Jackson+and+Ben

Turkey (Russia, Iran advantages)


 * Text: The United States Federal Government should institute a phased withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons at the Incirlik air base in Turkey.**


 * Contention one is Russian Relations**

Guardian 10 (Ruth Collins, July 8, “A rocky road for US-Russia relations”  ) It's been a rocky road for US-Russian relations over the past few weeks. The light-hearted images of Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev chomping on cheeseburgers in Washington brought some hope of a new era of reconciliation. Yet the arrest of 10 alleged Russian spies in the US only days later and the US secretary of state's tour of eastern Europe and the South Caucasus have done more than enough to question whether relations have truly been "re-set". Arms control was one of the most controversial issues raised throughout Hillary Clinton's recent five-day tour of the Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Last April, as a sign towards improved US-Russian relations, Obama and Medvedev signed an arms control treaty that would see both countries cut their nuclear arsenals by a third by 2017. However, Russia said then that it was prepared to withdraw from the treaty if the US increased its missile defence system in any way – even to counteract a potential threat from Iran – that would pose a direct threat to Russia 's strategic nuclear forces. It is certain that the missile-shield pact that Clinton signed with Poland during her visit will not sit well with the Kremlin. Despite her protestations that the move is not a direct attack on Russia, it will certainly make Russia less willing to collaborate with the US on this issue.
 * Although relations between the US and Russia have seemed to improve, relations are on the decline- nuclear arms control is controversial issue**

__The relationships also suffered considerably in the area of military security. In addition to withdrawing from the ABM treaty, the United States took steps to advance its military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders, giving rise to further suspicions in Moscow. Despite the established NATO-Russia Council, the two sides again treated each other as potential enemies rather than partners, and Washington did little to integrate Russia into Western security institutions or address its concerns.__ Not only did the United States not stop at two waves of NATO expansion that had already taken place against opposition from Russia, but it was now working one extending membership in the alliance to former Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. Although Russian officials, such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, warned that possible entry of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO would bring about a tremendous “geopolitical shift” requiring Moscow to “revise its policy,” Washington took the warnings lightly, tossing Russia, a potentially valuable partner, aside. In this context, __Russia saw Washington’s plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic as a deviation from, rather than a contribution to, the war on terror__. In response, President Putin went as far as to announce his decision to declare a moratorium on implementing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treat, which would allow Russia to freely move ins conventional forces within its territory in response to those steps taken by NATO that the Kremlin may see as potentially harmful.
 * Furthermore, US-Russia relations are suffering because of American and NATO military expansionism**
 * Tsygankov 2009** (Andrei P., Russophobia: anti-Russian lobby and American foreign policy, Andrei P. Tsygankov is a PhD, and a professor of political science and international relations at San Francisco State University, Page 7-8)

__U.S.-Russian__ //relations// __are at their lowest point since the breakup of the Soviet Union__ //in// __1991.__ __Although suspicion and distrust from the age of the__ //Cold War// __has undoubtedly plagued U.S.-Russian__ //relations// __since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the recent list of conflicts of interest between the two countries__, including Iran's nuclear program, the ever-expanding NATO alliance, __the planned deployment of the missile defense system__ //in// both the Czech Republic and Poland, __U.S. acceptance of an independent Kosovo, and U.S. involvement__ //in// __the conflict__ //in// __Georgia has taken__ //relations// __to__ //a// __dangerously familiar situation where arms control issues are major points of contention on the agendas of__ both the __Russia__n Federation __and the United States.__ All these conflicts of interest have genuinely disturbed the __Russians__ causing them to respond //in a// reactive manner and __question the motives of the United States both__ //in// __the region and around the world. This thesis argues that__ //a new Cold War// __between Russia and the United States is possible (if matters cannot be dealt with__ diplomatically and actions by one side are misperceived by the other side), based on and supported by, the Stimulus Response Theory. This thesis argues that __an ideological conflict between capitalism and communism does not have to exist__ //in// __order for__ //a new// (and different) //Cold War// __to take place__.
 * U.S-Russia relations are low now. If we do not act soon, this will trigger a new Cold War.**
 * Deatsch 09** Amanda Deastsch- Her dissertation for M.A. from Webster University. (“Misperceptions in U.S.-Russia relations: Prospects for a new Cold War?” abstract)

Kolesnikov et al. 08 (Sergei, Rolf Mützenich, Patrik Vankrunklesven, “Time to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Europe?” < []> Dr. Rolf Mützenich has a phD from the University of Bremen in political science, member of SPD, Spokesperson on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. Patrik Vankrunklesven is a Belgian Senator, and PNND Council Member, Sergei Kolesnikov is a PNND Council Member) However, it will be difficult to move towards a complete withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons in Europe if there is not concurrent progress on transparency and control of tactical weapons in western Russia. It is believed that Russia has about 2,330 operational nonstrategic nuclear weapons for delivery by antiballistic missiles, air defense missiles, tactical bombers, and naval cruise missiles and torpedoes – about half of what it had deployed in the early 1990s. However, exact numbers and locations are difficult to determine due to a lack of transparency from Russia. Russia has indicated some willingness to consider further reducing their tactical weapons stockpile, for example by abstaining on a 2002 resolution at the United Nations General Assembly on the issue (France, the U.K. and U.S. voted against). However, this position has hardened since 2003. The 2006 Russian White Paper on Defence makes no mention of Russian tactical weapons, but instead criticizes US deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on foreign soil (in NATO countries ). It is likely that the US plans for forward deployment of Ballistic Missile Defences in former Eastern Bloc countries – the Czech Republic and Poland – have also contributed to this hardening attitude. Thus progress on Russian tactical weapons would be more likely if there are further reductions in US tactical weapons in NATO countries, a change in NATO nuclear policy, or a change in plans for deployment of BMD defences in the Czech Republic and Poland. Parliamentarians in Russia, US, NATO countries and other European countries can play a role by encouraging progress on all these fronts. This can be done through parliamentary resolutions, questions in parliament, joint parliamentary appeals and through contact with parliamentary colleagues in these countries.
 * removing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe is uniquely key to convincing Russia to reduce its stockpile of nuclear weapons**

Global Research 10 (2/5, “Russia says US Tactical Nukes Must be Withdrawn from Europe”, <[]>, The Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG) is an independent research and media organization) MOSCOW -- US tactical nuclear arms should be withdrawn from Europe, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko said on Thursday. “Issues of further nuclear disarmament, including tactical nuclear arms, should not be addressed as such, but only in close relation with other types of weapons, including conventional armed forces in Europe and the ballistic missile defence systems,” he said. Russia is adamant that nuclear arms should be deployed only in the territory of the states possessing such weapons. “In this context, withdrawal of American tactical weapons from Europe back to the United States would be welcome. It should be accompanied by complete and irreversible demolition of the entire infrastructures supporting the deployment of such weapons in Europe,” he noted. Commenting on the recent article by Swedish and Polish foreign ministers, Karl Bildt and Radoslaw Sikorski, in which they called on Moscow to withdraw tactical nuclear arms from Russian territories bordering on the European Union, the foreign ministry spokesman said that “it would be good if the authors of this article furnished their explanations – namely: if their opinion heralded a shift in the common European position and readiness for a closer, open and comprehensive dialogue on all aspects of European security.”
 * Russia wants the US to withdraw nukes from Turkey- Foreign Ministry spokesperson shows**

Perry et al 20 09 (William James Perry, Charles D. Ferguson, Brent Snowcroft, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy [book], Council on Foreign Relations, Page xii, William James Perry is the former Secretary of Defense and professor at Stanford University, Charles D. Ferguson is an Adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Brent Snowcroft is a former national security advisor and Resident Trustee from the Forum for International Policy) The threat of a nuclear conflict is also not totally removed. Russia retains the capability to pose an existential threat to the United States. However, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has neither shown nor threatened such intent against the United States. Indeed, for much of this period the United States and Russia cooperated closely on reducing nuclear arsenals and curbing nuclear proliferation. The most recent chill in U.S.-Russia relations has been caused in part by U.S. efforts to make Ukraine and Georgia members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( NATO ) and to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Additionally, Russia has begun to rebuild its nuclear forces. These developments are not remotely equivalent to the hostility during the Cold War, but ignoring such problems could lead to the resurfacing of certain Cold War–like tensions. The Obama administration, understanding the importance of this issue, has begun a major effort to restart a strategic dialogue with Russia. In a speech in Munich just a few weeks after the inauguration, Vice President Joseph Biden proposed to “press the reset button” on U.S.-Russia relations. President Obama and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev met in April and announced their intent to negotiate a new arms control treaty and make deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals. We strongly support this dialogue, which includes their common interest in nuclear nonproliferation, but recognize that success is far from assured. The United States and Russia have been far apart on other issues, most notably NATO expansion, missile defense deployment in eastern Europe, and the relative importance of so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons. Yet, understanding what is at stake, it is encouraging to see both sides moving to make a fresh start.
 * Tactical nuclear weapons are the key issue separating the United States and Russia**

However, change is in the air. While __the presence of U.S. nonstrategic weapons in Europe (__based in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey specifically) __has always had nongovernmental critics, now some of these individual governments are raising questions as well. Germany was the first to break ranks; its officials began speaking favorably about the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe several years ago__. And last November, __Berlin officially committed itself to the removal of U.S. weapons from German territory__. Similarly, in early February__, the Polish and Swedish foreign ministers__ [|__urged__] __both the United States and Russia to reduce the number of tactical weapons__ in Europe. Most recently, __Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway__ [|__announced__] __that they will demand that the United States remove the weapons__ from Europe.
 * US TNW’s will be forced out of every country except turkey in the squo**
 * Podvig 10** (“What to do about tactical nuclear weapons” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/what-to-do-about-tactical-nuclear-weapons The Bulletin Online) February 25, 2010 Pavel Podvig is a columnist for The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He works as a research associate at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He headed the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Research Project in 1995.

__Finally there is the issue of NATO’s nonproliferation standard. The practice of equipping and training non-nuclear NPT signatories in NATO with U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities was largely tolerated by the NPT community during the Cold War. But this arrangement is untenable in an era where the focus is on nonproliferation because it muddles the message, creates double standards, and is – plain and simple – in contradiction with the intention of the NPT. It is not a standard that NATO or the United States should defend today. The nuclear sharing is simply not important enough to justify this contradiction__.
 * Keeping TNWs in Europe kills American and NATO credibility on nonproliferation**
 * Kristensen 2010** (Hans M., May 10, Federation of American Scientists Security Blog, “US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Status and Issues”, , > Hans M. Kristensen is Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Between 1998 and 2002, Kristensen directed the Nuclear Strategy Project at the Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, CA. Kristensen was a Special Advisor to the Danish Ministry of Defence in 1997-1998 as a member of the Danish Defence Commission, a Danish Ministry of Defence led review of Danish military policy. He was a Senior Researcher with the Nuclear Information Unit of Greenpeace International in Washington D.C from 1991 to 1996, prior to which he coordinated the Greenpeace Nuclear Free Seas Campaign in Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden)

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I wish to touch on a subject that, like Russia itself, has, in recent years, tended to get short shrift in Washington policy circles—not least because it is a subject many of us in this room associated with the Old Russia and a period now mercifully behind us. That subject is nuclear arms control. In fact, it is a subject for today and tomorrow—or at least it had better be. __While Russia claims to be an energy superpower, it is definitely still a nuclear superpower: it possesses about 15,000 nuclear weapons (including stockpiled ones), compared to approximately 10,000 in the U.S. arsenal (France is a distant third, with about 350 warheads). Jointly regulating the size, nature and deployment of those weapons used to be the principal business of U.S.-Soviet relations and, for a while, it remained very much on the agenda of U.S.-Russian relations as well. It was essential to avoiding a global thermonuclear war. The edifice of treaties and agreements whereby we and the USSR kept the nuclear peace constitutes a valuable legacy of the cold war, an otherwise grim, dangerous, frightening, and unlamented period that has passed into history. That legacy, however, is in jeopardy.__ Arms control is in danger of passing into history as well—and that state of affairs is potentially tragic and perilous. It arises because of the breakdown in recent years of the strategic arms control process. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—which was an integral and supposedly permanent part of the SALT I agreements signed by Richard Nixon in 1971—is now a dead letter. President Bush made it so when he withdrew from the treaty in 2002. The same fate could await the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, which were initiated by Ronald Reagan, and produced a START I treaty in 1991 that was signed by the first President Bush. (Just last week, in compliance with START, Russia dismantled nine ICBMs, bringing the total number of Russian missiles destroyed this year to 36.) That treaty expires in 2009, the year after next, and with it, all provisions for mutual inspection and accountability will also disappear
 * The impact of continued Russian proliferation is global thermonuclear war**
 * Talbott, 2007** (Strobe, President, the Brookings Institution, “Building a Constructive U.S.-Russian Relationship” – http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2007/1030_russia_talbott.aspx

__The stationing of NATO’s TNWs in western European states has been a continued sore point in relations between Russia and the five host states of Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. Russia resents the current nuclear sharing arrangement as it believes such actions are a violation of their obligations to the NPT. Their removal or consolidation would mark an improvement in European____‐ Russian relations__. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller has signalled that America is willing to enter in negotiations with Russia about these deployments and such discussion could begin as early as December 2009.16
 * Removing TNW’s is key to reviving US-Russian relations**
 * Claudine Lamond**, Australian National University (International Relations), June **2009**, “International Security Report” []

In these and other ways, __Russia has been plunging back into the nineteenth century__. And, as a result__, it has entered the twenty-first century with its twentieth-century systems of nuclear maintenance__ __and control also in a state of disintegration.__ What does this mean? No one knows fully because nothing like this has ever happened before in a nuclear country. But one thing is certain: __Because of it, we now live in a nuclear era much less secure than was the case even during the long cold war. Indeed, there are at least four grave nuclear threats in Russia today:__ § __There is,__ of course__, the threat of proliferation__, the only one generally acknowledged by our politicians and media--__the danger that Russia's vast stores of nuclear material and know-how will fall into reckless hands__. § But, __second,__ __scores of ill-maintained Russian reactors__ on land __and on decommissioned submarines--with the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons--are explosions waiting to happen.__ § __Third,__ also for the first time in history, __there is a civil war in a nuclear land--in the Russian territory of Chechnya, where fanatics on both sides have threatened to resort to nuclear warfare.__ § __And most immediate and potentially catastrophic, there is Russia's decrepit early-warning system. It is supposed to alert Moscow if US nuclear missiles have been launched at Russia,__ __enabling the Kremlin to retaliate immediately__ with its own warheads__, which like ours remain even today on hairtrigger alert. The leadership has__ perhaps __ten to twenty minutes to evaluate the information__ and make a decision. __That doomsday warning system has nearly collapsed__--in May, a __fire rendered inoperable four more of its already depleted satellite components__--__and become a form of Russian nuclear roulette, a constant danger of false alarms and accidental launches against the United States.__ How serious are these threats? In the lifetime of this graduating class, the bell has already tolled at least four times. __In__ __1983 a Soviet Russian satellite mistook the sun's reflection on a cloud for an incoming US missile. A massive retaliatory launch was only barely averted.__ __In 1986 the worst nuclear reactor explosion in history occurred at the Soviet power station at Chernobyl. In 1995 Russia's early-warning system mistook a Norwegian research rocket for an American missile,__ __and again a nuclear attack on the United States was narrowly averted.__ And just last summer, __Russia's most modern nuclear submarine__, the Kursk, __exploded at sea. Think of these__ tollings __as chimes on a clock of nuclear catastrophe__ ticking inside Russia. We do not know what time it is. It may be only dawn or noon. But it may already be dusk or almost midnight. __The only way to stop that clock is for Washington and Moscow to acknowledge their overriding mutual security priority and cooperate fully in restoring Russia's__ economic and __nuclear infrastructures__, most urgently its early-warning system. Meanwhile, all warheads on both sides have to be taken off high-alert, providing days instead of minutes to verify false alarms. __And absolutely nothing must be done to cause Moscow to rely more heavily than it already does on its fragile nuclear controls.__ These solutions seem very far from today's political possibilities. __US-Russian relations are worse than they have been since the mid-1980s.__ The Bush Administration is threatening to expand NATO to Russia's borders and to abrogate existing strategic arms agreements by creating a forbidden missile defense system. __Moscow threatens to build more nuclear weapons in response.__ Hope lies in recognizing that there are always alternatives in history and politics--roads taken and not taken. Little more than a decade ago, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, along with President Ronald Reagan and the first President George Bush, took a historic road toward ending the forty-year cold war and reducing the nuclear dangers it left behind. But their successors, in Washington and Moscow, have taken different roads, ones now littered with missed opportunities. If the current generation of leaders turns out to lack the wisdom or courage, and if there is still time, it may fall to your generation to choose the right road. Such leaders, or people to inform their vision and rally public support, may even be in this graduating class. Whatever the case, __when the bell warning of impending nuclear catastrophe tolls again in Russia, as it will, know that it is tolling for you, too.__ And ask yourselves in the determined words attributed to Gorbachev, which remarkably echoed the Jewish philosopher Hillel, __"If not now, when? If not us, who?"__
 * U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS CHECK FOUR SCENARIOS OF NUCLEAR WAR**
 * COHEN 1** (Stephen, Prof of Russian Studies at NYU, June 7, @http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20010625&c=1&s=cohen)

For more than 40 years, __Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union__ __(i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations____). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic__ value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. __Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik__ __Air__ Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. __However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore.__ __In fact,__ __the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months__ __as opposed to hours or days.__ __Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched.__ __Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella. So in effect,__ __U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey are without military value or purpose.__ That means removing them from the country should be simple, right? Unfortunately, matters of national and international security are never that easy. In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another 110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and European officials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular, they argue that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliance cohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [the nuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability." Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons would dangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies. But NATO's post-Cold War struggles with cohesion are a result of far more than disagreement over tactical nuclear deployments. NATO has given Turkey plenty of reasons to doubt its members' commitment to Ankara on several recent occasions. For example, before both Iraq wars, some NATO members hesitated to provide Turkey with air defenses or to assist it with displaced persons who had fled into its territory. Moreover, Turkey, which values NATO as a direct connection to Washington, witnessed the United States completely ignore its vehement opposition to the most recent Iraq War. Additionally, Ankara is dismayed by the reluctance of some of its NATO allies to label the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has caused violent chaos along the Turkish border, as a terrorist organization. Then there is the issue of Tehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any discussion of the United States removing its tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in the Middle East and bring about a "proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options--especially if the United States pulls its nuclear weapons from Incirlik. __When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon, a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said that Turkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb. This isn't Ankara's official policy, but it seems to indicate a general feeling among its leaders.__ __Whether Turkey is primarily concerned about security or prestige, the bottom line is that it would not sit idly by as Iran established a regional hegemony.__ __Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security____.__ Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns. The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in peration Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish support for U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in April was warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regional energy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recently doubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there. __By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey__. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of the strategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb. Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improve Ankara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of further reductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations, __Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen in concert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington would risk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner. If used properly, Turkey actually can play an important role in this complex process, and the United States and its allies should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West.__ __First,__ __Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated____.__ As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior. More largely__,__ __if the U____nited__ __S____tates and E____uropean U____nion__ __task Turkey with a bigger role in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, Turkey would obtain a stronger footing in alliance politics, contain its chief security concerns, and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.__
 * Turkish nukes don’t deter or serve any purpose – only a risk of the advantage**
 * __Bell and Loehrke 9__** – manager at the Ploughshares Fund, Truman National Security Fellow, writer about U.S nuclear weapons in Turkey and research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund, graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists


 * Contention two is Iranian Relations**

WASHINGTON - __Due to concern over potentially harmful international political implications, U.S. officials will only say they "believe" Iran is engaged in a clandestine program that may yield a nuclear weapon. However, the men and women working undercover to stop Iran from doing so are willing to say much more. "There is no doubt Iran is definitely building a nuclear weapon," a senior foreign counterproliferation official with a U.S. ally says__ in an exclusive interview with WTOP. "Oh yes, in my opinion __it is fact. "We see it every day," the official says__. The Obama administration is clearly concerned. "The nature and scope of Iran's nuclear program causes the U.S. and the international community to question whether Iran's nuclear intentions are peaceful__," says National Security Council__ spokesman Mike Hammer. __"Iran is pursuing a nuclear program that includes significant capabilities, particularly its uranium enrichment and heavy water reactor capabilities that would provide Iran a nuclear weapons capability,__" Hammer says, adding __that the capabilities "are not inherently capable of supporting Iran's stated objective of a peaceful nuclear power program."__ Hammer says __the body of evidence against Iran includes belligerent statements from Iranian officials, human intelligence sources and Iran's own military activity__. "Iran is, at a minimum, keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Iran also continues to advance its ballistic missile programs throughout the region and to increasingly longer ranges," says Hammer. Recent reports have emerged that Iranian agents are using the port of Dubai to smuggle sophisticated electronics. The foreign counterproliferaton official says, with certainty, the smuggling operations go well beyond Dubai. "We have seen them try to use UAE (United Arab Emirates), Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, to name a few other countries." U.S. counterproliferation agents, while toeing a very thin political line, seem to corroborate the official's statement. "We see a number of trans-shipment points around the world. It is correct to say that Iran does not exclusively use Dubai," says Timothy Gildea, a special agent in the Counterproliferation Investigations Unit of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement department. "They will evolve their transshipment practices. If one area becomes elevated and law enforcement is focusing on that (area), they will move it (their smuggling operation) around as required to get that equipment to their country," Gildea says. __The most damning allegation comes from the broad selection of items that are being smuggled that list Iran as their final destination.__ Clark Settles, chief of the Counter Proliferation Investigations unit, says __the variety of items leaves little doubt of Iran's true intentions. "If they were just acquiring items for uranium enrichment and not a lot of the other items that they've attempted to acquire -- from missile guidance, to triggered spark gaps that are used to detonate nuclear weapons__ -- if they were just trying acquire one thing and not the other, __then argument would__ hold some water," says Settles. Counterproliferation experts say Iranian agents' smuggling operations include parties who aren't aware they are doing anything illegal. But Settles says most of those arrested are very clear about what's going on. "In an undercover capacity, we act in every role - as the shippers, the freight forwarders, the buyers, the sellers - to really delve into these networks to prove that they are not innocent individuals that are being duped by the Iranians or by somebody else." "They know exactly what they're doing. They're doing it for profit or they work for those governments or those terrorist groups." Scores of people arrested on smuggling charges were trying to move dual-use components, which can be used for both peaceful and military purposes. These components are legal to buy and ship to places. __Iran__ is not one of those places. Mahmoud Yadegari, an Iranian-Canadian citizen who is on trial in Canada for procuring nuclear dual-use components from a U.S. company and attempting to re-export them to Iran, claims he was not deceived into doing it. Yadegari allegedly __purchased pressure transducers, which can be used in gas centrifuge plants - a key link in the process of weaponizing nuclear material. In 2007__, an official __U.S.__ National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program __suggested the Iranians had suspended its program__. One of the key judgments of the report stated: "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." __But the senior foreign counterproliferation official__ who spoke with WTOP __says, "We really have not seen any change in Iranian procurement efforts over the last 5 years__." Settles, with ICE, indicates __U.S. law enforcement hasn't seen much of a change either__. "We've played it in out in (U.S.) court and we've caught a significant number of people. __When you put the two together, it still appears they have intentions of moving their nuclear weapons program forward__," he says. Another round of sanctions has had little effect on Iran's resolve. "From right and from left, they adopt sanctions, but for us, they are annoying flies, like a used tissue," said Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after the sanctions were announced. The Obama administration has said that "all options are on the table" in order to stop Iran from possessing nuclear weapons. When asked on The Politics Program with Mark Plotkin whether Israel is planning to stop Iran from developing a bomb, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Michael Oren reiterated the Obama administration's stance. As intelligence officials struggle to define what Iran is up to, so does a former __U.N. weapons inspector. "I think the evidence that I have seen - and there is no doubt a lot that I have not seen - indicates that (Iran is) taking all the critical steps along the way that they need to get to a weapon__, but I do not know whether they have decided to go all the way or stop just short of having deployable weapons," says David Kay. However, Kay says it may not matter. "We will soon have to start treating them and reassuring allies as if they had decided to go all the way."
 * Iran is building nuclear weapons- multiple pieces of evidence and testimonies prove.**
 * Green June 14** 2010 (“Iran “definitely” building nuclear weapons” J.J. Green is the national security correspondent for WTOP. He also worked for FOX, ABC News Nightline, CNN, and C-SPAN. [])

In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors__, Turkey has become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been__ since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923__. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a willingness to take on a similar role in Iran’s dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey’s NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors.21 Some of these neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, criticize Turkey’s policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being directed against them. 22 Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, **portray these weapons as a symbol of Western imperialism.** **Turkey therefore will have to seriously reconsider its policy on U.S. nuclear weapons.**__
 * US withdraw of TNW’s from turkey grants them the credibility to prevent Iranian nuclearization**
 * __Kibaroglu 6/7__**/10 (Mustafa, Professor and Vice Chair of the IR dept @ Bilkent U, “Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”)

[Alexandria Bell, nuclear scientist and nuclear policy expert, and Benjamin Loehrke, research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “The Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”, published 11/23/2009. [] ] If used properly, __Turkey actually can play an important role__ in this complex process, __and the United States__ and its allies __should seriously consider Turkish offers to serve as an interlocutor between Iran and the West.__ First, __Ankara's potential influence with Tehran should not be underestimated.__ As Princeton scholar Joshua Walker has noted, __given its long-established pragmatic relations and growing economic ties with Iran, Ankara is in a position to positively influence Tehran's behavior.__ More largely, __if the United States__ and European Union __task Turkey with a bigger role__ in the diplomatic back-and-forth with Iran, it would help convince Ankara (and others) of Turkey's value to NATO and have the additional benefit of pulling Ankara into a closer relationship with Washington and Brussels. As a result, __Turkey would obtain a stronger footing__ in alliance politics, __contain its__ chief __security__ concerns, __and foster the necessary conditions for the removal of tactical U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkish soil.__
 * GIVING TURKEY MORE RESPONSIBILITY DETERS IRAN FROM DEVELOPING NUKES.**

//[Sabrina Tavernise, Turkey expert and staff writer for the// **//New York Times//**//, “Turkish Leader Volunteers to Be U.S.-Iran Mediator”, published November 11th, 20//**//08//**//.// [|//http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/12/world/europe/12turkey.html//] //] Saker// ANKARA, Turkey — __Turkey wants to be the mediator between the new Obama administration and Iran, using its growing role in the Middle East to bridge the divide between East and West__, said Turkey’s prime minister, [|Recep Tayyip Erdogan]. Mr. Erdogan said in an interview on Sunday that [|__Barack Obama__]__’s election opened new opportunities for a shift in relations between the United States and Iran, Turkey’s neighbor__. Mr. Obama said during his campaign that he would consider holding talks with Iran, something the Bush administration has long opposed. Mr. Erdogan described the note of congratulations sent to Mr. Obama last week by the Iranian president, [|Mahmoud Ahmadinejad], as “a step that has to be made use of.” “__We are ready to be the mediator,” Mr. Erdogan sai__d, before going to the United States to attend a meeting about the global economic crisis. “I do believe we could be very useful.”
 * TURKEY IS READY TO MEDIATE WITH IRAN – THEY JUST HAVE TO GET RID OF THEIR NUKES.**

//[Sabrina Taverernise, staff writer for the// **//New York Times//**//, “For Turkey, an Embrace of Iran is a Matter of Building Bridges”,// **//6/12//**///2010.// [|//http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/world/middleeast/13turkey.html//] //] Saker// __At the heart of the__ current __friction is a fundamental disagreement over Iran__ and its intent. For the United States, Iran is a rogue state intent on building a bomb and crazy enough to use it. __Turkey agrees that Iran is trying to develop the technology that would let it quickly build a weapon__ if it chose__, but says Iran’s leaders may be satisfied stopping at that. “We believe that once we normalize relations with Iran__, and it has relationships with other actors, __it won’t go for the bomb,”__ said a Turkish official who works closely with Prime Minister [|Recep Tayyip Erdogan]. Besides, Turkish officials say, previous sets of sanctions have not worked with Iran, which continues to insist that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Part of Turkey’s motivation in reaching out to Iran is based in realpolitik. Iran is Turkey’s neighbor and also supplies the country with a fifth of its natural gas. The nuclear talks were part of that effort. They culminated in May in what Turkey, and its partner Brazil, said was a commitment by Iran to swap a portion of its low-enriched uranium with other countries. Iran would ship out part of its stockpile in exchange for a form of uranium less likely to be used for weapons. But American officials went ahead with sanctions anyway, saying the amount to be swapped under the agreement was no longer enough to stop Iran from making a bomb. Months ago Iran had negotiated a similar deal with the West, including the United States, but then backed away. At the time Iran had a smaller stockpile, and swapping material then would have deprived the country of enough fuel for a bomb for about a year. “The prevailing sentiment in Washington is that the agreement is just another Iranian ploy and that Ankara has played into Tehran’s hands,” said Steven Cook, an expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. A Western diplomat added, “The general feeling in Washington is that the Iranians really aren’t going to negotiate away their nuclear program.” Turkey says it fears a nuclear-armed Iran, because it would upset the balance of power between the two countries, but it also worries that the Obama administration’s focus on sanctions — reminiscent of President George W. Bush’s rush to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, some here say — will lead to war. “The Western countries do things and Turkey pays the bill,” said Sedat Laciner, director of the International Strategic Research Organization in Ankara. “We don’t want another Iraq.” __The Turkish official__, meanwhile, __explained the country’s rationale for treating Iran with respect. “We are saying, make them feel like they have something real to lose by going for a bomb,”__ said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. __“Will sanctions change Iranian behavior? No. Will it stop them from further enriching uranium? It will not.”__ __It is a__ risky __calculation,__ but one __that__ Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American writer, says __the Turks are in the best position to make.__ Unlike Americans, Turks travel to Iran frequently and speak a language similar to the Azeri dialect spoken in Iran’s north.
 * ONLY TURKEY’S METHOD OF DIPLOMACY CAN CONVICE IRAN TO GIVE UP ITS BOMB.**

__Another aspect of Iran’s foreign policy is the opaque nature of the regime’s decision-making structure. The formal structure itself reflects a dualism between elected and appointed officials. The informal world of kinship and affiliations affects the exercise of power as well. Factionalism, which has become more pronounced in the past few years, exacerbates the differences in tendencies among those able to influence or exercise power and decisions__. “The schizophrenic nature of the regime itself”9 which alternates pragmatism and ideology (theology) do not add either to its consistency or its predictability. __Factional competition has also animated Iranian strategy__. The 1979 US embassy siege and hostage crisis was not the only case where a major action was motivated by domestic political competition rather than the product of a considered decision.10 More recently, __President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has instrumentalized confrontation with the West for his own factional purposes. As one observer noted, this “reckless contempt for American power” saw him “actively pursuing a fight.”____11 Another analyst has suggested that the hardliners in Iran “are gambling on confrontational tactics as the means to secure the regime’s future. Having weighed the risks, the hardliners have decided that compromise and concession would threaten their hold on power more than__ __provocation does.”__
 * Iran won’t fold under U.S. pressure alone**
 * Chubin 8** – Director of Studies at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Shahram, “Iran’s Risk-Taking in Perspective”, http://www.ifri.org/?page=detail-contribution&id=4987&id_provenance=97 )

//[Yigal Schleifer, writer for Eurasianet, “Turkey: Can Ankara Promote Rapproachment Between the United States and Iran?”, published 11/20/2008 at// [|//http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav112108.shtml//] //] Saker// __Hoping to build on__ its growing __relations with Iran and__ its traditional alliance with __the United States, Turkey__ recently __offered its services as a mediator between the two countries.__ Analysts in Turkey say Ankara's offer, though sincere, may be a tough sell in both Washington and Tehran. Washington and Tehran severed ties following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and these days the two states are at odds over Iran's nuclear program. [[|For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]]. With President-elect Barack Obama on record as saying his incoming administration would consider engagement with Iran, Turkish leaders tried to give rapprochement prospects a boost. __"We are ready to be the mediator,"__ Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip __Erdogan told the New York Times__ in a November 9 interview. "I do believe we could be very useful." __"We watch the relations__ between Iran and United States __with great concern__," Erdogan added. __"We expect such issues [as the nuclear matter] to be resolved at the table. Wars are never solutions__ in this age." Observers were not surprised by Erdogan's offer. __Ankara,__ for the last few years, __has actively sought to establish itself as a kind of regional mediator and (soft) power broker, working to strengthen relations with neighbors__ that it has previously kept at an arm's length -- even bringing Israel and Syria together for a round of secret meetings in Istanbul. __"Erdogan likes this idea of playing the mediator, proving to the world that Turkey is important__ __and a key player__ in this region and in a much better position that many countries in the world and the region. I think that Erdogan has a sense of mission that __Turkey can help,__ since __it has the trust of all the sides concerned,"__ said Sami Kohen, a political analyst and columnist for the daily Milliyet newspaper. "__No country__ in the area, perhaps no country __in the world, has Turkey's geopolitical advantage____. There are advantages to being in between east and west,"__ he continued. __"Since the United States hasn't been able to talk directly to Iran, somebody else has to do that, and from the Turkish perspective, who is better to do that than them? Who else has the trust of the Iranians?"__
 * Only increasing trust between iran and turkey can prevent proliferation**

[Tulin **__Daloglu,__** Turkey expert for Foreign Policy, “Turkey Takes Sides”, published **__4/16__**/2010. [] ] In principle, __Erdogan shares Obama's ideal of a world without nuclear weapons. However, the best way to champion this cause is to lead by example__ -- and on this front, the Turkish prime minister has done very little. __The U__nited __S__tates __hosts__ approximately __90 warheads in Turkey,__ at the Incirlik Air Base. So far, __Erdogan has done nothing to ensure their departure from Turkish soil.__ "It costs a lot of money to keep them there," Henri Barkey, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told me. "If Turkey wants them to be taken away, the U.S. will do it immediately. But if [the United States] considers doing it and Turkey says 'no,' it won't remove those nuclear warheads." In the end, all issues seem to come back to Erdogan's obsession with Israel. It is easy to use Israel as a scapegoat, as Erdogan attempts to redefine Turkish identity and its national security interests. Erdogan's constant rhetorical assaults on Israel do have a profound effect on Turkish public opinion, slowly convincing Turks that it is Israel, not a nuclear Iran, that is the primary threat to peace. The prime minister argues that he is not shifting the country from West to East -- he is still a vocal advocate of Turkey's EU accession, for example. However, he knows well that his popularity on the Arab street is not due to the Arab world's appreciation for Turkey's founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, but because he is taking their side against Israel and its Western allies. As a Turk, I have watched these developments with growing concern. Turkey's leadership cannot help advance peace and stability if it chooses to see Israel as an enemy. __Turkey is a vital balancer in the region,__ __and it can and should remain as the go-between between__ Israel, __the Arab world, and the West.__ __Unfortunately, Erdogan's leadership has created a dangerous vacuum in the Middle East. Without Turkish leadership, the international community will be severely hampered in its efforts to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program. This will shift the regional balance of power and truly endanger__ Turkey's __security.__ When this day comes, Erdogan might still try to blame Israel and the United States -- but the truth is that the only person he will have to blame is himself.
 * Without this credibility Iran will nuclearize**

For President Obama and most of the American foreign-policy apparatus, __a nuclear__-weapons-capable __Islamic Republic would be strategically untenable__. __A nuclear Iran would embolden Tehran to act out conventionally and by proxy, hiding behind its own nuclear deterrence__. __Growing Iranian prestige and ability to project power would force other regional states to make accommodations with Tehran that might not be in the U.S. national-security interest.__ Any __additional nuclear power in the Middle East would__ also __unleash a cascade of proliferation__: __If Iran went nuclear,__ Saudi Arabia and Turkey would need to develop their own capabilities. If Saudi Arabia and Turkey went nuclear, __Egypt and Greece would as well. A nuclear Egypt would lead Libya to reconsider its decision to abandon the bomb__, which in turn might lead Algeria to reconsider its own position. __In short, a nuclear Islamic Republic would be a game-changer that would complicate U.S. interests in the region for decades to come.__ That said, Washington need not fear that an Iranian leadership with a handful of nuclear weapons would cause the U.S.'s demise.
 * This causes cascading proliferation**
 * Rubin 9** – senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School (Michael, October 5, “Bad Options on Iran: An Israeli strike won't suffice”, http://www.meforum.org/2476/bad-options-on-iran )

__Further improvements in Iranian missiles would initially put most European capitals, and eventually, the North American continent, within range of a potential Iranian attack__. Iran has an ambitious satellite launching program based on the use of multi-stage, solid propellant launchers, with intercontinental ballistic missile properties to enable the launching of a 300-kilogram satellite within two years. __If Iran achieves this goal, it will put many more states at risk of a future nuclear attack.[|__[15__]]__ __The nuclear ambitions of__ the Islamic Republic of __Iran are__, of course, __a challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPT). A nuclear Iran might well bring an end to this regime and to American attempts to curb proliferation in the Middle East and in other parts of the world.__ Indeed, __the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran would have a chain-effect, generating further nuclear proliferation in the immediate region. Middle Eastern leaders, who invariably display high threat perceptions, are unlikely to look nonchalantly on a nuclear Iran. States such asTurkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and, of course, Iraq would hardly be persuaded by the United States that it can provide a nuclear umbrella against Iranian nuclear blackmail or actual nuclear attack. American extended deterrence is very problematic in the Middle East.[|__[16__]] Therefore, these states would not resist the temptation to counter Iranian influence by adopting similar nuclear postures.__ __The resulting scenario of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East would be a recipe for disaster.__ This strategic prognosis is a result of two factors: a) the inadequacy of a defensive posture against nuclear tipped missiles, and b) the difficulties surrounding the establishment of stable nuclear deterrence in the region.
 * This results in nuclear war**
 * __Inbar 6__** (Efraim, Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and Director of its Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies “The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran” Article was Peer Reviewed by David Leitner and Tamara Sternlieb, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol 10 No 1 Article 7 March 2006) [], AD: 7-31-09)

__Turkey has quietly held NATO tactical nuclear weapons since the Cold War. Removing them will be a critical step towards a safer world__**. But it won’t be easy.** On April 5, 2009, __President Barack Obama made a speech in Prague outlining his intention to make nuclear disarmament, with the eventual goal of elimination, the organizing principle of U.S. nuclear policy. Now the task is to figure out the how to actually get to zero nuclear weapons__. There are approximately 23,335 nuclear weapons held between nine nations: the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Less widely known are the five other states that hold nuclear weapons. __During the Cold War, NATO deployed nonstrategic or “tactical” nuclear weapons in__ Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and __Turkey. Today these aging weapons are more of a liability than an asset__—their size and portability makes them attractive to terrorists. The removal of these tactical nukes is an early step on the long road to zero. Getting the five NATO members who hold the tactical nukes to relinquish them quietly will take care, and __Turkey may be the toughest piece in this particular part of the disarmament puzzle__. I recently returned from a trip to Turkey, coordinated by the Truman National Security Project, an institute that recruits, trains, and positions a new generation of Americans to lead on national security. __In discussions with government officials, civil servants, retired military personnel, academics, and businessmen, two things became clear: First, that it is difficult to be positioned at a geographical and societal crossroads, and second, that you are stuck with your neighbors. The Turks look around them and see conflicts and threats in most directions.__ I was interested in what the Turks saw when they looked towards Tehran. Specifically, I asked about the threat, perceived or real, from the Iranian nuclear program. The answers varied sharply. Some dismissed the threat, noting that the Turks and the Persians had not been in conflict for 500 years. Others shuddered at the mention of a nuclear Iran. __But regardless of the official line that Iran is an important trading partner and a regional ally, I think the Turks would not abide a nuclear Iran__. In fact, when asked directly about the response to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, a high-ranking official from the Foreign Ministry said that Turkey would follow suit—immediately. I took this as a confirmation of the oft-repeated theory that if Iran attains a nuclear weapon, surrounding nations will acquire them too, resulting in a “cascade of proliferation.” __Throwing multiple nuclear arsenals into a region with many long-standing tensions, disputed borders, and conflicting ethno-religious sects is a recipe for catastrophe__. Turkey has a vastly superior military force and would not be directly threatened by Iran (a few people I spoke to flippantly noted that it was Israel who would be in trouble). Nevertheless, nations acquire nuclear weapons not only for security, but also for pride and prestige. Having a nuclear capability elevates a nation into an elite, if dubious, club. At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons. Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. They also hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb. Polling I had seen previously indicated ample public support in Turkey for giving up these weapons, but my trip there made it clear that polling, papers, and news reports are no substitute for actually going to a country and meeting with people. Most Turks I met would answer disarmament questions in entirely different ways, depending on whether or not Iran was referenced. Removing tactical nuclear weapons from Turkey will be difficult, but not impossible. In order to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons, U.S. policy makers have to start thinking about how things are connected. Countries like Turkey rely on nuclear weapons for political and security reasons. To feel comfortable without nukes, these countries must be convinced that their neighbors will not acquire them. That means efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles—including tactical nukes—and efforts to stop the creation of new nuclear programs must happen in concert. Ploughshares Fund President Joe Cirincione notes that __disarmament and nonproliferation are two sides of the same coin: disarmament creates the unity needed to prevent proliferation, which provides the security needed for disarmament.__ I have no doubt that the Turks with whom I met would agree.
 * Independently the existence of Turkish TNW’s causes middle-east wildfire proliferation and war**
 * Bell 2009** (Alexandra, Truman National Security Fellow, Aug 26, “Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,” www.Ploughshares.org)