Aff+-+Daniel+and+Sid


 * Plan: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance using computer software vulnerabilities or exploits unknown to relevant vendors.**


 * Contention 1 is IP theft.**


 * Intellectual property theft is massively expanding now—disclosing zero-days builds trust with companies—info-sharing legislation is key**
 * Jaffer 15** [Jamil N., Adjunct Professor of Law and Director, Security Law Program, George Mason University Law School, Occasional Papers Series, published by the Dean Rusk Center for International Law and Policy, 4-1-2015, “Cybersecurity and National Defense: Building a Public-Private Partnership,” http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=rusk_oc] khirn

JAMIL N. JAFFER: Thank you Dr. Johnson. Well, I’ll actually AND trust between the government and private sector to share that kind of information.


 * IP theft destroys military operations—the impact is primacy**
 * Warikoo 13** professor of Himalayan and Central Asian Studies at the University of Colorado (Arun, “CYBER WARFARE: CHINA'S ROLE AND CHALLENGE TO THE UNITED STATES” p. 67-8, Jul-Dec 2013, ProQuest) | js

4.1 Intellectual Property (IP) Protection and Enforcement Intellectual Property or IP AND China's hackers that cost $1 billion and 20 years to develop.36


 * That solves great power conflict**
 * Kagan, 2/19**/2015 (Robert, Senior fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, Ph.D. in American history from American University, “The United States must resist a return to spheres of interest in the international system”, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/19-united-states-must-resist-return-to-spheres-of-interest-international-system-kagan)JBS

Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it AND , the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.


 * Russian IP theft now—they can’t be deterred—bolstering cyberdefense is key**
 * Bennett 4/12**/15 cybersecurity reporter for The Hill (Cory, “Russia’s cyberattacks grow more brazen” 4/12/15, http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/238518-russias-cyberattacks-grow-more-brazen) | js

Russia has ramped up cyber attacks against the United States to an unprecedented level since AND future,” he said. “So we’ve got some work to do.”


 * That’s crucial to Russian modernization efforts**
 * Booz Allen Hamilton 13** [Leading provider of management and technology consulting services to the U.S. government, Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist, “Cyber Theft of Corporate Intellectual Property: The Nature of the Threat,” July 2013, http://www.boozallen.com/insights/2013/07/Cyber-Theft-of-Corporate-Intellectual-Property] khirn

Russia’s own espionage effort is also driven by a desire to diversify its economy and AND industry and government networks could give China and Russia military advantages worth billions.


 * That causes Russian aggression**
 * Isachenov 15** [Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press, Business Insider, Feb. 4, 2015, “Russia continues massive military modernization despite economic woes,” http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-continues-massive-military-modernization-despite-economic-woes-2015-2#ixzz3eVw3maaO] khirn

MOSCOW (AP) — Hundreds of new Russian aircraft, tanks and missiles are AND the massive military buildup will stretch the nation's economic potential beyond the limit.


 * That escalates—we’re already on the brink of nuclear war**
 * Reid 15** Professor of Law at University of St. Thomas School of Law (Charles J., University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy, “VLADIMIR PUTIN’S CULTURE OF TERROR: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?” p. 53–5) | js

In waging such a limited war, furthermore, Putin would rely not on ICBMs AND must make sure such threats do not emanate again from a world leader.

Cyberwarfare and corporate espionage sound like the basis of a good summer beach read: AND honed over years and designed to steal large volumes of valuable intellectual property."
 * Cyber espionage tanks innovation – no incentive to invest**
 * Lukas 13** (Carrie Lukas, master's degree in public policy and former social security analyst at the Cato Institute, U.S. News, 6/4/13, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/06/04/chinas-industrial-cyberespionage-harms-the-us-economy) /dylsbury

Humanity has the skills and know-how to deflect a killer asteroid of virtually AND he said. "You cannot deflect an asteroid you haven't yet found."
 * Innovations are key to asteroid detection—deflection tech exists, but detection is key**
 * Wall, 13** – senior writer at space.com (Mike, Space.com, “How Humanity Could Deflect a Giant Killer Asteroid”, 11/22/13, http://www.space.com/23530-killer-asteroid-deflection-saving-humanity.html, 11)

Even if extinction events are improbable, the expected values of countermeasures could be large AND between risks that threaten 99% of humanity and those that threaten 100%.
 * Asteroids outweigh—extinction**
 * Matheny, 7** (Jason G Matheny, Prof of Health Policy and Management at the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction,” Risk Analysis Volume 27 Number 5, Oct. 15 2007, http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007-10-15-reducingrisk.html)twemchen


 * Contention 2 is offensive cyber operations.**


 * Cyber arms races now—the US is rapidly expanding offensive capabilities under the guise of surveillance**
 * Correa 15** [Gordon, security correspondent, BBC News, “Rapid escalation of the cyber arms race,” 29 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32493516] khirn

Rapid proliferation What surprised cyber-experts is the speed with which cyber-attack AND long before the Chinese had also not just caught up but moved ahead.


 * That goes nuclear—command and control hacking, crisis instability, and fracturing nuclear agreements**
 * Austin 13** [Director of Policy Innovation at the EastWest Institute, “Costs of American Cyber Superiority,” 8/6, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/costs-of-american-cyber-superiority/] khirn

The United States is racing for the technological frontier in military and intelligence uses of AND be every bit as reasonable given their anxiety about unconstrained American cyber superiority.


 * Independently risks miscalc—hair-trigger status causes nuclear war**
 * Japan Times 15** [May 1, 2015, “U.S., Russian ‘hair-trigger’ nuclear alert urged ended, especially in age of cyberattack,” http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/01/world/u-s-russian-hair-trigger-nuclear-alert-urged-ended-especially-age-cyberattack/#.VZIjlflVikp] khirn

WASHINGTON – Former U.S. and Russian commanders Thursday called for scrapping “ AND systems are subject to false alarms,” Cartwright said at a news conference.


 * And, low response times means there’s a greater timeframe and probability than traditional nuclear escalation**
 * Dycus 10** [Stephen is a Professor of national security law at Vermont Law School, former member of the National Academies committee on cyber warfare, LLM, Harvard University, LLB, BA, Southern Methodist University, “Congress’ Role in Cyber Warfare,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 4(1), 2010, p.161-164, http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol4no1/11_Dycus.pdf] khirn

In other ways, cyber weapons are critically different from their nuclear counterparts. For AND before launching a counterstrike, if that were U.S. policy.


 * Uniquely true because of misperception fostered by offensive dominance**
 * Rosenzweig 9** [Paul, founder of Reid Branch Consulting, specializing in homeland security, senior advisor to the Chertoff Group, Carnegie Fellow at Northwestern, professor at National Defense University, Editorial board at the Journal of National Security Law & Policy, deputy assistant secretary for policy at the US Department of Homeland Security, "National Security Threatsin Cyberspace" merican Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security And National Strategy Forum, September 2009, www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf] khirn

Offensive dominance creates a great risk of cyber arms races. State and non- AND it came from a third party, could also ignite a conflict.124


 * Disclosing vulnerabilities solves arms races—builds legitimacy to negotiate international cyberdefense agreements**
 * Schneier 14** (Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, called a "security guru" by The Economist. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute. “Should U.S. Hackers Fix Cybersecurity Holes or Exploit Them?”, May 19, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/should-hackers-fix-cybersecurity-holes-or-exploit-them/371197/)CLi

The implications of U.S. policy can be felt on a variety of AND fix almost all the vulnerabilities we find. But not all, yet.


 * That spurs international cooperation and mitigates offensive use**
 * Clark et. al. 9** (David Clark, Senior Research Scientist at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Whitfield Diffie, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Abraham Sofaer, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and then a Legal Adviser to the United States State Department, “Cyber Security and International Agreements”, http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/lec17/Sofaer.pdf)CLi

The potential utility of international cybersecurity agreements deserves to be carefully examined. International agreements AND more secure cyber environment through measures that go beyond conventional forms of deterrence.


 * Eliminating offensive cyberattacks allows the US to set global norms in cyberspace**
 * Goldsmith 10** [Jack, teaches at Harvard Law School and is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, “Can we stop the Cyber Arms Race,” Washington Post, February 1, 2010, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks] khirn

In a speech this month on "Internet freedom," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton AND arms race in an arena where the offense already has a natural advantage.


 * Contention 3 is solvency.**


 * Obama announced that the US would disclose zero-days to their vendors, but loopholes allow the NSA to stockpile zero-days and jeopardize widespread cybersecurity—the plan’s disclosure is key to solve**
 * Soghoian and Roubini 2015** (Chris Soghoian, Principal Technologist and Senior Policy Analyst, American Civil Liberties Union Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project & Sonia Roubini, ACLU Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, “Feds Refuse to Release Documents on “Zero-Day” Security Exploits”, March 3, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/blog/feds-refuse-release-documents-zero-day-security-exploits)CLi

Federal agencies served with a Freedom of Information Act request are refusing to release documents AND documents like the ones we have requested, this debate cannot take place.


 * The plan solves effective information sharing between the government and private sector—a signal of clear commitment and a steady flow of actionable disclosure is key to cooperative cyberdefense—overcomes legal barriers**
 * Rosenzweig 12** [Paul, leading cybersecurity expert, founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company, and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group, “Cybersecurity and Public Goods: The Public/Private “Partnership,” An Emerging Threats Essay, Hoover Institution, Stanford] khirn

Information Sharing, Public Goods, and the Law This economic understanding of cybersecurity suggests AND problems are not likely to be ones of law, but of commitment.


 * Disclosing zero-days disarms cyberattackers globally**
 * Masnick 14** [Mike, founder and CEO of Floor64 and editor of the Techdirt blog, “Obama Tells NSA To Reveal, Not Exploit, Flaws... Except All The Times It Wants To Do The Opposite,” Techdirt, April 14, 2014, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140413/07094726892/obama-tells-nsa-to-reveal-not-exploit-flaws-except-all-times-it-wants-to-do-opposite.shtml] khirn

However, the NY Times had a story this weekend about how this move has AND do that. Because they're not about protecting anyone -- other than themselves.


 * US is the lynchpin of the zero-days market---that sustains the arms race and global cyberattacks—the plan reverses that and collapses the market**
 * Paganini 13** (Pierluigi Paganini, Chief Information Security Officer at Bit4Id, firm leader in identity management, member of the ENISA (European Union Agency for Network and Information Security)Treat Landscape Stakeholder Group. He is also a Security Evangelist, Security Analyst and Freelance Writer. Editor-in-Chief at "Cyber Defense Magazine", “Zero-day Market, the Government are the Main Buyers”, http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/14561/malware/zero-day-market-governments-main-buyers.html)

Governments, and in particular US one, are principal buyers of zero-day AND source code to compose new malicious agent to use against the same authors.

Threading through much of our analysis is an underlying policy issue: the tradeoff for AND for Øday-exploits—best serves U.S. national security.
 * Specifically, the plan’s signal deters suppliers from even finding the vulnerabilities**
 * Stockton and Goldman 13** (Paul Stockton, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs, and Michele Golabek-Goldman, who has a JD from Yale Law School. “Curbing the Market for Cyber Weapons”, December 18th, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364658)CLi


 * The status quo provides incentives for writing software with vulnerabilities—the plan’s signal is crucial to long-term cybersecurity**
 * Schneier 12** [Bruce, security expert with 13 books, fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute and the CTO of Resilient Systems, “The Vulnerabilities Market and the Future of Security,” Forbes, 5/30/2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceschneier/2012/05/30/the-vulnerabilities-market-and-the-future-of-security/] khirn

Recently, there have been several articles about the new market in zero-day AND for the 1%.” And it makes the rest of us less safe.


 * Disclosing vulnerabilities amounts to disarming the NSA—zero-days are key**
 * Kehl et al. 14** [Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI, New America is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy institute that invests in new thinkers and new ideas to address the next generation of challenges facing the United States, Policy Paper, “Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,” July 2014, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsas-impact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-and-cybersecurity/] khirn

In April 2014, Bloomberg reported that the NSA had known for at least two AND are documented, subject to full analysis, and acted upon promptly.”296

P171 To whom should a vulnerability report be made? In many cases, there AND . In this situation, the choice is simple: report it openly.
 * The plan solves orphaned software—relevant vendors are software vendors, standards bodies, or the public at large if nobody’s responsible**
 * Bellovin et al. 14** [Steven M., professor of computer science at Columbia University, Matt Blaze, associate professor of computer science at the University of Pennsylvania, Sandy Clark, Ph.D. student in computer science at the University of Pennsylvania, Susan Landau, 2012 Guggenheim Fellow; she is now at Google, Inc., April, 2014, “Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet,” Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 12 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1] //khirn