Lloyd+and+Steven

Afghanistan Adv: Heg, War =1ac – plan=

The United States federal government should substantially reduce military presence assigned to the counterinsurgency mission in Afghanistan.

1ac – Hegemony
When General David Petraeus testifies today on Capitol Hill,
 * First – credibility. Obama announced a July 2011 withdrawal date, but it is based on the conditional success of the counterinsurgency mission. This deadline is __perceived__ as unconditional withdrawal and has created global confusion**
 * Rogin, 10** - staff writer for Foreign Policy, Prior to that, Josh covered defense and foreign policy for Congressional Quarterly. Josh has also worked at the House International Relations Committee, and the Brookings Institution (Josh, “Petraeus: Withdrawal timeline does not mean "switching off the lights",” The Cable, 6/29, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switching_off_the_lights)


 * The counterinsurgency mission will fail for multiple reasons – there is no chance of meeting the deadline**
 * Nelson, 9** – former director of a Joint Task Force in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, retired naval officer with assignments at the National Counterterrorism Center and National Security Council, and Senior Fellow at the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Rick, “The Other Side of the COIN”, 10/1, http://csis.org/publication/other-side-coin)
 * Q1: General McChrystal is expected to request up to 40,000 additional troops and recommend a greater focus on counterinsurgency operations. I**uld entail.

The coalition's strategy in Afghanistan is at an impasse. T
 * Cross border sanctuaries, government corruption, ethnic tensions within the Afghan army and the utter failure of population protection makes failure inevitable**
 * Dorronsoro, 10** - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. Previously, Dorronsoro was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes (Gilles, “The Case for Negotiations,” In These Times, 5/24, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40863

When it was launched in March, __the Marjah operation__ to these two energy-rich regions of the world. Whoever holds the energy high ground in the coming decades will exert enormous influence on world politics
 * Security exists only in 5 of 116 areas in Afghanistan and the Taliban is spreading despite Obama’s surge – the problem is COIN itself**
 * Hallinan, 10**-columnist for foreign policy in focus (7/22/10, Conn, “The Great Myth: Counterinsurgency,” [])

Obama's final decision in December offered something for everyone, or tried to:
 * Failure will spill over to the entirety of US foreign policy and prevent Obama from exercising leadership**
 * Fernholz, 10** – writing fellow at the American Prospect and Research Fellow at the New America Foundation (Tim, The American Prospect, “The Ultimate Test Case,” March, 2010, lexis) **Katulis = security policy analyst at the Center for American Progress**

But this moderate tone gains Obama the leverage that Bush lacked.
 * The plan restores US credibility – ending the counterinsurgency mission will salvage Obama’s Afghanistan policy and allow a sustainable presence**
 * Stewart, 10** - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “ Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3)

Over the winter break I had an epiphany about the interrelation of U.S. hard and soft power
 * COIN is overstretching the US military and exhausting American leadership – withdrawing to a counterterrorism strategy is vital to preventing great power challengers**
 * Kretkowski, 10** – Frequently assists think tank in conferences and other work products that aid DoD's long-term thinking about threats that may not be addressable via weapons platforms. Spent six months in Afghanistan working with Army public affairs. (Paul, “Against COIN, for CT in Afghanistan and Elsewhere”, 1/7, Beacon (a blog), http://softpowerbeacon.blogspot.com/2010/01/against-coin-for-ct-in-afghanistan-and.html)

**Kuhner, 9 -** the president of the Edmund Burke Institute for American Renewal (Jeffrey, Washington Times, “Obama’s quagmire; US should look to its own interests,” 9/7, Lexis Academic) __America is losing the war in Afghanistan.__ Rather than change course, President Obama is sending 21,000 additional U.S. troops.
 * Afghanistan is a quagmire of attrition warfare that is destroying US morale and readiness.**

Since we invaded Iraq six and a half years ago and Afghanistan eight years ago,
 * This will obliterate American primacy**
 * Pyne, 9 -** Vice Chair of the Utah State Legislative Compensation Commission and Vice President of the Association of the United States Army's Utah chapter and a Vice President of the Salt Lake Total Force Chapter of the Military Officers Association of America (David, “ Obama failing our troops in Afghanistan,” 11/7, http://westernfrontamerica.com/2009/11/07/obama-failing-troops-afghanistan/)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power‑the diplomatic, economic and military leader.
 * American primacy is vital to accessing every major impact—the only threat to world peace is if we allow it to collapse**
 * Thayer, 6 -** professor of security studies at Missouri State (Bradley, The National Interest, “In Defense of Primacy”, November/December, p. 32-37)

There is an anomaly in this strategy, however. Where the United States previously had devolved operational responsibility to allied groups, or simply hunkered down
 * Withdrawal allows the US to replenish its strategic reserve**
 * Friedman, 10** - American political scientist. He is the chief intelligence officer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratfor. Prior to Stratfor, Friedman spent almost twenty years in academia, teaching political science at Dickinson College. During this time, he regularly briefed senior commanders in the armed services as well as the U.S. Army War College (George, “The 30-Year War in Afghanistan,” Stratfor, 6/29, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100628_30_year_war_afghanistan)

__The best Afghan policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to__ f
 * Reducing presence to just counterterrorism creates sustainable presence, and prevents vacillations between engagement and isolationism**
 * Stewart, 9-** Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan)

An effort to conduct "counterinsurgency" in Afghanistan is not just a costly business for still-unspecified strategic returns.
 * The plan causes a shift to selective engagement**
 * Gventer, 9** - Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. She served two tours in Iraq, including a year as a senior adviser to General Peter Chiarelli, the operational commander in Iraq in 2006 (Celeste, “False Promise of 'Counterinsurgency'”, 12/1, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/12/01/NYT.html)

1ac - Insurgency
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3) The counterinsurgency strategy and surge in Iraq led to a drop in violence (against predictions)
 * Counterinsurgency failure inevitable – the mountainous terrain and impossible troop requirements mean the Taliban can hide forever**
 * Stewart, 10** - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “ Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14,

Galston 10 - Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ Brookings (William, Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ Brookings, “A Question of Life and Death: U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” Brookings, June 15th, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0615_afghanistan_galston.aspx) __Are the basic premises of our current policy in Afghanistan fatally flawed?__
 * A large military footprint combined with the perception of an illegitimate government make crushing the Taliban impossible – it can recruit faster than we can kill**

**Pashtun nationalism and the lack of history with a strong state makes combatting corruption or raising a sustainable security force impossible.** **Dorronsoro, 09** - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (9/23/09, Gilles, The National Interest, “Afghanization,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22218) In addition, **there is no state structure to speak of in the Pashtun belt**.

**Nationalism means that even if the US won every battle it couldn’t beat the insurgency** **Dorronsoro, 09** - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2/9/09, Gilles, The National Interest, “Going South in Afghanistan,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20794) Afghanistan may be the right war, but the United States could very well fight it in the wrong place.

**Akhtar, 10-** professor of international relations, and a senior analyst & writer. He was the dean of faculty of management, Baluchistan university, and former chairman of International Relations Department, Karachi university (1/26/10, Shameem, “Pakistan’s Instability : The US War Factor,” http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1262372328640&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs/MAELayout#**1)
 * First – Pakistan. A large counterinsurgency footprint drives insurgents to Pakistan, mobilizes the Pakistani Taliban and will cause Pakistan to collapse**

__If it is a war against extremists and militancy inside Pakistan, it is a civil war because its **origins stem** from the US,__

But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, s for dealing with it.
 * Pakistan collapse causes global nuclear conflict – draws in China, India and Russia**
 * Pitt, 9**- //a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,”// http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)


 * Risk of nuclear terrorism is high – probably an attack will come from al Qaeda by 2013**
 * Hall, 10** (Mimi, USA Today, “Obama seeks front against nuclear terror”, 4/12, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-11-nukesummit_N.htm

WASHINGTON — President Obama is asking world leaders to commit to a new international offense against nuclear terrorism

I spent five years as a counterterrorism analyst for the Pentagon and rigorously studied plots from Madrid to London to 9/11.
 * Afghanistan is a vital safe haven for al Qaeda – terrorism is inevitable but nuclear risks can be reduced if the US drives them out**
 * Arkedis, 9** - director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute. He was a counterterrorism analyst with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service from 2002 to 2007 (Jim, “Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven”, 10/23, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question ‘‘Is Nuclear War Inevitable??’’
 * Nuclear terrorism causes extinction**
 * Morgan, 9** - Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea (Dennis, Futures, November, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race,” Science Direct)

**Gradual withdrawal while maintaining a counterterrorism strategy allows more effective US leadership in the war on terror and maximizes US credibility** **Chellany, 09** - professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi (9/14/09, Brahma, Japan Times, “An Advantagous U.S. Exit,” http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090914bc.html) When the administration's principal war target is not the Taliban but rather al-Qaida remnants on the run,

An effort on that scale would garner majority US domestic support only if the public sees likely victory and Congress,
 * A substantial drawdown to a purely counterterrorism presence will maximize US influence in Central Asia and contain instability and terrorism**
 * Simon, and Stevenson, 9** * adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, AND **Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, (Steven and Jonathan, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, 51:5, 47 – 67, October 2009 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=7132409)

It will therefore take about three years to get to this posture.
 * A counterterrorism posture empirically works – it reduces the threat of terrorism and can provide actionable intelligence without undermining US credibility**
 * Long, 10** - assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Austin, “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Spring 2010, Science Direct)

This three-zone strategy is not, //per se,// a gamechanger, and it must be accompanied by an incremental, phased withdrawal.
 * Withdrawal of combat troops will immediately turn the population against the Taliban and shore up Afghan government legitimacy**
 * Dorronsoro,9 -**Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (January 2009, Gilles, “Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf)

1ac – solvency
This insoluble problem is why the counterterrorism option is important.
 * Indicts of the counterterrorism option underestimate the size of what the plan leaves intact – it is sufficiently resourced to provide force protection, intelligence gathering, army training and will maintain the support of the local population**
 * Long, 10** - assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Austin, “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Spring 2010, Science Direct)