Charlie+and+Joyce

Afghanistan - heg with credibility, overstretch, dollar heg and insurgency with terror, pakistan =1ac – plan=

PLAN: The United States federal government should substantially reduce military presence assigned to the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan.

//**Advantage I: Hegemony**//

//**The war in Afghanistan will collapse American primacy – 3 internal links:**//

//**First – credibility. Obama announced a July 2011 withdrawal date, but it is based on the conditional success of the counterinsurgency mission. This deadline is __perceived__ as unconditional withdrawal and has created global confusion**//

//**Rogin, 10** - staff writer for Foreign Policy, Prior to that, Josh covered defense and foreign policy for Congressional Quarterly. Josh has also worked at the House International Relations Committee, and the Brookings Institution (Josh, “Petraeus: Withdrawal timeline does not mean "switching off the lights",” The Cable, 6/29, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switching_off_the_lights)//

//When General David Petraeus testifies today on Capitol Hill, his main job will be to carefully define the timeline for the beginning of America's exit from Afghanistan, a timeline that has stakeholders in Washington and throughout the region confused and concerned.// //"As the President has stated, July 2011 is the point at which we will begin a transition phase in which the Afghan government will take more and more responsibility for its own security," Petraeus wrote in his advanced questions submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee and obtained by// The Cable//. "As the President has also indicated, July 2011 is not a date when we will be rapidly withdrawing our forces and -switching off the lights and closing the door behind us."// // His job will also be to defend President Obama's decision to set a public date for the beginning of the withdrawal in the first place, by arguing that having a time line in the public discussion helps pressure the Afghans to move faster toward being able to govern and secure their country on their own.// //"I believe there was value in sending a message of urgency -- July 2011... But it is important that July 2011 be seen for what it is: the date when a process begins, in which the reduction of US forces must be based on the conditions at the time, and not a date when the U.S. heads for the exits ," he wrote to the committee. He stressed that multiple times that the pace of the drawdown would be "conditions based." // //But even in his own writing to the committee, Petraeus acknowledged that the enemy, the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan, are waiting out the coalition and biding their time until foreign forces decide to leave.// //"Insurgent leaders view their tactical and operational losses in 2010 as inevitable and acceptable. The Taliban believe they can outlast the Coalition's will to fight and believe this strategy will be effective despite short-term losses. The Taliban also believe they can sustain momentum and maintain operational capacity," he wrote.// //One of the main enablers of any U.S. exit is the development of the Afghan National Security Forces, which has not gone at the pace the coalition had hoped. Petraeus wrote that he would review the situation of the ANSF within four months of assuming command, if confirmed.// //As of the latest review, only 5 out of 19 Afghan National Army brigades can function without a majority of their functions supported by the U.S., according to Petraeus, and only 2 out of 7 major headquarters can function properly without significant coalition support. As of June 27, there are 7,261 ANA troops in the city of Kandahar and 6,794 Afghan soldiers in Helmand province, Petraeus wrote.// //He also said that a comprehensive plan to reintegrate some Taliban fighters is under final review with President Hamid Karzai and "offers the potential to reduce violence and provide realistic avenues to assimilate Pashtun insurgents back into Afghanistan society."// Petraeus promised to take a look at the rules of engagement that U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan feel are tying their hands in the fight, but he didn't say whether he was leaning toward changing them or not. Meanwhile, confusion over the president's timeline persists both in Washington and abroad as interested parties try to interpret the July 2011 date in a way that serves their own political interests. //House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-CA, said Monday that there would be "a serious drawdown" next summer, seemingly getting ahead of the administration in an effort to appease the liberal wing of her caucus, which is threatening to not support more funding for the war.// //Two of the committee members Petraeus will face today, Sens. John McCain**,** R-AZ, and Lindsey Graham, R-SC, held a press conference Thursday to announce their opposition to setting any public date, no matter what the caveats.// // Foreign leaders are especially confused, particularly the Afghan and Pakistani governments, who see a difference between public promises of drawdowns and private assurances from the administration that the July 2011 date would not precipitate large scale troop reductions.// One high level diplomatic source said that Pakistani and Afghan leaders believe that they were told by National Security Advisor Jim Jones that there was not going to be a big withdrawal and the there would be "no reduction in commitment" in July 2011. But regardless of whether the administration sent mixed messages, the nuance of their time line policy has been misunderstood or ignored in the region, as various actors start to plan strategies with the expectation that U.S. troops are leaving. "In retrospect, despite all the caveats, it was a mistake to put such a date certain for the beginning of withdrawal ," said Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council. " The word beginning was lost and it strengthens the ability of different interests to hedge, which is exactly what they've been doing ."

=1ac - Hegemony=


 * Obama will sell the plan as a drawdown to a lighter but permanent commitment to Afghanistan – this resolves confusion over the withdrawal deadline and restores US credibility**
 * Stewart, 10** - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “ Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3)

But this moderate tone gains Obama the leverage that Bush lacked. As long as the US asserted that Afghanistan was an existential threat, the front line in the war on terror, and that, therefore, failure was not an option, the US had no leverage over Karzai. The worse Afghanistan behaved—the more drugs it grew and terrorists it fostered—the more money it received. If it sorted out its act, it risked being relegated to a minor charitable recipient like Tajikistan. A senior Afghan official warned me this year “to stop referring to us as a humanitarian crisis: we must be the number one terrorist threat in the world, because if we are not we won’t get any money.” By asserting convincingly that Afghanistan is not the be-all and end-all and that the US could always ultimately withdraw, Obama escapes this codependent trap and regains some leverage over the Afghan government. In his politer words: It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan. But perhaps even more importantly, defining a more moderate and limited strategy gives him leverage over his own generals. By refusing to endorse or use the language of counterinsurgency in the speech, he escapes their doctrinal logic. By no longer committing the US to defeating the Taliban or state-building, he dramatically reduces the objectives and the costs of the mission. By talking about costs, the fragility of public support, and other priorities, he reminds the generals why this surge must be the last. All of this serves to “cap” the troop increases at current levels and provide the justification for beginning to reduce numbers in 2011. But the brilliance of its moderate arguments cannot overcome that statement about withdrawal. With seven words, “our troops will begin to come home,” he loses leverage over the Taliban, as well as leverage he had gained over Karzai and the generals. It is a cautious, lawyerly statement, expressed again as “[we will] begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.” It sets no final exit date or numbers. But the Afghan students who were watching the speech with me ignored these nuances and saw it only as departure. This may be fatal for Obama’s ambition to “open the door” to the Taliban. The lighter, more political, and less but still robust militarized presence that his argument implies could facilitate a deal with the Taliban, if it appeared semi-permanent. As the President asserted, the Taliban are not that strong. They have nothing like the strength or appeal that they had in 1995. They cannot take the capital, let alone recapture the country. There is strong opposition to their presence, particularly in the center and the north of the country. Their only hope is to negotiate. But the Taliban need to acknowledge this. And the only way they will is if they believe that we are not going to allow the Kabul government to collapse. Afghanistan has been above all a project not of force but of patience. It would take decades before Afghanistan achieved the political cohesion, stability, wealth, government structures, or even basic education levels of Pakistan. A political settlement requires a reasonably strong permanent government. The best argument against the surge, therefore, was never that a US operation without an adequate Afghan government partner would be unable to defeat the Taliban—though it won’t. Nor that the attempt to strengthen the US campaign will intensify resistance, though it may. Nor because such a deployment of over 100,000 troops at a cost of perhaps $100 billion a year would be completely disproportional to the US ’s limited strategic interests and moral obligation in Afghanistan—though that too is true. Instead, Obama should not have requested more troops because doing so intensifies opposition to the war in the US and Europe and accelerates the pace of withdrawal demanded by political pressures at home. To keep domestic consent for a long engagement we need to limit troop numbers and in particular limit our casualties. The surge is a Mephistophelian bargain, in which the President has gained force but lost time. What can now be done to salvage the administration’s position? Obama has acquired leverage over the generals and some support from the public by making it clear that he will not increase troop strength further. He has gained leverage over Karzai by showing that he has options other than investing in Afghanistan. Now he needs to regain leverage over the Taliban by showing them that he is not about to abandon Afghanistan and that their best option is to negotiate. In short, he needs to follow his argument for a call strategy to its conclusion. The date of withdrawal should be recast as a time for reduction to a lighter, more sustainable, and more permanent presence. This is what the administration began to do in the days following the speech. As National Security Adviser General James Jones said, “That date is a ‘ramp’ rather than a cliff.” And as Hillary Clinton said in her congressional testimony on December 3, their real aim should be to “develop a long-term sustainable relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past, primarily our abandonment of that region.” A more realistic, affordable, and therefore sustainable presence would not make Afghanistan stable or predictable. It would be merely a small if necessary part of an Afghan political strategy. The US and its allies would only moderate, influence, and fund a strategy shaped and led by Afghans themselves. The aim would be to knit together different Afghan interests and allegiances sensitively enough to avoid alienating independent local groups, consistently enough to regain their trust, and robustly enough to restore the security and justice that Afghans demand and deserve from a national government. What would this look like in practice? Probably a mess. It might involve a tricky coalition of people we refer to, respectively, as Islamists, progressive civil society, terrorists, warlords, learned technocrats, and village chiefs. Under a notionally democratic constitutional structure, it could be a rickety experiment with systems that might, like Afghanistan’s neighbors, include strong elements of religious or military rule. There is no way to predict what the Taliban might become or what authority a national government in Kabul could regain. Civil war would remain a possibility. But an intelligent, long-term, and tolerant partnership with the United States could reduce the likelihood of civil war and increase the likelihood of a political settlement. This is hardly the stuff of sound bites and political slogans. But it would be better for everyone than boom and bust, surge and flight. With the right patient leadership, a political strategy could leave Afghanistan in twenty years’ time more prosperous, stable, and humane than it is today. That would be excellent for Afghans and good for the world. Meanwhile, Obama’s broader strategic argument must not be lost. He has grasped that the foreign policy of the president should not consist in a series of extravagant, brief, Manichaean battles, driven by exaggerated fears, grandiloquent promises, and fragile edifices of doctrine. Instead the foreign policy of a great power should be the responsible exercise of limited power and knowledge in concurrent situations of radical uncertainty. Obama, we may hope, will develop this elusive insight. And then it might become possible to find the right places in which to deploy the wealth, the courage, and the political capital of the U nited S tates. We might hope in South Asia, for example, for a lighter involvement in Afghanistan but a much greater focus on Kashmir .1

=1ac – Hegemony=


 * Second –overstretch**


 * Counterinsurgency doctrine is overstretching the US military and exhausting American leadership – withdrawing to a counterterrorism strategy is vital to preventing great power challengers**
 * Kretkowski, 10** – Frequently assists think tank in conferences and other work products that aid DoD's long-term thinking about threats that may not be addressable via weapons platforms. Spent six months in Afghanistan working with Army public affairs. (Paul, “Against COIN, for CT in Afghanistan and Elsewhere”, 1/7, Beacon (a blog), http://softpowerbeacon.blogspot.com/2010/01/against-coin-for-ct-in-afghanistan-and.html)

Over the winter break I had an epiphany about the interrelation of U.S. hard and soft power: I now oppose a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan and advocate a purely counterterror (CT) strategy (PDF link) there instead. Blame history—or histories—that I've read recently, starting with Livy's works on early Rome (books I-V) last spring and Donald Kagan's //The Peloponnesian War// at the end of 2009. I've taken occasional dips back into Robert Kaplan's //Warrior Politics// and his source materials (Churchill, the Federalists, Machiavelli, Sun Tzu, and several others). What I've taken from that reading is that the U.S. must pull back from its current efforts to remake Iraq and Afghanistan in the image of a Western democracy, or risk long-term political and economic exhaustion. What follows is not an argument about morality, and readers may find much of it amoral. It //is// about making cold-blooded political and economic calculations about where U.S. national interests will lie in the next decade. They do not lie in an open-ended COIN mission. The history of the Peloponnesian War is particularly relevant here. Athens began fighting Sparta with the resources of an empire and thousands of talents of silver in the bank—enough to fight expensive, far-flung naval and land campaigns for three years without lasting financial consequences. Athens was //rich//, and if peace with Sparta had come by the end of the third year, Athens would have continued to prosper and rule over much of the Mediterranean. (Athens had a "hard"—conquered or cowed—empire as opposed to the "soft" empire of alliances and treaties the U.S. currently has.) But the war with Sparta dragged on for decades, despite occasional peace overtures by both sides. By war's end—despite the spoils of battle and increased taxes and tribute extracted from its shrinking dominion—Athens was broke, depopulated by fighting and plague, bereft of its empire, and could no longer project power into the Mediterranean. Where its former interests ranged from Black Sea Turkey to southern Italy, it spent decades as a small-bore power and never regained its former strength or influence. I worry that the U.S. is similarly locked into an open-ended commitment to democratize a nation that is of regional rather than global importance—a parallel to Athens convincing itself that it had to conquer distant, militarily insignificant Sicily. The U.S. could "win" in Afghanistan where victory is defined as a stable, legitimate central government that can project power within its own borders. I don't doubt that the U.S. and its allies could accomplish this given enough time and resources. But I think—as many COIN experts also do—that it will take at least another decade or more of blood and treasure to produce such a result, if ever. Of course I'd like to see the results of a successful COIN campaign: a stable democracy, women's rights, and general prosperity for Afghans, who among all Asia's peoples surely deserve those things. I certainly want to end al-Qa'ida's ability to operate freely in South Asia and elsewhere. The U.S. is the only country that would both conceive of these missions and attempt to carry them out. But goals beyond keeping al-Qa'ida on the run don't serve the long-term interests of the U.S., and I am more interested in regaining and preserving U.S. hard power than I am in the rewards that would come from "winning" a lengthy COIN war. I fear the U.S. people and government becoming exhausted from the costs of a lengthy COIN effort, just as they are already exhausted from (and have largely forgotten about) the Iraq war. I worry that if this fatigue sits in, the U.S. will abandon foreign-policy leadership as it has done periodically throughout history. This outcome would be worse than a resurgent Taliban, worse than Afghan women and men being further oppressed, and worse than al-Qa'ida having plentiful additional caves to plot in. Here are some signs of an exhaustion of U.S. power: The U.S. is already overextended, with commitments in Iraq (shrinking for now), Afghanistan (expanding), Yemen (pending) and Iran (TBD). At home, the U.S. economy remains feeble and in the long term is increasingly hostage to other nations for goods and services it no longer produces (and increasingly, no longer //can// produce). Even more worrisome is the U.S. credit situation. The wars, and much other U.S. government spending, are now heavily underwritten by other countries' purchases of debt the U.S. issues. It has borrowed trillions from foreign countries and especially China, which continues its steady, highly rational policy of promoting exports while freeriding under the American security umbrella (just as the U.S. once rode for free beneath Britain's). Over time, those countries accrue enough debt to have a say in U.S. policies that may threaten the dollar's value, which is why you now see high U.S. officials flying to Beijing to soothe PRC nerves and explain why America keeps borrowing money. At home, there are few resources to apply following a major disaster, such as a Katrina-style hurricane or a major earthquake. The U.S. needs to start rebuilding its reserves—of capital, of credit, of political goodwill abroad, of military force—to be ready for these and more serious crises, for which we currently have few resources to spare. Such challenges may involve humanitarian crises (think Darfur, a Rwanda-style genocide, Indian Ocean tsunamis); Latin American instability (Mexico, Venezuela, post-Castro Cuba); rogue-state nuclear development (Iran, North Korea); or complex challenges from a rising power (China, a reinvigorated Russia ).
 * "Winning" in Afghanistan**

=1ac – Hegemony=


 * This will obliterate American primacy**
 * Pyne, 9 -** Vice Chair of the Utah State Legislative Compensation Commission and Vice President of the Association of the United States Army's Utah chapter and a Vice President of the Salt Lake Total Force Chapter of the Military Officers Association of America (David, “ Obama failing our troops in Afghanistan,” 11/7, http://westernfrontamerica.com/2009/11/07/obama-failing-troops-afghanistan/)

Since we invaded Iraq six and a half years ago and Afghanistan eight years ago, we have lost nearly 7,000 American soldiers and contractors killed in action with tens of thousands more severely wounded at the cost of a trillion dollars thus far. October has been the single deadliest month for US forces since the war began. It shouldn’t take a military strategist to realize that after fighting a war for over eight years without any real idea how to win, it might be time to consider a drastic change in strategy. This should include a sober assessment of the cost/benefit analysis of staying and fighting at a rising cost in American blood and treasure versus conserving our military strength and bringing our troops home to defend America from terrorist attack. The Soviets fought an eight year long war in Afghanistan before finally realizing that victory was not a possibility in a conflict which some say began a chain of events that resulted in the collapse of the Evil Empire thanks to Reagan’s support of proxy forces against the Soviet invaders. If the Soviet Union could not win after eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, what makes our leaders think that we can? The longer we keep large numbers of our troops fighting no-win counterinsurgency wars of attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan, the weaker and more vulnerable we will become to the point where eventually the American Empire, as some call it, may decline precipitously or perhaps even collapse altogether. Worse yet, America’s increasing military weakness highlighted further by Obama’s ongoing demolition of our nuclear deterrent might invite a catastrophic attack from our from our Sino-Russian alliance enemies. Already some of our retired generals have stated that they believe our Army and Marine Corps ground forces have been broken by their over-deployment in the desert sands of Iraq and Afghanistan. If the Soviet Union could not win after eight years of fighting in Afghanistan, what makes our leaders think that we can? The longer we keep large numbers of our troops bogged down fighting two no-win counterinsurgency wars of attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan, the weaker and more vulnerable we will become to the point where eventually the American Empire, as some call it, may decline precipitously or perhaps even collapse altogether. Worse yet, America’s increasing military weakness highlighted further by Obama’s ongoing demolition of our nuclear deterrent, might invite a catastrophic attack from our from our Sino-Russian alliance enemies. Already some of our retired generals have stated that they believe our Army and Marine Corps ground forces have been broken by their over-deployment in the desert sands of Iraq and Afghanistan. This high tempo of deployments has resulted in much of our military equipment to break down while procurement and readiness are at their lowest levels over the past quarter century. Our national security always suffers when we get bogged down in wars where our troops are asked to bleed and die, but are not permitted by our political leaders to win. Our brave soldiers should never be allowed to sacrifice in this way without the hope of victory! The best way to support our troops is to bring them home to their families and make a commitment that we will not let a week go by without thanking a soldier for their willingness to risk life and limb to defend us all. What is it going to take to get our political leaders to realize that the costs of staying and fighting the long war in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly outweigh the costs of redeploying out of theater? The same voices we hear calling for us to send another 40,000 to 100,000 troops to Afghanistan are the ones that would have called for us to keep surging and fighting in Vietnam in perpetuity at the cost of hundreds of thousands of our soldiers lives. It didn’t make sense to do that then and it doesn’t make sense to do so now. Ronald Reagan won the Cold War against the Evil Soviet Empire in part by employing proxies to fight and win our battles for us. We need to learn from Reagan and re-employ a strategy of arming and supporting proxies both states and insurgent movements to fight our wars so our troops don’t have to. America needs to conserve its military strength for a time when we they may be called upon to fight great power enemies, not waste it bogged down fighting Vietnams in the desert as we have been doing the past several years. Until we do, we will remain in a state of imperial overstretch and strategic paralysis with no reserve forces to fight new hypothetical wars of necessity and with a continuing window of vulnerability which our enemies will undoubtedly continue to exploit. North Korea has already been exploiting our window of vulnerability with their ongoing nuclear missile buildup as has the Islamic Republic of Iran is doing with its near imminent development of weaponized nukes. Even Russia has done so with their invasion of US-ally Georgia this past year.


 * American primacy is vital to accessing every major impact—the only threat to world peace is if we allow it to collapse**
 * Thayer, 6 -** professor of security studies at Missouri State (Bradley, The National Interest, “In Defense of Primacy”, November/December, p. 32-37)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power‑the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, ei­ther because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of pri­macy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its in­terests. But __retrenchment__, in any of its guis­es, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that __would lead to far greater instability and war in the world__, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capa­bilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capa­bilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American pri­macy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action­ but they fall to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensur­ing American primacy takes as its starting point the protec­tion of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on re­trenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because __threats will exist no mat­ter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington can­not call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats__. Whether they are terror­ists, rogue states or rising powers, his­tory shows that threats must be confront­ed. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvinc­ing half‑pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weak­ness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, **__predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong__**. The same is true of the anarchic world of interna­tional politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, __then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.__ And when enemies must be confront­ed, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. __This requires a phys­ical, on‑the‑ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing.__ Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global com­mon"‑‑the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space‑allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent ca­pabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today‑-in a world where Ameri­can primacy is clearly and unambiguous­ly on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes, ­their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America‑-their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements‑and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this coun­try, or any country, had so many allies. __U.S. primacy‑-and the bandwagon­ing effect‑has also given us extensive in­fluence__ in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to cre­ate coalitions of like‑minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or __to stop proliferation__ through the Pro­liferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents. American‑led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effec­tiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand coun­tries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and ac­tions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, re­sort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communica­tion and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases‑‑Venezuela, Iran, Cuba‑it is an anti‑U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrin­sically anti‑American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power‑‑Rome, Britain or the United States today. Schol­ars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. __Everything we think of when we con­sider the current international order‑free trade, a robust monetary regime, increas­ing respect for human rights, growing de­mocratization‑‑is directly linked to U.S. power__. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: __Appalling things happen when international orders collapse__. __The Dark Ages fol­lowed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles__. __With­out U.S. power, the liberal order cre­ated by the U__nited __S__tates __will end just as assuredly.__ As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washing­ton and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, __American primacy helps keep a number of complicated rela­tionships aligned‑-between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia.__ This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but __a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: **great power wars**.__ __Second,__ __American power gives the U__nited __S__tates __the ability to spread de­mocracy__ and other elements of its ideol­ogy of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, __once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced.__ This is not because democracies do not have clashing inter­ests. Indeed they do. Rather, __it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably__ in concurrence with U.S. lead­ership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Admin­istration for attempting to spread democ­racy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's crit­ics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or sta­bilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Per­haps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Af­ghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threat­ened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Wash­ington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western‑style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Ku­wait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the glob­al economy. __With its allies, the U__nited __S__tates __has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network character­ized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mo­bility of capital and labor markets__. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a glob­al public good from which all states ben­efit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well‑being of America. __This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable__. Economic spin‑offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his ca­reer confident in the socialist ideology of post‑independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recog­nizes that __the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globaliza­tion, which are facilitated through Amer­ican primacy__.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. =1ac – Hegemony=

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100628_30_year_war_afghanistan)
 * Withdrawal allows the US to replenish its strategic reserve**
 * Friedman, 10** - American political scientist. He is the chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratfor. Prior to Stratfor, Friedman spent almost twenty years in academia, teaching political science at Dickinson College. During this time, he regularly briefed senior commanders in the armed services as well as the U.S. Army War College (George, “The 30-Year War in Afghanistan,” Stratfor, 6/29,

There is an anomaly in this strategy, however. Where the United States previously had devolved operational responsibility to allied groups, or simply hunkered down, this strategy tries to return to devolved responsibilities by first surging U.S. operations. The fourth phase actually increases U.S. operational responsibility in order to reduce it. From the grand strategic point of view, the United States needs to withdraw from Afghanistan, a landlocked country where U.S. forces are dependent on tortuous supply lines. Whatever Afghanistan’s vast mineral riches, mining them in the midst of war is not going to happen. More important, the U nited S tates is overcommitted in the region and lacks a strategic reserve of ground forces. Afghanistan ultimately is not strategically essential, and this is why the United States has not historically used its own forces there.// //Obama’s attempt to return to that track after first increasing U.S. forces to set the stage for the political settlement that will allow a U.S. withdrawal is hampered by the need to begin terminating the operation by 2011 (although there is no fixed termination date). It will be difficult to draw coalition partners into local structures when the foundation — U.S. protection — is withdrawing. Strengthening local forces by 2011 will be difficult. Moreover, the Taliban’s motivation to enter into talks is limited by the early withdrawal. At the same time, with no ground combat strategic reserve, the U nited S tates is vulnerable elsewhere in the world, and the longer the Afghan drawdown takes, the more vulnerable it becomes (hence the 2011 deadline in Obama’s war plan).// //In sum, this is the quandary inherent in the strategy: It is necessary to withdraw as early as possible, but early withdrawal undermines both coalition building and negotiations. The recruitment and use of indigenous Afghan forces must move extremely rapidly to hit the deadline (though officially on track quantitatively, there are serious questions about qualitative measures) — hence, the aggressive operations that have been mounted over recent months. But the correlation of forces is such that the United States probably will not be able to impose an acceptable political reality in the time frame available. Thus, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is said to be opening channels directly to the Taliban, while the Pakistanis are increasing their presence. Where a vacuum is created, regardless of how much activity there is, someone will fill it.// //Therefore, the problem is to define how important Afghanistan is to American global strategy, bearing in mind that the forces absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the U nited S tates vulnerable elsewhere in the world. The current strategy defines the Islamic world as the focus of all U.S. military attention. But the world has rarely been so considerate as to wait until the U nited S tates is finished with one war before starting another. Though unknowns remain unknowable, a principle of warfare is to never commit all of your reserves in a battle — one should always maintain a reserve for the unexpected. Strategically, it is imperative that the United States begin to free up forces and re-establish its ground reserves .//

=1ac – Hegemony=
 * Third, the dollar –**

//**Maintaining a large counterinsurgency strategy will bankrupt the US, end the dollar and collapse global US financial influence**// //**Corn, 9** – Ph.D. from the University of Paris and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, currently on leave from the US State Department (Tony, “Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan?// //Bounding Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, 10/21,// //http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/10/toward-a-kilcullenbiden-plan///

//Just do the math - __with 63,000 troops on the ground, the cost for the U.S. of the Afghan War is already 6.7 billion dollars a month. With a hypothetical 40,000 troop increase, it would rise to__// __more than 10 billion a month//.//__ //For how long? Though it gives a time estimate for the possibility of failure (12 months), the report does not provide any timeline as to the possibility of actual success. __Most counterinsurgency experts appear to be in agreement that it will take more than two years to know whether the plan has a chance of succeeding, and at least an additional three years for the plan to__// __actually //succeed.//__ //In short, __the recommended__// __jump //is a 500 billion dollar gamble that would come on top of the Iraq trillion dollar war//__//.// //In these conditions, a//ny //responsible Administration - be it Democrat or Republican - would be justified in taking a closer look. That “endless money forms the sinews of war” (Cicero) is a timeless truth. The question is to what extent does the U.S. have endless money at this particular juncture?// //Among the numerous analogies made between the wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam lately, the one that has yet to surface concerns the monetary dimension. The first casualty of the Vietnam War was not the Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society project – it was the mighty dollar itself. Though the dollar had been the undisputed currency of the world ever since WWII, __the Vietnam folly eventually forced Nixon to decouple the dollar from gold. From 1971 until roughly 2001, the dollar’s new status did not seem to matter much, since the European Croesus could always be expected to bankroll the American Caesar__.4// //Not anymore. __Today, Croesus no longer speaks German and French, but Mandarin and Arabic; and Croesus is increasingly vocal in its call to put an end to the status of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency__. Ironically, the only people on earth who don’t seem to realize the// incredible //advantage derived by America from the dollar’s status are the American people themselves.// //In last instance, America’s military “command of the commons” rests on America’s monetary command of the common currency .5 The fact that, five years from now, the implementation of the McChrystal plan could actually lead to “victory” at the theater-strategic level is a distinct// possibility//. __The fact that, five years from now__ as well, __the dollar would no longer be the world’s reserve currency is a quasi-__//__certainty. //The end of America as a// monetary //superpower would spell the end of America as a superpower// tout court //– the ultimate defeat at the national-strategic level.//__ //Bottom line - on the one hand, __the U.S. does not have 500 billion dollars to waste in an open-ended escalation__ in one of the many ungoverned sandboxes of the world. On the other hand, an incremental (“middle way”) strategy would fail to create the psychological effect required in both the West and Afghanistan at this point.// //That said, a// temporary //40,000// surge //remains a realistic option, but only so long as the White House strategy rests on two pillars “bounding” the counterinsurgency campaign - on the one hand, a convocation of a new loya jirga as advocated by counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen - on the other, a regional diplomatic settlement as advocated by Vice-President Joe Biden.//

=1ac – Hegemony=

//**Economic leadership prevents economic collapse—leadership preserves resilience**// //**Mandelbaum** **2005** – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005 [Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 192-195]//

//Although the spread of nuclear weapons, with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be fired in anger somewhere in the world, counted as the most serious potential consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's government, it was not the only one. __In the previous period of American international reticence, the 1920s and 1930s, the global economy suffered serious damage that a more active American role might have mitigated__. __A twenty-first-century American retreat could have similarly adverse international economic consequences.__ __The economic collapse of the 1930s caused extensive hardship throughout the world and led indirectly to World War II__ __by paving the way for the people who started it to gain power in Germany and Japan__. In retrospect, the Great Depression is widely believed to have been caused by a series of errors in public policy that made an economic downturn far worse than it would have been had governments responded to it in appropriate fashion. Since the 1930s, acting on the lessons drawn from that experience by professional economists, governments have taken steps that have helped to prevent a recurrence of the disasters of that decade.' In the face of reduced demand, for example, governments have increased rather than cut spending. Fiscal and monetary crises have evoked rescue efforts rather than a studied indifference based on the assumption that market forces will readily reestablish a desirable economic equilibrium. In contrast to the widespread practice of the 1930s, political authorities now understand that putting up barriers to imports in an attempt to revive domestic production will in fact worsen economic conditions everywhere. Still, __a serious, prolonged failure of the international economy, inflicting the kind of hardship the world experienced in the 1930s__ (which some Asian countries also suffered as a result of their fiscal crises in the 1990s) __does not lie beyond the realm of possibility. Market economies remain subject to cyclical downturns, which public policy can limit but has not found a way to eliminate entirely__. __Markets also have an inherent tendency to form bubbles, excessive values for particular assets,__ whether seventeenth century Dutch tulips or twentieth century Japanese real estate and Thai currency, __that cause economic harm when the bubble bursts and prices plunge__. __In responding to these events, governments can make errors__. They can act too slowly, or fail to implement the proper policies, or implement improper ones. Moreover, the global economy and the national economies that comprise it, like a living organism, change constantly and sometimes rapidly: Capital flows across sovereign borders, for instance, far more rapidly and in much greater volume in the early twenty-first century than ever before. This means that measures that successfully address economic malfunctions at one time may have less effect at another, just as medical science must cope with the appearance of new strains of influenza against which existing vaccines are not effective. Most importantly, __since the Great Depression, an active American international economic role has been crucial both in fortifying the conditions for global economic well-being and in coping with the problems that have occurred, especially periodic recessions and currency crises, by applying the lessons of the past. The absence of such a role could weaken those conditions and aggravate those problems.__ The overall American role in the world since World War II therefore has something in common with the theme of the Frank Capra film It's a Wonderful Life, in which the angel Clarence, played by Henry Travers, shows James Stewart, playing the bank clerk George Bailey, who believes his existence to have been worthless, how life in his small town of Bedford Falls would have unfolded had he never been born. George Bailey learns that people he knows and loves turn out to be far worse off without him. So it is with the United States and its role as the world's government. Without that role, the world very likely would have been in the past, and would become in the future, a less secure and less prosperous place. The abdication by the United States of some or all of the responsibilities for international security that it had come to bear in the first decade of the twenty-first century would deprive the international system of one of its principal safety features, __which keeps countries from smashing into each other, as they are historically prone to do__. __In this sense, a world without America would be the equivalent of a freeway full of cars without brakes__. Similarly, should the American government abandon some or all of the ways in which it had, at the dawn of the new century, come to support global economic activity__, the world economy would function less effectively and might even suffer a severe and costly breakdown.__ A __world without the United States would in this way resemble a fleet of cars without gasoline.__//

//**That goes nuclear without economic leadership**// //**Mandelbaum 2005** – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005 [Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 224]//

//At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic uncertainty that characterized the years before World War II. At worst, __the retreat of American power could lead to a repetition of the great global economic failure and the bloody international conflicts the world experienced in the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, the potential for economic calamity and wartime destruction is greater at the outset of the new century than it was in the first half of the preceding one because of the greater extent of international economic interdependence and the higher levels of prosperity—there is more to lose now than there was then—and because of the presence, in large numbers, of nuclear weapons__.//

//**The plan solves – reducing to a counterterrorism focus creates sustainable presence, and prevents vacillations between engagement and isolationism**// //**Stewart, 9-** Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan)//

//__The best Afghan policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to__ far fewer – perhaps __20,000.__ In that case, two distinct objectives would remain for the international community: development and counter-terrorism. Neither would amount to the building of an Afghan state or winning a counter-insurgency campaign. A __reduction in troop numbers and a turn away from state-building should not mean total withdrawal: good projects could continue to be undertaken in electricity, water, irrigation, health, education, agriculture, rural development__ and in other areas favoured by development agencies. __Even a light US presence could continue to allow for aggressive operations against Al Qaeda terrorists, in Afghanistan__, who plan to attack the United States. The US has successfully prevent Al Qaeda from re-establishing itself since 2001 (though the result has only been to move bin Laden across the border.). The US military could also (with other forms of assistance) support the Afghan military to prevent the Taliban from seizing a city or taking over the country.// //These twin objectives will require a very long-term presence, as indeed is almost inevitable in a country which is as poor, as fragile and traumatized as Afghanistan (and which lacks the internal capacity at the moment to become independent of Foreign aid or control its territory). But a long-term presence will in turn mean a much lighter and more limited presence (if it is to retain US domestic support). We should not control and cannot predict the future of Afghanistan. It may in the future become more violent, or find a decentralised equilibrium or a new national unity, but if its communities continue to want to work with us, we can, over 30 years, encourage the more positive trends in Afghan society and help to contain the more negative.// //Such a policy can seem strained, unrealistic, counter-intuitive and unappealing. They appear to betray the hopes of Afghans who trusted us and to allow the Taliban to abuse district towns. No politician wants to be perceived to have underestimated, or failed to address, a terrorist threat; or to write off the ‘blood and treasure’ that we have sunk into Afghanistan; or to admit defeat. Americans are particularly unwilling to believe that problems are insoluble; Obama’s motto is not ‘no we can’t’; soldiers are not trained to admit defeat or to say a mission is impossible. And to suggest that what worked in Iraq won’t work in Afghanistan requires a detailed knowledge of each country’s past, a bold analysis of the causes of development and a rigorous exposition of the differences, for which few have patience.// //__The greatest risk__ __of our inflated ambitions__ and fears, encapsulated __in the current surge is that it will achieve the exact opposite of its intentions and in fact precipitate a total withdrawal. **The heavier our footprint, and the more costly, the less we are likely to be able to sustain it.**__ Public opinion is already turning against it. Nato allies are mostly staying in Afghanistan simply to please the United States and have little confidence in our objectives or our reasons. Contemporary political culture tends to encourage black and white solutions: either we garrison or we abandon.// //While, I strongly oppose troop increases, I equally strongly oppose a total flight. __We are currently in danger of lurching from troop increases to withdrawal and from engagement to isolation. We are threatening to provide instant electro-shock therapy followed by abandonment. This is the last thing Afghanistan needs.__ The international community should aim to provide a patient, tolerant long-term relationship with a country as poor and traumatized as Afghanistan. Judging by comparable countries in the developing world (and Afghanistan is very near the bottom of the UN Human Development index), making Afghanistan more stable, prosperous and humane is a project which will take decades. It is a worthwhile project in the long-term for us and for Afghans but __we__ __will only be able to sustain our presence if we massively reduce our investment__ and our ambitions and begin to approach Afghanistan more as we do other poor countries in the developing world. The best way of avoiding the mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s – the familiar cycle of investment and abandonment which most Afghan expect and fear and which have contributed so much to instability and danger - is to husband and conserve our resources, __limit our objectives to counter-terrorism__ and humanitarian assistance and __work out how to work with fewer troops__ and less money over a longer period. In Afghanistan in the long-term, less will be more.//

=1ac – Insurgency=
 * Contention 2: the war**

//**COIN WILL FAIL –**//

//**The counterinsurgency mission will fail**//

//**Needs 600,000 troops, corruption, population protection**// //**Nelson, 9** – former director of a Joint Task Force in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, retired naval officer with assignments at the National Counterterrorism Center and National Security Council, and Senior Fellow at the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Rick, “The Other Side of the COIN”, 10/1, http://csis.org/publication/other-side-coin)//

//**Q1: General McChrystal is expected to request up to 40,000 additional troops and recommend a greater focus on counterinsurgency operations. Is this approach likely to succeed in strengthening the Afghan state, defeating the Taliban, and advancing America’s fight against terrorism?**// //**A1:** Probably not. Counterinsurgency doctrine, or COIN, has captured the hearts and minds of many in the D.C. policy community. Upon close inspection, however, it becomes clear that COIN, at least as applied to Afghanistan, is built on a number of shaky assumptions. Consider: //

Critics charge that these operations are mere tactical successes, detached from any larger strategy. This is a disingenuous assessment. Targeted strikes do, in fact, serve the greater strategic purpose of disrupting the planning and execution of terrorist attacks. Unlike COIN—which seems to harbor the grandiose notion of eliminating terrorism by transforming societies, regardless of cost—counterterrorism acknowledges that radicalism will always exist and that policymakers should directly seek to contain it.// //At the core of this shift is an acknowledgment that our best Afghanistan policy is no better than our best Pakistan policy. ISAF and Afghan forces can do everything imaginable to eliminate Taliban influence in the country, but any effort that does not address the presence of militants in Pakistan’s semi-governed spaces ultimately does little to reduce the threat posed by al Qaeda. At a most basic level, the Obama administration must change the calculus of the Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with regard to extremists in the country’s northwest. Doing so will force the United States to play a central role in rapprochement between Pakistan and India—and be a fair broker to both parties.// //What about Afghanistan? Proponents of an “all-in” approach tend to misrepresent a minimalist strategy as complete withdrawal, arguing that the United States abandoned Afghanistan after the Soviet war and that doing so again would plunge the country into anarchy. But few serious analysts are talking about abandoning Afghanistan, and there is no reason to believe that a smaller, more specialized force would not be able to confront any resumption of al Qaeda activity in the country. As far as the Taliban are concerned, there is reason to believe that an ever-larger foreign troop presence simply swells the movement’s ranks (to wit : it has been dismaying to watch increased troop levels correlate with recent Taliban gains). Until the administration can convincingly demonstrate how additional troops will, in fact, support broader national security and counterterrorism goals, the United States is better served by a strategy that minimizes the loss of life and dizzying levels of expenditure that any “all-in” approach would entail.
 * 1) General McChrystal gets all 40,000 troops he has requested, the combined International Security Assistance Force ( ISAF
 * 2) and NATO mission
 * 3) //. The claim is based on the assumption that insurgencies require the backing, or at least acquiescence, of surrounding communities [[file:///C:/Users/Charlie Rafkin/Documents/My Dropbox/Charlie and Joyce Dropbox/Aff/1ac afghanistan v4.doc#_msocom_8|[CR8]]]
 * Q2: So how should the United States approach the war?**
 * A2:** We need to reframe our thinking about U.S. goals and the means to achieve them. As outlined above, COIN in Afghanistan is only tenuously linked to counterterrorism, the original purpose of our efforts. The Obama administration should implement a more minimalist policy in the region, one that employs special operations forces and airstrikes to directly target terrorists, especially leaders of cells.
 * A2:** We need to reframe our thinking about U.S. goals and the means to achieve them. As outlined above, COIN in Afghanistan is only tenuously linked to counterterrorism, the original purpose of our efforts. The Obama administration should implement a more minimalist policy in the region, one that employs special operations forces and airstrikes to directly target terrorists, especially leaders of cells.

=1ac - Hegemony=


 * Border hopping, corruption, ethnic tensions within the Afghan army and perception of army as invaders**
 * Dorronsoro, 10** - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes (Gilles, “The Case for Negotiations,” In These Times, 5/24, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40863

The coalition's strategy in Afghanistan is at an impasse. The renewed efforts undertaken since the summer of 2009 have failed to temper the guerrilla war. A few tactical successes are possible, but this war cannot be won. The coalition cannot defeat the Taliban as long as Pakistan continues to offer them sanctuary. And increasing resources to wage the war is not an option. The costs of continuing the war--to use Ambassador Karl Eikenberry's expression in the leaked telegram to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton--are "astronomical." The entire U.S. strategy revolves around a swift Afghanization of the conflict, yet the coalition's Afghan partner is weaker than it was a year ago. The state's presence in the provinces has declined sharply and the legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai's government is contested. As a result of the massive fraud in the August 2009 presidential elections, the government has no popular legitimacy, and the legislative elections slated for fall 2010 will probably undermine the political system even further because fraud is inevitable. It is unlikely that the Afghan regime will ever be able to assume responsibility for its own security. As a result, the coalition faces an endless war accompanied by an intolerable loss of life and treasure. A less costly alternative would be to negotiate a broad agreement with the Taliban leadership to form a national unity government, with guarantees against al Qaeda's return to Afghanistan. But even if such negotiations might occur, they hold no guarantee of success. Yet the cost of their failure is negligible compared with the potential gain: a relatively swift way out of the crisis that preserves the coalition's essential interests. Time is not on the coalition's side. The United States should contact Taliban leaders as soon as possible rather than waiting for the situation to deteriorate further. In pursuit of a losing strategy The Taliban cannot be defeated militarily because the border with Pakistan is and will remain open for the insurgents. The Pakistani army, which refuses to launch an offensive against the Afghan Taliban, has never considered taking action against the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan. The February arrest of acting Taliban military commander Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is probably a sign that the Pakistani military wants more control over the insurgency to prepare for the negotiation process. What's more, the insurgency is now nationwide and cannot be contained by counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in two or three southern provinces. The COIN strategy cannot succeed because of the immense resources it requires. In a marginal, strategically unimportant district such as Marjah, the coalition would have to keep thousands of troops for years to prevent the Taliban's return. To replicate such strategy, even in one province, would overstretch the U.S. military. In addition to COIN, military strategists think they can quickly weaken the Taliban through the creation of militias, the co-opting of Taliban groups and targeted assassinations. These policies will not strengthen the Afghan government's legitimacy or influence; to the contrary, they are destroying the Karzai government's credibility. The effects of this strategy are irreversible, and with the acceleration of political fragmentation, the coalition is faced with the prospect of a collapse of Afghan institutions. The Karzai government is unlikely to engage in institutional reform, given that it is increasingly dependent on the networks that ensured its fraudulent re-election. Consequently, the coalition is having more and more trouble influencing Karzai. The weakness of the central political institutions means that the development of the army and the police force--the coalition's priorities--is occurring in a vacuum. Transferring security responsibilities to our Afghan partner will probably not be possible in the foreseeable future. Afghans perceive their representative institutions as illegitimate. Between 10 percent and 15 percent of Afghan voters are believed to have supported Karzai during the 2009 presidential elections. All indications point to a high level of cynicism among the people and their rejection of the government; in fact, they massively refrained from voting even in places where security was reasonably good. The legislative elections scheduled for September 2010 will further erode faith in the political system. The lack of security makes it impossible to hold credible elections in at least half of Afghanistan. And in February 2010, Karzai seized control of the ECC (Electoral Complaints Commission); there is no longer an independent institution to validate the process. Aside from fraud and corruption, Karzai's lack of legitimacy is linked to his presumed lack of autonomy vis-à-vis the coalition. Internal U.S. Army studies, and the experiences of numerous journalists and researchers indicate that a majority of the population in combat zones now considers the foreign forces as occupiers. Military operations are polarizing the population against foreign forces and further weakening Karzai's regime, which appears irreparably unpopular and illegitimate. The coalition is perceived as the main provider of insecurity. Villagers do not want to see the establishment of coalition outposts that can bring only bombings and IEDs. Furthermore, the coalition is hurt by the dependence of Karzai on his local allies, who generally oppose the coalition's objectives. The coalition is also undermined when the Afghan government aggressively distances itself from the coalition when civilians are killed by "friendly fire." The failed Karzai government The government in Kabul is now too weak to reassert control over the periphery of the country. As a result, the coalition is increasingly dependent on local strongmen who it helped put in place or with whom it has worked. The weakening of the Afghan regime is very bad news for the coalition, which is promoting Afghanization in order to reduce its own investment. It is hard to build a military that is independent of the institutional network that constitutes the state. Problems such as ethnic tensions, local and national corruption, and the lack of a clear purpose make it hard to motivate soldiers and officers. The coalition should recognize that an autonomous Afghan army is a very distant goal. The coalition's large offensive to "clear" Taliban territory will not work, because the Afghan army and the police are not ready. If the coalition tries to secure Taliban territory on a long-term basis, it will overstretch itself and casualties will increase significantly. Modest objectives would be more realistic. Most observers recognize the impossibility of a military solution. Nonetheless, different arguments have been put forward to reject negotiations. First, the coalition needs more time. Reinforcements are not yet fully in place, so talk of failure is premature. Second, experts such as Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid explain that the Taliban have reached the height of their influence, implying that the coalition would be in a stronger position in the future. One can counter that the coalition should begin negotiations now while it still has the means to exert military pressure. There is nothing to indicate that the Taliban are going to slow their advance. They are pursuing a strategy that includes expanding their influence in the cities. And nothing indicates that the Karzai regime won't be even weaker a year from now. From this perspective, the Afghan surge will have had the same result as all troop increases since 2003: a deterioration of security. Consequently, marginal military gains for the coalition in the next 18 months are the exact equivalent of a strategic defeat. Hence the need for a negotiated settlement.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3)
 * Mountainous terrain**
 * Stewart, 10** - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “ Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14,

The counterinsurgency strategy and surge in Iraq led to a drop in violence (against predictions), but the same will not happen in Afghanistan. The Iraq insurgency was the movement of a minority sectarian group, the Sunnis, whose supporters have been driven from most of the neighborhoods in the capital city and whose leaders were tribal figures with a long-standing relationship to the central government. The Shia-dominated Baghdad government was a powerful, credible force, from the majority ethnic and sectarian group, and was supported by mass political parties, with their own militias. The challenge for Petraeus and his predecessors in Iraq was to grasp this political opportunity; provide support, money, and status to the losing Sunni groups to separate them from al- Qaeda; and convince Nouri al-Maliki to disengage from some of the Shia militias and endorse the settlement. In Afghanistan, neither the Karzai government nor the Taliban have the history, the structure, or the incentives to foster such a deal. Afghanistan contains a diffuse rural insurgency spread among a population of 30 million people, 80 percent of whom are scattered among 20,000 remote, often mountainous villages. It is different from Iraq, where the insurgency was largely centered around the flat urban areas surrounding Baghdad. Nor is it like the much smaller Malaya of the 1950s, where the British in their antiguerrilla operations were able to move villagers to walled and guarded camps. At least half of Afghanistan (a country almost the size of Texas) is now threatened by insurgency, and the COIN doctrine requires sufficient troops to secure and protect the population areas. This is why the architects of the COIN doctrine are calling for a ratio of one “trained counterinsurgent ” (a category that includes Afghans, if they have been given the necessary skills) for every fifty members of the population or a combined total that would amount in Afghanistan to 600,000 troops, if they intended to cover the country (though most theorists believe it is only necessary to cover half). The effective, legitimate Afghan government, on which the entire counterinsurgency strategy depends, shows little sign of emerging, in part because the international community lacks the skills, the knowledge, the legitimacy, or the patience to build a new nation. In short, COIN won’t work on its own terms because of the lack of numbers and a credible Afghan partner and in absolute terms because of the difficulties of the country and its political structures.


 * Morale, occupiers, mountainous terrain**

**Kuhner, 9 -** the president of the Edmund Burke Institute for American Renewal (Jeffrey, Washington Times, “Obama’s quagmire; US should look to its own interests,” 9/7, Lexis Academic)

__America is losing the war in Afghanistan.__ Rather than change course, President Obama is sending 21,000 additional U.S. troops. This will bring the total to 68,000 American soldiers fighting in Afghanistan, bolstering coalition forces to 110,000. The **__troop surge__**, however, **__will not work. Afghanistan has become__** Mr. **__Obama's Vietnam - a protracted quagmire__** draining precious American blood and treasure. August was the deadliest month for U.S. forces, with 47 soldiers killed by Taliban insurgents. More than 300 coalition troops have died in 2009. This is the highest toll since the war began in 2001, and there are still four months to go. The __tide of battle has turned against the West__. The Taliban is resurgent. It has reasserted control over its southern stronghold in Kandahar. __The Taliban is launching devastating attacks in the western and northern parts of the country - formerly stable areas. U.S. casualties are soaring**. The morale of coalition forces is plummeting**.__ Most of our allies - with the exception of the Canadians and the British - are reluctant to engage the Islamist militants. American public support for the war is waning. The conflict has dragged on for nearly eight years. (U.S. involvement in World War II was four years, World War I less than one.) Yet, America's strategic objectives remain incoherent and elusive. The war's initial aim was to topple the Taliban and eradicate al Qaeda bases from Afghan territory. Those goals have been achieved. Washington should have declared victory and focused on the more important issue: preventing Islamic fundamentalists from seizing power in Pakistan, along with its nuclear arsenal. Instead, America is engaged in futile nation-building. Mr. Obama, like President George W. Bush before him, believes Afghanistan must be transformed by erecting a strong central government, democracy and a modern economy. Washington argues this will prevent terrorism from taking root and bring about lasting "stability." Hence, following a recent reassessment of the war by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, U.S. commander in Afghanistan, the Obama administration is contemplating deploying 20,000 to 40,000 U.S. troops - on top of the 21,000 already pledged. Moreover, billions have been spent building irrigation canals, schools, hospitals and factories. Civilian advisers are being sent to encourage farmers to grow other cash crops besides opium poppies. Western aid money has been used to establish a massive Afghan army, a large police force and a swollen government bureaucracy. Gen. McChrystal said this week that the situation is "serious," but not impossible. He still believes victory is within reach. His new strategy is to protect Afghan civilians from Taliban attacks. He also wants to create a lucrative jobs programs and improve local government services. The goal is to win the "hearts and minds" of the Afghan people. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says we must combat Afghanistan's "culture of poverty." Call it humanitarian war through social engineering. Mr. **__Obama's policy will result in a major American defeat - one that will signal the end of America as a superpower and expose us to the world as a paper tiger__**. Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires. The mighty British and Russian armies were humiliated in drawn-out guerrilla campaigns. __The country's mountainous geography__ and primitive tribal culture __are ideally suited for insurgent warfare. By sending in more troops, Washington is playing right into the Taliban's hands: We are enabling the Taliban to pick off our forces one by one as they wage a campaign of attrition.__ __The Taliban blend with the local population, making it almost impossible for U.S. forces to distinguish combatants from civilians. American counterinsurgency efforts are thus alienating some of the locals.__ Initially welcomed as liberators, __we are__ now __viewed__ in some quarters __as occupiers__. Moreover, much of the West's aid money is siphoned off by greedy politicians in Kabul. President Hamid Karzai's government is corrupt, venal and ineffective. It barely controls one-third of the country. It is despised by many Afghans for its brutality and incompetence. In addition, Mr. Karzai's vice-presidential running mate is a drug trafficker. __The West's efforts to forge a cohesive national state based on federalism and economic reconstruction have failed. Warlords are increasingly asserting power in the provinces. The country is fractured along tribal and ethnic lines. The center cannot hold: Afghanistan remains mired in anarchy, blood feuds and weak, decentralized rule.__ U.S. troops should be deployed to defend U.S. national interests. Their lives should never be squandered for an experiment in liberal internationalism. In fact, such a policy is morally grotesque and strategically reckless. Mr. __Obama should quickly withdraw most U.S. forces from Afghanistan. **American air power and small, flexible Special Forces units are more than enough to wipe out al Qaeda terrorists**.__ __The Taliban is too hated to reoccupy the country - unless our huge military and economic footprint drives numerous Afghans into__ the evil, welcoming __arms of extremists.__

**Pashtun nationalism, Karzai illegitimacy** **Dorronsoro, 09** - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (9/23/09, Gilles, The National Interest, “Afghanization,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22218)

In addition, **there is no state structure to speak of in the Pashtun belt**. The military operations there are foreign alone, including no more than token Afghan National Army forces. No Afghan forces can effectively take charge of secured areas after the “clear” phase, as they are nowhere near numerous or well-trained enough, and the police are often corrupt or inefficient. In addition, the pro-government tribes or communities that are present in a few districts cannot venture outside their areas without great difficulty. The supposed “ink spot” strategy—whereby the coalition establishes control in a key part of a province and security radiates outward—is not working, because of the social and ethnic fragmentation. Stability in one district doesn’t necessarily bleed over into the neighboring one, since groups and villages are often antagonistic to one another, and compete for the resources provided by the war economy. In this context, **to secure an area means essentially to stay there indefinitely, under constant attack by the insurgency**. Even if only 20 percent of a village sympathizes with the insurgents, “clearing” cannot work. As long as the coalition persists in its current strategy, **increasing the number of troops in country will not only be inefficient, it will be dangerously counterproductive.** As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said not so long ago, more troops would fuel opposition amongst the Afghan population. Considering the growing illegitimacy of the Karzai regime, more foreign troops will be resented as a military occupation. To this end, the coalition’s communiqués stating that the foreign presence in Afghanistan will go on for two generations—which were intended to reassure the Afghan partners—are staggering diplomatic blunders, especially in a country where feelings towards outsiders are at best ambiguous. The more foreign troops fight to take territory back from the Taliban, the more the population rejects them, because it sees them as the major provider of insecurity. In addition, more troops mean more casualties, leaving the coalition less time to do its work before public opinion turns too far against the war. Yet it is unrealistic to expect quick results, especially in training the Afghan National Army. And at the same time, it is more and more difficult to argue in support of the discredited Karzai regime.


 * COIN is causing multiple impacts --**

**Akhtar, 10-** professor of international relations, and a senior analyst & writer. He was the dean of faculty of management, Baluchistan university, and former chairman of International Relations Department, Karachi university (1/26/10, Shameem, “Pakistan’s Instability : The US War Factor,” http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1262372328640&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs/MAELayout#**1)**
 * First – Pakistan. A large counterinsurgency footprint drives insurgents to Pakistan, mobilizes the Pakistani Taliban and will cause Pakistan to collapse**


 * __If it is a war against extremists and militancy inside Pakistan, it is a civil war because its__** __origins stem **from the US,**__ **NATO __occupation of neighboring Afghanistan__. __The conflict should be seen as an extension of the ongoing resistance of the Afghan people to alien domination__. It is inaccurate to say that the US invaded Afghanistan because of the 9/11 attacks by Al-Qaeda. Former BBC correspondent George Arney reported on September 18, 2001, that Niaz Naik, the former Pakistani foreign secretary, had told him that he was informed by US officials at a UN-sponsored international contact group on Afghanistan in Berlin during July that year that unless Osama bin Laden were handed over swiftly, America would take military action to kill or capture both Bin Laden and Mullah Omar. The wider objective, however, was to topple the Taliban regime and install a transitional government under King Mohammad Zahir Shah. The invasion was to take place in mid-October 2001. Mr. Naik went on to say that he doubted that the US would have abandoned its plan to invade Afghanistan even if Osama were handed over by the Taliban. Arney's story is corroborated by the Guardian correspondent David Leigh in his report published on September 26, 2001, in which he revealed that the Taliban had received specific warning by the US through secret diplomacy in Berlin in July that the Bush Administration would topple the entire regime militarily unless Osama is extradited to the US. This was part of the larger design of US military, industrial complex to bring about regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. As the US needed bases in Pakistan to accomplish its pre-planned invasion of Afghanistan, the Bush Administration sought to use Islamabad as a cat's paw to pull the chestnuts out of the fire. Fortunately for President Bush, a usurper ruled there, devoid of all legitimacy, legal and moral, and he readily and willingly succumbed to US pressure and made a U-turn by severing all links with the Taliban. He even joined the war against Afghanistan instead of using his leverage with the Taliban to exhaust all means of peaceful settlement of the dispute. The entire region, including Pakistan, was declared a war zone by the US military command, and the flights of all passenger planes were prohibited over a certain altitude, while no merchant ships could enter the harbors of Pakistan, thus bringing maritime trade (which comprises approximately 95 percent of Pakistan's import-export trade) to a standstill. __It is no wonder that Pakistan suffered a loss of 34 billion dollars because of its involvement in the Afghan war.__ America's War As one can see, __it was America's war that was imposed upon Pakistan__. Whether Pakistan could have avoided the war is a matter of controversy among politicians and political observers. But __the war has fuelled insurgency in Pakistan's hitherto peaceful tribal territory adjacent to Afghanistan.__ __This insurgency shows no sign of abatement__, as terrorist attacks on military and civilian centers in the capital and major cities of the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab continue with a vengeance,** __posing threat to the security of the state.__ **In the meantime, routine predator strikes by the US in Waziristan have taken a heavy toll of civilian lives amid accusations of Islamabad's complicity in the piratical attacks on tribespeople, which prompts them to resort to retaliatory strikes on the perpetrators. Not satisfied with Pakistan's military operations in the tribal region, the US Administration has compelled Islamabad's fragile government to pull out its troops from the tense Indo-Pak border and deploy them in the restive tribal belt along the Pak-Afghan border. Now** __Pakistan faces existential threat from the Taliban__ **and not India, a perception __which the country's military leadership is not prepared to share,__ given the unresolved disputes with New Delhi, which triggered four wars during the last 62 years. At the same time, speculation (not entirely unfounded) is rife about the involvement of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the former Blackwater (now christened Xe Services) in murder, mayhem, and gunrunning as evidenced by the armed Americans who drive consulate vehicles through cities and, when intercepted, refuse to disclose their identity. It is here that one recalls with dismay the role of General Stanley McChrystal, who until last year headed the Joint Special Operations Command, which runs drone attacks and targeted assassinations with the assistance of the operatives of the former Blackwater. This was revealed by Jeremy Scahill's investigative report published in the US weekly the Nation. That may, perhaps, solve the mystery surrounding a series of assassinations of ulama belonging to various Islamic movements. The sinister motive behind such acts of terror is to incite sectarian violence in Pakistan and lay the blame at the doors of religious extremists. Similar death squads were organized by the CIA in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua to carry out political assassinations of nationalists who were opposed to US intervention. At the time, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua complained to the International Court of Justice about the mining of Nicaraguan ports, the violation of the country's airspace, the killing and kidnapping of individuals on the Nicaraguan territory, and the threat or use of force by the US. The court in its decision in June 1986 held that the US was in breach of the customary rules of international law and international humanitarian law. The above case is titled the "Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua." The precedent set by this case may be invoked by Pakistan to prevent the US drone attacks on its territory. Once the piratical attacks of the US have stopped, the irritant in the tribal insurgency would have gone, paving the way for pacification of the conflict. If this were Pakistan's war, the government would have exercised its own judgment in dealing with the militants at home, either by conciliation or by resort to force. But Islamabad's so-called operation against militants is subordinated to US military designs in the region, aimed at the encirclement of the People's Republic of China and the control of the transit of gas pipelines from Central Asia to South Asia. It is not aimless that China expressed its concern over the concentration of US, NATO troops in the region. India fits in the American scheme of things, hence the US-India nuclear deal.**
 * Pakistan's National Interest __In this emerging security environment, Pakistan will have to be content with its role as a junior partner of India. Therefore__**__, **the sooner Islamabad extricates itself from the US "war on terror," the better it is for its security and independence**.__ **Doesn't Islamabad realize that its military operation against the militants would leave its border with India vulnerable to a New Delhi offensive? If Pakistan permits the US to attack the suspected training centers of militants on its territory, will it be able to prevent India from doing so? With Islamabad embroiled in internecine strife, it cannot negotiate with India from a position of strength. It may be forced to make a compromise that might be detrimental to its national interest. __Pakistan's preoccupation with tribal rebellion would not permit it to deal with separatist ethnic forces in Baluchistan. Undoubtedly, this is a threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan.__ After the total failure of the military operation in Baluchistan, the federal government has come round to the painful conclusion that political and not military action can bring militancy to an end. Granting general amnesty to the dissidents and engaging them in a meaningful dialogue on contentious issues is a laudable initiative. The same gesture should be made to the militants in the tribal areas. But Islamabad has adopted double standards in dealing with the Baluchistan militants and the Pashtun militants, as if there were good militants and bad ones. This discriminatory policy would intensify the Pashtun insurgency and might drive them toward even more escalation. The rulers have seen the consequences of military operations in the former East Pakistan, Baluchistan, Karachi, Sind, and FATA (federally administered tribal areas). If anything, __the situation has only worsened. The surge of US troops, the expansion of war beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and the attacks on Quetta and Muridke as envisaged by Obama's new strategy would mean that US troops are at war with the people of Pakistan.__**
 * Any Solution?**
 * __The Obama Administration would be better advised to concentrate on its exit strategy,__ and to that end, it is imperative that it involve the UN in its peace-making efforts aimed at the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan, because the Karzai Government has no legitimacy. To fill the vacuum, the UN peacekeeping force, made up of troops of states not involved in the Afghan war, may be deployed until a government of national unity is able to assume full responsibility. Here the US can contribute to the postwar reconstruction of Afghanistan under the aegis of the UN. __The insurgency in the tribal region is the spillover effect of US military occupation of Afghanistan, but Pakistan faces a far greater threat: the threat of ethnic violence as manifested in the bloody clashes among various linguistic groups in urban and rural Sind. These have been overshadowed by the counterinsurgency operations in FATA, but they may erupt at any moment, thus destabilizing the state.__**

=1ac – Insurgency=

Pakistan collapse causes global nuclear conflict – draws in China, India and Russia Pitt, 9**- //a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,”// http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)**

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. __Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos__, and is doing so __with nuclear weapons__ in its hip pocket, __right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world.__ The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. __The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself.__

__Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley.__ According to a recent Reuters report__:__ The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. T__he United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that__ __Pakistan could collapse **under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there**__**. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" __"__Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons . Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "__As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan,"__ reported the Times last week, "__senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities.__ In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spines of those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. __If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government__, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed __India could be galvanized into military action__ of some kind, __as could__ nuclear-armed __China or__ nuclear-armed __Russia.__ If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of __loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the__** __entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster**.**__ **We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.**

=1ac – Insurgency=

Second – terrorism –

Risk of nuclear terrorism is high –an attack is inevitable by al Qaeda by 2013 Hall, 10 **(Mimi, USA Today, “Obama seeks front against nuclear terror”, 4/12, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-11-nukesummit_N.htm**


 * WASHINGTON — President Obama is asking world leaders to commit to a new international offense against nuclear terrorism — a threat so dire that it could challenge "our ultimate survival ."**
 * At a first-ever summit of 47 countries to address the problem of "loose nukes," Obama will push for specific steps toward his goal of securing in four years the world's vast quantity of vulnerable nuclear material, such as uranium that could be enriched for a weapon. The summit begins today, but discussions will start in earnest Tuesday.**
 * Obama said " the single biggest threat" to U.S. security is the possibility of a terrorist organization with a nuclear weapon. **
 * "If there was ever a detonation in New York City, or London, or Johannesburg, the ramifications economically, politically and from a security perspective would be devastating," he said Sunday before meeting with South African President Jacob Zuma, who is attending the summit.**
 * Also attending: presidents, prime ministers and kings from countries such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Jordan.**
 * Obama continues one-on-one meetings with leaders today, and on Tuesday, the group will sign a "high-level communiqué" that recognizes the seriousness of the threat and outlines efforts to secure or eliminate vulnerable stockpiles, according to Gary Samore, the White House senior adviser for non-proliferation.**
 * The summit is "intended to rally collective action," White House Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes says.**
 * The meetings will present their own security challenge for the Secret Service and other law enforcement agencies because there will be so many world leaders at one time in Washington.**
 * Samore says several countries will announce plans to eliminate or better protect their stockpiles.**
 * Securing nuclear material is a challenging but necessary job "because the global stockpile of nuclear weapons materials is large enough to build 120,000 nuclear bombs (and ) because Osama bin Laden considers it his religious duty to obtain nuclear weapons and to use them against the U nited S tates," says Alexandra Toma of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a 40-member coalition dedicated to securing nuclear material.**
 * Five countries — the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China and France — are internationally recognized nuclear powers and have signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which pledges to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. India, Pakistan and North Korea also have nuclear weapons, and Israel is suspected of having warheads, according to the non-partisan Arms Control Association. Israel does not admit or deny having them.**
 * The United States and Russia hold the overwhelming majority of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the material that could be used to build a crude but devastating bomb.**
 * According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nuclear-security group run by former Democratic senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, there is no comprehensive inventory of the world's nuclear material. But 672 research reactors have been built worldwide and 272 operate in 56 countries, most at universities or other research centers where security is lax, the group says.**
 * "Much of the nuclear materials that are potentially vulnerable or could be used for nuclear weapons are actually in the hands of private industry, so government regulation is a very important component," Samore says.**
 * Some of the material already has been stolen, according to Harvard University's Matthew Bunn, author of //Securing the Bomb//. " Nuclear theft is not a hypothetical worry," he says. " It's an ongoing reality ."**
 * The International Atomic Energy Agency, a watchdog arm of the United Nations that monitors the use of nuclear power and technology , has documented 18 cases involving the theft or loss of plutonium or weapons-grade uranium , mostly occurring in the former Soviet Union. The IAEA says a majority of these cases have not had a pre-identified buyer and "amateurish character" and "poor organization" have been the hallmark of some of the cases involving unauthorized possession of materials.**
 * In Prague last year, Obama said, "Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound."**
 * Government efforts have been made to secure nuclear material in recent years. Last week, the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) worked with officials in Chile to remove nuclear material from reactors near Santiago and transport it to the USA.**
 * The agency has removed all significant amounts of highly enriched uranium from 18 countries, helped convert 60 reactors in 32 countries to the use of safer, low-enriched uranium and closed seven reactors.**
 * The NNSA also has secured highly enriched uranium in more than 750 buildings worldwide and safely stored 2,691 kilograms of nuclear material.**
 * Despite those efforts, in 2008, the Commission for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction warned, " Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack" by 2013 .**

=1ac – Insurgency=

Afghanistan is a vital safe haven for al Qaeda – terrorism is inevitable but nuclear risks can be reduced if the US drives them out Arkedis, 9 **- director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute. He was a counterterrorism analyst with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service from 2002 to 2007 (Jim, “Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven”, 10/23, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven)**


 * I spent five years as a counterterrorism analyst for the Pentagon and rigorously studied plots from Madrid to London to 9/11. The above arguments may have merit in a piecemeal or abstract sense, but fall apart in the specific case of what we all dread: a large-scale, al Qaeda operation aimed at the United States.**
 * It is certainly true, for example, that terrorist groups can accomplish much online. Individuals can maintain contact with groups via chat rooms, money can be transferred over the Web (if done with extreme caution), and plotters can download items like instruction manuals for bomb-making, photographs of potential targets, and even blueprints for particular buildings.**
 * But all the e-mail accounts, chat rooms, and social media available will never account for the human touch. There is simply no substitute for the trust and confidence built by physically meeting, jointly conceiving, and then training together for a large-scale, complex operation on the other side of the world. **
 * As the 9/11 plot developed, mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) put the future operatives through a series of training courses along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Courses included physical fitness, firearms, close combat, Western culture, and English language. The 9/11 Commission report notes the extreme physical and mental demands KSM put on the participants -- even if the operation didn't require extensive firearms usage, KSM would have wanted the operatives to be proficient under intense pressure, should the need arise.**
 * Juxtapose that with an online learning environment. While you can no doubt learn some amazing things from online courses, it is far preferable to have a dedicated professor physically present to supervise students and monitor their progress. Or think of it another way: You wouldn't want the U.S. Marine Corps to send recruits into battle without training under a drill instructor, would you? KSM was somewhere between a professor and sergeant.**
 * Second, critics argue that the Madrid bombings of 2004 (which killed 191) as well those in London a year later (which killed 56) were largely -- though not entirely -- conceived, prepared, and executed within their respective countries, thus obviating the need for a safe haven.**
 * True enough. However, unlike 9/11 (which killed nearly 3,000), those plots' successes were possible due to their simple concept and small scale. In both cities, the playbook was essentially the same: Four to eight individuals had to find a safe house, download bomb-making instructions, purchase explosive agents, assemble the devices, and deliver charges to the attack points. Without trivializing the tragic loss of life in the European attacks, building those explosive devices was akin to conducting a difficult high-school chemistry experiment.**
 * On that scale, 9/11 was like constructing a nuclear warhead. In every sense, it was a grander vision, involving 20 highly skilled operatives infiltrating the U.S. homeland, who conducted a series of hijackings and targeted four national landmarks with enough know-how, preparation, and contingency plans to be success. In one instance, KSM taught the 9/11 operatives to shoot a rifle from the back of a moving motorcycle, just in case. You can't do that in someone's bedroom -- you need space, time, and the ability to work without worrying that the cops are listening in.**
 * In other words, as a plot grows in number of operatives, scale of target, distance from base, and logistical complexity, so does the need for space to reduce the chances of being discovered and disrupted. **
 * The final argument is that denying al Qaeda a safe haven is an exercise in futility: Drive Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan and he'd relocate to some place like Sudan, southern Algeria, Somalia, or other swaths of ungoverned territory. However, this logic makes two faulty assumptions: that al Qaeda is mobile, and that the group's international affiliates would automatically roll out the red carpet for the jihadi refugees.**
 * Neither is true. Bin Laden and his senior and mid level cadre are well-known to intelligence services the world over. Any attempt to travel, let alone cross an international border (save Afghanistan-Pakistan) would fall somewhere between "utterly unthinkable" and "highly risky. " Moving would further require massive reorientation of al Qaeda's financial operations and smuggling networks.**
 * Nor would bin Laden's senior leaders be automatically welcomed abroad in areas their regional partners control. Though al Qaeda has established "franchise affiliates" in places like North Africa and Southeast Asia, relationships between al Qaeda's leadership and its regional nodes are extraordinarily complex. Groups like the North African affiliate "al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM) are happy to co-opt the al Qaeda "brand" for recruiting and financial reasons, but they don't necessarily share the al Qaeda senior leadership's ideological goals. AQIM is much more focused on attacking the Algerian government or foreign entities within the country, having not displayed much capability or desire for grandiose international operations. And last, recruits come to North Africa more often through independent networks in Europe, not camps along the Durand Line. Think of the relationship like the one you have your in-laws: You might share a name, but you probably don't want them coming to visit for three full weeks.**
 * Regional leaders aren't terribly loyal to senior leadership, either. Take Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the deceased leader of the group's Iraq affiliate. He was summoned to bin Laden's side numerous times in an attempt to exert control as the Iraqi commander's tactics grew more grotesque and questionable. Zarqawi declined, not wanting to risk travel or accept instruction from bin Laden.**
 * In the end, a safe haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is as good as it gets for al Qaeda's chances to launch a large-scale attack against the Un ited S tates. Certainly, smaller, less complex attacks could be planned without "Afghan real estate," but any such plot's death toll and long-term effect on American society will be far more limited. Unfortunately, that's a risk President Barack Obama has to accept -- no amount of intelligence or counterterrorism operations can provide 100 percent security. But to avoid the Big One, the U.S. president's best bet is to deny al Qaeda the only physical space it can access .**

=1ac – Insurgency=

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction Morgan, 9 **- Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct)**


 * In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’ [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange . As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian ‘‘dead hand’’ system, ‘‘where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,’’ it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the U nited S tates’’ [10].**
 * Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal ‘‘Samson option’’ against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well.**
 * And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or ‘‘lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the ‘‘use them or lose them’’ strategy and psychology ; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to ‘‘win’’ the war.**
 * In other words, once Pandora’s Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, ‘‘everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors’’ [10]. In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter .**

=1ac – Insurgency=

=1ac – Insurgency=

A substantial drawdown to a purely counterterrorism presence will maximize US influence in Central Asia and contain instability and terrorism Simon, and Stevenson, 9 *** adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, AND** Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, (Steven and Jonathan, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, 51:5, 47 – 67, October 2009 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=7132409)

An effort on that scale would garner majority US domestic support only if the public sees likely victory and Congress, the White House and the Beltway punditry line up decisively behind the policy. The emerging trends are pointing in the contrary direction. As monthly and annual US casualties in Afghanistan reached historical peaks in August 2009, and the Afghan national election loomed, a poll conducted by ABC News and the Washington Post indicated that most Americans did not support an extended US military commitment in Afghanistan.31 Congressional Democrats are balking at anticipated requests for more troops.32 And even conservative columnists, like the influential George F. Will, have turned against a maximalist Afghanistan policy.33 Overall, increasingly strong perceptions of the Karzai government as inept and corrupt are making prospects that the U nited S tates could enlist it as an effective counter-insurgency partner and lend it the legitimacy required to rebuild the country seem more and more baseless. The upshot is that only if the U nited St ates establishes a well-calibrated limited policy now will it have the political flexibility to sustain it over the longer-term and thereby to effectively contain the jihadist threat in Central Asia. If, on the other hand, the Obama administration promises more than it can deliver in Afghanistan, a reprise of Vietnam may occur: once failure becomes clear, domestic support will evaporate, the administration will be compelled to withdraw precipitously, and the U nited S tates will lose considerable traction in the region. Congressional democrats are balking at anticipated requests for more troops These factors suggest that the U nited S tates should limit its Afghanistan/Pakistan policy to counter-terrorism and disown country-wide counterinsurgency and state-building in Afghanistan. At the same time, Washington must remain highly sensitive to the dynamic whereby decreased military activity in Afghanistan combined with robust operations in Pakistan could induce al-Qaeda to return to Afghanistan and render it a main threat once again. In that light, any abrupt wholesale American military withdrawal from Afghanistan would be too risky. Instead, the United States should seek to facilitate a glide-path to a substantial drawdown - and with it fewer casualties and lower expenditures in Afghanistan - over the next few years. Doing so would involve continuing to suppress al-Qaeda in Pakistan with selective and discriminate drone strikes and denying al-Qaeda access to Afghanistan. The former would require bases within Afghan territory from which to deploy airpower and special-operations forces against terrorists and terrorist infrastructure, as well as the troops and equipment to secure these bases. The latter would call for reinforced border security and force protection within Afghanistan, which in themselves would entail a surprisingly large number of soldiers. For these purposes, the United S tates would continue to bring extensive human intelligence and surveillance capabilities to bear on Afghanistan to detect and assess potential threats to American interests. To mitigate and eliminate such threats, the generous deployment of US special-operations forces to Afghanistan - which currently comprises some 50% of all US special-operations personnel - would have to be maintained over the medium term. Meanwhile, US train-and-equip programmes for Afghan security forces should be intensified in contemplation of a gradual and controlled hand-off of the domestic counter-terrorism mission to them when they are ready, as well as to prepare them for counterinsurgency operations, should the Afghan government wish to use them for that purpose. The United States should also provide strong political and economic support for the Afghan government, which is likely to remain under Karzai once the votes of the 20 August election are counted and certified. Kabul, however, should be left to take the lead in managing its relationship with the Taliban (as well as anti-narcotics policy). With US encouragement, the Karzai government should make it clear to Pashtuns in the southern and eastern parts of the country that if they support insurgents or terrorists aiming to destabilise the Afghan or Pakistani governments, they will suffer financially and militarily. Again, some US forces would be needed to give such arrangements teeth, but not at the levels required for an all-out counter-insurgency. American insurance against a militant Islamist coup or an uncontrollable level of destabilisation also should be left in place. This could entail a standby stabilisation force with tactical air capabilities based in or near Kabul, along with a robust quick-reaction force. That policy would reflect the reality that a deeply committed counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan is potentially counterproductive, probably unwinnable and in any event unnecessary. The United States can protect its interests and fulfil its international security obligations with a far more circumscribed counter-terrorism effort focused on Pakistan. Under such an approach, US policy would recognise Afghanistan as the residual problem that it has, in fact, become. =1ac – Insurgency=


 * A counterterrorism posture empirically works – it reduces the threat of terrorism and can provide actionable intelligence without undermining US credibility**
 * Long, 10** - assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Austin, “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Spring 2010, Science Direct)

It will therefore take about three years to get to this posture. But will it work? First, this is clearly not the U.S. posture before September 11, 2001, so any comparisons to that period are inapt. Second, arguments that this was essentially the United States posture from 2002-2006 are much closer to the mark. However, here the argument is that this posture ‘‘failed’’ because the militants have made a comeback. Yet this misinterprets the strategic goal completely. If the strategic goal is a stable Afghanistan, then the strategy was a failure. If the strategic goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan, it was a success: there are, at present, few al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and certainly no senior leadership. In an interview on October 5, 2009 national security adviser James Jones noted of al Qaeda in Afghanistan that the ‘‘maximum estimate is less than 100 operating in the country, no bases, no ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies.’’41 The counterterrorism option merely seeks to ensure that this minimal level of al Qaeda presence continues in the future. Alternately, this argument conflates all militants under the rubric al Qaeda. This is problematic: if any thug with a Kalashnikov is a threat to U.S. national security then readers should prepare for a rough future as there are millions of them spread across the globe. It is this conflating of the local fighter with the global terrorist that David Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerilla rails against, so it would behoove the United States to avoid this error.42 More generally, Riedel and O’Hanlon claim this small footprint posture will be ineffective because actionable intelligence will not be obtained without a substantial conventional force ground presence. Yet this is belied by the fact that the U nited S tates gains actionable intelligence against targets in even very dangerous areas in which it has essentially no ground forces. In Somalia in 1993, a small U.S. task force, supported by a small conventional force, was able to collect intelligence on the Habr Gidr clan.43 CIA and special operations personnel were also able to collect intelligence in Iraq before the 2003 invasion.44 The United States also has a good track record of gaining actionable intelligence specifically against al Qaeda in hostile environments without conventional forces. At least three times in 2007-2009, the United States collected sufficient intelligence to enable strikes on al Qaeda affiliates in Somalia, where there are no conventional U.S. forces.45 A similar strike was launched in Yemen in 2002, another country lacking U.S. conventional forces.46 Across the border from Afghanistan in Pakistan it has struck even more targets (according to one source at least thirty eight from September 2008 to March 2009) despite having no conventional presence .47 Some will protest that the Pakistanis serve as the ground presence in Pakistan, but they do not have a substantial security force (or in some cases any at all) presence in many areas where the United States has targeted al Qaeda. For example, in the militant redoubt of South Waziristan, where the United States has launched multiple drone strikes, Pakistan had no significant conventional ground force presence until October 2009.48 Others argue Somalia and Yemen are poor comparisons because they are mostly flat and on the coast, making offshore intelligence collection easy. While true, this argument stresses access, not ground force presence, which enables collection. Yet with the posture recommended in this article, the United States is assured vastly greater access than it has in either Somalia or Yemen. In the period immediately after September 11, 2001, even with essentially no conventional ground presence in Afghanistan, small teams of U.S. intelligence and special operations forces worked with local allies to gain substantial intelligence on al Qaeda in an environment filled with hostile Taliban. A poorly executed operation at Tora Bora enabled Osama bin Laden to escape, but this was not because intelligence was unavailable. Even this failure resulted in the deaths of many al Qaeda associates and forced its leadership to flee the country.49 It seems implausible that a vastly more robust presence in Afghanistan would be significantly less capable of collecting intelligence than these small teams, or similar U.S. efforts in Somalia and Pakistan. At best, large numbers of U.S. troops make the work of intelligence collectors easier. Their presence helps prevent militants from massing forces to attack small units and provides readily available quick reaction forces, allowing collectors to assume more risk in collection. Conventional forces also collect some intelligence organically via patrols and engagements. With a reduced force posture, collectors will have to be more circumspect and work harder. Yet as the above examples of collection in hostile environment demonstrate, this will not prevent them from operating. Another argument against the small footprint is that U.S. ground forces in substantial numbers in Afghanistan have given the United States more leverage over Pakistan. According to this explanation, the increase in troops in Afghanistan provides the rationale for Pakistani offensive operations against militants in 2009 and also why U.S. drone targeting has been more successful in the same period. Yet the timing suggests that this change in behavior has more to do with Pakistani perceptions of the militants’ threat. Pakistani operations began when in April 2009 militants broke a ceasefire that was only a few weeks old and sought to expand their control towards the Punjabi heartland of Pakistan.50 This timing seems significant in explaining Pakistan’s offensives. In contrast, U.S. drone strikes increased in tempo beginning in late 2008, months before a decision to send more troops to Afghanistan was made.51 Even if troops do give leverage over Pakistan, how much is that leverage worth in U.S. blood and treasure? There is no sign that additional troops will cause Pakistan to stop supporting its proxies. In terms of the strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda, Pakistan was aiding U.S. intelligence collection and began allowing drone strikes in June 2004 when there were less than 18,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Thus, it seems likely they will not simply stop it with 13,000 there.52 The final argument marshaled against this small footprint posture is that it hands al Qaeda a major propaganda victory. It could claim it drove another superpower out, that the West lacks will, and the like. There is some merit in this argument but with 13,000 U.S. military personnel in the country hunting for al Qaeda day and night, it would probably not prove to be a resounding victory. More importantly, it is far from clear what this propaganda victory would mean in terms of the strategic goal. It would not appear to have much effect on the first two goals, as al Qaeda would continue to be disrupted and dismantled by operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the latter of which will remain highly unsafe for al Qaeda. It might make it harder to achieve the third goal, defeat. Yet it is this goal that is most unclear anyway. In fact, Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker argue in War 2.0 that, while it has become impossible for al Qaeda to ‘‘win’’ in any meaningful sense, its existence as a transnational social movement using various media means it cannot be totally defeated either.53 Finally, the U nited S tates has to leave Afghanistan at some point, so it is inevitable that it will make the claim to have driven the U nited S tates out. As policymakers have sought to grapple with the challenge of Afghanistan, the lessons of Vietnam have been invoked and debated by both those favoring an increase in U.S. troops and those against it.54 Yet Vietnam was not the United States only experience with irregular warfare in Southeast Asia. The U.S. experience in Laos provides a better historical analogy for U.S. strategic ends and means in Afghanistan. In Laos, the United States supported both a weak central state and minority tribes, principally the mountain dwelling Hmong. The U.S. goal was limited, seeking both to interdict the use of Laotian territory to supply Communist forces in South Vietnam and to tie down as many North Vietnamese units as possible. Beginning in 1961 and with only a handful of CIA case officers, development workers, and Special Forces personnel, the U.S. mission worked with Hmong leader Vang Pao to create an effective guerilla force. This force had notable successes against the Communists, evolving into a force capable of holding territory when supported by U.S. airpower and small numbers of Thai ground forces. Other CIA-supported irregular units and even a few Laotian government units were also effective. In addition, the strategy was able to tie down multiple North Vietnamese divisions and ensure that the Laotian government held about as much territory in 1972 as it did in 1962.55 As with Laos, U.S. goals in Afghanistan are strictly limited and do not require a major state building enterprise. If anything, U.S. goals in Afghanistan are more limited than in Laos, as the goal in the former is to keep out at a few hundred irregular fighters while the latter sought to oppose tens of thousands of disciplined soldiers. The limited goals in Laos could be achieved with limited means, making it sustainable for more than a decade. A similar limited means strategy will likewise make U.S. strategy in Afghanistan sustainable for the long term. To return to the point from which this analysis began—strategy is matching means and ends. If the ends desired are about al Qaeda, the counterterrorism option is the best fit in terms of means. It is sustainable, always crucial in prolonged conflict, as it limits the expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure. It is also less dependent on Pakistan choosing to abandon its proxies, a possibility that seems remote at present. The counterterrorism option is not only possible, but as Steve Simon and Jonathan Stevenson argue, it is the best alternative for the U nited S tates. =1ac – Insurgency=


 * Indicts of the counterterrorism option underestimate the size of what the plan leaves intact – it is sufficiently resourced to provide force protection, intelligence gathering, army training and will maintain the support of the local population**
 * Long, 10** - assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Austin, “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Spring 2010, Science Direct)

This insoluble problem is why the counterterrorism option is important. If even a costly effort in Afghanistan cannot fully achieve the goal against al Qaeda, then it is crucial to determine whether a less costly effort can achieve a similar effect by keeping Afghanistan inhospitable to al Qaeda. This would be a clear and cost-effective alignment of resources with goals, the essence of strategy. Determining the viability of the counterterrorism option requires detailing what it might look like. Most discussion of the counterterrorism option has been vague. Riedel and O’Hanlon sum it up as ‘‘a few U.S. special forces teams, modern intelligence fusion centers, cruise-missile-carrying ships and u nmanned a erial v ehicle s ...’’ But there has been little effort to put flesh on this skeleton in terms of numbers and locations of U.S. troops. The following section presents a possible counterterrorism force posture .// //Possible Counterterrorism Force Posture// //First, this posture would require maintaining bases in Afghanistan. Three airfields (see map below) would be sufficient: Bagram (about 50 kilometers north of Kabul), Jalalabad (in eastern Afghanistan) and Kandahar (in southern Afghanistan). This would enable forces to collect intelligence and rapidly target al Qaeda in the Pashtun regions where its allies would hold sway .// // In terms of special operations forces, this posture would rely on two squadrons of so-called ‘‘ Tier 1’’ operators, one at Jalabad Air Field (JAF) and one at Kandahar Air Field (KAF). These would be drawn from classified U.S. special mission units (SMUs) attached to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), U.S. Army Special Forces’ Combatant Commanders in Extremis Forces (CIFs), and allied units such as the British Special Air Service (SAS) or Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2).9 In addition, the posture would require a battalion equivalent of U.S. Army Rangers, U.S. Navy SEALs, U.S. Marine Special Operations Companies (MSOCs), British Special Forces Support Group, or some mix, with basically a company with each Tier 1 squadron or equivalent and one in reserve at Bagram.10// //These forces would work together as task forces, with the Tier 1 operators being tasked with executing direct action missions to kill or capture al Qaeda targets while the other units would serve as security and support for these missions. According to Sean Naylor’s reporting, these direct action task forces are structured like the regional task forces in Iraq in 2006 that were tasked to hunt al Qaeda in Iraq. Naylor also reports similar units are already in place in Afghanistan.11// // In addition to these ground forces, a battalion task force from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) would be used to provide helicopter transport, reconnaissance, and fire support for the task forces. The battalion would bring some mix of MH-47 heavy lift helicopters and MH60 medium lift helicopters, including the MH-60L gunship.12 The helicopters have a combat radius of at least 300 kilometers (km), giving the task forces operational reach to almost any part of the Pashtun region.13 This battalion could be supplemented with additional aviation assets from other units, such as CV-22 tilt rotor aircraft from the Air Force’s 8th Special Operations Squadron or AH-64 attack helicopters from any one of several Army aviation units.14// //The JAF based task force would likely need to operate principally in the heartland of the Haqqani network (Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces) as this would be where al Qaeda’s principal ally in the east could best protect its members (who are not generally Pashtun). For similar reasons, the KAF based task force would principally operate against targets in Kandahar, the home of the Quetta Shura Taliban, and some of the surrounding provinces such as Helmand and Oruzgan. Both task forces would nonetheless be capable of acting against targets elsewhere in the Pashtun regions.// // In addition to these two task forces, a counterterrorism option would retain the three Army Special Forces battalions and other elements that appear to be assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).15 This provides roughly 54 Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs), the basic unit of Army Special Forces. While the task forces would focus purely on direct action, ODAs would partner with local forces to collect intelligence and secure specific areas.16 Additionally, these ODAs would provide crucial support to critical Afghan allies and reassure them that the U nited S tates is not going to entirely abandon them. CJSOTF-A should, in addition, have a dedicated helicopter battalion for its own lift.// // This reassurance and support of local allies is a crucial and underappreciated part of a counterterrorism option, though such support to local allies could also be part of a counterinsurgency campaign. Indeed, the recently launched Community Defense Initiative (CDI) seeks to use Special Forces troops to build effective tribal militias to fight the Taliban and other militants .17 With 54 ODAs, the United States could potentially support local allies in roughly 50 Afghan districts, assuming one ODA per district with a few deployed in other roles.18 Logistics might prevent this upper limit from being reached but at a minimum several dozen districts could be supported by CJSOTF-A’s ODAs. These local allies would in many cases be from non-Pashtun groups (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras ), which would limit their ability to be effective in Pashtun areas but would likely include at least a few other tribes that see more benefit working with the Afghan government and the United States than against them.// // The non-Pashtun groups were the critical allies of the U nited S tates in 2001 and remain staunchly against the Taliban and other militants. The Tajiks of the Panjshir Valley, for example, are probably even more anti-Taliban than the United States and have made the province one of the most secure in the country.19 With U.S. support, these groups will be able to prevent the expansion of militants outside Pashtun areas .// // Local allies in Pashtun areas will not only help contain militants but will also enable collection of intelligence to support the task force operations. One example is the Shinwari tribe in Nangarhar province, which has never valued the Taliban. Shinwari militias are reported to be working with Special Forces in the Achin district of Nangarhar.20 The Afghan Border Police commander on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border at Spin Boldak, General Abdul Razziq, also derives substantial revenue from cross-border trade and will likely continue to fight the Taliban to maintain this revenue, making him a probable local partner.21 Another potential ally is the Alokozai tribe in the Arghandab district of Kandahar province, which has a history of resisting the Taliban.22// //Supporting local allies does not mean abandoning the Afghan government any more than supporting local allies in the Awakening movement in Iraq’s Anbar province meant abandoning the Iraq government. However, it does pose risks, as local allies interests may not always align with those of the central government.23 Balancing the two will require deftness which will be discussed later.// //In addition to the two task forces and CJSOTF-A, a few more ‘‘enablers’’ would be required. First, this posture would need additional special operations personnel focused on intelligence collection, along with a substantial complement of intelligence community personnel to collect both human and signals intelligence. 24 Second, it would require a significant complement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) including Predators, Reapers, and other specialized types along with their support personnel, equivalent to perhaps three squadrons. Third, an AC-130 gunship squadron for air support would be needed, along with combat search and rescue teams from Air Force Special Operations Command.// //Clearly, ‘‘small’’ is a relative term. This special operations posture alone would be roughly five battalions of ground forces, eight aviation squadrons/ battalions, and a few odds and ends plus higher headquarters. This would be approximately 5,000 U.S. and Coalition troops.25// //In addition, a conventional force component would be needed to serve as a quick reaction force, to provide security for the bases, and to protect convoys. A reasonable estimate for this force would be a brigade or regimental combat team, giving a battalion to each base with the higher headquarters at Bagram. This would add about another 3,500 troops.26 In addition, about 500 U.S. personnel would remain as advisers and liaisons to Afghan security forces, particularly the Afghan National Army where they would be attached at brigade and corps level.// //Additional air support besides the UAVs and AC-130s would also be needed. Two squadrons of fighter-bombers (F-15E, A-10, etc.) likely would be sufficient, adding another 2,000 personnel or so.27 Finally, this posture would require additional staff, logistics, and support personnel (medical for instance), some but not all of which could be contractors, adding another 2,000 military personnel.28 This would be a total force of about 13,000 military personnel and some supporting intelligence community personnel and contractors. This is a high-end estimate and the counterterrorism option could potentially be done with fewer troops. Some military personnel with Afghanistan experience believe this mission could be undertaken with half this number of troops but the posture described above errs on the side of caution.29 This is small compared to the current posture in Afghanistan, smaller still than the forces implied in General McChrystal’s report, and tiny compared to the peak number of forces in Iraq. On the other hand, it is vastly larger than any other counterterrorism deployment. //

//**Withdrawal of combat troops will immediately turn the population against the Taliban and shore up Afghan government legitimacy**// //**Dorronsoro,9 -**Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (January 2009, Gilles, “Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf)//

//This three-zone strategy is not,// per se, //a gamechanger, and it must be accompanied by an incremental, phased withdrawal. The withdrawal would not be a consequence of “stabilization,” but rather an essential part of the process. Since __the presence of__ __foreign troops is the most important factor in mobilizing support for the Taliban__, the beginning of the __withdrawal would__ __change the political game on two levels__. First, __Jihad would become__ __a motivation for fewer Afghan__s; instead, __the conflict would be mostly seen as a civil war.__ Second, __the pro-government population__ (or, more exactly, the anti-Taliban one) __would rally together because of fear of a Taliban victory____.__// //Why Withdraw the Combat Troops ? Reframing the War// //There is an argument against withdrawing combat troops: namely, that al-Qaeda would retain its sanctuary in Afghanistan because the Afghan state would not have control of some parts of the country, especially in the east. Though superficially compelling, this argument is weak for two reasons. First, the international coalition lacks the resources to control the periphery of the Afghan territory anyway. Second, __the withdrawal of combat troops does not preclude targeted operations with the agreement of the Kabul government__. So, in terms of physical security, __the withdrawal of combat troops does not bring clear gains for al-Qaeda.__// //There are two important reasons for withdrawal.// //First, __the mere presence of foreign soldiers fighting a war in Afghanistan is probably the single most important factor in the resurgence of the Taliban.__ The convergence of nationalism and Jihad has aided the Taliban in extending its influence. It is sometimes frightening to see how similar NATO military operations are to Soviet ones in the 1980s and how the similarities could affect the perceptions of the population. __The majority of Afghans are__ __now deeply opposed to the foreign troops on their soil__. **__The idea that one can “stabilize” Afghanistan with more troops goes against__** **__all that one should have learned from the Soviet war.__** The real issue is not to “stabilize” but to create a new dynamic. The Taliban have successfully framed the war as a Jihad and a liberation war against (non-Muslim) foreign armies. The concrete consequence of this moral victory is that the movement has been able to gain ground in non-Pashtun areas. The situations in Badghris Province (northwest) and in Badakhshan Province (northeast) are extremely worrisome, because the Taliban have been able to attract the support of some Pashtun tribes and fundamentalist networks. A province like Wardak, initially opposed to the Taliban in the 1990s, is now one of its strongholds. Insecurity bred by the narcotics trade and the infighting of local groups in the north also provides the Taliban opportunities to find new allies on a more practical, rather than ideological, ground. This trend is extraordinarily dangerous, since the spread of the war geographically would put Western countries in an untenable position.// //Second, __withdrawal would create a new dynamic in the country, providing two main benefits__. __The momentum of the Taliban would slow or stop altogether, because without a foreign occupier the Jihadist and nationalist feelings of the population would be much more difficult to mobilize__. Furthermore__, the Karzai regime would gain legitimacy__. If Karzai (or his successor) receives enough help from the international coalition, he would be able to develop more centralized institutions in the strategic areas or at least keep local actors under control. __The regime would remain corrupt but would appear more legitimate if it succeeded in bringing security to the population in the strategic zones without the help of foreign troops.__ The support of the urban population, which opposes the Taliban, is a critical issue. __Corruption is a problem primarily if it accelerates the independence of Afghanistan’s peripheral regions.__//

Withdrawal --> credibility – deadline --> fuck. CONDITIONS BASED APPROACH -

Nationalism based off a large US military footprint – add.// // nelson and doroonsoro card – different reasons why COIN FAILS// // current strategy = population protection Predictive about// //Government will be delegitimized later//

//Local forces --> no Karzai gvt and causes state collapse//

//What’s the impact to Karzai corruption --> no support anything besides Karzai – see Karzai as corruptible// //withdrawal --> strategic reserve – spun wheels a little – friendman = good to help make this argument

Internal US army studies//

//Researchers – vast majority consider foreign forces occupiers--> nothing to do//

//US = blamed as tax of the Taliban – don’t want to be perceived as//

//Even if do a GOOD POPULATION STRATEGY – can’t prevent IEDs – these kill the population – even though reduced the US gets blamed for encouraging the Taliban//

//Corruption undermines the afghan army – taliban’s momentum = increasing// //gvt = unsuccessful // //answers ct failure – gets out of a lot of neg args AT CT

different long card in the old 1AC – should read both – probably will have to read less.

Harder args about CT fails in this evidence – DISTINGUISHES from CT proposal most other commentators talk about – just a few other special ops teams – proposal that leaves a large footprint in Afghanistan is QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT – can collect intelligence and establish force protection for the cT mission – combined with CT --> answers that turn VERY WELL.

involves coop w/ local population – force protection to answer logistics – there would be a relatively large footprint that he says is 13,000 personnel – small footprint overall – MUCH DIFFERENT

Local training and decentralization --> solves the CP Das. Still involves training the army but pretty good. How can you access this if most interps are a SMALLER FORCE. You get to define the intent of your plan – 13,000 and 20,000. You’re not withdrawing to what O’Hanlon says.

Small footprint that’s bigger than what the other people say.

VASTLY LARGER THAN ANY OTHER CT DEPLOYMENT – THIS DISTINGUISHES IT FROM OTHER OPTIONS.

Use population protection answers below to answer bilat cp

ALSO – use withdraw da answers below