Sam+Troyer+and+Daniel+Cielak

= Affirmative =

**The risk of a US-China war over Taiwan is high. Blocking independence is China’s __core__ national interest and outweighs economic ties**
As Taiwan is important to both China and the United States, conflict of interests AND bonds of commerce, trade, and military ties between the two powers.
 * Kuntić, 15** – visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, “The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan-the United States relationship” CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280)

**The DPP’s election means Taiwan is moving towards de jure independence with US backing**
The pro-independence DPP has returned to power in Taiwan. Despite repeated warnings AND of the Taiwan Strait and for the benefit of the US itself too.
 * Yin, 6/8/16 -** Yin Chengde is a research fellow of China Foundation for International Studies (“Time for US to Change Its Taiwan Policy” http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/time-for-us-to-change-its-taiwan-policy/

**This enraged China just ended relations with Taiwan**
Well before Taiwan held its elections on January 20, Beijing made it clear that AND more damage done to cross-strait relations than either side can fix.
 * Tiezzi, 16** - Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation (“Did China Just Kill Cross-Strait Relations?”, 6/26/16, The Diplomat, []

**Nationalist pressure and nuclear insecurity make the risk of war high and nuclear escalation probable**
Although a number of regional sovereignty and maritime disputes have the potential to sour the AND Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses .”67
 * Glaser, 15** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

**Strategic ambiguity risks miscalculation**
If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense AND not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals.
 * Colby and Slocombe, 16** - Mr. Colby is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Mr. Slocombe was U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001 (Elbridge and Walter, “U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous” Wall Street Journal, 5/23, []

**It’s the __most probable__ cause of nuclear war – strategic mistrust makes escalation likely**
Taiwan is the //most likely// potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between China AND arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating. ”
 * Lowther, 13** – citing a CSIS report (William, Tapei Times, 3/16, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” [])

**It risks extinction**
But what would that “victory” entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear AND — destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.
 * Wittner, 12** - Professor of History emeritus, SUNY Albany (Lawrence, “Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?” Huffington Post, 1/30, []

1ac – relations
====**The US and China are locked an action-reaction cycle of hostility. Negotiating a staged Framework Agreement will de-escalate tensions and create a sustainable path towards relations and cooperation on global existential threats**==== To overcome the structural weaknesses in U.S.-China relations—which could AND conflict U.S. and Chinese military operations and avoid accidental confrontations.
 * Gross, 13** - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 152-155

**Taiwan is the most important __starting point__ to address strategic distrust – plan is the vital internal link to broader, sustainable cooperation**
More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current crossstrait relations AND of //cooperation on other issues// and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.
 * Glaser, 15** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

**Relations solves prolif, US-china nuclear war, and broader US multilateralism**
The foremost near-term security benefit to the United States of developing improved relations AND China could work alongside the United States in maintaining regional security and stability.
 * Gross, 13** - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 62

**US-Sino regional cooperation solves mulitalt- specifically true for asia**
A shared U.S.-China vision for regional security would serve to align AND a common vision, and implements agreed practices which strengthen regional stability.53
 * Gross, 13** - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 66

**Multilat on the brink now- declining efficacy of International institutions make now key**
Rising multipolarity was once thought to lead to multilateralism. The more numerous the great AND short of expectations, as states keep negotiating mostly on an individual basis.
 * Malamud, 16** - Andrés Malamud, Malamud, PhD, is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, where he chairs the PhD program in Comparative Politics, 06-06-16, Online: “http://latinamericagoesglobal.org/2016/06/3589/”, Article: “It’s a multipolar world after all! (It’s just not a multilateral one.)” Accessed on: 06-24-16//AWW

** Independently, successful management of proxy conflicts through regional multilateral institutions prevents existential threats **
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a global strategic AND  contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24
 * Herd, 10** - Graeme P. Herd, Head of the International Security Programme, Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2010, “Great Powers: Towards a “cooperative competitive” future world order paradigm?,” in Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the 21st Century, p. 197-198

**Relations are key to stopping nuclear modernization – solves global nuclear war**
Shaping China’s military development Improved relations with China would allow the U.S. AND an arms control regime that //considerably lowers the risk of nuclear war// .44
 * Gross, 13** - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 62

**Chinese nuclear modernization means they can’t be deterred and causes war**
Even against a conventionally armed weaker power, such an early escalation of conflict would AND gain by the nuclear modernization might give them added resolve in a crisis.
 * Christensen, 15 –** William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton(Thomas, __The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power__, p. 85-86)

1ac - plan
====The United States Federal Government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China over a staged Framework Agreement, beginning with an offer of reciprocal reductions in military commitments over Taiwan.====

1ac – solvency
====**Plan begins negotiations over a Framework Agreement with staged, reciprocal reductions of forces over Taiwan. China will say yes and it will build a foundation for larger cooperation that reduces the overall risk of nuclear war in Asia**==== Taiwan currently faces an overwhelming military threat from China, which uses its forces to AND be more than sufficient to deter and dissuade China from seeking regional dominance.
 * Gross, 13** - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 159-165)

**China says yes to greater diplomatic engagement; it’s verifiable and won’t destabilize relations with Taiwan or Asia**
Under such circumstances, avoiding future escalating Sino-American crises over People’s Liberation Army AND also not inconceivable that Beijing would permit or provide convincing levels of verification.
 * Swaine, 11 –** senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, __America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century__, p. 359-363

**Even if China says no, the plan boosts US resolve and reinforces regional alliances**
The preceding assessment lays bare the complexity of a U.S. policy of AND East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security.
 * Glaser, 15** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

**Negotiated reciprocal concessions are vital to rapprochement and de-securitizing the conflict**
During the second phase of the onset of stable peace, the trading of individual AND second phase, each state becomes confident that the other has benign motivations.
 * Kupchan, 12 –** Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University (Charles, How Enemies Become Friends, p. 41-45

**China is only hostile in response to disrespect of Chinese sovereignty – Social identity theory dictates China’s foreign policy not offensive realism**
Overall, in all the three dimensions, the very fact that China was trying AND of disrespect towards its sovereignty, just as it was twenty years ago.
 * Lee, 16** - Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles (James Jungbok Lee (2016) Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful? A Social Psychological Perspective, Asian Security, 12:1, 29-52, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1140644 SIT = Social Identity Theory

= Negative =

Past 2NRs
 * 1) Elections, Case Defense
 * 2) CO2 Ag, Case Defense
 * 3) T-Engagement
 * 4) T-Categories

= Contact =

For anything neg or aff, email me at stroyer00@gmail.com