James+and+bCliff

=Korean Conflict Adv=


 * Advantages**
 * Korean Conflict**
 * Regionalism**


 * Plan:**
 * The United States federal government should implement a phased withdrawal of its ground troops in the Republic of Korea.**


 * Advantage 1 is Korean Conflict**


 * U.S. presence makes North Korean provocations inevitable and guarantees our draw in**
 * Bandow, 10** – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/3/10, Doug, “Taming Pyongyang,” [], JMP)

Suspicions continue to mount that North Korea torpedoed the Cheonan, a South Korean corvette which sank more than a month ago in the Yellow Sea to the west of the Korean peninsula. Policy makers in both Seoul and Washington are pondering how to respond. __The potential__, even if small, __of renewed conflict on the peninsula demonstrates that today’s status quo is unsatisfactory for all of the North’s neighbors.__ The Korean War ended in an armistice nearly six decades ago. No peace treaty was ever signed; over the years the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea committed numerous acts of war, most dramatically attempting to assassinate South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a visit to Burma and seizing the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo. Conflict was avoided because the United States, long the senior partner to the Republic of Korea in their military alliance, refused to risk igniting a new conflict. __In recent years the DPRK’s conduct has remained predictably belligerent but constrained__: fiery threats, diplomatic walk-outs, policy reversals, and unreasonable demands have mixed with occasional cooperative gestures as Washington and Seoul attempted to dissuade the North from developing nuclear weapons. __North Korean relations **recently** **have been in a down cycle**__**__.__** __Pyongyang has walked out of the__ long-running __Six Party talks__ and failed in its attempt to engage Washington. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy,” which essentially entailed shipping money and tourists north irrespective of the DPRK’s conduct, causing North Korea to downgrade economic and diplomatic contacts and even recently confiscate South Korean investments. Japan’s relations with the North remain stalled over the lack of accounting over the kidnapping of Japanese citizens years ago. __Still, for at least two decades Pyongyang had eschewed military action.__ Shots were fired between South and North Korean ships last November near the disputed boundary in the Yellow Sea, but no harm was done. __Brinkmanship was the DPRK’s standard diplomatic strategy. Triggering a new war was not____. Why the North would sink a South Korean vessel is a matter of speculation.__ More critical is the response. Now what? The issue is most pressing in Seoul. South Korean officials say the investigation continues as they seek definitive evidence that a torpedo sunk the Cheonan. The tragedy would be no less if the cause was a mine, but the latter could be dismissed as an unfortunate occurrence rather than deliberate attack. If the sinking was intentional, however, the ROK must respond. To do nothing would reward the North and encourage additional irresponsible action. President Lee Myung-bak has said: “I’m very committed to responding in a firm manner if need be.” One South Korean diplomat suggested to me that __the South will seek Security Council condemnation of the DPRK____.__ This is in line with President Lee’s promise “to cooperate with the international community in taking necessary measures when the results are out.” But even if Seoul won Chinese support for a UN resolution, __the ROK would have to take bilateral measures. That certainly would end investment and aid, likely would prevent negotiations and **possibly would entail military retaliation**__**.** __The result__ not only __would__ mean a serious and prolonged worsening of bilateral relations and increase in bilateral tensions, but could __end any chance__—admittedly today very slim—__of reversing North Korean nuclear development.__ Moreover, a military strike would entail a chance of war. **__Tit-for-tat retaliation might spiral out of control__****__.__** The potential consequences are horrifying. __The ROK nevertheless might be willing to take the risk. Not Washington____.__ The United States is cooperating in the investigation and reportedly urging the Lee government to wait for proof before acting. But even if the DPRK is culpable, the last thing the Obama administration wants is another war. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last month: “I hope that there is no talk of war, there is no action or miscalculation that could provoke a response that might lead to conflict.” From America’s standpoint, avoiding a potentially bloody war on the Korean peninsula while heavily involved in Afghanistan and still tied down in Iraq is far more important than South Korean concerns over justice and credibility. The People’s Republic of __China__ also __would__ __be a big loser in any war: refugees would and conflict could spill over the Yalu.__ The North Korean state likely would disappear, leaving a united Korea allied with America and hosting U.S. troops near China’s border. Beijing’s international reputation would suffer as its policy of aiding the North was fully and dramatically discredited. __Japan__ would be less vulnerable to the consequences of war but __could be the target of North Korean attempts to strike out____.__ Undoubtedly, Tokyo also would be asked to contribute to the peninsula’s reconstruction. Of course, North Korea and its people would suffer the most. The former would cease to exist. That would be an international good, but **__millions of North Koreans likely would die__** or otherwise suffer along the way. War would be a tragic end to decades of hardship and isolation. What to do? Seoul needs some degree of certainty before acting. So long as the sinking might have been caused by a mine, the ROK cannot act decisively. If a torpedo attack is the most likely cause, however, winning Security Council backing would be a useful step. Then finding the right level of response, including possibly closing the Kaesong industrial park in the North or targeting a North Korean vessel for destruction, would be necessary. If it chooses the latter, the ROK would need Washington’s backing and China’s understanding. Finally, a lot of people in several countries would have to cross their fingers and say some prayers. In any case, the six-party talks would seem kaput. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said the Obama administration remained committed to the negotiations despite the sinking, stating that “I wouldn’t necessarily link those directly.” Yet __the likelihood that Pyongyang would yield its nuclear weapons while sinking South Korean vessels seems **vanishingly small.**__ __Even a minimal possibility of a negotiated settlement should be pursued, but at some point__ **__the effort simply looks foolish.__** That’s the short-term. Two longer-term issues require attention, however the current controversy is resolved. First, __the__ __U__nited __S__tates __and ROK must reconsider their alliance relationship__. Even on the issue of defending against the DPRK their interests differ: Seoul must satiate an angry public desiring vengeance as well as preserve its credibility in confronting the North. **__America must avoid another war at most any cost__****__.__** __Given the South’s level of development, it makes no sense for its defense decisions to be subject to Washington’s veto. Nor does it make any sense for the__ __U__nited __S__tates __to **risk being drawn into a war**__ __as a result of acts between other nations. These **bilateral differences are only likely to grow**, especially if the relationship between America and China grows more contentious.__ __Then South Korea could find itself risking involvement in Washington’s war.__ Also involved is the ROK’s self-respect. In two years the U.S. plans on devolving operational control of the combined forces to South Korea. Yet some South Koreans fear their nation won’t be ready to lead its own defense. That Washington took military command in underdeveloped, impoverished South Korea in 1950 is understandable. To argue that America must continue doing so in 2010 is bizarre.


 * Even if a conflict won’t start __intentionally__, current high tensions risk __accidents__ that __escalate__ to global nuclear war**
 * STRATFOR, 10** (5/26/10, “North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula,” [], JMP)

Managing Escalation But __no one____, of course, is interested in another war on the Korean Peninsula__. Both sides will posture, but at the end of the day, __neither benefits from a major outbreak of hostilities.__ And despite the specter of North Korean troops streaming under the DMZ through tunnels and wreaking havoc behind the lines in the south (a scenario for which there has undoubtedly been significant preparation), neither side has any intention of invading the other. __So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could precipitate escalation — that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, **the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quite real****.**__ Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. __For nearly 40 years, tensions__ __on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War.__ __During__ __that time it was feared that a second Korean War could all too **easily escalate into and a thermonuclear World War III**__, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But __current tensions are **quickly escalating to a level unprecedented**__ __in the post-Cold War period____, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.__


 * The status quo is fundamentally different – nuclear use is now likely and deterrence won’t solve**
 * Chung, 10** – Visiting Professor at the School of International Relations, Nanyang Technological University and former Professor of international relations at Seoul National University (6/1/10, Chung Chong Wook, “The Korean Crisis: Going Beyond the Cheonan Incident,” http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0352010.pdf)

The sinking of the Cheonan, for which South Korea blames Pyongyang, has triggered a crisis in the Korean peninsula. Though there is every reason to be pessimistic about the future, there is also a need to look beyond the crisis for long-term regional stability. __SHARPLY RISING military tensions following the sinking of a South Korean naval corvette are **creating a crisis in the Korean peninsula**__**__.__** __It is not the first time that the Korean peninsula is engulfed in a crisis, but__ **__this one is different__**__. There are good reasons to view the current crisis with grave concern.__ One is the nature of the crisis. __The current imbroglio__ is not an unintended consequence of an accident. Nor was it an act of terrorism. It __was__ what could be __a carefully planned and well-executed act of war__ where a 1,200-tonne naval ship, the Cheonan, was blown into half, killing 46 soldiers -- at least that is the conclusion in South Korea. The Nuclear Factor After a month-long investigation, the Seoul government announced that the ship was hit by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine. The evidence it produced included the tail part of the torpedo recovered from the bottom of the sea where the ship sank. President Lee Myung-bak, demanding the North’s apology, announced a series of measures suspending all inter-Korea cooperation except in the humanitarian area. North Korea, which earlier denied its involvement, immediately cut off almost all land, air and sea lines of communications with the South. It warned that any violation was to be dealt with by the wartime laws. It also placed its armed forces on special alert. __The two Koreas appear to be heading for a serious military confrontation____.__ __Another factor that adds to the severity of the current crisis is the nuclear capability of the North__.. Pyongyang is believed to have fissionable materials enough for up to ten plutonium bombs. __Its two nuclear tests so far reinforced the possibility of **all-out military flare-up involving nuclear weapons**__**__.__** The nuclear logic could certainly apply for deterring a war, but **__North Korea has proven that the rational logic of deterrence may not necessarily hold__**__.__ __Such is the risk of dealing with a desperate country whose brinkmanship tactics often defy the strategic calculus of its neighbours.__ The drastic decline in the South Korean stock market is indicative of how the situation is perceived. Despite all these ominous developments, however, premature pessimism is not advisable.


 * Reinforcing deterrence just makes __miscalculation__ more likely**
 * Armstrong, 10** **–** Professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University (Charles, 5/26/10, CNN, “The Korean War never ended” [])

New York (CNN) -- The Korean War began 60 years ago on June 25, 1950, and it still hasn't ended. Fighting on the Korean Peninsula may have stopped with a cease-fire in July 1953, but North and South Korea have remained in a tense state of armed truce ever since, with open warfare just a hair-trigger away. The sinking of the South Korean navy vessel Cheonan on March 26 -- which an international investigation team concluded last week to be the result of a North Korean torpedo attack -- shows how volatile the situation remains between North and South. __There is a real danger of the current war of words escalating into a shooting war, which would be a catastrophe for Korea and the surrounding region. But if all sides, including the United States, pull back from the brink, this tragedy may also present an opportunity to defuse tensions with North Korea and resume talks that have been on hold for the last two years.__ The Cheonan disaster caused an outcry of grief and anger in South Korea. On May 24, South Korea's President Lee Myung-bak gave a forceful speech to his countrymen, asserting that South Korea would not tolerate any provocation from the North and would pursue "proactive deterrence." South Koreans, Lee vowed, "will immediately exercise our right of self-defense" if their territorial waters, airspace or territory are violated." Lee called the sinking of the Cheonan, in which 46 sailors died, a violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Korean War Armistice and said he would turn to the U.N. Security Council for international support in condemning North Korea. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has demanded North Korea face "consequences" for this attack. But North Korea denies involvement in the incident, claiming the whole investigation is a fabrication designed to undermine North-South Korean relations and ignite a war against the North. The North Koreans have said any retaliation against them for the incident would be met with a forceful and immediate response, up to and including all-out war. China has so far been neutral about the investigation's findings, calling the incident a "tragedy" but refusing to blame North Korea and calling for calm on all sides. Without China's support, no call for action against North Korea will make it through the U.N. Security Council. (China is one of the five nations that hold veto power on the Council.) China supported two rounds of U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang, after North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, but is unlikely to support sanctions this time. North Korea denies responsibility for the incident and China regards the evidence as inconclusive. Besides, __it's hard to see what further economic or diplomatic pressure can be put on North Korea, which already faces tough previous sanctions____.__ Contrary to common belief, North Korea is not facing internal political disarray or economic decline. Kim Jong Il appears to be fully in charge, and harvests for the last two years have been relatively good. Chinese sources estimate a substantial increase in North Korean industrial production over the last year. Whatever may have motivated the attack on the Cheonan, it was not the act of a desperate or divided regime, and the strong sanctions called for by President Lee -- even if China would agree to support and enforce them -- are not likely to get North Korea to admit responsibility for the attack or to change its behavior. On the other hand, __there is a real danger of this war of words escalating into a shooting war.__ With well over a million Korean troops facing each other across the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South, along with 29,000 U.S. troops in the South, and North Korea now armed with nuclear weapons, the consequences of a renewed Korean War would be catastrophic for the Korean peninsula and the entire Northeast Asia region. __The Cheonan incident has reinforced U.S.-South Korean__ __and U.S.-Japanese cooperation in deterring the North. But **deterrence can look like provocation from the other side,** **and in such a tense and volatile environment, a slight miscalculation can lead to disaster.**__ __Anger and outrage may be understandable, but cooler heads must prevail. Millions of lives are at stake. Rather than lead to deepening confrontation, this tragedy may be an opportunity to re-engage North Korea in talks__ to scale back and ultimately eliminate its nuclear program, and to promote security and economic cooperation with its neighbors. North Korea has never admitted to acts of terrorism in the past, and we cannot expect it to acknowledge responsibility and apologize for the sinking of the Cheonan as a precondition for such talks. Instead, the international community should take advantage of Kim Jong Il's stated willingness to return to multilateral negotiations, suspended since 2008, as a way of reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. It is time to end the Korean War, not start it anew.


 * The U.S. response to bolster deterrence will just increase provocations and make miscalculation more likely**
 * Armstrong, 10** **–** Professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University.. (Charles, 5/26/10, CNN, “The Korean War never ended” [])

On the other hand, __there is a real danger of this war of words escalating into a shooting war____.__ With well over a million Korean troops facing each other across the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South, along with 29,000 U.S. troops in the South, and North Korea now armed with nuclear weapons, the consequences of a renewed Korean War would be catastrophic for the Korean peninsula and the entire Northeast Asia region. __The Cheonan incident has reinforced U.S.-South Korean and U.S.-Japanese cooperation in deterring the North. But **deterrence can look like provocation from the other side, and in such a tense and volatile environment, a slight miscalculation can lead to disaster****.**__ __Anger and outrage may be understandable, but cooler heads must prevail. Millions of lives are at stake. Rather than lead to deepening confrontation, this tragedy may be an opportunity to re-engage North Korea in talks__ to scale back and ultimately eliminate its nuclear program, and to promote security and economic cooperation with its neighbors. North Korea has never admitted to acts of terrorism in the past, and we cannot expect it to acknowledge responsibility and apologize for the sinking of the Cheonan as a precondition for such talks. Instead, the international community should take advantage of Kim Jong Il's stated willingness to return to multilateral negotiations, suspended since 2008, as a way of reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula. It is time to end the Korean War, not start it anew.


 * Withdrawing __ground troops__ solves – stops North Korea from probing U.S. weakness to draw our forces into a wider conflict. Air and naval installations will maintain power projection capabilities.**
 * Stanton, 10** – U.S. Army Judge Advocate in Korea from 98-02 and practicing attorney in Washington, D.C. (4/12/10, Joshua, The New Ledger, “It's Time for the U.S. Army to Leave Korea,” [], JMP)

Proceeding against the advice of my cardiologist, I must concede that for once, Ron Paul is actually on to something. __The ground component of U.S. Forces Korea__, which costs U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars a year to maintain, __is an__ equally __unaffordable political liability on the South Korean street. We should withdraw it____.__ Every Saturday night off-post brawl is a headline in the muck-raking Korean press, for which the American soldier is inevitably blamed, and for which angry mobs perpetually demand renegotiations of the Status of Force Agreement to give Korea’s not-even-remotely-fair judicial system more jurisdiction over American soldiers. __The South Korean people do not appreciate__ the security __our soldiers__ provide. The way some of them treat our soldiers ought to be a national scandal. Many off-post businesses don’t even let Americans through their front doors. **__The degree of anti-Americanism in South Korea is sufficient to be a significant force protection issue in the event of hostilities__****__.__** South Korea does not have our back. South Korea made much of the fact that it sent 3,000 soldiers to Iraq, where they sat behind concrete barriers in a secure Kurdish area of Iraq, protected by peshmerga, making no military contribution and taking no combat casualties. Their contribution to the effort in Afghanistan has been negligible, which is more than can be said of their contribution to the Taliban (previous President Roh Moo Hyun reportedly paid them a ransom of up to $20 million in 2007 to free South Korean hostages who took it upon themselves to charter a shiny new bus to bring Christianity to Kandahar). South Korea has been an equally unsteady ally against China. __The American security blanket has fostered a state of national adolescence by the South Korean public.__ Too many of them (some polls suggest most) see America as a barrier to reunification with their ethnic kindred in the North. Maybe nothing short of a North Korean attack on the South can encourage more sober thinking by South Koreans about their own security, but I suspect a greater sense of self-reliance and even vulnerability might. During my service in Korea, as U.S. taxpayers subsidized South Korea’s defense, South Korea subsidized Kim Jong Il’s potential offense with billions of dollars in hard currency that sustained the very threat against which we were ostensibly helping to defend. South Korea never made North Korea’s disarmament a condition of this aid. Instead, that aid effectively undermined U.S. and U.N. sanctions meant to force North Korea to disarm. What does South Korea have to show for this colossal outlay now. __Because South Korea, now__ one the world’s wealthiest nations, __expects__ up to 600,000 __American soldiers to__ arrive __protect it__ from any security contingency, __successive South Korean governments actually cut their nation’s defense rather than modernizing it__ __and building an effective independent defense.__ Consequently, South Korea still has a 1970-vintage force structure, designed around a 1970-vintage threat, equipped with 1970-vintage weapons. This is partly the legacy of ten years of leftist administrations, but it’s also the legacy of military welfare that allowed South Korea to defer upgrading its equipment, building a professional volunteer army, and organizing an effective reserve force to deal with security contingencies. Worst of all, __South Korea diverted billions of dollars that should have been spent on modernizing its military into regime-sustaining aid to Kim Jong Il__, to be used, as far as anyone knows, for nukes, missiles, artillery, and pretty much everything but infant formula. To this day, South Korea continues to resist accepting operational control over its own forces in the event of war. The U.S. Army presence in Korea is an anachronism, defending against the extinct threat of a conventional North Korean invasion. __The far greater danger is that if Kim Jong Il assesses our current president as weak, he will choose more limited or less conventional means to strike at our soldiers and their families.__ Given the reported presence of Taliban operatives in Seoul, he might even plausibly deny responsibility for an attack. Thus, while I don’t go so far as to accept the Princess Bride Doctrine (”never get involved in a land war in Asia”), __I do not believe it is wise for us to have our forces within easy artillery range of Kim Jong Il, such that he may freely choose the time, place, and manner of our involvement__ I offer two qualifications here. First, __this is not to suggest that we unilaterally abrogate the alliance with South Korea. **Our air and naval installations in Korea provide useful power-projection capability**__ __and are far more secure__, ironically, than our many scattered and isolated Army posts. I can imagine any number of contingencies for which we’d want to have the ability to move people and supplies into South Korea in a hurry. Second, this is not to suggest that Ron Paul is not an anti-Semitic crypto-racist advocate of a thoughtlessly escapist foreign policy, and broadly speaking, an imbecile. This is just one occasion in which he inadvertently, in the fashion of a stopped clock, aligns with the correct result.


 * Conventional weaknesses will force North Korea to resort to CBW use – either deliberate, accidental or unathorized**
 * ICG, 09** (6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” [], JMP)

This report examines North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities in the context of its military doctrine and national objectives. It is based on open source literature, interviews and unpublished documents made available to Crisis Group. Companion reports published simultaneously assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and what the policy response of the international community should be to its recent nuclear and missile testing.[1] North Korea’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles pose serious risks to security. __Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities are the greatest threat____, but it also possesses a **large stockpile of chemical weapons** and is suspected of maintaining a biological weapons program.__ The Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) had been underway since August 2003 with the objective of ending the North’s nuclear ambitions, before Pyongyang announced its withdrawal in April 2009, but __there is no direct mechanism for dealing with its chemical weapons and possible biological weapons. The North Korean leadership is very unlikely to surrender its WMD **unless there is** **significant change in the political and security environments.**__ The Six-Party Talks pro­duced a “Statement of Principles” in September 2005 that included a commitment to establish a permanent peace mechanism in North East Asia, but the structure and nature of such a cooperative security arrangement is subject to interpretation, negotiation and implementation. Views among the parties differ, and no permanent peace can be established unless North Korea abandons all its WMD programs. The diplomatic tasks are daunting, and diplomacy could fail. If North Korea refuses to engage in arms control and to rid itself of WMD, the international community must be prepared to deal with a wide range of threats, including those posed by Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities. __Unclassified estimates of the chemical weapons__ (CW) __arsenal are imprecise, but **the consensus** is that the__ Korean People’s Army __(KPA) possesses 2,500-5,000 tons,__ including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun and V-agents (persistent nerve agents). __The stockpile__ does not appear to be increasing but __is **already sufficient**__ __to inflict massive civilian casualties on South Korea____.__ The North’s CW can be delivered with long-range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels. North Korean military doctrine emphasises quick offensive strikes to break through enemy defences in order to achieve national military objectives before the U.S. can intervene effectively on behalf of its South Korean ally. However, __the North’s conventional military capabilities are declining against those of its potential foes, so the leadership is likely to rely on asymmetric capabilities for its national security objectives. This strategy poses a significant danger because it risks **deliberate, accidental or unauthorised WMD attacks or incidents****.**__


 * North Korean bioweapon use would __spread globally__ within __six weeks__ – greater risk that nuclear weapons**
 * Levy, 07** (6-8-07, Janet Ellen, The American Thinking, “The Threat of Bioweapons,” [], JMP)

Immediately following 9-11, an anthrax attack originating from letters containing anthrax spores infected 22 people, killing five. After almost six years, the case has not been solved. __Intelligence analysts and academics report that North Korea has developed anthrax, plague, and__ __botulism toxin and conducted extensive research on smallpox, typhoid and cholera.__ A world-renowned bioweapons expert has confirmed that Syria has weapons grade smallpox resistant to all current vaccines developed under the cover of legitimate veterinary research on camelpox, a very closely related virus. The researcher further reports that Syria is suspected of testing the pathogen on prison populations and possibly in the Sudan. Although there are close to 50 organisms that could be used offensively, rogue nations have concentrated their bioweapons development efforts on smallpox, anthrax, plague, botulinum, tularemia and viral hemorrhagic fevers. With the exception of smallpox, which is exclusively a human host disease, all of the other pathogens lend themselves to animal testing as they are zoonotic, or can be transmitted to humans by other species. __Biological weapons are among the most dangerous in the world today and can be engineered and disseminated to achieve a **more deadly result than a nuclear attack****.**__ Whereas the explosion of a nuclear bomb would cause massive death in a specific location, __a biological attack with smallpox could infect multitudes of people across the globe. With incubation periods of up to 17 days, human disseminators could unwittingly cause widespread exposure before diagnosable symptoms indicate an infection and appropriate quarantine procedures are in place.__ Unlike any other type of weapon, __bioweapons__ such as smallpox __can replicate and infect a chain of people over an indeterminate amount of time from a single undetectable point of release. According to__ science writer and author of The Hot Zone, Richard __Preston, "If you took a gram of smallpox__, which is highly contagious and lethal, and __for which there's no vaccine available globally now, and released it in the air and created about a hundred cases, the chances are excellent that **the virus would go global in six weeks**__ as people moved from city to city......__the death toll could easily hit the hundreds of millions.....**in scale, that's like a nuclear war.**__**__"__****[**1] __More so than chemical and nuclear research, bioweapons development programs lend themselves to **stealth development**.__ They are difficult to detect, can be conducted alongside legimate research on countermeasures, sheltered in animal research facilities within sophisticated pharmaceutical corporations, disguised as part of routine medical university studies, or be a component of dual use technology development. Detection is primarily through available intelligence information and location-specific biosensors that test for the presence of pathogens. __Biological weapons have many appealing qualities for warfare and their effects can be engineered and customized from a boutique of possibilities.__ Offensive pathogens are inexpensive compared to conventional weapons and small quantities can produce disproportionate damage. They have unlimited lethal potential as carriers and can continue to infect more people over time. **__Bioweapons are easy to dispense__** __through a variety of delivery systems from a missile, an aerosol or a food product____.__ They can be placed into a state of dormancy to be activated at a later stage allowing for ease of storage. __Pathogens are not immediately detectable or identifiable due to varying incubation periods__ __and can be rapidly deployed, activated and impossible to trace.__ The technology to develop biological agents is widely available for legitimate purposes and large quantities can be developed within days.


 * Impact is extinction**
 * Ochs 02** – MA in Natural Resource Management from Rutgers University and Naturalist at Grand Teton National Park [Richard, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” Jun 9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html]

__Of all the weapons of mass destruction____, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth.__ Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. __While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily__, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. __There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions.__ The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. __With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever.__ Potentially worse than that, __bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation____.__ AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? __HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE__. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. __To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute.__ Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate.. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. __We__ truly __hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life.__ Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.

E**ven if the attack fails the United States will retaliate** SCHNEIDER 1997 (Barry, Director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Future Conflict Studies at the U.S. Air War College., Future War and Counterproliferation, 72-73) Calum As a result, today, in the minds of many, the only legitimate use of U.S. nuclear weapons would be in response to a direct nuclear attack on the United States, its forces, its allies, or its vital interests.13 A U.S. nuclear response to much less severe attacks likely would be seen as severely disproportionate to the provocation, even if chemical or biological attacks were launched. However, __if enemy__ CBW __attacks__ were directed against important target~ in the American homeland, or if they __caused horrific numbers of U.S. and allied casualties in the field____, it might well be that U.S. public opinion then woul.d sanction a U.S. nuclear retaliatory response. In that case, an aroused American public might demand harsh nuclear retribution.__

Destroys the world economy and causes retaliation leading to global war __Diamond 8__ (John, 10/9/08, Washington fellow of the Saga Foundation, “A financial apocalypse isn't nearly as scary as a nuclear one,” http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/10/a-financial-apo.html) BB

The aftershocks As the Saga Foundation — a non-profit organization focused on the threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction — argued in a recent white paper, the vast damage at and around a nuclear ground zero would be dwarfed in scope by the national and global economic aftershocks. These aftershocks would stem not only from the explosion itself but also from a predictable set of decisions a president would almost certainly have to make in grappling with the possibility of a follow-on attack. Assuming, as the experts believe likely, that such a weapon would have to be smuggled into the country, the president could be expected to close the nation's borders, halt all freight commerce and direct a search of virtually any moving conveyance that could transport a nuclear weapon. Most manufacturing would then cease. In a nation that lives on just-in-time inventory, these developments could empty the nation's shelves in days. The effects of post-attack decision-making go far beyond this example. If U.S. intelligence determined that one or more countries had somehow aided and abetted the attack, we would face the prospect of full-scale war. Even short of that, the nation would demand, and the president would almost certainly order, a level of retaliation at the suspected locus of the attacking group that would dwarf the post-9/11 military response. The possibility of follow-on attacks could transform our notions of civil liberties and freedom forever. And as former 9/11 Commission co-chairman Lee Hamilton has pointed out, a nuclear terrorist attack would prompt a collapse in public faith in the government's ability to protect the American people. Think your 401(k) hurts now? The presidential nominees, and the American people, should reconsider the tendency to view these two issues — economic crisis and the threat of catastrophic terrorism — as separate problems. A nuclear attack on a U.S. city would not only devastate the target and kill possibly hundreds of thousands, it would also create instantaneous national and global economic ripple effects with incalculable consequences. To put it in personal terms, if you think things are tough in the nation's financial sector now, imagine what your 401(k) — or your paycheck — might look like six months after a nuclear detonation in Lower Manhattan or downtown Washington. Saga's study merely began what must become a much larger-scale effort to understand in the fullest detail possible the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism, not only the attack itself but also the decisions that would almost certainly follow. The idea is not to depress people but to motivate them. While some of the consequences are obvious, others are not, and it is the less understood aftershocks that could damage our world as well as transform it — and not for the better.


 * Also, North Korean aggression and nuclearization will cause intentional, miscalculated, or accidental nuclear conflict – even a limited nuclear war causes rapid cooling and ozone disruption, collapses the economy, and spills over to other hot spots**
 * Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10** – *Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND ** Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” [])

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. __Korea__ __and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years.__ This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. __The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious__, not only for the Northeast Asian region but __for the whole international community.__ At worst, __there is the **possibility of nuclear attack**__1, __whether by **intention, miscalculation, or merely accident**, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities____.__ On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. **__Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.__** But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).__The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees__ Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but __the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years.__ The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…__The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger__…To make matters even worse, __such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.__4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. __Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use__. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. __The__ __direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could **make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison**.__ How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. __There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships__5, __with **subsequent nuclear breakout** and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and **aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states****.**__ The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.


 * The plan solves by motivating China and South Korea to effectively influence the leadership transition**
 * Bandow, 08** – Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance and former special assistant to Reagan (9/15/08, Doug, “Dear Leader Goes South,” [], JMP)

Two men have ruled the northern half of the Korean peninsula for sixty-three years. “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung was installed by the Soviets after the peninsula was divided by the victorious powers at the end of World War II. He gradually moved his son, Kim Jong-il, into a central leadership role, and the “Dear Leader” took over after his father’s death in July 1994. But Kim Jong-il has gone missing amid rumors of illness, incapacity, or death. What comes next if the Dear Leader does not reemerge? North Korea offers a rare example of monarchical communism. The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has the usual attributes of a communist dictatorship: dominant Korean Workers Party, secondary state institutions, and an oversized military. But the DPRK offers a unique twist—amidst a hierarchy filled with anti-Japanese guerrillas, party apparatchiks, and bemedaled generals is an extended family whose members slip in and out of power. At times __North Korean politics has the makings of an Ottoman soap opera, with competing wives and families.__ Kim Jong-il pushed aside an uncle and younger step-brother in his rise to power. He has three sons by two different wives (whether de jure or de facto no one knows for sure) and a son-in-law. His brother-in-law, Jang Song-taek, disappeared in a purge a few years ago but recently reemerged. Suspected illegitimate children wield political power and make economic deals. But if Kim is out, the family reign seems over. The Great Leader went to great effort to empower his eldest son. Jong-il first received public mention as the unnamed “party center,” allowing him to shape the communist hierarchy. But Jong-il’s oldest son is in disgrace. His second son is a couple weeks short of his twenty-seventh birthday. The youngest may be the most promising, but Korean culture venerates age and seniority. None of the sons have taken obvious, let alone important, political roles. Jang ranks second in the party hierarchy, but his influence absent Kim Jong-il is hard to assess. Top officials outside of Kim’s family are closely tied to the two rulers, but are unlikely to offer more than transitional leadership. Number two and de facto head of state Kim Yong-nam (no relation) is nearly eighty-one. The top military leader Jo Myong-rok is Kim’s number two on the National Defense Commission but also is over eighty-two. A better bet might be another, younger general, O Kuk-ryol. Of course, all speculation will prove irrelevant if Kim reemerges, hail and hearty. But he hasn’t been seen for a month and there is no logical reason for him to miss the North’s sixtith anniversary celebrations. While __the political soap opera__ is entertaining, it **__could have deadly consequences.__** Analysts have long speculated on whether Kim was serious about negotiating away his country’s nuclear program and if he had sufficient authority to impose a pacific policy on the military. The nuclear negotiations recently stalled, with Pyongyang growing more belligerent after Washington refused to remove North Korea from its list of terrorist states. Whether this reflects a routine turn in DPRK negotiating strategy, an increase in military influence, or a problem with Kim Jong-il’s health no one knows. It’s tempting to believe that things can’t get worse in North Korea, where an unpredictable, brutal personal dictatorship has left the common people to suffer through mass immiseration and starvation. However, by all accounts Kim is intelligent and understands the challenges facing his nation. And it is conceivable, even if not likely, that he has been convinced of the economic and political benefits to be gained from nuclear disarmament. But if not Kim, then who? Assume his family maintains its hold over power—that might mean continuation of the status quo, though not necessarily. __A collective leadership might exercise caution towards the outside world__, but that likely would doom the nuclear deal as well as further rapprochement with South Korea. __Military dominance could yield a responsible moderate__ determined to create a more prosperous and less isolated DPRK, __but hard-line rule seems far more likely__. Think Burma, for instance. __The most frightening scenario would be a violent power struggle and even national collapse. Then the best case would be mass refugee flows to South Korea and China. The worst case would be factional conflict spilling over North Korea’s borders, possibly attracting intervention by the South and China.__ Japan and Russia also would be vitally concerned in the outcome even if they remained aloof from any fighting. There’s not much Washington can do as East Asia waits with collective bated breath for confirmation of Kim’s fate. But even if he is alive and well today, a transition will eventually come. And nervous—indeed, panicked—uncertainty is likely to return. Indeed, __should the international geopolitical environment worsen, with__, say, __increased tensions between China and the__ __U__nited __S__tates __as Beijing’s regional influence grows, a North Korean succession crisis could be even more destabilizing.__
 * __The best American strategy would be to get out of the way__****__.__** __Without a cold war raging, South Korea is of little security concern to America.__ With the ROK enjoying 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea, __the South can defend itself.__ __Pull back America’s remaining troops, and **Washington could leave dealing with an uncertain leadership transition**__ **__in Pyongyang to others in the region, most importantly South Korea and China.__**


 * Chinese involvement is key to stabilize Korea – prevents violent collapse, military response by South Korea, North Korea nuclearization and allied proliferation**
 * Bandow, 10** – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to Reagan (5/3/10, Doug, “Taming Pyongyang,” [], JMP)

Second, the United States, South Korea and Japan must develop a unified approach to China built on the sinking of the Cheonan. Even if the North is blameless, __the incident demonstrates that the status quo is dangerous**. Just one irresponsible act from the unpredictable DPRK could trigger a new devastating conflict.**__ And if Pyongyang is guilty, the risk could not be clearer. Until now the PRC has viewed the status quo as beneficial: the DPRK remains a friendly buffer state; a North Korean atomic bomb would not be directed at China; the United States and ROK must perennially go hat-in-hand to Beijing to beg for its assistance in dealing with the North. In contrast, applying substantial political and economic pressure on Pyongyang would risk breaking the bilateral relationship and might spark a violent collapse, unleashing a flood of refugees. The PRC has said little about the Cheonan incident. The foreign ministry called the sinking an “unfortunate incident.” Beijing’s ambassador in Seoul reaffirmed his nation’s commitment to peace and stability. The allied pitch should be simple. As noted earlier, the risks of war are obvious and catastrophic. But __even if peace survives, today’s badly misgoverned DPRK might implode of its own accord__, even without Chinese pressure. __There is a possibility of violent collapse, given the North’s impending leadership transition and apparent signs of public dissatisfaction__, which would have significantly negative consequences for Beijing. __And if Seoul eschews military retaliation, the North’s ongoing nuclear program combined with warlike provocations would place increasing **pressure on the South and Japan to develop** **countervailing arsenals.**__ __Beijing should take the lead in__ __forging a new, active policy designed to both **denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote political and economic reform in the North****.**__ In fact, __a Chinese commitment to take a much more active role might help **convince Seoul to choose nonviolent retaliation** **for the Cheonan’s sinking.**__ Although few people expect the Koreas to end up at war, the risk is real. And unacceptable. The incident should impel a serious rethinking of the current U.S.-ROK alliance as well as the strategy for involving China in the North Korean issue.


 * U.S. presence is useless to deter North Korea – withdrawal will motivate South Korea and China to stabilize and de-nuclearize the peninsula**
 * Erickson, 10** – Executive Director of CenterMovement.org (5/6/10, Stephen, “End the Cold War in Korea: Bring American Troops Home Before it’s Too Late,” [], JMP)

On the night of March 26 the South Korean 1,200-ton warship Cheonan patrolled the boundary waters between North and South Korea. At 10:45 an explosion near the bow rocked the vessel and sank the Cheonan, taking the lives of 46 crew members with it. Although the investigation is still ongoing, the South Korean Defense Minister has declared that a torpedo is the likeliest source of the blast. __North Korea appears to have destroyed the South Korean warship.__ Normally such an unprovoked attack would start a war, but the Korean peninsula is not a normal place. The Koreans, with their strong sense of nationalism, remain divided along the 38th parallel, with a 2.5 mile “demilitarized zone” between them. Meanwhile approximately 28,000 US troops still help guard the border. An armistice formally ended hostilities in Korea in 1953, but officially the war never ended. No peace treaty was ever signed. One year ago, the North formally and ominously withdrew from the armistice. North Korea, a tiny country with the world’s 4th largest standing army, is the most militarized society in the world. It has a standing army of 1.2 million soldiers, and a peasant militia with as many as 4 million reserves. Some 13,000 artillery pieces, dug into the hills within range of the South Korean capital of Seoul, are poised to obliterate the South’s most important city upon “The Dear Leader’s” command. Some estimates suggest that as many as one million South Koreans could die under such an assault. Then there’s the matter of North Korea’s several nuclear weapons. __South Korea__, officially the “Republic of Korea,” __has about half as many soldiers as the North, but they are **better trained and far better equipped.**__ South Korea is wealthy and technologically advanced. North Korea has half the population and 1/30th the economy of the South. While the rulers of the North live lavishly, famine killed a million people in the 1990s, and the United Nation’s World Food Program is worried that this year may witness the worst food shortages since then. Starving people can be dangerous people. Historically North Korea uses its military, its only strength, as leverage to obtain outside assistance. South Korea today might well be able to ultimately defend itself against the North, but the bloodshed would be horrific. A key factor in any future conflict is Seoul’s location so near the North. Experts suggest (See “Is Kim Jong-il Planning to Occupy Seoul?” ) that a recently revised North Korean military strategy consists of swiftly taking Seoul and holding the city’s millions of people as hostages. All of this begs a couple of important questions. How many more South Korean ships can be torpedoed before the South retaliates, surely starting a larger war? And, what are 28,000 American troops doing in the middle of this Korean powder keg? As the sinking of the Cheonan clearly indicates, the sparks are already flying. __The permanent US military deployment__ in South Korea __is a Cold War anachronism. There is **absolutely no reason**__ __that a nation as advanced and prosperous as South Korea cannot defend itself__ __from its pathetically backward northern brothers and sisters.__ A well-known night-time satellite image taken from space shows a brilliant South and a North languishing in the Dark Ages. The US presence creates political dysfunction while it minimally protects South Korea. __US soldiers on South Korean soil breed resentment.__ Thousands of nationalist South Korean students regularly take to the streets to protest the Americans soldiers in their country and to call for unification between North and South. South Korean and US government policies are often awkwardly out of step with each other, with America often having the far more hawkish posture, as it did during the W. Bush years. __American security guarantees have perhaps sometimes led the government of the South to engage in policies of inappropriate appeasement toward the North.__ __The threat of South Korea investing in nuclear weapons to counter the North might____,__ for example, __finally **persuade China to put sufficient pressure of North Korea**__**__.__** __A South Korea determined to match North Korean nuclear weapons development might paradoxically__ **__further the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula__****__.__** __Most crucially__, from an American point of view, __the US Army is stretched too thin to play much of a role in protecting South Korea.__ As things stand, __American soldiers are little more than targets for North Korean artillery and missiles. A defense of Seoul,__ its re-conquest, __and forcible regime change in the North are all beyond US military capabilities at this time, given its commitments elsewhere.__ US participation on the ground in a new Korean War would also stress the US federal budget beyond the breaking point. The United States never properly created a new foreign and defense policy when the Cold War ended. Instead, it has generally maintained its Cold War military posture, with bases and commitments strewn throughout the globe, even as new challenges since 911 have called American forces to new missions. __The US military presence in Korea is a Cold War artifact that needs to be brought home before it’s too late.__


 * A phased withdrawal prevents U.S. draw in – regional security efforts can effectively resolve Korea crises**
 * Carpenter, 09** – vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen, CATO Handbook for Congress, 7th Edition, “54. East Asian Security Commitments,” [], JMP)

South Korea The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) is a cold war anachronism. __Washington should have weaned Seoul from the U.S. security bottle years ago.__ When the security treaty went into effect in 1954, South Korea was a war-ravaged hulk that confronted not only a heavily armed North Korea, but a North Korea strongly backed by both Moscow and Beijing. Under those circumstances, it would have been virtually impossible for South Korea to provide for its own defense. Washington had just waged a bloody war to prevent a communist conquest of the country, and given the cold war context, U.S. leaders regarded the Korean Peninsula as a crucial theater in the effort to contain the power of the Soviet Union and China. Therefore, they deemed it necessary to keep the ROK as a security client. Most South Koreans were extremely grateful for the U.S. protection. Those circumstances bear no resemblance to the situation in the 21st century. __Today, South Korea has twice the population and an economy 40 times larger than that of its communist nemesis.__ The ROK is an economic powerhouse with the world’s 13th-largest economy, and South Korean firms are competitive in a host of high-tech industries. Meanwhile, North Korea is one of the world’s economic basket cases, and there have even been major episodes of famine in that pathetic country. Moscow and Beijing have major economic ties with the ROK and regard North Korea as an embarrassment. They have no interest whatever in backing another bid by Pyongyang to forcibly reunify the peninsula. Under those conditions, South Korea should certainly be able to defend itself. Yet instead of building military forces sufficient to protect its security, Seoul remains heavily dependent on the United States for key aspects of its defense. Despite its proximity to North Korea, the ROK spends a paltry 2.77 percent of its gross domestic product on the military—less than does the United States, half a world away and located in a peaceful region. There is simply no justification for continuing that free ride. Equally unpleasant is the growing lack of gratitude on the part of many South Koreans for the exertions the United States has made over the decades on behalf of their security. __Public opinion polls show that younger South Koreans regard the__ __U__nited __S__tates __as a more serious threat than North Korea.__ Indeed, __many South Koreans now believe that Washington is the **principal obstacle to better relations with North Korea**__ __and to eventual political reunification.__ The current government of President Lee Myungbak may be less overtly anti-American than that of his predecessor, but that sentiment has scarcely diminished among the general population. The ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis illustrates the drawbacks associated with Washington’s insistence on micromanaging the security affairs of East Asia. __In a normal international system, the East Asian frontline states would be taking the lead in formulating policies to deal with North Korea instead of expecting the__ __U__nited __S__tates to negotiate directly with Pyongyang and produce an agreement acceptable to them all. They would decide what risks they were willing to incur to compel Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program—or in the alternative, whether they were prepared to live with a nuclear-armed North Korea. That is not to say that the United States has no interests at stake regarding North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Washington understandably wants to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons—in East Asia and elsewhere. There is also legitimate concern that North Korea might eventually become a nuclear arms peddler, supplying bombs to other anti-American regimes— and perhaps even to terrorist organizations. Pyongyang’s apparent assistance to Syria regarding nuclear technology highlighted the proliferation problem. Nevertheless, the danger a nuclear-armed North Korea could pose to the United States is more remote and theoretical than the danger to North Korea’s neighbors. Their risk exposure is inherent—imposed by the realities of geography. Even if North Korea acquired only a few nuclear warheads and only modestly increased the range of its current delivery systems, it would pose a plausible threat to the security of South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Conversely, __America’s risk exposure is largely discretionary. The principal reason Washington is obsessed with the North Korean problem is the presence of__ more than 27,000 __U.S. troops__ in South Korea. __Because of those forces, America has put itself__, quite literally, __on the **frontlines of a potentially explosive crisis**__**__.__** That approach is precisely the opposite of the course Washington ought to adopt. __The__ new __administration should__ immediately begin to __reduce America’s risk exposure by ordering a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea____.__ Washington should also indicate to the __East Asian powers__ that they __bear primary responsibility for dealing with__ the problem of __North Korea__’s nuclear program, since they have the most at stake. It is time, indeed it is long past time, to insist that South Korea manage its own security affairs. The United States has drawn down its military forces stationed in that country from approximately 37,000 to 27,000 over the past six years. Washington should implement a complete withdrawal within the next three years and terminate the misnamed mutual security treaty. That commitment was designed for an entirely different era. There is no need and very little benefit today for keeping South Korea as a security client.

=Regionalism Adv=


 * Advantage Two is Regionalism**


 * U.S. alliance relationships are unsustainable – Asian powers should develop a regional security strategy that __does not__ rely on the U.S. – solves WMD terrorism, tame China, prevents Sino-Japan conflict, Japan imperialism, solve resource conflicts and stop major power domination**
 * Francis, 06** – former Australian Ambassador to Croatia and fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University from 05-06 (Fall 2006, Neil, Harvard International Review, “For an East Asian Union: Rethinking Asia's Cold War Alliances,” [], JMP)

At the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States established bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific intended to contain Soviet and Chinese communist expansion in the region. __US security strategy now focuses largely on combating terrorism and denying weapons of mass destruction to so-called rogue states. It is a strategy that cannot be implemented with geographic mutual defense treaties formed to address conventional military threats.__ Furthermore, the United States has demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq that it is prepared to pursue its global security interests unilaterally, even at the risk of its political relations with traditional alliance partners. __What happened over Iraq between the__ __U__nited __S__tates __and its European allies could equally happen between the__ __U__nited __S__tates __and its Asian allies over__ Taiwan or __North Korea with serious consequences for the interests of countries in that region. East Asian powers need to develop a collective security strategy for the region that **does not rely** on the__ __U__nited __S__tates’ __participation____.__ Prudence suggests that East Asian countries need to take the opportunity offered by the recently inaugurated East Asian Summit (EAS) to begin the process of developing an East Asian community as the first step toward the realization of an East Asian Union. This will occur only if led by a strong, proactive Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). China is now the world’s second-largest economy, almost two-thirds as large as the United States in terms of domestic purchasing power. In 2005 China overtook Japan to become the world’s third-largest exporter of goods and services. In 2004 it was the third-largest trading partner with ASEAN; the second largest with Japan, Australia, and India; and the largest with the Republic of Korea. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has estimated that in 2004, in purchasing power parity dollar terms, China’s military expenditure was US$161.1 billion, the second highest in the world. The Pentagon has estimated that in 2005 China’s military expenditure was two to three times larger than its official figure of US$29.9 billion. China’s growing economic and military strength along with the United States’ preoccupation with its new security agenda has made some East Asian countries increasingly apprehensive. __Particularly since September 11, bilateral military alliances have become less relevant to US security interests, and the__ __U__nited __S__tates __will likely reduce its military presence in the East Asian region____.__ Parts of Asia believe that Chinese hegemonic aspirations for East Asia could emerge if the United States were to disengage from the region. Fear of China and the possibility that it harbors hegemonic aspirations were among the factors that led to the creation of ASEAN in 1967 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. Engaging China in an East Asian union in the future would ensure it will pay a high price in loss of trade and investment if it acts against the interests of the union’s other members. Prospects for an East Asian Community In December 2005 ASEAN hosted an inaugural East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The summit involved the 10 ASEAN countries; the ASEAN+3 countries of China, Japan, and South Korea; as well as Australia, New Zealand, and India. The summit declaration of December 14, 2005, described the meeting as a forum for “dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.” The declaration also noted that the summit could “play a significant role in community building in this region.” ASEAN would work “in partnership with the other participants of the East Asian Summit,” but ASEAN was to retain leadership, preventing control of East Asian community building by either the ASEAN+3 countries, which China could dominate, or the 16 EAS countries, which some felt could steer the EAS toward what would be an unwelcome “Western” agenda. It remains to be seen whether an East Asian community can emerge under ASEAN leadership. ASEAN is an association: it is not a strong regional institution with common interests and objectives. It reflects the diversity of its membership, which has traditionally preferred an unstructured organization, a consensus approach to decision making, and avoidance of controversial issues or intervention in the affairs of its members. The ASEAN Way under Challenge ASEAN’s ways, however, may be changing. Since the late 1990s ASEAN’s non-intervention principle has come under challenge. In 1997 ASEAN was faced with an Asian economic crisis triggered by currency speculators and in 1997 to 1998 with a regional pollution haze problem caused by illegal land-clearance fires in Indonesia. ASEAN’s ineffectiveness in these crises brought internal scrutiny to bear on ASEAN’s policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs. As a result, since 1999 ASEAN foreign ministers have discussed these and other transnational problems—illegal migration, terrorism, and the drug trade—that call for collective responses. They have also considered allowing ASEAN to oversee electoral and governance processes within member states. In 1999 a number of ASEAN countries defied the long-standing ASEAN position that East Timor was an internal matter for Indonesia and sent peace-keeping forces to the island to help quell the violence instigated there by anti-independence militia backed by Indonesian armed forces. In 2005 ASEAN placed public pressure on the government of Myanmar to allow an ASEAN delegation to visit Myanmar and assess what progress had been made in human rights and democratization. With the aid of the United States and European Union, ASEAN also persuaded Myanmar to relinquish its role as ASEAN chair. ASEAN’s actions in the 1990s suggest increased sensitivity to the negative effects of individual member nations on the organization’s international standing as well as the beginning of openness toward intervention in the domestic affairs of its members. Toward Realization At its December 2005 summit, ASEAN agreed to institute an ASEAN Charter by 2020 to provide what Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi has called a “mini-constitution,” a document that will establish an institutional framework for ASEAN as well as a legal identity recognized by the United Nations. The older members—Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—want ASEAN to become something more than an association. Institutionally strong and mostly democratic, they might more readily welcome a rules-governed organization similar to the European Union. Others with institutionally weak, authoritarian governments, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, are wary of placing their domestic policies under greater international scrutiny and favor the status quo. If the former nations prevail it will augur well for the realization of an East Asian community with the potential to evolve into an East Asian Union. __An East Asian community__ composed of the 16 EAS participants would represent more than 60 percent of the world’s population and possess a combined GDP greater than the European Union. It __could provide significantly increased trade benefits to its members____, help dampen Sino-Japanese rivalry, ease the present tensions in the region over Japan’s Pacific War, encourage more cooperative attitudes toward the issue of natural resource exploitation in East Asia, promote engagement over containment, and **prevent domination of the region by any major power**.__ The determining factor will be ASEAN’s ability to provide the leadership necessary to create a strong, independent East Asian Union.

**Regionalism is currently halfhearted – only a __clear sign__ of U.S. withdrawal can motivate __sustainable__ regional security cooperation** **Carpenter and Bandow 4** **- *** Vice President of Defense and Foreign Studies at the Cato Institute, AND ** Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute **(**Ted Galen Carpenter, 12/2004, The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations With North and South Korea, pg 160-161)DR

The security treaties with the United States and the U.S. troop presence allow the diversion of financial resources to domestic priorities. And relying on the United States for security **avoids painful debates about what kind of policy those countries need to pursue.** The U.S. security blanket is entirely too comfortable for Washington’s clients. **Without a decisive move by the United States** to take away that security blanket by a certain date, changes in the security posture of South Korea and Japan will be very slow to occur. Second, the United States should encourage the various nations of East Asia to take greater responsibility for the security and stability of their region. In **limited and at times hesitant ways** that process is taking place even without U.S. encouragement. ASEAN has begun to address security issues, most notably taking an interest in the disorders in Indonesia that threatened to spiral out of control in the late 1990s and that continue to pose a problem. Australia assumed a leadership role in helping to resolve the East Timor crisis. It was revealing that Canberra became more proactive after the United States declined to send peacekeeping troops or otherwise become deeply involved in that situation. 37 According to the conventional wisdom that U.S. leadership is imperative lest allies and client states despair and fail to deal with regional security problems, Australia’s actions suggest just the opposite. **When countries in a region** **facing a security problem cannot offload that problem onto the United States, they take action to contain a crisis and defend their own interests.** More recently, Australia has developed a more defined and robust regional strategy. In a June 2003 speech, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that Australia would not necessarily turn to the United Nations before acting in crises that could affect its security. Instead, Canberra was prepared to join— and sometimes even lead— coalitions of the willing to address urgent regional challenges. Downer spoke as Australia prepared to send 2,000 police officers and supporting military personnel to the Solomon Islands, which had experienced such an epidemic of violence and corruption that it verged on being a failed state. Earlier, Prime Minister John Howard had told Australian lawmakers that having failed states in its neighborhood threatened Australia’s interests, because such states could become havens for criminals and political extremists. 38 Perhaps most revealing, the Australian government plans to double its defense spending over the next three years with the intent of becoming a much more serious military player. 39 Third, Washington should indicate to Tokyo that it no longer objects to Japan’s assuming a more active political and military posture in East Asia. Quite the contrary, U.S. officials ought to adopt the position that, as the principal indigenous great power, Japan will be expected to help stabilize East Asia, contribute to the resolution of disputes, and contain disruptive or expansionist threats that might emerge. Washington also should use its diplomatic influence to encourage political and security cooperation between Japan and its neighbors, but U.S. policymakers must not let East Asian apprehension about a more assertive Japan dictate American policy and keep the United States in its role as regional policeman. It is reasonable to explore with Tokyo avenues of cooperation in those areas where there is a sufficient convergence of interests. That cooperation should not, however, take the form of a new alliance. Proposals to reform and strengthen the alliance are unwise. 40 They will perpetuate Japan’s unhealthy dependence on the United States even as they arouse China’s suspicions of a U.S.–Japanese attempt to contain the People’s Republic. An ongoing security dialogue and occasional joint military exercises would be more appropriate than a formal alliance for East Asia’s security needs in the twenty-first century. Elaborate, formal treaty commitments are a bad idea in general. They are excessively rigid and can lock the United States into commitments that may make sense under one set of conditions but become ill-advised or even counterproductive when conditions change. Beyond that general objection, a U.S.–Japanese alliance would be likely to create special problems in the future. Such an alliance would provide tangible evidence to those in the People’s Republic who contend that Washington is intent on adopting a containment policy directed against China. 41 The United States should retain the ability to work with Japan and other powers if Beijing’s ambitions threaten to lead to Chinese dominance of the region, but Washington must be wary of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. An informal security relationship with Japan would preserve the flexibility to block China’s hegemony, if that danger emerges, without needlessly antagonizing Beijing. **America still can have a potent power projection capability with a reduced military presence based in Guam** **and other U.S. territories in the central and west-central Pacific.**


 * Specially, withdrawal will reduce Korea’s veto of multilateral security mechanisms – yielding a peace system on the peninsula that prevents great power war**
 * Lee, 09** – Seoul National University (December 2009, Geun, “The Nexus between Korea’s Regional Security Options and Domestic Politics,” [|www.cfr.org], JMP)

Korea’s Option of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia The idea of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is not a recent one. __Since__ 19__88__, __Korea has advocated regional security cooperation, and in__ 19__94__, __Korea officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue__ (NEASED) __at the ASEAN Regional Forum__ (ARF). Serious discussion of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia started in 2005 during the Six Party Talks to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Six Party Talks have been an important generator of innovative ideas, and participants in the Six Party Talks have gradually realized the importance of a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia, even if they do not share identical interests in such a mechanism.6 From Korea’s perspective, a semi-regional arrangement like the Six Party Talks produces five main benefits.7 First, a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia composed of the United States, China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea will provide insurance to the concerned parties that the agreements struck at the Six Party Talks will not be violated by the participants. Cheating and lack of trust are among the fundamental problems in solving the Korean nuclear crisis, and a multilateral binding of agreements can help solve the problems by increasing transparency and the transaction costs of violating the agreements. Second, __a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia is fundamentally a global security arrangement,__ __as it includes all the global powers except the__ __E__uropean __U__nion. The United States and China unofficially form the Group of Two (G2), Japan is an economic superpower, and Russia used to be the leader of the Eastern bloc. __The high concentration of superpowers in Northeast Asia poses a threat to Korea because **an outbreak of great-power conflict in the region will definitely devastate** **Korea, if not the world.**__ __Therefore,__ **__Korea has reason to promote a multilateral security mechanism__** __that increases transparency among global powers and functions as a confidence-building measure.__ Third, __voluntary or involuntary betrayal by the__ __U__nited __S__tates __has preoccupied many Koreans and security experts.__ Some Koreans felt betrayed when the United States agreed to the division of the Korean peninsula. The Park Chung-hee government felt abandoned when the United States withdrew a significant portion of U.S. soldiers from Korea, and was taken aback by rapprochement between the United States and China. Many Koreans got upset when the United States supported the authoritarian Korean government and kept silent during the Kwangju massacre in 1980. They again felt betrayed when it was rumored that the Clinton administration planned air strikes against North Korea without informing South Korea. And they were upset with the unilateral foreign policy stance of the George W. Bush administration, including its decision to pull the second infantry division out of Korea. __A multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia will mitigate the security concern of Korea when the__ __U__nited __S__tates __either voluntarily or involuntarily defects from its commitment to Korea.__ Fourth, __multilateral security cooperation__ __in Northeast Asia is necessary to **establish a peace system on the Korean peninsula** and ultimately unify Korea.__ Many Korean people doubt that the major powers, including the United States, want the unification of the Korean peninsula. __Korea wants to deal with these powers transparently through a multilateral security cooperation mechanism.__ Fifth, seeing the latest global financial crisis and the rise of China, many Koreans recognize the need to adjust Korea’s external strategy to the changing geoeconomic world. __Making exclusive ties with the__ __U__nited __S__tates __may be a high-risk investment in a past hegemon__, while exclusive ties with China would be a high-risk investment in an uncertain future. __In this transitional period for geoeconomics, multilateral security cooperation is an attractive partial exit option for Korea.__ __A multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia appeals to Korea, so **if voice** **and loyalty in the U.S.-Korea relationship do not reveal positive correlations, then Korea will pay more attention to multilateral regional options.**__ Moreover, **__if the U.S.__** **__capability and credibility in delivering its security promises to alliance partners are questioned, there will be fewer veto powers in Korean politics against a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia__**__, particularly when such an option still maintains a loose form of the U.S.-Korea alliance.__


 * Accelerating U.S. withdrawal is key to catalyze a multipolar balance of power in the region and pave the way for an off-shore balancing strategy.**
 * Espiritu, 06** – Commander, U.S. Navy (3/15/06, Commander Emilson M. Espiritu, “The Eagle Heads Home: Rethinking National Security Policy for The Asia-Pacific Region,” [], JMP)

Can the U.S. live with the risk of an unstable Korean Peninsula? The obvious answer is “no.” It is clear that a stable Korean peninsula is more beneficial to the United States. Clearly North Korea is a major player to determining whether the Korean Peninsula remains stable. One would argue __as long as the current regime of Kim Jung Il remains in power and continue to pursue WMD__ (i.e. Nuclear weapons) __there will be a **permanent unstable scenario**__ __in the region.__62 On the other hand, __as long as the__ __U__nited __S__tates __remains in the region and continues to be forward deployed__ __in South Korea__, that __the U.S. is contributing to such instability in the region____.__ According to Revere, if there is an unstable region (Korean Peninsula), the U.S. goals become harder to achieve.63 __Should an unstable Korean Peninsula exist, this could possibly lead to conflicts in the region, most obvious between the Koreas__; promote unhealthy economic competition in the region, whereas more developed nations (Japan, China) do not provide any form of economic assistance to the Koreas; __and more dangerously__ __a weapons/arms race (maybe to include more nuclear weapons in the region) to maintain a power balance.__ In order to strengthen regional stability, the U.S. would need to succeed in countering terrorism, enhancing economic prosperity, eliminating weapons of mass destruction, promoting democracy, and addressing transnational issues.64 At what cost and risks is the U.S. willing to accept in order to achieve stability in the region? Conclusion The United States cannot live with the risks involved in an unstable region. The Korean Peninsula and the East-Asia Pacific region are home to many of the economic giants worldwide. Additionally, __with the rising cost of economic commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. must rethink alternatives to bring stability in__ the East-Asia Pacific region more specifically, __the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. must continue to pursue peace and stability__ using all elements of national power certainly __using **less emphasis on a military solution**____.__ Additionally, __the U.S. must selectively engage the Koreas to bring stability to the Korean Peninsula__ __by pursuing a combined strategy of isolationism and off-shore balancing.__ Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic solutions take time. __Perhaps by using other countries particularly in the region would be beneficial to the__ __U__nited __S__tates __but also to the other countries as well.__ Strategic positioning of U.S. troops not only around the Korean Peninsula but throughout the world is the key to pursuing the National Objectives. __By pursuing a stable Korean Peninsula without heavy U.S. involvement is beneficial both internationally and economically.__ __Accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. troops, could lead to a multi-polar balance of power in the region.__65 Obviously, this would require a significant change in foreign policy and power position in the region; __it would certainly cause other nations to reconsider their national security strategy.__ All in all, in a speech given by James A. Kelley, stated that “Regional stability remains our overarching strategic goal and provides the underpinnings for achievement of other key goals and objectives.”66 Finally, as stated in the 2006 QDR, “Victory can only be achieved through the patient accumulation of quiet successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power.” 67 __Perhaps by completely withdrawing all U.S. troops from South Korea could potentially lead to one of these successes and bring stabilization to the region without heavy U.S. involvement. It is possible by taking the “let them work it out” (the Koreas) approach would certainly be advantageous to the U.S.__ The time is now for the Eagle to head home.


 * Strengthening the East Asian regional security architecture key to solve terrorism, territorial disputes, disease, environmental degradation, and maritime security**
 * Nanto, 08** – Specialist in Industry and Trade Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Services (1/4, “East Asian Regional Architecture: New Economic and Security Arrangements and U.S. Policy,” www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33653.pdf)

__A stronger **regional security organization**__ __in East Asia could play a role in quelling terrorism__ by violent extremists. Since terrorism is a transnational problem, __the__ __U__nited __S__tates __relies on international cooperation to counter it. Without close multilateral cooperation, there are simply too many nooks and crannies for violent extremists to exploit.__101 Currently, most of that cooperation is bilateral or between the United States and its traditional allies. While the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN + 3, for example, have addressed the issue of terrorism, neither has conducted joint counter-terrorism exercises as has the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Neither organization as a group, moreover, has joined U.S. initiatives aimed at North Korean nuclear weapons (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative). Meanwhile, __tensions continue across the Taiwan Strait, and disputes over territory and drilling rights have flared up between China and Japan and between Japan and South Korea.__ (For the United States, __there is a growing possibility of nationalist territorial conflicts between two or more U.S. allies____.__102) The North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved; North Korea has conducted tests of ballistic missiles and a nuclear weapon; and the oppressive military rule in Burma/Myanmar continues. __Added to these concerns are__ several regional issues: __diseases__ (such as avian flu, SARS, and AIDS), __environmental degradation, disaster mitigation and prevention, high seas piracy, and weapons proliferation__. Memories of the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis still haunt policy makers in Asian countries. These are some of the major U.S. interests and issues as the United States proceeds with its policy toward a regional architecture in East Asia. Since this policy is aimed at the long-term structure of East Asian nations, it can be separated, somewhat, from current pressing problems. A metric by which any architecture can be evaluated, however, is how well it contributes to a resolution of problems as they now exist or will exist in the future.


 * Territorial disputes draw in great powers --- causes World War 3**
 * Waldron, 97** – professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College and an associate of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard (March 1997, Arthur, Commentary, “How Not to Deal with China,” EBSCO)

__MAKING THESE flash-points all the more volatile has been a dramatic increase in the quantity and quality of China's weapons acquisitions.__ An Asian arms race of sorts was already gathering steam in the post-cold-war era, driven by national rivalries and the understandable desire of newly rich nation-states to upgrade their capacities; but the Chinese build-up has intensified it. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in 1989, China's current build-up is part and parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and international openness toward repression and irredentism. Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most importantly from Russia. The latest multibillion-dollar deal includes two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the much-feared SS-N-22 cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis anti-missile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American aircraft carriers. This is in addition to the Su-27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kilo-class submarines, and other force-projection and deterrent technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft, missiles, and submarines--and considering nuclear options. __The sort of unintended escalation which started two world wars could arise from any of the conflicts around China's periphery. It nearly did so__ in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of intimidation, fired ballistic missiles __in the Taiwan Straits____. It could arise from a Chinese-Vietnamese confrontation__, particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the Chinese, as they did in 1979, and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should tip in the direction of Hanoi. __It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among Tibetans__, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China. __Chains of alliance or interest____, perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself**, could easily draw in neighboring states--**____Russia, or India, or Japan--or the__ __U__nited __S__tates.


 * U.S. military concessions toward North Korea are critical to break the deadlock in the six party talks. This will provide a framework to re-establish US-Russian relations, stabilize the peninsula, and allow Russia to become a major economic player in the region.**
 * Toloraya, 08** – diplomat with the rank of Minister and Director of Korean Programs at IMEMO, the top Russian Foreign Ministry official in charge of the Korean peninsula, Doctor of Economy and a Full Professor degree in Oriental Studies (Georgy, //Asian Perspective,// “**THE SIX PARTY TALKS: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE”, ProQuest)**

__The real root of the controversy, as Russian experts interpret it, is the fact that no "strategic decision" has yet been taken__ in either capital about the future. __The United States still has not demonstrated its long-term commitment to toleration of the Pyongyang regime and coexistence with it without overt or covert attempts to bring it down.__ Consequently, __North Korea has nothing left but to depend on its "military deterrent" and try to keep the country isolated in order to conserve the system and prevent its collapse. Russian experts try to see the reality as it is and not set misleading goals and deadlines.__ A serious policy cannot be based on wishful thinking and misapprehension. It is hard to imagine how North Korea could discard its only trump card-the nuclear weapons it now has-in return for mere promises, although it is prepared to move forward cautiously with terminating and dismantling its military nuclear production program. That should be encouraged. At the same time it is necessary to be fully aware that North Korea's renouncing of nuclear weapons will take a much longer time, and even then may only happen if it is satisfied with comprehensive security guarantees that have yet to be provided.45 How do Russian experts see the possible future of the Six Party Talks? There is still no agreed concept of what should be their outcome. This should be worked out collectively. __The change of U.S. administrations provides a chance for setting a goal, which should be realistic and then would enjoy Russian support.__ Some possibilities follow. * __The chief strategic goal of the diplomatic process should definitely not be just denuclearization, but peace, development, and friendly cooperation in Northeast Asia.__ The issue of North Korea's security is sometimes omitted and that blocks any progress. Therefore __it is necessary to solve the WMD and other related issues in a manner that would not jeopardize the main priorities-peacefully and step-by-step.__ In fact, solving the main task is the key to solving the WMD-related concerns. __* A peaceful scenario would presume turning the DPRK into a peaceful, non-aggressive, developing state, open to international cooperation-in short, the "conventionalization" of the country.__ That might seem utopian with the current regime, but it is under- going an evolution that could be successful provided the regime has sufficient guarantee of its security, including guarantees for the safety of the current elite. Therefore, the transformation should be gradual and not endanger political stability. An eventual power succession in the DPRK would present an ideal chance for starting such a process. * International assistance is a must for overcoming the backwardness and isolation of the DPRK, which is necessary for comprehensive security. The long history of aid to developing countries suggests that aid can be futile, even counterproductive, in the absence of complementary reforms.46 Therefore, economic assistance to the DPRK as part of the package for the solution of the nuclear problem should be aimed at assisting system transformation, not at preservation of its outdated model. * The six-party format can be an ideal venue for coordination of such assistance. Its long-term aim should be the DPRK's economic and social transformation, by drawing it into the international division of labor and introducing international managerial experience, including a gradual transformation of the current political elite to become a more liberal government system. (Many members of the elite are relatives or comrades in a framework of clan politics.) * For coordination of economic and development assistance, the interested countries (not limited to the Six Party Talk members) could choose to create a special body entrusted with the task of planning and providing such assistance. The experience of KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) proves that this task is feasible. __* In the longer run the solution to Korean security and development issues could provide momentum for forming a regional structure by institutionalizing the Six Party Talks.__ The Desirability of a Multilateral Security System __Russia would like to see a multiparty security__ __and cooperation system emerge in Northeast Asia. The Six Party Talks have provided a unique opportunity to try a multilateral approach to solving the__ thorny __issues that plague the region____.__ In a best-possible future, __we might__ paradoxically be __thankful for the appearance of the North Korean nuclear problem simply because it actually triggered the emergence of regional security and cooperation dialogue. It took years to recognize the fact that a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem cannot be found without assuring the security of North Korea itself. T__he latter goal in turn cannot be achieved without the adoption of broader principles of interaction between the countries involved. __That in turn leads to the conclusion that many "narrow" regional problems cannot be solved without first solving general issues of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia.__ This is especially critical in light of a nascent standoff between China, on the one hand, and the United States and Japan, on the other, a confrontation both sides would like to avoid in principle. __Russia,__ __having been drawn into a tense relationship with the United States globally in the wake of the war in Georgia, would also like to see Northeast Asia become a region of cooperation.__ There is no obvious geopolitical reason for confrontation there. __Russia has always been a proponent of a multilateral security mechanism in Asia and the Pacific.__47 Initiatives on multilateral Asian security organizations date back at least to the Gorbachev era.48 __Russian positions in Asia have considerably weakened since the demise of the USSR, while the centrifugal tendencies of the Far Eastern regions have been on the rise.__ Therefore, __Moscow has become even more interested in promoting its interests through a multilateral structure____, which would provide access to the decision-making processes of other governments and prevent unilateralism.__ Theoretically speaking, __institutionalization of the Northeast Asian security and cooperation mechanism might play an important role in a changeover from contentions based on mutual deterrence to a system of cooperation and competition grounded in the balance of interests, i.e., in a "concert of powers."__ The Six Party Talks may play an important role in working out a "code of conduct" in Northeast Asia and setting up a multilateral mechanism to promote it. As chair of the Working Group on the peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia (under the February 2007 agreements), Russia has suggested guiding principles for peace and security that the parties should find agreeable.49 The official position is that these principles should be adopted at the level of foreign ministers and thus set the framework for future work. This opinion is shared by the United States, which hopes to move forward on developing a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism that "would help transform the cooperative relationships built through the Six-Party Process into an enduring security framework for Northeast Asia."50 Russia also enjoys Chinese and ROK support in this activity.51 However, __controversies among the Asian members of the club could prevent them from setting up a charter of Northeast Asian security and cooperation.__ At the same time North Korea sees the multilateral format mostly as a nuisance-merely decoration for its bilateral dealings with the United States. North Korean diplomats consider the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) model irrelevant to Northeast Asia, pointing to this organization's failure to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia.52 __The stalemate in U.S.-North Korea dialogue as well as the pause in North-South Korea relations makes the DPRK's cooperation with the ROK on security issues unlikely and the degree of eagerness and initiative of the two Koreas in promoting multilateralism questionable at best. There is thus a niche for a relatively neutral Russian mediator role.__ __Active diplomacy in this direction is especially important for Russia in the context of its global relations with the "centers of power." As Russia is increasingly seen as an opponent if not a foe of the West__ (e.g., the expression "the new cold war" has already been coined), __it would be natural to think its cooperation with the United States__ __on global issues would be limited at best. However, this logic should not necessarily apply in the Korean case, which might well be considered a special one in Russia-U.S. international dealings. U.S.-Russia cooperation in the framework of the 6PT **might have much wider global implications****.**__53 __At the same time, Moscow conservatives still fear that a fullfledged OSCE-type structure might only increase the U.S. hold on the region without producing tangible benefits for Russia or for other regional actors. They argue that Washington only pursues its own interests and is trying to strengthen its foothold in the area.__ Under this logic a new security architecture might harness not only its allies but also China and Russia in a framework where the United States, not being a geographical part of the region, would have rights but not obligations. The concept of what the agenda of the multilateral forum could be and the sequence of stages for establishing such a structure is being discussed in the Russian expert community. Some argue that Northeast Asia is not yet ready for a security mechanism and the road to it should start with a multilateral cooperation structure. “In a multilateral process,” writes one Russian researcher, “structural and procedural issues are often no less important for the effectiveness of the process than substantive issues.”54 The multiparty diplomatic process should therefore become a multi-track one, where progress in one direction should not necessarily depend on the situation in other tracks. A Japanese expert’s approach—to link the bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral issues and institutions under the six-party umbrella framework—also seems sound.55 Such an approach can be used to address region-specific proliferation issues, security guarantees, economic assistance, and diplomatic relations, including changing the Korean armistice regime to a new peace regime and achieving coordination of institutions. Some suggestions for promoting the Northeast Asian cooperation organization building follow. • The security architecture should be discussed at an early stage, although the implementation of an agreed concept might take time. The general principles discussed between the parties are well-established in international practice and include obeying the UN Charter principles, forging mutual trust, noninterference in internal affairs, a decline in military danger, and diplomatic conflict resolution. Nevertheless, these principles will still not be formally agreed upon pending resolution of the nuclear issue. Discussion (including at Track II level) aimed at working out common approaches to forming a collective comprehensive security system should therefore be encouraged. The Chinese idea of integrative security presented at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996—combining comprehensive, cooperative, and common security concepts56—could become a basis for these discussions. • On a more practical level the sides should begin designing trustbuilding measures for the prevention of maritime and air incidents, notifications of military exercises and their monitoring by observers, and annual reviews of defense doctrines. Ensuring the security of maritime communication lines in Northeast Asia and to the south may also be relevant. • Countermeasures to nonconventional threats and challenges should be elaborated, including assistance during natural calamities, as well as fighting epidemics, environmental problems, cross-border crime, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. These issues are discussed at various fora, including ARF, but sometimes the area covered seems to be too broad for any concrete decisions and measures.57 • Multilateral economic projects and coordination of regional economic policies should be discussed, particularly laying out common approaches to the setting up of new zones for free trade and reforming existing ones. Russia is especially interested in establishing regional integration in energy and transport infrastructure, in which it would be a core key participant.58 • The setting up of an infrastructure for inter-civilizational and inter-ethnic contacts and rapprochement in the region where longstanding ethnic strife exists might become a historic mission of the new regional organization. It is important to develop joint projects in culture, science, and education, and stimulate multilateral humanitarian exchanges with due account of experience gained at bilateral negotiations. Regardless of the twists and turns on the thorny road of Korean settlement, __promoting multilateral security cooperation will remain Russia’s priority.__ __The reasons are not only__ military and __security in nature but also economic.__ __In this era of uncertainty of world finance, the development of the real estate sector is fast becoming a priority, and this means an increased need for Russia’s greater involvement in Northeast Asian regional energy and industrial projects.__

**Relations key to solve accidental nuclear war** **Cohen 10**—prof, Russian Studies and History, NYU. Prof emeritus, Princeton (Stephen, US-Russian Relations in an Age of American Triumphalism: An Interview with Stephen F. Cohen, 25 May 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/us-russian-relations-age-american-triumphalism-interview-stephen-f-cohen, AMiles)

Cohen: The real concern I have with this "we won the Cold War" triumphalism is the mythology that we are safer today than we were when the Soviet Union existed. Though it is blasphemous to say so, we are not safer for several reasons, one being that the Soviet state kept the lid on very dangerous things. The Soviet Union was in control of its nuclear and related arsenals. Post-Soviet Russia is "sorta" in control, but "sorta" is not enough. There is no margin for error. Reagan's goal in the 1980s was not to end the Soviet Union, but to turn it into a permanent partner of the United States. He came very close to achieving that and deserves enormous credit. He did what had to be done by meeting Gorbachev half-way. But since 1991, the arrogance of American policymaking toward Russia has either kept the Cold War from being fully ended or started a new one. The greatest threats to our national security still reside in **Russia**. This is not because it's communist, but because it **is laden with** all these **nuclear, chemical, and biological devices—that’s the threat**. The reaction of the second Bush administration was to junk decades of safe-guarding agreements with Moscow. It was the first time in modern times that we have had no nuclear control reduction agreement with the Russians. **What should worry us** every day and night is the triumphalist notion **that nuclear** war is no longer possible. It **is now possible in even more ways than before, especially accidental ones**. Meanwhile, the former Soviet territories remain a Wal-Mart of dirty material and know-how. If terrorists ever explode a dirty device in the United States, even a small one, the material is likely to come from the former Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar Act (1992) was the best program Congress ever enacted to help Russia secure its nuclear material and know-how, a major contribution to American national security. But no one in Washington connects the dots. Take Senator Lugar himself. He seems not to understand that we need Russia's complete cooperation to make his own legislation fully successful, but he repeatedly speaks undiplomatically, even in ugly ways, about Russia’s leaders, thereby limiting their cooperation and undermining his own legacy. In other words, to have a nuclear relationship with Russia that will secure our national security, we must have a fully cooperative, trusting political relationship with Moscow. That’s why all the talk about a replacement for the expired START agreement, which Obama has been having trouble reaching with the Kremlin, is half-witted. Even if the two sides agree, and even if the Senate and Russian Duma ratify a new treaty, the agreement will be unstable because the political relationship is bad and growing worse. Evidently, no one in the Administration, Congress, or the mainstream media, or, I should add in the think tanks, can connect these dots.

**Independently, peaceful US overtures toward Korea is critical to break the deadlock in Russian-DPRK relations and pave the way for a massive expansion of renewed economic ties on the peninsula** **Joo, 09** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan (April 09, Seung-Horris, “Moscow–Pyongyang Relations under Kim Jong-il: High Hopes and Sober Reality”)

Trade and Investment In the late 1980s, North Korea's trade with the Soviet Union and its affiliates constituted three-quarters of North Korea's total trade volume. Bilateral trade between Pyongyang and Moscow sharply dropped from approximately $US1bn in 1989–90 to $US80m in the mid-1990s. After the three summits between Putin and Kim Jong-il in 2000–02, bilateral economic contacts and exchanges of economic delegations increased. Still, the level of economic cooperation remained low and there were few joint ventures. After 2000, bilateral trade increased to about $US130m in 2002–04.46 Still North Korea's trade with Russia in 2003 was less than 2 percent of its total trade volume. By contrast, North Korea's trade with China in the same year constituted one-third of North Korea's total trade.47 The Russia–DPRK trade volume in 2005 was lower than the 1990 level; and further declined from $US240m in 2005 to $US190m in 2006. The reduction in trade in 2006 was due to a reduction in Russian oil exports. Russia's exports to North Korea in 2006 stood at $US190m and Russia's imports from North Korea in the same year reached $US20m. The bulk of the trade was carried out between North Korea and Russia's Far Eastern regions, which accounted for 80% of the total trade between the two countries.48 The main Russian exports are coal, timber, petroleum products and nitrogen fertilizers. North Korea's main export items include workers, sea products, food and agricultural products.49 North Korea's imports from Russia far exceed its exports, resulting in a widening trade deficit for North Korea.50 North Korea is suffering from chronic and serious trade deficit overall. According to the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), North Korea's trade volume reached $US3bn (excluding its trade with South Korea) in 2005, recording a trade deficit of $US1bn. The trade deficit is attributed to the drop in exports of fisheries goods and increased imports of energy resources, food, and machinery.51 China is North Korea's most important economic partner (except for South Korea) and China's economic influence over the country is increasing. Economic cooperation between the DPRK and China is on the rise, whereas economic cooperation between the DPRK and Russia remains flat. China's trade with and investment in the DPRK is carried out by small firms, which are proactive and aggressive, but Russia's economic cooperation with the DPRK is led by big, unwieldy state-owned firms.52 There have been numerous talks between the DPRK and Russia to expand economic cooperation, but very few of the planned projects have been actually implemented. Russia has been pushing for trilateral economic cooperation combining Russia's technical facilities, the DPRK's labor, and the ROK's capital. North Korean factories built with the support of the Soviet Union, including the Kimchaek steel plant, the Seungri chemical plant, the Ryongsong bearing plant, and the Anju textile plant, need repairs and upgrading. Russia is proposing to modernize these industrial facilities with the ROK's capital. Gazprom Neft is interested in a project aimed at overhauling the Seungri Oil Refinery in North Korea. The two countries will also discuss the possibility of resuming supplies of Russian crude oil to Seungri if an agreement can be reached between Russian oil producers and the North Korean government.53 Russia and North Korea are interested in a joint project to build an interstate electro-transmission line between Vladivostok and Chongjin. Russia's electricity monopoly Unified Energy Systems (UES) is interested in providing electricity to South and North Korea. UES wants to pursue a trilateral project through which it will build an electric line from the Far East to North Korea and supply it with 800 megawatts of electricity. UES made a couple of proposals, but nothing came out of it.54 According to a draft protocol of the Russian–North Korean intergovernmental commission in March 2007, Russia's Eurocement Group will take part in the modernization of the North Korean Sunchon Cement Complex. The protocol listed other possible joint projects including cooperation in repairing and scrapping ships at the Ryongnam shipyard, joint production at the Taedonggang Storage Battery Plant, and a joint venture at a North Korean bearing plant.55 North Korea wants Russian companies to construct the second line of the East Pyongyang power and heat plant and to reconstruct another two power and heat stations.56 Iron Silk Road Putin is keen on the "iron silk road" project of linking the TSR to the TKR for economic and security reasons. He states that this project would contribute to the development of the Russian Far East and help reduce tensions in Korea. Following the 2000 inter-Korean summit talks, Seoul and Pyongyang agreed to re-link an inter-Korean railway severed by the division of the nation. If the TKR were linked up with the TSR, trilateral economic cooperation between Russia, the ROK, and the DPRK would gain momentum. Putin broached the iron silk road plan when he first met with Kim Jong-il in 2000, and Kim reportedly responded favorably. Putin continued to promote the iron silk road and triangular economic cooperation when he met with President Kim Dae-jung while attending the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. At this meeting, the two leaders agreed to connect the TKR to the TSR.57 Putin and Kim Jong-il confirmed their will to pursue the iron silk road plan when they met a second time in 2001. Before the iron silk road project is realized, inter-Korean railroads must be re-linked. In May 2007, North and South Korea carried out test runs of trains across the demilitarized zone, and during the second inter-Korean summit in October 2007, Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-hyun agreed to open their border to freight railroad services. In December 2007, North and South Korea resumed the inter-Korean cargo train service between the Munsan Station in the South and the Panmun Station in the North (a 19.8 km route). The cross-border railway service had been suspended since the Korean War (1950–53). The cargo railroad service would run on weekdays carrying raw materials, parts and manufactured goods to and from the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea, and South Korea. For economic reasons,58 Seoul is primarily interested in the Seoul–Pyongyang–Sinuiju line (along the west coast of the Korean peninsula) connecting the TKR to a Chinese railroad more than the Seoul–Wonsan–Khasan line (along the east coast of the Korean peninsula) linking the TKR to the TSR. Russia, however, wants South Korea to choose the east coast option. Moscow has persistently pushed for the iron silk road plan. In December 2002, a working group of Russian railway ministry experts completed a thorough examination of the 101.2 km-long Wonsan–Geumgangsan stretch of the future TRK.59 Russia had already upgraded a 240-km-long section from Ussuriysk to Khasan by October 2003.60 Russia intends to link the lines between Vladivostok and Cheongjin in North Korea in the first phase and then connect the railway to South Korea in the second phase. The Russian Railways (RZD; state-owned railroad monopoly in Russia) has pursued trilateral cooperation with the DPRK and the ROK to reconstruct a railway stretch from the Khasan station to the Rajin in the northeast of North Korea and to construct a container terminal in the port of Rajin. Russia's Vostochny port near Nakhodka is saturated with freight. Moscow and Pyongyang plan to use the renovated Rajin port to ship freight from Northeast Asia to Russia and Europe after the railroad section is renovated and Rajin port is modernized.61 The 55-km (34-mile) Rajin–Khasan line can connect to the TSR. North Korea's railroads are outdated, ill maintained and in need of repairs. The RZD has pushed to establish an international consortium to finance the $US7bn project to renovate the TKR and to link it to the TSR. In 2001, North Korea and Russia completed a survey on the North's railroad conditions. In March 2006, Pyongyang agreed to the Russia's proposal to form an international consortium to finance the reconstruction of the TKR.62 At the tripartite talks in March 2006, transport chiefs of Russia and the two Koreas agreed to renovate the Rajin-Khasan section as a pilot project. In late April 2007, RZD and the North's Ministry of Railways signed a non-binding memorandum of intention on the reconstruction of a railway section from the Russian border station Khasan to the North Korean port of Rajin. The memorandum also included their intention to construct a container terminal in Rajin.63 On 17 May 2007, Russia and the DPRK launched a first test run of railway traffic between Rajin and Khasan.64 In July 2007, the RZD' representatives announced that the company decided to begin repair and construction work in the third quarter of this year. The reconstruction of the Rajin-Khasan railroad stretch is estimated to cost $US1.7bn.65 According to ROK Foreign Minister Song Min-soon, as of December 2007, the South Korean consortium and Russia's railway company (without North Korea's participation) were discussing the creation of a joint logistics company which would reconstruct the Rajin-Khasan stretch.66 Difficulties in securing the fund are delaying the project. North Korea is less than enthusiastic about the TKR project because its leaders fear their country's collapse and do not want to show to the outside world the poor conditions of their railroads. More importantly, tensions in DPRK–US relations remain the **main political obstacle** to implementing the Khasan–Najin railroad project. In this context, a statement by the president of the RZD company, Vladimir Yakunin, on the company's website is telling: "At the end of last year [2004] North Korea said that since the USA toughened up its policy towards North Korea the country 'sees no point' in holding a second trilateral meeting of experts to discuss the implementation of the project to reunite the Trans-Korean Railway and link it with the Trans-Siberian Railway."67 The plan to link the TSR with the TKR will work only after North Korea's nuclear crisis is resolved and inter-Korean reconciliation deepens. The plan's success will also depend on securing the funds for the project. China and Russia are in competition to develop Rajin, and China is ahead of Russia. China established the Rason International Distribution Company Limited through the joint investment of the People's Committee Economic Cooperation Company in Rason. The Chinese company secured 50-year exclusive management rights to Port #3 and Port #4 in Rajin and a national highway linking Hunchun and Rajin.68 China reportedly expressed its willingness to invest over $US1bn in Rajin. China is interested in building a 93-kilometre line from Rajin to Hunchun and in constructing logistics, commercial and industrial facilities in Rajin. China's main northeastern port of Dalian is overcrowded and Rajin could ease the burden and give China easy access to the East Sea.69 Debt Repayment Pyongyang's debt to Moscow remains another major obstacle to overall economic cooperation. North Korea owed Soviet Russia about 3.8 billion hard currency.70 North Korea incurred over two-thirds of the debt through purchases of weapons and military equipment from the Soviet Union.71 As the legal successor to the Soviet Union, Russia demanded Pyongyang's assumption of the debt responsibility, and during the second session of the Russia–North Korea Joint Economic Commission in 1997, North Korea for the first time promised to repay its debt to Russia. Since then, negotiations on the debt repayment have been held intermittently, but no agreement has been reached yet. Talks on the debt issue discontinued in 2002, but resumed in late 2006. Russia's Vneshtorgbank and North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank reportedly agreed to set the debt amount at $US8bn after considering interests accrued and the changed exchange rate.72 Until then, Russia held the position that North Korea's debt repayment was a precondition for revitalizing bilateral economic cooperation. In late 2006, Russia proactively engaged the DPRK to negotiate the debt issue, offering to write off the bulk of the debt and proposing new conditions to pay back the remainder. This approach appears to be intended to induce the DPRK to join trilateral economic cooperation with Russia and South Korea and encourage North Korea's continued participation in the Six-Party nuclear talks. According to a Russian diplomatic source, North Korea in recent negotiations offered Russia the rights to develop its underground resources and suggested a lease of land in its ports.73 In talks held in December 2006, Russia proposed "to write off the greater part of the debt and settle the remaining sum on easy terms."74 During a meeting of the intergovernmental commission in March 2007, Russia proposed a number of economic measures to resolve the debt problem, including investment and in exchange for property.75 Konstantin Pulikovski, co-chair of the Russia–North Korea intergovernmental commission for economic cooperation, revealed in March 2007 that North Korea called on Russia to take a political decision (or forgive almost the entire debt) on the debt issue: "The [North] Korean side is openly and plainly saying that in the current situation North Korea is unable to repay its debt to Russia and is proposing to take a political decision on this issue."76 The unresolved debt issue continues to obstruct Russia–DPRK cooperation in economic and scientific-technical spheres. North Korean Laborers North Korea began to send its contract laborers to the Soviet Union as early as 1945.77 According to one estimate, the DPRK currently earns $US5m-$US20m annually by exporting labor to Russia.78 The presence of the North Korean work force in Russia constitutes a significant component of bilateral economic cooperation.79 In 2007, North Korea ranked fourth among countries in terms of the number of its labor force (over 21,700) in Russia.80 North Korea has expressed an interest in increasing the number of its workers. During his official visit to Moscow in August 2001, Kim Jong-il proposed to send more than 5,500 North Korean workers every year. During this second unofficial visit to the Russian Far East in 2002, he again proposed sending an additional 2,500 North Korean workers to the region.81 But the Russian Far East does not have enough jobs to satisfy North Korea's demand. North Korean laborers are engaged in logging in Khabarovsk Krai and Amursk Oblast and farming and apartment construction in Primorye. In February 1995, the Russian government renewed its logging agreement with North Korea, effective for the next three years.82 The renewal agreement included provisions for North Korea's guarantee of better human rights for its workers in Siberia and the right of Russian law enforcement officials to intervene in North Korea logging camps. These stipulations came about after public outcries over the torture and executions of the lumberjacks by North Korean security agents in the Khabarovsk Krai.83 In 1997, the number of North Korean lumberjacks in the Far East decreased by two thirds, from 15,000 to 5,000, due to the reduction of lumber production and increased rail transportation costs in Russia.84 At the end of the 1990s, North Korean loggers in Russia numbered less than 7,000.85 In 2006, over 2,000 North Korean loggers were working in the Amur and Khabarovsk regions.86 North Korean loggers in Khabarovsk Krai are paid about $US170–$US190 per month and North Korean construction workers in Primorye $US120–$US130 a month.87 About 200 North Korean workers are engaged in fishing and mining in Sakhalin.88 In 2005, the total number of North Koreans working in the Russian Far East stood at 13,806. Most of them were on three or six month contracts and very few were on 1–3 year contracts.89 The terms of contract for North Korean workers vary. North Korea's state-owned firms allow the workers to keep as little as 10 percent of their wages. In some instances, North Korean workers, especially at the construction sites in Vladivostok, are required to earn a fixed amount of money but allowed to keep additional income. In other instances, they are not paid in cash but in-kind or in coupons. North Koreans' labor may also be used to pay for timber or oil.90 Conclusions With Putin's arrival in the Kremlin, a new era dawned in Moscow–Pyongyang relations. After a decade of estrangement, the two neighbors finally reached rapprochement. The relations warmed up quickly in 2000 when Putin enthusiastically courted Pyongyang and Kim Jong-il reciprocated. Both Putin and Kim Jong-il initially harbored high hopes for their newly restored relationship. Putin hoped to regain lost influence on Korean affairs by re-establishing ties with Pyongyang. He also wanted to use joint economic projects to develop the Russian Far East and in doing so, assert Russia's position as a major power in Northeast Asia. He was not, however, willing to "pay the price." There are two ways to gain influence over recalcitrant North Korea: it can be either bought or enforced. Putin's Russia offered neither unconditional support, nor profuse assistance to North Korea; and it was not ready to use force to subjugate the country. Kim Jong-il harbored unrealistic expectations of Russia as well. He was hopeful that Putin, as in the Soviet era, would readily grant his requests for military items, energy provision, and economic assistance, and provide them gratis. Repeated requests fell on deaf ears, and every time the same response was heard: "cash only!" Moscow and Pyongyang soon lowered their expectations and became realistic. While trying to stay on Pyongyang's good side, Moscow sought to project its image as an objective mediator and to promote multinational economic projects. Pyongyang, on the other hand, looks to Russia mostly as a counterbalance against the USA. North Korea's persisting nuclear crisis chilled Moscow–Pyongyang relations. It soon became obvious to Russian leaders that Kim Jong-il continued to be intent on dealing with the USA directly for security guarantee and economic aid, and to treat Russia as a secondary player in his survival game. Besides, North Korea's persisting nuclear crisis and the danger of an armed conflict in the Korean peninsula overshadowed all Moscow–Pyongyang relations. North Korea's nuclear issue has to be resolved first before anything meaningful can be done between the two countries. Russia's lack of imagination and irresoluteness has also contributed to the current state of stagnation and inactivity between them. What are the prospects for Moscow–Pyongyang relations? Barring drastic turns of events, the relationship is likely to remain calm and limited in the near future. US foreign policy and US–DPRK relations hold the key to Russia–DPRK relations. For both Russia and North Korea, the USA is the most important country to be reckoned with. By the same token, North Korea has become highly dependent on China in political and economic terms, and Russia will have tough time competing with China. The onset of a mini-Cold War between the USA and Russia may lead to a rekindling of intimate relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, but this scenario is unlikely. What is more likely is a complete immobilization or a sudden death due to serious illness of Kim Jong-il. What impact this eventuality will have on Moscow–Pyongyang relations will be anybody's guess. No matter what happens, Russia will have a long way to go before it is recognized as a major political–economic player in Korea and Northeast Asia.

Institute of State Governance and the Yonsei Leadership Center (Nov/Dec, Seung Ham Yang, Woosang Kim, and Yongho Kim, “RUSSO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS IN THE 2000S”, Proquest)
 * These increased ties are key to creating a trans-Siberian railroad that revitalizes the Asian and Russian economies**
 * Yang et al. 04**- Yang is Professor of Political Science at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea, and Director of the

__Improved relations with North Korea would generate an opportunity to engage economically on the Korean Peninsula____, by participating__, for example, __in__ future __projects linking Russia with the two Koreas.__ __Specifically, Russia is interested in participating in the Trans-Siberian Railroad__ (TSR) __project. For Seoul, connecting pipelines from Russia Irkhutsk region to South Korea via North Korea could lower current import prices by as much as 25% by obviating the need for expensive maritime transportation.__ This was a departure from Primakov security-oriented approach, which aimed at strategically linking Russia with China and India. (China remained suspicious of India ambitions for regional hegemony and turned down the Russian proposal. The Putin administration took an alternative policy tack toward regional economic cooperation that incorporated Japan, China, and both Koreas, via Putin visit to China, Japan, and North Korea in July 2000, participation in the APEC summit in November that year, and a Seoul visit in February in the following year. In particular, __Russia has pursued multilateral energy and transport projects, taking advantage of energy resources in the Russian Far East and eastern Siberia. This effort ultimately is aimed at building a new Northeast Asian economic community with Russia at its center.__ The discussion so far suggests that __economic factors__ have been and __will be a major driving force__ __in the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship__ in the 2000s. However, as mentioned earlier, __there is a dualism attached to Putin foreign policy that is designed to promote symbiosis between Russia economy and security__, its strategic partnership with China and its position in the competition for regional influence, and between cooperation with the United States and Moscow search for status as a global leader. Below, we address the notion that security still functions as one of the main factors in the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship.


 * A Russian economic collapse will trigger nuclear strikes against the US, provoke a Russo-Sino war, and threaten the world with an accidental launch**
 * David 99** **–** Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University [Steven R., “Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars,” //Foreign Affairs,// Jan/Feb, LN]

__If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause__ __.__ From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience. A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery__.__ __With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow__ when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. __Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non‑Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely. Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia__ -- even though in decline -- __does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An__ __embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China__ __.__ Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. __Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors.__ __Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia__. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime. Most alarming is the real possibility that __the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal.__ No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. __Russia retains__ some 20,000 __nuclear weapons__ and the raw material for tens of thousands more, __in scores of sites scattered throughout the country__ __.__ So far, the government has managed to prevent the loss of any weapons or much material__.__ __If war erupts__ __,__ however , __Moscow's__ __already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states. Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.__ Lack of attention to the threat of civil wars by U.S. policymakers and academics has meant a lack of response and policy options. This does not mean, however, that Washington can or should do nothing at all. As a first measure, American policymakers should work with governments of threatened states to prevent domestic conflict from erupting. Contingency plans for closing the Mexican-American border should be considered. And the possibility of a Mexican civil war raises the issue of American intervention. How and where the United States would enter the fray would of course be determined by circumstances, but it is not premature to give serious thought to the prospect. To guard against a conflict in Saudi Arabia, the United States should lead the effort to reduce Western dependence on Saudi oil. This will require a mixed strategy, including the expansion of U.S. strategic oil reserves (which could be done now, while Saudi oil is cheap and available), locating new suppliers (such as the Central Asian republics), and reviving moribund efforts to find oil alternatives. None of this will be easy, especially in an era of dollar-a-gallon gasoline, but it makes more sense than continuing to rely on an energy source so vulnerable to the ravages of civil war. For __Russia__, America must reduce the chances that __civil__ __conflict__ there __will unleash nuclear weapons against the United States____.__