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Current policy prevents the United States from cooperating with China in space – that risks accidental escalation from inevitable space accidents

 * Fernholz 15** [Tim Fernholz, QZ, “NASA has no choice but to refuse China’s request for help on a new space station,” October 13, 2015, []]

The Martian has been praised as the rare science fiction movie that takes pains with scientific accuracy, but one of the more prosaic events in the movie is actually among the least likely. In the film, Chinese and US space agencies work together to save the day. But in fact, that kind of international Kumbaya moment is forbidden by US law —a restriction underscored today (Oct. 13) at the International Astronautical Congress ( IAC ). The chief designer of China’s space program, Zhou Jianping, said his country would solicit international partners for a space station it plans to launch in 2022, with opportunities ranging from shared experiments and spacecraft visits by foreign crews to building permanent modules to attach to the main station. The European and Russian space agencies already have signed preliminary agreements with China, but NASA will have to snub the project. The ban on cooperation between NASA and the China Manned Space Program is a legacy of conservative lawmaker Frank Wolf, who cut off any funding for work with China in protest of political repression there and for fear of sharing advanced technology; he retired in January, but the restrictions remain in place. And NASA is not a fan of them. In his own remarks at the IAC, NASA administrator Charles Bolden said the US, for its own good, ought to dump the four-year-old ban. “We will find ourselves on the outside looking in, because everybody…who has any hope of a human spaceflight program…will go to whoever will fly their people,” Bolden said, according to a report from Reuters. Currently, China operates a space station called Tiangong 1 that has hosted several multi-week visits by groups of Chinese astronauts. The US supports the International Space Station and its permanent crew of three to six astronauts alongside 15 other countries, including Russia. Both the US and Russia have committed to provide support to the station through 2024. The US has a long history of space diplomacy with opponents —as with the USSR during the 1970s. With US policy framing Chinaas a peaceful competitorrather than ideological enemy, the current restrictions on consorting with the Chinese space program has put NASAin atough spot with space scientists from outside the agency , some of whom have protested the ban by boycotting scientific conferences. If the desire for manned cooperation with the Chinese is not enough to persuade US lawmakers to loosen their restrictions, there’s also the increasing concerns among space agencies and satellite operators that a lack of coordinationbetween burgeoning space programs will lead to//potential orbital disaster//. Tests of anti-satellite weapons have already resulted in costly, in-orbit accidents. //Civil space coop// e ration between the US and China could provide //trust// and //lines of communication// for //de-escalation// as fears of space militarization increase. And it’s not like there isn’t some cross-pollination already—SpaceNews notes that Zhou received some of his training at the University of Southern California.

The probability of miscalculation is high and risks spiraling escalation --- first-strike pressures, inadequate legal frameworks, and no counterspace weapon taboos

 * Finch 15** [James P. Finch is the Principal Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he previously acted as the Principal Director for Space Policy. He has held space-related leadership positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Headquarters U.S. Air Force, “Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth,” //JFQ// 76, 1st Quarter 2015]
 * Note – ADIZ = Air Defense Identification Zone

As potentially dangerous as the overlappingADIZsar e, they are far less destabilizingthan actions in space could be during a crisis. Allcontestants in the “great game” unfolding in Asia have fairly similar appreciations of the implications that would follow engaging military or, worse, civilian aircraft transiting their ADIZ. These understandings have been built over 100 years of air travel and were underscored dramatically in the miscalculation associated with the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983. Such shared understandings are largely nonexistent in space. Not only do nations have less experience operating in the domain, but the criticality of space systems tobroader operational objectives also may create a tempting target early in a crisis. Combined with the lack of potential human casualties from engagements in space, this lack of common understandingmay create a//growing risk of miscalculation// in a terrestrial political crisis. If not explicitly addressed, this instability in space could even create a chasm that undermines the otherwise well-crafted tenets of strategic or nuclear stability. While much has been written about how nuclear weapons contribute to, or detract from, crisis stability, space, in some ways, is more complex than nuclear stability. First, today a clear taboo exists against the use of nuclear weapons. Crossing that firebreak at any level has immediately recognizable and significant implications. Second, in the context of nuclear weapons, theorists can (at least arguably) discriminate among escalatory motives based on the type of weapon— strategic or tactical—and based on the type of target—counterforce or countervalue targeting. This was most famously sketched out in the form of an escalation ladder in Herman Kahn’s 1965 book, On Escalation. This convenient heuristic method for understanding escalation based on the target and the weapon type is arguably more complex for space. This is a byproduct of the lack of mutual understanding on the implications of the weapon and the value of the target. These factors deserve detailed consideration because they describe the playing field on which a terrestrial crisis could spiral into space conflict. Efforts to manage crises, therefore, must account for these complexities. To begin, there is no taboo against many types of counterspace systems. Starting a framework with weapon type, the threshold for use of temporary and reversible counterspace weapons appears much lower. There are documented instances of electronic jamming happening all over the world today, and the number of actors who possess counterspace weapons such as communications jammers is much higher. Given the low cost and relative simplicity of some counterspace weapons, even nonstate actors have found utility in employing them. As former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn noted, “ //Irregular warfare has come to space// .”8 Consequently, this type of weapon —temporary and reversible— may appear at first glance to be less escalatory and less prone to miscalculation than kinetic weapons. At the other end of the weapons spectrum are weapons that have permanent and irreversible effects. The extreme version of such a weapon would be a debris-generatin g kinetic kill device such as the kind that was tested by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War and by China in 2007. These weapons are particularly insidious because they generate large amounts of debris that indiscriminately threatens satellites and other space systems for decades into the future. One additional dimension to the weapons spectrum that merits consideration in the context of crisis stability relates to the survivability of a weapon. It is commonly accepted that //space is an offense-dominant domain//, which is to say that holding space targets at risk is far easier and cheaper than defending them. This could lead to first-strike instabilityby creating pressure for early action at the conventional level here on Earth before counterspace attacks could undermine the capability for power projection. But the offense-dominant nature of the domain has implications for both peaceful satellites as well as space-based weapons. This could also create first-strike instability regarding space-based weapons since the advantage would go to the belligerents who use their space weapon first. In this way, space-based weapons may be uniquely destabilizing in ways that their more survivable, ground-based relatives are not. Adding complexity to Kahn’s heuristic, however, is the situational context surrounding the employment of counterspace systems. In the space context, strategists will have to consider weapon type, the nature of the target, and also the terrestrial context. Today’s electronic jamming has primarily been witnessed in the Middle East, where regimes have sought to deny freedom of information to their populations by jamming commercial communications satellites. The same weapon type— a satellite communications jammer — applied against a satellite carrying strategic nuclear command and control communications during a crisis could be perceived much differentl y. In such an instance, //decisionmakers might conclude that the other side is attempting to deprive them of nuclear command and control as a prelude to escalation//. Similarly, the application of permanent, irreversible force against a commercial or third party satellite would have a much different effect on crisis dynamics than mere jamming. Physically destroying or otherwise rendering inoperable such assets could raise a party’s stake in the conflict, by threatening either its power projection capabilities globally or its assured ability to retaliate against a nuclear strike. Many militaries use commercial assets to communicate with deployed forces, and a “show of force” strike against a commercial satellite could inadvertently engage an adversary’s vital interests. Simply put, the weapon, target, and context all contribute to the perceived intent and effects of a counterspace attack. Unlike in other domains, //tremendous ambiguity exists regarding the use of counterspace weapon// s. This means that all of these variables would be open to interpretation in crises, and it should be remembered that an inherent characteristic of crises is a short timeframe for decisionmaking. When time is short and the potential cost of inaction is significant, or even catastrophic, decisionmakers tend to lean toward worst-case interpretations of an adversary’s actions. //This is a clear recipe for inadvertent miscalculation//.

Space cooperation can avoid miscalc--- high-level trust-building requires a common framework that emerges through peacetime collaboration

 * Finch 15** [James P. Finch is the Principal Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he previously acted as the Principal Director for Space Policy. He has held space-related leadership positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Headquarters U.S. Air Force, “Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth,” //JFQ// 76, 1st Quarter 2015]

At the government-to-government (so-called Track 1) level, there is not currently a productive venue for the U nited S tates and China to develop a mutual understanding of how space playsinto crisis stability. While space security has been incorporated into existing diplomatic and defense dialogues, these steps in the right direction have been slow and tentative, and there is much work to be done. Recently, some engagements led by think tanks (known as Track 1.5 dialogues due to mixed delegations of government and academics) have begun to explore the issue, and it is clear that both sides harbor a lot of mistrust and misperception. The United States continues to raise questions about China’s military modernization and its potential coercion of regional neighbors over contested territory. China continues to question the implications of expanding U.S. missile defensesand, to a lesser extent, the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Suspicions about space activities fit within this broader geopolitical mistrust. The U nited S tates continues to express concern about Chinese space activities and China’s lack of transparency when it comes to unique space launch profiles or robotics experiments. China, for its part, expresses concerns about U.S. activities, such as the reusable experimental test platform known as the X-37B. These misperceptions are hard to resolve, both because of the inherent dual-use nature of space systems and the difficulty in creating transparency for a regime so far removed from terra firma. //Resolving such suspicions and building trust take time// and require a common understanding of the nature of the space domain and space systems. Returning to the formulation of Colby, recall that “in a stable situation. . . major war would only come about because one party truly sought it, not because of miscalculation.” Miscalc ulation is best avoided when each side understands the implications of its actions and understands how the other side will interpret and react to those actions. This situation does not exist in today’s environment regarding space systems and space weapons. We lack a common understanding of how space will contribute to, or come to define, potential crises between the United States and China. As both countries seek to define a “new type of great power relationship,” it would be wise to consider how new technologies and operational concepts are best managed during crises. Given both sides’ growing reliance on space systems to achieve their future military and political aims, a lack of understanding comes with great peril. We should strive to build a common framework now, using dialogues during peacetime, before//provocative actions// in space during a crisis //imperil stability// here on Earth.

Space conflict goes nuclear – flashpoints with China are inevitable – outweighs probability of ground-based conflicts
Billings 15 [ Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space and physics, Citing Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center, and James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, The Scientific American, August 10, 2015, “War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever”, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever]

//The world’s most worrisome military flashpoint is// arguably not //in// the Strait of Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-man’s-land of Earth //orbit, where a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race// in all but name. The emptiness of outer space might be the last place you’d expect militaries to vie over contested territory, except that outer space isn’t so empty anymore. About 1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits, providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting and planetary surveillance. //For militaries that rely on// some of those //satellites for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground//, with the U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, //as China// and Russia //aggressively// seek to //challenge U.S. superiority// in space with ambitious military space programs of their own, //the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that could// cripple [ //destroy// ] //the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure. And// though it might begin in space, such a conflict could //easily ignite full-blown war on Earth.// The //long-simmering tensions are now approaching a boiling point//due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of possible //a// nti- //sat// ellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last month’s failure of tension-easing talks at the //U// nited //N// ations. Testifying before Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both “developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict,” //such as those that might erupt over China’s military activities in the S// outh //C// hina //S// ea or Russia’s in Ukraine. //China in particular//, Clapper said, //has demonstrated “the need to interfere with, damage and destroy” U.S. satellites// , referring to a series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007. There are many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or permanently damage a satellite’s components, particularly its delicate sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from ground controllers. In response to these possible threats, the Obama administration has budgeted at least 5 billion to be spent over the next five years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S. military space program. //The U.S. is// also //attempting to tackle the problem through diplomacy//, although //with minimal success// ; in late July at the //U// nited //N// ations, //long-awaited discussions stalled// on a European Union-drafted code of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. //The failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo//, likely leading to years of further debate within the UN’s General Assembly. “The bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space,” says Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space secure. “But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if attacked.” Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned through the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, space-based surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested “space mines,” self-detonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space peaked with the Reagan administration’s multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15 fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted. According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites were—particularly the ones in “ geosynchronous ” orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more. Such satellites effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them sitting ducks. But because any //hostile action against those satellites could easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth//, both superpowers backed down. “Neither one of us signed a treaty about this,” Krepon says. “We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the other guy would, too.” //Today, the situation is much more complicated.// Low- and high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60 different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, //each and every satellite is at risk//, in part because not all members of the growing club of military space powers are willing to play by the same rules —and they don’t have to , //because the rules remain// as yet //unwritten.// Space junk is the greatest threat. Satellites race through space at very high velocities, so the quickest, dirtiest way to kill one is to simply launch something into space to get in its way. Even the impact of an object as small and low-tech as a marble can disable or entirely destroy a billion-dollar satellite. And if a nation uses such a “kinetic” method to destroy an adversary’s satellite, it can easily create even more dangerous debris, potentially cascading into a chain reaction that transforms Earth orbit into a demolition derby. In 2007 the risks from debris skyrocketed when China launched a missile that destroyed one of its own weather satellites in low-Earth orbit. That test generated a swarm of long-lived shrapnel that constitutes nearly one-sixth of all the radar-trackable debris in orbit. The U.S. responded in kind in 2008, repurposing a ship-launched anti-ballistic missile to shoot down a malfunctioning U.S. military satellite shortly before it tumbled into the atmosphere. That test produced dangerous junk too, though in smaller amounts, and the debris was shorter-lived because it was generated at a much lower altitude. More recently, China has launched what many experts say are additional tests of ground-based anti-satellite kinetic weapons. None of these subsequent launches have destroyed satellites, but Krepon and other experts say this is because the Chinese are now merely testing to miss, rather than to hit, with the same hostile capability as an end result. The latest test occurred on July 23 of last year. Chinese officials insist the tests’ only purpose is peaceful missile defense and scientific experimentation. But one test in May 2013 sent a missile soaring as high as 30,000 kilometers above Earth, //approaching the safe haven of strategic geosynchronous satellites.//

Causes nuclear war, collapses all vital systems crucial to human civilization

 * Lamrani 16** [Omar, geopolitical and security analyst for Stratfor, National Interest, “What the U.S. Military Fears Most: A Massive Space War,” May 18, 2016, []]

The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern life. Moreover, //future breakthroughs may await in space//, including //solar energy improvements// , nuclear //waste disposal// and //extraterrestrial mining//. A war in space would disabl e a number of key satellites, and the resulting debris would place vital orbital regions at risk. //The damage to the world economy could also be disastrous//. In severity, //the consequences of space warfare could be comparable to those of nuclear war//. What's more, disabling key constellations that give early launch warnings could be seen as the //opening salvo in a nuclear attack//, driving the //threat of a wider conflagration//. The small satellite revolution promises the speedy replacement of disabled satellites in the event of attack — theoretically securing the U.S. military's use of space constellations in support of operations during a conflict. Small satellites are not a magic bullet, however; key satellite functions will still depend on bulkier and more complex systems, such as the large but critically important nuclear-hardened command-and-control mission satellites. Many of these systems involve hefty antennas and considerable power sources. Given that access to orbit may not be guaranteed during a war in space, the United States has also been exploring alternative ways to perform some of the core functions that satellites now provide. At this stage, high-flying unmanned aerial vehicles with satellite-like payloads offer the most advanced alternative. But considering the vehicles' vulnerability to sophisticated air defenses, their lower altitude and endurance relative to orbital satellites, and their limited global reach, this remains a tentative solution at best. Overall, the United States is getting far more serious about the threat of space warfare. Investment in new technologies is increasing, and the organizational architecture to deal with such a contingency is being put in place. In the race between shield and sword, however, there is no guarantee that offensive ASAT capabilities will not have the advantage, potentially denying critical access to space during a catastrophic celestial war. The High Cost of a War in Space: Increased competition in space is reviving fears of a war there, one with devastating consequences. Humanity depends on space systems for communication, exploration, navigation and a host of other functions integral to modern lif e. Moreover, future breakthroughs may await in space, including solar energy improvements, nuclear waste disposal and extraterrestrial mining.

The plan solves – engaging China in space through the International Space Station spills over to enhance broader space cooperation and reverses the dangerous perception of a space arms race
[|http://www.space.com/29671-china-nasa-space-station-cooperation.html#sthash.xuOfRk7T.dpuf]]
 * David 15** [Leonard David, Space.com's Space Insider Columnist, “US-China Cooperation in Space: Is It Possible, and What's in Store?,” June 16, 2015,

There's a growing debate over whether China and the United States should cooperate in space, and the dialogue now appears to focus on how to createa n "open-door" policy in orbit forChinese astronauts to make trips to the I nternational S pace S tation (ISS). Discussion between the two space powers has reached the White House, but progress seems stymied by Washington, D.C., politics. Specifically at question is how to handle a 2011 decree by the U.S. Congress that banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with China regarding space. Meanwhile, the Chinese space program is pressing forward with its own "long march" into space, with the goal of establishing its own space station in the 2020s. Space.com asked several space policy experts what the future holds for U.S.-China collaboration in space. Presidential leadership It will take //presidential leadership// to get start ed on //enhanced U.S.-Chinese space cooperation//, said John Logsdon, professor emeritus of political science and international affairs at The George Washington University's Space Policy Institute in Washington, D.C. " The first step is the White House working with congressional leadership to get current, unwise restrictions on such cooperation revoked ," Logsdon told Space.com. "Then, the United States can invite China to work together with the United States and other spacefaring countries on a wide variety of space activities and, most dramatically, human spaceflight." Logsdon said the U .S.-Soviet Apollo-Soyuz docking and "handshake in space" back in 1975 serves as a history lesson. "A similar initiative bringing the U nited S tates and China together in orbit would be a powerful indicator of the intent of the two 21st century superpowers to work together on Earth as well as in space ," Logsdon said. While it is impressive that China has become the third country to launch its citizens into orbit, the current state of the Chinese human spaceflight program is about equivalent to the U.S. program in the Gemini era, 50 years ago, Logsdon noted. " China has much more to learn from the United States in human spaceflight than the converse ," Logsdon said. "From the U.S. perspective, the main reason to engage in space cooperation with China is political, not technical." Complicated relationship The U.S. and China have a complex relationship, said Marcia Smith, a space policy analyst and editor of SpacePolicyOnline.com. "It is not like the U.S.-Soviet Cold War rivalry that was driven by military and ideological competition." Today, the U.S.-Chinese situation has those elements, Smith told Space.com, "but our mutually dependent trade relationship makes it a whole different kettle of fish ." Smith pointed out that, as far as space cooperation goes, the United States had very low-level agreements with the Soviets from the early 1960s on sharing biomedical data. During the Richard Nixon administration, the doors were flung open to what became the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), only to close again under then-President Jimmy Carter after the Soviets invaded, ironically, Afghanistan. Even during the strained years of the Ronald Reagan administration, small programs — again, mostly in the biomedical area — were allowed to continue, Smith said. "But the bold cooperation on human spaceflight — the equivalent of inviting China to join the ISS partnership — waited for regime change," Smith told Space.com "It is U.S.-Russian cooperation, not U.S.-Soviet. Perhaps when there is regime change in China, we will see the same kinds of possibilities emerge." Until then, "one would hope that low-level cooperation, akin to U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in the 1960s or 1980s, might be possible," Smith added. The law does allow multilateral, not bilateral, cooperation, she said. "The door is not completely shut." A U.S.-China space race? " //It is in the interest of U.S. national security to engage China in space// ," said Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Johnson-Freese noted that her views do not necessarily represent those of the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. " //The United States has unnecessarily created the perception of a space race between the U.S. and China, and that the U.S. is losing, by its unwillingness to be inclusive in ISS space partnerships// ," Johnson-Freese said. Refusing Chinese participation in the I nternational S pace S tation, at least in part, has spurred China to build its own station, Johnson-Freese said, " which could well be the de facto international space station when the U.S.-led ISS is deorbited ." [China's Space Station Plans in Photos] Cooperation stonewalled Apollo-Soyuz demonstrated that space can be a venue to build cooperation and trust during difficult political times, when they are most needed, and without dangerous tech nology transferal , Johnson-Freese said. "However, that demonstration has gone unheeded regarding China ," she noted. Johnson-Freese said the reasoning given by those who have stonewalled cooperation in space with the Chinese "often has little to do with space or national security ." Rather, "space is merely a token for complaints about China in other areas, such as human rights," she said. Other countries are eager to work with China in space, Johnson-Freese said, and " //the U.S. merely appears petulant" in its refusal to engage in any meaningful way with China in space//.

Inviting China to the ISS solves broader space cooperation --- continued Chinese exclusion destroys international space partnerships

 * Bradley 13** [Mack A. Bradley, “The Space to Lead,” a thesis presented to the Washington University of St. Louis, Missouri, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, August 2013]

After 40 years of intense, if peaceful, conflict, the US and Russia quickly came together on the ISS since it advanced the interests of both. Today, cooperation in space between the ISSpartners is well-established even if other aspects of their relationships are chillier. But what is for some the obvious step of including China in the ISS family is firmly off the table, at least for the moment. //Not only has America opposed Chinese involvement in the ISS//, but thanks to US Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va) //it’s actually against the law for NASA to even cooperate with the Chinese space agency//. In a 2012 meeting in Quebec City, Canada, the ISS partners discussed Chinese participation, with ESA director general Jean-Jacques Dordain voicing support for some level of cooperation with China. NASA Administrator Charles Bolden reminded his international 19 colleagues that his agency could not support Chinese participation in the station, but that they should pursue other forms of cooperation with China. Despite Bolden’s nearly heroic efforts to thread the diplomatic needle, press reports of the meeting prompted an angry letter from Rep. Wolf. Wolf told Bolden that he “should make clear that the U.S. will not accept Chinese participation in any stationrelated activities.”34 US efforts to //ice China out of the ISS//, and to outlaw even the smallest cooperation with an emerging and important space power are painfully short-sighted. A bitterly Cold War didn’t stop US/Russian cooperation, as early as the 1970s. The difference in American attitudes in the case of the station relates to the fact that the United States won the Cold War. In the early 1990s, Russia was exhausted, a spent force that would take years to rebuild and the US was in a position of strength. China on the other hand is rising rapidly, economically, militarily and in terms of space. Concerns about technology transfer to, or technology theft by, China are rife in the US. China didn’t help themselves either in their efforts to be welcomed into the ISS community. In 2007, China's People’s Liberation Army destroyed a defunct Chinese Fengyun-1C weather satellite with a ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile. This intentional explosion in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) was the largest debris-generating event in the history of spaceflight, creating 2,317 pieces large enough to track, and perhaps as many as 35,000 smaller pieces according to a 2007 report by NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO).35 This unannounced ASAT test was grossly irresponsible, making a far more dangerous environment in LEO for all spacefaring nations, and it is hard to square with the principles of the OST, to which China is a signatory. A month after Fengyun, the COPUOS Scientific and Technical Subcommittee adopted a set of seven guidelines to slow the growth of orbital debris, including a call to avoid the intentional destruction of any orbiting spacecraft.36 Even so, the United States entered into Apollo-Soyuz in the afterglow of the moon landings. It brought Russia into the ISS partnership from a position of strength vis-a-vis its former Cold War rival. The overall competition to come between the United States and China is too broad for the purposes of this paper, but China’s rise in terms of space capabilities and aspirations will certainly continue. Barring some other sort of foolish and destructive behavior like Fengyun, it’s reasonable to assume that China’s international standing as a spacefaring power will continue to grow in tandem with its capabilities .20 Furthermore, while an absolute and persistent decline in America’s space capabilities, prestige and international leadership are by no means certain , a relative decline almost certainly is. As Dr. Paul Kaminski says, where the US once had a virtual monopoly, now the list of spacefaring countries continues to grow. Dr. Kaminski is chairman of the Defense Science Board, a US Air Force Colonel (Ret.), former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, former official in the National Reconnaissance Office and Air Force Systems Command and Director for Low Observables Technology who oversaw the development of stealth technology in platforms such as the F-117 Nighthawk (popularly, and inaccurately, known as the “Stealth Fighter”) and the B-2 Spirit (“Stealth Bomber”). “It was a monopoly that we could offer to share in with key allies so it had a big influence on their willingness and interest in cooperating with us on national security policy.” But now, Kaminski says, things are changing “because some aspects of space are becoming more of a commodity. There are other countries now launching theirown reconnaissance satellites, launching their own communications satellites, buying communications as a commodity, so our (space) policy and capabilities , while still very important, havea less sharp influence .”36A Some new space powers, like China, will be large, significant players whether the United States likes it or not. It would be wise therefore //for the US to engage with China from a position of relative strength//. It is simply unrealistic to believe that the rest of the world will continue to ostracize China’s space program simply because it suits American purposes. Right now, the most obvious point of contention is China’s exclusion from the ISS partnership. But once the ISS is de-orbited, either in 2020 or sometime thereafter, the world will move on to the next project , all of the options for which lend themselves to a //broad international partnership//. //If the US continues to snub China now, it will instead find itself having to create a working relationship with China in the future when US power and influence are likely to be relatively diminished//. The technology transfer concerns among US policymakers go far beyond space, and China will accomplish its goals in space with or without technology transfer that may result from US engagement, and indeed which may result whether or not the US engages China.37 Integrating China into a robust international partnership , the ISS , of which the US was the principal creator and remains a21 strong leader despite the gap in US manned spaceflight seems //far preferable// to the US entering a //future partnership// which could well be of //Chinese design//.

====Positive engagement provides a foundation for a stronger overall relationship and reverses anti-Chinese sentiment amongst government planners – that allows cooperation on space weather modeling, satellite observation, and exploration====
 * Weeden 15** [Brian, Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and a former U.S. Air Force Officer with sixteen years of professional experience in space operations and policy, “An Opportunity to Use the Space Domain to Strengthen the U.S.-China Relationship,” September 9, 2015, http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=602]

The U.S.-China relationship in space has the potential to be a //stable foundation// for a//stronger overall relationship// between the two countries. Space was arguably a stabilizing element in the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War by providing national capabilities to //reduce tensions// and an //outlet for collaboration//. Although the future of the U.S.-China relationship will be characterized by both competition and cooperation, taking concrete steps to stabilize relations in space can be part of the solution to avoiding the “Thucydides trap,” where an established power’s fear of a rising power leads to conflict. The Role of Space in the U.S.-China Relationship Space is a critical domain to the security of the U nited S tates. Space capabilities enable secure, hardened communications with nuclear forces, enabl e the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, and provide valuable intelligence. Such capabilities are the //foundation// of the U nited S tates ’ ability to //defend its borders//, //project power to protect its allies// and interests overseas, and //defeat adversaries//. The space domain, however, is currently experiencing significant changes that could affect the United States’ ability to maintain all these benefits in the future. A growing number of state and nonstate actors are involved in space, resulting in more than 1,200 active satellites in orbit and thousands more planned in the nearfuture. Active satellites coexist in space along with hundreds of thousands of dead satellites, spent rocket stages, and other pieces of debris that are a legacy of six decades of space activities. As a result, the //most useful and densely populated orbits// are experiencing significant increases in physical and electromagnetic //congestion// and //interference//. Amid this change, China is rapidly developing its capabilities across the entire spectrum of space activities. It has a robust and successful human spaceflight and exploration program that in many ways mirrors NASA’s successe s in the 1960s and 1970s and is a similar source of national pride. Although it still has a long way to go, China is developing a range of space capabilities focused on national security that one day might be second only to those of the United States. Some of China’s new capabiliti es have created significant concern within the U.S. national security community, as they are aimedat countering or threatening the space capabilities of theU nited S tates and other countries. The massive changes in the space domain and China’s growing capabilities have affected the U.S.-China relationship in space. There is growing mistrust b etween the two countries, fueled in part by their development and testing of dual-use tec hnologies such as rendezvous and proximity operations and hypervelocity kinetic kill systems. This mistrust is compounded by a misalignment in political and strategic priorities: China is focused on developing and increasing its capabilities in the space domain, whereas the United States is focused on maintaining and assuring access to its space capabilities. Recommendations for Managing Tensions and Promoting Positive Engagement Despite these challenges and concerns, there are concrete steps that the United States and China can take to manage tensions and possibly even work toward //positive engagement//. In 2011, President Barack Obama and then Chinese president Hu Jintao issued a joint statement on strengthening U.S.-China relations during a visit by President Hu to the White House. As one of the steps outlined in the statement, the two presidents agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space and discuss opportunities for practical future cooperation. President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit presents an opportunity to build on the 2011 agreement and take steps toward these goals. The first step should be to have a substantive discussion on space security. President Obama should clearly communicate the importance that the United States places on assured access to space, U.S. concerns with recent Chinese counterspace testing, and the potential negative consequences of any aggressive acts in space. Both countries should exchange views on space policies, including their interpretations of how self-defense applies to satellites and hostile actions in space. Doing so can help avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions that could lead either country to unwittingly take actions that escalate a crisis. Second, Presidents Obama and Xi should discuss specific ideas for cooperation in civil and scientific space activities and the use of space for peaceful applications on earth. //Continuing to exclude China from civil space cooperation// will not prevent it from developing its own capabilities; this approach will only ensure that China cooperates with other countries in space in a way that advances its own national interests and goals. //Space weather//, //scientific research// , //exploration// , //capacity building for disaster response// , and //global environmental monitoring//are all areas where the U nited S tates and China share joint interests and could //collaborate with each other// and other //interested countries to help establish broader relationships outside the military realm//.

**Expanded space cooperation enables more effective data sharing --- that produces better models capable of anticipating solar flares and geomagnetic storms**

 * Johnson-Freese 15** [Joan Johnson-Freese is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “Found in Space: Cooperation,” October 9, 2015, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-china-space-cooperation-a-welcome-dialogue-begins]

The increasing U.S. propensity, especially in conjunction with political campaigning, to equate diplomacy with appeasement and negotiation with weakness has not served the U.S. well in other parts of the world, and won’t with China either. The Obama Administration has apparently decided that with nothing to lose politically, it intends to make strategic and sometimes bold foreign policy moves before leaving office, in spite of obstructionist roadblocks: normalizing relations with Cuba, negotiating a nuclear treaty with Iran, and talking with the Chinese about space among them. It is ironic that “talking” has become a bold policy move. According to the DOS media note on the meeting, [2] the broad intent of the meeting was greater transparency, initially including an exchange of information on each other’s space policies. The importance of that simple objective cannot be overstated. The Chinese –- Asian –- cultural propensity toward opaqueness has resulted in the U.S. assessing all things space-related doneby China from a worst-case scenario perspective. The American cultural attribute of everybody –- regardless of standing or knowledge – having an opinion on every subject can result in the Chinese believing that anything said in the New York Times or on Fox News is official U.S. policy. Clarity can serve both parties well. Apparently also, according to the media note, space debris and satellite collision avoidance were discussed, in acknowledgement that those issues cannot be handled solely on a national basis and are critical to maintaining the sustainability of the space environment. Since the United States has more assets in space and is more dependent on those space assets in both civil and military operations than any other country, it behooves the U.S. to pursue all potentially valuable avenues available to protect the space environment. It is in U.S. interests. Given the increasing number of Chinese assets in space, sustainability of the space environment is in Chinese interests as well. Countries cooperate where both have a vested interest. Other topics that were discussed in conjunction with potential cooperation were civil Earth-observation activities, space sciences, space weather and the civil Global Navigation Satellite System. Beyond the general benefits that flow to the U.S. from cooperation – including learning Chinese standard operating procedures in decision making and operations, establishing an internal Chinese constituency to argue against aggressive Chinese actions that threaten cooperative programs by creating a vested interest in continuance, and getting a closer look at Chinese capabilities – cooperation in each of these areas offers the U.S. more in benefits than associated risks. Working together on civilian- Earth observation activities would likely involve //sharing data on complex Earth-system processes relevant to everyone on the planet//. There are frequently //data gaps in the models// designed to address these complex processes, gaps that can be closed by //sharing data//. //Better models would yield positive benefits to both countries in fields like disaster management, environmental studies, coastal and marine planning, and sustainable land use//. Everybody wins. Space-science cooperation has long been discussed as potentially valuable and viable for two reasons. First, it can be an area of cooperation where technology-transfer concerns can be minimized. Although it would likely begin only with data exchanges, ideally data exchanges could lead to more extensive projects so that Americans can learn more about Chinese decision making and foster positive constituencies within China. Further, space scientists in both countries are notoriously like stepchildren when it comes to funding allocations. //Working cooperatively could enable scientists in both countries to do more with their limited funds//. One area of space science with practical application is space weather – //being able to anticipate solar flares// and //geomagnetic storms// that are potentially damaging to satellites in orbit and negatively affecting ground facilities and operations, and thereby be able to protect against those effects. //Space weather “predictions” are based on fundamental scientific research on solar-terrestrial physics//. Finally, discussions on civil Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) focus on navigation satellite systems with global coverage, including the U.S. Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), the Russian GLONASS system, and the expanding Chinese BeiDou system. It is in U.S. interests to assure that China integrates BeiDou with other systems rather than having BeiDou incompatible with other systems. If China were to integrate only BeiDou into the myriad of commercial products that utilize GNSS and that China produces, thereby requiring a different receiver than currently used by GPS, that would wield significant negative economic impacts on the U.S. Additionally, non-integration could also create a more chaotic environment for GNSS use. Therefore, the United States is not merely doing China a favor by participating in these talks or by considering expanded areas of space cooperation, as is sometimes characterized. It is the United States acting in its own best interest. While ideally the U.S. could tie space cooperation to other contentious issues between the U.S. and China – cyber attacks, for example – that is unlikely to happen. Expecting and waiting for that unlikely link to be made allows critical space issues to go unaddressed.

Solar flares are inevitable --- better forecasting is crucial to effectively adapt power grids to geomagnetic storms

 * Stone 15** [Maddie, Gizmodo, “The US is Finally Heeding Warnings About a Monster Solar Storm,” October 30, 2015, []]

Space weather scientists at the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration and NASA have warned for years that if a massive solar storm were to strike the Earth, the effects could be catastrophic. Think worldwide power and telecommunications outages, lasting weeks to months. Everything that relies on electricity, from our computers to our refrigerators to our water supply, could break down. “Frankly,” space weather consultant John Kappenman told Gizmodo last month, “this could be one of the most severe natural disasters that the country, and major portions of the world, could face.” Apocalypse preppers have been stocking their EMP bunkers for years, but yesterday, the White House released the very first National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan. These two documents outline goals and strategies for improved space weather modeling, forecasting, and response coordination. Ultimately, they represent a roadmap toward a future where the unfortunate arrivalofa giant solar stormdoesn’t spell the end of modern society. What’s Space Weather and Why Do We Care? Space weather is a fairly broad term encompassing a bunch of stuff the Sun hurls our way, including high-energy x-rays, magnetized plasma, and charged particles. All of these can interact with Earth’s magnetic field, causing geomagnetic disturbances that light up the northern and southern skies with dazzling auroras. Most of the time, these cosmic light shows are beautiful and harmless. Sometimes, however, things can get nasty, especially when the Sun releases a large burst of plasma known as a coronal mass ejection (CME). Large CMEs are unusual, and it’s even more unusual for our planet to line up directly in their path. But when that happens, CMEs cause geomagnetic storms that generate tremendous electric currents in the upper atmosphere. Some of this current makes its way into the ground, where it’s channeled by any and all conductive materials, including certain rocks, pipes, and electric cables. Currents from large geomagnetic storms canultimately feed into our grids, //melting transformers at the heart of power distribution centers//. Because our power supply has become more aggregated and interconnected over the last decades, the effects of an outage at one distribution center could spread far and wide, impacting millions of people. “In the case of electric power grids, both the manner in which systems are operated and the accumulated design decisions engineered into present-day networks around the world have tended to significantly enhance geomagnetic storm impacts,” writes Kappenman in a report on the dangers of space weather. To illustrate his point, Kappenman cites a geomagnetic storm that occurred across Earth’s northern hemisphere in March of 1989: This [storm] started a chain of power system disturbance events that only 92 seconds later resulted in a complete collapse to the entire power grid in Quebec. The rapid manifestation of the storm and impacts to the Quebec power grid allowed no time to even assess what was happening to the power system, let alone provide any meaningful human intervention. Over the course of the next 24 hours, additional large disturbances propagated across the continent, the only difference being that they extended much further south and came, at times, arguably close to toppling power systems from the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions of the U.S. to the Midwest. Again, geomagnetic storms of this magnitude are rare, but it’d be unwise to assume we won’t see another in the years to com e. In fact, a CME roughly four times larger than the one that caused the 1989 Quebec outages narrowly missed us in 2012. “ If it had hit, we would still be picking up the pieces ,” physicist Daniel Baker of the University of Colorado told NASA two years later. A report by the National Academies estimated that the cost of such an event could exceed 2 trillion dollars—the economic equivalent of 20 Hurricane Katrinas. The Road Forward Clearly, it’s high time we to start thinking about how to prepare for the possibility of a monster solar storm. The National Space Weather Action Plan released yesterday describes how the US government will coordinate efforts on space weather forecasting, infrastructure preparation and education. Here are some highlights. Establishing the “Godzilla” Storm: On the science front, a key component of the White House’s new plan is figuring out just how big these suckers can get. To this day, the largest solar storm recorded on Earth was the 1859 Carrington Event, a series of powerful CMEs that ignited the northern lights as far south as Cuba, causing global telegraph outages. The Carrington Event has always been our benchmark for really big storms, but in recent years, observations of Sun-like stars beyond our solar system have shown that “ //superflares// ”— 1,000 times larger than the Carrington Event — can and do occur. In 2012, a study published in Nature estimated that such a flare could strike the Earth every 800 to 5,000 years. That’s a pretty wide margin of uncertainty for such a potentially devastating event. Clearly, we need to get a better handle on the upper size limit of our own Sun’s eruptions and the actual risk superflares pose. Monitoring Vulnerability on the Ground: While we know that large pulses of electric current pose a danger to power grids, experts don’t agree on just how vulnerable our infrastructure is. The White House Action Plan calls for a nationwide assessment of vulnerability that includes factors like the age and design of grid infrastructure and the underlying geology. The DOE has also been tasked with developing a grid monitoring system that would “display the status of power generation, transmission, and distribution systems during geomagnetic storms.” Real-time monitoring tools like this could be used by grid operators who need to make fast decisions about when to shut things off. Improved Forecasting: A big aspect of our vulnerability to space weather is the fact that we have almost no lead-time before a large storm strikes. If a CME is heading straight for us, our first notice comes from the space weather monitoring satellites situated at the L1 Lagrange point a million miles in front of Earth. At best, these satellites give us about an hour’s notice. //There’s a lot of room to improve our forecasting, and it starts with a better understanding of when and how large solar flares and CMEs occur//. The White House Action Plan calls for more research on solar dynamics. Just as we can use weather models to predict the onset of tropical storms, //with better solar models we might be able to forecast days, or even weeks in advance, when the Sun’s gearing up to punt a a giant blob of plasma our way//. Cooperation: Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of a large geomagnetic storm is that its effects could be felt globally. This makes space weather unique among all natural disasters humans face, and it underscores the need for international coordination. To that end, the White House Action Plan outlines a number of goals and targets, including 1) an international meeting on the social and economic impacts of a large solar event, 2) multi-national acknowledgement of space weather as a global challenge, 3) facilitating open-access to space weather data across agencies and countries, 4) developing international standards for solar storm measurements and scales, and 5) developing a set of “mutual-aid arrangements” to facilitate response efforts worldwide. The last thing we want is for a bunch of power-hungry humans to panic. We’re all in this together, and it’d be nice if we didn’t devolve into a society of cannibalistic road warriors overnight.

The impact is extinction
IBT 11 [ International Business Times, Solar Flare Could Unleash Nuclear Holocaust Across Planet Earth, Forcing Hundreds of Nuclear Power Plants Into Total Meltdowns, []]

What happens when there's no electricity? Imagine a world without electricity. Even for just a week. Imagine [|New York] City with no electricity, or Los Angeles, or Sao Paulo. Within 72 hours, most cities around the world will devolve into total chaos, complete with looting, violent crime, and runaway fires. But that's not even the bad news. Even if all the major cities of the world burned to the ground for some other reason, humanity could still recover because it has the farmlands: the soils, the seeds, and the potential to recover, right? And yet the real crisis here stems from the realization that once there is no power grid, all the nuclear power plants of the world suddenly go into "emergency mode" and are forced to rely on their on-site emergency power backups to circulate coolants and prevent nuclear meltdowns from occurring. And yet, as we've already established, these facilities typically have only a few hours of battery power available, followed by perhaps a few days worth of diesel fuel to run their generators (or propane, in some cases). Did I also mention that half the people who work at nuclear power facilities have no idea what they're doing in the first place? Most of the veterans who really know the facilities inside and out have been forced into retirement due to reaching their lifetime limits of on-the-job radiation exposure, so most of the workers at nuclear facilities right now are newbies who really have no clue what they're doing. There are 440 nuclear power plants operating across 30 countries around the world today. There are an additional 250 so-called "research reactors" in existence, making a total of roughly 700 nuclear reactors to be dealt with (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/i...). Now imagine the scenario: You've got a //massive solar flare// that knocks out the world power grid and destroys the majority of the power grid transformers, thrusting the world into darkness. Cities collapse into chaos and rioting, martial law is quickly declared (but it hardly matters), and every nation in the world is on full emergency. But that doesn't solve the really big problem, which is that you've got 700 nuclear reactorsthat can't feed power into the grid (because all the transformers are blown up) and yet simultaneously have to be fed a steady stream of emergency fuels to run the generators the keep the coolant pumps functioning. How long does the coolant need to circulate in these facilities to cool the nuclear fuel? //Months//**. ** This is also the lesson of Fukushima: You can't cool nuclear fuel in mere hours or days. It takes //months// to bring these nuclear facilities to a state of cold shutdown. And that means in order to avoid a multitude of Fukushima-style meltdowns from occurring around the world, you need to truck diesel fuel, generator parts and nuclear plant workers to every nuclear facility on the planet, ON TIME, every time, without fail, for months on end. Now remember, //this must be done in the middle of the total chaos breakdown of modern civilization, where there is no power//, where law enforcement and emergency services are totally overrun, where people are starving because food deliveries have been disrupted, and when looting and violent crime runs rampant in the streets of every major city in the world. Somehow, despite all this, you have to run these diesel fuel caravans to the nuclear power plants and keep the pumps running. Except there's a problem in all this, even if you assume you can somehow work a logistical miracle and actually deliver the diesel fuel to the backup generators on time (which you probably can't). The problem is this: Where do you get diesel fuel? Why refineries will be shut down, too from petroleum refineries. Most people don't realize it, but petroleum refineries run on electricity. Without the power grid, the refineries don't produce a drop of diesel. With no diesel, there are no generators keeping the coolant running in the nuclear power facilities. But wait, you say: Maybe we could just acquire diesel from all the gas stations in the world. Pump it out of the ground, load it into trucks and use that to power the generators, right? Except there are other problems here: How do you pump all that fuel without electricity? How do you acquire all the tires and spare parts needed to keep trucks running if there's no electricity to keep the supply businesses running? How do you maintain a truck delivery infrastructure when the electrical infrastructure is totally wiped out? Some countries might be able to pull it off with some degree of success. With military escorts and the total government control over all fuel supplies, a few nations will be able to keep a few nuclear power facilities from melting down. But here's the real issue: There are 700 nuclear power facilities in the world, remember? Let's suppose that in the aftermath of a massive solar flare, the nations of the world are somehow able to control half of those facilities and nurse them into cold shutdown status. That still leaves roughly 350 nuclear facilities at risk. Now let's suppose half of those are somehow luckily offline and not even functioning when the solar flare hits, so they need no special attention. This is a very optimistic assumption, but that still leaves 175 nuclear power plants where all attempts fail. Let's be outrageously optimistic and suppose that a third of those somehow don't go into a total meltdown by some miracle of God, or some bizarre twist in the laws of physics. So we're still left with 115 nuclear power plants that "go Chernobyl." Fukushima was one power plant. //Imagine the devastation of 100+ nuclear power plants, all going into meltdown all at once across the planet//. It's not the loss of electricity that's the real problem; it's the //global tidal wave of invisible radiation that blankets the planet, permeates the topsoil, irradiates everything that breathes and delivers the final crushing blow to human civilization as we know it today//. Because //if you have 100 simultaneous global nuclear meltdowns//, the tidal wave of radiation will make farming nearly impossible for years. That means no food production for several years in a row. And that, in turn, means a near-total //collapse of the human population// on our planet. How many people can survive an entire year with no food from the farms? Not one in a hundred people. Even beyond that, how many people can essentially live underground and be safe enough from the radiation that they can have viable children and repopulate the planet? It's a very, very small fraction of the total population.

US-China satellite cooperation crucial to ocean observation and climate models --- but anti-Chinese space collaboration precludes it

 * Freedman 13** [Andrew, “NOAA Criticized for Likely Satellite Gap and China Option,” September 23, 2013, []]

With a likely gap in critical weather satellite coverage beginning in 2016, the N ational O ceanic and A tmospheric A dministration (NOAA) has not developed sufficient contingency measures to ensure that weather forecasts remain as reliable as they are today, according to three new federally commissioned reports and lawmakers at a House subcommittee hearing. Weather satellites provide invaluable data to forecasters and climate scientists alike, with polar-orbiting satellites, for example, providing at least 80 percent of the information that gets fed every day into sophisticated weather computer models. A gap in satellite coverage – a looming possibility post years of mismanagement, budget difficulties, and technical troubles – could significantly r educe the government’s ability to anticipate major storms and protect life and property, which is the main mission of NOAA’s National Weather Service. The precariousness of U.S. weather satellite infrastructure was driven home earlier this year when a “micrometeoroid” struck a geostationary weather satellit e, forcing NOAA to rely on a backup satellite. But in the near future, there may be long chunks of time when there are no backups available. NOAA has been left scrambling to figure out how to compensate for what could be reams of lost data, a gap in coverage that may occur as soon as 2016 and could last for longer than a year. In a controversial finding, a report commissioned by //NOAA found that the agency's best alternative would be to turn to China for help//. The report said //NOAA’s “silver bullet” solution would be for it to purchase data from China’s polar-orbiting satellites// to compensate for lost U.S. data. China plans to launch its next generation of polar-orbiting satellites later this year and in 2014, ahead of the U.S. new polar-orbiting satellites, and the capabilities of the Chinese satellites are expected to be comparable to U.S. spacecraft, the study said. The European Center for Medium Range Weather Forecasts, which maintains one of the most accurate medium-range weather models in the world, already incorporates the Chinese data in experimental ways, and plans to use it operationally if there is a data gap from U.S. satellites, the study said. In the U.S., however, concerns about national security have held back any use of Chinese weather satellite data. Washington has recently criticized Beijing for alleged Chinese computer hacking of American companies, and Chinese space firms have long had ties to the country’s military. At a joint hearing on the weather and satellite program, held on Sept. 19 by the House Science Subcommittees on Oversight and Environment, lawmakers from both parties sharply criticized NOAA for considering buying data from the Chinese government. Instead, they urged NOAA to consider purchasing data from commercial satellite providers that are developing fleets of small satellites that could be used for weather forecasting and environmental monitoring. “I have grave concerns about incorporating data into U.S. systems from a country well-known for its persistent and malicious cyber attacks against our nation,” said Oversight Subcommittee chairman Paul Broun (R-Ga.). Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.) said going with commercial vendors, rather than Chinese data, would make more sense. “(There is) A pretty misplaced set of values here when we are more interested in Chinese satellite data and we are hesitant to use commercial data from our own commercial companies,” he said. Mary Kicza, who directs NOAA’s satellite service, said the decision whether to purchase Chinese satellite data would need to be a “whole of government” decision involving national security officials. The biggest risk of a data gap concerns polar-orbiting satellites, which continuously scan the planet from north to south. The satellites gather information on winds and moisture in theupper atmospher e, which is then fed into computer models that meteorologists use for making weather forecasts. The data from the polar-orbiting satellites is particularly useful for making medium-range p redictions out to about seven days in advance. The other weather satellites are known as geostationary satellites since they orbit above a fixed point along the Earth’s equator, keeping continuous watch on a particular swath of the planet. Images from these satellites, which are known by the acronym “GOES,” often appear on television weathercasts. The likelihood of a data gap is much higher with the polar-satellite program than it is for the geostationary satellites, largely because of the limited design lifetime of current satellites and the launch schedule for the next generation of these spacecraft. Tests that have deprived computer models of some polar satellite data have shown that the model projections would be significantly less accurate, raising concerns about the reliability of U.S. weather forecasts when a data gap occurs. For example, experiments done using the forecast for Hurricane Sandy showed that forecast models would have shown the storm curving out to sea and missing the U.S., rather than taking its devastating hook to the west, into the New Jersey coast. That storm claimed 117 lives and caused at least $65 billion in damage. Accurate forecasts made several days in advance of the storm’s landfall were widely credited for saving lives. “ A gap (in satellite coverage) would be catastrophic for forecastin g by the national weather servic e,” Rep. Chris Stewart (R-Utah) said at the hearing. Because of mismanagement, billions in cost overruns, and technical hurdles, there has been a significant delay in launching the next generation of polar-orbiting satellites, known as the Joint Polar Satellite System, or JPSS. According to Kicza, NOAA anticipates that the first JPSS satellite from the $11.3 billion program will be ready for launch in March of 2017, at the earliest. However, that timeline is already past the design lifetime of the youngest polar-orbiting satellite currently in orbit, known as the Suomi-NPP satellite, and if there are any slips to the launch date, it would make a data gap both more likely to occur and longer than it otherwise would be. Kicza said faster development of the first JPSS satellite, combined with improved performance from the newest polar-orbiting satellite, known as the Suomi-NPP satellite, along with additional funds from Congress have reduced the likelihood of a gap in polar-satellite coverage. However, David A. Powner, the director of information technology management issues at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), testified that the likelihood of a data gap has not been reduced. “I’m not aware of the gap situation improving,” Powner said. The GAO released two reports on Sept. 19 pertaining to NOAA’s two main weather and climate satellite fleets. Both found that NOAA has not adequately planned for what to do in the event that it experiences a partial loss of its fleet.

Effective satellite data models are key to ocean ecosystem adaptation

 * McCauley 16** [Douglas, professor of marine biology at the University of California, Santa Barbara and an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellow in the Ocean Sciences, “How Satellites and Big Data Can Help to Save the Oceans,” Yale Environment 360, http://e360.yale.edu/feature/how_satellites_and_big_data_can_help_to_save_the_oceans/2982]

Yet a key question remains: Will the new availability of sophisticated, satellite-based technologies, coupled with the democratization of online data about the health of our environment, help ensure that these positive advancements live up to their potential to protect the oceans ? The first encouraging policy development is the explosive movement by countries around the world to set up massive marine protected areas of unprecedented size. The biggest of these newly proposed mega-marine protected areas, the Pitcairn Islands Marine Reserve, is three-and-a-half times larger than the United Kingdom, and more than 100,000 times larger than the historical median size for an ocean protected area. The 19 mega-marine protected areas created or announced in the last six years would comprise an area larger than all the protected ocean areas created previously. Several huge marine reserves currently being considered would add an additional 775,000 square miles of ocean protection. The second key development is that the United Nations is now drawing up a treaty that would, for the first time, manage biodiversity across the high seas — the region outside the 200-mile exclusive economic zones of individual nations. The forthcoming United Nations high seas treaty would be setting new rules for a swath of the ocean 22 times larger than the United States. These new regulations are focused on preserving marine biodiversity, establishing international ocean reserves, evaluating processes for sharing marine genetic resources, and effectively carrying out environmental impact assessments. These bold new policies suggest that decision-makers are finally committed to taking the kind of aggressive actions needed to stay a step ahead of industrialization in the oceans — something we failed to do when industrialization occurred on land. This issue extends well beyond industrial-scale fishing. Recent innovation and technological development have now made it possible to take the industries of farming, mining, power generation, and even data center management underwater. The scope and significance of this mass acceleration of new uses of the ocean cannot be overstated. In 2014, for example, the world began eating more fish from farms than from the wild — a marine reprise of our historic shift on land from hunting wild food to farming. Mining claims have already been staked to roughly 400,000 square miles of deep-sea ecosystems. The campaigns to vastly expand marine protected areas and significantly improve international governance of the oceans are extremely exciting. But both of these important policy movements have an Achilles heel: Laws only matter if you can ensure that people actually follow them. These new policies cover such vast areas that they render boat, plane, and other traditional forms of ocean observation as obsolete as sextants. In the absence of systems to watch their boundaries, large marine protected areas will be nothing more than huge paper parks. Likewise, our efforts to control the exploitation of high-seas biodiversity via the new U.N. treaty will only be effective if we aren’t blind to what is happening in this large and distant part of the ocean. But just as technological innovation is fueling a rapid acceleration of development in the ocean, //high-tech solutions may also hold the key to ensuring that a marine industrial revolution advances responsibly and intelligently//. These advances, when put in the hands not just of governments but also of researchers, citizen- scientists and environmental groups, promise a new era in which we can actively observe and responsibly plan out what’s going on in the world’s seas. A vital solution lies in the use of satellite-interfacing sensors and data processing tools that are beginning to allow us to watch how ships use the oceans as easily as we track Uber taxis cruising around a city. Like airplanes, more and more ships now carry sensors that publicly transmit their position so they don’t crash into each other. We can make use of these same streams of safety data to detect where industrial fishing is concentrated, to watch as seabed mining exploration begins, and to observe how cargo ships overlap with whale migration pathways. Instead of the oceans being a black hole of data, our new challenge is figuring out ways to intelligently and efficiently sift through the billions of data points now pouring in. Fortunately, smart new algorithms can help pick out specific kinds of vessel behavior from this sea of big data. Ships leave unique behavioral fingerprints. For example, purse seine fishing boats make circles around fish schools when setting their nets, while long-line fishing boats travel linearly up and back along the gear they set. In a recent report in the journal Science, colleagues at the non-profit Global Fishing Watch and I monitored progress as the nation of Kiribati closed a section of its ocean the size of California to fishing. After six months of observation, we happily saw that all vessels, save one, left to fish elsewhere. Our group also mapped out the activity of purse seine fishing boats on the high seas of the Pacific — generating the first publicly accessible view of where fishing activity occurs in the very region that the UN high seas convention may consider setting up international protected areas. A key question ahead is whether governments will realize the value of this new data and act on calls from the scientific community to require that more vessels carry these observation sensors and use them properly. We estimate that approximately 70 percent of all large fishing vessels worldwide are already equipped with these publicly accessible tracking systems. Some captains, unfortunately, misuse the tool by turning it off after leaving port or failing to enter proper vessel identification information into the system. All such noncompliance issues are readily detectable by big data processing. If political will can be mustered to close these loopholes, //these observation technologies could shed an immense amount of light on our now-dark oceans//. Orbiting in space alongside these ship-tracking satellites is another rapidly growing fleet of nanosatellites that constantly take high-resolution pictures of the earth. This technology promises to be an important additional piece in the ocean-observation puzzle. The goal of the groups tending to these flocks of tiny electronic eyes is to be able to take a high-resolution snapsho t of the entire earth, every day. These new imaging satellites may soon allow marine ecologists, ocean conservation groups, and marine park managers to begin to search in near real-time for ships in protected areas, tomonito r weekly (even daily) losses of coastal mangrove forests, and to document abuses to coral reefs , such as dredging. With foresight, the intelligence derived from the vessel tracking systems may eventually be interlinked with these imaging satellites to enable them to function like space-based red light cameras that snap pictures of law breaking at sea as it happens.

The brink is now – acidification, warming and de-oxygenation all threaten to overwhelm ocean ecosystem resilience

 * Young 14** [Grace, thesis submitted for a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical & Ocean Engineering at MIT, “Missiles & Misconceptions: Why We Know More About the Dark Side of the Moon than the Depths of the Ocean” 1/17, []]

The misconceptions that drove spending on space were mirrored in our lack of knowledge about the ocean's importance. Our ambivalence about the ocean is reflected in the vast disparity in research funding. Today, however, we are beginning to understand how dependent we are on the ocean, and how the impact of human-induced climate change, pollution, and overfishing on the ocean are far more //threatening// to //our survival// than whether we “control the heavens." The ocean, which cover's 71% of Earth's surface, produces at least half the oxygen we breath and filters deadly carbon dioxide.86 It is a crucial regular of global climate and weather, but one we do not understand.  Since 1950 there has been a dramatic increase in extreme weather,87 requiring billions of dollars spent globally towards repair and response efforts.  Moreover, eight of the world's top ten largest cities are located on the seacoast. The ocean they adjoin is profoundly changing in complex ways we do not understand. Marine species are disappearing before we know of their existence . These species are not only matters of curiosity, but can hold secrets to understanding life and medicine, and are integral to the health of marine ecosystems .{ The oceans have become 26% more acidic since the start of the Industrial Revolution and continue to acidify at an unprecedented rate .88 Acidification affects marine ecosystems; it especially harms shelled creatures such as oysters and muscles that filter water,89 but can benefit sea grass and other invasive plants that will overwhelm ecosystems and accelerate the extinction of marine animal species.90 At the same time acidification from climate change is threatening entire ecosystems, industrial and agricultural pollution , plus increasing volumes of human trash are//threatening to overwhelm the ocean's ability to regenerate//. The National Academy of Science estimated that in 1975 more than 750 tons of garbage was dumped into the ocean every hour.91 Fortunately, in 1987 the US ratified Marpol Annex V, an international treaty that made it illegal to throw non-biodegradable trash overboard from ships in the waters of signatory countries. While this is progress, the MARPOL law is difficult to enforce. Governments do not know where or when dumping happens because there is no infrastructure for monitoring or policing the vast oceans. Sadly, Nature magazine reported that during the 1990s debris in the waters near Britain doubled, and debris in the Southern Ocean encircling Antarctica increased one hundred fold.92 Today we do not know how much trash is in the ocean. Author Donovan Hohn noted in 2008, “Not even oceanographers can tell us exactly how much floating scruff is out there; oceanographic research is simply too expensive and the ocean too varied and vast."93 But the number is not good. Stranded whales and other marine life with trash filling their bellies serve as a powerful harbinger for what is to come (Figure 11), and //more oceanographic research is needed// . Along with pollution and climate change, overfishing is among the greatest threats facing our ocean and human wellbeing. A study in Science projected that all commercial fishand seafood species will collapse by 2048 .94 Already, populations of large fish, including tuna, swordfish, marlin, cod, halibut, skates, ounder, and others, have reduced by 90% since 1950, according to a 2003 study in Nature.95  A world without seafood will harm developing nations the most. More than 3.5 billion people globally depend on the ocean for their primary source of food, and most of those people are in fast-growing developing regions of Asia and Africa.96 In 20 years, the number could double to 7 billion.97 Fortunately, according to a pivotal paper published in Science in 2006, overfishing is proven to be a reversible problem , but only if humans act effectively within the next decade .98 Otherwise, //global// malnutrition and //famine// is on the horizon as so far aquaculture has not been able to keep up with the dramatic losses of wild catch. “Unless we fundamentally change the way we manage all the oceans species together, as working ecosystems, then this century is the last century of wild seafood," marine ecologist Steve Palumbi warned.99 NOAA has made substantial progress in regulating US fisheries, although that fact must be taken with a grain of salt because the US imports 91% of its seafood.100 Moreover, the most catastrophic overfishing is occurring in international waters where traditional industrial fishing nations continue to resist stronger efforts at global regulation. Realizing the ocean's importance to humankind, President Kennedy became a staunch advocate for ocean research shortly before he died. Exactly a month before his assassination, he asked Congress to double the nation's ocean research budget and greatly expand ocean research for the sake of worldwide security and health. He called for a global ocean research initiative: The ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, belong not to one nation or one ideology, but to all mankind, and as science carries out its tasks in the years ahead, it must enlist all its own disciplines, all nations prepared for the scientific quest, and all men capable of sympathizing with the scientific impulse.101 He had no chance to see his plans through, however, and his successor, Lyndon Johnson, was focused on space as the “high ground" and “control of the heavens" for perceived military and geo-political reasons. 4.3 Extent of Oceanographic Knowledge During the space race, leaders believed that the ocean was an already conquered territory. In 1962, President Kennedy called space a “new ocean,"102 although 95% of the ocean remains unseen by human eyes.103 As mentioned previously, Johnson suggested space technology would be to the 20th century what ships were to the British Empire for the past millennia,104. Kennedy echoed Johnson's words: We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people. For space science, like nuclear science and technology, has no conscience of its own. Whether it will become a force for good or ill depends on man, and only if the United States occupies a position of preeminence can we help decide whether this new ocean will be a sea of peace or a new terrifying theater of war.105  The truth remains, however, that we have not conquered the seas. As discussed in Sections 2.2 and 3.2, ocean explorationhas largely been a surface affair. 90% of the ocean's volume, the dark, cold environment we call the deep sea, is largely unknown .106 In 1960, when Jacques Piccard and Don Walsh became the first men to reach the deepest part of the ocean, they saw only saw two fish,107 so it was mistakenly envisioned that the deep ocean was essentially lifeless. In reality, however, it is teaming with life. Tim Shank, a deep-sea biologist at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, explained why the explorers did not see much life near the Mariana Trench: The waters above the Challenger Deep are extremely unproductive in part because algee at the surface prevents food from being cycled in deeper waters. \If it had been a trench with a productive water column, like the Kermadec Trench near New Zealand, I think he would have seen much more biology," he told Nature.108 Fantastic photos from Cousteau's shallow water missions helped to fill the gap, showing brilliant life in sea, but those only scratched the surface. An estimated two thirds of marine species are yet to be discovered.109 In 2014, NASA's budget is $17 billion. Its space exploration budget alone is $3.8 billion,110 hundreds of times more than NOAA's office of ocean exploration and research budget of $23.7 million.111k The discrepancy in funding for ocean exploration, particularly in comparison to that for space, has lasting effects that inhibit efforts for continued exploration.  After his mission to the Mariana Trench in 2012, James Cameron candidly told the press that the state of today's ocean exploration is “piss poor."112 He continued, The public needs to understand that the US government is no longer in a leadership position when it comes to science and exploration, as they were in the 1960s and 1970s. We have this image of ourselves in this country as number one, leading edge, that sort of thing and it is just not the case.113 Cameron, who privately funded his journey to the Mariana Trench, noted that private individuals such as Eric Schmidt, Google's former chief executive and founder of the Schmidt Ocean Institute, have made strides in trying to up for what governments are not doing, but progress is still slow due to lack of government infrastructure. Author Ben Hellwarth explains: [P]rivate groups--including the team of Jacques Cousteau, who was as great a pitchman and fundraiser as anyone--would find sea dwelling and exploration a tough business to pursue, especially without a government-primed infrastructure and market like the one that evolved for space travel. The situation was something like tech mogul Elon Musk trying to launch SpaceX without the benefit of a space station or the many trails NASA blazed with its billions.114 To illustrate, Hellwarth elaborates with the recent history of the undersea habitat Aquarius: The kind of public interest and unbridled enthusiasm that has long sustained the space program and NASA's multibillion-dollar budgets has never materialized for like-minded quests into the ocean. Last year's near closure of the world's only sea base was the latest case in point. If you can't name this unique, American-run undersea outpost, you are not alone, and that's at least part of the problem. It's called the Aquarius Reef Base, and for the past two decades, this school-bus-sized structure has been operating a few miles south of the Florida Keys and a few fathoms below the surface. From its beginning Aquarius has typically had to squeak by on less than $3 million a year, sometimes much less than a drop in the fiscal bucket by space program standards. (NASA's estimated cost of a single space shuttle launch, for example, was $450 million.) Then last year the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which owns Aquarius, decided to pull the plug on the base. An organized effort to save Aquarius created an unusual surge in media and other attention, not major front-page headlines, to be sure, but there was at least a discernible spike.115 Even after the Cold War ended in the early 1990s with fall of Berlin Wall, NASA's budget remained dramatically larger than budgets for ocean research. The reason for the budget disparity has less to do with commercial or military reasons, and more to do with lingering geo-political issues and inertia from the Cold War, including constituencies in Congress, an independent governmental agency, and established defense contractors that benefit from government-funded space exploration. Contractors such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin, for example, have immense capacity to lobby Congress for further funding. Ocean exploration, on the other hand, had almost no constituency outside of the scientific community, which alone has little political clout. Because of the lingering effects of misconceptions, ocean exploration lags far behind space exploration, to the point that our dearth of oceanographic knowledge may result in serious harm to humankind in the next generation. 5 Conclusion: Will There Be a Sputnik for the Ocean? The sea, the great unifier, is man's only hope. Now, as never before, the old phrase has a literal meaning: We are all in the same boat. Jacques Cousteau Since 5000 BC, humans have progressed from star-gazers to moon-walkers and from shallow-water swimmers to deep-sea explorers. Technological innovation drove exploration in both space and sea to unprecedented levels, particularly during the mid-1900s. With the start of the Cold War, however, ocean exploration proceeded at a snail's pace compared to space research. This sudden shift in priority was due to misconceptions about the military and geopolitical importance of space and the ocean's importance to human wellbeing. Looking back, there are many \what ifs" in the history of exploration. For example, what if Eisenhower had his wish of making NASA part of the Department of Defense? Then we most likely would not have reached the moon or Mars because those NASA missions were not primarily military-oriented. What if the Soviets launched the first deep sea vehicle rather than the first orbiting satellite? Might there have been a Sputnik-like reaction towards the ocean rather than space? What if Kennedy wasn't assassinated and got his wish of creating a global ocean research initiative in the 1960s? Looking ahead, progress in ocean exploration and management looks dire . This is especially tragic because marine environments and ecosystems are degrading, even disappearing, at the fastest ratein 300 million years, 116 as they face the triple threat of acidification, warming, and deoxygenation . “ The health of the ocean is spiraling downwards far more rapidly than we had thought .. . . The situation should be of the gravest concern to everyone since everyone will be affected by changes in the ability of the ocean to support life on Earth," Professor Alex Rogers of Oxford University emphasizes.117 The US government probably will not fund the necessary research anywhere near the scale it continues to fund space research. As such, scientists are increasingly looking for private and industrial support. James Cameron, the Cousteau legacy, and Eric Schmidt among others are showing that privately-funded ocean exploration is possible. The underfunded and oft-delayed “SeaOrbiter" project, which aims to be the ocean equivalent of a space station, shows how difficult fund-raising for such projects can be.118 Yet SeaOrbiter would cost a tiny fraction of a single space shuttle flight. That the ocean was a place for international collaboration probably hurt it during the decades of Cold War hysteria; but hopefully we can now use that to an advantage, to bring nations together. The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) showed how large-scale multinational research, funded by a combination of governments and industry sectors, can be successful. The future of ocean exploration might depend on a oceanographic version of CERN. Or, it could be in research studies tied to national interests, like the space program. As a recent national forum on the future of the ocean stated, ocean exploration as an urgent necessity, and an issue of national security.119 Let us hope that not only the US government, but also the entire global community recognizes the importance of aggressive ocean research and management before it is too late.

It will end all life on the planet
Dingle 11 [Sarah, reporter for ABC Radio Current Affairs, “Ocean heading for mass extinction, scientists warn”, ABC News, [], June 21, 2011]

Scientists are warning of a potential marine massacre with a mass extinction of sea life akin to the death of the dinosaurs. A new report says the seas are battling pollutants, overfishing and warming, and warns that without swift action the fight to save species could be lost. The International Program on the State of the Oceans report brought together coral reef ecologists, toxicologists and fisheries scientists. And when they compared notes, the result was grim. Co-author Professor Ove Hoegh Guldberg, who specialises in reef ecosystems, says scientists found "unprecedented warming". " We're seeing acidification in the ocean and now we're starting to see a drop in oxygen concentration throughout the major part of the ocean," he said. "Now it's impacting directly on sea life, but the other is that it is a potential early step towards conditions which are associated with so-called mass extinction events ." Professor Guldberg does not want to be alarmist, but says a growing human population is to blame for many of the changes. He warns the pressure will only increase, with the world's population set to grow by another 3 billion people in the next 30 to 50 years. "As human populations have expanded in coastal areas – and it's really boomed throughout the world – you've had the modification of coastlines by the very fact that by destabilising vegetation you get nutrients and sediments going out in those coastal waters," he said. "That's had a tremendously damaging effect in our neighbourhood. In South-East Asia for example, the entire loss of marine ecosystems that used to be there and used to support people." Dr. Alex Rogers is the scientific director of the International Program on the State of the Oceans and a professor of conservation biology at Oxford University. He says when he got together with his colleagues they realised changes in ocean temperatures were occurring much faster than they had expected. " The changes that people had been predicting would happen in the lifetime of our children, or our children's children, are happening really now before our eyes ," he said. Dead zones Professor Guldberg says concerns about marine environments often take a back seat both in public debate and scientific research. "They did a study last year where I counted the number of peer-reviewed papers on climate change on the land versus the sea and there were 20 more papers, 20 times as many papers, associated with problems on land versus the sea," he said. He says the sea provides up to a quarter of the world's protein and is concerned about the proliferation of dead zones if nothing is done. Dead zones are areas where oxygen levels in the water drop to zero, a condition known as anoxia. He says in these conditions only certain species survive. "It won't be fish that we like to eat. There are animals and plants - well in fact I shouldn't say animals but more plants and bacteria, green slime, that will prosper in the anoxic environment ," he said. Professor Guldberg says the ocean is the life support system for the planet's atmosphereand if uncontrolled degradation continues, the threat of mass extinction is real and //does not just apply to the sea//. " If we barrel along as we are right now, there's an increasing risk that we will be entering into one of these //mass extinction events// ," he said. " This is where you essentially get a runaway set of conditions which will be very //unsustainable as far as human or any other life// that we have on the planet today." "This comes back to the fact that the ocean is central to the climate and conditions across the entire planet ." Professor Guldberg says to control the pace of change the world must move to zero emissions within the next 40 years. The report's findings will be presented at the United Nations headquarters in New York this week.

1NC's- T QPQ or unconditional, Elections, Japan DA, case specific CP 2NR- DA and CP, or just case