Lewis+and+Libby

Afghanistan- Hegemony and Insurgency


 * The United States federal government should substantially reduce military presence assigned to the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan.**

**1ac – Losing the war**

Q1: General McChrystal....approach would entail.
 * The counterinsurgency mission will fail for multiple reasons – there is no chance of meeting the deadline**
 * Nelson, 9** – former director of a Joint Task Force in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, retired naval officer with assignments at the National Counterterrorism Center and National Security Council, and Senior Fellow at the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Rick, “The Other Side of the COIN”, 10/1, http://csis.org/publication/other-side-coin)

**Dorronsoro, 10** - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes (Gilles, “The Case for Negotiations,” In These Times, 5/24, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40863 The coalition's strategy in Afghanistan....a negotiated settlement.
 * Cross border sanctuaries, government corruption, ethnic tensions within the Afghan army and the utter failure of population protection makes failure inevitable**

**Hallinan, 10** -columnist for foreign policy in focus (7/22/10, Conn, “The Great Myth: Counterinsurgency,” "|http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_great_myth_counterinsurgency) When it was launched in March.... commander General Stanley McChrystal.
 * Security exists only in 5 of 116 areas in Afghanistan and the Taliban is spreading despite Obama’s surge – the problem is COIN itself**

**Galston 10 -** Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ Brookings (William, Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ Brookings, “A Question of Life and Death: U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” Brookings, June 15th, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0615_afghanistan_galston.aspx) Are the basic premises of our .... political force in Afghanistan.
 * A large military footprint combined with the perception of an illegitimate government make crushing the Taliban impossible – it can recruit faster than we can kill**

**Stewart, 10** - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3) The counterinsurgency strategy... its political structures.
 * Counterinsurgency failure inevitable – the mountainous terrain and impossible troop requirements mean the Taliban can hide forever**

**1ac – Hegemony**
 * The war in Afghanistan will collapse American primacy – 2 internal links:**

**Rogin, 10** - staff writer for Foreign Policy, Prior to that, Josh covered defense and foreign policy for Congressional Quarterly. Josh has also worked at the House International Relations Committee, and the Brookings Institution (Josh, “Petraeus: Withdrawal timeline does not mean "switching off the lights",” The Cable, 6/29, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switching_off_the_lights ) When General David Petraeus testifies... e xactly what they've been doing ."
 * First – credibility. Obama announced a July 2011 withdrawal date, but it is based on the conditional success of the counterinsurgency mission. This deadline is** **perceived** **as unconditional withdrawal and has created global confusion**

Obama's final decision in December offered ..., any of his other initiatives.
 * Failure will spillover to the entirety of US foreign policy and prevent Obama from exercising leadership**
 * Fernholz, 10** – writing fellow at the American Prospect and Research Fellow at the New America Foundation (Tim, The American Prospect, “The Ultimate Test Case,” March, 2010, lexis) **Katulis = security policy analyst at the Center for American Progress**

**Stewart, 10** - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3) But this moderate tone gains.... focus on Kashmir. 1
 * The plan restores US credibility – ending the counterinsurgency mission will salvage Obama’s Afghanistan policy and allow a sustainable presence**


 * Second –overstretch**

**Kretkowski, 10** – Frequently assists think tank in conferences and other work products that aid DoD's long-term thinking about threats that may not be addressable via weapons platforms. Spent six months in Afghanistan working with Army public affairs. (Paul, “Against COIN, for CT in Afghanistan and Elsewhere”, 1/7, Beacon (a blog), http://softpowerbeacon.blogspot.com/2010/01/against-coin-for-ct-in-afghanistan-and.html) Over the winter break... China, a reinvigorated Russia ).
 * COIN is overstretching the US military and exhausting American leadership – withdrawing to a counterterrorism strategy is vital to preventing great power challengers**

**Kuhner, 9 -** the president of the Edmund Burke Institute for American Renewal (Jeffrey, Washington Times, “Obama’s quagmire; US should look to its own interests,” 9/7, Lexis Academic) America is losing the war in Afghanistan.... welcoming arms of extremists.
 * Afghanistan is a quagmire of attrition warfare that is destroying US morale and readiness.**

**Pyne, 9 -** Vice Chair of the Utah State Legislative Compensation Commission and Vice President of the Association of the United States Army's Utah chapter and a Vice President of the Salt Lake Total Force Chapter of the Military Officers Association of America (David, “Obama failing our troops in Afghanistan,” 11/7, http://westernfrontamerica.com/2009/11/07/obama-failing-troops-afghanistan/) Since we invaded Iraq six... US-ally Georgia this past year.
 * This will obliterate American primacy**

A grand strategy based....due to the economic prosperity it provides. The best Afghan policy would 9.... long-term, less will be more
 * American primacy is vital to accessing every major impact—the only threat to world peace is if we allow it to collapse**
 * Thayer, 6 -** professor of security studies at Missouri State (Bradley, The National Interest, “In Defense of Primacy”, November/December, p. 32-37)
 * Reducing presence to just counterterrorism creates sustainable presence, and prevents vacillations between engagement and isolationism**
 * Stewart, 9-** Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan)

An effort to conduct "counterinsurgency"... capable of applying overwhelming force.
 * The plan causes a shift to selective engagement**
 * Gventer, 9** - Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. She served two tours in Iraq, including a year as a senior adviser to General Peter Chiarelli, the operational commander in Iraq in 2006 (Celeste, “False Promise of 'Counterinsurgency'”, 12/1, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/12/01/NYT.html)

**1ac – Insurgency**

**Akhtar, 10-** professor of international relations, and a senior analyst & writer. He was the dean of faculty of management, Baluchistan university, and former chairman of International Relations Department, Karachi university (1/26/10, Shameem, “Pakistan’s Instability : The US War Factor,” http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1262372328640&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs/MAELayout#**1)** If it is a war against extremists... thus destabilizing the state.
 * First – Pakistan. A large counterinsurgency footprint drives insurgents to Pakistan, mobilizes the Pakistani Taliban and will cause Pakistan to collapse**

But a suicide bomber in ... the situation. So should we all. Second – terrorism –
 * Pakistan collapse causes global nuclear conflict – draws in China, India and Russia**
 * Pitt, 9 - a** New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183 )

President Obama is asking world leaders... will be used in a terrorist attack" by 2013.
 * Risk of nuclear terrorism is high – probably an attack will come from al Qaeda by 2013**
 * Hall, 10** (Mimi, USA Today, “Obama seeks front against nuclear terror”, 4/12, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-11-nukesummit_N.htm

I spent five years as a counterterrorism ... physical space it can access.
 * Afghanistan is a vital safe haven for al Qaeda – terrorism is inevitable but nuclear risks can be reduced is the US drives them out**
 * Arkedis, 9** - director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute. He was a counterterrorism analyst with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service from 2002 to 2007 (Jim, “Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven”, 10/23, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven)

In a remarkable website... in a nuclear winter.
 * Nuclear terrorism causes extinction**
 * Morgan, 9 -** Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct)


 * 1ac – Solvency**

When the administration's principal.... deep-rooted military-mullah alliance.
 * Gradual withdrawal while maintaining a counterterrorism strategy allows more effective US leadership in the war on terror and maximizes US credibility**
 * Chellany, 09** - **p** rofessor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi (9/14/09, Brahma, Japan Times, “An Advantagous U.S. Exit,” http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090914bc.html)


 * A substantial drawdown to a purely counterterrorism presence will maximize US influence in Central Asia and contain instability and terrorism**
 * Simon, and Stevenson, 9** * adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, AND Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, (Steven and Jonathan, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, 51:5, 47 – 67, October 2009 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=7132409)

An effort on that scale would garner.... residual problem that it has, in fact, become.


 * Indicts of the counterterrorism option underestimate the size of what the plan leaves intact – it is sufficiently resourced to provide force protection, intelligence gathering, army training and will maintain the support of the local population**
 * Long, 10** - assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Austin, “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Spring 2010, Science Direct)

This insoluble problem is why.... counterterrorism deployment.

This three-zone strategy is not... the withdrawal.
 * Withdrawal of combat troops will immediately turn the population against the Taliban and shore up Afghan government legitimacy**
 * Dorronsoro,9 -**Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (January 2009, Gilles, “Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf)