Ryan+and%20Alysa

Plan Text: The United States federal government should remove all military personnel at Futenma from Japan.

Advantage 1 is Japanese polical stability, and advantage 2 is the US Japan alliance

Thus the plan – The United States federal government should remove all military personnel at Futenma from Japan.

Observation One: Political Stability

Japanese political stability is collapsing - Okinawa is an impossible dilemma for Japanese Politicians

Xinhua General News Service, 2010 (June 2, Commentary: Hatoyama falls victim to Futenma dilemma, Lexisnexis)

Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama resigned on Wednesday after only eight months in office, adding to the country's already sizable portfolio of short-lived premierships. Although abrupt changes of government are not uncommon in Japan's recent history, what makes the latest case different is that unlike many other flash-in-the-pan prime ministers, Hatoyama did not trip over domestic issues, but rather over diplomatic ones. Precisely speaking, he fell victim to a dilemma over an unpopular U.S. military base in Japan. The outgoing leader owns a glaring record -- leading his Democratic Party of Japan to a sweeping election victory last year, ending a five-decade conservative rule by the Liberal Democratic Party, and once boasting an over 70 percent popularity rating for his cabinet. Amid high expectations of the Japanese public, the Hatoyama administration came to power. Yet unfortunately, together with its ascent, a time bomb also started ticking. That bomb was the much-hyped proposal to relocate the Futenma air base of the United States in Japan's Okinawa Prefecture. Pledging to pursue an equality-based relationship with the United States, the Hatoyama administration set out to conduct a reassessment over the U.S. military facilities in Okinawa, to amend previous deals with the United States, and to move the Futenma airbase out of the prefecture or even the country. These ambitious policies raised the brows of the United States, sending waves of chill into the close alliance between the two countries. On the one hand, Hatoyama's gestures raised an expectation among Okinawa residents and even the whole Japanese public of a relocation of the U.S. airbase. Yet on the other hand, the United States' uncompromising attitude prevented him from delivering his electoral campaign promise. It did not take long before Hatoyama realized that he had been caught between a rock and a hard place. Not only did the United States voice dissatisfaction, the Japanese people and the opposition parties followed each other in saying "No."

Japan is politically gridlocked- recent elections prove

Christian Science Monitor, 2010 [Gavin Blair, correspondent, July 12, “Japan's new prime minister stumbles over consumption tax”, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0712/Japan-s-new-prime-minister-stumbles-over-consumption-tax, accessed 7/18/10]

Japan faces the prospect of political gridlock after the heavy losses suffered Sunday in upper house elections by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which has been in power only 10 months, and with a new leader appointed last month. Having finally ousted the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) after more than half a century of almost uninterrupted power, the DPJ has now managed to lose one leader and one election before its first year in government is out. Voters were apparently unhappy with new prime minister Naoto Kan's recently announced proposal to double the consumption tax rate to 10 percent. This despite polls showing a majority of the public say such a measure is inevitable in order to fix the creaking state finances, and it also being the policy of the opposition LDP – Sunday's main electoral beneficiary. "I touched on the consumption tax and the public may have felt it came all of a sudden. I also believe that my lack of explanation about it was a big factor," a tired and slightly shaken-looking Mr. Kan told a news conference in the early hours of Monday morning. After the resignation of former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama – over political funding scandals and the issue of relocating a US Marine base on an Okinawa - the DPJ enjoyed a huge surge in popularity when Kan took over; only to see it evaporate again in the weeks leading up to the election. A new standard of fickleness After supporting the LDP almost unwaveringly for more than 50 years, the electorate seems to have become extremely fickle, with poll numbers falling and rising dramatically and frequently. “The Japanese have become single-issue voters, swinging back and forth on just one issue, which this time was the consumption tax,” says Rei Shiratori, president of the Institute for Political Studies in Japan, “I’m concerned whether we can establish a mature democracy in this fashion.” Japan is still going through a phase of “disalignment and realignment” as it breaks with the postwar status quo, according to Professor Shiratori. As the election results were confirmed Monday morning, the DPJ emerged with 44 seats to the LDP's 51, though the governing DPJ remains the largest party in the less-powerful upper house due to the system of putting half the legislatures’ seats up for election every three years. The DPJ now holds 106 out of 242 seats. However, the lack of an overall majority means the opposition can now make it difficult for the government to push through its legislative program. “The Japanese seem to have become like Americans and grown to like gridlock,” says Gerald Curtis, professor of political science at Columbia University and visiting professor at Tokyo’s Waseda University. S&P warning no debt Ratings agency Standard & Poor’s (S&P) issued a warning Monday that it could further downgrade its assessment of Japan’s huge national debt in the wake of the DPJ’s defeat and the possibility of political impasse. The agency said in a statement, “A hung parliament would make it very difficult for the government to push through major policies."

US pressure to maintain Okinawan bases collapsed the Japanese government – continued pressure will increase political instability

Vaughan, 10, School of Political Science & International Studies, The University of Queensland [Michael June “JAPAN IN THE MELTING POT: AN ANALYSIS”; http://espace.library.uq.edu.au /eserv/UQ:205974/ Japan_Analysis.pdf; Accessed 7/16/10]

The Futenma matter, after months of tension between Japan and the US, was resolved on 28 May 2010 after a joint telephone conference between Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama. In a joint statement, Tokyo and Washington said that the Airbase will be moved, as agreed in 2006, to the coastal Henoko region of Okinawa. Both sides reaffirmed the “indispensable” nature of the alliance not only for Japan’s security, but also for that of the Asia‐Pacific region as a whole. The decision was made in line with Hatoyama’s self‐imposed deadline of the end of May 2010, in an attempt at salvaging a little of the embattled Prime Minister’s credibility. The decision, though, caused dramatic developments inside the governing Coalition. On the day of the announcement, the Prime Minister dismissed SDP leader and Minister for Consumer Affairs, Mizuho Fukushima, from the Cabinet over her continued opposition to the Government’s plan of retaining the US Base within Okinawa Prefecture. Two days later, as has already been noted, the SDP abandoned the DPJ Coalition, after finding its position within the Government to be untenable. The heaviest blow of all fell a further three days later on 2 June 2010, when, in a move that shocked and stunned the nation, both the Prime Minister and the DPJ Secretary‐General resigned their respective offices over a failure to relocate the Futenma Air Station away from Okinawa as promised during the 2009 Election campaign as well as over money scandals. Okinawan residents were strongly antagonistic towards the Hatoyama Government for its breaking of an Election pledge to remove the American military presence from the Prefecture completely. On 4 June 2010, former Finance Minister, Naoto Kan, was elected Prime Minister by both Houses of the Diet. Earlier in the day, Mr Kan defeated his rival for the Presidency of the DPJ, little‐known figure Shinji Tarutoko, by 291 votes to 129 votes. Kan was regarded as the anti‐Ozawa candidate, whilst Tarutoko was seen as the pro‐Ozawa candidate. Some observers opine that Ozawa’s influence within the DPJ lessened as a result of his resignation as Secretary‐General. Such views are questionable, however, given that Ozawa still heads a major intraparty faction of some 150 members of both Diet Chambers. One final matter has also been clarified – this being the rigid insistence of the United States on retaining the 2006 Agreement regarding Bases on Okinawa – one of the causes of the fall of the Hatoyama Government. The reason for American insistence on retaining a Base at Henoko on Okinawa has been given by one major Japanese daily newspaper as being that a secret nuclear arsenal is located there and is kept operational at all times should any emergency arise.

Kan needs credibility to maintain support for his agenda - fiscal reforms key to Japan’s economy

The Irish Times, 2010 [July 13, david mcneill in Tokyo Lexisnexis Japan faces political gridlock after drubbing of ruling party acc. July 14, 2010]

Sunday s result is a disaster for a party that has promised radical economic and political reform. Although the upper house is far weaker than the lower chamber, it has the power to block all but the most important Bills. Mr Kan needs both houses onside if he is to achieve his pledges to transform government and pull the country out of a fiscal nosedive. Just after taking office on June 8th, he warned that the country s enormous national debt nearly 200 per cent of gross domestic product could throw the country s roughly $5-trillion economy into a Greek-style crisis. The warning was meant to concentrate minds: unlike Greece, Japan s dept is held domestically. But many analysts believe the threat of implosion in the world s second-largest economy is real enough, given its spluttering growth and the ballooning costs of propping up Japan s greying society over five million are set to retire this year and next. Unfortunately, voters did not warm to Mr Kan s proposed solution: a long-mooted hike in consumer tax from five to 10 per cent. Few believed his assurances that the tax would not punish the poor, a fact he acknowledged yesterday. My lack of explanation about (the tax) was a big factor (in the disappointing outcome). With gridlock looming in the upper house, the prime minister must now go back to the electorate and persuade them to surrender more of their declining income. In 10, 20, or 30 years from now, I hope the public will see this government as the defining factor that began rebuilding Japan s economy, he said at the weekend.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Kan’s fiscal restraints key to Japan’s economic recovery

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Sanchanta, 2010, Deputy bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal in Tokyo [Mariko, Takshi Nakamichi, June 3, “Kan Elected to Head Japan's Ruling Party”, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704025304575283933688747838.html, accessed 7/18/2010]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Mr. Kan, who has grown increasingly fiscally conservative over recent months as he watched Greece's debt problems rock global financial markets, signaled on Thursday that he will impose greater fiscal discipline in Japan. Since the Hatoyama administration was launched in September, it has largely focused on fixing the nation's economy, putting fiscal discipline on the back burner. The national budget it compiled for the fiscal year that started in April features record spending and new borrowing. Hatoyama to Quit Over Broken Vow Mr. Kan pledged to finalize growth strategies and fiscal reform plans that the Hatoyama cabinet had been working on by the end of the month. "I have decided to run in [the election] to lead a campaign of implementing policy to break through 20 years of Japan's deadlocked situation," Mr. Kan said. "Unless we steer policy in a wrong direction, we can resuscitate the economy. We can correct the current state in which [government] borrowing seems to keep growing indefinitely."

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Japanese political gridlock kills the global economy – Japan needs to be a political leader in Asia to revive the economy

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Glosserman. 2009. Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS [Brad. 8/6/09. Japan-U.S. Security Relations: A Testing Time for the Alliance. [|http://csis.org/files/public ation/issuesinsights_v09n14.pdf] Accessed: July 14, 2010]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Consistent with the economic issues that dominated the opening discussion, several speakers highlighted the economic dimension of the alliance, a field that many believe has not received the attention it deserves. A U.S. participant explained that economic issues and multilateral engagement are integral to the new administration’s regional strategy. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum should figure highly in both governments’ thinking. With the annual leaders’ meeting to be hosted by Singapore in 2009, Japan in 2010, and the U.S. in 2011, APEC has a singular opportunity to become a core instrument of regional integration. (To put it another way, failure to seize this moment could result in the U.S. writing APEC off.) This makes the stasis in Tokyo even more worrisome: Japan has to provide energy and ideas to keep APEC relevant. As a U.S. participant warned, showing up is not enough: there has to be a robust agenda. Progress at APEC is even more important as the world battles the economic downturn. Countries are being tempted to embrace protectionist measures; many already have, despite pledges to resist their siren song. With the Doha round of trade talks stalled, regional efforts to stimulate trade have to take the initiative. As one American warned, APEC has to set a higher standard: protectionist measures are permitted under the WTO format. If APEC does not raise the bar, then the economic downturn will be longer and more severe than many expect.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Global Depression causes global war – proliferation ensures it threatens survival

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Kerpen policy director for American’s for Prosperity 08 (Phil October 28, 2008 [http://www.philkerpen.com/?q=node/201 From Panic to Depression? The dangers of blaming free trade, low taxes, and flexible labor markets)

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">It’s important that we avoid all these policy errors — not just for the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival. The Great Depression, after all, didn’t end until the advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet. In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terrorist organizations that breed on poverty and despair, another global economic breakdown of such extended duration would risk armed conflicts on an even greater scale.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Japanese political instability turns all the negative impacts – it destroys Japanese regional influence and the Alliance, increasing Chinese expansion

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Klingner 2009-Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation [Bruce, “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance” August 26, Backgrounder #2308, accessed July 10,, accessed July 10, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/ 2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliance]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Japan's regional and global influence and relevance are diminishing due to a faltering economy, paralyzed political system, and constrained armed forces. The current trajectory of Japan's future is poor, with little reason for optimism for a change in course. "The danger is that [the bilateral] alliance will, despite its strategic importance, grow ever more irrelevant to the increasingly global realities of world affairs,"[13] warns Kent Calder of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. As a result, the world "has likely seen the high-water mark of Japan's international presence and assertiveness."[14] Japan must realize that the result of indecision, stagnation, and attempting to merely maintain the status quo is devolving it to a second-tier, middle-power nation. Left unchecked, Tokyo's influence and relevance in Asia will continue to erode. It is not a case of Japan abandoning the race, but simply that its competitors have gotten much better. It is like a ball player who continues to play the same level of game, oblivious to the fact that the other players on both his team and the opponent's are continually improving their capabilities. If Japan is uncertain of its future regional role, China is not. China, like nature, abhors a vacuum. If democratic Tokyo is unwilling to play a leadership role, China's growing economic and military capabilities will increasingly enable it to fill the gap that Japan's declining financial strength and self-imposed security constraints have caused. That could lead nations in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to increasingly see China as a more capable and reliable actor than Japan. This is certainly not good for U.S. strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Japanese leadership deters a conflict over Taiwan better than US military presence – China would be more credibly deterred by a regional actor, and Japan would support Taiwan

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6335, accessed 7/14/10]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">The Japanese public appears to be generally sympathetic to the Taiwanese cause, suggesting that Tokyo’s decision to show support for Taipei goes beyond narrow security concerns, and also beyond a desire to please Washington. An estimated 2.3 million tourists travel between Taiwan and Japan each year, and Japan is Taiwan’s largest trading partner.73 Favorable sentiment does not necessarily translate into support for independence among Japanese, however. In a September 2002 Japan Times survey, 71 percent of Japanese declared they were satisfied with the status quo on Taiwan; in other words, they favored neither reunification with the PRC nor independence from it.74 This may reflect a recognition on the part of the Japanese public that Taiwanese independence may provoke the Chinese to military action, which would certainly prove detrimental to Japanese security. But doubts and fears about the PRC do not completely overwhelm Japanese affinity for Taiwan and the Taiwanese. A Mainichi poll taken in 2001 asked Japanese citizens to identify countries and regions friendly to Japan. Taiwan ranked third, behind the United States and South Korea.75 On balance, the Japanese like Taiwan and the feeling is apparently mutual. “The Japanese built universities, roads, and other infrastructure. They educated us, they turned us into a more modern society,” said Hwang Kuan-hu, a national policy adviser to Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian, “We welcome Japan becoming more involved again with Taiwan.”76 Whether this mutual appreciation would translate into a formal Japanese pledge to assist Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression remains to be seen, but that should ultimately be a decision for the Japanese government, and the Japanese public, consistent with their own security concerns. The presumed wishes or desires of the United States should not be the determining factor. Given Taiwan’s strategic location across crucial Japanese lines of communication, the Japanese would view PRC control over the island as a security threat. Although Japan currently has only a limited capacity for blocking military annexation, a strong statement, building on the February 2005 joint declaration, may help deter Chinese military action against Taiwan. Even a position of deliberate ambiguity, holding out the possibility that Japan might employ military means to repel Chinese aggression, would likely be more credible coming from a regional military power than is the current ambiguous pledge originating with a United States that is struggling to sustain a host of commitments around the globe.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">The impact is Global nuclear war

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Hunkovic, American Military University, 09 [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, []]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Closing Futenma and moving off Okinawa solves for Japanese opposition – current US pressure worsens the situation

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Feffer, 2010, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies [John, March, “Pacific Pushback: Can Japan Say No to Washington?”, http://jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp116.html, accessed on 7/17/10]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">For environmental, political, and economic reasons, ditching the 2006 agreement is a no-brainer for Tokyo. Given Washington's insistence on retaining a base of little strategic importance, however, the challenge for the DPJ has been to find a site other than Nago. The Japanese government floated the idea of merging the Futenma facility with existing facilities at Kadena, another U.S. base on the island. But that plan—as well as possible relocation to other parts of Japan—has met with stiff local resistance. A proposal to further expand facilities in Guam was nixed by the governor there. The solution to all this is obvious: close down Futenma without opening another base. But so far, the United States is refusing to make it easy for the Japanese. In fact, Washington is doing all it can to box the new government in Tokyo into a corner. Ratcheting Up the Pressure The U.S. military presence in Okinawa is a residue of the Cold War and a U.S. commitment to containing the only military power on the horizon that could threaten American military supremacy. Back in the 1990s, the Clinton administration's solution to a rising China was to “ integrate, but hedge.” [9] The hedge—against the possibility of China developing a serious mean streak—centered around a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and a credible Japanese military deterrent.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Observation Two: The US Japan Alliance

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Relations with Japan are on the brink – the DPJ election proves that US actions will determine the future of the alliance.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Chanlett-Avery, 09 Specialist in Asian Affairs Congressional Research Service [Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance Congressional Research Service; 11/25/09; “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress”; [|http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-in/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA511942& Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]; accessed: 7/14/10]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Options for U.S. Policymakers As a new ruling coalition takes the reins of Japan for the first time in history, U.S.-Japan relations are likely to face a delicate and potentially challenging period. The DPJ, Japan’s main ruling party, has long signaled a desire for greater autonomy from Washington, while continuing to acknowledge the centrality of the bilateral alliance in Japanese security policy. Asia experts in the United States are currently debating the long-term significance of the DPJ’s momentous victory over the LDP in the recent elections and the potential impact that it may have on the bilateral alliance. Some experts see the change of power as a setback for the alliance, pointing to the DPJ’s past criticism of the alliance and plans to withdraw from the Indian Ocean refueling mission. Others view the new government as an opportunity to revitalize Japan and, by extension, the U.S.-Japan alliance.34 Still other experts believe that the new government will face foreign and domestic political realities that will limit its ability to fundamentally alter the status quo in bilateral relations. Whichever scenario proves correct, there seems little doubt that much will depend on how U.S. policy toward Japan proceeds in the months ahead. Policymakers in Washington will be working with a new and largely unfamiliar set of counterparts in Tokyo, who are themselves unused to governing. The initial challenge for U.S. officials will likely be to gain the trust of a new ruling party that has long expressed skepticism toward aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Although mainstream members of the DPJ support the alliance, they tend to be wary of overbearing U.S. influence and seek a less deferential bilateral dynamic than is perceived to have existed under previous LDP rule. As coordination between the two governments proceeds on sensitive alliance management issues, such as the base realignment process, some experts warn that overt U.S. pressure on Tokyo may be counterproductive in the early phase of the new government.35 Patience, these experts argue, should be the operational principle guiding U.S. alliance managers over the coming months. However, there are those who argue that the United States should take a more forceful approach toward the new government in Tokyo by outlining the political consequences of a less cooperative bilateral defense relationship.36 Nonetheless, there are numerous outstanding issues involving the U.S.-Japan alliance that will soon need to be addressed, such as the relocation of U.S. bases on Okinawa and the implementation of other agreements to strengthen the allies’ “global partnership.” There are legitimate U.S. strategic priorities and interests that U.S. officials must be prepared to justify to a relatively inexperienced coalition government that will have its share of critics on these issues. Progress in this regard will likely require a balance between firm U.S. diplomacy and the kind of “listening” approach that the Obama Administration has promised to take toward allies around the world.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Forcing our presence in Okinawa will fracture the US-Japan alliance - Okinawan and Japanese objections are causing the biggest threat to the alliance in decades

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Feffer, 2010, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies [John, March, “Pacific Pushback: Can Japan Say No to Washington?”, http://jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp116.html, accessed on 7/17/10]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">You'd think that, with so many Japanese bases, the United States wouldn't make a big fuss about closing one of them. Think again. The current battle over the Marine Corps air base at Futenma on Okinawa—an island prefecture almost 1,000 miles south of Tokyo that hosts about three dozen U.S. bases and 75% of American forces in Japan—is just revving up. In fact, Washington seems ready to stake its reputation and its relationship with a new Japanese government on the fate of that base alone, which reveals much about U.S. anxieties in the age of Obama. What makes this so strange, on the surface, is that Futenma is an obsolete base. Under an agreement the Bush administration reached with the previous Japanese government, the U.S. was already planning to move most of the Marines now at Futenma to the island of Guam. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is insisting, over the protests of Okinawans and the objections of Tokyo, on completing that agreement by building a new partial replacement base in a less heavily populated part of Okinawa. The current row between Tokyo and Washington is no mere “Pacific squall,” as Newsweek dismissively described it. [1] After six decades of saying yes to everything the United States has demanded, Japan finally seems on the verge of saying no to something that matters greatly to Washington, and the relationship that Dwight D. Eisenhower once called an “indestructible alliance” is displaying ever more hairline fractures. Worse yet, from the Pentagon's perspective, Japan's resistance might prove infectious—one major reason why the United States is putting its alliance on the line over the closing of a single antiquated military base and the building of another of dubious strategic value.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">The Futenma controversy kills the Security Alliance – it breeds suspicion and anger in both governments

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Klingner 2009- Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation [Bruce, “U.S. Should Stay Firm on Implementation of Okinawa Force Realignment” December 16, Backgrounder #2352 accessed july 13, http://www.heritage.org/ Research/Reports/2009/12/US-Should-Stay-Firm-on-Implementation-of-Okinawa-Force-Realignment]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">The Futenma controversy has caused the Obama and Hatoyama administrations' relationship to get off on the wrong foot. Frustration, suspicion, and anger are increasing in both capitals, threatening to create a crisis of confidence. The FRF controversy has, in the words of one U.S. official, "sucked the air out of the room" by redirecting alliance attention away from strategically important regional and global security issues. The Futenma dispute has already harmed the bilateral alliance. The extent of the damage will depend on the responses of both countries. The alliance is not yet in crisis, but if the situation is mishandled, the alliance could be headed for one. The U.S. and Japan need to keep in mind that the alliance is critically important for both countries and that the contentious issues are only one part of the broader relationship. Washington and Tokyo need to work together to reduce the current tension level and to refocus on transforming the alliance to address security challenges.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Futenma is The Key issue in the US Japan relationship – it will spill over to determine the entire state of relations

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Hornung, 2010, professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu [postdoctoral researcher at the Eat Asian Studies Center at Ohio State University. Jeffery July 8, Jeffrey JUL 8, 2010 KAN HE DO IT? HTTP://CSIS.ORG/PUBLICATION/KAN-HE-DO-IT accessed: JULY 14, 2010.]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">There is no question that Okinawa bears an enormous burden by hosting three-quarters of all U.S. forces in Japan. There is also no question that Futenma’s location in densely populated Ginowan poses innumerable hazards to the community. Given these facts, the people of Okinawa want to reduce the footprint of U.S. forces, particularly Futenma. These opinions are not new, but Hatoyama’s promise to listen to their concerns raised expectations that he would prioritize those concerns over U.S. priorities. Yet, this ended with Hatoyama’s apology for breaking his promise. Hatoyama’s handling of the relocation issue reawakened anti-base sentiment. This helped get Mr. Inamine elected, the first time an anti-relocation candidate was elected mayor of Nago. It is arguably the first time since the 1995 rape of a schoolgirl that the Okinawa people are openly calling for the relocation of bases out of the prefecture to the extent they are doing currently. There will be no return to stable alliance relations as long as the local communities hosting U.S. forces do not grant their understanding of the burden they are forced to bear.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">The first scenario is Missile Defense - US Japan cooperation is necessary for Joint Missile defense – it is key for ongoing tests

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Payne, 10, Member of the Defense Science Board, the DoD Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, [Keith Co-chairman of the Nuclear Strategy Forum, Thomas Scheber, Principal Associate Director for Nuclear Weapons Program; March “U.S. Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia”; []; Accessed 7/16/10]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">In recent years, joint cooperation on ballistic missile defense has been growing in importance and activity. Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings typically included discussion of cooperative measures for BMD. In November 2007, the defense ministers from both countries met and agreed to advance joint efforts to cooperate on operational aspects. 154 In December 2007, a joint BMD test used a SM-3 interceptor fired from a Japanese destroyer, Kongo. This successful joint live-fire test marked a major milestone in missile defense cooperation with the United States. In November 2008, a subsequent BMD test involving an interceptor fired by a ship in the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force was partially successful. On October 28, 2009, a Japanese destroyer, JS Myoko, fired an SM-3 interceptor missile which successfully impacted a medium-range ballistic missile about 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean.155 The United States and Japan are continuing to work together to increase the range and lethality of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.156 Japan hosts an X-band radar which is an integral part of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Japanese and U.S. forces cooperate in missile defense exercises and are continuing to improve interoperability between elements of each other’s defensive systems. The most recent Japan Defense White Paper calls for continued cooperation with the United States to further strengthen security arrangements on “defense operations.” Specifically, it calls for joint exercises and training to be enhanced, continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan (but a “realignment of those forces”), cooperation on ballistic missile defense, and close collaboration with the United States in international security efforts. Consistent with this goal, the United States and Japan recently expanded the size and complexity of the annual exercise, Yama Sakura (Mountain Cherry Blossom). The exercise, conducted in December 2009 on the northern island of Hokkaido, included over 5,000 troops and involved ballistic missile defense training.157

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Joint missile defense is key – North Korean missile threat destabilizes Asia causing war

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Klingner 2009-Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation [Bruce, “North Korea's Missile Gambit” February 17, 2009 WebMemo #2295, accessed July 17, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/02/North-Koreas-Missile-Gambit]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">What the U.S. Should Do Emphasize that North Korea's actions are provocative, counterproductive, and call into question Pyongyang's viability as a negotiating partner. Highlight that North Korea's threatening belligerence, not U.S. "hostile policy" as Pyongyang claims, has hindered negotiations. Affirm U.S. commitment to defend our allies against any North Korean provocation, including missile launches or naval confrontation in the West Sea. Underscore Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' pledge to shoot down the North Korean missile if it approaches U.S. territory. Emphasize that North Korea's missile threat demonstrates the continuing need for the U.S., Japan, and South Korea to develop and deploy missile defense systems. It is ironic that President Obama's Secretary of Defense has suggested using missile defenses that Obama would likely not have funded had he been in office during their development. Declare that the U.S. is willing to resume negotiations to eliminate North Korea's missile threats to its neighbors. Such negotiations, however, must comprehensively constrain missile development, deployment, and proliferation rather than simply seeking a quid pro quo agreement--cash payments in exchange for not exporting missile technology. Nor should such negotiations deflect attention from Pyongyang's denuclearization requirements in the Six Party Talks.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Next is East Asian Multilateralism - The US Japan Alliance is crucial for Japan to expand its Multilateral leadership in East Asia – our cooperation on security issues will expand Japan’s international role

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Chanlett-Avery, 09 Specialist in Asian Affairs Congressional Research Service [Emma Chanlett-Avery, William H. Cooper, Specialist in International Trade and Finance Congressional Research Service; 11/25/09; “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress”; [|http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-in/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA511942& Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]; accessed: 7/14/10]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">As the DPJ settles into its new role as the main ruling party, it may over time show greater confidence in following through on its long-promised vision of a more assertive foreign policy for Japan. Among some of the measures called for by the DPJ are expanding Japan’s role in U.N.sanctioned peacekeeping operations, deepening ties with Asia, taking greater responsibility for defending the Japanese homeland, expanding regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTA), and promoting an ambitious new set of global climate change standards. Although the move toward a U.N. and Asia-centered diplomacy may be perceived as a less U.S.-centric approach, such a trend may not necessarily signify a divergence from broader U.S. goals and interests. The DPJ’s vision of a “proactive” foreign policy that would enhance Japan’s international contributions is one that is likely to be broadly supported by Washington. Indeed, there are several areas where the new government in Tokyo may cooperate closely with Obama Administration initiatives, from setting new global warming standards to nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Several upcoming high-level events, including a planned bilateral summit in Tokyo in November 2009, will provide opportunities for President Obama to discuss issues of mutual interest with newly elected Prime Minister Hatoyama.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Engagement in multilateralism prevents East Asian nationalistic conflict – better public opinion, and understanding.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Tanaka, 08 – Senior Fellow at the Japan Centre for International Exchange (Hitoshi, “The Strategic Rationale for East Asia Community Building,” from the publication East Asia at a Crossroads, pp. 99-100, ed. Jusuf Wanandi and Tadashi Yamamoto, published by JCIE, accessed 7/15/10, http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/crossroads/chp6_tanaka.pdf) Red

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Whenever one looks for the origins of nationalistic sentiment in Northeast Asia, be it anti-Japanese sentiment in China, anti-Japanese/ Chinese sentiment in South Korea, or anti-Chinese/North Korean sentiment in Japan, the answer often lies at least partially in domestic politics.7 Leaders in any number of political systems sometimes see the pursuit of a populist or nationalistic foreign policy as a means of garnering popular support. Although such tactics may succeed in reaping short-term gains for the party in power, they can have dangerous consequences in the long run. In contrast, the leaders of a nation that is a member of a community that has adopted a norm of seeking multilateral solutions to intraregional issues depend on their neighbors for help in addressing problems outside national borders. Since regional stability is central to the national interest, the state’s leaders will show an increased sensitivity to views and expectations of community partners rather than depending solely on the popular support of domestic constituencies. As domestic constituencies come to see the benefits of a more constructive and cooperative foreign policy, popular opinion will become increasingly supportive. The end result would be a more rational (or, at the very least, less provocative) foreign policy and mutually beneficial (as opposed to zero-sum) calculations of national interest. In short, as states become socialized to these norms of interaction, multilateralism may become a means to transcend national egoism and ambition and minimize the deleterious effects of traditional power politics. This process would reduce confrontational nationalistic sentiment and could potentially, one day in the distant future, render concerns about the emergence of a militarist or expansionist power in the region obsolete. Any process that is able to remove or at least partially attenuate these concerns, which arguably pose the single largest obstacle to community-building efforts, would make an invaluable contribution to long-term peace and stability in East Asia.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Expanding the US – Japan relations to include other regional players is key to address multilateral threats –prolif, and disease

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Tanaka 09 – Senior Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange [Hitoshi, “A New Vision for the US-Japan Alliance,” vol. 4 no. 1, pub JCIE, April 2009, accessed 7/14/10, http://www.jcie.or.jp/insights/4-1.html] Red

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">A New Approach to East Asia Threats to regional stability increasingly come from nontraditional areas such as WMD proliferation, human and drug trafficking, natural disasters, energy security, environmental degradation, maritime piracy, and infectious disease. All of these challenges will require multilateral and cooperative solutions. The scope of the US-Japan alliance must expand beyond bilateral military deterrence. It must become more inclusive and place greater emphasis on functioning more as a public good. Although Japan and the United States should lead this initiative, efforts will not make much progress without the support of other advanced democracies in the region such as South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The two allies should move to strengthen and expand existing trilateral strategic consultations (e.g. US-Japan-South Korea and US-Japan-Australia). It should be stressed, however, that the objective is neither to unilaterally impose western values upon East Asian nations nor to exclude non-democratic nations from reaping the benefits of regional stability and economic prosperity. Rather, the objective is for Japan and the United States to engage states in the region in rules-based communities through inclusive multilateralism. As states adopt standardized rules and norms of behavior, the transaction costs of interaction will decrease, which will in turn deepen trust, interdependence, and stability throughout East Asia. At the same time that Japan and the United States actively engage China in regional and global rules-based communities and bring it into multilateral dialogue on issues ranging from macroeconomic policy to talks on energy and the environment, they must also work with other US allies to hedge against the uncertainty surrounding China's future. Concerns abound about several aspects of China's foreign policy—including issues related to rapidly rising defense expenditures, military transparency, and its aggressive approach to energy security—and domestic policy—such as CO2 emissions and environmental damage, treatment of minorities, and income disparities. Japan and the United States should place priority on encouraging China to pursue economic policies that will make a constructive contribution to efforts to address the global economic crisis, make its military affairs more transparent, and agree to fully participate in the successor to the Kyoto Protocol. With respect to security issues, Japan and the United States should initiate and institutionalize regular trilateral security dialogue with China involving civilian and military personnel. This would provide a forum through which to advocate increased transparency, reduce mutual suspicions, and consolidate trust between the region's three great powers. Stable security ties among these three nations are a prerequisite for long-term peace and stability in the region. In recent years, the Six-Party Talks format has emerged as an effective sub-regional security forum for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, but we still have, unfortunately, a lengthy and bumpy ride ahead of us before the nuclear issue is resolved. This forum, which has succeeded in bringing together the five most powerful states in the region to openly discuss and cooperate in resolving a security issue of common concern, should remain active even after the nuclear issue is settled and be used to address remaining issues on the Korean Peninsula. Emerging nontraditional security issues pose an increasingly serious threat to regional stability. Building on the existing network of US security partners in the region, Japan and the United States should work with states in the region to establish an East Asia Security Forum to proactively address such security issues as human and drug trafficking, natural disasters, infectious disease, resource scarcity, maritime piracy, terrorism, and WMD proliferation. With ASEAN+6 member nations and the United States working in concert, this forum would adopt an action-oriented and functional approach to addressing these threats and carry out operations in a manner similar to the PSI.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Disease Pandemic leads to extinction

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Toolis, the director of a major television series on the history of plagues, 09 (Kevin, The Express, April 28, 2009 U.K. 1st Edition “Pandemic Pandemonium” lexis)

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">It destroyed the Roman Empire, wiped out most of the New World and killed millions in Europe. How disease - not just Mexico's swine fever - has shaped the planet SCIENTISTS call it the Big Die Off, when a terrifying new virus rips through a species and kills up to a third of the entire population. And we all now could be facing a new apocalypse, though no one yet knows how potent the new strain of Mexican swine fever will be, or how many millions could die. Yet if history teaches us anything it tells us that the greatest danger the human race faces is not some crackpot North Korean dictator but a six-gene virus that could wipe out one third of the global population. Our real enemy, a new plague virus, is so small you can barely see it even with an advanced electron microscope. It has no morality, no thought or no plan. All it wants to do is reproduce itself inside another human body. We are just another biological opportunity, a nice warm place to feed and replicate. Viruses are as old as life itself. What is startling though is how vulnerable our globalised societies are to the threat of a new deadly plague. Before World Health Organisation scientists could identify this new H1N1 virus it had travelled halfway across the world via international flights.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Proliferation leads to extinction

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division 02 of Institute for Defense Analysis (Victor A., Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90 Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90)

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear “six shooters” on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">US concessions on Futenma are necessary to save the alliance

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Vaughan, 10 PhD in Political Science and International Studies. [Michael ; 1/8/10; “JAPAN’S QUIET REVOLUTION: THE 2009 ELECTION & ITS AFTERMATH”; http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv /UQ:191742/Japans_Quiet.pdf; Accessed 7/14/10]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">The Futenma Base issue has thus been the cause of severe friction between Japan and the United States. Either one or the other of the parties will have to concede ground or else face a damaging major rift in the long-standing alliance. It remains to be seen whether the Hatoyama government holds its resolve or whether the Obama administration imposes its will upon the angry and disaffected people of Okinawa. As Columnist Roger Cohen has observed, President Obama “has a Japan problem … there are troubles. Reliable Japan is now restive Japan. It’s talking about a more ‘equal partnership’ – read less subservient. Acquiescence has given way to argument.” 16

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Changing the US Japan alliance makes it more stable – Japanese independence would raise public support

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6335, accessed 7/14/10]

<span style="font-family: 'Trebuchet MS',Helvetica,sans-serif;">In each of the three crises discussed above, a Japanese prime minister less closely aligned with the United States might well have behaved in a different fashion. Indeed, the opposition DPJ has long advocated a more independent posture vis-à-vis the United States.90 The key to understanding the evolution of the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship depends, therefore, on more than the words and actions of a few individuals at the top; one must consider broader Japanese and American interests and domestic public opinion in both countries. A U.S.-Japan strategic relationship that more closely resembles an alliance in the traditional sense of the term, as opposed to the current patron-client relationship, is likely to be an enduring model for U.S.-Japanese security cooperation in the future, especially if it is based on popular support. Fortunately, popular sentiment within Japan offers still more clues about how the three cases discussed above might play out in a future in which Japan behaves as a normal country, that is, as a country responsible for defending its interests, and not dependent on the United States.