessel by 99 percent compared to levels allowed before the effective date of 2007. Further developments have required still better fuel efficiency and reduction of green house gas emissions. Addressing these external costs is rightfully the role of government, because external costs are not necessarily within the purview of private business.(10) Marine transport is the most efficient means, yet it is not used to its optimum capacity.(11) Costs of Not Increasing Marine Transport The costs of not fully implementing a marine highway have been documented in many articles and informational sources for over a decade, and are addressed in the MARAD report. Pollution, reliance on foreign oil, lost time/productivity due to highway congestion, stress, effects on populations that live near highways, waste, national security vulnerability and exposure during crises are all products of the transportation system as it functions today, and have been for some time. MARAD reports on studies regarding the cost-effectiveness of specific Marine Highway services. For example, the Institute for Global Maritime Studies found that “medium-sized, uncongested ports could be inexpensively modified to handle ro/ro ships at an investment of about $5 million each."(12) Compare $5 million per port modification with the cost of infrastructure maintenance to keep the same system in place. The I-95 Corridor Coalition estimates that the investment along Interstate Highway 95 on the length of the United States east coast would be a whopping $47 billion per year to respond to the expected increase in activity.(13) Federal Funding  Part of the initiative of the Energy Act was the extension of Capital Construction Funds to owners to create incentive to build vessels for containers and ro/ro shipping through tax deferrals. Another incentive was the authorization of $2 billion for MARAD’s Title XI loan guarantee program(14)  MARAD’s April 2011 report concludes that “the full range of public benefits of Marine Highways services will not be realized based solely on market-driven transportation choices **.** "(15) The funding was intended to address this problem. The external costs and benefits make the involvement of government necessary and vital. Financing multiple vessels in order to be able to service actual transportation needs will almost certainly require federalassistance. However, the final version of the Act does not provide additional Title XI authorization.(16) This 25-year term debt is too important to lose. The use of CCF funding works in collaboration with the Title XI program. As for the FY 2012 Budget, $54.1 million of the $76.6 million of the existing Title XIauthority is slated for cancellation because of the state of the economy.(17) Without adequate funding, the Marine Highway idea is just that, a good idea. In abad economy, long-term investments that bring the kind of return which will be realized by AMH are essential. The budget cuts to this program demonstrate a shortsightedness that is disheartening at best.
 * And current funding is insufficient**
 * Zimmer, 11** [Nancy, August, “Progress on America’s Marine Highway” graduated from Smith College (B.A., cum laude, 1998), and City University of New York School of Law, (J.D., 2001). She is admitted to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, and is a trained mediator. She is also a former commercial fisherman and commercial fishing boat owner. She is a member of the Maritime Law Association of the United States. Nancy can be contacted on +1 508 432-2121 or by email at zimmer@sealaw.org, http://www.corporatelivewire.com/top-story.html?id=66]

Mark Rosen (Deputy General Counsel at the Center for Naval Analyses & Professor of Homeland Security Law and Policy at George Washington University) 2010 “Energy Independence and Climate Change: The Economic and National Security Consequences of Failing to Act” University of Richmond Law Review, Lexis There is a growing consensus in U.S. national security circles that American dependence on imported oil constitutes a threat to the United States because a substantial portion of those oil reserves are controlled by governments that have historically pursued policies inimical to U.S. interests. For example, Venezuela, which represents eleven percent of U.S. oil imports, "regularly espouses anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric both at home and abroad ... [and] ... promotes ... [an] anti-U.S. influence in parts of Latin and South America ..." 72 that retards the growth of friendly political and economic ties among the United States, Venezuela, and a few other states in Latin and South America. This scenario plays out in many different regions. Russia, for example, has used its oil leverage to exert extreme political pressure upon Ukraine and Belarus. 73 Longstanding Western commercial relations with repressive regimes in the Middle East - i.e., Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia - raise similar issues because of the mixed strategic messages that are being sent. Of course, large wealth [*989] transfers have allowed the Taliban in Saudi Arabia to bankroll terrorism. 74 A. Chokepoints and Flashpoints For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will most likely be involved in protecting access to oil supplies - including the political independence of oil producers - and the global movements of using oil to help sustain the smooth functioning of the world economy. The security challenges associated with preserving access to oil are complicated by geographical "chokepoints," through which oil flows or is transported, but which are vulnerable to piracy or closure. 75 "Flashpoints" also exist as a result of political - and sometimes military - competition to secure commercial or sovereign access to oil in the face of disputed maritime and land claims that are associated with oil and gas deposits. Together, these challenges have necessitated that the United States and its allies maintain costly navies and air forces to protect sea lanes, ocean access, and maintain a presence to deter military competition in disputed regions. A selection of today's chokepoints and flashpoints follow. The Strait of Hormuz. This strait is the narrow waterway that allows access from the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf. Two-thirds of the world's oil is transported by ocean, and a very large percentage of that trade moves through Hormuz. The northern tip of Oman forms the southern shoreline of the strait. 76 Hormuz is protected by the constant transits of the U.S. Navy and its allies. Even though the strait has not been closed, the Persian Gulf has been the scene of extensive military conflict. 77 On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, initiating an eight-year war between the two countries that featured the "War of the Tankers," in which 543 ships, including the USS Stark, were attacked, while the U.S. Navy provided escort services to protect tankers [*990] that were transiting the Persian Gulf. 78 There have been past threats by Iran to militarily close the strait. 79 Additionally, there are ongoing territorial disputes between the United Arab Emirates and Iran over ownership of three islands that are located in approaches to the strait. 80 Closure of the strait would cause severe disruption in the movements of the world's oil supplies and, at a minimum, cause significant price increases and perhaps supply shortages in many regions for the duration of the closure. 81 During the War of the Tankers, oil prices increased from $ 13 per barrel to $ 31 a barrel due to supply disruptions and other "fear" factors. 82 Bab el-Mandeb. The strait separates Africa (Djibouti and Eritrea) and Asia (Yemen), and it connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Aden. The strait is an oil transit chokepoint since most of Europe's crude oil from the Middle East passes north through Bab el-Mandeb into the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. 83 Closure of the strait due to terrorist activities or for political/military reasons, could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline complex, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope). 84 This would add greatly to transit time and cost, and would effectively tie-up spare tanker capacity. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb would effectively block non-oil shipping from using the Suez Canal. 85 In October 2002 the French-flagged tanker Limburg was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists. 86 During the [*991] Yom Kippur War in 1973, Egypt closed the strait as a means of blockading the southern Israeli port of Eilat. 87 The Turkish Straits and Caspian Oil. The term "Turkish Straits" refers to the two narrow straits in northwestern Turkey, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which connect the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea on one side and the Aegean arm of the Mediterranean Sea on the other. Turkey and Russia have been locked in a longstanding dispute over passage issues involving the Turkish Straits. 88 The 1936 Montreux Convention puts Turkey in charge of regulating traffic through the straits; 89 yet Turkey has been hard pressed to stop an onslaught of Russian, Ukrainian, and Cypriot tankers, which transport Caspian Sea oil to markets in Western Europe. 90 Because of the very heavy shipping traffic and very challenging geography, there have been many collisions and groundings in the past, creating terrible pollution incidents and death. 91 Thus far, none of these incidents have been attributed to state-on-state-conflict or terrorism; 92 however, the confined waterway is an especially attractive target because of the grave economic and environmental damage that would result from a well-timed and well-placed attack on a loaded tanker. The issues surrounding the straits are also a subset of larger problems associated with the exploitation of Caspian oil, including severe pollution of the Caspian Sea as a result of imprudent extraction techniques, as well as the ever-present potential for conflict among the various claimants to the Caspian's hydrocarbon resources due to an inability of the various Caspian littoral states to agree on their maritime boundaries - and their [*992] legal areas in which to drill. 93 Any one of these problems could become a major flashpoint in the future. China vs. Japan. The Daiyu/Senkaku islands located in the East China Sea have become an increasingly contentious dispute because both claimants have, in the past, used modern military platforms to patrol the areas of their claims in which there are suspected oil and gas deposits in the seabed. 94 In September 2005, for example, China dispatched five warships to disputed waters surrounding its oil and gas platforms, which were spotted by a Japanese maritime patrol aircraft. 95 There have been other similar military-to-military encounters. 96 Given the fact that both countries have modern armed forces and are comparatively energy starved, it is not difficult to envision serious conflict erupting over these disputed areas. The Arctic Super Highway. Traditionalists would probably not include the Arctic as a security chokepoint. The oil connection is reasonably well known: "22 percent of the world's undiscovered energy reserves are projected to be in the region (including 13 percent of the world's petroleum and 30 percent of natural gas)." 97 However, given the very small margins that transporters earn transporting oil from point A to B, 98 shipping companies are always in search of shorter routes to transport oil to market. As the thawing of the Arctic Ocean continues as a result of climate change, 99 this may create new shipping routes that transporters of [*993] oil and other goods will use to maximize their profits and minimize their transit times. As supplies of readily exploitable crude oil are reduced, the probability increases that some of this trade will result from exploitation activities in the land and littoral areas adjacent to the Arctic Sea. This development is concerning for a number of reasons: (1) the area is very remote and could provide a safe haven to pirates seeking to hijack cargoes; (2) the environmental sensitivity of the area, and the concomitant difficulty of mounting a cleanup effort, means that an oil spill in that marine environment will be much more persistent than an oil spill in temperate waters; 100 (3) the Arctic presents unique navigational difficulties due to the lack of good charts, navigational aids, and communications towers, as well as the impacts of extreme cold on the operational effectiveness of systems; 101 (4) the unsettled nature of claims by various countries, including the United States, to the seabed continental shelf resources in the littoral areas off their coastlines creates the potential for military competition and conflict over these claims. 102 The International Maritime Organization ("IMO") is now circulating draft guidelines for ships operating in Arctic areas to promote - but not require - ship hardening against an iceberg strike, better crew training, and environmental protection measures. 103 These guidelines are merely advisory and can only be implemented via the flag states. 104 Also, neither IMO nor any of the UN Law of the Sea Institutions have mandatory jurisdiction over any of the flashpoint issues relating [*994] to competing continental shelf claims in the Arctic, 105 meaning that any disputes will remain unresolved for a long time. The above is only a selected list of potential flashpoints in which oil is the main culprit. Disputes between China and six other nations of the Spratly Islands, and other territories in the South China Sea, remain unresolved. 106 The Spratly Islands could become a flashpoint in the future, involving the United States or its allies, because of the proximity of those areas to the major sea routes to Japan and Korea. 107 The strategic straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda in Southeast Asia are absolutely essential to the movement of raw materials to Japan, Korea, and China. 108 Because of Lombok's depth and strategic location, it is a major transit route for very large crude carriers that move between the Middle East and Asia. 109 Lombok is an undefended waterway that is only eighteen kilometers in width at its southern opening, making it an attractive chokepoint for hijacking or eco-terrorism in which the waters of the environmentally sensitive Indonesian archipelago would be held hostage. 110
 * Oil dependence escalates**


 * __Second is congestion__**

Traffic congestion is costing billions every year **,** further threatening the nation’s economic recovery and highlighting the need for a boost in infrastructure investment, a new report finds. Rush-hour delays are costing the nation more than $100 billion year, about $750 for every U.S. commuter, as commute times have more than doubled in 30 years, according to the Urban Mobility Report released Tuesday by theTexas Transportation Institute. Rep. Nick Rahall (D-W.Va.), ranking member on the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, said the report demonstrates the need for Congress to pass a robust surface transportation bill. “The cost of congestion continues to cripple our nation’s economic competitiveness and productivity, causing companies and consumers to needlessly lose billions of dollars stuck in traffic each year,” Rahall said. “This report is further evidence that Congress must reject Republican efforts to slash transportation investment and get to work crafting a surface transportation bill that is large enough in size and scope to put Americans back to work and tackle the backlog of transportation needs in this country.” President Obama has proposed a boost in infrastructure spending as part of the $447 billion job-creation plan he has touted most of the month. “If you invest in roads and transit, you get better service and access to more jobs,” said Tim Lomax, one of the study’s authors. “Traffic management and demand management should be part of the mix, too. Generally speaking, mobility investments in congested areas have a high return rate.” The report found that delays for the average commuter have increased to 34 hours annually, up from 14 hours in 1982. Congestion is becoming a bigger problem outside of rush hours, with about 40 percent of delays occurring in the afternoon and overnight, creating “an increasingly serious problem for businesses that rely on efficient production and deliveries.” The economic recession has only provided a temporary respite from the growing congestion problem. When the economic growth returns, the average commuter is estimated to see an additional three hours of delay by 2015 and seven hours by 2020. By 2015, the cost of gridlock will rise from $101 billion to $133 billion per year — more than $900 for every commuter, and the amount of wasted fuel will jump from 1.9 billion gallons to 2.5 billion gallons — enough to fill more than 275,000 gasoline tanker trucks, the study found. “Congestion does more than choke our highways, it chokes our economy, making it harder to buy what we need and harder to keep or find a job,” Lomax said. “That’s a bad thing — especially when our economic recovery is so fragile.” The report suggests several solutions, including traditional road building and transit use, combined with traffic management strategies such as signal coordination and rapid crash removal. Telecommuting and flexible work hours also can play a role in reducing traffic. While there’s no silver bullet to fixing the problem, the report suggests that answers will have to come from all involved. “The solution mix may be different for each city, but the one thing they all share in common is urgency, Lomax said. “If we want a strong economy, doing nothing is not a productive option.”
 * It underlies a multibillion dollar drag on the economy – chokes any possible recovery**
 * Needham, 11** [Report: Traffic congestion costs billions, weighs on the economic recovery, Vicki, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/801-economy/184105-report-traffic-congestion-costs-billions-weighs-on-the-economic-recovery]

The global economy has embarked on a fragile recovery, which might be derailed by the crisis hovering over the eurozone, warned the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Tuesday. In its latest economic outlook, the Paris-based organization pointed out that regions have been recovering at different speed worldwide, with the United States and Japan taking lead over the sluggish euro area, while large emerging economies saw a moderate upswing. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth across the OECD is projected to slow from an annual rate of 1.8 percent in 2011 to 1.6 percent in 2012, before recovering to 2.2 percent in 2013, according to the outlook. Meanwhile, the organization forecast a mild recession in the eurozone this year, with GDP growth rate declined by 0.1 percent before rebound to 0.9 percent in 2013. "The crisis in the euro zone remains the single biggest downside risk facing the global outlook," said OECD chief economist Pier Carlo Padoan. "We need a euro area compact with 3 main goals: to avoid downside scenario, create sustained growth, build or rebuild monetary union ... ," Padoan told a press conference at the launching of the biannual report. The report found that business and household confidence is rising in the United States, flat in Japan, but weak or even falling in Europe where financial markets are tight and the adverse impacts of fiscal consolidation on near-term growth may be significant, particularly in countries hardest hit by the euro crisis. Similar trends were seen in labor markets, as unemployment is edging down in the United States, but rising in Europe, said the report. A downside scenario may materialize and spill over outside the euro area with very serious consequences for the global economy, the OECD warned. "The global economic outlook is still cloudy," saidOECD Secretary-General Angel Gurria, adding that "the global economic recovery is weak, considerabledownside risks remain and sizeable imbalances remain to be addressed." "We need decisive policy action now," the OECD chief stressed, urging government leaders to find new approaches to pave ways for economic growth by "go structural, go social, go green" to foster an inclusive society and promote social equity as "these structural reforms are not only good at creating growth, they can help address the problem of income inequality."
 * The global economy is fragile**
 * Xinhua News, 5/23/12** [OECD: Global Economy Recovery Fragile, reprinted, http://english.cri.cn/6826/2012/05/23/191s701502.htm]

The 2010 Urban Mobility Report, the most accurate picture oftraffic congestion in 439 US urban areas, now includes information about truck delay and the economic impact of congestion specific to trucking. This work was done under the auspices of the Development of an Areawide Estimate of Truck Freight Value in the Urban Mobility Report (CFIRE 04-16) project, led by CFIRE Associate Director Jessica Guo and Deputy Director Jason Bittner in partnership with David Schrank and Bill Eisele at the Texas Transportation Institute.. This project expands upon a framework for estimating commodities moving on the roadways through and within a given city. The original framework, developed by the Texas Transportation Institute as part of their ongoing work on the Urban Mobility Report, uses the Federal Highway Administration’s Freight Analysis Framework (FAF) database to identify the commodities in the trucks that originate and terminate in a given city, as well as pass through it. The research team created and tested a methodology for generating truck freight values using case studies in Austin, Texas, Denver, Colorado, and are in the process of refining it for Milwaukee, Wisconsin under this project. An early version of the resulting areawide freight value methodology was used in the 2010 Urban Mobility Report to develop freight value estimates for all 101 urban areas included in the report. Of the 101 urban areas included in the 2010 Urban Mobility Report, seventeen are located in the Midwest. Two of these are very large urban areas (Chicago and Detroit), while there are nine large urban areas (Minneapolis-St. Paul, St. Louis, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, Louisville, Kansas City, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus), five medium urban areas (Wichita, Grand Rapids, Akron, Dayton, and Toledo), and one small urban area (Madison). In these urban areas alone, delays represent nearly $6 billion (of the $33 billion nationwide) in freight-related congestion costs for the more than $1.3 trillion of total commodity value that moved through these areas in 2009. Larger, more densely populated urban areas have greater traffic volumes and consume more goods and thereby have higher total commodity values. This research also illustrates the important role of long transportation corridors in freight movement. A number of smaller urban areas along major East-West interstate highway corridors–such as Milwaukee, Columbus, and Madison–have commodity values rankings much higher than their delay rankings. This means that while there is less congestion impeding freight movement through these urban areas, it also means that these areas form crucial links in much larger freight transportation systems. “Wisconsin’s Interstate and U.S. highway corridors help serve the whole nation,” says Bittner. The same is true of most–if not all–of the other Midwest states. The 2010 Urban Mobility Report also suggests a number of operational treatments for reducing congestion in urban areas–freeway incident management, freeway ramp metering, arterial street signal coordination, arterial street access management, and high-occupancy vehicle lanes–and the particular urban areas where these strategies are applicable. For example, the report suggests that all of these strategies except HOV lanes would be beneficial in Milwaukee and Chicago. CFIRE researchers also have identified several strategies for reducing congestion, including identifying and mitigating bottlenecks and removing artificial restrictions such as delivery prohibitions and lane restrictions. Guo has led national efforts to better identify and alleviate bottlenecks in the trucking network. “Findings to date about truck delay and freight bottlenecks calls for more comprehensive and localized analysis of the causes of and solutions to freight bottlenecks,” says Guo. “Cooperation between states, as well as between the public and private sectors, is vital to ensuring that valuable and limited resources are distributed such that they reduce freight congestion in a prudent and cost-effective manner.” ”As our economy begins to rebound, it is critical that shipments navigate the supply chain distribution system efficiently. Unfortunately, the cost to the economy of congestion—and specifically freight congestion—is too high,” says Bittner. “We offer some solutions, but at the end of the day, we need to recognize that if we don’t invest in the system, our competitiveness will suffer here and abroad.” The 2010 Urban Mobility Report is published by the Texas Transportation Institute and uses a wealth of traffic speed data provided by INRIX, a leading private-sector provider of travel time information.
 * The economic impact is widespread**
 * Wagner, 11** [The Economic Impact of Traffic Congestion on Truck-borne Freight, Steve Wagner, Communications Manager CFIRE a transportation think tank, extensively citing a 2010 Urban Mobility Report, http://www.wistrans.org/cfire/2011/03/2010-umr/]

Apart from a handful of places around the country, there are no roadway prices to signal consumers about the real economic cost of their decisions to travel during congested times of day. It should be no surprise, therefore, that we witness an apparent shortage of road space yet little use of public transit. In deciding when and how to travel, people cer­tainly take into account their private costs, such as gas, oil, insurance, and so on. They also consider the congestion they expect to encounter. Travelers do not, however, consider the costs their trips impose on others when they add to the congestion (Mohring 1999). These costs are external to people’s trip-mak­ing decisions; economists thus call them “external costs.” They include the economic value of time wasted in delayed and unreliable conditions, the extra gas and other vehicle operating costs of stop-and-godriving, and the environmental damage and related costs to human health. Although studies differ in re­lation to definitions and methods, recent estimates of external roadway costs vary from $0.13 per ve­hicle mile to $0.29 per gelnbvehicle mile (HDR|HLB Decision Economics 2005; see also Small and Ve­hoef 2007, Chapter 3). Compared with the private costs of driving (about $0.52 per vehicle mile based on AAA 2007), external costs thus exceed private costs by some 25 to 56 percent. If the price of any other good or service were set so far below its cost, it would surprise no one to find that its demand routinely outstripped its supply and that there would be very low demand for substitutes. Time spent in traffic jams is the manifestation of roadway supply falling short of the demand for travel. Delay is an economic cost because it means less time available for productive work as well as for nonwork activities that people value. Moreover, unreliable conditions—wide day-to-day variation in the time needed to drive from Point A to Point B—lead people to guard against the risk of being late for work and appointments by leaving early. This time spent is at the expense of yet more time for productive work, as well as more time at home in the morning for family or other personal busi­ness. For trucks, unreliable transit times are of special significance because of just-in-time penalties built into many delivery contracts. A pattern of late de­liveriesfor the receivers of goods can lead them to bear the cost of holding extra inventories—“shock stocks”—to guard against the risk of material short­ages in just-in-time production systems (Shirley and Winston 2004). In 2005, autos and trucks lost an estimated 4.2 bil­lion hours to traffic delays and to the effects of cush­ioning against the risk of being late. The monetary equivalent value of these losses, when combined with the 2.9 billion gallons of fuel wasted in stop-and-go conditions, amounted to an estimated $78 billion lost during that year.2 Even with the exclu­sion of environmental costs, $78 billion equates to “105 million weeks of vacation and 58 fully loaded supertankers” (TTI 2007b). While statistics on the nationwide effects of congestion are indicative of its importance as a problem of national strategic significance, the im­pacts of congestion on people and their well-being are felt locally. A recent analysis of traffic in New York City finds that, even after allowing for some congestion as part and parcel of a vibrant economy, congestion there has “passed the tipping point” (Partnership for New York City 2006), stripping the metropolitan economy of more than $13 billion a year, including about $6 billion in wasted time and workday productivity. The study reports that shippers who rely on pre­dictable pickups and deliveries in order to maintain low inventory costs (and to obtain value from their investments in just-in-time technologies and busi­ness processes) hold costly shock stocks that reduce productivity and competitiveness. Trucking firms, which incur financial penalties for late deliveries, cushion against the risk of such penalties by leav­ing earlier than they would under more reliable and predictable travel time conditions, thereby reduc­ing their productivity and competitiveness. Congestion imposes an economic burden on a wide range of industries.Those directly affected by con­gestion include the retail trades, restaurants, health care and social services, construction, manufactur­ing, wholesale trade, taxis, financial and profes­sional services, the services and repair industry, andfor-hire trucking. Table 1 summarizes the estimated cost burdens borne by a selection of these sectors. The impact of congestion on the retail, restau­rant, entertainment, and other consumption-based trades, for example, stems partly from a reduction in trips for consumption purposes. By increasing the cost oftraveling to such destinations, congestion deters some consumers from using those services and causes others to use them less often than they otherwisewould. As a result, retailers earn less rev­enue and employ fewer workers. Congestion also adds to the logistics costs of retailers by reducing the reliability of delivery times for merchandise and supplies. This adds to costs by inhibiting the adoption of inventory-saving and other productiv­ity-enhancing strategies. Congestion imposes costs on the financial and professional services industries, due (inter alia) to the time spent by employees in highly congested conditions when traveling to business meetings. Frequently, professional work­ers will guard against the risk of being late or miss­ing a meeting altogether by allowing extra time in their travel schedules. Less congestion would make additional time available for productive work in the office. In sum, the New York study finds that traffic jams in the region add millions of dollars to produc­tion and distribution costs and erode the economy of nearly fifty-five thousand jobs.
 * And, the externalities act as a multiplier – decreases the underlying foundation of US economic leadership**
 * Lewis, 08** [David, Senior Vice President with HDR where he serves as the firm’s Chief Economist and Direc­tor for Economics and Financial Services, He served previously as President and CEO of HLB Decision Economics, prior to which he was a Principal Economist of the U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Brookings Institution, America’s Traffic Congestion Problem: Toward a Framework for Nationwide Reform, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/07/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2008/7/congestion%20pricing%20lewis/07_congestion_lewis.PDF]

3. Mitigating highway congestion. SSS can alleviate traffic congestion by shifting freight from the highways to inland and coastal waterways. Majorhighways, along the three US coasts (east coast, west coast and the Gulf of Mexico), suffer from congestion. Trucks currently carry about 60% of the domestic general cargo tonnage and contribute significantly to this problem. Trucksdelivering their cargo compete with cars for space on highways. This congestion is costly as well. According to the annual urban mobility report from the Texas Transportation Institute [2], traffic congestion continues to worsen in American cities of all sizes, creating a $78 billion annual drain on the US economy in the form of 4.2 billion lost hours and 2.9 billion gallons of wasted fuel for 2007. The congestion cost of an additional truck trip is the added delay that it causes to other users of the highway. The added delay occurs because the average speed of the vehicles will begin to decrease progressively once the density of vehicles on the road reaches high volume to capacity ratios. This congestion, which is generally associated with peak-hour traffic, is referred to as recurring congestion. A solution to the highway congestion problem couldbe a change in transportation patterns from shippers, especially for long-haul trips, with distances greater than 500 miles. Shippers should explore alternative modes of transportation, such as SSS, and consider using SSS instead of truck transportation. Trucks will do the short-haul, pick-up and delivery, at the start and the end of the transportation chain.
 * The internal link is __linear__**
 * Perakis and Denisis,08** [A survey of short sea shipping and its prospects in the USA, ANASTASSIOS N. PERAKIS* and ATHANASIOS DENISIS Department of Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, University of Michigan, 213 NAME Building, 2600 Draper Dr., Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2145, USA, http://intermodalmarine.com/pdfs/Survey%20of%20SSS%20Prospects%20in%20the%20U.S..pdf]

In order to remain competitive in a global economy, improving domestic infrastructure as well is a sound strategy to promote growth and efficiency, support increased manufacturing, feed the American marketand serve as an export platform for manufactured goods around the world. Our economicprosperity is closely tied to and heavily dependent upon international trade. Since approximately 99 percent by volume of this overseas trade is moved bywater, it underscores how pivotal the Maritime Transportation System is to our goal of supply chains and consequently to our economic and nationalsecurity. You have noted the numbers with regard to waterborne cargo, Mr. Chairman, that contributes $649 billion annually to the U.S. gross domestic product and more than 13 million jobs. An anVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:51 Jan 03, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\CG\6-14-1~1\66919.TXT JEAN nouncement last week from the Commerce Department reaffirmed these numbers. New trade figures for U.S. exports of goods and services for April revealed a 1.3-percent increase from March to a record $175.6 billion, still with a trade deficit but causing the trade deficit to decline by 6.7 percent from the preceding month. However, because of much of the system’s infrastructure is aging and constrained bycapacity limitations, this projection raises the fundamental question: Will the MTS be able to meet these new demands and continue to provide a seamless, integrated multimodal transportation system. In response to the 2004 Ocean Action Plan, the Committee on the Marine Transportation System did release in 2008 a national strategy that offered 34 recommendations to maintain and enhance the MTS, especially the system’s capacity, safety and security, environmental stewardship, resilience and reliability, and long-term financing. In general, progress towards fulfilling the national strategy is incomplete at best. Certainly efforts by this Administration to establish a pilot program for marine highways and to designate the marine highway corridors and grants awarded under the Recovery Act to fund MTS infrastructure investments have been positive steps, but they don’t seem to be enough and much more needs to be done. Unfortunately, the prospects don’t seem to be very good under present Federal budget constraints for finding new resources to maintain necessary infrastructure investments to maintain, enhance and expand the system to meet its future challenges. Nevertheless, we must find a way forward. With this in mind, I look forward to hearing the recommendations from our witnesses on how we might creatively and constructively address the needs of the Marine Transportation System. I will learn how we might leverage greater public and private investments to improve the efficiency and reliability of the system and how we can utilize the system to drive job creation and revitalize our maritime industries. The overarching reality is that our economic future and the Maritime Transportation System are closely intertwined **.** To think that our economy can fully recover and grow if we fail toinvest in this critical infrastructure is both unrealistic and shortsighted. We must summon the world to invest in this system or we risk choking off the very conduit that makes our economy hum, that drives job creation and that ensures the U.S. market remains pre-eminent in global trade. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
 * And, independently an effective MTS is vital to growth – capacity limitations act as a deadly stranglehold**
 * Lobiondo, et al 11** [Congressional Testimony, Frank A. LoBiondo is the U.S. Representative for New Jersey's 2nd congressional district, serving since 1995. He is a member of the Republican Party, CREATING JOBS AND INCREASING U.S. EXPORTS BY ENHANCING THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2011 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BIbLMqrPg5gJ:www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg66919/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg66919.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us]

Absence of growth causes nuclear war Austin ‘09 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman, Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187) Conversely, global policymakers do not seem to have grasped the downside risks to the global economy posed by a deteriorating domestic and international political environment. If the past is any guide, the souring of the political environment must be expected to fan the corrosive protectionist tendencies and nationalistic economic policy responses that are already all too much in evidence. After spending much of 2008 cheerleading the global economy, the International Monetary Fund now concedes that output in the world's advanced economies is expected to contract by as much as 2% in 2009. This would be the first time in the post-war period that output contracted in all of the world's major economies. The IMF is also now expecting only a very gradual global economic recovery in 2010, which will keep global unemployment at a high level. Sadly, the erstwhile rapidly growing emerging-market economies will not be spared by the ravages of the global recession. Output is already declining precipitously across Eastern and Central Europe as well as in a number of key Asian economies, like South Korea and Thailand. A number of important emerging-market countries like Ukraine seem to be headed for debt default, while a highly oil-dependent Russia seems to be on the cusp of a full-blown currency crisis. Perhaps of even greater concern is the virtual grinding to a halt of economic growth in China. The IMF now expects that China's growth rate will approximately halve to 6% in 2009. Such a growth rate would fall far short of what is needed to absorb the 20 million Chinese workers who migrate each year from the countryside to the towns in search of a better life. As a barometer of the political and social tensions that this grim world economic outlook portends, one needs look no further than the recent employment forecast of the International Labor Organization. The ILO believes that the global financial crisis will wipe out 30 million jobs worldwide in 2009, while in a worst case scenario as many as 50 million jobs could be lost. What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

**Bernauera 10** -[Climate Change, Economic Growth, and Conflict Thomas Bernauera, Anna Kalbhenna, Vally Koubia,b and Gabriele Ruoffa a ETH Zurich Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) and Institute for Environmental Decisions (IED) and b University of Bern Department of Economics and Oeschger Institute for Climate Change Research;http://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2010/papers/S1115_paper1.pdf] Economic growth and conflict Previous research has shown that reduced levels of domestic economic activity tend to create incentives for increased conflict.6 Drawing on this research, we posit that climate change, by reducing economic growth (that is, reducing the ability of the economy to grow), affects the utility of individuals and groups to engage in civil conflict. It does so in two ways. First, negative climatic conditions, via their negative effect on economic growth, can reduce resources available to the government (e.g. by reducing tax revenue). The government thus has fewer resources to “invest in people”, for instance to provide better nutrition, schooling, and on-the-job training that would lead to improved living conditions. It also has fewer resources to “provide for the people” in terms of sustaining peace through the maintenance of law and order – the latter, for instance, lowers the probability of rebel victory by increasing the cost of rebellion. Second, climate related phenomena such as lower precipitation, higher temperature, and extreme weather events lead to lower personal income from production and also decrease the opportunity for future employment. Consequently, the opportunity cost of rebellion decreases because the expected returns from peaceful employment, say farming, compared to joining criminal and insurgent groups are lower. In situations like these, when individuals expect to earn more from criminal or insurgent activity than from lawful and peaceful activity, predatory behavior becomes more likely. The latter implicates conditions in which each individual or group’s effort to increase its own welfare reduces the welfare of others and also increases the probability of mutual attacks (Jervis & Snyder, 1999). The argument that poverty breeds conflict and war is supported by several empirical studies (e.g. Hidalgo et al., 2010; Dube & Vargas, 2008; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that low economic growth, which is a proxy for foregone earnings, has considerable explanatory power in their intrastate conflict regression. They conclude that rapid economic growth reduces the risk of conflict. Dube and Vargas (2008) examine whether violent actions in Colombia in the 1994-2005 period are linked to low opportunity costs of agricultural labor, using crop prices as a proxy for such costs. They show that a drop in the price of coffee substantially increased the incidence and intensity of intrastate conflict in coffee-intensive areas. They attribute this result to the lowering of opportunity costs of joining a rebel movement (via depressed wages) in coffee growing areas. Hidalgo et al. (2010), using a panel data set with over 50,000 municipality-year observations, show that land invasions by the rural poor in Brazil occur immediately after adverse economic shocks, which in the statistical analysis are instrumented by rainfall. Consequently, our argument that reduced economic growth can impact on the likelihood of civil conflict is well supported by the existing literature.
 * Growth itself prevents conflict**

__Navy__

 * Advantage 2 is the Navy**

As President Obama announced his robust infrastructure investment program touting an immediate infusion of $50 billion for improvements to the nation’s infrastructure, images of a newly revitalized U.S. maritime industry swirled around me in a twilight zone moment. The six-year plan is estimated to cost about $350 billion to fix 150,000 miles of broken roadways, 233,000 miles of dilapidated railroad track, and 150 miles of aging airline runways. Yet not aword was uttered about increasing funding for America’s Marine Highway Program or rejuvenating the shipbuilding industry.Perhaps the president’s advisors had forgotten to remind him about the gridlock stifling the nation’s cities and highways. Or about the car and truck pollution that kills an estimated three percent of the population each year. In an era of rising fuel costs, dense smog and roadway congestion, personnel at the Department of Transportation (DOT) should have pointed out to Obama that there are 15.5 million commercial trucks on U.S. highways, of which two million are tractor trailers, and that they log about 435 billion miles each year while consuming approximately 53.9 billion gallons of fuel. Now add the estimated 136 million registered cars and about one million buses to the highway equation and you have a horrific traffic jam of 152.5 million motorized, fuel-burning vehicles bogging down freedom of the roadways and polluting the populace. As the president deals with the 2010 $1.3 trillion budget deficit calculated to be 9.2 percent of GDP, which is slightly less than the shortfall of 9.9 percent of GDP ($1.4 trillion) posted in 2009, he is also confronted with $130 billion (2010) for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates will cost the nation $745 billion between 2011 and 2020. With unemployment hovering around 10 percent due to the Great Recession that began in late 2007, federal revenues from corporate income taxes fell by 55 percent ($166 billion) in 2009, and individual income taxes declined by 20 percent ($230 billion). Additionally, for the first time since 1946, taxes from Social Security and Medicare declined 1 percent or $9 billion. And, of course, there is the $7.5 trillion owed by the government to domestic investors ($4 trillion-52%) and foreign investors ($3.6 trillion-48%) at the end of 2009. With this bleak economic picture staring the nation in the face like a double-barrelled shotgun, it’s no wonder that America’s shipyards are closing at record numbers and the number of U.S. mariners is declining rapidly. And forget the Jones Act, because if there are no U.S. yards or mariners there won’t be any need for U.S. cabotage laws. To all the anti-Jones Act folks screaming protectionism costs consumers too much and that American shipyards and ships cannot be competitive in the new global economy, I say the U.S. government will have to beef up its police forces, Coast Guard and National Guard to ensure a catastrophic event by terrorists or criminals doesn’t shut down U.S. ports or waterways. Because freedom isn’t free and a bigger government means more taxes. Really, grandma can pay the extra dollar for the iron at Walmart. Besides, if the U.S. maritime industry ceases to exist, who will run the supply lines the next time the U.S. military isdeployed overseas? DOT’s budget in 2010 is $73.2 billion and it’s scheduled to increase to $79 billion for 2011. In 2011, highways will get $42.1 billion and rail will receive $11 billion. Meanwhile, theMaritime Administration’s (MARAD) budget gets smaller: $433 million in 2009, $363 million this year, and $352 million allocated for 2011. The vast majority of MARAD’s budget goes to the Military Security Program, which stays constant at $174 million. Assistance to small yards in 2011 is zero, while getting rid of the Ready Reserve Fleet has been allocated $10 million. An additional $49.3 million currently goes for operations and programs. Does that mean there might be some loose change rattling around for America’s Marine Highway Program? The U. S. is exceptional among nations as it has 95,000 miles of coastline and 25,000 miles of navigable inland waterways and lakes. In moving domestic cargo, the math is simple: Move a ton of freight by truck and a gallon of fuel will get 155 miles down the road; by rail, that gallon will go 413 miles; but by towed barge that gallon will move the ton of freight nearly 576 miles. Furthermore, trucks are the dirtiest form of ground transport. In the past decade, automotive emissions have risen 3.3 percent, while truck emissions have risen nearly 77 percent. The evidence is clear, and throwing more money at thecrumbling highway system so that more and more trucks can clog the roadways to move a few tons of freight seems ludicrous. America’s Marine Highways are plentiful and renewable. A barge moving over 400,000 tons of cargo 2,300 miles would only consume 9,000 gallons of fuel, whereas that same cargo being moved by trucks would require 53,000 gallons. Since the mid-1990s, more than 40,000 U.S. merchant mariners, 38,000 longshoremen and 200,000 shipyard workers have lost their jobs. And over the last 50 years more than 60 shipyards have gone out of business. Northrop Grumman is closing its Tallulah yard in Louisiana by the end of 2010 and its much bigger Avondale yard by 2013…and another shipyard closes. Recently, the internal Revenue Service did an “Audit Techniques Guide” for its agents regarding inland waterway transportation. The report concluded, “Barge shipping is by far the most energy-efficient mode of transportation, extremely safe, causes little congestion, produces little air/noise pollution, has minimal land use or social impact.” The report went on to say, “The goods exchanged between states using the waterways exceeds $100 billion, and the industry supports 70,000 jobs while supporting 800,000 jobs in related industries. River states represent 54 percent of the population, 56 percent of heavy manufacturing, and 61 percent of agricultural jobs. And the waterways’ transportation industry provides $1.6 billion in fuel tax.” The CBO study cited earlier declared that national highway congestion resulted in 4.2 billion hours of delay and 2.9 billion gallons of additional fuel used at a cost of $78 billion. The proposed remedy is for the federal government to impose a policy of “congestion pricing.” This policy would charge drivers to use highways-roadways. More money out of your pocket during heavy traffic and lower prices in opposite circumstances, and check this one out: “Nationwide implementation of congestion pricing could provide governments a ‘social benefit’ of $19 billion to $45 billion per year.” President Obama needs to realize that we cannot pave our way or railroad our way to inevitable growth. The cost would probably be around $350 billion over six years. Obama and Secretary LaHood need to sit down with a few of us in the maritime industry so we can explain to them that the way to alleviatecongestion and pollution and save billions of dollars in fuel costs is by transporting goods over water. Think of the creation of jobs at shipyards, on vessels, and in ports.Imagine a budget surplus for the arts, education, mass transportation, and health care for the poor. Imagine….
 * Shipyard closings decimate the shipbuilding industry**
 * Munoz, 11** [January 11, The Obama Infrastructure Plan, and Another Shipyard Closes, OP-ED by Tony Munoz, Editor-in-Chief of the Maritime ExecutiveMagazine and the MarEx Newsletter, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/obama-infrastructure-plan-and-another-shipyard-closes]

http://www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/short-sea-shipping-long-on-benefits/ To help meet the current congestion crisis on U.S. highway systems and rail networks, the Department of Transportation and the U.S. Maritime Administration are promoting short sea shipping as an environmentally friendly, timely, and cost-effective way to expand freight capacity. The practice uses existing vessels and infrastructure to move freight betweencoastal ports, and between coastal ports and inland ports. It is a critical component of the nation's transportation system, and an integral part of the global transportation and logistics network. Providing consistent service, reliability, competition, and pricing, short sea shipping can help the United States meet present and future domestic andforeign trade demands. Short sea shipping proponents envision waterways used in tandem with trucks, rail, and pipelines to provide physically and economically integrated, timely, and competitive service for moving freight to final destinations. Eventually, meeting capacity demands will require new, technologically advanced vessels and infrastructure components—a boon for the American maritime and shipbuilding industries. And, choosing short sea shipping instead of routing cargo by rail or road provides important environmental benefits such as reduced emissions and energy use. European Union (EU) countries use short sea shipping to mitigate their significant surface transportation problems. Today, more than 44 percent of all freight movements in the EU are waterborne. EU policymakers have put short sea and coastal shipping—in close coordination with rail and highway freight improvements—at the top of their transportation agendas. Short sea shipping is already a vital part of the EU's transportation system. It is the only European transportation mode to keep pace with the growth of road transportation. Indeed, its ton-kilometer performance grew by almost 38 percent in the 1990s. A Fragmented U.S. System In the United States, public and private sector leaders believe in short sea shipping as a promising concept. But due to infrastructure, legal, and economicconstraints facing our shipping supply chain, no agreement has been reached on its application. The U.S. system today is an aggregate of public and private modes of freight and passenger delivery, each with its own areas of interest and funding. U.S. transportation planners readily acknowledge that the national highway and rail systems cannot build themselves out of an impending trade explosion. Water, especially along the coastlines, offers a natural and inexpensive solution to many congestion problems. We must make a concerted effort to maintain, enhance, modernize, and expand the base of the marine transportation system and the services at U.S. ports. But building necessary intermodal freight and passenger capacity in congested metropolitan or transportation corridor areas is capital-intensive and time-consuming—and can sometimes be controversial. The General Accountability Office is investigating the viability of short sea shipping as part of the United States' overall intermodal transportation system. This should help raise awareness of short sea shipping's potential with the major legislative and executive policymakers in the United States. Currently under consideration is legislation that would provide resources to help local ports meet their growing infrastructure needs and better handle increased business. This legislation focuses on leveraging funds from federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector. Genuine progress in moving freight off our crowded highways and rail systems and onto the waterways requires a real commitment on the part of U.S. political leaders.
 * Increased support for short sea shipping sustains the shipbuilding industry**
 * Raymond, 05** [Charles, President and CEO Horizon Inc. “Short Sea Shipping: Long On Benefits”,

A less well recognized candidate for increased government investment that would create jobs, improve infrastructure, remove impediments to economic growthand helpnational security is the domestic shipbuilding industry. Simply put, the United States has always supported a domestic shipbuilding industry and merchant marine on national security grounds. The centerpiece of this policy is the Jones Act, passed in 1920, which requires that vessels engaged in trade between two U.S. ports be American-built, owned and crewed. This is important for national security because the Navy both acquires its support vessels -- tankers and supply ships -- from U.S. shipyards and uses that same industrial base for overhaul and maintenance for its surface combatants. This industrialbase could not be sustained on Navy funding alone, hence the need to support commercial activities such as the construction of Jones Act ships. The first thing that the President could do is provide continued funding for the Title XI Federal Ship Financing Program. Title XI provides loan guarantees on contracts to build or overhaul commercial vessels in U.S. shipyards. The guarantees can be employed to cover the production of any type of commercial vessel including barges and offshore oil rigs. Title XI encourages the maintenance of commercial facilities and a skilled workforce that can also be employed inconstructing and maintain Navy vessels. An even bigger boost to the nation’s economy and national security would result from an administration decision to expand implementation of the MarineHighway Initiative. The MHI is intended to accelerate development of waterborne shipping services thereby reducing congestion on land as well as saving money since waterways shipping is extremely cost effective for the movement of high volume and bulk freight. Because of the Jones Act, initiatives under the MHI that involve funding support for the construction of carrier vessels would go to U.S. shipyards. The results would be a double boost to the economy (ship construction and reduced freight costs), the creation of jobs and support for national security. Mr. President, put more money behind the MHI.
 * And, expansion of title XI funding ensures __increased naval capacity__**
 * Goure, 11** [Lexington Institute, Obama Could Create Jobs And Support Defense, Daniel, PhD, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/obama-could-create-jobs-and-support-defense?a=1&c=1171]

NLUS, 12 – a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating our citizens about the importance of sea power to U.S. national security and supporting the men and women of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine and their families (Navy League of the United States, “Maritime Primacy & Economic Prosperity: Maritime Policy 2012-13”, Navy League of the United States, 1/21/12, http://www.navyleague.org/files/legislative_affairs/maritime_policy20122013.pdf | AK) Global engagement is critical to the U.S. economy, world trade and the protection of democratic freedoms that so many take for granted. The guarantors of these vital elements are hulls in the water, embarked forward amphibious forces and aircraft overhead. The Navy League of the United States’ Maritime Policy for 2012-13 provides recommendations for strategy, policy and the allocation of national resources in support of our sea services and essential to the successful execution of their core missions. We live in a time of complex challenges — terrorism, political and economic turmoil, extremism, conflicts over environmental resources, manmade and natural disasters — andpotential flash points exist around the globe. It is the persistent forward presence and engagement of maritime forces that keep these flash points in check, prevent conflict and crisis escalation, and allow the smooth flow of goods in a global economy. The United States has fought multiple wars and sacrificed much to ensure un challenged access to sea lanes and secure the global commerce upon which the U.S. economy depends. The “persistent naval presence” provided by our forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps ships, aircraft, Sailors and Marines is the guarantor of that hard-won maritime security and the critical deterrent against those who might seek to undermine that security. Maintaining naval forces that can sustain our national commitment to global maritime security and dissuade transnational aggression in the future must be a national imperative. The No. 1 challenge to that imperative is the lack of a fully funded, achievable Navy shipbuilding program that produces the right quantity and quality of ships, with the right capabilities, for the right costs, in economically affordable numbers over the next 25 years. A shipbuilding plan must be defined and agreed upon by the Navy, the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security, Congress and the administration — and executed now. Recognizing that hard choices must be made in a reduction of the defense budget, the Navy League is reducing its recommended funding for the Department of the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), account to $20 billion or more per year. This reduced funding leads to a recommended reduced force level of 305 ships to meet our nation’s global security challenges. This also recognizes that the worldwide commitment of ship deployment must be reduced. America’s amphibious expeditionary force is prepared to engage today’s threats — today. Our Marines remain heavily engaged in Afghanistan and support numerous other small-unit operations that enable nation-building with allies around the globe. The Marine Corps needs the authorization to reduce to an end strength of 186,800 Marines, and this force level must be properly resourced to maintain a balanced air-ground logistics team. The Corps must regain its expertise in amphibious operations and maintain that capability in force structure. The service also must be provided the resources to reset the force, to restore or acquire new equipment and capabilities consumed in the ongoing wars. The Coast Guard is a multimission, worldwide-deployed armed force with broad law enforcement authorities. It operates seamlessly with the DoD services as prescribed by the National Command Authority and is the lead agency for maritime homeland security and law enforcement support to the Navy in deployed operations. In addition, it fulfills several legally mandated missions, including its most employed mission of search and rescue, plus protection of living marine resources, drug interdiction, illegal migrant interdiction, defense readiness, marine safety, ice operations, aids to navigation, marine environmental protection, and ports, waterways and coastal security. The substantial breadth of operations, which has increased markedly in tempo since the 9/11 attacks, continues to overstress aging equipment, resulting in rising maintenance costs and a greater workload for Coast Guard personnel. The Coast Guard must increase its active-duty military strength to at least 45,000, have an operational expense budget of at least $6.7 billion and an Acquisition, Construction and Improvements (AC&I) budget resourced at no less than $2.5 billion per year, of which $2 billion should be dedicated to continuing the recapitalization of the fleet. Skilled Mariners are more critical than ever to ensuring our ability to sustain U.S. national and global security interests. Ninety-five percent of the equipment and supplies required to deploy the U.S. armed forces is moved by sea. The base of skilled U.S. Merchant Mariners is shrinking. The shipping capabilities of the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force and the DoD’s Military Sealift Command are sized to support routine and some surge logistics and specialized mission requirements. This critical capability must be maintained by ensuring an active commercial U.S.-flag Merchant Marine to support efficient and cost-effective movement of DoD cargo. The U.S. shipbuilding industry is in crisis. Finding a solution must be an imperative if our nation is to maintain a Navy capable of supporting the nation’s defense. Jobs lost in this sector mean precious ground lost in capability and capacity that cannot be regained. The current production levels for ship construction and the manufacturing of the other critical systems, equipment and weapons that we install in our ships, submarines and aircraft are at critically low levels. Sustaining and upgrading our nation’s critical, defense-related industrial base must be an essential element of our National Security Strategy. Personnel must train as they will fight to remain operationally ready. This all-volunteer military also must receive highly competitive compensation in the way of salary as well as health care, retirement and quality-of-life benefits to remain an effective fighting force. Taking care of our wounded warriors is fundamental.
 * Risks escalation of every transnational threat – the ship building industry is key**

In addition to the above environmental and societal benefits, SSS has also the following advantages: 1. Expansion of the transportation network capacity. SSS can add more capacity to the stressed freight transportation network of the US in an efficient way. Given that the sea lanes or ‘marine highways’ are intheory limitless, SSS is by far the easiest to expand transportation system. 2. Port productivity improvement. By swiftly transhipping containers out of a hub-port, using feeder vessels and container barges, SSS can increase the capacity of the port terminals, reduce the ‘dwell time’ for containers in the yard and overall improve the productivity of the port. 3. Revival of the US maritime sector.The introduction of new waterborne transportation will revitalize the maritime sector in the US **.** There will be new shipbuilding opportunities for new short sea vessels and therefore employment opportunities as well. The new satellite terminals will also create more jobs for the local communities. 4. Corporate social responsibility. The significant environmental and social advantages of SSS over the other transportation modes can lead to different transportation patterns and change the attitudes of the transportation users, i.e. shippers. Under the corporate social responsibility (CSR) concept, businesses make their decisions considering also the interests of other parties, such as the society and the environment, and therefore taking responsibility for the impact of their activities. For example, companies are taking further steps to improve the quality of life for the local communities and the society in general or help the environment. Proponents of CSR argue that corporations gain in the long term in multiple ways by operating with a perspective broader than their own immediate, short-term profits. Several studies have found a positive correlation between social/environmental performance and financial performance [45]. In the increasingly conscience-focused marketplaces of the twenty-first century, the demand for more ethical business processes and actions is increasing and additional pressure is applied on almost every industry to improve its business ethics. Often it takes a crisis to precipitate attention to CSR, such as the crisis in the US freight transportation network. It is also suggested that stronger government intervention and regulation, rather than voluntary action, are needed in order to ensure that companies behave in a socially responsible manner. The freight transportation industry is a competitive industry. Cost and time are the two main decision-making criteria for the choice of mode. Transportation companies compete on cost and on the level of service been offered, operating under certain standards and regulations. However, the increased awareness on CSR may force them to move further than their compliance with environmental standards. Shippers will start looking at their environmental impact of their transportation activities and may turn their attention to greener modes. SSS has to promote its Short sea shipping in the USA 607 Downloaded By: [University of Michigan] At: 16:17 29 November 2008 image as a sustainable mode of freight transportation and attractenvironmentally aware shippers. Recent surveys however have showed a lack of awareness about the advantages of SSS among shippers, shipowners, and the public as well [46].
 * And, inland water ways are functionally limitless – the plan is the easiest means of infrastructure expansion and revitalizes the maritime sector**
 * Perakis and Denisis,08** [A survey of short sea shipping and its prospects in the USA, ANASTASSIOS N. PERAKIS* and ATHANASIOS DENISIS Department of Naval Architecture & Marine Engineering, University of Michigan, 213 NAME Building, 2600 Draper Dr., Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2145, USA, http://intermodalmarine.com/pdfs/Survey%20of%20SSS%20Prospects%20in%20the%20U.S..pdf]

In conclusion, our study found that the tremendous advantage the US enjoys in naval power directly supports our national security through global power projection and maintaining freedom of the seas. Our ability to build large, highly capable naval ships is a vital part of our naval superiority and is therefore inexorably linked to our national security. The US must maintain it lead in naval power by protecting its domestic shipbuilding industry. It is our conclusion that the number one issue facing the American military shipbuilder today is the uncertainty in future orders for ship construction. The year to year fluctuation in the projected naval order book adds uncertainty for the shipbuilder wanting to invest in capital and labor improvement, and adds cost to the vessels actually being delivered. This fluctuation is exacerbated when the US Navy cancels entire ship classes or severely limits procurement of vessels that have been programs of record, programs which the shipbuilders have used to make labor and capital investment decisions. We feel it is imperative for the Navy to identify the force of the future and commit to a stable procurement plan to implement that force. The concept of Seabasing must mature at least to the point where the major yards can invest in the infrastructure necessary to build the force. In this area, we also conclude that the requirement for full funding of naval vessels in the year of authorization hampers the ability of the Navy and the industry to maintain a steady shipbuilding plan. It is apparent to us that the US Navy shipbuilding program is often used as a “bill payer” for other DoD priorities. In addition to the reality that the money is not obligated in the year of funding, the temptation to use the US Navy shipbuilding account to pay current year expenses is greater if significant procurement dollars are available to pay the full cost of individual ships. While we are convinced the nation must maintain sufficient shipbuilding capacity to allow for surge in national emergencies, we feel that the current and projected naval order book does not support the capacity being carried by the six largest shipyards. Restructuring of the industrial base is necessary. This restructuring may entail the politically difficult decision to allow some yards to close, but if the naval order book does not increase and the restructuring does not occur, unit cost will continue to skyrocket out of proportion to the value to the nation of the vessel.
 * And, a strong maritime and shipbuilding industry is a vital pre requisite to credible naval capabilities**
 * Alberto, et al., 5** (Lieutenant Colonel Ronald P., U.S. Army, Colonel Michael G. Archuleta, U.S. Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel Steven H. Bills, U.S. Air Force, Commander William A. Bransom, U.S. Navy, Mr. Kenneth Cohen, Department of State, Commander William A. Ebbs, U.S. Navy, George Manjgaladze, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Georgia, Commander Elizabeth B. Myhre, U.S. Navy, Audrea M. Nelson, DA, Robert L. Riddick, Department of Defense, Colonel Christopher M. Ross, U.S. Army, Julia N. Ruhnke, DA, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory M. Ryan, U.S. Marine Corps, Colonel David D. Thompson, U.S. Air Force, Commander Hugh D. Wetherald, U.S. Navy, Dr. Mark Montroll, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Dr. Michael Farbman, USAID, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Captain David B. Hill, U.S. Coast Guard, faculty at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, “SHIPBUILDING”, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 2005, http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/programs/academic/industry/reports/2005/pdf/icaf-is-report-shipbuilding-2005.pdf, Deech)

Deter major power war. No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers. Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of deterring major power war. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power. The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by a robust sealift capability that can concentrate and sustain forces, sea control and power projection enable extended campaigns ashore.
 * Great power war**
 * Conway et al 7** [James T., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf]

Naval forces can be employed in support of foreign policy, military (theater) strategy, and peace operations. Navies are an ideal tool for providing support of foreign policy. Their main advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political symbolism. Naval forces have diverse capabilities that can be quickly tailored to the situation at hand. They are also largely self-sufficient and do not require extensive land support. Naval forces can be employed in support of the country’s diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis, or for naval diplomacy— actions aimed to create a favorable general and military image abroad, establish one’s rights in areas of interest, reassure allies and other friendly countries, influence the behavior of other governments, threaten seaborne interdiction, and, finally, threaten the use of lethal force. Deployment of naval forces during times of tension or crisis to back up diplomacy and thereby pose an unstated but clear threat is an example of naval diplomacy, which can also help in coalition-building. Navies are generally much more effective than armies or air forces in terms of their international acceptability and capacity to make the desired impact. They can be used symbolically to send a message to a specific government. When a stronger message is required, naval diplomacy can take the form of employment of carefully tailored forces with a credible offensive capability, signaling that a much more capable force will follow, or it can give encouragement to a friendly country by providing reinforcement. The threat of the use of limited offensive action or coercion might be designed to deter a possible aggressor or to compel him to comply with a diplomatic demarche or resolution. Naval forces can be used in conflict prevention, coercive diplomacy, and peace operations. Conflict prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally or collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aimed at either preventing escalation of disputes into armed conflict or facilitating resolution of armed violence. These actions range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of naval forces. The main purpose of the forward presence of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific, Arabian Sea, Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities that might affect the national interests of the United States and its allies or friends. Naval forces deployed in forward areas should be of sufficient size and combat power to defeat opposing forces quickly and decisively.
 * Naval strength solves Middle East war**
 * Vego, 8** — professor of operations at the Naval War College, former commanding officer in the former Yugoslav Navy and former West German merchant marine (Milan N., “On Naval Power”, Joint Forces Quarterly, July 2008, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-50/JFQ-50.pdf, Deech)

Gold, 07 [Thomas J., Masters in Strategic Intelligence, Joint Military Intelligence College, Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East: An Analysis of Future Events, p. 53-55] If the political, ethnic, and military policies, and future nuclear weapons development in the Middle East continue in their present directions, Iran or Iraq will eventually initiate a nuclear conflict, probably in the 2005-2015 time frame. Major focal events such as total arms control (resulting in a regional NWFZ), individual acceptance of the NPT, or changes in Middle East leadership will ultimately determine which future happens. FUTURE INDICATORS A constant watch is needed to assess the actions, intentions, and progress of the Middle East countries with their nuclear programs. As well as the status of each country’s nuclear program, its military capability and intentions must also be monitored to determine which future direction is most likely and if the first use of nuclear weapons is likely. ‘Future Indicators” verify the progress of each country toward the most likely “Alternate Future”. Future No. 23 (most likely,): Israel, Iran, and Iraq have developed nuclear weapons. Israel and Iran have kept their weapons as a deterrent. Iraq is the first to use nuclear weapons, probably for aggression. Depending on which Middle East country is attacked by Iraq, either Israel or Iran will retaliate with a secondary nuclear strike. Actions by the U.S., Russia, or other countries will have little effect in deterring this retaliation. This future scenario also carries the risk of escalation into a regional or global nuclear conflict if the major nuclear powers become involved. This scenario can only take place if Iran chooses to retain its nuclear weapons for deterrence rather than be aggressive. Note that Iran has developed weapons approximately three years earlier than Iraq. Israel must also be complacent about Iraq’s program and not destroy the Iraqi reactors as it did in 1981. Transposition to Future No. 20: Iran becomes democratic and does not develop nuclear weapons. However, without the appearance of having a potential nuclear capability, Iran will surely become the most probable target of Iraq’s attack. Transposition to Future No. 14: Israel or one of the major nuclear powers takes a major action which deters Iraq from nuclear aggression. This scenario would result in a very unstable situation when all three countries have nuclear weapons. The potential would then exist for a regional dispute to escalate into __nuclear conflict__. Transposition to Future No. I: Prior to any conflict, all Middle East countries have agreed to a NWFZ, abandoned their nuclear development programs, and destroyed all nuclear weapons and related materials. Indicators for Future Scenario No. 23: A tier the development and assembly of a nuclear device, Iraq may test the weapon within Iraqi territory to verify its design, or politically move Iraq into being a nuclear power: this action would be a major step toward regional hegemony. After testing this weapon, Iraq may also begin a buildup of its nuclear capability for future deterrence or aggression. Future No. 17 (second most likely): Israel and Iran have developed nuclear weapons. Iraq program is not complete, and Israel has kept its weapons as a deterrent. Iran is the first to use nuclear weapons, probably for aggression. As the status of the Iraqi program is uncertain, the most probable target for an Iranian first strike using nuclear weapons is Israel. A nuclear retaliation by Israel would be certain. The potential now exists for the involvement of the major nuclear powers, the U.S. siding with Israel, and Russia siding with Iran. Escalation to regional or global nuclear war is //__now__// a possibility.
 * And, goes __global__ and __nuclear__**

Although cloaked in the reassuring boilerplate about American military preeminence and global leadership, in reality the Obama administration’s new Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is the first step in the United States’ adjustment to the end of the Pax Americana—the sixty-year period of dominance that began in 1945. As the Pentagon document says—without spelling out the long-term grand-strategic implications—the United States is facing “an inflection point.” In plain English, a profound power shift in international politics is taking place, which compels a rethinking of the U.S. world role. The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be replaced by a multipolar international system. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency. Two terms not found in the DSG are “decline” and “imperial overstretch” (the latter coined by the historian Paul Kennedy to describe the consequences when a great power’s economic resources can’t support its external ambitions). But, although President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta may not admit it, the DSG is the first move in what figures to be a dramatic strategic retrenchment by the United States over the next two decades. This retrenchment will push to the fore a new U.S. grand strategy—offshore balancing. In a 1997 article in International Security, I argued that offshore balancing would displace America’s primacy strategy because it would prove difficult to sustain U.S. primacy in the face of emerging new powers and the erosion of U.S. economic dominance. Even in 1997, it was foreseeable that as U.S. advantages eroded, there would be strong pressures for the United States to bring its commitments into line with its shrinking economic base. This would require scaling back the U.S. military presence abroad; setting clear strategic priorities; devolving the primary responsibility for maintaining security in Europe and East Asia to regional actors; and significantly reducing the size of the U.S. military. Subsequent to that article, offshore balancing has been embraced by other leading American thinkers, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble and Robert Pape. To be sure, the proponents of offshore balancing have differing ideas about its specifics. But they all agree that offshore balancing is based on a common set of core strategic principles. ● Fiscal and economic constraints require that the United States set strategic priorities. Accordingly, the country should withdraw or downsize its forces in Europe and the Middle East and concentrate is military power in East Asia. ● America’s comparative strategic advantages rest on naval and air power, not on sending land armies to fight ground wars in Eurasia. Thus the United States should opt for the strategic precepts of Alfred Thayer Mahan (the primacy of air and sea power) over those of Sir Halford Mackinder (the primacy of land power). Offshore balancing is a strategy of burden shifting, not burden sharing. It is based on getting other states to do more for their security so the United States can do less. ● By reducing its geopolitical and military footprint on the ground in the Middle East, the United States can reduce the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism directed against it. Islamic terrorism is a push back against U.S. dominance and policies in the region and against on-the-ground forces in the region. The one vital U.S. interest there—safeguarding the free flow of Persian Gult oil—can be ensured largely by naval and air power. ● The United States must avoid future large-scale nation-building exercises like those in Iraq and Afghanistan and refrain from fighting wars for the purpose of attaining regime change. Several of these points are incorporated in the new DSG. For example, the new strategy document declares that the United States “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” The document also states the United States will “rebalance [its] military investment in Europe” and that the American military posture on the Continent must “evolve.” (The Pentagon’s recent decision to cut U.S. ground forces in Europe from four brigades to two is an example of this “evolution.”) Finally, implicitly rejecting the post-9/11 American focus on counterinsurgency, the strategy document says that with the end of the Iraq war and the winding down of the conflict in Afghanistan, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” The DSG reflects the reality that offshore balancing has jumped from the cloistered walls of academe to the real world of Washington policy making. In recent years the U.S. Navy, the Joint Staff and the National Intelligence Council all have shown interest in offshore balancing as an alternative to primacy. Indeed, in his February 2011 West Point speech, then defense secretary Robert Gates made two key points that expressed a clear strategic preference for Mahan over Mackinder. First, he said that “the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere.” Second—with an eye on the brewing debate about intervention in Libya—he declared that “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.” In plain English, no more Eurasian land wars. The subsequent Libyan intervention bore the hallmarks of offshore balancing: The United States refused to commit ground forces and shifted the burden of military heavy lifting to the Europeans. Still, within the DSG document there is an uneasy tension between the recognition that economic constraints increasingly will impinge on the U.S. strategic posture and the assertion that America’s global interests and military role must remain undiminished. This reflects a deeper intellectual dissonance within the foreign-policy establishment, which is reluctant to accept the reality of American decline. In August 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed a “New American Moment;” reaffirmed the U.S. responsibility to lead the world; and laid out an ambitious U.S. global agenda. More recently, Mitt Romney, a leading contender for the Republican presidential nomination, declared that the twenty-first century “must be an American century” and that “America is not destined to be one of several equally balanced global powers.” These views are echoed by foreign-policy scholars who refuse to acknowledge the reality of decline or embrace a theory of “painless decline” whereby Pax Americana’s norms and institutions will survive any American retrenchment. But, American “exceptionalism” notwithstanding, the United States is not exempt from the historical pattern of great-power decline. The country needs to adjust to the world of 2025 when China will be the number-one economy and spending more on defense than any other nation. Effective strategic retrenchment is about more than just cutting the defense budget; it also means redefining America’s interests and external ambitions. Hegemonic decline is never painless. As the twenty-first century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The central strategic preoccupation of the United States during the next two decades will be its own decline and China’s rise.
 * Transition to offshore balancing is inevitable**
 * Layne 12** (Christopher Layne, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, JD from the University of Southern California Law Center, LLM in international law from the University of Virginia Law School, Mary Julia and George R Jordan professor of international affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, former associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami, former fellow in the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at the University of California Los Angeles, former fellow at the CATO Institute, former fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, former MacArthur Foundation fellow in global security, former visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, former research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University, former member of the professional staff at the Arroyo Center at the California Institute of Technology, former foreign policy analyst for NATO, 1-27-12, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405) GZ

The United States has a legacy commitment to global stability, and that poses a particular challenge to the waning hegemon as it seeks to fulfill its commitment with dwindling resources. The fundamental challenge for the United States as it faces the future is closing the "Lippmann gap," named for journalist Walter Lippmann. This means bringing America's commitments into balance with the resources available to support them while creating a surplus of power in reserve. To do this, the country will need to establish new strategic priorities and accept the inevitability that some commitments will need to be reduced because it no longer can afford them. These national imperatives will force the United States to craft some kind of foreign-policy approach that falls under the rubric of "offshore balancing"--directing American power and influence toward maintaining a balance of power in key strategic regions of the world. This concept--first articulated by this writer in a 1997 article in the journal International Security--has gained increasing attention over the past decade or so as other prominent geopolitical scholars, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Robert Pape, Barry Posen and Andrew Bacevich, have embraced this approach. Although there are shades of difference among proponents of offshore balancing in terms of how they define the strategy, all of their formulations share core concepts in common. First, it assumes the United States will have to reduce its presence in some regions and develop commitment priorities. Europe and the Middle East are viewed as less important than they once were, with East Asia rising in strategic concern. Second, as the United States scales back its military presence abroad, other states need to step up to the challenge of maintaining stability in key regions. Offshore balancing, thus, is a strategy of devolving security responsibilities to others. Its goal is burden shifting, not burden sharing. Only when the United States makes clear that it will do less--in Europe, for example--will others do more to foster stability in their own regions. Third, the concept relies on naval and air power while eschewing land power as much as possible. This is designed to maximize America's comparative strategic advantages--standoff, precision-strike weapons; command-and-control capabilities; and superiority in intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance. After all, fighting land wars in Eurasia is not what the United States does best. Fourth, the concept avoids Wilsonian crusades in foreign policy, "nation-building" initiatives and imperial impulses. Not only does Washington have a long record of failure in such adventures, but they are also expensive. In an age of domestic austerity, the United States cannot afford the luxury of participating in overseas engagements that contribute little to its security and can actually pose added security problems. Finally, offshore balancing would reduce the heavy American geopolitical footprint caused by U.S. boots on the ground in the Middle East--the backlash effect of which is to fuel Islamic extremism. An over-the-horizon U.S. military posture in the region thus would reduce the terrorist threat while still safeguarding the flow of Persian Gulf oil. During the next two decades, the United States will face some difficult choices between bad outcomes and worse ones. But such decisions could determine whether America will manage a graceful decline that conserves as much power and global stability as possible. A more ominous possibility is a precipitous power collapse that reduces U.S. global influence dramatically. In any event, Americans will have to adjust to the new order, accepting the loss of some elements of national life they had taken for granted. In an age of austerity, national resources will be limited, and competition for them will be intense. If the country wants to do more at home, it will have to do less abroad. It may have to choose between attempting to preserve American hegemony or repairing the U.S. economy and maintaining the country's social safety net. The Constellation of world power is changing, and U.S. grand strategy will have to change with it. American elites must come to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for an indeterminate period of time. The Euro-Atlantic world had a long run of global dominance, but it is coming to an end. The future is more likely to be shaped by the East. At the same time, //Pax Americana// also is winding down. The United States can manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline. The problem is that many Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American exceptionalism with such fervor that they can't discern the world transformation occurring before their eyes.
 * Balancing solves war – the only question is efficacy of our Navy**
 * Layne 12** (Christopher Layne, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, JD from the University of Southern California Law Center, LLM in international law from the University of Virginia Law School, Mary Julia and George R Jordan professor of international affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, former associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami, former fellow in the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at the University of California Los Angeles, former fellow at the CATO Institute, former fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, former MacArthur Foundation fellow in global security, former visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, former research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University, former member of the professional staff at the Arroyo Center at the California Institute of Technology, former foreign policy analyst for NATO, 4-26-12, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline became Inevitable,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/2/) GZ


 * Stabilizing the shipbuilding industry would reduce costs and solve institutional problems**


 * Cropsey ’12** [18 April 2012, “The U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plan: Assumptions and Associated Risks to National Security” Dr. Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. He served as Naval Officer from 1985 to 2004 and as deputy senior under secretary of the Navy in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush, @http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--USNavyShipbuildingPlan--Testimony041812.pdf, AZhang]

Knowledge of shipbuilding remains part of American manufacturing. But accelerating cost, an ageing workforce, reduced orders for warships, and an uncertain future risk the nation’s ability to turn out sufficient numbers of vessels at affordable prices and profitably enough to keep shipbuilding companies alive. The destabilization of the American shipbuilding industrial base is one reason that the cost of warships is outpacing the rate of inflation. The Navy’s reduced procurement of ships over the past twenty years has caused the industry to contract, lay off workers, and in general to become less reliable. This has driven up the cost of labor and the cost of construction materials. The fewer ships the Navy buys, the less lucrative the industry is for skilled workers. As the cost of labor rises shipbuilders are increasingly pressed to attract and train qualified personnel. The negative trends reinforce each other. As younger workers are dissuaded from seeking employment or remaining in the industry by the prospects of sporadic employment those who remain—the existing workers—age. The cycle is self-defeating. Paying older workers increases overhead costs and makes it increasingly expensive to invest in the training and education of a younger workforce. The destabilization of the industrial base also causes costs to rise since many of the materials and products that go into building Navy ships are not useful for other purposes. Since the Navy is buying far fewer ships now than it did in the 1980s, many shipyards rely on a single source for necessary materials. With a virtual monopoly on these products, the suppliers have in large part the ability to name their price. The inefficient manner in which the shipyards acquire these materials drives up labor and overhead costs. The solution lies in stabilizing the American shipbuilding industry. This means that the Navy must either increase its orders of ships and/or improve its business practices, for example disciplining the changes it requires of shipbuilders once orders have been placed and vessels are under construction. Buying and stockpiling spare parts for ships that are already in service and whose need for regular maintenance and repair is well known would also help provide stability for the American shipbuilding industry. In a study conducted on the subject in 2006, the RAND Corporation concluded that the rising costs of building ships is the result of a combination of unsteady U.S. Government procurement rates and a “monopsony relationship” between the government and the shipbuilders. In a monopsony a single purchaser is faced with a host of sellers. Because there is so little American shipbuilding outside of what the Navy purchases, U.S. firms are at the commercial mercy of the 9 percent of the Navy budget devoted to buying ships. A 2005 Government Accountability Office report attributed cost increases in shipbuilding to instability in the entire industry, the difficulty in recruiting and training qualified personnel, high rates of skilled personnel turnover and the shipbuilders’ dependence on a rapidly shrinking supplier base.


 * Naval readiness is rapidly declining now with no funding for modernization— investment is key**


 * Eaglen ’12** [3 April 2012, MacKenzie Eaglen, Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, Lanterloon,“U.S. military faces a readiness crisis,” @http://lanterloon.com/u-s-military-faces-a-readiness-crisis/, AZhang]

None of America’s armed forces can meet all of the demands placed on them by commanders today. Just last week, the Navy said that for the second time in seven months, equipment failure prevented an amphibious assault ship — the USS Essex — from meeting a commitment at sea. Unfortunately, this is not surprising. The U.S. military faces a readiness crisis — one confronting not just its people and end-strength cuts — but pushing equipment to the breaking point.Across all services, long-standing readiness problems are worsening and breakdowns are happening more frequently. Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert testifying to Congress last July shortly before his promotion to Chief of Naval Operations, said: “The stress on the force is real. And it has been relentless.” The overall picture is dismal: While the Navy’s fleet has shrunk by about 15 percent since 1998, the number of ships deployed overseas has remained constant. Each ship goes to sea longer and more often, resulting in debilitating maintenance problems. Simple wear and tear is weakening defense capabilities across the board as the military’s major platforms age after high wartime usage rates and a lack of major recapitalization since the Reagan buildup. An Air Force F-15C literally broke in half during flight some years ago. Today, every single Navy cruiser hull has cracks; A-10C Warthogs have fuselage fractures, and the UH-1N Twin Huey helicopter fleet is regularly grounded. Over half the Navy’s deployed aircraft are not ready for combat. Last April, the engine of a F/A-18C Hornet caught fire aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson. Last March, the engine of a Marine Hornet about to take off from the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis exploded. As these aging aircraft were bursting into flames, senior officials were warning Washington politicians that keeping the older fighter planes in safe flying condition was “one of their most serious challenges.” Built in the 1980s and 1990s, the jets were designed to fly for 6,000 hours. Delayed delivery of the replacement F-35, however, has forced the services to squeeze an additional 4,000 flight hours out of the Hornets. This is just a sample of the readiness problems plaguing those who serve in uniform. Yet, the almost-$1 trillion “stimulus” bill didn’t contain a nickel for military modernization. Instead, the president and Congress have been cutting defense dollars and capabilities for the past three years. Today, Washington wants to divert even more defense dollars to debt reduction — even in the face of the rapidly declining readiness of the U.S. military. This will only exacerbate the problem of how to meet the urgent need to conduct overdue maintenance on older ships, planes and vehicles. The latest defense budget takes a half trillion dollars out of military spending over the next decade even though Pentagon leaders expect no let up in demand for U.S. forces worldwide. Should an unforeseen crisis arise, the consequences could be deadly. While there is no quick or easy fix, admitting there is a problem and doing something about it should be everyone’s priority. In 2010, a bipartisan blue-ribbon panel set up by Congress and led by Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defense and George W. Bush’s National Security Adviser issued a stark warning about the worrisome state of America’s military and advised Congress to act quickly to rebuild and modernize the U.S. military: “The aging of the inventories and equipment used by the services, the decline in the size of the Navy, escalating personnel entitlements, overhead and procurement costs, and the growing stress on the force means that a train wreck is coming in the areas of personnel, acquisition, and force structure.” Meeting the military’s full modernization requirements will “require a substantial and immediate additional investment that is sustained through the long term.” However, the price of U.S. weakness will be greater in the long run.


 * Failure to effectively build a fleet undermines Navy capacity, power projection, and peaceful competition with China**


 * Cropsey ’10** [Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. He served as Naval Officer from 1985 to 2004 and as deputy senior under secretary of the Navy in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush, “The US Navy in Distress,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 34 No. 1, January 2010, pp. 43-44, @http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Cropsey_US_Navy_In_Distress.pdf, AZhang]

The United States faces several alternative naval futures. Failure to build a fleet that answers the nation’s enduring need for flexible maritime forces or reverse the effects of serious and sustained naval decline will produce a navy-lite, one that looks more and more like a coast guard. Forgetting the bond between effective maritime strategy and discouraging likely future challenges is certain to embolden and generate increasingly formidable naval competition: With continued effort China can shed its ‘near peer competitor’ status and become the real thing. The inability to re-consider fundamental assumptions about the shape of naval forces erodesone of the United States’ traditional strengths, a flexible concept of mari- time strategy as an essential element of national defense strategy. Failure to disci- pline the costs of building and maintaining naval forces, or to reduce a multiplying and largely unaccountable defense bureaucracy sentences the US combat fleet to either reduced size or capability – or both. The incapacity to identify affordable technologies foreshadows the end of the innovation and ingenuity that has charac- terized the American fleet since the post-Revolutionary War Navy built its first six over-size frigates that served effectively as capital ships from the western Atlantic to the central Mediterranean. All these pathologies result in a much diminished US Navy. All are grave. None is as debilitating as the Navy’s self-induced drift towards conceiving of itself as a coalition-organizing an d land-oriented deterrent to local conflict. This essentially con- tinentalist idea possesses strong attraction for the Defense Department’s flavour du jour: multi-lateralist approaches to land-based asymmetrical challenges. But it is a death knell for a globe-spanning, trans-oceanic, strategic maritime force as well as the idea of such a force upon which both supreme naval competence and public support depends. The late Samuel P. Huntington wrote in his famous article for the May 1954 issue of Proceedings, ‘If a service does not possess a well defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.’ A maritime strategy of deterrence through ‘thinking locally and acting globally’, as the oft-seen bumper sticker advocates, matches the sensibilities of most Western European populations today. It will never command the same respect and support as a strategy based on the nation’s need to protect against multiplying ballistic missile threats and seaborne WMD. Its silence about the dangers of China’s rising naval power is a strategic blunder as well as a lost opportunity to educate and gather public support. Maritime strategy that seeks lesser goals threatens irreparable damage to our alliances, prestige, and the international sys- tem that American policy has labored to create for the past century. The notion of using the Navy as a ‘global force for good’ – as the recruiting ad promises – isn’t bad and isn’t new. It could also be relatively inexpensive since building, renting, or buying small vessels linked to a mother ship and configured to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is cheap compared to the cost of combatants. But the humanitarian mission is subordinate to the United States’ greater strategic objectives. The global-force-for-good idea turns on its head the influence that maritime force – in the absence of traditional navy-to-navy struggles for sea con- trol – was supposed to exert over a strategic littoral area and transforms it into a kind of public diplomacy that seeks to shape public attitudes in potentially hostile regions by demonstrating American good will. In failing to marshal the domestic political support necessary to maintain a large, capable, robust maritime force,this approach will reduce the Navy to an instrument of coastal or perhaps hemispheric defense.This puts at risk the nation’s capacity to meet with confidence an increasingly fragmented strategic future. It shatters the perception of the United States as a great power. It calls into question our future ability to clear the seas of a potential enemy’s naval and merchant shipping at precisely the moment when a would-be great power, China, is constructing maritime forces that could resur- rect a naval contest of wills such as the one that withered when an essentially contin- ental power, the Soviet Union opposed an essentially maritime power, the United States.Identifying China as a potential naval competitor threatens neither the truth nor peace. There is no better assurance of continued peaceful competition with China than a maritime strategy that retains a powerful US combat fleet in the western Pacific.

__Solvency__

 * Contention Two is __Solvency__**

*Note: SST = short sea transportation, CCF = capital construction fund For more than a decade, Europe and the U.S. have witnessed increasing highway traffic congestion and considered the possible use of water transport as a highway supplement and alternative. The European Community has moved to embrace water transport for its container and ro/ro traffic using programs like the Marco Polo and Motorways of the Sea initiatives. In the U.S., there has been general agreement that our ocean coastal waters could provide additional transportation capacity and that a comprehensive federal program would be required to achieve it. But no such program has been initiated, and the multiple "choke points" and miles of bumper-to-bumper traffic that have characterized travel on major highways, such as I-95, I-10 and I-5, have simply grown more pronounced year by year. These issues remain unaddressed today. With the December 2007 enactment of the Marine Transportation sections of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (Act), Congress and the Bush Administration provided the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) with the authority for a European-style Motorways of the Sea program to facilitate federal and local government collaborations and attract public and private sector investment for short sea transportation infrastructure projects to access the potential of our nation's ocean highways. The Short Sea Transportation Program The Act directed the Secretary to establish a short sea transportation program (SST) to mitigate landside congestion and provide a favorable legal regime for public and private sector investment to create the infrastructure necessary for new coastwise and other domestic waterborne services. The program was intended to expand the use of the Great Lakes/Saint Lawrence Seaway System as well as inland, intracoastal and coastal waterways for the transportation of freight loaded in containers and trailers to mitigate landside congestion. Section 1121 mandated actions to create an environment that would foster federal, state and local cooperation in the planning and financing of shore-side infrastructure and attract private sector investment to finance vessel fleet requirements. The House version of Section 1122 addressed the need for U.S. government-assisted financing for the vessels that would be involved by extending the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) Capital Construction Fund’s (CCF) tax-deferral program to container and ro/ro services nationwide and authorizing $2 billion for MARAD’s Title XI loan guarantee program. Section 1123 mandated a report to be made not later than one year after the December 19, 2007 enactment to detail progress in the implementation of SST and provide recommendations for further administrative or legislative action as appropriate. Certain actions in the Act are mandated as "shall" while others are merely permitted as "may." The Act provides that the Secretary "shall establish a short sea transportation program and designate short sea transportation projects to be conducted under the program to mitigate landside congestion and encourage the use of short sea transportation through the development and expansion of: (1) documented vessels; (2) shipper utilization; (3) port and landside infrastructure; and (4) marine transportation strategies by state and local governments." In administering the program, the Secretary "shall": • Designate SST routes as extensions of the surface transportation system to focus public and private efforts to use the waterways to relieve landside congestion along coastal corridors; • Enter into memorandums of understanding with the heads of other federal entities to transport federally owned or generated cargo using program-designated SST projects when practical or available; • Consult with shippers and other participants in transportation logistics and develop proposals for short-term incentives to encourage the use of SST in consultation with federal entities and state and local governments; • Develop strategies to encourage the use of SST for passengers and cargo; • Assess the extent to which states and local governments include SST and other marine transportation solutions in their transportation planning, and encourage state departments of transportation to develop strategies, where appropriate, to incorporate SST, ferries, and other marine transportation solutions for regional and interstate transport of freight and passengers in their transportation planning; • Encourage groups of states and multi-state transportation entities to determine how SST can address congestion, bottlenecks, and other interstate transportation challenges; • Establish a board to identify and seek solutions to impediments hindering effective use of SST, with representatives of the Environmental Protection Agency and other federal, state, and local governmental entities and private sector entities; and • Issue temporary SST program regulations for the implementation of the SST program not later than 90 days after December 19, 2007, and to issue final regulations not later than October 1, 2008. MARAD was assigned responsibility for implementation of SST, which it renamed America's Marine Highway Program. Two Years Late and $2 Billion Short The report to Congress on the implementation of SST and any recommendations for further legislative or administrative action, which was due not later than December 19, 2008, was finally issued on April 5 of this year. It addresses the "shall" tasking assigned under Section 1121 point by point and confirms – without noting DOT’s failure to meet the mandated deadlines of March 18 and October 1, 2008 for the publication of regulations or the December 19, 2008 deadline for filing the report – that the congressionally assigned tasks have been completed or are otherwise well underway. The report's organization and content are explained in an Executive Summary which commences: "The first section of this report provides the justification for expanding the utilization of Marine Highway services. It describes the interests of the federal government in encouraging greater use of Marine Highways and, through the example of Europe, shows that government policy can be successful in achieving this result. An important point of this section is that the full range of public benefits of Marine Highways services will not be realized based solely on market-driven transportation choices." The report confirms the Secretary's apparent compliance with the Act's directions. In the Conclusion it acknowledges that: "The private sector will ultimately be the key to the success of America's Marine Highway through innovation, outreach and investment,” and goes on to state: "Without strong leadership from the federal government, however, the nation's rivers and coastal waterways will continue to be underutilized for domestic container and trailer freight transportation. It is difficult for private operators to support the scale of investment needed to initiate large-scale operations. Private operators are particularly disadvantaged by the fact that many of the important public benefits of water transportation. . . cannot be captured in the form of higher revenues or lower costs. . . . Government action is required to help overcome these challenges and assist the expansion of Marine Highway services in a significant manner." The report confirms the Secretary's apparent compliance with the Act's directions. In the Conclusion it acknowledges that: "The private sector will ultimately be the key to the success of America's Marine Highway through innovation, outreach and investment,” and goes on to state: "Without strong leadership from the federal government, however, the nation's rivers and coastal waterways will continue to be underutilized for domestic container and trailer freight ansportation. It is difficult for private operators to support the scale of investment needed to initiate large-scale operations. Private operators are particularly disadvantaged by the fact that many of the important public benefits of water transportation . . . cannot be captured in the form of higher revenues or lower costs. . . . Government action is required to help overcome these challenges and assist the expansion of Marine Highway services in a significant manner." But there are no "recommendations [to the Congress] for further legislative or administrative action that the Secretary of Transportation considers appropriate." Instead, the report provides only: "suggestions from the transportation community. . . which are under consideration by the Administration and thus not necessarily endorsed by MARAD, US DOT, or the Administration, that stakeholders say could induce increased waterborne freight traffic on America's Marine Highways." We are assured that MARAD will work to “incorporate America's Marine Highway more completely into the national transportation system . . . fund research and study the commercial market . . . [and] evaluate the outcomes of Marine Highway projects already underway . . . .” Where are the outlines of any MARAD process to address and prioritize the "suggestions from the transportation community," or of Administration support for the modification of the Harbor Maintenance Tax, or of support for a well-funded, multiyear MARAD Title XI program for the financing necessary for the creation of the container and ro/ro fleets of $150-to-$200 million vessels that will required to achieve SST’s objectives? One only need review the MARAD Administrator's FY 2012 budget testimony on March 1 and the March 10 testimony of the Secretary to understand that there will be no America's Marine Highway Program. Instead of a request for some portion or all of the Act's authorization of $2 billion for Title XI vessel financing, the MARAD Administrator requested the cancellation of $54.1 million of the $76.6 million of its existing Title XI authority "because the maritime industry must share in the national sacrifice during these challenging economic times." And while the Secretary spoke of multibillion-dollar investments for six-year authorizations in high-speed rail, road and bridge improvements, and rehabilitation of existing transit systems, the entire MARAD operating budget request was only $357.8 million. So we have a delayed December 2008 report to Congress, delivered in April 2011, and not much else. End of the Highway? From discussions too numerous to count over the past dozen years, it is clear that two of the most important impediments to the initiation of coastwise blue water services have been (1) the absence of the two federal support programs that have proven essential to the financing of the nation's existing blue water container and ro/ro fleets in prior decades, and (2) the imposition of the Harbor Maintenance Tax. Financing the multiple vessel commitments to meet the service frequencies that will be needed to attract cargoes from interstate highways to coastal waterways will almost certainly require federal assistance. The congressional sponsors of the Act were mindful of this need, which is why the original versions of the Act, as reported by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and later passed by the House, provided access to two important MARAD financing assistance programs: the Title XI loan guarantee program, authorizing $2 billion of new financing, and the CCF tax deferral program, extending these deferrals to SST project use. These programs, which enable vessel owners to obtain long-term commercial financing and purchase vessels with tax-deferred dollars over periods of up to 25 years, have been used in combination in the financing of virtually all of the container and ro/ro vessels in current U.S. domestic service. The final version of the Act does not provide additional Title XI authorization but does extend CCF program availability. The CCF extension to coastwise services has been a long-time maritime community objective. The extension was included in congressional initiatives in the 1990s, in the SEA 21 congestion mitigation proposals in 2002, and in congressionally sponsored legislation in 2003. The CCF program is made up of individual tax deferrals based on MARAD contracts; its extension has already become effective for existing MARAD contract holders and should be available upon application and approval for others. The availability of Title XI 25-year term debt is of equal transaction importance. The two programs are complementary and designed for joint use. Title XI or similar debt financing support will be necessary for meaningful SST developments. Title XI program opponents have called it a "corporate subsidy." But, in fact, it is simply "mortgage insurance," as it was termed in its 1938 enactment, that is being purchased by the vessel owner and included as a transaction cost.
 * A comprehensive federal expansion of Title XI loan guarantees mitigates congestion and creates conditions favorable for private investment – the plan reverse the only barrier to short sea transportation**
 * Cook, 11** — former General Counsel of the Maritime Administration, Counsel to Seward and Kissel LLP (H. Clayton, “Dead in the Water”, Maritime Executive, 7/8/2012, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/dead-in-the-water, Deech)

The private sector most always is the innovator and principle investor in new vessels. However, one of the challenges for vessel operators, especially new marketentrants, is the high cost of getting their designs for more efficient vessels constructed or to finance innovations in fuel and “green” technologies. What can thefederal government do to help stimulate those investments and a shift to greener vessels? Creating demand for water-borne transportation should be the firstpriority, as it effectively serves an incentive for vessel owners to build new ships, as well as providing incentives for the ports themselves. With increaseddemand, capacity will follow. And as we build new ships, they will meet or exceed today’s emissions standards, making them far more environmentallysustainable than our current fleet of older ships. Incentives for cargo owners and surface transportation service providers can be aimed at inducing the redirection of freight and passengers that better utilizes the excess capacity of our Marine Highways. We are looking at potential incentives that do this while we continue traditional programs, like Title XI loan guarantees, to help remove barriers to new vessel acquisition. Additionally, in 2007, Marine Highway vessel owners became eligible to utilize Capital Construction Funds for vessel construction, which also helps make new vessels more affordable. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 also directs the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency, to conductresearch on the environmental benefits of Marine Highways, including research on new technology and vessel designs. The goal is to reduce emissions, improve energy efficiency and lower transportation costs. While no specific funding has been provided to conduct this research, the Maritime Administration isincorporating Marine Highways into its overall research and development strategy and will make the most of existing resources and research relationships to advance this very important component of the Marine Highway
 * And, solely private sector action is insufficient – high startup costs make external incentives critical**
 * McCormick, 10** [Strengthening US Government US Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood addressed the recent National Port Summit in San Diego. Wayne McCormick, of America’s Marine Highways, conducted the following interviewSupport of Marine Highways, http://americasmarinehighways.com/userfiles/Inland%20Port%20Mag%20-%20LaHood%20%282%29.pdf]

A loan guarantee is not the same as a federal grant. Rather, it means the federal government will assign a loan-loss reserve to guarantee that the bank makingthe loan or mortgage for ship building will have a solvent debtor should the ship owner default.It reduces the risk to the lender, and is an essential element to attracting financial backing. The U.S. Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) Title XI programwas the backbone of loan guarantees for ship builders. The program, decades old, was designed to ensure the United States had sufficient ships for a war-time emergency. The Bush Administration stopped new funding for shipbuilding, citing waste and some defaults in the program. While influential lawmakers from both parties expressed support of Title XI, Republican Senator John McCain came out in support of the president’s plan, and led successful efforts in the Senate to oppose new shipbuilding funds. McCain, who chaired the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,[i] which had partial oversight of Title XI, questioned the relevance of the program in support of national security during a 2003 debate on a supplemental budget proposal bill in the U.S. Senate. “This funding is simply not justified as part of an emergency supplemental to fund the ongoing war,” McCain said in an April 3, 2003, speech on the Senate floor. “The Title XI program does not serve any defense or homeland security purpose and it should not receive funding under the guise of a wartime need.” McCain described Title XI as “riddled with problems.” And in fairness to the Arizona senator, there have been loan defaults related to the program. Some of these defaults, however, occurred due to the intervention of members of Congress who overrode MARAD staff on behalf of projects that should never have been funded. Which is to say, the problem wasn’t always with Title XI, but with Congress itself. Former Rep. Helen Bentley (R-Maryland) expressed such a sentiment during a House Transportation Committee hearing on short sea shipping in February, 2007. Bentley, a chair of the Federal Maritime Commission under former President Richard Nixon and a long-time advocate for the U.S. maritime industry, blamed “members of Congress” for some of the loan default problems with Title XI. When her comments, which were made as an aside to another witness, were reported during the hearing, there was no rebuttal. In a recent interview, Mark Schlefer, a retired Washington, D.C., maritime attorney and an authority on Title XI, also recalled that problems with the program surfaced with passenger ships that he says should never have been built. Congressional meddling, Schlefer agrees, undermined the program. Schlefer not only calls for the re-authorization of Title XI funding, but for reforming the program to remove obstacles to new participants and start-up companies that hope to build ships.
 * And, the plan reduces risk and creates the financial backing necessary for short sea shipping**
 * Margaronis, 08** [Green Ships Can Fight Global Warming, president of California-based Santa Maria Shipowning & Trading Inc, p. online document retrieved via a google download, full text email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com]

Opportunities A successful short sea shipping program offers an opportunity to add value to a national or international transportation network and, thus, increase theaffected economy’s efficiency and ultimately the societal standard of living. These benefits will accrue when the short sea shipping program addresses the myriad issues inherent in the transportation infrastructure network. U.S. Domestic Market The characteristics found in the transportation network for the U.S. domestic market are similar to that of other domestic markets found in nations with advanced economies as well as in the international transportation networks where at least one member nation has an advanced economy. Most developed nations rely on a national highway system to carry cargo. Due to the fact that annual freight movement increases far surpass that of annual highway mileage construction, highway congestion has become a significant problem. Highway congestion is apparent in terms of the increased travel time necessary to make a journey. Highway travel time also increases the social welfare cost due to resultant inefficiencies. Freight movement inefficiencies are projected to increase dramatically as US highways “. . . experienced a doubling of vehicle miles traveled in the past twenty years while the total highway mileage has only increased by 1%.”[11] This general trend is expected to continue. Most nations rely on a cabotage policy. In the United States, the Jones Act requires all vessels operating between US ports to be domestically built, owned, operated, and staffed. Many privately owned domestic shipyards in the United States operate with high cost structures, thus building vessels that are not always competitively priced. An extensive domestic short sea shipping network will require a tremendous fleet build-up and the shipyard costs ofconstruction will be a competitive issue. In addition to vessel construction costs, short sea shipping is dependent on achieving a competitive cost structure to vie with trucking and rail for the shippers’ contracts. One cost consideration is the requisite upgrading of port and terminal facilities currently geared for deep sea merchant vessels; not the needs of smaller short sea shipping vessels. Longshore labor rates are another factor that may cause increased costs for cargo shipped via short sea vessels. Further, the Harbor Maintenance Tax, as currently configured, will add to the cargo transportation costs for shippers selecting the short sea network. The tax is an ad valorem charge on exports, imports, other shipments, and passenger transportation involving use of a harbor. Finally, as in all development projects, standards in the early stage have yet to emerge. Revenue and cost projections dominate data developed based upon actual experience. Strategic decision making is guided by modeling and forecasting rather than short sea shipping experience. Competitive advantages may possibly accrue to those successful organizations that first develop short sea shipping as a commercially viable enterprise and enter the various market segments. However, the firms that are the first in the market may enjoy potentially high rewards; but correspondingly high risks. If they are unsuccessful they may potentially push their organizations into bankruptcy. MARAD has taken the lead public policy role and dedicated substantial effort during approximately the past three years to understand and educate key personnel in the transportation sector about the short sea shipping potential. The government agency hosted its second annual Short Sea Shipping Conference during November 2003 to advance the discussion by interested transportation and maritime executives, governmental officials and foreign dignitaries. The Conference included a breakout session, “Obstacles and Solution Strategies for Effective Short Sea Shipping (SSS) in the Western Hemisphere.” The objective of the session was to identify and propose specific solutions to the major obstacles impeding SSS implementation and growth along coastal routes, between coastal ports, along navigable rivers and across the Great Lakes. Participants represented consulting groups; engineering/design firms; federal, state and local government agencies; port authorities; shippers; shipyards; terminal operators; and vessel operators. Their candid remarks contributed greatly to the discussion that took place. Three obstacles were identified and discussed[12] during the session: Obstacle #1: A Lack of Awareness. The session participants suggested that three equally important and critical activities will build awareness. Increased coordination and prioritization are needed among local, state and provincial authorities in Canada, Mexico and the United States. A greater understanding of the complementary interests and relationships among the various transportation nodes is needed. Further, increased knowledge aboutthe costs of short sea shipping is needed. Participants recommended that increased education and outreach to governmental leaders, organized labor, and the general public were essential as well as increased participation in shipper organizations to make short sea shipping’s beneficial aspects known. Advocacy, R&D, outreach materials and research study cost categories were identified. Obstacle #2: The Need for Competitive Shoreside and Port Capital Costs. Four equally weighted solutions were recommended to overcome this obstacle: 1) identification of short sea shipping costs and assessment of these costs in relation to other transportation modes; 2) reduction of both operational costs and the Harbor Maintenance Tax burden; 3) public and/or private investment for shoreside infrastructure; and 4) extension of loan guarantees. The expected benefit would be to reduce costs to make short sea shipping competitive with alternative transportation modes. R&D and tax policy cost categories were identified. Obstacle #3: Increased Public Funding Needed to Complement Private Investment. A series of four equally important recommendations were offered: 1) gain initial support for vessel construction; 2) secure funding for start-up costs; 3) receive funding for inland waterway and landside improvements; and 4) use existing Harbor Maintenance Tax infrastructure fund balances to support short sea shipping initiatives. Expected benefits include public transportationimprovements, highway congestion relief,environmental and health and welfare benefits and the growth in the short sea shipping industry with a commensurate increase in employment. Vessel, start-up, facility and infrastructure cost categories were identified.
 * And, that heightens the resiliency of the transportation network – a secure federal funding stream ensures adequate coordination**
 * Lombardo, 04** [Short Sea Shipping: Practices, Opportunities and Challenges[1] Written by Gary A. Lombardo, Ph.D.[2] Prepared by TransportGistics, Inc, http://www.insourceaudit.com/WhitePapers/Short_Sea_Shipping.asp]

As our road and rail networks have become increasingly congested and near maximum capacity, we must look to the inland waterway system as a solution.12 The inland waterway system provides an alternative to overland transportation, reducing congestion plaguing existing road and rail infrastructure. Inland waterways account for approximately 11% of total domestic freight (as measured in ton-miles), third behind road and rail.13 Principal commodity groups include coal, petroleum, farm products, chemicals and crude materials such as aggregates for construction and other minerals. Total volume ranges around 630 million tons annually, and about 300 million ton-miles. Coal is used to generate over half the electricity produced in the U.S. and the inland waterways transport about 20% of this energy source.14 The Mississippi River System is the most important commercial navigation corridor, consisting of the Mississippi River and its multiple connecting tributaries. The majority of U.S. navigable rivers and canals are in the eastern half of the country. The Columbia, Sacramento, and San Joaquin Rivers are the only major navigable rivers on the West Coast. The Department of the Army, with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as its executive agent, has statutory responsibility for operating and maintaining all U.S. navigable waterways, excluding the Saint Lawrence Seaway. The Corps maintains more than 12,000 miles of inland waterways, owning or operating 196 commercially active lock sites with 241 lock chambers for the federal government. These waterways integrate a system of rivers, lakes, and coastal bays improved for commercial and recreational transport. Locks provide the essential infrastructure that allow tows to “stairstep” their way through the system and reach distant inland ports such as Minneapolis, Chicago, and Pittsburgh.15 Most of the locks supporting the inland waterway system are antiquated and in need of repair, expansion, and modernization. Many of the Corps-owned or operated locks are well past their planned design life of 50 years. Of the locks still in use in the United States, 30 were built in the 19th Century and another 92 locks are more than 60 years old.16 Nearly 50% of all Corps-maintained locks were considered to be functionally obsolete by the beginning of 2005. Assuming no new locks are built in the next 20 years, by 2020, another 93 existing locks will be obsolete. This means that 80 percent of locks now in service are beyond their planned design life, casting doubt of the reliability of the system as a whole. The physical condition of the inland waterway infrastructure recently received a grade of D- from the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) in their 2005 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, released in March 2005.17 The report highlights the concern that lock condition is declining at the same time waterway usage is increasing. This is a significant challenge facing the inland waterway system, indicative of problems facing other industry sectors as well, casting doubt on the future viability of our national freight transportation system. Historically, the transportation infrastructure of the United States has allowed this country to become the world economic powerhouse it is today by providing a high quality, inexpensive, and expansive network of roads, bridges, rails, inland waterways, and ports.18 This expansive system requires full integration of all transportation modes through an efficient national intermodal network. Intermodal freight transportation defines the transit of cargo through two or more modes from origin to its final destination. As the U.S freight transportation system advances further into the 21st Century, the need for managing the demand on the system and monitoring the volume of freight handled by each transportation mode becomes more critical.19 Each mode contributes to meet strategic freight transportation requirements, improving the efficiency of the U.S. national economy holistically. Individual industries offer unique capabilities historically preferable to various commodity shippers; however, advances in technology and operating procedures now open opportunities for more flexible origin to destination transportation planning. Adopting a more balanced approach among transport modes should be a national objective, potentially leading to increased throughput and lower costs to shippers and potential customers. Transportation infrastructuresupports our national security as well as our economy. The Defense Transportation System (DTS) is an integral part of the U.S. national transportation system. Close coordination among a wide variety of military and federal agencies is essential to meeting national wartime or contingency transportation requirements. The U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides the process for Defense Department (DOD) global transportation management. This process establishes an integrated transportation system that is used across the range of military operations, providing the most effective use of all transportation modes from origin to destination.20 In 2003 the Secretary of Defense designated USTRANSCOM the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). As the DPO, USTRANSCOM develops and directs the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to globally project national security capabilities.21 Future distribution requirements are not limited to contingency operations in distant lands. The Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative is a distribution initiative that contributes to logistics transformation. This concept identifies use of a transportation coordinator to integrate and synchronize movement of freight within the continental United States.22 This coordinator leverages the entire transportation industry, streamlining the process of moving a variety of DOD cargo. In 2005, USTRANSCOM’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) synchronized 212 vessel operations and the related land movement by truck, rail, and barge in support of DOD operations worldwide, moving over 22,239,700 square feet of unit cargo.23 Since USTRANSCOM works with a variety of commercial assets, services, and systems, it must continually grow the partnership with industry to incorporate current technology, anticipate trends, and develop future capabilities.24
 * And, marine infrastructure is key – other networks have reached maximum capacity – ineffective coordination precipitates wider congestion**
 * Jackson, 07** [LEVERAGING THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE U.S. INLAND WATERWAY SYSTEM, Colonel Donald E. Jackson, Jr. United States Army Professor John F. Troxell Project Adviser, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0K7n92gvqk0J:www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD%3DADA469583+&hl=en&gl=us]

In order to be an effective and reliable link in the transportation network, the inland waterway systemrequires adequate and consistent funding toremain a reliable mode of transport.Unlike road and rail, however, funding for new construction, operations, and maintenance (O&M) is shared by thefederal government and commercial inland waterway users. The federal government continues to invest in navigation because of its benefit to the national economy. The distribution of cost between the federal government and the local project sponsor for waterways was established in the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986 (Public Law 99-662). The Act established cost-share requirements for inland waterway projects that result in greater financial and decision-making role for non-federal stakeholders. The federal government typically pays 100% of costs associated with feasibility studies and O&M expenses. The Inland Waterway Trust Fund (IWTF), created in 1978, pays half the cost of the construction and major rehabilitation costs for specified federal inland waterways projects. It receives money from a tax on fuel (currently set at 20 cents per gallon) on vessels engaged in commercial transportation on inland waterways.64 Typically, Congress appropriates funds from the federal general revenue fund (GR) as part of the annual process in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill to pay the other 50% of construction costs.65 Navigation industry groups argue that the current system makes a significant contribution to the national economy and that the aging infrastructure warrants increased investment by the federal government. The USDOT Framework advocates prioritizing timely operations and maintenance projects for inland waterways as a method of maintaining and preserving existing infrastructure.66 Some taxpayer advocacy groups, however, oppose even current levels of federal investment and argue for a greater share of the financial burden to be borne by the users of these facilities.67 A possible solution would be to share more of the cost of infrastructure repair with users of the system. The inland waterway system, for example, not only supports navigation but also provides a multitude of recreational opportunities as well as hydroelectric power generation for constituents within their respective watersheds. Currently this public service provides little to no revenue for waterway infrastructure maintenance or construction. Funding needed improvements in the waterway system is a national problem.68 Effective integration of the U.S. Inland Waterway System is key to expanding the capacity of the national freight transportation infrastructure. Through strategic examination of the entire intermodal transportation system, and a detailed look at the many factors inhibiting the inland waterways from being a preferred route for goods movement, we can determine the best method of integrating the inland waterways system, leveraging them into the nation’s current intermodal transportation system.69 Traditional methods of overland transport are not easily usurped by inland waterways. The U.S. Inland Waterway System has historically served to move large, bulk cargoes and suffers from recent bouts of unreliability. Decreasing reliability of inland waterways is a factor of increasing age and recent budget constraints that combine to result in increased downtime at commercial lock facilities, both scheduled and unscheduled. USACE reports lock unavailability time has more than doubled since the early 1990s from about 60,000 hours to over 120,000 hours annually. Shippers on inland waterways can generally prepare for scheduled lock maintenance; however, unscheduled lock downtime can seriously disrupt shipment schedules and contract commitments, leaving shippers scrambling for delivery alternatives typically at a much higher cost.70 Unfortunately, this trend is alarming to shippers and must be adequately addressed to leverage the capacity potential desperately needed to support national freight transportation requirements. The inland waterway system infrastructure requires some modernization and expansion to account forchanges in barge technology and capability. The current design and capacity of existing locks do not account for, or take advantage of, advances in barge operations.71 Lock delays attributed to waiting in line to use the lock are currently over 550,000 hours annually, translating into about $385 million in increased transportation costs.72 USACE reports that some modernization of the system has been taking place since the 1950s-mainly along the Ohio River-with enlargement or replacement of older 600-foot lock chambers with new 1200-foot facilities that will pass a 15-barge tow in a single lockage. Other principal high volume waterways-the Upper Mississippi, Tennessee, and Illinois Rivers, as well as the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway remain dominated by 600-foot lock chambers. One important trend improving the value and capability of the inland waterway system is the increase, especially since 2000, of container-on-barge transport. Containerization is increasing the adaptability of inland ports to transport large quantities of goods on barges never before thought possible. The European Federation of Inland Ports estimates that further growth in the container sector is likely and inland ports will continue their investment efforts in this field in order to further improve their position in the transport market.73 Containers can now hold non-traditional cargo such as liquids, perishable (using refrigeration) and non-perishable agricultural products, as well as bulk cargo such as minerals, petroleum, and others.74 Improved cargo security is an important benefit of containerization. Container on barge is highly developed in Europe.75 Containers are designed to be modular for easy interchange among transportation modes, allowing cargoes to be moved by the combination of ship, rail, and truck that best meets the needs of shippers and receivers.76 Containers can hold more when transported by barge since they are not held to same weight limitations as overland transport. Every container transported by barge means one less truck on the highway. Container-onbarge operations save fuel, ease congestion on roads, and can haul hazardous materials or other cargo not suitable for transport through large population centers. Barges facilitate military deployment, moving unit containers and vehicles in a secure manner preventing pilferage and equipment damage associated with fast moving and relatively unguarded transport. Inland waterways are positioned to take some of the lower to moderate value container traffic off the even more congested roadways. The Columbia-Snake River system already has significant container-on-barge traffic, and similar services are growing along the Gulf Intra-coastal and North Atlantic ports.77
 * And, put away your process and funding counterplans – consistent funding and a net increase are required to generate new capacity**
 * Jackson, 07** [LEVERAGING THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE U.S. INLAND WATERWAY SYSTEM, Colonel Donald E. Jackson, Jr. United States Army Professor John F. Troxell Project Adviser, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0K7n92gvqk0J:www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD%3DADA469583+&hl=en&gl=us]

The Dual-Use Vessel Program and Americas Marine Highway Next Steps, http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/the-dual-use-vessel-program-and-america-s-marine-highway-next-steps] “Short Sea Shipping” and AMH A MarAdand Department of Transportation (DOT) “short sea shipping" program was announced by Maritime Administrator William Schubert in 2002 and discussed at length in his FY 2003 authorization testimony. The program was rechristened "America's Marine Highways" by Maritime Administrator Sean Connaughton. Congress addressed these short sea shipping issues in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which contained provisions establishing a formal marine highway program within the federal government and charged DOT with responsibility for implementation and administration. DOT received a broadgrant of authority for federal action and forfederal and local governmentcollaboration in order to attract public and private sector projects to access the nation’s “ocean highways,” including the authority for European-style Marco Polo and Motorways of the Sea programs. The merits of these initiatives to “move traffic from our highways to our waterways” were obvious. The House version of the 2007 Act addressed the need for U.S. government-assisted financing for the required vessels by extending the CCF tax-deferral program to ro/ro and container services nationwide and authorizing $2 billion for short sea transportation use from the Title XI loan guarantee program. As the 2007 Act was enacted, it included the CCF program extension but not the $2 billion authorization for Title XI financing. Furthermore, it did not remove the 1986 Treasury initiatives that had been designed to curtail CCF program use and diminish its value. No initial funding was provided for implementation of the 2007 Act’s grants of authority, and only limited funding has since been available. However, MarAd moved ahead in designating Marine Corridors and Connectors and providing Marine Highway Grants and entering into Marine Highway Cooperative Agreements. Most importantly, as funds have become available MarAd has worked with the Navy to coordinate AMH and DUV program objectives. Prescription for Progress The principal issues of shipyard construction are apparently agreed on the basis of the 2007 and 2008 Workshop recommendations and the Design Report assumptions. The potential for Title XI and CCF programs to reduce fully financed costs is apparently agreed as tabled during the 2008 Workshop, subject to the removal of the 1986 tax barriers to CCF program use. With the Design Report in hand and two additional corridor studies due in May, MarAd and the Navy appear well on their way to achieving the Navy’s 2005 Senior Executive Sealift Forum objective of learning “what it will require to induce U.S. shippers and ship operators to move cargo and operate U.S.-flag ships, respectively, that will have military utility and be available for military use during a major contingency.” The next step will be to obtain Office of Management and Budget approval for a series of legislative initiatives to include the following: 1. Repeal of the Harbor Maintenance Tax as applied to AMH services; 2. Repeal of the Treasury’s 1986 CCF limitations enactments (returning that program to the form in which it was originally enacted); 3. Modification of the tonnage tax to allow its application on a strictly days-in-service foreign vs. domestic basis (returning the tonnage tax to the form in which it was originally drafted); 4. Authorization of a multiyear federal financing guarantee program that was a part of the House-passed version of the 2007 Act, backed by some form of multiyear appropriations funding; and 5. Authorization for a specific European-style Marco Polo program to mitigate start-up risks. With industry support, congressional approval of such legislation appears achievable. And with these changes made it may be possible to initiate one or more AMH services with relatively modest forms of government start-up assistance.
 * No link uniqueness**
 * Cook, 12**** [H. Clayton Cook, Esq. has been involved with Jones Act issues for more than 40 years and served as General Counsel of the Maritime Administration from 1970-1973. He is currently Counsel to Seward & Kissel LLP in Washington, DC.

=__Negative__=

__Practice Debate 2NRs__
__**NIB - Meyer and Bobby**__ TIFIA CP and Jackson Vanik DA

__**NIB - Andrew L and Sumon**__ Jackson Vanik DA and case

__**CCS - Fran and MGD**__ T - Pipelines

__**NIB - Paula Z and Daniela**__ Capitalism K

__**CCS - Fran and MGD**__ T - Pipelines

__**Title XI - Neil and Alex**__ Capitalism K

__**Dredging - Ken and Corinne**__ States CP and Jackson Vanik DA

__**Title XI - Neil and Alex**__ Shipbuilding/Navy Adv CP and Russia Oil DA

__**New Orleans - Brian and Paula C**__ Jackson Vanik DA and case

__**Alaska Ports - Jon and Ben M**__ Alaska CP and Jackson Vanik DA

__Tournament 2NRs__
__**AIP - BT Evan and Jonathan**__ T - Grants

__**CCS - Miranda and Eigen**__ Cybersecurity and case

T - Loan Guarantees
 * __Title XI - Greyson and Reid__**

__**NIB - Caliswag and Ryan**__ Cap K 2AR was condo