Vivienne+Pismarov+and+Zane+Dille+(GRAMS-HJPV)

Russian Arctic militarization is expanding rapidly – the lack of ice-capable ships prevents a US response
As the U.S. and E.U. keep a very close eye on the situation with Russia and Ukraine, //Russia is// also increasing its presence and influence elsewhere: the Arctic – a melting region that is opening up prime shipping lan
 * Mitchell 14** – Jon Mitchell is an independent author for Foreign Policy Journal, citing Naval Statements and Nicholas Cunningham, an expert in the field (“Russia’s Territorial Ambition and Increased Military Presence in the Arctic” April 23, 2014 []) zabd

Russian Arctic militarization is expanding rapidly – the lack of ice-capable ships prevents a US response
As the U.S. and E.U. keep a very close eye on the situation with Russia and Ukraine, //Russia is// also increasing its presence and influence elsewhere: the Arctic – a melting region that is opening up prime shipping lanes and real estate with an estimated $1 trillion in hydrocarbons .[1] With the opening of two major shipping routes, the North Sea route and the Northwest Passage, the potential for economic competition is fierce, especially among the eight members of the Arctic counci l: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Russia, and the United States.[2] President Putin made statements this week concerning Russia’s national interests in the Arctic region: chiefly, militarization and the preparation of support elements for commercial shipping routes .[3] The Russian President called for full government funding for “socio-economic development” from 2017-2020, including a system of Russian naval bases that would be home to ships and submarines allocated specifically for the defense of national interests that involve the protection of Russian oil and gas facilities in the Arctic.[4] Russia is also attempting to accelerate the construction of more icebreakers to take part in its Arctic strategy .[5] The Russian Federation recently staked a territorial claim in the Sea of Okhotsk for 52,000 square kilometers,[6] and is currently preparing an Arctic water claim for 1.2 million square kilometers.[7] The energy giant owns 43 of the approximate 60 hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic Circle.[8] With Russian energy companies already developing hydrocarbon deposits and expanding border patrols on its Arctic sea shelf (in place by July 1, 2014),[9] Putin is actively pursuing a strong approach to the Arctic region. Russian oil fields, which significantly contribute to the country’s revenue, are in decline – forcing Russian oil companies to actively explore the Arctic region.[10] While the U.S. Defense Secretary called for a peaceful and stable Arctic region with international cooperation, the Arctic has created increased militarization efforts, particularly by Russia. Already the Arctic has seen powerful warships of Russia’s Northern Fleet, strategic bomber patrols, and airborne troop exercises.[11] In fact, Russian military forces have been permanently stationed in the Arctic since summer 2013.[12] According to a source in the Russian General Staff, a new military command titled Northern Fleet – Joint Strategic Command, will be created and tasked to protect Russian interests in its Arctic territories; a strategy that was approved in 2009.[13] Furthermore, weapons developers are being tasked with creating products that can face the harsh Arctic environment. According to an RT report, “ Putin ordered the head of the Russian arms industry , Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, to concentrate the efforts on creation of Arctic infrastructure for the soonest deployment of troops. Rogozin reported that all Russian weapons systems can be produced with special features needed in the extreme North and the weapons companies were ready to supply such arms to the Defense Ministry.”[14] The “Arctic infrastructure” that Rogozin refers to will include Navy and Border Guard Service bases.[15] These bases are part of Putin’s aim to strengthen Russian energy companies and military positions in the Arctic region. In 2013, a formerly closed down base was reopened in the Novosibirsk Islands and is now home to 10 military ships and four icebreakers – a move that Reuters called “a demonstration of force.”[16] The Defense Ministry is also planning on bringing seven airstrips in the Arctic back to life .[17] Russia’s militarization in the Arctic region is only a part of its increasing activity throughout the globe. Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said, “ It’s crucially important for us to set goals for our national interests in this region. If we don’t do that, we will lose the battle for resources which means we’ll also lose in a big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independen ce.”[18] On the contrary, Aleksandr Gorban, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry is quoted saying that a “war for resources”[19] in the Arctic will never happen. But what was once a more hands-off region of the world that provided international cooperation and stability is now turning into a race for sovereignty and resources claims – as evidenced not only by Russia’s increasing military presence, but also Canada and the United States. Canada is now allocating part of its defense budget towards armed ships that will patrol its part of the Arctic Circle,[20] while the United States has planned a strategy of its own. In addition to conducting military exercises with other Arctic nation members, the U.S. Navy has proposed a strategy titled The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030 that was released in February 2014. The 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, cited in the Arctic Roadmap, provides the Navy’s two specific objectives for the Arctic: 1) advance United States’ security interests; and 2) strengthen international cooperation.[21] According to the strategy, the Navy’s role will primarily be in support of search and rescue, law enforcement, and civil support operations.[22] However, this may grow to a more militarized strategy depending on the U.S. government’s view of Russia’s increased military activity in the Arctic region over the next few years. In either case, the U.S. is falling behind in Arctic preparation. It has very few operational icebreakers for the Arctic region where its only primary presence is seen through nuclear submarines and unmanned aerial vehicles, according to an RT article.[23] Until 2020, the Navy will primarily use its submarines and limited air assets in the Arctic, while its mid-term and far-term strategy emphasizes personnel, surface ships, submarines, and air assets that will be prepared for Arctic conditions and operations.[24] Despite its mid and long-term strategy, the U.S. will already be lagging in establishing a military presence to compete with Russia’s, who already has strategies in motion until 2020 and later. Last month, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a united Canadian-U.S. counterbalance to Russia’s Arctic presence, pointing out “they have been aggressively reopening military bases.”[25] While the U.S. cannot legitimately criticize Putin for opening military bases and simultaneously avoid blatant hypocrisy, it is worth noting that Russia is developing a strong military presence in a potentially competitive region. //to// be the first established dominant force in a new region that will host economic competition and primary shipping lanes, albeit in a harsh environment that makes it difficult to extract resources. Nicholas Cunningham aptly stated “ both Russia and the West fear losing out to the other in the far north, despite what appears to be a small prize.”[ 26] Although the Arctic holds a mass of the world’s oil and gas deposits, the extreme environment and remote location makes it difficult to produce energy quickly and efficiently. Despite this, the Russian Federation is focused on developing disputed hydrocarbon areas that it claims are part of the country’s continental shelf. In addition, Russia is allocating funds and forces to the Arctic to protect its interests. While the U.S. is currently lacking in natural resource development and exploitation in the Arctic Circle, it desires to display a show of strength in the cold region to compete with potential Russian domination and influence. But because the Defense Department faces constant budget cuts, preparing an Arctic naval force will be slow and difficult. For now, the United States can only show strength through nuclear submarines and drone technology. Putin and the Russian Federation are laying disputed claims to territories both inside and outside the Arctic while creating the foundation for a potential military buildup in the Arctic – provided that the U.S. and Canada can even allocate sufficient budgets for Arctic military expansion. One thing is sure: if the Arctic region continues to melt and open up vital shipping lanes, there must be international cooperation to provide security and rescue elements for commercial shipping. Since Russia has significant territorial claims and the most coastlines in the Arctic Circle, it would be natural for the Russian Federation to have a wide security presence in the region, but this must be coupled with international cooperation in commercial shipping lanes and by providing support elements, such as search and rescue. The U nited S tates will not be able to fully compete with a country that is heavily investing in the Arctic region – particularly due to budget constraints and lack of Arctic-prepared vessels. If the U.S. desires to limit Russian influence and territorial claims, it must do so by partnering with other members of the Arctic council – not by entering into a military buildup simply to dominate Russia in the Arctic.
 * Mitchell 14** – Jon Mitchell is an independent author for Foreign Policy Journal, citing Naval Statements and Nicholas Cunningham, an expert in the field (“Russia’s Territorial Ambition and Increased Military Presence in the Arctic” April 23, 2014 []) zabd

Expanding militarization risks conflict among multiple rising Arctic powers
The Arctic, always before on the frigid edges of the international imagination, is becoming a hot topic in world affairs, particularly in Asia, because of its virtually untapped resources and increasing strategic importance. In 2012, the amount of cargo transported through the region more than doubled, and in May 2013 the Arctic Council , traditionally membered by Europe’s Nordic countries, along with Russia, Canada, and the US, granted observer status to China, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, and Italy , a reminder that climate change is opening the Arctic to wider use and commercial exploitation, especially by Asian interests. Indeed, a Chinese shipping company sent that country’s first commercial voyage through the Arctic in September 2013. And Russia is negotiating with Korean shippers about using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for energy shipments. These developments are already bringing the Arctic and Asian security agendas together, and in the process changing Asia’s strategic boundaries and planning. Beijing officials believe that by the end of the decade five to fifteen percent of their country’s international trade, mainly container traffic, will use the NSR. With plans to put a second icebreaker into service this year and launch three scientific expeditions by 2015, China’s interest in the Arctic has taken a major step forward during the last year. After the council meeting in May, Yu Zhengasheng, chairman of the Political Consultative Conference, visited Finland, Sweden, and Denmark to increase general trade and cooperation with those countries, particularly in the Arctic, and Beijing announced plans to expand its polar research, in collaboration with Nordic research centers, with the aim of crafting better climate-change policies. State-owned Chinese businesses have also rolled out a series of related energy deals, including one plan to begin oil exploration off Iceland’s southeast coast and another to finance a major international mining project at Greenland’s Isua iron-ore field. China National Petroleum Corporation, which last year signed a major long-term deal to buy oil from the Russian state-owned company Rosneft, has also agreed to become the “anchor customer” of the liquefied natural gas project run by Novatek, an independent Russian gas producer, on the Yamal Peninsula, in northwestern Siberia, which stretches into the Arctic. China is not the only Asian nation displaying heightened interest in the Arctic. According to an article last May in the Straits Times, “Singapore’s ‘Arctic diplomacy’ is driven primarily by an ambition to exploit an emerging market niche in which it sees itself as a technological and expertise leader.” And because of its rapidly accelerating energy requirements, India too has been forced to look to the Arctic for possible relief. Along with China, India had an Arctic research station in place in Norway in advance of the Arctic Council decision, and the New Delhi government is looking to buy or build an icebreaker. Voices in the Indian media, such as Shastri Ramachandaran, writing in the Daily News and Analysis of Mumbai, have noted that if the country wants to be seen as a viable contender for membership in the UN Security Council it must become much more active diplomatically in the “behind the scenes exercises to shape the future of the Arctic.” An Indian upgrade in the Arctic would also check China’s. As Iftikhar Gilani warned recently in the same newspaper, if India does not develop an Arctic policy that restrains China, it is “heading for near diplomatic disaster.” Thus, beyond purely commercial considerations of trade and access to energy sources, classic geopolitical strategic rivalries and identity politics play no small role in driving the policies of states interested in the Arctic. But these analyses also show how a fusion or at least an overlap of the Asian and Arctic security agendas is clearly occurring. It is partly because of geopolitical strategic rivalries such as that between India and China, but also because of a race for its rich resources and its key global location, that the Arctic is edging onto the international front burner. A surge in commercial trade coincides with what might be called the growing securitization of the Arctic, namely attempts to place all discussions about the Arctic under the framework of national security, a trend that implies a //further emphasis on military instruments of power// and implies military threats by interested parties to secure their Arctic interests. Every major analysis of the Arctic concedes the possibility of confrontation there. One possible //flashpoint// is the current //tension between Russia and China// over exploitation of the region. On February 27, 2013, President Vladimir Putin warned an expanded session of his Ministry of Defense Collegium that Russia confronted military threats from other states’ growing militarization in the Arctic. And in September, Russian forces occupied the New Siberian Islands in the Asian side of the region to defend against undefined threats, while also carrying out extensive military exercises on the European side. Putin singled out the Arctic because of its huge mineral and energy endowment. A March 2012 article by Sergei Konovalov in the military analysis supplement of the Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that Russia believes energy shortages caused by Middle Eastern instability will force major countries to look ever more to the Arctic, including disputed territories that Russia claims. “Therefore the Russian military grouping in the Arctic will be built up at an accelerated rate in 2012 for the purpose of protecting potential hydrocarbon deposits and Russian Federation territory in the zone of the Arctic Ocean.” Russia’s 2009 National Security Strategy openly listed the Arctic as one particular area of danger as other powers may attempt to forcibly seize Russia’s energy holdings there. Threats about the Arctic such as those emanating from Moscow have been echoed in Europe and even in Asia. The British defense minister, Philip Hammond, for instance, cites the threats stemming from the militarization of the Arctic in his opposition to spending cuts in defense. Norway worries about Russian militarization in the High North despite a 2010 agreement between the two countries delimiting exploration on the European side of the Arctic. Canada has also been vocal in responding to Russia’s aggressive policies. As far back as 2009 and 2010, China has disputed any claims of sovereignty in the Arctic waters beyond the twelve-mile zone granted to littoral countries who have signed the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In a challenge to Russian territorial claims in the region, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo of the Chinese Navy stated in March 2010 that “the Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.” Such objections are hardly just a matter of principle. Yin went on to say that he believed the current scramble for the Arctic encroaches on China’s interests, and that exploitation of the Arctic “will become a future mission of the navy .”
 * Blank, 14** - Stephen J. Blank is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council; served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base (Stephen, “Enter Asia: The Arctic Heats Up” World Affairs Journal, March/April, [|http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/enter-asia-arctic-heats)//DH]

Claims of Arctic cooperation don’t account for the decline in U.S. leadership which makes great power war likely
The Arctic in the unipolar moment One of the cornerstones of America's unipolar moment has been the remarkable decline in interstate conflict. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system has not been on the verge of any major war, nor have great powers aggressively pursued policies that would balance against American power in a way that would be taken seriously. According to many scholarly studies, the world since the end of the Cold War has become far more secure in the interstate sense, and security and defence policies of states are now preoccupied more with human- centric and intrastate variables than anything else. Though it is difficult to deny that the world has become more stable at the systemic level, the role of hard power and military capabilities did not disappear with the Soviet Union; instead, the use of militarism to achieve national goals in the unipolar moment greatly decreased as a direct result of the values and grand strategy of the U nited S tates. The impact of a unipolar systemic arrangement on state behaviour is best explained by the hegemonic stability theory.18 According to this theory, a unipolar structure is able to pacify the relations of states because there is recognition of the hegemon's ability to control or intervene in conflicts that may threaten its power, or the order of the system. Wohlforth summarizes the basic precept of hegemonic stability theory by contending: The theory stipulates that especially powerful states ("hegemons") foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisfied state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be [...] If the system is unipolar, the great power hierarchy should be much more stable than any hierarchy lodged within a system of more than one pole. Because unipolarity is based on a historically unprecedented concentration of power in the United States, a potentially important source of great power conflict - hegemonic rivalry - will be missing .19 It is essential to note two things about the status of the United States as systemic hegemon throughout the immediate post-Cold War era - first, that its preponderance of power in every area of capability measurement created a stable and less tense system in which states were able to interact; and second, that the United States' time as hegemon has fostered the growth of multilateral institutions and agreements rather than a bullying type of unipolarity.20 From a systemic standpoint, it would seem that there is little reason to be concerned about military aggression, arms racing and distrustful competition in the modern system, but one vital concern to note is that much of the unipolar and hegeomic stability literature completely ignores the role of the Arctic in state security calculations. Throughout an era of institutional binding, regional integration, humanitarianism and soft power growth, the competition for the Arctic was following much of the same pattern, with states preferring to make their claims in institutional or legal settings. Yet, as the unipolar moment has started to decline, and multipolarity is on the horizon, the competition in the circumpolar region has taken on a very different tone. Competing claims over Arctic territories, such as the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea and other maritime boundaries, and the use of the region as a space for military exercises are by no means new and they have not come to the forefront of the strategic security agendas of states since the post-9/11 era. Rather, throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was a realm of constant supervision, not because either superpower wanted to develop the region, but more because of the mutual fear each side had of offensive attacks being launched over the pole. Even throughout the unipolar moment, the Arctic has been a space for sovereignty competition, but the nature of the competition had been mostly legal, institutional or soft power focused .21 Worth noting as well is the very complex nature of reasons for state interests in the Arctic. Mark Nuttall effectively summarizes the complexities of the high north as he claims: In the post-Cold War world [the Arctic] is seen as a natural scientific laboratory, under- stood as a homeland for indigenous peoples, a place of sovereignty conflicts, an emerging hydrocarbon province with which the world is coming to think of as one of the last major frontiers for oil and gas, and a region of dramatic environmental change.22 Though the intricacies of Arctic competition are intriguing to note, it is how states are strategically asserting their claims that is of particular importance. The start of America's hegemonic decline has allowed states to revisit their approaches to the Arctic as nations jockey for position by balancing or rivalling American preferences. As a result, the nature of Arctic competition has incorporated both soft power and hard power elements. Further, the nature of militarism and hard power tension has increased due to the recent spending and strategic shifts by many Arctic states in recent years, including Canada, Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 The reasons for America's decline are relatively unsurprising - military overextension in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of international support for American foreign policy objectives throughout the Bush era; the 2008 economic recession; and the utter distrust by most states, including close American allies, of the United States' political objectives.24 The system remains unipolar, of course, but as stated above, the preponderance of power capabilities has substantially diminished, opening the door for others to balance and rival American power in the coming years. Coincidentally, it has also been the revelations of science in recent years that have also promoted a faster pace for those states making Arctic claims. The role of climate change and its impact over the Arctic has allowed for states to more freely move into the region and pursue strategies previously unavailable.25 According to Lotta Numminen, climate change has recently affected states' perceptions of the possible economic opportunities in the Arctic in four ways: first, that the subsurface of the Arctic Ocean floor is assumed to contain substantial oil and gas reserves, to which there will be increased access; second, that melting waters will provide new waters for international fisheries; third, the increase in research strategies; and fourth, is the greater access to sea passages.26 One of the main reasons states see the Arctic region as such a lucrative area is the potential for increasing their respective economic and natural resource capabilities. Previously, the northern ice caps prevented states from entering most of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding areas, but as these environmental situations change, states have readily identified the high north as a priority in both their security and economic strategies. Among the main reasons the Arctic has not been more readily seen as a potential area for security competition and conflict is the interpretation that the United States has little or no interest in the circumpolar region at all. According to Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, American hegemony throughout the post-Cold War era was seen as passive, stable and enduring because of the lack of counterpower being demonstrated in the system: Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, mean- while - China, Russia, Japan, and Germany - are in the opposite position. They can- not augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat.27 Almost completely omitted from such interpretations, however, are America's northern borders over Alaska and into the Arctic. Latitudinal thinking would seem to indicate that Brooks and Wohlforth are correct in terms of America's interests in many areas of the globe, but this ignores what has been happening at the top of the world in the high north. It is not as if the United States has been ignorant of its own decline in power, especially regarding the Arctic. In 2009, the United States issued National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 that deal exclusively with American Arctic policy. According to these directives, the altera- tions to national policies of other states regarding the Arctic compelled the United States to clearly outline the security and development strategies they would use to protect its Arctic interests. Among the first, and most clear, elements of the directives is the clear intention of the United States to defend their national security interests. According to Article III, subsection B 1 of the directives: The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.28 The contemporary changes to the international system as the era of American hegemony has begun to wane, the effects of climate change and greater access, and the increasingly militaristic strategies of most every Arctic state have led to a situation where tensions are at an all time high, and that legal or institutional processes are unlikely to resolve anything amicably. As the system continues its transition away from unipolarity, observers are left to ponder what might come next after an era of relative interstate stability. Multipolarity and the circumpolar In their 2002 article on the nature of United States primacy and the enduring aspects of American hegemony, Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the United States would have to act as a benevolent hegemon in order to prevent counterbalancing and to be able to build effective regimes worldwide. They argue: Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are tenets of successful statecraft that have proved their worth from classical Greece onward. Standing taller than leading states of the past, the United States has unprecedented freedom to do as it pleases. It can play the game for itself alone or for the system as a whole; it can focus on small returns today or larger ones tomorrow. If the administration truly wants to be loved as well as feared, the policy answers are not hard to find.29 The problem with such analyses of American hegemony is that the Bush administration chose to ignore utterly such warnings and, rather than acting magnanimously, post-9/11 American foreign policy did precisely what it should not have. Pre-emption, coercion and irrational interventions, combined with a major economic recession, all serve to explain why American hegemony began to decline by 2005 in terms of both actual power levels and perceptions of legitimate hegemonic status.30 The clearest sign that American exceptionalism has been decreasing is the aggressive and regional balancing dynamics taking place between states in the Arctic region. Security strategy in the circumpolar region has altered dramatically since 2005, with more states showing interest, hard power spending increasing, and legal processes being coupled by at times overtly offensive strategy.31 Russia, Canada and a number of European states, especially Norway and Sweden, exemplify this line of argument about how sovereignty claims have become focused on traditional inter- state arms racing and militarism while soft power components, like governance structures and legal processes, continually evolve.32 As mentioned previously, even the United States has woken up to see that, as their hegemony declines, other states have begun to balance against them in the Arctic, thus provoking the 2009 Presidential Directives. Even so, Arctic interested nations have not yielded to American claims, nor has there been any evidence of America's closest allies backing down in the face of its Arctic assertions, most clearly evidenced by Canada's continued claims over the Northwest Passage.33 In the international relations canon, most observers point to either India or China as emerging great powers that are the most likely to counterbalance Ameri- can power. The 2004 American National Intelligence Council report highlights this theory by stating: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players - similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century - will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own.34 Both China and India have recently expressed their interest in Arctic affairs, but no power is as close to rivalling or challenging American power in hard power terms than Russia. This is especially true in the Arctic, as Russia's Arctic policies have made its intentions towards asserting its control over territory it deems to be sover- eign very clear. The role of the Arctic in Russian foreign policy cannot be understated. According to Russia's 2008 Arctic policy document, the region is seen as the epicentre of Russia's military and socio-economic development. The top two priorities for Russian Arctic interests are defined as follows: (a) In the sphere of socio-economic development - the expansion of the resource base of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, in order to substantially satisfy Russia's needs in hydrocarbon resources, hydro-biological resources, and other types of strate- gic raw materials; (b) In the sphere of military security, defense, and safekeeping of the state borders of the Russian Federation located in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation - the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federa- tion, including the maintenance of the required combat potential of military groupings under the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and agencies in this region [...]35 In order to achieve these goals, the Russians have created a unique military brigade to be permanently posted in the Arctic, have placed a Russian Federation flag on the Arctic Ocean seabed, have conducted various missile tests, have sailed their nuclear submarines through contested waters and have openly challenged the abilities of other states to enforce their own claims. In response to Russian offensive posturing and the inability of the United States to dissuade security competition in the area, middle and minor powers have begun to use hard power as a means of trying to enforce their sovereignty. Perhaps the best example here is Canada, whose military capabilities are extremely weak, but strong rhetoric and a drastically increased level of high-north military spending since 2006 seems to indicate that the Canadian government cannot rely on its American alliances to protect its interests, and that posturing by states like Russia or even Denmark clearly threaten Canada's national interests. As Norway, Sweden and Denmark have begun to put an emphasis on hard power capabilities to extend or defend northern claims, Canada has done the same. Worth noting as well in the Canadian context is that, while great powers like Russia and the United States can easily defeat any middle or minor power, Canada's capabilities are being either rivalled or surpassed by European states like Norway.36 Canada's realization of the evolving security and environmental climate in the Arctic has compelled changes to its domestic and foreign security policies, each seeking to assert Canadian sovereignty over areas of the Arctic, especially the Northwest Passage. One of the main components of now Prime Minister Harper's 2005-06 campaign was to bolster Arctic security resources, as many Canadians have identified the region as an essential part of Canada's national security and identity.37 Rob Huebert argues: The Harper government has increasingly recognized the significance of maintaining a strong presence in the Arctic and has vigorously begun to improve Canada's northern abilities [...] The Harper government has also made a series of promises to consider- ably expand Canada's northern capability [...] If these promises are implemented, Canada will have significantly improved its ability to control activity in its Arctic.38 In virtually any other area of the world, Canadian national security cannot be divorced from the United States, which is a partial explanation for why Canada has traditionally been considered a middle power since the end of World War II.39 Yet, since the start of American decline, the Canadian government has recognized that its fate in the Arctic will be its own, and not intrinsically tied to the protection of the United States, as the Americans have their own interests in the region and have shown a complete disregard for Canadian claims over the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. As the world moves towards multipolarity, it has become increasingly obvious that the Arctic region represents an area of increased security competition and a potentially conflictual region in the future. Multipolar systems are the most unstable, and history has shown these to produce military conflict due to the natural effects brought by a larger number of self-interested powers vying for power and security. Further, as new great powers begin to emerge, American strategic considerations will be spread so thin that they will be unable to prevent against their eventual loss of hegemony. The largest mistake being made at this time by international security scholars and policymakers is their normal obsession with China, India and latitudinal thinking. The next area of major war is not likely to be the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea, due to traditional security balancing, deterrence and economic interests in each of these areas. Multipolarity naturally brings the possibility of war. Mearsheimer contends that war is far more likely in multipolar systems for three reasons : First, there are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multipolar system. Second, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential for miscalculation is greater in multipolarity : states might think they have the capability to coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not.40 Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the outbreak of war in the near future. That said, as America's influence continues to wane, other states have shown their desire to take full advantage of the U nited S tates' inability to control northern affairs. If the United States does lose its hegemony, which many commentators believe is inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in security calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fray, and two of those states have Arctic borders and a historical legacy of conflict. Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and the United States as great powers, while the other Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power from doing as it pleases. Lastly, miscalculation is evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are both arming for possible Russian aggression, though Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies towards Nordic nations. Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades the probability of northern conflict is ever increasing. The shift to hard power strategies, the effects of climate change, and the decline of the United States all speak to the fact that multipolarity can increase levels of tension and mistrust, thus altering the currently stable nature of Arctic affairs. Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as the system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly difficul t. As such, observers must be mindful of the systemic variables at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics, as changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies.
 * Murray, 12** – Vice President of Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta. He holds a senior fellowship at the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, a research fellowship at the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, and a research fellowship at the University of Alberta’s European Union Centre of Excellence.(Robert, “Arctic politics in the emerging multipolar system: challenges and consequences” The Polar Journal, June, Taylor & Francis)//DH

Arctic conflict risks a nuclear confrontation
Wallace & Staples ‘10 – *Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia, **President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa (Michael, Steven, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”) //J.N.E The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water por t. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with ship- based helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 60 9 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the U nited S tates and the Russia n Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapon s.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly.

That causes extinction
Vestergaard ’10 – visiting fellow with the CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program, researching uranium governance, specialist in nuclear weaponry for DIIS (“Conference on an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Copenhagen, 10-11, 2009”, Danish Institute for International Studies, *note: the document was released in 2010) //J.N.E Global climate consequences of a regional nuclear war a certain number of small weapons will have much great er consequences, both in the number of people killed from the explosions and in the amount of soot produced, than a smaller number of larger bombs with the same total explosive force (Robock et al 2007a ). The new insights into the circulation of the atmosphere have also shown that a limited nuclear war, such as a war between India and Pakistan, where about 100 Hiroshima-size, 15 kt bombs are used, mostly over population centres, would result in the release of about 5 Tg of soot. This soot, mostly from burning cities, would decrease the global temperature by about 1.25 degrees C, over 6-8 years. That is not nuclear winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow (Figs. 2 & 3). The growing season would be shortened by 10 to 20 days in many of the most im - portant grain producing areas in the world, which might completely eliminate some crops that have insufficient time to reach maturity (Fig. 4). An accurate evaluation of the global decrease in food production has yet to be done, but there will be substantial deficits (Helfand 2007). In earlier periods we have seen that a global decrease in grain production of 5% over a couple of years brought about a sharp increase in prices, and that starvation increased in countries that are normally dependent on the import of food. The period of nuclear darkness would cause a much greater decrease in grain production than 5%, and it would continue over many years. The reserves of the most important grains in the world have, in recent years, been corresponding to less than six weeks of consumption (see ref: Wikipedia 2007-2008; World hunger facts 2009). There are currently more than 800 million people in the world who are chronically malnourished. Several hundred million more live in countries which are dependent on imported grain for their survival. In a situation of severe food shortage globally, can we expect that the wealthy countries will accept tightening their belts to such an extent that the poor and undernourished survive these seven years of famine? If not, hundreds of millions of people in many continents, in particular Africa, will die from hunger (Helfand 2007). In the war zone of India and Pakistan it can be expected that 20 million people will die from blast and fire, millions more from the radioactive fallout. Many tens of millions will flee the contaminated areas. And many will die from epidemics and hunger, maybe more than from the bombs. But the greater number of fatalities will occur in countries far away, of those who will succumb to starvation because of the global nuclear darkness (Toon et al 2007a, 2007b). Severe ozone depletion To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone (Mills et al 2008). A study published two years ago by the National Academy of Sciences, using a similar nuclear war scenario involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs, showsozone losses in excess of 20% globally, 25-45% at mid latitudes and 50-70% at northern high latitudes, persisting for five years and with substantial losses continuing for five additional years (Fig. 5). The resulting increases in UV radiation would have serious consequences for human health. Here in Copenhagen we would be advised not to be outdoors for several hours around the middle of the day. The effects on agriculture, on animals, on the economy and on the human population of this unprecedented increase in ultraviolet radiation have not yet been evaluated. The effects would undoubtedly be serious. A //regional nuclear war would result in an unprecedented global catastrophe// I have decided to present this material at this conference because it shows the global consequences of any nuclear war, even a war in which less than one half a per cent of all the nuclear weapons in existence are used. //Nuclear proliferation is a threat to all of us//. //Nuclear weapons in the Arctic zone would increase the danger of a nuclear confrontation//. And, most importantly, it is not sufficient to decrease the number of nuclear weapons to a few hundred. They must be abolished. Also shown for comparison, in the lower panel, is the global average change in downward shortwave radiation for the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the largest volcanic eruption of the 20th century, as compared to the nuclear war scenarios. Figure 1. Change of global average surface air temperature, precipitation, and downward shortwave radiation reaching the surface of the Earth for the 5 Tg ( Robock et al 2006), 50 Tg and 150 Tg cases. DIIS REPORT 20 10:03 49 Figure 2. The decrease in average global temperature after a regional nuclear war with 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons, compared to the development of the temperature over the recent century. The decrease in temperature will be much more pronounced (Robock et al 2007b). Figure 3. Changes in global temperature and precipitation after a regional nuclear war using 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons, producing 5 million tons of soot (Robock et al 2007b). DIIS REPORT 20 10:03 50 Figure 4. Changes in the growing season – frost free days – in the northern and southern hemispheres in the first year after a regional nuclear war using 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons (after Robock et al 2007a). Acknowledgement: PowerPoint graphs made available by Dr Alan Robock at http:// climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/nuclear Figure 5. Time evolution of the total ozone column after a 5 Tg soot injection into the upper troposphere at 30°N latitude. Changes in ozone are given as a per cent devia - tion of the integrated column from the control run, or baseline value, as a function of time since soot injection. The global mean total ozone variation is shown along with zonal average changes at four specific latitudes (as labelled) (Mills et al 2008).

The plan would revitalize US presence in the Arctic that __spills over__ to international influence
NRC 7 – working arm of the United States National Academies, which produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine (National Research Council, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of US Needs,” [] ) mj Economic activity is predicted to increase and move northward as a result of sea-ice retreat. Those deploying fishing fleets, cruise ships, mining, and the associated ore transit ships , as well as petroleum recovery and tanker ship transport, anticipate increased operations in the region. When current orders for ice-strengthened tankers have been filled, the worldwide fleet of these vessels will double in number. Ice retreat increases the cost-effectiveness of using the Northern Sea Route (primarily north of Russia) and the Northwest Passage (primarily north of Canada) for transporting petroleum, ore, and cargo. Both routes include U.S. Arctic waters.The potential for increased human activity in northern latitudes will likely increase the need for the U nited S tates to assert a more active and influential presence in the Arctic not only to protect its territorial interests, but also to //project its presence as a world power// concerned with the security, economic, scientific, and international political issues of the region. Over the past decades the U.S. Coast Guard has not conducted routine patrols in ice-covered waters due to a lack of funding. The growing human presence and increased economic activity in the Arctic will be best served by reinstating patrols in U.S. coastal waters and increasing U.S. presence in international waters of the north. To assert U.S. interests in the Arctic, the nation needs to be able to access various sites throughout the region at various times of the year, reliably and at will. While the southern extent of the Arctic ice pack is thinning and becoming less extensive during the summer, //there is no question that polar icebreakers will be required// for many decades for egress to much of the Arctic Basin. Ice conditions in the U.S. Arctic are among the most variable and occasionally challengingthrough the circum-Arctic. National interests require icebreakers that can navigate the most formidable ice conditions encountered in the Arctic. Recommendation 1: The U nited S tates should continue to project an active and influential presence in the Arctic to support its interests. This requires U.S. government polar icebreaking capability to ensure year-round access throughout the region.

US Arctic leadership generates __allied cooperation__ sufficient to check Russia
(CNN) -- While much of the world is focused on the Russian incursion into the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, another long-term move may allow the former Soviet navy to dominate U.S. interests to the north: the Arctic. The rapid melting of the Arctic Ocean is quickly creating a new variety of challenges that have the potential to cause significant global damage if they remain unaddressed. The Obama administration's policy correctly recognizes that the United States has profoundly important economic and cultural interests in the Arctic but regrettably reveals very little about what the federal government will be doing outside of the science field. While recent U.S. policies either dance around the core issues, or worse, do not acknowledge that they exist, the Russians are taking the lead on Arctic policy. After all, the Arctic is in their backyard, too.Moreover, Russia -- as if to highlight the value they place on their navy and renaissance as a maritime nation -- took control of the strategic Crimean Peninsula, assuring and securing warm waterRussianNavy access to the global commons. In light of these recent events, it would be wise for Washington to seriously consider the economic potential and security vulnerabilities that exist on or near the U.S. Arctic coastline. Overwhelmingly, the U.S. Arctic policy debate echoes past concerns of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Consequently, many in the policy community are pushing a heavy science and no-development agenda to preserve the pristine character of the region. The recently issued Department of Defense Arctic Strategy is a case in point: It talks extensively about the DOD scientific mission and uses the terms "sustainable development" and preservation of the unspoiled area as important national goals. But just saying "no" ignores the fact that the precious Arctic mineral and oil and gas resources will help assure the U nited S tates is able, over time, to achieve and then maintain its energy independence. Science is incredibly important, as is safe and responsible development of the Arctic, but our agencies and scientists need to approach these issues with a greater sense of urgency. Arguably, the science needs to be a component of a detailed national action, but that's only a fraction of good U.S. policy. U.S. Arctic policy should prioritize four things: One: Demonstrate leadership in the Arctic and develop a strategy and policy to match. The U.S. has no leadership in the high north and Russia does, which is a great concern for our allies. Two: Invest ininfrastructure, Navy and Coast Guard to support U.S. security and commercial interests in the Arctic. The key here is to develop the policy that drives those requirements so we are not "late to need." Three: Demonstrate leadership in the maritime domain worldwide -- and not retreat as we are doing by default in the Arctic. Four: Facilitate and further developoffshore natural resources in the high north/Alaska and the national, international, maritime and geopolitical governance structures that will underpin those enterprises. Washington, in less than two years, will assume a leadership role when it becomes Chair for the Arctic Council.Unfortunately, the DOD policy and U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 do not articulate what the U.S. Arctic leadership agenda will entail. The reality is ignoring the issues and choosing not to participate in the Arctic will not make the issues go away. Yes, budgets are challenging, but the Arctic is no different from any other international frontier or global common where the U.S. has interests. We need to protect it and demonstrate leadership in the maritime domain -- not retreat. So, too, our policy makers need to be looking beyond our shores to Moscow, Ottawa, Oslo, Copenhagen, the Arctic Council, international oil companies and Lloyds of London for help in solving this governance challenge. The last thing that any of the Arctic states can afford is to back into a Russian-generated crisis with no resources or a plan. The time is now for more U.S. leadership to ensure the Arctic becomes a safe, secure and prosperous region in which to live and work.
 * Slayton and Rosen 3-14-14** -- research fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-chair of the Hoover Institution's Arctic Security Initiative AND an international and national security lawyer by training, is a senior legal adviser at CNA Corporation (David M.* and Mark E.**, “Another region where the Russian military threatens to dominate the U.S.,” CNN, [])BC

The perception of arctic counterbalancing induces Russian cooperation
The United States devotes much of its diplomatic and military energies to the Middle East today for a very simple reason: The Middle East is the source of much of the world’s energy, and not coincidentally, much of the world’s tensions. Tomorrow’s source of energy reserves and geopolitical tensions may not be the deserts and densely populated urban areas of the Middle East, but rather the icy waters and desolate tundra of the Arctic. Supply and Demand Before we get to the simmering tensions in the Arctic, it’s important to discuss why the United States, Canada, Russia, Europe and others are so interested in the region. First, there is the matter of supply. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic may hold 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil—30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13 percent of undiscovered oil (USGS). About a third of the oil is in Alaskan territory (Carroll). These oil and gas deposits were always there, of course, but today the cost of extracting them is increasingly justifiable due to market realities. Growing demand, along with decreasing and undependable supplies in the Middle East, are conspiring to push energy prices upwards, which is encouraging exploration in the Arctic. The Energy Information Agency forecasts a 20-percent increase in daily world oil consumption by 2030, owing largely to demand in China and India (EIA). Another important factor in the Arctic energy rush relates to shipping. The fabled Northwest Passage, once frozen throughout most of the year, is thawing. “ Opening up the Northwest Passage cuts 4,000 nautical miles off the trip from Europe to Asia,” NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen observes. “You can bet a lot of companies have done that math.” Zone of Peace? Given the Arctic’s vast supply of energy resources and the world’s growing energy demands, it’s neither surprising nor alarming that Arctic nations are beginning to stake their respective claims. What is alarming is how one Arctic nation is going about this. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin expressed his desire in 2010 “ to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation” (Carbonnel). But actions speak louder than words : In 2011, Russia announced plans to deploy two army brigades —10,000 troops— to defend its Arctic claims (AP). U.S. and Canadian fighters intercepted Russian bombers 45 times between 2007 and 2010, up from just eight between 1999 and 2006 (Elliott). In 2009, Moscow announced plans to build a string of military bases along Russia’s northern tier (UPI). In 2008, a Russian general revealed plans to train “troops that could be engaged in Arctic combat missions, ” ominously adding, “Wars these days are won and lost well before they are launched” (AFP). During a 2007 expedition, after Russia provocatively planted its flag under the North Pole, the lead explorer declared, “The Arctic is ours.” In fact, Russia brazenly claimed almost half the Arctic Circle and all of the North Pole in 2001 (Clover and Idov). It seems Putin is far closer to that view today than he is to his 2010 “zone of peace” promises. “Russia intends without a doubt to expand its presence in the Arctic,” he recently boasted. “We are open to dialogue…but naturally, //interests will be hard and consistent// ” (Shuster). In short, Moscow is signaling its seriousness about claiming most of the Arctic as its own. Fundamental Interests All of this is getting the attention of the United States and its Arctic allies. At the end of the Bush administration, the U.S. issued a new Arctic Region Policy, declaring that “The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests” (White House). Similarly, the Obama administration has emphasized that “The United States has an inherent national interest in knowing, and declaring to others with specificity, the extent of our sovereign rights with regard to the U.S. extended continental shelf” (U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project). Together, the U.S. and Canada are conducting missions to map the continental shelf. Demarcating the shelf is vital to determining how the Arctic pie is divided. As my Fraser Institute colleague Alex Moens and I have written elsewhere, “Russia’s outsized Arctic claims rest on a dubious interpretation of an underwater ridge linking to the Russian landmass. Russia argues that this ridge is an extension of its own continental shelf.” Some observers contend that joining the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will help America secure its Arctic claims—and limit Russia’s. Unlike its Arctic neighbors, the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, even though the treaty has support in the military and among leaders from both parties. “The Arctic is changing,” observes Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations from 2007 to 2011. “The most important thing is to become party to the Convention of the Law of the Sea. If we are not party to that treaty, we will not have a seat at the table as this unfolds” (Cavas). Vice President Joseph Biden has argued that UNCLOS “allows us to secure and extend our sovereign rights” (Abrams). The Bush administration’s Arctic policy called on the Senate to pass the treaty “promptly.” Critics, however, worry that the treaty could limit U.S. sovereignty and freedom of action. Zone of Conflict? With or without the treaty, it’s only prudent for the U.S. and its Arctic allies to develop some sort of security component to the Arctic puzzle. “We can’t wish away the security implications,” Rasmussen observes. “An entire side of North America will be much more exposed.” The United States already maintains some 20,000 active-duty forces in Alaska and holds routine exercises in the region. “Northern Edge” exercises, for example, have featured airborne drops, close-air support, port security, harbor defense, supply-route protection and critical-infrastructure protection—just the sort of operations that might be necessary to keep the Arctic and its waterways open (Elmendorf AFB). The U.S. is not alone. Spurred by Russian adventurism, Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay talks about “enlarging the footprint and the permanent…presence we have in the North” (Cummins). Toward that end, Canada is building new bases and conducting annual maneuvers to defend its Arctic territories. “Our government is committed to protecting and asserting Canada’s presence throughout our Arctic,” Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared in 2010 (Comte). Assets from the U.S. 2nd Fleet, U.S. Coast Guard and Danish navy have joined the Canadian military for Arctic maneuvers (Comte). In 2009, Norway led Arctic maneuvers enfolding 13 nations. The scenario: Repel an attack on oil rigs by the fictional country of “Northland,” a thinly disguised euphemism for Russia (Weber). Sweden followed with its own Arctic war games, featuring 12,000 troops. Norway, Sweden and Finland are developing what The Economist magazine calls a “Nordic security partnership” as a hedge against Russian activity in the Arctic. Denmark is standing up an Arctic military command and beefing up its military presence in Greenland. In response to Russia’s Arctic claims, made in a blatant military context, NATO officials envision a “military presence” in the Arctic and have pointedly declared the Arctic a region “of strategic interest to the alliance” (de Hoop Scheffer). One reason a military presence will be necessary is the possibility of accidents caused by drilling and shipping. In addition, competition for Arctic resources could lead to confrontation. Adm. James Stavridis, who serves as NATO’s military commander, concedes that the Arctic could become “a zone of conflict” (UPI). To brace for that possibility and thwart Russia’s Arctic fait accompli, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway—all NATO members and Arctic nations—should follow the Cold War playbook: build up the assets needed to defend their interests, use those assets to deter aggression, and deal with Moscow from a posture of strength and unity. The challenge is to //remain open to cooperation// while //scenarios//. After all, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Even as Putin and his puppets make mischief, Moscow is open to making deals. Russia and Norway, for instance, recently resolved a long-running boundary dispute, paving the way for development in 67,000 square-miles of the Arctic. Moreover, the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway have agreed on Arctic search-and-rescue responsibilities (Cummins). In a world of increasingly integrated markets, we know there is much to gain from Arctic cooperation and much to lose from protracted military standoff. But we also know that dealing naively with Moscow carries a heavy cost—and that integration is a two-way street. “Russian leaders today yearn not for integration,” the Brookings Institution’s Robert Kagan concludes, “but for a return to a special Russian greatness.” In short, Russia is more interested in recreating the autarky of some bygone era than in the shared benefits of globalization. Framework for Partnership //Dealing with Russia is about power//. As Churchill once said of his Russian counterparts, “ There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have //less respect than for weakness// .” //When the message is clear// —or “hard and consistent,” to use Putin’s language— //ture//. When the message is unclear, Russia will take what it can get. Just consider Russia’s contrasting treatment of its neighbors : Moscow blusters about Poland and the Baltic states but keeps its hands off, largely becausethey are protected by the U.S.-NATO umbrella. Conversely, Russia bullies Ukraine, garrisons its troops —uninvited— in Moldova, and occupies Georgian territor y. //The common denominator of these// //unfortunate countries:// //They// //have no U.S. security guarantee//. Russia should be given an opportunity to participate as a responsible partner in Arctic development. But if Russia continues to take Putin’s hard line, the U.S. and its allies are left with few other options than standing together or allowing Russia to divide and conquer. To avoid that, the allies may need to agree among themselves on lines of demarcation, transit routes and exploration rights—and then pool their resources to protect their shared interests. This will require investment in Arctic capabilities. For instance, the U.S. has only three //polar icebreakers//, two of which have exceeded their projected 30-year lifespan (O’Rourke). Russia can deploy 20 icebreakers. “ We have extremely limited Arctic response capabilities ,” explains Adm. Robert Papp, USCG commandant. Noting that the Coast Guard has “the lead role in ensuring Arctic maritime safety, security and stewardship,” Papp urges Congress “to start building infrastructure up there” (Joling and Papp).
 * Dowd 11** – Senior Fellow of the Fraser Institute and Senior Editor of Fraser Insight. In addition to conducting research into defence and security, he has contributed to the Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America Annual Report. Dowd is an adjunct professor at Butler University; was as a founding member of the Sagamore Institute leadership team, where he continues to hold a senior fellow post; and was director of Hudson Institute’s corporate headquarters (Alan, “The Big Chill: Energy Needs Fueling Tensions in the Arctic,” []) zabd

Reliance on foreign icebreakers is undermining the credibility and quality of US polar science leadership
and International Studies (CSIS).(Heather, “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: an American perspective” January, csis.org)//DH
 * Conley, 12** - director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic

Although the United States lacks an overarching Arctic economic development strategy and suffers from insufficient security assets, it does maintain a competitive edge in the field of research and science. Northern Alaska has always been a region of particular interest to scientists with its unique climate, flora, and fauna. The Greenland Ice Sheet Project Two, initiated in 1998 by the Office of Polar Programs of the NSF, provided the world with what was then the deepest ice core ever recovered as well as the clearest outline of climate history.47 The discoveries of this project piqued the interest of the scientific community and made clear that the Arctic is one of the //es// to study climatic changes, global temperatures, sea ice extent, and short-lived climate forcers, such as black carbon and levels of methane. The United States has been at the vanguard of international climate research with established institutions like the National Science Foundation, U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC, part of the NSF),48 the U.S. Geological Survey,49 and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee,50 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,51 and the National Snow and Ice Data Center.52 The National Science Foundation had an annual budget of $6.8 billion for FY 2011, with the Office of Polar Programs receiving $493.4 million and USARC research receiving $1.58 million.53 The USARC has laid out its research goals in its Report on Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research, stressing five main themes: environmental change of the Arctic, Arctic Ocean, and Bering Sea; Arctic human health; civil infrastructure; natural resource assessment; and indigenous languages, cultures, and identities.54 These goals are broad based, and while they may not directly address security concerns, they do have an impact on U.S. Arctic policy because all future decisionmaking related to the Arctic—be it economic development or aligning security assets—is completely dependent on a strong scientific understanding of this fragile milieu. There can never be too much scientific data or understanding about this largely unknown region, and the current level of U.S. science and research in the Arctic is a critical and foundational element of a proactive U.S. leadership model. Unfortunately, strong capabilities as an Arctic science power do not make up for the deficiency in the rest of U.S. coastal and security capabilities. As stated in the Coast Guard’s own report to Congress in 2008, “Although the NSF is a global leader in scientific research, the Coast Guard believes that the NSF would lack the staff and expertise to direct the multi-mission deployment of icebreakers employed for other USCG missions.”55 In addition, the N ational O ceanic and A tmospheric A dministration is unable to collect and provide all the information on weather forecasting, oceanography, and navigational charting requested by the Coast Guard, the industries, and the local communities .56 In fact, the NSF has repeatedly made use of Canadian, Russian, and Swedish icebreakers to transport U.S. scientists in the U.S. Arctic , where U.S. capabilities were nonexistent.57 This kind of arrangement has proven both risky and inefficient. In July 2011, Sweden decided to recall its icebreaker Oden, leased to the NSF every winter since 2006–07, due to worsening ice conditions in the Baltic Sea. This recall left the United States without the technical ability to reach and resupplyMcMurdo station in Antarctica .58 Further examples illustrate U.S. dependence on other nations as a result of its own lack of capabilities. In December 2011, officials from Nome, Alaska, requested a Russian fuel tanker to deliver an emergency shipment when the city was blocked by sea ice. Originally, the Healy was unavailable to assist with this operation as it was returning from a previously scheduled scientific mission.59 However, the Healy is now scheduled to break an ice channel for the tanker once the Russian vessel is cleared to enter the Alaskan port and will facilitate the tanker’s return to open water.60 As U.S. capabilities are stretched between critical missionsand its ongoing yet equally critical scientific work, the need to address these shortfalls in capabilities is urgent, as Alaskan Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell stated in his December 2011 congressional testimony: “Without action, America is putting its national security on the line, and we are going to miss the opportunities of the Arctic while watching other nations advance.”61

Icebreakers are vital to revitalizing US polar sciences leadership – it’s key to understanding the climate
NRC 7 – working arm of the United States National Academies, which produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine (National Research Council, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of US Needs,” [] ) mj

Fundamental advances resulting from polar research have directly benefited society. Polar research led to the identification of the presence and cause of the “ozone hole” and has resulted in coordinated worldwide actions to discontinue the use of chlorofluorocarbons. Understanding how the polar regions affect ocean circulation is leading to a better understanding of global climate. The study of Weddell seals, which dive to great depths and cease breathing for long periods, led to better understanding of how such mammals handle gas dissolved in blood during and after deep diving events. This has contributed to advances in understanding sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). The study of mammals, insects, and plants that endure freezing temperatures, yet prevent the formation of ice crystals in their internal fluids, is aiding in the design of freeze-resistant crops and improved biomedical cryopreservation techniques. The Arctic and Antarctic are natural laboratories whose extreme, relatively pristine environments and geographically unique settings enable research on fundamental phenomena and processes that are //feasible nowhere else//. Today, researchers seek a better understanding of how new ocean crusts form, how organisms adapt to the extremes of temperature and seasonality (light conditions), how ice sheets behave, and how the solar wind and the earth interact. Unexplored, subglacial lakes in the Antarctic that have been sealed from the atmosphere for millions of years are soon to be explored and entered. Beneath the South Pole Station a cubic kilometer of clear ice is being instrumented with 5,000 detectors to observe high-energy neutrinos that may tell us about phenomena such as supernovae. Pristine ice cores that span centuries give direct data about temperature changes and atmospheric gas concentrations in the past. As global climate has garnered worldwide attention, the polar regions have been found to react acutely to fluctuations in climate and temperatures. The 40 percent reductionin Arctic sea- ice thickness over the past four decades is one of the most dramatic examples of recent changes. Because ice tends to reflect solar radiation and water absorbs it, melting in the polar regions can exert a strong influence on both atmospheric climate and ocean circulation. Huge reservoirs of water are held in massive ice sheets and glaciers; substantive release may create major climate and social dislocations. Thus, research in these regions plays a pivotal role in the global Earth system exerting influences of critical importance. Scientists have declared 2007-2008 the International Polar Year. Multinational collaboration and new polar research activities are planned. The health and continued vitality of polar research are intimately linked to the availability of the appropriate infrastructure and logistical support to allow scientists to work in these harsh environments. Access to the polar regions is essential if the United States is to continue to be a //leader in polar science.// To operate reliably and safely in these regions //icebreaking capability//. Icebreakers enable resupply of land-based stations and field camps in the south. The availability of polar icebreakers with greater icebreaking capability would enable important new research in the Southern Ocean in locations where ice is thick. While other assets and platforms such as airplanes and spaceborne sensors are useful tools, surface ground -truth and in situ sampling will not be replaced in the near future. Because there are no land sites in the central Arctic, an icebreaker is an essential platform to support sustained scientific measurements i n the Arctic Ocean. The availability of adequate icebreaking capabilities will be essential to advancing research in both polar regions.

That’s key to adapting to climate change
Ross 7/19/14 – Victoria, San Diego Technology Examiner, “The Arctic holds the key to climate change” [|http://www.examiner.com/article/the-arctic-holds-the-key-to-climate-change //] JV

In a place at the very top of the Northern Hemisphere scientists are collecting the most important samples. Arctic News yesterday reports how devastating the changes have been in the Arctic due to warming waters and ash blown from fires in Alaska and Canada. There is an urgent need to collect data on the changes in the Arctic. Phytoplankton is the key element in the change of the planet as the specks of algae are emitted to the clouds from the basic phytoplankton. This is the key to affect climate swings and it is the key to feeding arctic inhabitant s. A few years ago Kevin Arrigo was in the Chukchi Sea for a research project funded by NASA. He states, “The deeper we went into the ice, the more phytoplankton there were. They reached amazing concentrations, to the point where it was the largest bloom anybody had ever seen anywhere in the world’s oceans. And it was less than three feet of ice.” Why is this research so important? What is its connection to Climate Change on the planet? Bob Pickart, the lead physical oceanographer, for a project funded by the National Science Foundation in the Chukchi Sea this spring had the goal to gather hundreds of water samples. The samples contain the nutrients which spur the growth of the phytoplankton. Once it begins it goes up the food chain to all inhabitants in the Chukchi Sea and Arctic- both ocean and land. This is the basis for the ecosystem. When phytoplankton has light, it can bloom and blooms were found three feet deep in the ice. Arrigo says that, “Productivity has been shifting earlier and earlier, because the ice is melting earlier and earlier. But now the bloom — the productivity — is not even waiting for the ice to melt.” This presents a new set of circumstances. Arrigo is concerned that if it’s coming earlier for animals who have set their biological clock : “What’s going to happen? Are they going to produce their offspring at a point when the bloom’s already happened, it’s too late, there’s no food in the water?” The imbalance of ice melting more quickly and earlier each year changes the actions of polar bears and other inhabitants to hunt on the disappearing solid ice for the fish. The phytoplankton will transmit the algae upward to the atmosphere earlier and cause an imbalance in a chain of effects set from the past decades of ten thousand years. The Arctic is particularly vulnerable to warming due to seas in the Arctic Ocean which are often shallow and covered by sea ice that is disappearing rapidly. The Arctic Ocean acts like a trap capturing heat carried in by the Gulf Stream, which brings in ever warmer water and the land around it is affected with melting ice. Of all the heat trapped on Earth by greenhouse gases, 90 percent goes into oceans, while the remaining 10 percent goes to the Arctic ice sheets. In the US President Obama has created a task force of 26 officials from across the country to address the issue. He announced a nearly $1 billion National Disaster Resilience Competition in June. Obama told members of the task force at a meeting this past Wednesday that, "We are here because we know that climate change is an undeniable scientific fact." For the hard hit Alaska tribes facing ice melts and rising sea levels, the Interior Department is setting aside $10 million dollars. The question of how the Arctic region will change and with it the planet finds its answer in the Chukchi Sea where the Arctic life from plant blooms lead to its inhabitants. The need for study and answers with technology based equipment will unravel the secrets of the phytoplankton in the Arctic for mankind of the planet.

Warming is real, anthropogenic and risks extinction
Costello 11 –, Anthony, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Mark Maslin, Department of Geography, University College London, Hugh Montgomery, Institute for Human Health and Performance, University College London, Anne M. Johnson, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Paul Ekins, Energy Institute, University College London [“Global health and climate change: moving from denial and catastrophic fatalism to positive action” May 2011 vol. 369 no. 1942 1866-1882 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society] Advocacy about the health consequences will ensure that climate change is a high priority. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change was set up in 1992 to ensure that nations worked together to minimize the adverse effects, but McMichael and Neira noted that, in preparation for the Copenhagen conference in December 2009, only four of 47 nations mentioned human health as a consideration [1]. With business as usual, __global warming caused by__ rising greenhouse gas ( __GHG) emissions____will threaten mass populations____through__ increased transmission of some __infections__, __heat stress__ , __food and water insecurity__ , increased deaths from more frequent and extreme climate events, threats to shelter and security, and through population migration [2]. On the one hand it is necessary in the media to counter climate change sceptics and denialists, but on the other __it is__ also __important not to allow climate catastrophists __, who tell us it is all too late, to deflect us from pragmatic __ and positive action. ____Catastrophic scenarios are possible in the long__ er __term__, and effective action will be formidably difficult, but evidence suggests that __we__ do __have__ the tools, __the time and__ the __resources to bring__ about the __changes needed for climate stability__. 2. Climate change evidence and denial Given the current body of evidence, __it is surprising that__ global __warming and__ its causal __relationship with__ atmospheric __GHG__ pollution __is disputed____any more than the relationship between__ acquired immune deficiency syndrome ( __AIDS) and__ human immunodeficiency virus ( __HIV__ ) infection, __or__ lung __cancer and cigarette smoking__. The basic principles that determine the Earth’s temperature are, of course, relatively simple. Some of the short-wave solar radiation that strikes the Earth is reflected back into space and some is absorbed by the land and emitted as long-wave radiation (heat). Some of the long-wave radiation is trapped in the atmosphere by ‘greenhouse gases’, which include water vapour, carbon dioxide and methane. Without GHGs the Earth would be on average 33◦C colder. Over the last 150 years, since the Industrial Revolution, humans have been adding more carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. The result is that the Earth’s atmosphere, ocean and land are indeed warming—due to increased atmospheric ‘greenhouse gas’ concentrations [3]. Gleick et al. [4], from the US National Academy of Sciences, wrote a letter to Science stating ‘ __There is compelling, comprehensive, and consistent objective evidence that humans are changing the climate in ways that threaten__ our __societies__ and the ecosystems on which we depend’. The most recent __report__ by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [5], amounting to nearly 3000 pages of detailed review and analysis of published research, also declares that the __scientific uncertainties__ of global warming __are__ essentially __resolved__. This report states that there is clear evidence for a 0.75◦C rise in global temperatures and 22 cm rise in sea level during the twentieth century. The IPCC synthesis also predicts that __global temperatures could rise further__ by between 1.1◦C and 6.4◦C by 2100, and sea level could rise by between 28 and 79 cm, or more if the melting of Greenland and Antarctica accelerates. In addition, weather patterns will become less predictable and the occurrence of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, heat waves and droughts, will increase. There is also strong evidence for ocean acidification driven by more carbon dioxide dissolving in the oceans [6]. Given the current failure of international negotiations to address carbon emission reductions, and that atmospheric warming lags behind rises in CO2 concentration, there is concern that global surface temperature will rise above the supposedly ‘safe limit’ of 2◦C within this century. Each doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration alone is expected to produce 1.9–4.5◦C of warming at equilibrium [7]. Of course, climate modelling is an extremely complex process, and uncertainty with projections relating to future emissions trajectories means that the time scale and magnitude of future climate change cannot be predicted with certainty [8]. These uncertainties are magnified when future climate predictions are used to estimate potential impacts. For example, the environmental impacts of climate change are also uncertain, but could underestimate such impacts because they detrimentally interact with habitat loss, pollution and loss of biodiversity due to other causes. There is also the additional problem that switching from biome to biome may not be directly reversible. For example, rainforest recycles a huge amount of water so it can survive a significant amount of aridification before it burns and is replaced by savannah. But the region then has to get much wetter before rainforest can return, as there is greatly reduced water cycling in savannah [9]. In the policy arena, further uncertainty surrounds the desire for international agreements on emission cuts, and the possible routes to such agreement and implementation. The feasible speed of technological innovation in carbon capture and provision of renewable/low-carbon energy resources is also uncertain. __Denying the__ causes or the current weight of __evidence__ for anthropogenic climate change __is irrational__, just as the existence of ‘uncertainties’ should not be used to deny the need for proportionate action, when such uncertainties could underestimate the risks and impact of climate change. There is no reason for inaction and there are many ways we can use our current knowledge of climate change to improve health provision for current and future generations. 3. Catastrophism At the other end of the scale are doom-mongers who predict catastrophic population collapse and the end of civilization. In the early nineteenth century, the French palaeontologist Georges Cuvier first addressed catastrophism and explained patterns of extinction observed in the fossil record through catastrophic natural events [10]. We know now of five major extinctions: the Ordovician–Silurian extinction (439 million years ago), the Late Devonian extinction (about 364 million years ago), the Permian–Triassic extinction (about 251 million years ago), the End Triassic extinction (roughly 199 million to 214 million years ago) and the Cretaceous– Tertiary extinction (about 65 million years ago). These mass extinctions were caused by a combination of plate tectonics, supervolcanism and asteroid impacts. The understanding of the mass extinctions led Gould & Eldredge [11] to update Darwin’s theory of evolution with their own theory of punctuated equilibrium. Many scientists have suggested that the current human-induced extinction rates could be as fast as those during these mass extinctions [12,13]. For example, one study predicted that 58 per cent of species may be committed to extinction by 2050 due to climate change alone [14], though this paper has been criticized [15,16]. Some people have even suggested that **__human extinction may not be a remote risk__** [17–19]. Sherwood & Huber [7] point to continued __heating effects__ that __could make the world__ largely __uninhabitable__ by humans and mammals within 300 years. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature (used because it reflects both the ambient temperature and relative humidity of the site), is surprisingly similar across diverse climates and never exceeds 31◦C. They suggest that if it rose to 35◦C, which never happens now but would at a warming of 7◦C, __hyperthermia in humans__ and other mammals __would occur as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible,__ therefore __making__ many __environments uninhabitable.__

Research-driven adaptation strategies build in __resilience__ to prevent total ecosystem collapse

 * Doney, 8 -** Senior Scientist Marine Chemistry & Geochemistry Department Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (Scott, **“**The Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act: H.R. 4174” Written testimony presented to the Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, United States House of Representatives6/5, []

Major gaps exist in our current scientific understanding, limiting our ability to forecast the consequences of ocean acidification and //hindering the development of adaptation approaches// for marine resource managers. Thus far, most of the elevated CO2 response studies on marine biota, whether for calcification, photosynthesis or some other physiological measure , have been short-term laboratory or mesocosm experiments ranging in length from hours to weeks. Chronic exposure to increased CO2 may have complex effects on the growth and reproductive success of calcareous and non-calcareous plants and animals and could induce possible adaptations that are not observed in short term experiments. Our present understanding also stems largely from experiments on individual organisms or a species in isolation; consequently, the response of populations and communities to more realistic gradual changes is largely unknown. Other aspects of ocean biogeochemistry may be strongly influenced by rising CO2 levels. Recent experiments with one of the most abundant types of phytoplankton, Synechococcus, showed significantly elevated photosynthesis rates under warmer, high CO2 conditions. Elevated CO2 also enhanced nitrogen fixation rates (production of biologically useful nutrients from dissolved nitrogen gas) for a key tropical marine cyanobacteria, which would in effect fertilize the surface ocean and offset predicted reductions in tropical biological production due to climate warming and stratification. Further, a major but underappreciated consequence of ocean acidification will be broad alterations of inorganic and organic seawater chemistry beyond the carbonate system. Acidification will affect the biogeochemical dynamics of calcium carbonate, organic carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus in the ocean as well as the seawater chemical speciation of trace metals, trace elements and dissolved organic matter. A fully-integrated research programwith in-water and remote sensing observing systems on multiple-scales, laboratory, mesocosm (large volumes of seawater either in tanks or plastic bags), and field process studies, and modeling approachesis required to //med management strategies// //that address how humans might// //best mitigate or// //adapt// //to these long-term changes//. This program should emphasize how changes in the metabolic processes at the cellular level will be manifested within the ecosystem or community structure, and how they will influence future climate feedbacks. A program should include the following components: Systematic monitoring system with high resolution measurements in time and space of atmospheric and surface water carbon dioxide partial pressure (pCO2), total dissolved inorganic carbon, alkalinity, and pH to validate model predictions and provide the foundations for interpreting the impacts of acidification on ecosystems; In regions projected to undergo substantial changes in carbonate chemistry, tracking of abundances and depth distributions of key calcifying and non-calcifying species at appropriate temporal and spatial scales to be able to detect possible shifts and distinguish between natural variability and anthropogenic forced changes; Standardized protocols and data reporting guidelines for carbonate system perturbation and calcification experiments; Manipulative laboratory experiments to quantify physiological responses including calcification and dissolution, photosynthesis, respiration, and other sensitive indices useful in predicting CO2 tolerance of ecologically and economically important species; New approaches to investigate address long-term subtle changes that more realistically simulate natural conditions; Manipulative mesocosm and field experiments to investigate community and ecosystem responses (i.e., shifts in species composition, food web structure, biogeochemical cycling and feedback mechanisms) to elevated CO2 and potential interactions with nutrients, light and other environmental variables; Integrated modeling approach to determine the likely implications of ocean acidification processes on marine ecosystems and fisheries including nested models of biogeochemical processes and higher trophic-level responses to address ecosystem-wide dynamics such as competition, predation, reproduction, migration, and spatial population structure; Robust and cost effective methods for measuring pH, pCO2, and dissolved total alkalinity on moored buoys, ships of opportunity, and research vessels, floats and gliders; Studies on the human dimensions of ocean acidification including the socio-economic impacts due to damaged fisheries and coral reefs; Assessment of potential adaptation strategies needed by resource managers including reducing other human stresses (over-fishing, habitat destruction, pollution) to //increase// //ecosystem// //resiliency//as well as local-scale mitigation efforts.

Antarctic science is the vital internal link to global science diplomacy
Collins 11 – Center for Global Sustainability Studies and major sponsor of the 22nd Pacific Science Congress (June 2011, “Founded on science, world cooperation in Antarctica a model for meeting climate, other challenges,” [] ) mj

__The success of world co-operation based on science__ and practiced since the Cold War __by__ __nations operating in Antarctica offers a model__ to humanity __as it confronts challenges__ to common interests __like climate change, biodiversity loss and overfishing__, says the editor of a new book on science diplomacy. Since the end of the Second World War __science has become an important tool of diplomacy, not only for issues involving environmental management, but for peace in the world we live in__, says Paul Berkman, former Head of the Arctic Ocean Geopolitics Programme, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, UK, and Research Professor at the Bren School of Environmental Science & Management at the University of California Santa Barbara. Says Dr. Berkman, keynote speaker at an international conference on Antarctica being held in Malaysia: "For half a century__, it has become increasingly obvious that we face planetary-scale phenomena that cannot be solved by any one nation or region__, nor solved quickly. Today and forever after, __national and international interests need to find the type of balance practiced today__ under the Antarctic Treaty." In a new book published by the Smithsonian Institution, Science Diplomacy: Antarctica, Science and the Governance of International Spaces, Dr. Berkman writes: "The two world wars of the 20th Century underscored animosity on a global scale. In contrast, __reflecting unparalleled international cooperation, institutions have evolved since 1945 to prevent or resolve disputes transcending national boundaries.__ Most of these institutions relate to issues that cross national boundaries. However, there is a suite of institutions that has emerged to manage regions beyond the reach of national jurisdiction in the high seas (1958), Antarctica (1959), outer space (1967), and the deep sea (1971)." __The origin, development and success of the Antarctic Treaty offers hope and inspiration applicable to the challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss, overfishing and a host of similarly vexing environmental problems__, he writes. __"Any lessons we are able to glean from the Antarctic experience will be relevant not only to those interested in traditional international spaces but also to those in search of effective approaches to governing an expanding range of issues (e.g., climate change)…that are destined to become even more important in the future."__ "Perhaps __the broadest legacy of the__ first 50 years of the (__Antarctic Treaty) is the development__ of a suite __of practices that are useful in any effort to ensure that interactions between science and policy produce positive results__ for both __communities in addressing a wide range of large-scale issues__ for the benefit of humankind and the world we inhabit." "The parts of the planet that fall under national jurisdiction constitute just 30% of the world," says Dr. Berkman. "We're still in infancy in terms of how to work as a civilization. __The extent of humanity's common interests and inter-connectedness has only become truly apparent in the second part of the 20th Century__." __The fundamental role of science in international governance as exemplified in the Antarctic Treaty includes such responsibilities as monitoring and assessing change over time and space, the discovery of new beneficial health and other products derived from biological resources, and prioritizing and framing issues for consideration.__ "__Science is free of such time-bound blinders and therefore is fundamental to environment-related diplomacy at a global scale__," says Dr. Zakri, who co-chairs as well the Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT). "The world is changing always. __Science provides the common language, culture and foundation for nations and people to work together in decision-making on shared global interests."__

Science diplomacy solves all impacts
Federoff 8 – professor of biology at Penn State University known for her research on biology and life sciences, president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) (April 2008, “International Science and Technology Cooperation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Research and Science Education,” Committee on Science and Technology, [] ) mj

Chairman Baird, Ranking Member Ehlers, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss science diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State. The U. S. is recognized globally for its leadership in science and tech nology. Our scientific strength is both a tool of ``soft power''- -part of our strategic diplomatic arsenal-- and a basis for creating partnerships with countries as they move beyond basic economic and social development. Science diplomacy is a central element of the Secretary's transformational diplomacy initiative, because science and technology are essential to achieving stability and strengthening failed and fragile states. S &T advances have immediate and enormous influence on national and global economies, and thus on the international relations between societies. Nation states, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations are largely shaped by their expertise in and access to intellectual and physical capital in science , technology, and engineering. Even as S&T advances of our modern era provide opportunities for economic prosperity, some also challenge the relative position of countries in the world order, and influence our social institutions and principles. America must remain at the forefront of this new world by maintaining its technological edge, and leading the way internationally through science diplomacy and engagement. The Public Diplomacy Role of Science Scienceby its nature facilitates diplomacy because it strengthens political relationships, embodies powerful ideals, and creates opportunities for all. The global scientific community embraces principles Americans cherish : transparency, meritocracy, accountability, the objective evaluation of evidence, and broad and frequently democratic participation. Science is inherently democratic, respecting evidence and truth above all. Science is also a common global language, able to bridge deep political and religious divides. Scientists share a common language. Scientific interactions serve to keep open lines of communication and cultural understanding. As scientists everywhere have a common evidentiary external reference system, members of ideologically divergent societies can use the common language of science to cooperatively address both domestic and the increasingly trans-national and global problems confronting humanity in the 21st century. There is a growing recognition that science and technology will increasingly drive the successful economies of the 21st century. Using Science Diplomacy to Achieve National Security Objectives The welfare and stability of countries and regions in many parts of the globe require a concerted effort by the developed world to address the causal factors that render countries fragile and cause states to fail. Countries that are unable to defend their people against starvation, or fail to provide economic opportunity, are susceptible to extremist ideologies, autocratic rule, and abuses of human rights. As well, the world faces common threats, among them climate change, energy and water shortages, public health emergencies, environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity, and religious extremism. These threats can undermine the national security of the United States, both directly and indirectly. Many are blind to political boundaries, becoming regional or global threats. The United States has no monopoly on knowledge in a globalizing world and the scientific challenges facing humankind are enormous. Addressing these common challenges demands common solutions and necessitates scientific cooperation, common standards, and common goals. Wemust increasingly harness the power of American ingenuity in science and technology through strong partnerships with the science community in both academia and the private sector, in the U.S. and abroad among our allies, to advance U.S. interests in foreign policy. There are also important challenges to the ability of states to supply their populations with sufficient food. The still-growing human population, rising affluence in emerging economies, and other factors have combined to create unprecedented pressures on global prices of staples such as edible oils and grains. Encouraging and promoting the use of contemporary molecular techniques in crop improvement is an essential goal for U.S. science diplomacy. An essential part of the war on terrorism is a war of ideas. The creation of economic opportunity can do much more to combat the rise of fanaticism than can any weapon. The war of ideas is a war about rationalism as opposed to irrationalism. Science and technology put us firmly on the side of rationalism by providing ideas and opportunities that improve people's lives. We may use the recognition and the goodwill that science still generates for the United States to achieve our diplomatic and developmental goals. Additionally, the Department continues to use science as a means to reduce the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and prevent what has been dubbed ` brain drain .' Through cooperative threat reduction activities, former weapons scientists redirect their skills to participate in peaceful, collaborative international research in a large variety of scientific fields. In addition, new global efforts focus on improving biological, chemical, and nuclear security by promoting and implementing best scientific practices as a means to enhance security, increase global partnerships, and create sustainability.

es and real estate with an estimated $1 trillion in hydrocarbons .[1] With the opening of two major shipping routes, the North Sea route and the Northwest Passage, the potential for economic competition is fierce, especially among the eight members of the Arctic counci l: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Sweden, Russia, and the United States.[2] President Putin made statements this week concerning Russia’s national interests in the Arctic region: chiefly, militarization and the preparation of support elements for commercial shipping routes .[3] The Russian President called for full government funding for “socio-economic development” from 2017-2020, including a system of Russian naval bases that would be home to ships and submarines allocated specifically for the defense of national interests that involve the protection of Russian oil and gas facilities in the Arctic.[4] Russia is also attempting to accelerate the construction of more icebreakers to take part in its Arctic strategy .[5] The Russian Federation recently staked a territorial claim in the Sea of Okhotsk for 52,000 square kilometers,[6] and is currently preparing an Arctic water claim for 1.2 million square kilometers.[7] The energy giant owns 43 of the approximate 60 hydrocarbon deposits in the Arctic Circle.[8] With Russian energy companies already developing hydrocarbon deposits and expanding border patrols on its Arctic sea shelf (in place by July 1, 2014),[9] Putin is actively pursuing a strong approach to the Arctic region. Russian oil fields, which significantly contribute to the country’s revenue, are in decline – forcing Russian oil companies to actively explore the Arctic region.[10] While the U.S. Defense Secretary called for a peaceful and stable Arctic region with international cooperation, the Arctic has created increased militarization efforts, particularly by Russia. Already the Arctic has seen powerful warships of Russia’s Northern Fleet, strategic bomber patrols, and airborne troop exercises.[11] In fact, Russian military forces have been permanently stationed in the Arctic since summer 2013.[12] According to a source in the Russian General Staff, a new military command titled Northern Fleet – Joint Strategic Command, will be created and tasked to protect Russian interests in its Arctic territories; a strategy that was approved in 2009.[13] Furthermore, weapons developers are being tasked with creating products that can face the harsh Arctic environment. According to an RT report, “ Putin ordered the head of the Russian arms industry , Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, to concentrate the efforts on creation of Arctic infrastructure for the soonest deployment of troops. Rogozin reported that all Russian weapons systems can be produced with special features needed in the extreme North and the weapons companies were ready to supply such arms to the Defense Ministry.”[14] The “Arctic infrastructure” that Rogozin refers to will include Navy and Border Guard Service bases.[15] These bases are part of Putin’s aim to strengthen Russian energy companies and military positions in the Arctic region. In 2013, a formerly closed down base was reopened in the Novosibirsk Islands and is now home to 10 military ships and four icebreakers – a move that Reuters called “a demonstration of force.”[16] The Defense Ministry is also planning on bringing seven airstrips in the Arctic back to life .[17] Russia’s militarization in the Arctic region is only a part of its increasing activity throughout the globe. Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said, “ It’s crucially important for us to set goals for our national interests in this region. If we don’t do that, we will lose the battle for resources which means we’ll also lose in a big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independen ce.”[18] On the contrary, Aleksandr Gorban, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry is quoted saying that a “war for resources”[19] in the Arctic will never happen. But what was once a more hands-off region of the world that provided international cooperation and stability is now turning into a race for sovereignty and resources claims – as evidenced not only by Russia’s increasing military presence, but also Canada and the United States. Canada is now allocating part of its defense budget towards armed ships that will patrol its part of the Arctic Circle,[20] while the United States has planned a strategy of its own. In addition to conducting military exercises with other Arctic nation members, the U.S. Navy has proposed a strategy titled The United States Navy Arctic Roadmap for 2014 to 2030 that was released in February 2014. The 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, cited in the Arctic Roadmap, provides the Navy’s two specific objectives for the Arctic: 1) advance United States’ security interests; and 2) strengthen international cooperation.[21] According to the strategy, the Navy’s role will primarily be in support of search and rescue, law enforcement, and civil support operations.[22] However, this may grow to a more militarized strategy depending on the U.S. government’s view of Russia’s increased military activity in the Arctic region over the next few years. In either case, the U.S. is falling behind in Arctic preparation. It has very few operational icebreakers for the Arctic region where its only primary presence is seen through nuclear submarines and unmanned aerial vehicles, according to an RT article.[23] Until 2020, the Navy will primarily use its submarines and limited air assets in the Arctic, while its mid-term and far-term strategy emphasizes personnel, surface ships, submarines, and air assets that will be prepared for Arctic conditions and operations.[24] Despite its mid and long-term strategy, the U.S. will already be lagging in establishing a military presence to compete with Russia’s, who already has strategies in motion until 2020 and later. Last month, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for a united Canadian-U.S. counterbalance to Russia’s Arctic presence, pointing out “they have been aggressively reopening military bases.”[25] While the U.S. cannot legitimately criticize Putin for opening military bases and simultaneously avoid blatant hypocrisy, it is worth noting that Russia is developing a strong military presence in a potentially competitive region. //to// be the first established dominant force in a new region that will host economic competition and primary shipping lanes, albeit in a harsh environment that makes it difficult to extract resources. Nicholas Cunningham aptly stated “ both Russia and the West fear losing out to the other in the far north, despite what appears to be a small prize.”[ 26] Although the Arctic holds a mass of the world’s oil and gas deposits, the extreme environment and remote location makes it difficult to produce energy quickly and efficiently. Despite this, the Russian Federation is focused on developing disputed hydrocarbon areas that it claims are part of the country’s continental shelf. In addition, Russia is allocating funds and forces to the Arctic to protect its interests. While the U.S. is currently lacking in natural resource development and exploitation in the Arctic Circle, it desires to display a show of strength in the cold region to compete with potential Russian domination and influence. But because the Defense Department faces constant budget cuts, preparing an Arctic naval force will be slow and difficult. For now, the United States can only show strength through nuclear submarines and drone technology. Putin and the Russian Federation are laying disputed claims to territories both inside and outside the Arctic while creating the foundation for a potential military buildup in the Arctic – provided that the U.S. and Canada can even allocate sufficient budgets for Arctic military expansion. One thing is sure: if the Arctic region continues to melt and open up vital shipping lanes, there must be international cooperation to provide security and rescue elements for commercial shipping. Since Russia has significant territorial claims and the most coastlines in the Arctic Circle, it would be natural for the Russian Federation to have a wide security presence in the region, but this must be coupled with international cooperation in commercial shipping lanes and by providing support elements, such as search and rescue. The U nited S tates will not be able to fully compete with a country that is heavily investing in the Arctic region – particularly due to budget constraints and lack of Arctic-prepared vessels. If the U.S. desires to limit Russian influence and territorial claims, it must do so by partnering with other members of the Arctic council – not by entering into a military buildup simply to dominate Russia in the Arctic.

Expanding militarization risks conflict among multiple rising Arctic powers
The Arctic, always before on the frigid edges of the international imagination, is becoming a hot topic in world affairs, particularly in Asia, because of its virtually untapped resources and increasing strategic importance. In 2012, the amount of cargo transported through the region more than doubled, and in May 2013 the Arctic Council , traditionally membered by Europe’s Nordic countries, along with Russia, Canada, and the US, granted observer status to China, Japan, India, South Korea, Singapore, and Italy , a reminder that climate change is opening the Arctic to wider use and commercial exploitation, especially by Asian interests. Indeed, a Chinese shipping company sent that country’s first commercial voyage through the Arctic in September 2013. And Russia is negotiating with Korean shippers about using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for energy shipments. These developments are already bringing the Arctic and Asian security agendas together, and in the process changing Asia’s strategic boundaries and planning. Beijing officials believe that by the end of the decade five to fifteen percent of their country’s international trade, mainly container traffic, will use the NSR. With plans to put a second icebreaker into service this year and launch three scientific expeditions by 2015, China’s interest in the Arctic has taken a major step forward during the last year. After the council meeting in May, Yu Zhengasheng, chairman of the Political Consultative Conference, visited Finland, Sweden, and Denmark to increase general trade and cooperation with those countries, particularly in the Arctic, and Beijing announced plans to expand its polar research, in collaboration with Nordic research centers, with the aim of crafting better climate-change policies. State-owned Chinese businesses have also rolled out a series of related energy deals, including one plan to begin oil exploration off Iceland’s southeast coast and another to finance a major international mining project at Greenland’s Isua iron-ore field. China National Petroleum Corporation, which last year signed a major long-term deal to buy oil from the Russian state-owned company Rosneft, has also agreed to become the “anchor customer” of the liquefied natural gas project run by Novatek, an independent Russian gas producer, on the Yamal Peninsula, in northwestern Siberia, which stretches into the Arctic. China is not the only Asian nation displaying heightened interest in the Arctic. According to an article last May in the Straits Times, “Singapore’s ‘Arctic diplomacy’ is driven primarily by an ambition to exploit an emerging market niche in which it sees itself as a technological and expertise leader.” And because of its rapidly accelerating energy requirements, India too has been forced to look to the Arctic for possible relief. Along with China, India had an Arctic research station in place in Norway in advance of the Arctic Council decision, and the New Delhi government is looking to buy or build an icebreaker. Voices in the Indian media, such as Shastri Ramachandaran, writing in the Daily News and Analysis of Mumbai, have noted that if the country wants to be seen as a viable contender for membership in the UN Security Council it must become much more active diplomatically in the “behind the scenes exercises to shape the future of the Arctic.” An Indian upgrade in the Arctic would also check China’s. As Iftikhar Gilani warned recently in the same newspaper, if India does not develop an Arctic policy that restrains China, it is “heading for near diplomatic disaster.” Thus, beyond purely commercial considerations of trade and access to energy sources, classic geopolitical strategic rivalries and identity politics play no small role in driving the policies of states interested in the Arctic. But these analyses also show how a fusion or at least an overlap of the Asian and Arctic security agendas is clearly occurring. It is partly because of geopolitical strategic rivalries such as that between India and China, but also because of a race for its rich resources and its key global location, that the Arctic is edging onto the international front burner. A surge in commercial trade coincides with what might be called the growing securitization of the Arctic, namely attempts to place all discussions about the Arctic under the framework of national security, a trend that implies a //further emphasis on military instruments of power// and implies military threats by interested parties to secure their Arctic interests. Every major analysis of the Arctic concedes the possibility of confrontation there. One possible //flashpoint// is the current //tension between Russia and China// over exploitation of the region. On February 27, 2013, President Vladimir Putin warned an expanded session of his Ministry of Defense Collegium that Russia confronted military threats from other states’ growing militarization in the Arctic. And in September, Russian forces occupied the New Siberian Islands in the Asian side of the region to defend against undefined threats, while also carrying out extensive military exercises on the European side. Putin singled out the Arctic because of its huge mineral and energy endowment. A March 2012 article by Sergei Konovalov in the military analysis supplement of the Moscow newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that Russia believes energy shortages caused by Middle Eastern instability will force major countries to look ever more to the Arctic, including disputed territories that Russia claims. “Therefore the Russian military grouping in the Arctic will be built up at an accelerated rate in 2012 for the purpose of protecting potential hydrocarbon deposits and Russian Federation territory in the zone of the Arctic Ocean.” Russia’s 2009 National Security Strategy openly listed the Arctic as one particular area of danger as other powers may attempt to forcibly seize Russia’s energy holdings there. Threats about the Arctic such as those emanating from Moscow have been echoed in Europe and even in Asia. The British defense minister, Philip Hammond, for instance, cites the threats stemming from the militarization of the Arctic in his opposition to spending cuts in defense. Norway worries about Russian militarization in the High North despite a 2010 agreement between the two countries delimiting exploration on the European side of the Arctic. Canada has also been vocal in responding to Russia’s aggressive policies. As far back as 2009 and 2010, China has disputed any claims of sovereignty in the Arctic waters beyond the twelve-mile zone granted to littoral countries who have signed the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. In a challenge to Russian territorial claims in the region, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo of the Chinese Navy stated in March 2010 that “the Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.” Such objections are hardly just a matter of principle. Yin went on to say that he believed the current scramble for the Arctic encroaches on China’s interests, and that exploitation of the Arctic “will become a future mission of the navy .”
 * Blank, 14** - Stephen J. Blank is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council; served as the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base (Stephen, “Enter Asia: The Arctic Heats Up” World Affairs Journal, March/April, [|http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/enter-asia-arctic-heats)//DH]

Claims of Arctic cooperation don’t account for the decline in U.S. leadership which makes great power war likely
The Arctic in the unipolar moment One of the cornerstones of America's unipolar moment has been the remarkable decline in interstate conflict. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system has not been on the verge of any major war, nor have great powers aggressively pursued policies that would balance against American power in a way that would be taken seriously. According to many scholarly studies, the world since the end of the Cold War has become far more secure in the interstate sense, and security and defence policies of states are now preoccupied more with human- centric and intrastate variables than anything else. Though it is difficult to deny that the world has become more stable at the systemic level, the role of hard power and military capabilities did not disappear with the Soviet Union; instead, the use of militarism to achieve national goals in the unipolar moment greatly decreased as a direct result of the values and grand strategy of the U nited S tates. The impact of a unipolar systemic arrangement on state behaviour is best explained by the hegemonic stability theory.18 According to this theory, a unipolar structure is able to pacify the relations of states because there is recognition of the hegemon's ability to control or intervene in conflicts that may threaten its power, or the order of the system. Wohlforth summarizes the basic precept of hegemonic stability theory by contending: The theory stipulates that especially powerful states ("hegemons") foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisfied state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be [...] If the system is unipolar, the great power hierarchy should be much more stable than any hierarchy lodged within a system of more than one pole. Because unipolarity is based on a historically unprecedented concentration of power in the United States, a potentially important source of great power conflict - hegemonic rivalry - will be missing .19 It is essential to note two things about the status of the United States as systemic hegemon throughout the immediate post-Cold War era - first, that its preponderance of power in every area of capability measurement created a stable and less tense system in which states were able to interact; and second, that the United States' time as hegemon has fostered the growth of multilateral institutions and agreements rather than a bullying type of unipolarity.20 From a systemic standpoint, it would seem that there is little reason to be concerned about military aggression, arms racing and distrustful competition in the modern system, but one vital concern to note is that much of the unipolar and hegeomic stability literature completely ignores the role of the Arctic in state security calculations. Throughout an era of institutional binding, regional integration, humanitarianism and soft power growth, the competition for the Arctic was following much of the same pattern, with states preferring to make their claims in institutional or legal settings. Yet, as the unipolar moment has started to decline, and multipolarity is on the horizon, the competition in the circumpolar region has taken on a very different tone. Competing claims over Arctic territories, such as the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea and other maritime boundaries, and the use of the region as a space for military exercises are by no means new and they have not come to the forefront of the strategic security agendas of states since the post-9/11 era. Rather, throughout the Cold War, the Arctic was a realm of constant supervision, not because either superpower wanted to develop the region, but more because of the mutual fear each side had of offensive attacks being launched over the pole. Even throughout the unipolar moment, the Arctic has been a space for sovereignty competition, but the nature of the competition had been mostly legal, institutional or soft power focused .21 Worth noting as well is the very complex nature of reasons for state interests in the Arctic. Mark Nuttall effectively summarizes the complexities of the high north as he claims: In the post-Cold War world [the Arctic] is seen as a natural scientific laboratory, under- stood as a homeland for indigenous peoples, a place of sovereignty conflicts, an emerging hydrocarbon province with which the world is coming to think of as one of the last major frontiers for oil and gas, and a region of dramatic environmental change.22 Though the intricacies of Arctic competition are intriguing to note, it is how states are strategically asserting their claims that is of particular importance. The start of America's hegemonic decline has allowed states to revisit their approaches to the Arctic as nations jockey for position by balancing or rivalling American preferences. As a result, the nature of Arctic competition has incorporated both soft power and hard power elements. Further, the nature of militarism and hard power tension has increased due to the recent spending and strategic shifts by many Arctic states in recent years, including Canada, Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 The reasons for America's decline are relatively unsurprising - military overextension in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of international support for American foreign policy objectives throughout the Bush era; the 2008 economic recession; and the utter distrust by most states, including close American allies, of the United States' political objectives.24 The system remains unipolar, of course, but as stated above, the preponderance of power capabilities has substantially diminished, opening the door for others to balance and rival American power in the coming years. Coincidentally, it has also been the revelations of science in recent years that have also promoted a faster pace for those states making Arctic claims. The role of climate change and its impact over the Arctic has allowed for states to more freely move into the region and pursue strategies previously unavailable.25 According to Lotta Numminen, climate change has recently affected states' perceptions of the possible economic opportunities in the Arctic in four ways: first, that the subsurface of the Arctic Ocean floor is assumed to contain substantial oil and gas reserves, to which there will be increased access; second, that melting waters will provide new waters for international fisheries; third, the increase in research strategies; and fourth, is the greater access to sea passages.26 One of the main reasons states see the Arctic region as such a lucrative area is the potential for increasing their respective economic and natural resource capabilities. Previously, the northern ice caps prevented states from entering most of the Arctic Ocean and surrounding areas, but as these environmental situations change, states have readily identified the high north as a priority in both their security and economic strategies. Among the main reasons the Arctic has not been more readily seen as a potential area for security competition and conflict is the interpretation that the United States has little or no interest in the circumpolar region at all. According to Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, American hegemony throughout the post-Cold War era was seen as passive, stable and enduring because of the lack of counterpower being demonstrated in the system: Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly powers to the north and south, the United States is both less vulnerable than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, mean- while - China, Russia, Japan, and Germany - are in the opposite position. They can- not augment their military capabilities so as to balance the United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would almost certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power capabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to head off an emerging threat.27 Almost completely omitted from such interpretations, however, are America's northern borders over Alaska and into the Arctic. Latitudinal thinking would seem to indicate that Brooks and Wohlforth are correct in terms of America's interests in many areas of the globe, but this ignores what has been happening at the top of the world in the high north. It is not as if the United States has been ignorant of its own decline in power, especially regarding the Arctic. In 2009, the United States issued National Security Presidential Directive 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 that deal exclusively with American Arctic policy. According to these directives, the altera- tions to national policies of other states regarding the Arctic compelled the United States to clearly outline the security and development strategies they would use to protect its Arctic interests. Among the first, and most clear, elements of the directives is the clear intention of the United States to defend their national security interests. According to Article III, subsection B 1 of the directives: The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests. These interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.28 The contemporary changes to the international system as the era of American hegemony has begun to wane, the effects of climate change and greater access, and the increasingly militaristic strategies of most every Arctic state have led to a situation where tensions are at an all time high, and that legal or institutional processes are unlikely to resolve anything amicably. As the system continues its transition away from unipolarity, observers are left to ponder what might come next after an era of relative interstate stability. Multipolarity and the circumpolar In their 2002 article on the nature of United States primacy and the enduring aspects of American hegemony, Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the United States would have to act as a benevolent hegemon in order to prevent counterbalancing and to be able to build effective regimes worldwide. They argue: Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are tenets of successful statecraft that have proved their worth from classical Greece onward. Standing taller than leading states of the past, the United States has unprecedented freedom to do as it pleases. It can play the game for itself alone or for the system as a whole; it can focus on small returns today or larger ones tomorrow. If the administration truly wants to be loved as well as feared, the policy answers are not hard to find.29 The problem with such analyses of American hegemony is that the Bush administration chose to ignore utterly such warnings and, rather than acting magnanimously, post-9/11 American foreign policy did precisely what it should not have. Pre-emption, coercion and irrational interventions, combined with a major economic recession, all serve to explain why American hegemony began to decline by 2005 in terms of both actual power levels and perceptions of legitimate hegemonic status.30 The clearest sign that American exceptionalism has been decreasing is the aggressive and regional balancing dynamics taking place between states in the Arctic region. Security strategy in the circumpolar region has altered dramatically since 2005, with more states showing interest, hard power spending increasing, and legal processes being coupled by at times overtly offensive strategy.31 Russia, Canada and a number of European states, especially Norway and Sweden, exemplify this line of argument about how sovereignty claims have become focused on traditional inter- state arms racing and militarism while soft power components, like governance structures and legal processes, continually evolve.32 As mentioned previously, even the United States has woken up to see that, as their hegemony declines, other states have begun to balance against them in the Arctic, thus provoking the 2009 Presidential Directives. Even so, Arctic interested nations have not yielded to American claims, nor has there been any evidence of America's closest allies backing down in the face of its Arctic assertions, most clearly evidenced by Canada's continued claims over the Northwest Passage.33 In the international relations canon, most observers point to either India or China as emerging great powers that are the most likely to counterbalance Ameri- can power. The 2004 American National Intelligence Council report highlights this theory by stating: The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players - similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century - will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own.34 Both China and India have recently expressed their interest in Arctic affairs, but no power is as close to rivalling or challenging American power in hard power terms than Russia. This is especially true in the Arctic, as Russia's Arctic policies have made its intentions towards asserting its control over territory it deems to be sover- eign very clear. The role of the Arctic in Russian foreign policy cannot be understated. According to Russia's 2008 Arctic policy document, the region is seen as the epicentre of Russia's military and socio-economic development. The top two priorities for Russian Arctic interests are defined as follows: (a) In the sphere of socio-economic development - the expansion of the resource base of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, in order to substantially satisfy Russia's needs in hydrocarbon resources, hydro-biological resources, and other types of strate- gic raw materials; (b) In the sphere of military security, defense, and safekeeping of the state borders of the Russian Federation located in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation - the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federa- tion, including the maintenance of the required combat potential of military groupings under the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and agencies in this region [...]35 In order to achieve these goals, the Russians have created a unique military brigade to be permanently posted in the Arctic, have placed a Russian Federation flag on the Arctic Ocean seabed, have conducted various missile tests, have sailed their nuclear submarines through contested waters and have openly challenged the abilities of other states to enforce their own claims. In response to Russian offensive posturing and the inability of the United States to dissuade security competition in the area, middle and minor powers have begun to use hard power as a means of trying to enforce their sovereignty. Perhaps the best example here is Canada, whose military capabilities are extremely weak, but strong rhetoric and a drastically increased level of high-north military spending since 2006 seems to indicate that the Canadian government cannot rely on its American alliances to protect its interests, and that posturing by states like Russia or even Denmark clearly threaten Canada's national interests. As Norway, Sweden and Denmark have begun to put an emphasis on hard power capabilities to extend or defend northern claims, Canada has done the same. Worth noting as well in the Canadian context is that, while great powers like Russia and the United States can easily defeat any middle or minor power, Canada's capabilities are being either rivalled or surpassed by European states like Norway.36 Canada's realization of the evolving security and environmental climate in the Arctic has compelled changes to its domestic and foreign security policies, each seeking to assert Canadian sovereignty over areas of the Arctic, especially the Northwest Passage. One of the main components of now Prime Minister Harper's 2005-06 campaign was to bolster Arctic security resources, as many Canadians have identified the region as an essential part of Canada's national security and identity.37 Rob Huebert argues: The Harper government has increasingly recognized the significance of maintaining a strong presence in the Arctic and has vigorously begun to improve Canada's northern abilities [...] The Harper government has also made a series of promises to consider- ably expand Canada's northern capability [...] If these promises are implemented, Canada will have significantly improved its ability to control activity in its Arctic.38 In virtually any other area of the world, Canadian national security cannot be divorced from the United States, which is a partial explanation for why Canada has traditionally been considered a middle power since the end of World War II.39 Yet, since the start of American decline, the Canadian government has recognized that its fate in the Arctic will be its own, and not intrinsically tied to the protection of the United States, as the Americans have their own interests in the region and have shown a complete disregard for Canadian claims over the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. As the world moves towards multipolarity, it has become increasingly obvious that the Arctic region represents an area of increased security competition and a potentially conflictual region in the future. Multipolar systems are the most unstable, and history has shown these to produce military conflict due to the natural effects brought by a larger number of self-interested powers vying for power and security. Further, as new great powers begin to emerge, American strategic considerations will be spread so thin that they will be unable to prevent against their eventual loss of hegemony. The largest mistake being made at this time by international security scholars and policymakers is their normal obsession with China, India and latitudinal thinking. The next area of major war is not likely to be the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea, due to traditional security balancing, deterrence and economic interests in each of these areas. Multipolarity naturally brings the possibility of war. Mearsheimer contends that war is far more likely in multipolar systems for three reasons : First, there are more opportunities for war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multipolar system. Second, imbalances of power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential for miscalculation is greater in multipolarity : states might think they have the capability to coerce or conquer another state when, in fact, they do not.40 Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the outbreak of war in the near future. That said, as America's influence continues to wane, other states have shown their desire to take full advantage of the U nited S tates' inability to control northern affairs. If the United States does lose its hegemony, which many commentators believe is inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in security calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fray, and two of those states have Arctic borders and a historical legacy of conflict. Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and the United States as great powers, while the other Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power from doing as it pleases. Lastly, miscalculation is evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are both arming for possible Russian aggression, though Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies towards Nordic nations. Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades the probability of northern conflict is ever increasing. The shift to hard power strategies, the effects of climate change, and the decline of the United States all speak to the fact that multipolarity can increase levels of tension and mistrust, thus altering the currently stable nature of Arctic affairs. Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as the system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly difficul t. As such, observers must be mindful of the systemic variables at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics, as changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies.
 * Murray, 12** – Vice President of Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta. He holds a senior fellowship at the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, a research fellowship at the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, and a research fellowship at the University of Alberta’s European Union Centre of Excellence.(Robert, “Arctic politics in the emerging multipolar system: challenges and consequences” The Polar Journal, June, Taylor & Francis)//DH

Arctic conflict risks a nuclear confrontation
Wallace & Staples ‘10 – *Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia, **President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa (Michael, Steven, “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”) //J.N.E The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water por t. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with ship- based helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 60 9 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states – the U nited S tates and the Russia n Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world – converge on the Arctic and have competing claims. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapon s.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly.

That causes extinction
Vestergaard ’10 – visiting fellow with the CSIS Proliferation Prevention Program, researching uranium governance, specialist in nuclear weaponry for DIIS (“Conference on an Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Copenhagen, 10-11, 2009”, Danish Institute for International Studies, *note: the document was released in 2010) //J.N.E Global climate consequences of a regional nuclear war a certain number of small weapons will have much great er consequences, both in the number of people killed from the explosions and in the amount of soot produced, than a smaller number of larger bombs with the same total explosive force (Robock et al 2007a ). The new insights into the circulation of the atmosphere have also shown that a limited nuclear war, such as a war between India and Pakistan, where about 100 Hiroshima-size, 15 kt bombs are used, mostly over population centres, would result in the release of about 5 Tg of soot. This soot, mostly from burning cities, would decrease the global temperature by about 1.25 degrees C, over 6-8 years. That is not nuclear winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow (Figs. 2 & 3). The growing season would be shortened by 10 to 20 days in many of the most im - portant grain producing areas in the world, which might completely eliminate some crops that have insufficient time to reach maturity (Fig. 4). An accurate evaluation of the global decrease in food production has yet to be done, but there will be substantial deficits (Helfand 2007). In earlier periods we have seen that a global decrease in grain production of 5% over a couple of years brought about a sharp increase in prices, and that starvation increased in countries that are normally dependent on the import of food. The period of nuclear darkness would cause a much greater decrease in grain production than 5%, and it would continue over many years. The reserves of the most important grains in the world have, in recent years, been corresponding to less than six weeks of consumption (see ref: Wikipedia 2007-2008; World hunger facts 2009). There are currently more than 800 million people in the world who are chronically malnourished. Several hundred million more live in countries which are dependent on imported grain for their survival. In a situation of severe food shortage globally, can we expect that the wealthy countries will accept tightening their belts to such an extent that the poor and undernourished survive these seven years of famine? If not, hundreds of millions of people in many continents, in particular Africa, will die from hunger (Helfand 2007). In the war zone of India and Pakistan it can be expected that 20 million people will die from blast and fire, millions more from the radioactive fallout. Many tens of millions will flee the contaminated areas. And many will die from epidemics and hunger, maybe more than from the bombs. But the greater number of fatalities will occur in countries far away, of those who will succumb to starvation because of the global nuclear darkness (Toon et al 2007a, 2007b). Severe ozone depletion To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone (Mills et al 2008). A study published two years ago by the National Academy of Sciences, using a similar nuclear war scenario involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs, showsozone losses in excess of 20% globally, 25-45% at mid latitudes and 50-70% at northern high latitudes, persisting for five years and with substantial losses continuing for five additional years (Fig. 5). The resulting increases in UV radiation would have serious consequences for human health. Here in Copenhagen we would be advised not to be outdoors for several hours around the middle of the day. The effects on agriculture, on animals, on the economy and on the human population of this unprecedented increase in ultraviolet radiation have not yet been evaluated. The effects would undoubtedly be serious. A //regional nuclear war would result in an unprecedented global catastrophe// I have decided to present this material at this conference because it shows the global consequences of any nuclear war, even a war in which less than one half a per cent of all the nuclear weapons in existence are used. //Nuclear proliferation is a threat to all of us//. //Nuclear weapons in the Arctic zone would increase the danger of a nuclear confrontation//. And, most importantly, it is not sufficient to decrease the number of nuclear weapons to a few hundred. They must be abolished. Also shown for comparison, in the lower panel, is the global average change in downward shortwave radiation for the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the largest volcanic eruption of the 20th century, as compared to the nuclear war scenarios. Figure 1. Change of global average surface air temperature, precipitation, and downward shortwave radiation reaching the surface of the Earth for the 5 Tg ( Robock et al 2006), 50 Tg and 150 Tg cases. DIIS REPORT 20 10:03 49 Figure 2. The decrease in average global temperature after a regional nuclear war with 100 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons, compared to the development of the temperature over the recent century. The decrease in temperature will be much more pronounced (Robock et al 2007b). Figure 3. Changes in global temperature and precipitation after a regional nuclear war using 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons, producing 5 million tons of soot (Robock et al 2007b). DIIS REPORT 20 10:03 50 Figure 4. Changes in the growing season – frost free days – in the northern and southern hemispheres in the first year after a regional nuclear war using 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons (after Robock et al 2007a). Acknowledgement: PowerPoint graphs made available by Dr Alan Robock at http:// climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/nuclear Figure 5. Time evolution of the total ozone column after a 5 Tg soot injection into the upper troposphere at 30°N latitude. Changes in ozone are given as a per cent devia - tion of the integrated column from the control run, or baseline value, as a function of time since soot injection. The global mean total ozone variation is shown along with zonal average changes at four specific latitudes (as labelled) (Mills et al 2008).

The plan would revitalize US presence in the Arctic that __spills over__ to international influence
NRC 7 – working arm of the United States National Academies, which produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine (National Research Council, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of US Needs,” [] ) mj Economic activity is predicted to increase and move northward as a result of sea-ice retreat. Those deploying fishing fleets, cruise ships, mining, and the associated ore transit ships , as well as petroleum recovery and tanker ship transport, anticipate increased operations in the region. When current orders for ice-strengthened tankers have been filled, the worldwide fleet of these vessels will double in number. Ice retreat increases the cost-effectiveness of using the Northern Sea Route (primarily north of Russia) and the Northwest Passage (primarily north of Canada) for transporting petroleum, ore, and cargo. Both routes include U.S. Arctic waters.The potential for increased human activity in northern latitudes will likely increase the need for the U nited S tates to assert a more active and influential presence in the Arctic not only to protect its territorial interests, but also to //project its presence as a world power// concerned with the security, economic, scientific, and international political issues of the region. Over the past decades the U.S. Coast Guard has not conducted routine patrols in ice-covered waters due to a lack of funding. The growing human presence and increased economic activity in the Arctic will be best served by reinstating patrols in U.S. coastal waters and increasing U.S. presence in international waters of the north. To assert U.S. interests in the Arctic, the nation needs to be able to access various sites throughout the region at various times of the year, reliably and at will. While the southern extent of the Arctic ice pack is thinning and becoming less extensive during the summer, //there is no question that polar icebreakers will be required// for many decades for egress to much of the Arctic Basin. Ice conditions in the U.S. Arctic are among the most variable and occasionally challengingthrough the circum-Arctic. National interests require icebreakers that can navigate the most formidable ice conditions encountered in the Arctic. Recommendation 1: The U nited S tates should continue to project an active and influential presence in the Arctic to support its interests. This requires U.S. government polar icebreaking capability to ensure year-round access throughout the region.

US Arctic leadership generates __allied cooperation__ sufficient to check Russia
(CNN) -- While much of the world is focused on the Russian incursion into the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, another long-term move may allow the former Soviet navy to dominate U.S. interests to the north: the Arctic. The rapid melting of the Arctic Ocean is quickly creating a new variety of challenges that have the potential to cause significant global damage if they remain unaddressed. The Obama administration's policy correctly recognizes that the United States has profoundly important economic and cultural interests in the Arctic but regrettably reveals very little about what the federal government will be doing outside of the science field. While recent U.S. policies either dance around the core issues, or worse, do not acknowledge that they exist, the Russians are taking the lead on Arctic policy. After all, the Arctic is in their backyard, too.Moreover, Russia -- as if to highlight the value they place on their navy and renaissance as a maritime nation -- took control of the strategic Crimean Peninsula, assuring and securing warm waterRussianNavy access to the global commons. In light of these recent events, it would be wise for Washington to seriously consider the economic potential and security vulnerabilities that exist on or near the U.S. Arctic coastline. Overwhelmingly, the U.S. Arctic policy debate echoes past concerns of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Consequently, many in the policy community are pushing a heavy science and no-development agenda to preserve the pristine character of the region. The recently issued Department of Defense Arctic Strategy is a case in point: It talks extensively about the DOD scientific mission and uses the terms "sustainable development" and preservation of the unspoiled area as important national goals. But just saying "no" ignores the fact that the precious Arctic mineral and oil and gas resources will help assure the U nited S tates is able, over time, to achieve and then maintain its energy independence. Science is incredibly important, as is safe and responsible development of the Arctic, but our agencies and scientists need to approach these issues with a greater sense of urgency. Arguably, the science needs to be a component of a detailed national action, but that's only a fraction of good U.S. policy. U.S. Arctic policy should prioritize four things: One: Demonstrate leadership in the Arctic and develop a strategy and policy to match. The U.S. has no leadership in the high north and Russia does, which is a great concern for our allies. Two: Invest ininfrastructure, Navy and Coast Guard to support U.S. security and commercial interests in the Arctic. The key here is to develop the policy that drives those requirements so we are not "late to need." Three: Demonstrate leadership in the maritime domain worldwide -- and not retreat as we are doing by default in the Arctic. Four: Facilitate and further developoffshore natural resources in the high north/Alaska and the national, international, maritime and geopolitical governance structures that will underpin those enterprises. Washington, in less than two years, will assume a leadership role when it becomes Chair for the Arctic Council.Unfortunately, the DOD policy and U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 do not articulate what the U.S. Arctic leadership agenda will entail. The reality is ignoring the issues and choosing not to participate in the Arctic will not make the issues go away. Yes, budgets are challenging, but the Arctic is no different from any other international frontier or global common where the U.S. has interests. We need to protect it and demonstrate leadership in the maritime domain -- not retreat. So, too, our policy makers need to be looking beyond our shores to Moscow, Ottawa, Oslo, Copenhagen, the Arctic Council, international oil companies and Lloyds of London for help in solving this governance challenge. The last thing that any of the Arctic states can afford is to back into a Russian-generated crisis with no resources or a plan. The time is now for more U.S. leadership to ensure the Arctic becomes a safe, secure and prosperous region in which to live and work.
 * Slayton and Rosen 3-14-14** -- research fellow at the Hoover Institution and co-chair of the Hoover Institution's Arctic Security Initiative AND an international and national security lawyer by training, is a senior legal adviser at CNA Corporation (David M.* and Mark E.**, “Another region where the Russian military threatens to dominate the U.S.,” CNN, [])BC

The perception of arctic counterbalancing induces Russian cooperation
The United States devotes much of its diplomatic and military energies to the Middle East today for a very simple reason: The Middle East is the source of much of the world’s energy, and not coincidentally, much of the world’s tensions. Tomorrow’s source of energy reserves and geopolitical tensions may not be the deserts and densely populated urban areas of the Middle East, but rather the icy waters and desolate tundra of the Arctic. Supply and Demand Before we get to the simmering tensions in the Arctic, it’s important to discuss why the United States, Canada, Russia, Europe and others are so interested in the region. First, there is the matter of supply. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic may hold 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 90 billion barrels of oil—30 percent of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13 percent of undiscovered oil (USGS). About a third of the oil is in Alaskan territory (Carroll). These oil and gas deposits were always there, of course, but today the cost of extracting them is increasingly justifiable due to market realities. Growing demand, along with decreasing and undependable supplies in the Middle East, are conspiring to push energy prices upwards, which is encouraging exploration in the Arctic. The Energy Information Agency forecasts a 20-percent increase in daily world oil consumption by 2030, owing largely to demand in China and India (EIA). Another important factor in the Arctic energy rush relates to shipping. The fabled Northwest Passage, once frozen throughout most of the year, is thawing. “ Opening up the Northwest Passage cuts 4,000 nautical miles off the trip from Europe to Asia,” NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen observes. “You can bet a lot of companies have done that math.” Zone of Peace? Given the Arctic’s vast supply of energy resources and the world’s growing energy demands, it’s neither surprising nor alarming that Arctic nations are beginning to stake their respective claims. What is alarming is how one Arctic nation is going about this. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin expressed his desire in 2010 “ to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation” (Carbonnel). But actions speak louder than words : In 2011, Russia announced plans to deploy two army brigades —10,000 troops— to defend its Arctic claims (AP). U.S. and Canadian fighters intercepted Russian bombers 45 times between 2007 and 2010, up from just eight between 1999 and 2006 (Elliott). In 2009, Moscow announced plans to build a string of military bases along Russia’s northern tier (UPI). In 2008, a Russian general revealed plans to train “troops that could be engaged in Arctic combat missions, ” ominously adding, “Wars these days are won and lost well before they are launched” (AFP). During a 2007 expedition, after Russia provocatively planted its flag under the North Pole, the lead explorer declared, “The Arctic is ours.” In fact, Russia brazenly claimed almost half the Arctic Circle and all of the North Pole in 2001 (Clover and Idov). It seems Putin is far closer to that view today than he is to his 2010 “zone of peace” promises. “Russia intends without a doubt to expand its presence in the Arctic,” he recently boasted. “We are open to dialogue…but naturally, //interests will be hard and consistent// ” (Shuster). In short, Moscow is signaling its seriousness about claiming most of the Arctic as its own. Fundamental Interests All of this is getting the attention of the United States and its Arctic allies. At the end of the Bush administration, the U.S. issued a new Arctic Region Policy, declaring that “The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests” (White House). Similarly, the Obama administration has emphasized that “The United States has an inherent national interest in knowing, and declaring to others with specificity, the extent of our sovereign rights with regard to the U.S. extended continental shelf” (U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project). Together, the U.S. and Canada are conducting missions to map the continental shelf. Demarcating the shelf is vital to determining how the Arctic pie is divided. As my Fraser Institute colleague Alex Moens and I have written elsewhere, “Russia’s outsized Arctic claims rest on a dubious interpretation of an underwater ridge linking to the Russian landmass. Russia argues that this ridge is an extension of its own continental shelf.” Some observers contend that joining the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) will help America secure its Arctic claims—and limit Russia’s. Unlike its Arctic neighbors, the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, even though the treaty has support in the military and among leaders from both parties. “The Arctic is changing,” observes Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations from 2007 to 2011. “The most important thing is to become party to the Convention of the Law of the Sea. If we are not party to that treaty, we will not have a seat at the table as this unfolds” (Cavas). Vice President Joseph Biden has argued that UNCLOS “allows us to secure and extend our sovereign rights” (Abrams). The Bush administration’s Arctic policy called on the Senate to pass the treaty “promptly.” Critics, however, worry that the treaty could limit U.S. sovereignty and freedom of action. Zone of Conflict? With or without the treaty, it’s only prudent for the U.S. and its Arctic allies to develop some sort of security component to the Arctic puzzle. “We can’t wish away the security implications,” Rasmussen observes. “An entire side of North America will be much more exposed.” The United States already maintains some 20,000 active-duty forces in Alaska and holds routine exercises in the region. “Northern Edge” exercises, for example, have featured airborne drops, close-air support, port security, harbor defense, supply-route protection and critical-infrastructure protection—just the sort of operations that might be necessary to keep the Arctic and its waterways open (Elmendorf AFB). The U.S. is not alone. Spurred by Russian adventurism, Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay talks about “enlarging the footprint and the permanent…presence we have in the North” (Cummins). Toward that end, Canada is building new bases and conducting annual maneuvers to defend its Arctic territories. “Our government is committed to protecting and asserting Canada’s presence throughout our Arctic,” Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared in 2010 (Comte). Assets from the U.S. 2nd Fleet, U.S. Coast Guard and Danish navy have joined the Canadian military for Arctic maneuvers (Comte). In 2009, Norway led Arctic maneuvers enfolding 13 nations. The scenario: Repel an attack on oil rigs by the fictional country of “Northland,” a thinly disguised euphemism for Russia (Weber). Sweden followed with its own Arctic war games, featuring 12,000 troops. Norway, Sweden and Finland are developing what The Economist magazine calls a “Nordic security partnership” as a hedge against Russian activity in the Arctic. Denmark is standing up an Arctic military command and beefing up its military presence in Greenland. In response to Russia’s Arctic claims, made in a blatant military context, NATO officials envision a “military presence” in the Arctic and have pointedly declared the Arctic a region “of strategic interest to the alliance” (de Hoop Scheffer). One reason a military presence will be necessary is the possibility of accidents caused by drilling and shipping. In addition, competition for Arctic resources could lead to confrontation. Adm. James Stavridis, who serves as NATO’s military commander, concedes that the Arctic could become “a zone of conflict” (UPI). To brace for that possibility and thwart Russia’s Arctic fait accompli, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway—all NATO members and Arctic nations—should follow the Cold War playbook: build up the assets needed to defend their interests, use those assets to deter aggression, and deal with Moscow from a posture of strength and unity. The challenge is to //remain open to cooperation// while //scenarios//. After all, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Even as Putin and his puppets make mischief, Moscow is open to making deals. Russia and Norway, for instance, recently resolved a long-running boundary dispute, paving the way for development in 67,000 square-miles of the Arctic. Moreover, the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway have agreed on Arctic search-and-rescue responsibilities (Cummins). In a world of increasingly integrated markets, we know there is much to gain from Arctic cooperation and much to lose from protracted military standoff. But we also know that dealing naively with Moscow carries a heavy cost—and that integration is a two-way street. “Russian leaders today yearn not for integration,” the Brookings Institution’s Robert Kagan concludes, “but for a return to a special Russian greatness.” In short, Russia is more interested in recreating the autarky of some bygone era than in the shared benefits of globalization. Framework for Partnership //Dealing with Russia is about power//. As Churchill once said of his Russian counterparts, “ There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have //less respect than for weakness// .” //When the message is clear// —or “hard and consistent,” to use Putin’s language— //ture//. When the message is unclear, Russia will take what it can get. Just consider Russia’s contrasting treatment of its neighbors : Moscow blusters about Poland and the Baltic states but keeps its hands off, largely becausethey are protected by the U.S.-NATO umbrella. Conversely, Russia bullies Ukraine, garrisons its troops —uninvited— in Moldova, and occupies Georgian territor y. //The common denominator of these// //unfortunate countries:// //They// //have no U.S. security guarantee//. Russia should be given an opportunity to participate as a responsible partner in Arctic development. But if Russia continues to take Putin’s hard line, the U.S. and its allies are left with few other options than standing together or allowing Russia to divide and conquer. To avoid that, the allies may need to agree among themselves on lines of demarcation, transit routes and exploration rights—and then pool their resources to protect their shared interests. This will require investment in Arctic capabilities. For instance, the U.S. has only three //polar icebreakers//, two of which have exceeded their projected 30-year lifespan (O’Rourke). Russia can deploy 20 icebreakers. “ We have extremely limited Arctic response capabilities ,” explains Adm. Robert Papp, USCG commandant. Noting that the Coast Guard has “the lead role in ensuring Arctic maritime safety, security and stewardship,” Papp urges Congress “to start building infrastructure up there” (Joling and Papp).
 * Dowd 11** – Senior Fellow of the Fraser Institute and Senior Editor of Fraser Insight. In addition to conducting research into defence and security, he has contributed to the Institute’s Economic Freedom of North America Annual Report. Dowd is an adjunct professor at Butler University; was as a founding member of the Sagamore Institute leadership team, where he continues to hold a senior fellow post; and was director of Hudson Institute’s corporate headquarters (Alan, “The Big Chill: Energy Needs Fueling Tensions in the Arctic,” []) zabd

Reliance on foreign icebreakers is undermining the credibility and quality of US polar science leadership
and International Studies (CSIS).(Heather, “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: an American perspective” January, csis.org)//DH
 * Conley, 12** - director and senior fellow of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic

Although the United States lacks an overarching Arctic economic development strategy and suffers from insufficient security assets, it does maintain a competitive edge in the field of research and science. Northern Alaska has always been a region of particular interest to scientists with its unique climate, flora, and fauna. The Greenland Ice Sheet Project Two, initiated in 1998 by the Office of Polar Programs of the NSF, provided the world with what was then the deepest ice core ever recovered as well as the clearest outline of climate history.47 The discoveries of this project piqued the interest of the scientific community and made clear that the Arctic is one of the //es// to study climatic changes, global temperatures, sea ice extent, and short-lived climate forcers, such as black carbon and levels of methane. The United States has been at the vanguard of international climate research with established institutions like the National Science Foundation, U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC, part of the NSF),48 the U.S. Geological Survey,49 and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee,50 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,51 and the National Snow and Ice Data Center.52 The National Science Foundation had an annual budget of $6.8 billion for FY 2011, with the Office of Polar Programs receiving $493.4 million and USARC research receiving $1.58 million.53 The USARC has laid out its research goals in its Report on Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research, stressing five main themes: environmental change of the Arctic, Arctic Ocean, and Bering Sea; Arctic human health; civil infrastructure; natural resource assessment; and indigenous languages, cultures, and identities.54 These goals are broad based, and while they may not directly address security concerns, they do have an impact on U.S. Arctic policy because all future decisionmaking related to the Arctic—be it economic development or aligning security assets—is completely dependent on a strong scientific understanding of this fragile milieu. There can never be too much scientific data or understanding about this largely unknown region, and the current level of U.S. science and research in the Arctic is a critical and foundational element of a proactive U.S. leadership model. Unfortunately, strong capabilities as an Arctic science power do not make up for the deficiency in the rest of U.S. coastal and security capabilities. As stated in the Coast Guard’s own report to Congress in 2008, “Although the NSF is a global leader in scientific research, the Coast Guard believes that the NSF would lack the staff and expertise to direct the multi-mission deployment of icebreakers employed for other USCG missions.”55 In addition, the N ational O ceanic and A tmospheric A dministration is unable to collect and provide all the information on weather forecasting, oceanography, and navigational charting requested by the Coast Guard, the industries, and the local communities .56 In fact, the NSF has repeatedly made use of Canadian, Russian, and Swedish icebreakers to transport U.S. scientists in the U.S. Arctic , where U.S. capabilities were nonexistent.57 This kind of arrangement has proven both risky and inefficient. In July 2011, Sweden decided to recall its icebreaker Oden, leased to the NSF every winter since 2006–07, due to worsening ice conditions in the Baltic Sea. This recall left the United States without the technical ability to reach and resupplyMcMurdo station in Antarctica .58 Further examples illustrate U.S. dependence on other nations as a result of its own lack of capabilities. In December 2011, officials from Nome, Alaska, requested a Russian fuel tanker to deliver an emergency shipment when the city was blocked by sea ice. Originally, the Healy was unavailable to assist with this operation as it was returning from a previously scheduled scientific mission.59 However, the Healy is now scheduled to break an ice channel for the tanker once the Russian vessel is cleared to enter the Alaskan port and will facilitate the tanker’s return to open water.60 As U.S. capabilities are stretched between critical missionsand its ongoing yet equally critical scientific work, the need to address these shortfalls in capabilities is urgent, as Alaskan Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell stated in his December 2011 congressional testimony: “Without action, America is putting its national security on the line, and we are going to miss the opportunities of the Arctic while watching other nations advance.”61

Icebreakers are vital to revitalizing US polar sciences leadership – it’s key to understanding the climate
NRC 7 – working arm of the United States National Academies, which produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine (National Research Council, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of US Needs,” [] ) mj

Fundamental advances resulting from polar research have directly benefited society. Polar research led to the identification of the presence and cause of the “ozone hole” and has resulted in coordinated worldwide actions to discontinue the use of chlorofluorocarbons. Understanding how the polar regions affect ocean circulation is leading to a better understanding of global climate. The study of Weddell seals, which dive to great depths and cease breathing for long periods, led to better understanding of how such mammals handle gas dissolved in blood during and after deep diving events. This has contributed to advances in understanding sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). The study of mammals, insects, and plants that endure freezing temperatures, yet prevent the formation of ice crystals in their internal fluids, is aiding in the design of freeze-resistant crops and improved biomedical cryopreservation techniques. The Arctic and Antarctic are natural laboratories whose extreme, relatively pristine environments and geographically unique settings enable research on fundamental phenomena and processes that are //feasible nowhere else//. Today, researchers seek a better understanding of how new ocean crusts form, how organisms adapt to the extremes of temperature and seasonality (light conditions), how ice sheets behave, and how the solar wind and the earth interact. Unexplored, subglacial lakes in the Antarctic that have been sealed from the atmosphere for millions of years are soon to be explored and entered. Beneath the South Pole Station a cubic kilometer of clear ice is being instrumented with 5,000 detectors to observe high-energy neutrinos that may tell us about phenomena such as supernovae. Pristine ice cores that span centuries give direct data about temperature changes and atmospheric gas concentrations in the past. As global climate has garnered worldwide attention, the polar regions have been found to react acutely to fluctuations in climate and temperatures. The 40 percent reductionin Arctic sea- ice thickness over the past four decades is one of the most dramatic examples of recent changes. Because ice tends to reflect solar radiation and water absorbs it, melting in the polar regions can exert a strong influence on both atmospheric climate and ocean circulation. Huge reservoirs of water are held in massive ice sheets and glaciers; substantive release may create major climate and social dislocations. Thus, research in these regions plays a pivotal role in the global Earth system exerting influences of critical importance. Scientists have declared 2007-2008 the International Polar Year. Multinational collaboration and new polar research activities are planned. The health and continued vitality of polar research are intimately linked to the availability of the appropriate infrastructure and logistical support to allow scientists to work in these harsh environments. Access to the polar regions is essential if the United States is to continue to be a //leader in polar science.// To operate reliably and safely in these regions //icebreaking capability//. Icebreakers enable resupply of land-based stations and field camps in the south. The availability of polar icebreakers with greater icebreaking capability would enable important new research in the Southern Ocean in locations where ice is thick. While other assets and platforms such as airplanes and spaceborne sensors are useful tools, surface ground -truth and in situ sampling will not be replaced in the near future. Because there are no land sites in the central Arctic, an icebreaker is an essential platform to support sustained scientific measurements i n the Arctic Ocean. The availability of adequate icebreaking capabilities will be essential to advancing research in both polar regions.

That’s key to adapting to climate change
Ross 7/19/14 – Victoria, San Diego Technology Examiner, “The Arctic holds the key to climate change” [|http://www.examiner.com/article/the-arctic-holds-the-key-to-climate-change //] JV

In a place at the very top of the Northern Hemisphere scientists are collecting the most important samples. Arctic News yesterday reports how devastating the changes have been in the Arctic due to warming waters and ash blown from fires in Alaska and Canada. There is an urgent need to collect data on the changes in the Arctic. Phytoplankton is the key element in the change of the planet as the specks of algae are emitted to the clouds from the basic phytoplankton. This is the key to affect climate swings and it is the key to feeding arctic inhabitant s. A few years ago Kevin Arrigo was in the Chukchi Sea for a research project funded by NASA. He states, “The deeper we went into the ice, the more phytoplankton there were. They reached amazing concentrations, to the point where it was the largest bloom anybody had ever seen anywhere in the world’s oceans. And it was less than three feet of ice.” Why is this research so important? What is its connection to Climate Change on the planet? Bob Pickart, the lead physical oceanographer, for a project funded by the National Science Foundation in the Chukchi Sea this spring had the goal to gather hundreds of water samples. The samples contain the nutrients which spur the growth of the phytoplankton. Once it begins it goes up the food chain to all inhabitants in the Chukchi Sea and Arctic- both ocean and land. This is the basis for the ecosystem. When phytoplankton has light, it can bloom and blooms were found three feet deep in the ice. Arrigo says that, “Productivity has been shifting earlier and earlier, because the ice is melting earlier and earlier. But now the bloom — the productivity — is not even waiting for the ice to melt.” This presents a new set of circumstances. Arrigo is concerned that if it’s coming earlier for animals who have set their biological clock : “What’s going to happen? Are they going to produce their offspring at a point when the bloom’s already happened, it’s too late, there’s no food in the water?” The imbalance of ice melting more quickly and earlier each year changes the actions of polar bears and other inhabitants to hunt on the disappearing solid ice for the fish. The phytoplankton will transmit the algae upward to the atmosphere earlier and cause an imbalance in a chain of effects set from the past decades of ten thousand years. The Arctic is particularly vulnerable to warming due to seas in the Arctic Ocean which are often shallow and covered by sea ice that is disappearing rapidly. The Arctic Ocean acts like a trap capturing heat carried in by the Gulf Stream, which brings in ever warmer water and the land around it is affected with melting ice. Of all the heat trapped on Earth by greenhouse gases, 90 percent goes into oceans, while the remaining 10 percent goes to the Arctic ice sheets. In the US President Obama has created a task force of 26 officials from across the country to address the issue. He announced a nearly $1 billion National Disaster Resilience Competition in June. Obama told members of the task force at a meeting this past Wednesday that, "We are here because we know that climate change is an undeniable scientific fact." For the hard hit Alaska tribes facing ice melts and rising sea levels, the Interior Department is setting aside $10 million dollars. The question of how the Arctic region will change and with it the planet finds its answer in the Chukchi Sea where the Arctic life from plant blooms lead to its inhabitants. The need for study and answers with technology based equipment will unravel the secrets of the phytoplankton in the Arctic for mankind of the planet.

Warming is real, anthropogenic and risks extinction
Costello 11 –, Anthony, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Mark Maslin, Department of Geography, University College London, Hugh Montgomery, Institute for Human Health and Performance, University College London, Anne M. Johnson, Institute for Global Health, University College London, Paul Ekins, Energy Institute, University College London [“Global health and climate change: moving from denial and catastrophic fatalism to positive action” May 2011 vol. 369 no. 1942 1866-1882 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society] Advocacy about the health consequences will ensure that climate change is a high priority. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change was set up in 1992 to ensure that nations worked together to minimize the adverse effects, but McMichael and Neira noted that, in preparation for the Copenhagen conference in December 2009, only four of 47 nations mentioned human health as a consideration [1]. With business as usual, __global warming caused by__ rising greenhouse gas ( __GHG) emissions____will threaten mass populations____through__ increased transmission of some __infections__, __heat stress__ , __food and water insecurity__ , increased deaths from more frequent and extreme climate events, threats to shelter and security, and through population migration [2]. On the one hand it is necessary in the media to counter climate change sceptics and denialists, but on the other __it is__ also __important not to allow climate catastrophists __, who tell us it is all too late, to deflect us from pragmatic __ and positive action. ____Catastrophic scenarios are possible in the long__ er __term__, and effective action will be formidably difficult, but evidence suggests that __we__ do __have__ the tools, __the time and__ the __resources to bring__ about the __changes needed for climate stability__. 2. Climate change evidence and denial Given the current body of evidence, __it is surprising that__ global __warming and__ its causal __relationship with__ atmospheric __GHG__ pollution __is disputed____any more than the relationship between__ acquired immune deficiency syndrome ( __AIDS) and__ human immunodeficiency virus ( __HIV__ ) infection, __or__ lung __cancer and cigarette smoking__. The basic principles that determine the Earth’s temperature are, of course, relatively simple. Some of the short-wave solar radiation that strikes the Earth is reflected back into space and some is absorbed by the land and emitted as long-wave radiation (heat). Some of the long-wave radiation is trapped in the atmosphere by ‘greenhouse gases’, which include water vapour, carbon dioxide and methane. Without GHGs the Earth would be on average 33◦C colder. Over the last 150 years, since the Industrial Revolution, humans have been adding more carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. The result is that the Earth’s atmosphere, ocean and land are indeed warming—due to increased atmospheric ‘greenhouse gas’ concentrations [3]. Gleick et al. [4], from the US National Academy of Sciences, wrote a letter to Science stating ‘ __There is compelling, comprehensive, and consistent objective evidence that humans are changing the climate in ways that threaten__ our __societies__ and the ecosystems on which we depend’. The most recent __report__ by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) [5], amounting to nearly 3000 pages of detailed review and analysis of published research, also declares that the __scientific uncertainties__ of global warming __are__ essentially __resolved__. This report states that there is clear evidence for a 0.75◦C rise in global temperatures and 22 cm rise in sea level during the twentieth century. The IPCC synthesis also predicts that __global temperatures could rise further__ by between 1.1◦C and 6.4◦C by 2100, and sea level could rise by between 28 and 79 cm, or more if the melting of Greenland and Antarctica accelerates. In addition, weather patterns will become less predictable and the occurrence of extreme climate events, such as storms, floods, heat waves and droughts, will increase. There is also strong evidence for ocean acidification driven by more carbon dioxide dissolving in the oceans [6]. Given the current failure of international negotiations to address carbon emission reductions, and that atmospheric warming lags behind rises in CO2 concentration, there is concern that global surface temperature will rise above the supposedly ‘safe limit’ of 2◦C within this century. Each doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration alone is expected to produce 1.9–4.5◦C of warming at equilibrium [7]. Of course, climate modelling is an extremely complex process, and uncertainty with projections relating to future emissions trajectories means that the time scale and magnitude of future climate change cannot be predicted with certainty [8]. These uncertainties are magnified when future climate predictions are used to estimate potential impacts. For example, the environmental impacts of climate change are also uncertain, but could underestimate such impacts because they detrimentally interact with habitat loss, pollution and loss of biodiversity due to other causes. There is also the additional problem that switching from biome to biome may not be directly reversible. For example, rainforest recycles a huge amount of water so it can survive a significant amount of aridification before it burns and is replaced by savannah. But the region then has to get much wetter before rainforest can return, as there is greatly reduced water cycling in savannah [9]. In the policy arena, further uncertainty surrounds the desire for international agreements on emission cuts, and the possible routes to such agreement and implementation. The feasible speed of technological innovation in carbon capture and provision of renewable/low-carbon energy resources is also uncertain. __Denying the__ causes or the current weight of __evidence__ for anthropogenic climate change __is irrational__, just as the existence of ‘uncertainties’ should not be used to deny the need for proportionate action, when such uncertainties could underestimate the risks and impact of climate change. There is no reason for inaction and there are many ways we can use our current knowledge of climate change to improve health provision for current and future generations. 3. Catastrophism At the other end of the scale are doom-mongers who predict catastrophic population collapse and the end of civilization. In the early nineteenth century, the French palaeontologist Georges Cuvier first addressed catastrophism and explained patterns of extinction observed in the fossil record through catastrophic natural events [10]. We know now of five major extinctions: the Ordovician–Silurian extinction (439 million years ago), the Late Devonian extinction (about 364 million years ago), the Permian–Triassic extinction (about 251 million years ago), the End Triassic extinction (roughly 199 million to 214 million years ago) and the Cretaceous– Tertiary extinction (about 65 million years ago). These mass extinctions were caused by a combination of plate tectonics, supervolcanism and asteroid impacts. The understanding of the mass extinctions led Gould & Eldredge [11] to update Darwin’s theory of evolution with their own theory of punctuated equilibrium. Many scientists have suggested that the current human-induced extinction rates could be as fast as those during these mass extinctions [12,13]. For example, one study predicted that 58 per cent of species may be committed to extinction by 2050 due to climate change alone [14], though this paper has been criticized [15,16]. Some people have even suggested that **__human extinction may not be a remote risk__** [17–19]. Sherwood & Huber [7] point to continued __heating effects__ that __could make the world__ largely __uninhabitable__ by humans and mammals within 300 years. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature (used because it reflects both the ambient temperature and relative humidity of the site), is surprisingly similar across diverse climates and never exceeds 31◦C. They suggest that if it rose to 35◦C, which never happens now but would at a warming of 7◦C, __hyperthermia in humans__ and other mammals __would occur as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible,__ therefore __making__ many __environments uninhabitable.__

Research-driven adaptation strategies build in __resilience__ to prevent total ecosystem collapse

 * Doney, 8 -** Senior Scientist Marine Chemistry & Geochemistry Department Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (Scott, **“**The Federal Ocean Acidification Research and Monitoring Act: H.R. 4174” Written testimony presented to the Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, United States House of Representatives6/5, []

Major gaps exist in our current scientific understanding, limiting our ability to forecast the consequences of ocean acidification and //hindering the development of adaptation approaches// for marine resource managers. Thus far, most of the elevated CO2 response studies on marine biota, whether for calcification, photosynthesis or some other physiological measure , have been short-term laboratory or mesocosm experiments ranging in length from hours to weeks. Chronic exposure to increased CO2 may have complex effects on the growth and reproductive success of calcareous and non-calcareous plants and animals and could induce possible adaptations that are not observed in short term experiments. Our present understanding also stems largely from experiments on individual organisms or a species in isolation; consequently, the response of populations and communities to more realistic gradual changes is largely unknown. Other aspects of ocean biogeochemistry may be strongly influenced by rising CO2 levels. Recent experiments with one of the most abundant types of phytoplankton, Synechococcus, showed significantly elevated photosynthesis rates under warmer, high CO2 conditions. Elevated CO2 also enhanced nitrogen fixation rates (production of biologically useful nutrients from dissolved nitrogen gas) for a key tropical marine cyanobacteria, which would in effect fertilize the surface ocean and offset predicted reductions in tropical biological production due to climate warming and stratification. Further, a major but underappreciated consequence of ocean acidification will be broad alterations of inorganic and organic seawater chemistry beyond the carbonate system. Acidification will affect the biogeochemical dynamics of calcium carbonate, organic carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus in the ocean as well as the seawater chemical speciation of trace metals, trace elements and dissolved organic matter. A fully-integrated research programwith in-water and remote sensing observing systems on multiple-scales, laboratory, mesocosm (large volumes of seawater either in tanks or plastic bags), and field process studies, and modeling approachesis required to //med management strategies// //that address how humans might// //best mitigate or// //adapt// //to these long-term changes//. This program should emphasize how changes in the metabolic processes at the cellular level will be manifested within the ecosystem or community structure, and how they will influence future climate feedbacks. A program should include the following components: Systematic monitoring system with high resolution measurements in time and space of atmospheric and surface water carbon dioxide partial pressure (pCO2), total dissolved inorganic carbon, alkalinity, and pH to validate model predictions and provide the foundations for interpreting the impacts of acidification on ecosystems; In regions projected to undergo substantial changes in carbonate chemistry, tracking of abundances and depth distributions of key calcifying and non-calcifying species at appropriate temporal and spatial scales to be able to detect possible shifts and distinguish between natural variability and anthropogenic forced changes; Standardized protocols and data reporting guidelines for carbonate system perturbation and calcification experiments; Manipulative laboratory experiments to quantify physiological responses including calcification and dissolution, photosynthesis, respiration, and other sensitive indices useful in predicting CO2 tolerance of ecologically and economically important species; New approaches to investigate address long-term subtle changes that more realistically simulate natural conditions; Manipulative mesocosm and field experiments to investigate community and ecosystem responses (i.e., shifts in species composition, food web structure, biogeochemical cycling and feedback mechanisms) to elevated CO2 and potential interactions with nutrients, light and other environmental variables; Integrated modeling approach to determine the likely implications of ocean acidification processes on marine ecosystems and fisheries including nested models of biogeochemical processes and higher trophic-level responses to address ecosystem-wide dynamics such as competition, predation, reproduction, migration, and spatial population structure; Robust and cost effective methods for measuring pH, pCO2, and dissolved total alkalinity on moored buoys, ships of opportunity, and research vessels, floats and gliders; Studies on the human dimensions of ocean acidification including the socio-economic impacts due to damaged fisheries and coral reefs; Assessment of potential adaptation strategies needed by resource managers including reducing other human stresses (over-fishing, habitat destruction, pollution) to //increase// //ecosystem// //resiliency//as well as local-scale mitigation efforts.

Antarctic science is the vital internal link to global science diplomacy
Collins 11 – Center for Global Sustainability Studies and major sponsor of the 22nd Pacific Science Congress (June 2011, “Founded on science, world cooperation in Antarctica a model for meeting climate, other challenges,” [] ) mj

__The success of world co-operation based on science__ and practiced since the Cold War __by__ __nations operating in Antarctica offers a model__ to humanity __as it confronts challenges__ to common interests __like climate change, biodiversity loss and overfishing__, says the editor of a new book on science diplomacy. Since the end of the Second World War __science has become an important tool of diplomacy, not only for issues involving environmental management, but for peace in the world we live in__, says Paul Berkman, former Head of the Arctic Ocean Geopolitics Programme, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge, UK, and Research Professor at the Bren School of Environmental Science & Management at the University of California Santa Barbara. Says Dr. Berkman, keynote speaker at an international conference on Antarctica being held in Malaysia: "For half a century__, it has become increasingly obvious that we face planetary-scale phenomena that cannot be solved by any one nation or region__, nor solved quickly. Today and forever after, __national and international interests need to find the type of balance practiced today__ under the Antarctic Treaty." In a new book published by the Smithsonian Institution, Science Diplomacy: Antarctica, Science and the Governance of International Spaces, Dr. Berkman writes: "The two world wars of the 20th Century underscored animosity on a global scale. In contrast, __reflecting unparalleled international cooperation, institutions have evolved since 1945 to prevent or resolve disputes transcending national boundaries.__ Most of these institutions relate to issues that cross national boundaries. However, there is a suite of institutions that has emerged to manage regions beyond the reach of national jurisdiction in the high seas (1958), Antarctica (1959), outer space (1967), and the deep sea (1971)." __The origin, development and success of the Antarctic Treaty offers hope and inspiration applicable to the challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss, overfishing and a host of similarly vexing environmental problems__, he writes. __"Any lessons we are able to glean from the Antarctic experience will be relevant not only to those interested in traditional international spaces but also to those in search of effective approaches to governing an expanding range of issues (e.g., climate change)…that are destined to become even more important in the future."__ "Perhaps __the broadest legacy of the__ first 50 years of the (__Antarctic Treaty) is the development__ of a suite __of practices that are useful in any effort to ensure that interactions between science and policy produce positive results__ for both __communities in addressing a wide range of large-scale issues__ for the benefit of humankind and the world we inhabit." "The parts of the planet that fall under national jurisdiction constitute just 30% of the world," says Dr. Berkman. "We're still in infancy in terms of how to work as a civilization. __The extent of humanity's common interests and inter-connectedness has only become truly apparent in the second part of the 20th Century__." __The fundamental role of science in international governance as exemplified in the Antarctic Treaty includes such responsibilities as monitoring and assessing change over time and space, the discovery of new beneficial health and other products derived from biological resources, and prioritizing and framing issues for consideration.__ "__Science is free of such time-bound blinders and therefore is fundamental to environment-related diplomacy at a global scale__," says Dr. Zakri, who co-chairs as well the Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT). "The world is changing always. __Science provides the common language, culture and foundation for nations and people to work together in decision-making on shared global interests."__

Science diplomacy solves all impacts
Federoff 8 – professor of biology at Penn State University known for her research on biology and life sciences, president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) (April 2008, “International Science and Technology Cooperation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Research and Science Education,” Committee on Science and Technology, [] ) mj

Chairman Baird, Ranking Member Ehlers, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss science diplomacy at the U.S. Department of State. The U. S. is recognized globally for its leadership in science and tech nology. Our scientific strength is both a tool of ``soft power''- -part of our strategic diplomatic arsenal-- and a basis for creating partnerships with countries as they move beyond basic economic and social development. Science diplomacy is a central element of the Secretary's transformational diplomacy initiative, because science and technology are essential to achieving stability and strengthening failed and fragile states. S &T advances have immediate and enormous influence on national and global economies, and thus on the international relations between societies. Nation states, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations are largely shaped by their expertise in and access to intellectual and physical capital in science , technology, and engineering. Even as S&T advances of our modern era provide opportunities for economic prosperity, some also challenge the relative position of countries in the world order, and influence our social institutions and principles. America must remain at the forefront of this new world by maintaining its technological edge, and leading the way internationally through science diplomacy and engagement. The Public Diplomacy Role of Science Scienceby its nature facilitates diplomacy because it strengthens political relationships, embodies powerful ideals, and creates opportunities for all. The global scientific community embraces principles Americans cherish : transparency, meritocracy, accountability, the objective evaluation of evidence, and broad and frequently democratic participation. Science is inherently democratic, respecting evidence and truth above all. Science is also a common global language, able to bridge deep political and religious divides. Scientists share a common language. Scientific interactions serve to keep open lines of communication and cultural understanding. As scientists everywhere have a common evidentiary external reference system, members of ideologically divergent societies can use the common language of science to cooperatively address both domestic and the increasingly trans-national and global problems confronting humanity in the 21st century. There is a growing recognition that science and technology will increasingly drive the successful economies of the 21st century. Using Science Diplomacy to Achieve National Security Objectives The welfare and stability of countries and regions in many parts of the globe require a concerted effort by the developed world to address the causal factors that render countries fragile and cause states to fail. Countries that are unable to defend their people against starvation, or fail to provide economic opportunity, are susceptible to extremist ideologies, autocratic rule, and abuses of human rights. As well, the world faces common threats, among them climate change, energy and water shortages, public health emergencies, environmental degradation, poverty, food insecurity, and religious extremism. These threats can undermine the national security of the United States, both directly and indirectly. Many are blind to political boundaries, becoming regional or global threats. The United States has no monopoly on knowledge in a globalizing world and the scientific challenges facing humankind are enormous. Addressing these common challenges demands common solutions and necessitates scientific cooperation, common standards, and common goals. Wemust increasingly harness the power of American ingenuity in science and technology through strong partnerships with the science community in both academia and the private sector, in the U.S. and abroad among our allies, to advance U.S. interests in foreign policy. There are also important challenges to the ability of states to supply their populations with sufficient food. The still-growing human population, rising affluence in emerging economies, and other factors have combined to create unprecedented pressures on global prices of staples such as edible oils and grains. Encouraging and promoting the use of contemporary molecular techniques in crop improvement is an essential goal for U.S. science diplomacy. An essential part of the war on terrorism is a war of ideas. The creation of economic opportunity can do much more to combat the rise of fanaticism than can any weapon. The war of ideas is a war about rationalism as opposed to irrationalism. Science and technology put us firmly on the side of rationalism by providing ideas and opportunities that improve people's lives. We may use the recognition and the goodwill that science still generates for the United States to achieve our diplomatic and developmental goals. Additionally, the Department continues to use science as a means to reduce the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and prevent what has been dubbed ` brain drain .' Through cooperative threat reduction activities, former weapons scientists redirect their skills to participate in peaceful, collaborative international research in a large variety of scientific fields. In addition, new global efforts focus on improving biological, chemical, and nuclear security by promoting and implementing best scientific practices as a means to enhance security, increase global partnerships, and create sustainability.

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(SAME RUSSIA ADVANTAGE)

Climate change makes arctic methane release inevitable
Duarte and Huertas 12- *Director of the Oceans Institute at the University of Western Australia, **Staff Scientist at Spanish Scientific Research Council CSIC (Carlos and Antonio Delgado, “Methane Hydrates: A Volatile Time Bomb in the Arctic”, Arctic News, http://arctic-news.blogspot.com/2012/10/methane-hydrates-a-volatile-time-bomb-in-the-arctic.html)//WK The risk with climate change is not with the direct effect of humans on the greenhouse capacity of Earth’s atmosphere. The major risk is that the relatively modest human perturbation will unleash much greater forces. The likelihood of this risk is intimately tied to the developments over the next decade in the Arctic. Accelerating ice loss and warming of the Arctic is disturbing evidence that dangerous climate change is already with us. As I have argued earlier, now that we have realised this our efforts should be directed at managing the situation in the Arctic and avoiding the spread of dangerous climate change elsewhere. The Arctic is a core component of the earth system. Six of the 14 climate change tipping points of the earth system are located in the Arctic region. Whereas the term tipping point was initially introduced to the climate change debate in a metaphoric manner, it has since been formalised and introduced in the context of systems exhibiting rapid, climate-driven change, such as the Arctic. Tipping points have been defined in the context of earth system science as the critical point in forcing at which the future state of the system is qualitatively altered. Tipping elements are defined, accordingly, as the structural components of the system directly responsible for triggering abrupt changes once a tipping point is passed. This is because they can be switched into a qualitatively different state by small perturbations. Of the many tipping elements in the Arctic, that with potentially greatest consequences if perturbed is the vast methane deposit. Methane is a greenhouse gas. A molecule of methane has 20 times the greenhouse effect of a CO ₂ molecule, and the release of methane has been linked to climatic transitions along the history of planet Earth. The Arctic contains vast reserves of methane stored as methane hydrate, a gel-like substance formed by methane molecules trapped in frozen water. The methane hydrate deposits are estimated at between 1,000 and 10,000 Gigatons (109 tons) of CO ₂ -equivalents as methane, much of which is present in the shallow sediments of the extensive Arctic shelves. This amount of greenhouse gas is several times the total CO ₂ release since the industrial revolution. Even moderate (a few degrees C) warming of the overlying waters may change the state of methane from hydrates to methane gas, which would be released to the atmosphere. If this release is gradual, methane will add a greenhouse effect to the atmosphere. This will only be temporary, as it will be oxidised to CO ₂, with a decline in the greenhouse effect of 20-fold per unit carbon. However, if the state shift is abrupt it may lead to a massive release of methane to the atmosphere, which could cause a climatic jump several-fold greater than the accumulated effect of anthropogenic activity. Recent assessments have found bubbling of methane on the Siberian shelf. Models suggest that global warming of 3°C could release between 35 and 94 Gt C of methane, which could add up to an additional 0.5°C of global warming. Moreover, frozen soils and sediments contain large amounts of methane hydrates that can be released to the atmosphere. Indeed, rapid thawing of the Arctic permaforst has been reported to lead to the release of large amounts of methane. In our most recent cruise this summer (June 2012) along the Fram Strait and Svalbard Islands we found concentrations of methane in the atmosphere of about 1.65 ppm. However our equilibrium experiments (air atmospheric with Arctic surface water) reached values that were generally between 2.5 ppm and 10 ppm, with maximum values up to 35 ppm. These results confirm that this area of the planet is emitting large amounts of methane into the atmosphere. Understanding and forecasting the response of Arctic methane hydrate deposits to rapid warming and thawing in the Arctic is of the utmost importance. Provided the magnitude of these risks, and those associated with other tipping elements in the Arctic, our collective response to climate change appears to be a careless walk on the razor edge.

Methane bursts cause extinction-comparatively outweighs nuclear war
Ryskin 3- Ph.D. Chemical Engineering California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA Engineer-Physicist St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, St. Petersburg, Russia Fluid dynamics; statistical physics; geophysics Associate Professor of Chemical and Biological Engineering (Gregory, “Methane Driven Oceanic Eruptions and Mass Extinctions”, Northwestern University Department of Chemical Engineering, http://pangea.stanford.edu/research/Oceans/GES205/methaneGeology.pdf)//WK METASTABILITY AND ERUPTION A liquid subject to gravity and completely or partially saturated with dissolved gas is, thermodynamically, in a metastable state. Consider for clarity the case when the concentration of the dissolved gas is only slightly below saturation throughout, and thus increases downward in accordance with Henry’s law. Then locally there is no tendency for the dissolved gas to exsolve (to form bubbles), in spite of the fact that nuclei are abundant in seawater. (Exsolution would lead to a slight increase in free energy: below saturation, the chemical potential of the gas species is lower in solution than in the free gas phase.) At the same time, the free energy of the system as a whole would be greatly reduced if most of the dissolved gas were to somehow escape from solution and collect above the liquid. (This free energy reduction is due to the fast decrease of the chemical potential of gas with a drop in pressure.) Thus, the system is in a metastable state, albeit an unusual one. Strictly speaking, this state is not an equilibrium one even locally: the increase of the solute concentration with depth causes a diffusion ﬂux directed upward, which, given sufﬁcient time, could bring the system into the above state of minimum free energy. However, the continuous supply of methane by the rising bubbles from the seaﬂoor ensures that the concentration proﬁle will remain nonuniform, slowly approaching the saturation one. Even if that supply were to cease, the diffusion time scales are so long that this path toward the global energy minimum can be ignored. A very fast transition from this metastable state can be triggered by disturbances that displace ﬂuid a ﬁnite distance in the vertical direction. Such disturbances may result from an earthquake, a seaﬂoor volcano, convection currents due to geothermal heating, or an internal gravity wave. Consider a parcel of ﬂuid that is displaced upward, and is now subject to lower hydrostatic pressure, to which corresponds a lower solubility value. As a result, the ﬂuid in the parcel is now supersaturated with the dissolved gas, which must begin to exsolve, forming tiny gas bubbles. (If the ﬂuid in its original position was only partially saturated, exsolution will begin after the parcel has risen through some signiﬁcant distance, so in this case the initial disturbance must be sufﬁciently large.) The volume of the ascending parcel of ﬂuid increases due to the formation of bubbles, making it more buoyant and accelerating its rise; this leads to further reduction in the ambient pressure, further exsolution of gas, and further increase in the volume of the parcel. This self-accelerating motion entrains the surrounding ﬂuid; exsolution of the gas in the latter reinforces the motion. The result is a violent eruption (Kling et al., 1987; Zhang, 1996). From the initial eruption site, hydrodynamic disturbances propagate in all directions (via turbulent entrainment and/or internal gravity waves), triggering eruptions at other sites. Similarly to transitions from other metastable states (e.g., boiling of a superheated liquid), the eruption should spread quickly throughout the region of the ocean where the water column is saturated, or partially saturated, with gas. In spite of the low solubility of methane in seawater, the total possible increase in the buoyancy of the parcel can be large. Consider a parcel that started its rise at 4 km depth, where solubility of methane is ;4.3 3 1023. Then, if the parcel had a volume of 18 cm3 (1 mol of water) and was saturated with methane, it contained 4.3 3 1023 mol of dissolved methane. By the time this parcel has risen to the surface, essentially all the methane in the parcel has exsolved (solubility is ;2 3 1025 at the surface). At the surface conditions (T ø 25 8C, P 5 1 bar), 1 mol of any gas occupies 25 3 10 3 cm3, so the total volume of methane in the parcel is ;108 cm3 , and the volume of the parcel, which now contains a mist of water droplets in gaseous methane, is 126 cm3. That is, the volume of the parcel has increased by a factor of seven. Concurrent exsolution of other dissolved gases (e.g., carbon dioxide CO2, hydrogen sulﬁde H2 S) will add to the effect. A rather similar process is responsible for the most violent, explosive volcanic eruptions (called Plinian), such as eruptions of Mount Vesuvius in A.D. 79 or Mount St. Helens in 1980. These eruptions are driven by exsolution of gases (primarily water vapor) dissolved in the liquid magma. In Lake Nyos (Cameroon), CO2 of magmatic origin enters the water column from the bottom, at a depth of ;200 m. In 1986, the lake erupted, creating a gas-water fountain ;120 m in height (Zhang, 1996), and releasing a lethal cloud of CO2. A water surge washed up the shore to a height of ;25 m. The eruption continued for several hours (Kling et al., 1987). OCEANIC ERUPTION AS A CAUSE OF MASS EXTINCTION //methane-driven oceanic eruption for marine and terrestrial life are likely to be catastrophi////c//. Figuratively speaking, the erupting region ‘‘boils over,’’ ejecting a large amount of methane and other gases (e.g., CO2, H2 S) into the atmosphere, and ﬂooding large areas of land. Whereas pure methane is lighter than air, methane loaded with water droplets is much heavier, and thus spreads over the land, mixing with air in the process (and losing water as rain). The air methane mixture is explosive at methane concentrations between 5% and 15%; as such mixtures form in different locations near the ground and are ignited by lightning, explosions 2 and conﬂagrations destroy most of the terrestrial life, and also produce great amounts of smoke and of carbon dioxide. Firestorms carry smoke and dust into the upper atmosphere, where they may remain for several years (Turco et al., 1991); the resulting darkness and global cooling may provide an additional kill mechanism. Conversely, carbon dioxide and the remaining methane create the greenhouse effect, which may lead to global warming.The outcome of the competition between the cooling and the warming tendencies is difﬁcult to predict (Turco et al., 1991; Pierrehumbert, 2002). Upon release of a signiﬁcant portion of the dissolved methane, the ocean settles down, and the entire sequence of events (i.e., development of anoxia, accumulation of dissolved methane, the metastable state, eruption) begins anew. No external cause is required to bring about a methane-driven eruption—its mechanism is self-contained, and implies that eruptions are likely to occur repeatedly at the same location. Because methane is isotopically light, its fast release must result in a negative carbon isotope excursion in the geological record. Knowing the magnitude of the excursion, one can estimate the amount of methane that could have produced it. Such calculations (prompted by the methane-hydrate-dissociation model, but equally applicable here) have been performed for several global events in the geological record ; the results range from ;10 18 to 10 19 g of released methane (e.g., Katz et al., 1999; Kennedy et al., 2001; de Wit et al., 2002). These are very large amounts: the total carbon content of today’s terrestrial biomass is ;2 3 10 18 g. Nevertheless, relatively small regions of the deep ocean could contain such amounts of dissolved methane ; e.g., the Black Sea alone (volume ;0.4 3 1023 of the ocean total; maximum depth only 2.2 km) could hold, at saturation, ;0.5 3 10 18 g. A similar region of the deep ocean could contain much more (the amount grows quadratically with depth 3 ). Released in a geological instant (weeks, perhaps), 10 18 to 10 19 g of methane could destroy the terrestrial life almost entirely. Combustion and explosion of 0.75 3 10 19 g of methane would liberate energy equivalent to 10 8 Mt of TNT, ; //10,000 times greater than the world’s stockpile of nuclear weapons//, implicated in the nuclearwinter scenario (Turco et al., 1991).

Status quo mapping efforts are insufficient for detection and extraction
Ruppel et al. 11- U.S. Geological Survey (Dr. Carolyn, “A New Global Gas Hydrate Drilling Map Based on Reservoir Type”, USGS and DOE National Laboratory joint report in //Fire and Ice//, Fire and Ice, Vol 1. Issue 11, http://www.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/Research/Oil-Gas/methane%20hydrates/MHNews_2011_05.pdf#Page=13)//WK Several types of maps depicting global gas hydrate occurrences have been formulated, since large amounts of field data began to be acquired several decades ago. Here, we propose a new type of map that highlights the resource potential of gas hydrates in locations that have already been sampled by deep drilling. Historically, global maps related to gas hydrates have fallen into a few categories. The first type portrays the locations where pressure-temperature conditions in the sedimentary section are inferred to be appropriate for forming gas hydrates in the deep ocean and in permafrost regions. Such maps can be based on models that range from straightforward to relatively sophisticated, depending on the degree to which they incorporate global datasets on sediment thickness, organic carbon content, thermal regimes, and similar factors (e.g., Buffett and Archer, 2004; Wood and Jung, 2008). Scaled down to individual regions and with local detail included, such maps can provide important guidance for field surveys. Typically these maps emphasize prospective occurrences though, without regard to sediment properties that in part control gas hydrate saturations. Another type of map and associated database records where gas hydrate has been visually observed upon the recovery of sediments, sometimes without distinction between shallow gas hydrates accessible by piston cores and deeper gas hydrates studied during drilling programs (e.g., Booth et al., 1996; Kvenvolden and Lorenson, 2000). Shallow and deeper-seated gas hydrates are not equally important in a consideration of climate, hazard, and energy resource issues, and their inclusion on the same map can be misleading. Shallow gas hydrates (<50 m) are more susceptible to changes in the ocean-atmosphere system and in some cases may represent a near-seafloor drilling hazard ; however, they are not considered targets for natural gas production for a variety of technical and safety reasons. Deeper-seated gas hydrates that occur as high saturation deposits could eventually be good targets for production, and the gas evolved from these gas hydrates during drilling could in some cases become a hazard without appropriate controls. Such deep-seated gas hydrates are not very important for climate issues, since they could only emit methane to the ocean-atmosphere system if warming were particularly profound or long-lived. Other drawbacks of maps focusing on gas hydrates that have been visually observed in recovered cores are biased towards (1) fractured fine-grained sediments, where massive gas hydrate occurring as fracture fill is more likely to survive core recovery; (2) locations where recovery conditions (e.g., colder water, shallower water column) are more conducive to gas hydrate preservation; and (3) well-surveyed areas or features of particular interest to researchers. In particular, some maps give the impression that the distribution and volume of gas hydrate are greater on US continental margins than on the margins of Africa, Asia, or India. Owing to heavy local and regional bias in sampling, caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions about the global distribution of gas hydrates on the basis of such maps. Another kind of map portrays the distribution of bottom-simulating reflectors (BSRs ) to indicate areas where marine gas hydrate might occur in the sedimentary section. The recovery of gas hydrate at locations where a BSR is lacking (e.g., Paull et al., 1996 on the Blake Ridge; many locations in the Gulf of Mexico) underscores the limited niche for BSR maps. The presence of a BSR usually indicates that some gas hydrate, most commonly at low saturation, occurs near the base of the stability zone; a missing BSR in a gas hydrate-prone area may have several interpretations, including low methane flux (Xu and Ruppel, 1999), a petroleum system that focuses gas migration and disrupts pervasive, diffuse flux (e.g., Gulf of Mexico; Shedd et al., 2009), and local perturbations in temperature, salinity, and/or methane flux that modify or destroy BSRs.

Two internal links:

a) Icebreakers are key to effective methane detection
APL 6- Applied Physics laboratory at the University of Washington (Applied Physics Laboratory report for the Acoustic Navigation and Communications for High-latitude Ocean Research, “Acoustic Navigation and Communications for High-latitude Ocean Research A Report from an International Workshop Sponsored by the National Science Foundation Office of Polar Programs”, anchor.apl.washington.edu/ANCHOR_workshop_report.pdf)//WK The recent release of the newest International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean (IBCAO) digital terrain model [ 8] concludes with an important, and sometimes overlooked, observation: “ Even if the new IBCAO is far superior compared to its predecessors, it is not ﬂawless: it retains certain errors such as track line artifacts, terracing from the use of contours, and in areas where there are no available soundings, it relies on contours from maps with sometimes no source information. . . ” Much of the Arctic Basin, especially in perennially ice-covered regions, has never been mapped by modern sounding techniques. This lack of data limits geological and geophysical investigations of large- and small-scale topographic features in the Arctic Basin. Because of the strong control topography exerts on Arctic Ocean circulation, it also impacts oceanographic research. //xpand bathymetric maps as waning ice cover permits more incursions into unexplored regions//, but even in an ice-free Arctic, surface ships will acquire data with lower resolution than platforms that can operate within the water column. Given that many geoscientiﬁc investigations need map data with resolutions on the order of meter- or even sub-meter scales, accurate navigation of these submerged systems is imperative. Geological and geophysical issues that still require investigation in the Arctic Basin span broad spatial and temporal ranges. Formation of some major physiographic features (e.g., the Amerasia Basin and the Alpha Ridge) remains controversial. Resolving these questions requires mapping over thousands of square kilometers at resolutions on the order of tens to hundreds of meters in regions that are still inaccessible to icebreakers and even nuclear-powered submarines. Detection of methane hydrates and seeps in regions such as the North Slope of Alaska and Chukchi Borderland will cover much smaller areas at higher resolutions.Events such as teleseismically detected earthquakes along Gakkel Ridge or mass wasting slumps along continental margins can best be explored by rapid response of autonomous vehicles, yet they require precise navigation and accurate maps of potential topographic obstacles to be successful. The best measurements of sediment ﬂuxes through canyons and other gateways need to include repeated surveys of sediment pathways, especially in response to signiﬁcant events such as storm surges. Ultimately, analysis of the environmental change that is occurring in the Arctic must examine the Arctic Ocean as a system with a perspective that extends from the ocean ﬂoor to the atmosphere. Recent, successful deployments of AUVs in the Arctic show that the underwater portion of this perspective is coming into clearer focus, but it will require an infrastructure that allows all of the measurements to be co-registered in space and time.

Mapping key to effective methane extraction
Long et al 8- *researcher for Pacific Northwest National Library (P.E, “Preliminary Geospatial Analysis of Arctic Ocean Hydrocarbon Resources”, US Department of Energy, http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-17922.pdf)//WK Ice over the Arctic Ocean is predicted to become thinner and to cover less area with time (NASA, 2005). The combination of more ice-free waters for exploration and navigation, along with increasing demand for hydrocarbons and improvements in technologies for the discovery and exploitation of new hydrocarbon resources have focused attention on the hydrocarbon potential of the Arctic Basin and its margins. The purpose of this document is to 1) summarize results of a review of published hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic, including both conventional oil and gas and methane hydrates and 2) develop a set of digital maps of the hydrocarbon potential of the Arctic Ocean. These maps can be combined with predictions of ice-free areas to enable estimates of the likely regions and sequence of hydrocarbon production development in the Arctic. In this report, conventional oil and gas resources are explicitly linked with potential gas hydrate resources. This has not been attempted previously and is particularly powerful as the likelihood of gas production from marine gas hydrates increases. Available or planned infrastructure, such as pipelines, combined with the geospatial distribution of hydrocarbons is a very strong determinant of the temporal- spatial development of Arctic hydrocarbon resources. Significant unknowns decrease the certainty of predictions for development of hydrocarbon resources. These include: 1) Areas in the Russian Arctic that are poorly mapped, 2) Disputed ownership: primarily the Lomonosov Ridge, 3) Lack of detailed information on gas hydrate distribution , and 4) Technical risk associated with the ability to extract methane gas from gas hydrates. Logistics may control areas of exploration more than hydrocarbon potential. Accessibility, established ownership, and leasing of exploration blocks may trump quality of source rock, reservoir, and size of target. With this in mind, the main areas that are likely to be explored first are the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea, in spite of the fact that these areas do not have highest potential for future hydrocarbon reserves.

b) Icebreakers are key to extraction-the alternative is waiting for ice to melt which causes methane release
Hargreaves 12- CNN correspondent focusing on the energy industry (Steve, “Oil: Only part of the Arctic's massive resources”, CNN Money, http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/17/news/economy/Arctic-oil/index.htm)//WK NEW YORK (CNNMoney) -- When Royal Dutch Shell sinks five wells off Alaska -- slated for next month -- it will be the first drilling in U.S. Arctic waters in decades. Yet it will be just the latest in a slow-moving but steady push to tap the Arctic's vast natural resources. Encouraged by high commodity prices and shrinking sea ice, everyone from Big Oil to the cruise industry is eager to get in on the Arctic's riches. Oil and Gas: Perhaps the most high profile of the Arctic's natural resources, oil and natural gas also seem to be the most plentiful. Nearly 13% of the world's undiscovered oil reserves and 30% of its undiscovered gas reserves lie north of the Arctic circle, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. That's 90 billion barrels of oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Those estimates don't even include so-called unconventional oil and gas deposits such as hydrocarbons found in shale rock or methane hydrates on the sea floor -- which are basically crystals filled with natural gas. Finding themselves increasingly locked out of resource-rich nations such as Mexico, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, the world's major international oil companies are eying this potential Arctic bounty as a source for future growth. Shell's Alaska operations are garnering most of the headlines this summer, but the U.K.'s Cairn Energy has already drilled off the coast of Arctic Greenland. Norway's Statoil (STO) is exploring in the Barents Sea, where Chevron (CVX, Fortune 500) also has leased acreage. And Exxon Mobil (XOM, Fortune 500) has struck a deal with Russia's Rosneft to drill in the Arctic off the Siberian coast. These and other deals have been announced in rapid succession over the last few years. But actually producing sizable quantities of oil from the Arctic will be a long, slow process. The region is utterly lacking in the infrastructure needed to build oil wells and move crude out: pipelines, deep water ports, airstrips, housing. Even which counties own what resources is in dispute. Dealing with the shifting Arctic ice is another challenge. Greenpeace to monitor Shell Arctic drilling with submarines The pressures created by massive ice sheets could crush traditional oil field equipment. Even subsurface pipelines and well heads could be obliterated by a deep iceberg moving in the shallow Arctic waters off Alaska. "There needs to be an evolution of technologies," said Surya Rajan, an oilfield technology analyst at IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates. It's not at all certain extracting this oil and gas can be done without significant damage to the natural environment and the livelihoods of the people that inhabit the region. So for now, Arctic oil development will proceed at a slow pace, in shallow water with drilling mostly confined to summer months -- much as Shell (RDSA) is planning with its Alaska wells. Even if Shell strikes oil next month, those wells would not be producing oil for several years. It may be a decade or more before major amounts of oil or gas flow from Arctic waters. Shipping: The melting Arctic is creating a tantalizing prospect for shipping companies: Keeping the northern sea passage between Europe and Asia permanently open. For decades ships have been able to traverse the Arctic along two sea routes. One hugs the Canadian coast and the other along the Russian side. Obama to allow more Arctic drilling These routes can cut the distance between Northern Europe and Japan nearly in half, according to a report by the Arctic Council, an organization made up of the eight Arctic nations and other stakeholders. Some estimate it could shave a millions dollars in costs off each trip. Arctic voyages could previously only take place during a short window in the summer, and often require d expensive and scarce icebreakers to accompany the ships. That may be changing. Many scientists now estimate that the Arctic could be permanently ice-free in the summer by 2030. That could make the Arctic passable year round, and without requiring the services of an icebreaker.

The plan solves – two icebreakers are sufficient
NRC 7 – working arm of the United States National Academies, which produces reports that shape policies, inform public opinion, and advance the pursuit of science, engineering, and medicine (National Research Council, “Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of US Needs,” [] ) mj CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The committee finds that both operations and maintenance of the polar icebreaker fleet have been underfunded for many years, and the capabilities of the nation’s icebreaking fleet have diminished substantially. Deferred long-term maintenance and failure to execute a plan for replacement or refurbishment of the nation’s icebreaking ships have //r regions at risk////.// The nation needs the capability to operate in both polar regions reliably and at will. Specifically, the committee recommends the following: • The United States should continue to project an active and influential presence in the Arctic to support its interests. This requires U.S. government polar icebreaking capability to ensure year-round access throughout the region. • The United States should maintain leadership in polar research. This requires icebreaking capability to provide access to the deep Arcticand the ice-covered waters of the Antarctic. • National interests in the polar regions require that the United States immediately program, budget, design, and construct two new polar icebreakers to be operated by the U.S. Coast Guard. • To provide continuity of U.S. icebreaking capabilities, the POLAR SEA should remain mission capable and the POLAR STAR should remain available for reactivation until the new polar icebreakers enter service. • The U.S. Coast Guard should be provided sufficient operations and maintenance budget to support an increased, regular, and influential presence in the Arctic. Other agencies should reimburse incremental costs associated with directed mission tasking.