Morgan+and%20Jake


 * Critical South Korea**


 * Gender Adv, Orientalism Adv**


 * Plan text:**
 * The United States federal government should withdraw its military presence in South Korea. **


 * Contention 1: Is me love you long time**

Where there are soldiers, there are women who exist for them. This is practically a cliché. History is filled with examples of women as war booty and “camp followers,” their bodies being used for service labor of various kinds, including sex. Contrary to common assumptions in the West, prostitution is not “part of Asian culture.” Just about every culture under the sun has some version of it during times of war and times of peace. In some ways, military prostitution (prostitution catering to, and sometimes organized by, the military) has been so commonplace that people rarely stop to think about how and why it is created, sustained, and incorporated into military life and warfare. Academic interest and analysis of this issue gained momentum only in the last twenty years and still remains scant and sporadic. Even as interest in women and gender as categories of analysis has increased in many academic disciplines, there is still a question of intellectual “legitimacy,” that is, whether prostitutes, prostitution, and sex work warrant “serious” scholarly attention and resources, especially for students of international politics. After all, it is a highly “personal” and therefore “subjective” matter and prone toward the proverbial “he said/she said” contestation. To boot, many have turned the feminist emphasis on women and agency on its head by glibly claiming that most military prostitutes sought out the work and life of their own free will and therefore are exercising their agency. In this view, it is primarily about women’s personal decisions and responsibility to face the consequences; governments and other institutions of society need not be held accountable. Filipino activists from the Gabriela women's organization wearing cut-outs of the four accused US Marines of rape, pose standing behind bars in Manila, 23 November 2006. For decades, key leaders of Asian women’s movements such as Takazato Suzuyo of Okinawa and Matsui Yayori, the well-known Japanese journalist and feminist activist, Aida Santos and women’s organizations like GABRIELA of the Philippines have argued to the contrary. They documented and insisted that U.S. military prostitution in Okinawa/Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines involve a complex “system” of central and local government policies, political repression, economic inequalities and oppression of the underclass, police corruption, debt bondage of women by bar owners, in addition to pervasive sexist norms and attitudes in both the U.S. military and the respective Asian society. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Asian feminists raised these connections, they tended to fault patriarchal and sexist values together with power inequalities emanating from them and the economic and political disparities among nations. Such individuals and organizations also emphasized the compromised sovereignty of their own governments in relationship with the more powerful U.S. government and military, resulting in the compromised rights and dignity of the Korean, Okinawan, Filipina and other women who “serviced” American military (male) personnel. Aida Santos, a long-time activist opposing U.S. military bases in the Philippines (and later the Visiting Forces Agreement) wrote in the early 1990s that in the Philippines, “[r]acism and sexism are now seen as a fulcrum in the issue of national sovereignty.”[1] Such activists made the case that the personal is indeed political and international. [2] “Olongapo Rose,” a 1988 documentary film by the British Broadcasting Corporation about U.S. military prostitution in the Philippines graphically depicts the various political, economic, cultural, and racial “systems” at work. Even under authoritarian rule in the 1970s, Filipinas did not hesitate to speak up and campaign nationally and internationally against the Philippines authorities and the U.S. military for abetting and condoning the physical, sexual, and economic exploitation and violence against women who worked in the R&R industry along Olongapo and Subic Bay, where U.S. forces had been stationed until the early 1990s. But in Korea, even progressive activists of the 1970s and 1980s, who fought against military dictatorship, labor repression, and the violation of human rights overlooked military prostitution as a political issue. For one, they had their plates full, challenging the Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan regimes. Second, as much as some activists criticized the dominant role of the United States in the alliance relationship, others were loath to attack a fundamental institution that safeguarded Korean security. Of course, the legal system was stacked against them. With the National Security Law squarely in place, critics of the U.S. military or the alliance could be thrown into prison, tortured, or killed. Third, military prostitutes were so beneath the political radar screen of most progressives because the women themselves were viewed as “dirty,” lowest of the low, and “tainted” because they slept with foreign soldiers. A highly puritanical and moralistic sense of ethnonationalism among most Koreans had exiled Korean military prostitutes from the larger Korean society and political arena. It is common knowledge among military prostitutes and their advocates that the formers’ family often disowned them upon learning of their “shameful” lives. But in 1988, Yu Boknim, a Korean democracy activist, and Faye Moon, an American missionary and social activist became mavericks even among progressive dissidents by paying attention to the plight of the Korean gijichon (camptown) women. Together with the assistance of a handful of student activists and the financial support of some Protestant churches, they established Durebang (My Sister’s Place) in 1988 as a counseling center, shelter, and later bakery (to generate income for older women who had left the sex business and younger women who wanted to get out). But despite their efforts to raise awareness of the relationship between the presence of U.S. bases and the growth of this underclass of women and their Amerasian children, most of Korean society continued to ignore the women and their needs. Rather, Yu and Moon found increasing solidarity with their activist counterparts from the Philippines, Okinawa/Japan, and the United States as women began to organize around issues of sexual violence and slavery, militarism, and human rights in the Asia-Pacific. Currently, military prostitution in Korea has been transformed in line with global economic and migration trends. Foreign nationals, primarily from the Philippines and the former Soviet Union, have become the majority of sex-providers and “entertainers” for the U.S. troops. Young Korean women, with better education and economic and social opportunities than their mothers or grandmothers, are not available for such work. And they are not as easily duped by traffickers. In a more complex, globalized and multicultural sex industry environment, however, political and legal accountability for various problems and conflicts that both the prostitutes and the servicemen encounter become even more difficult to understand and more difficult for activists to target effectively. Nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis, hardworking advocacy organizations on behalf of the women, such as Saewoomtuh, continue to offer shelter, counseling, and health and legal assistance to the best of their ability. Kids at Amerasian transit center, Ho Chi Minh City, 1992.
 * US military presence in Korea sustains prostitution and violence—Americans project Orientalist and gendered notions of culture onto Korean women to maintain a permanent underclass in Korea **
 * Moon 09 ** - Wellesley College professor (Katharine H.S. “Military Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia” in The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Posted on January 17, 2009. [], MT)


 * Prostitution in South Korea stems from an Orientalist idea of dominance that sees Asians as weak, feminine and submissive, reliant on American military protection **
 * Wu 2k4 ** (Nadine, James Madison University, “The Dynamics of Orientalism and Globalization in the International Sex Industry and Human Trafficking,” 2004, [] ) SLV

Many governments have long promoted sex tourism as a way of generating revenue. Migration for commercial sex work rose significantly in the 1960s and 1970s, with the establishment of U.S military bases in Thailand and neighboring countries (Skrobanek, Boonpakdee, & Jantaeero, 1998). As the U.S military bases extended into Asia in the 1960’s women from poor families were encouraged to prostitute themselves for a source of income to support their families. In fact, some governments such as the Philippines encouraged women to do their “patriotic duty” to help the economy by prostituting themselves to military men (Truong 1996). There is also a booming prostitution industry surrounding U.S military bases in South Korea. It is not a coincidence that prostitution rose at the height of U.S military involvement in Asia. Sex tourism continues to be extremely profitable. In 1996 nearly five million sex tourists from the United States, Western Europe, Australia, and Japan visited Thailand. These transactions brought in about $26.2 billion to the Thai economy (Bales 1999). Many government officials seem to view its women as a gold mine to be used, and depend on them for foreign exchange dollars to help boost their economy. Revenue from sex tourism can be used to pay debts from the World Bank. Social structures are important in the trafficking of women. Castells theorizes that social structures are organized around relationships of production/consumption, power and experience (1996). Power is especially important in the trafficking industry. Traffickers often target people in their local communities because it gives them more power and control (Polaris Project 2003). In a familiar community, the traffickers know who the vulnerable people are. Trust is another good reason for traffickers to use people in their own community. Women are more likely to trust men from their own community so it is easier to deceive them. Traffickers use violence and threats as a form of power against women. They can threaten to hurt the woman’s family members if she does not agree to the traffickers’ demands. Because the woman knows the trafficker(s), she recognizes that the threat can easily be carried out. The trafficker(s) would know exactly who is in her family and where they live. Men who want vulnerable women are trying to establish power in a social structure. As a result of these social structures, many individuals benefit from human trafficking. The traffickers earn money while the customers get to enjoy a sexual experience. Even law enforcement officials, such as the policeman who brought Siri back to the brothel, often receive a percentage of the brothel’s profits. Many elements of human trafficking can be theorized in relation to Orientalism. Critical scholar Edward Said defined Orientalism with several different approaches. Orientalism is a legacy of the Enlightenment, which focused on defining the world in strict dichotomies such as good versus evil. Said analyzes Orientalism as a tradition of theory and practice that has affected the way we think today. According to Said, Orientalism emerged in Europe as an academic tradition of teaching and writing about the Orient. Western scholars studied the Orient through ethnography, and the interpretation of its culture by reading and translating Oriental texts. Orientalism is an idea constructed by the “West” and is also based on the distinction between the Orient and the Occident which leads to fantasies of the exotic “other”. The West sees itself as superior by comparing itself to the “Orient.” The Orient is childlike, exotic, backwards, and incapable of defining itself, while the West is progressive, active, and masculine. Because the Orient was seen as weak and inferior, colonization was viewed as a necessary to save them from their backwardness. Said analyzes Orientalism as a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (1978). Orientalist scholarship provided the means for western countries to take over Oriental lands and rescue them. In essence, it justified colonialism and cultural domination.

C onquerors' mistresses, wartime rape victims, military prostitutes, cinematic soldier-heroes, pin-up models on patriotic calendars-these are only some of the indications, not only that nationalism is often constructed in militarized settings, but that militarization itself, like nationalist identity, is gendered. To put it more simply, no person, no community, and no national movement can be militarized without changing the ways in which femininity and masculinity infuse daily life. Much of our research in the 1960s and 1970s focused on civil wars some we labeled as revolutionary, and others portrayed as mere insurgencies. They seemed to offer opportunities to explore changing consciousness, national versus class versus ethnic loyalties, the processes of social mobilization and party building, state fragility, and state expansion. But as I recall, thinking about civil wars did not prompt us to think about or even conceptualize militarism. States had militaries; that's how you could tell they were states. And certain levels of alienated mobilization seemed naturally to take the form of armed insurgency. But as for militarism a distinctive set of beliefs and structures and militarization a particular societal process entrenching these beliefs and structures we looked to neither concept to generate questions, to make us stop in our intellectual tracks. So we made militarization of any society appear simpler than, in fact, it was. When I think back now to the 1960s, I wonder why I didn't pause, why I found it so easy to accept armed nationalist conflicts as, if not inevitable, at least not very surprising. At some level I did not see nationalist warfare as problematic. True, I did puzzle over state elites' use of their militaries and police forces to respond to ethnic or antiimperialist challenges. I did wonder how civilian nationalists came to their decisions to take up armed resistance and whether they would succeed in controlling the military forces they had created. And I did try to understand how relatively unpoliticized people caught in the crossfire would piece together their own strategies for coping with escalating conflict. All this hard questioning notwithstanding, I think I assumed that militarization of any nationalist conflict wasn't difficult to accomplish. It only required, I naively presumed, the state's deployment of military units and the insurgents' acquisition of weapons and recruits and policies to bring both sides into an encounter. In those days I didn't give much thought to what sorts of mental transformations had to occur in order for national identities to become militarized. Now I am more and more convinced that the militarization of any nationalist movement occurs through the gendered workings of power. It is neither natural nor automatic. Militarization occurs because some people's fears are allowed to be heard, and to inform agendas, while other people's fears are trivialized or silenced. Slovak nationalism, reemerging today; Quebecois nationalism, now in its third decade of development; Lithuanian nationalism, successful in its achievement of statehoodnone have (as yet) been militarized. Within other nationalist movements, by contrast, there has been ambivalence and even explicit conflict over militarization. Thus, within contemporary Russian nationalism, U.S. black nationalism, Canadian Indian nationalism, South African black nationalism, German nationalism, and Serb, Croatian, and Bosnian nationalism, there have been debates over social changes that would legitimize particular militaristic tendencies. In each of these processes of national formation, the struggle today remains inconclusive. It is impossible to make sense of how nationalist ideologies and organizations emerge, grow, wither, or disappear altogether unless we chart these internal debates over militarization. Who supports militarizing strategies, and who offers alternatives? Do the supporters and their critics look different in their gender, region, generation, class, or political experience? Principal among militarizing transformations are changes in ideas about manliness manliness as it supports a state, and manliness as it informs a nation. If I had given more (or any!) thought to how the meaning assigned to being a man changed as a state deployed its forces in the name of "national security" or in the name of creating a new, more authentic nation, or as a nationalist movement mobilized its force, then I might have noticed that changes in ideas about masculinity do not occur without complementary transformations in ideas about what it means to be a woman. For instance, I might have paid attention to a state's policies regarding rape: were soldiers given instructions to avoid sexual assaults on women in the contested regions? Were reported assaults treated seriously by superior officers, or glossed over? I might have given more analytical weight to evidence that insurgent male leaders deliberately excluded or included women, that they tried to prevent sexual liaisons within their units, that they encouraged most women to serve the now-militarized cause in roles compatible with concepts of femininity preexisting in the community. And by paying attention I might have caught sight of the contradictions that thread their way through most instances of militarization. For militarization is a process that is not greased with natural inclinaions and easy choices. It usually involves confusion and mixed messages. On the one hand, it requires the participation of women as well as men. On the other hand, it is a social construction that usually privileges masculinity. It is the first of these two conditions that makes many women who have become nationalists willing to support militarization: their participation as women becomes valuable, and they often gain new space in which to develop political skills. During the Intifada, Palestinian women began to run more of the West Bank community institutions as the Israeli military closed down older institutions as security risks, and as hundreds of Palestinian men were imprisoned. During the eight-month Iraqi military occupation, Kuwaiti women, having lost their Asian maids, likewise gained a new sense of their political value; actions such as obtaining food, carrying information, and caring for torture victims took on new, nationalist connotations. Similarly, Iraqi women who identify themselves as nationalists by virtue of participation in the ruling Baathist Party's Women's Federation today speak of the earlier Iran-Iraq war as a time when the state was compelled to take women's talents seriously, as it replaced conscripted men with women in hosts of official positions. Yet because it is a process riddled with gendered contradictions, the militarization of any nationalist movement is usually contested. It is often precisely where one can observe the formal and informal political struggles between women and men. In these debates over militarization, women and men are divided, not simply over priorities on the political agenda, but also over what constitutes this amorphous thing, "the nation."Peace movements that emerge within militarizing nationalist movements are typically treated as though they are hopeless and/or analytically trivial. The militarization of our own curiosity often takes the form of treating the most militarized tendencies such as the formation of mostly male militias as the most analytically interesting.
 * Military violence is neither natural nor inevitable—war is sustained by gendered systems of identity like military prostitution**
 * Enloe 93 ** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 245-248, MT)

The filmmakers weren't able to follow the young man beyond basic training. But it would not be surprising if he had been sent to Afghanistan; Soviet troops were still mired in that guerrilla war when the documentary was being shot. Nor was the crew able to return to interview the mother after her son returned if he returned. Perhaps she would have told them of her new worries, maybe now mixed with anger, prompted by stories slowly filtering back from Afghanistan. These were not stories of enemy atrocities. They were stories of cruelty within the ranks of the Red Army itself: harsh hazing rituals carried out by older soldiers against younger conscripts or by men of one ethnic group against men of another ethnic group, with officers participating or standing passively by. Some mothers began to collect the stories, to add up the suicides, to challenge officials' sanguine explanations. In 1989, some of the women whose sons had been officially listed as missing in action began to form their own groups, independent of the official organizations designed to channel the anxieties of soldiers' mothers. The first objective of these groups was to extract more information about their sons' fates from the government. It was the unresponsiveness and even contempt with which officials greeted these requests that sparked more radical thinking and activist grass-roots organizing among increasing numbers of women. After a large demonstration outside the Soviet Chamber of Deputies in March 1989, the organizers founded the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers. A year later, it changed its name to Materinskoe Serdise, "Mother's Heart." Although the exact size of its membership remained unknown, the organization began to receive telephone calls and letters from parents throughout the Soviet Union anxious to know more about the whereabouts and well-being of their sons serving in the military. 3 These women were redefining motherhood. Being a good Soviet mother and being a Soviet patriot no longer seemed mutually reinforcing. The mothers began to forge a radically new portrait of the state's military. No longer did it seem the patriotic defender of Soviet society, the transformer of boys into mother-free men. It seemed more of an inhumane machine devouring the sons of mothers. The Gorbachev regime, trying to extricate itself from Afghanistan while instituting political reforms at home, was particularly vulnerable to this emergent maternal dissent. It was not only the military that had to be mollified but also the maternal organizations, which were wearing a new mantle, a new legitimacy. An official investigatory commission was created. Its 1991 report confirmed the women's claim. The authors estimated that for the past fifteen years an average of eight thousand Soviet soldiers had died annually in service: 50 percent from suicide, 20 percent from beatings or other inflicted injuries, 10 percent from accidents, and only 20% in the line of duty.4 In the wake of the abortive August coup, women organizing out of their identities as mothers of soldiers became even more assertive. In October 1991, a group of 250 women from fifty-six towns in Russia held a hunger strike outside Moscow's White House to demand that the state-sponsored All-Union Congress of Parents of Servicemen not be privileged as the sole organization representing soldiers' families. A few days later, representatives of the mothers of soldiers movement, as it was now being labeled, surrounded the defense minister and insisted that they be allowed inside the congress. When he turned his back on them and drove off, they pushed their way into the meeting hall, only to be evicted by police.5 The ending of any war is a complicated process. It is not an event: the signing of a peace accord, the decommissioning of a missile. It is a long series of steps, with each step shaping the steps that follow, yet no step automatically succeeding the ones that came before it. And the war-ending process is gendered. Many of the steps require the redefining of long-held notions of femininity and masculinity as well as the abandonment of government policies intended to sustain particular relationships between men and women and between men or women and the state. The Cold War has had distinct attributes, but in its dissolution it is no different from the Crimean War or World War II We will be able to chart more accurately the gendered processes that are at work in constructing the post Cold War world if we can describe exactly what it is that needs to be dismantled. What were the gendered relationships on which the Cold War relied for its creation and forty-five-year-long perpetuation? The regimes that were essential to perpetuating the Cold War had to convince their citizenries that the world was a dangerous place. Their citizens had to behave as if surrounded by imminent danger. Having internalized an acute sense of danger, citizens would be more likely to accept the heavy taxation and the underfunding of health, housing, and education that came with high military spending. Being persuaded that danger lurked, citizens would be more willing to leave secrecy unquestioned, to leave conscription and wiretapping unchallenged. The more convincingly danger was portrayed, the more vulnerable was any campaign for social change to accusations of subversion. Calling for a reduction of a factory's toxic emissions, working to spread literacy among poor urban women, organizing the harvesters of agricultural cropsall would be more easily imagined as threats to the state and to the social order itself if the world could be thought of as fraught with diffuse danger. But of course women and men do not experience danger in identical ways. In most of the societies that were drawn into the Cold War, men were thought to be manly insofar as they did not shy away from danger and perhaps even flirted with it as they protected the nation's children and women. Women, on the other hand, were considered those most vulnerable to danger. Only a foolish woman, a woman who ignored the dictates of femininity, behaved as though she was not endangered, as though a man's protection was irrelevant. If she went out alone at night, if she hitchhiked or traveled far from home without a masculine shield, she deserved what she got. Likewise, women could be persuaded to support their governments' efforts to organize against the Cold War threat. Any man was socialized into the gendered culture of danger in part by the women who would look to him to provide protection, to be the brave one.This gendering of danger has been dissected, and its myths exposed, chiefly by women in India, Great Britain, Mexico, the United States, Brazil, and elsewhere who have created movements against violence toward women and against government efforts to control women's sexuality. But the lessons are pertinent to making sense of the Cold War. For example, feminist researchers have uncovered a 1958 report by a presidential commission assessing the U.S. Military Assistance Program which urged national security strategists to think about Third World women's fertility. As the Cold War rivalry spiraled, the report explained that high birth rates were due to women's uncontrolled fertility. These rates were producing population growth in countries of strategic importance to the U.S.such as Egypt, Mexico, Brazil, and Indonesiathat would destabilize their regimes and make them dangerously susceptible to Communist subversion. 6 During the next two decades, women in many countries imagined to be strategically important in the U.S.Soviet rivalry would find that they were sharing their beds not only with their husbands but also with U.S. national security officials. Many Brazilian women who organized against their country's anti-Communist military government in the 1970s and 1980s came to the conclusion that militarized anti-Communism and domestic violence against women needed to be critiqued in the same breath, for the construction of the worldview that placed danger at its core relied on gendered danger as well.7 Male bonding among policymakers privy to state secrets, recruiting military ''manpower," and keeping checks on women-led social reform movements all were part of a web woven to perpetuate the Cold War, each thread of which required women to relate to danger in a markedly different way than was required of men. It was no coincidence, therefore, that the "feminine mystique" gained such political potency in the United States in the 1950s, at the very time when the government was taking steps to roll back the allegedly anomalous gender changes wrought by World War II. Pressing women especially white, middle-class womenback into the domestic sphere went hand in hand with promoting consumerist capitalism; the feminine mystique became as solid a pillar of the U.S. version of Cold War culture as did its remasculinized military. Both were part of the "American way of life" that would protect U.S. citizens from the lures of Communism. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that scores of women voluntarily offered their services to Washington's new civil defense bureaucracy.8 Homosexuality, latchkey children, women in combatall, U.S. Cold War cultural strategists warned, could undermine the country's capacity to meet the global threat. Smuggling FBI agents into U.S. Army women's softball teams in the 1950s in order to track down alleged lesbians, therefore, was just one small policy brick laid on the American side of the rising Cold War wall.9
 * Representations of a dangerous world solidify the gendered order of international relations. The war in Korea will never end until military masculinity is challenged**
 * Enloe **** 93 ** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 12-16, MT)


 * Patriarchal militarism will end life on Earth**
 * Warren and Cady 94** (Karen and Duane, Professors of Philosophy at Malacaster College and Hamline University, Hypatia, Spring)

The notion of patriarchy as a socially dysfunctional system enables feminist philosophers to show why conceptual connections are so important and how conceptual connections are linked to the variety of other sorts of woman-nature-peace connections. In addition, the claim that patriarchy is a dysfunctional social system locates what ecofeminists see as various "dysfunctionalities" of patriarchy-the empirical invisibility of what women do, sexist-warist-naturist language, violence toward women, other cultures, and nature-in a historical, socioeconomic, cultural, and political context.(10) To say that patriarchy is a dysfunctional system is to say that the fundamental beliefs, values, attitudes and assumptions(conceptual framework) of patriarchy give rise to impaired thinking, behaviors, and institutions which are unhealthy for humans, especially women, and the planet. The following diagram represents the features of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system: Patriarchy, as an Up-Down system of power-over relationships of domination of women by men, is conceptually grounded in a faulty patriarchal belief and value system,(a), according to which(some) men are rational and women are not rational, or at least not rational in the more highly valued way(some) men are rational; reason and mind are more important than emotion and body; that humans are justified in using female nature simply to satisfy human consumptive needs. The discussion above of patriarchal conceptual frameworks describes the characteristics of this faulty belief system. Patriarchal conceptual frameworks sanction, maintain, and perpetuate impaired thinking,(b): For example, that men can control women's inner lives, that it is men's role to determine women's choices, that human superiority over nature justifies human exploitation of nature, that women are closer to nature than men because they are less rational, more emotional, and respond in more instinctual ways than(dominant) men. The discussions above at(4) and(5), are examples of the linguistic and psychological forms such impaired thinking can take. Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise,(c), and the unmanageability,(d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy.I n the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion(that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress." And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current "unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies,(d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male gender-identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these are life consequences are precisely those concerns with nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors--the symptoms of dysfunctionality--that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is--as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.(11) The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature(see Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "a militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth” (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global.


 * Specifically, the idea of military dominance makes nuclear war inevitable**
 * Reardon, 93 ** (Betty, Women and peace: feminist visions of global security, p.31

A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay—all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used.

Since its publication, Said’s classic text has generated a great deal of scholarship and commentary. Relatively little of this work deals directly with violent conflict.7 Yet, war and violent conflict have always been fundamental to Orientalist discourses. Indeed, the very idea of the West, along with its History, is born in Orientalist conflict. Herodotus elaborated a vision of the Greeks through contrast with the Persian Empire they fought.8 Back then, of course, the Greeks were the weaker party, fighting for their existence on an imperial periphery. A long line of scholars and political and military commentators have made use of cultural materials already well developed in Herodotus—the Persians as a multitudinous mass who threatened to overwhelm the Greeks; their lack of individuality and ‘freedom’; their hierarchical social and political arrangements; their indolence and sensuality; their capacity for, indeed enjoyment of, unreasoning, passionate violence, and so on. Orientalism subsequently has been marked by this extremism, and by this fear, even as the poles of power shifted to favor the putative West of the day. The renaissance recoveries of Greek and Roman traditions, and their subsequent employment in Orientalisms of diverse kind, took place in a Europe poised to begin its modern rise to world dominance. The birth of Orientalist traditions in a context of Western weakness and existential crisis, but subsequently flowering in one of strength and dominance marks also the American experience. Outnumbered and threatened by Indians at the beginning, Puritan traditions of Indian hating became basic to the Frontier, the American West, and beyond to the ground wars in Asia.9 Already evident in the ancient Greek narratives is the basic principle of Orientalist war: the civilizing mission. Roman, British and contemporary American imperialists (along with British publicists who egg them on) continued to draw deeply on this originary stock of cultural resources even as they developed it. The West frames use of force in the non-European world almost always in civilizing terms. The modernization of backward peoples often requires violence, ultimately for their own good. ‘Rollback’ in the Cold War was about liberating the slave world from totalitarian grip. Narratives of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention partake also of this world of Orientalist war. I want to develop an important aspect of Orientalist constructions that is of great relevance to Korea. This concerns numbers, the idea of an overwhelming Asian horde, which is there right from the start. In the Greek and Persian wars of the fifth and sixth centuries BC, Persian forces outnumbered the Greeks in the major engagements, and of course it was, at that time, the Persians who had invaded Greece. Chroniclers exaggerated the ratio of opposing forces in some cases by orders of magnitude according to modern scholarship. Hans Delbruck suggests Greek oral and dramatic traditions inflated Persian numbers as a way of emphasizing the impressive character of victories won by their citizen soldiers against the professional warriors and noble cavalry of the Persian army. Subsequently, whatever the actual strategic context, whatever the actual relations ofpolitical and military power, this trope of a few outnumbered whites facing off against an Oriental horde that far outnumbers them generally has informed representations of war between the West and Orientalized others. The film 300 (dir. Zack Snyder 2007) is only the most recent example, one that speaks directly to the continued popular vitality of Herodotus’ themes, but there are numerous other examples. In fact, you will have a hard time finding Hollywood war films that do not in one or another involve a few outnumbered Americans.
 * The Orientalist notion that Korea must be defended is wrong and makes war inevitable **
 * Barkawi 08 ** (Tarak, lecturer in international security at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, specializes in the study of war, “Orientalism at War in Korea,” [] ) SLV


 * Military prostitution in Korea is sustained by racist depictions of Asian women—the legacy of US occupation exacerbates racism in both Asia and the United States **
 * Moon ** ** 97 ** – Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Department of Political Science and Edith Stix Wasserman Chair of Asian Studies (Katherine, “Sex among Allies” 1997, p. 33-35, MT)

In Olongapo and Angeles in the Philippines, where the U.S. Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base were respectively located (until the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1992),"[t]here was virtually no industry except the 'entertainment' business, with approximately 55,000 registered and unregistered prostitutes and a total of registered 2,182 R&R establishments. 68By 1985 the U.S. military had become the second largest employer in the Philippines, hiring over 40,000 Filipinos. . . . The sum of their salaries amounted to almost $83 million a year." 69 Ideologies around race and nationality have also contributed to the social inequalities and conflicts, especially affecting prostitutes, in the U.S. camptown communities in Asia. Enloe writes that"[c]lass and race distinctions inform all social relations between the U.S. military and the host community." 70 The racism demonstrated by American soldiers toward Asians in Vietnam and Korea are well-documented. Lloyd Lewis notes that "soldiers in all branches of the armed services [in Vietnam] recount receiving the same indoctrination" that the "enemy is Oriental and inferior." 71 The racist terms for Vietnamese--"gook, slant, slope, dink . . . or a half a dozen local variations"—72 had all been employed previously by Americans [toward Japanese in World War II and Koreans and Chinese in the Korean War] to designate yellow-skinned peoples." 73 Max Hastings has noted in his history of the Korean War that the "Eighth Army was forced to issue a forceful order" in the summer of 1951 that soldiers cease" to take a perverse delight in frightening civilians" and attempting to "drive the Koreans off roads and into ditches." The order concluded with "We are not in this country as conquerors. We are here as friends." 74 Hastings also includes a comment by a Marine, Selwyn Handler: "Koreans were just a bunch of gooks. Who cared about the feelings of people like that? We were very smug Americans at that time." 75 Bruce Cumings recounts the racism among Americans, soldiers and diplomats alike, in the late 1960s:"Their racism led them to ask me, because I was living with Koreans and they rarely ventured out to 'the economy,' things like whether it was true that the Korean national dish, kimch'i, was fermented in urine." 76 Racist stereotypes of Asians within the American society have mixed with sexist stereotypes of Asian women to foster American participation in camptown prostitution in Asia. The main military newspaper, Stars and Stripes, encouraged soldiers to explore Korea's "nighttime action," especially the kisaeng party, the"ultimate experience": Picture having three or four of the loveliest creatures God ever created hovering around you, singing, dancing, feeding you, washing what they feed you down with rice wine or beer, all saying at once," You are the greatest." This is the Orient you heard about and came to find. 77 A U.S. Army chaplain I interviewed in April 1991 noted the following: What the soldiers have read and heard before ever arriving in a foreign country influence prostitution a lot. For example, stories about Korean or Thai women being beautiful, subservient-- they're tall tales, glamorized. . . . U.S. men would fall in lust with Korean women. They were property, things, slaves. . . . Racism, sexism--it's all there. The men don't see the women as human beings--they're disgusting, things to be thrown away. . . . They speak of the women in the diminutive. 78 On Okinawa, U.S. servicemen from the Kadena Air Base" can be seen in town (Naha) wearing offensive T- shirts" depicting" a woman with the letters LBSM," which means" little brown sex machine." 79 The "brown" refers to the Filipino and Thai women who constitute the majority of military prostitutes on Okinawa. 80 Aida Santos reveals that Olongapo sells a variation on the theme--a popular T-shirt" bearing the message 'Little Brown Fucking Machines Powered with Rice.'" 81 She emphasizes that in the Philippines,"[r]acism and sexism are now seen as a fulcrum in the issue of national sovereignty." 82 The presence of U.S. military servicemen in Asia generates significant social transformations that affect both the host Asian society and the American society across the Pacific. Thanh-dam Truong has asserted that the U.S. military's use of Thailand as the major R&R base for U.S. soldiers fighting in Vietnam has spawned the now booming sex tourism industry all across the country, 83 winning Thailand the ignoble title, "Asia's brothel." Filipinos have charged that U.S. servicemen have brought AIDS and HIV into their country. Prostitutes in Olongapo, along with the umbrella feminist organization, GABRIELA, and health organizations, pushed the Philippine government to "obtain a guarantee that all U.S. service personnel coming into the Philippines be tested for HIV." 84 In 1988, the Philippines Immigration Commissioner required all U.S. servicemen entering the Philippines to present certificates verifying that they are AIDS-free. 85 In addition, sexual relations between American men and Asian prostitutes have created a living legacy of mixed-raced children who are rejected by both their mother's and father's societies. Maria Socorro"Cookie" Diokno, an active leader in the Philippines' anti-base movement, has referred to the children born of American servicemen and Asian women as "Amerasian 'souvenir' bab[ies]." 86 ABC's Prime Time (May 13, 1993) depicted Amerasian children in the Philippines who had been abandoned by their soldier-fathers and were living with their impoverished mothers, scavenging for food among heaps of rubble and waste. Enloe reports that"[o]f the approximately 30,000 children born each year of Filipino mothers and American fathers, some 10,000 [were] thought to become street children, many of them working as prostitutes servicing American pedophiles." 8 Enloe adds that a Filipino "insider" has noted that many others have been sold, with" Caucasian-looking children . . . allegedly sold for $50-200 (around P1,000-4,000), whereas the Negro-fathered ones fetch only $25-30 (around P500-600)." 88 Johnston's Mom in Songt'an, Korea, also tried to give up her sons to adoption, after earlier having given up a daughter. But in the end, she could not bear to do it and went back to prostitution in order to keep her boys. 89 In the film, Camp Arirang, one barwoman in Songt'an laments the need to give up her half African-American son one day; black Amerasian children are most shunned in Korean society, so most mothers try to send them to the United States for a chance at education and a future. She has already torn up all photographs of herself with her son because she knows she must let him go. In a voice cracking with emotion, she calmly says, "All I want him to know is that he was born in Korea, that his mother is Korean, and that she is dead. It will be easier for him that way." The withdrawal of U.S. naval bases from the Philippines in 1992 also left behind a legacy of approximately 50,000 Amerasian children in the Philippines, with an estimated 10,000 of them living in Olongapo, which had housed the U.S. Subic Naval Base. The law firm of Cotchett, Illston, and Pitre of Burlingame, California, filed a class action suit against the U.S. government on behalf of Amerasian children left behind in the Philippines in March 1993. 90 The plaintiffs would "ask the federal court to order the Navy to provide funds for the education and medical care of these children until they reach 18 years of age." 91 The prostitute- mothers of these children and several leading Philippine civic organizations, such as GABRIELA, as well as the Council of Churches, mobilized such legal action. Asian societies have borne the burden of the painful repercussions of militarized prostitution, but the American society has not gone untouched. Many of the prostitutes who end up divorced from their GI husbands (an estimated 80% of Korean-GI marriages end up in divorce) 92 go back into prostitution around military camp areas in the United States. 93 In the film The Women Outside, officials from the Mayor's Office of Midtown Enforcement in Manhattan state that some U.S. servicemen have been paid by flesh traffickers to marry women in Korea and bring them to the United States for work in massage parlors and brothels.


 * Racism is ethically wrong and justifies violence **
 * Memmi 2k ** (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is. and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one's moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is "the truly capital sin."fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity's spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed, All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. "Recall," says the Bible, "that you were once a stranger in Egypt," which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal -- indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end. The ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.


 * Contention 2: Yes, we do solve**


 * Intervening at the site of military prostitution allows us to challenge the masculine international order as a whole **
 * Enloe 93 ** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 16-18 MT)

It's true that in international politics women historically have not had access to the resources enabling them to wield influence. Today women are at the bottom of most international hierarchies: women are routinely paid less than even the lowest-paid men in multinational companies; women are two thirds of all refugees. Women activists have a harder time influencing struggling ethnic nationalist movements than do men; women get less of the ideological and job rewards from fighting in foreign was than do men. Though a pretty dismal picture, it can tell us a lot about how the international political system has been designed and how it is maintained every day: some men at the top, most women at the bottom. But in many arenas of power feminists have been uncovering a reality that is less simple. First, they have discovered that some women's class aspirations and their racist fears lured them into the role of controlling other women for the sake of imperial rule. British, American, Dutch, French, Spanish, Portuguese women may not have been the architects of their countries' colonial policies, but many of them took on the roles of colonial administrators' wives, missionaries, travel writers and anthropologists in ways that tightened the noose of colonial rule around the necks of African, Latin American and Asian women. To describe colonization as a process that has been carried on solely by men overlooks the ways in which male colonizers' success depended on some women's complicity. Without the willingness of 'respectable' women to see that colonization offered them an opportunity for adventure, or a new chance of financial security or moral commitment, colonization would have been even more problematic. 12 Second, feminists who listen to women working for multinational corporations have heard these women articulate their own strategies for coping with their husbands' resentment, their foremen's sexual harassment and the paternalism of male union leaders. To depict these women merely as passive victims in the international politics of the banana or garment industries doesn't do them justice. It also produces an inaccurate picture of how these global systems operate. Corporate executives and development technocrats need some women to depend on cash wages; they need some women to see a factory or plantation job as a means of delaying marriage or fulfilling daughterly obligations. Without women's own needs, values and worries, the global assembly line would grind to a halt. But many of those needs, values and worries are defined by patriarchal structures and strictures. If fathers, brothers, husbands didn't gain some privilege, however small in global terms, from women's acquiescence to those confining notions of femininity, it might be much harder for the foreign executives and their local élite allies to recruit the cheap labor they desire. Consequently, women's capacity to challenge the men in their families, their communities or their political movements, will be a key to remaking the world. 'So what?' one may ask. A book about international politics ought to leave one with a sense that 'I can do something'. A lot of books about international politics don't. They leave one with the sense that 'it's all so complex, decided by people who don't know or care that I exist'. The spread of capitalist economics, even in countries whose officials call themselves socialists, can feel as inevitable as the tides. Governments' capacity to wound people, to destroy environments and dreams, is constantly expanding through their use of science and bureaucracy. International relationships fostered by these governments and their allies use our labor and our imaginations, but it seems beyond our reach to alter them. They have added up to a world that can dilute the liveliest of cultures, a world that can turn tacos and sushi into bland fast foods, globalize video pornography and socialize men from dozens of cultures into a common new culture of technocratic management. One closes most books on 'international political economy' with a sigh. They explain how it works, but that knowledge only makes one feel as though it is more rewarding to concentrate on problems closer to home. Hopefully, the chapters that follow will provoke quite a different feeling. They suggest that the world is something that has been made; therefore, it can be remade. The world has been made with blunt power, but also with sleights of hand. Perhaps international policy-makers find it more 'manly' to think of themselves as dealing in guns and money rather than in notions of femininity. So they and most of their critics as well have tried to hide and deny their reliance on women as feminized workers, as respectable and loyal wives, as 'civilizing influences', as sex objects, as obedient daughters, as unpaid farmers, as coffee-serving campaigners, as consumers and tourists. If we can expose their dependence on feminizing women, we can show that this world system is also dependent on artificial notions of masculinity: this seemingly overwhelming world system may be more fragile and open to radical change than we have been led to imagine. Some women have already begun the difficult process of trying to create a new international political system. Many point to the conference in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985 to mark the end of the United Nations Decade of Women as a watershed. For eighty years Nairobi women had been trying to build new international alliances, especially to end men's exclusive right to vote in national elections and to end the exploitation of women as mothers and as prostitutes by national and imperial armies. Some of those efforts made international élites nervous. Occasionally, they wittingly or unwittingly entrenched gendered hierarchies of international power. They elevated motherhood to a political status; they made feminine respectability a criterion for political legitimacy; they proposed that white women should be the political mentors of women of color. An international feminist alliance, as we will see, doesn't automatically weaken male-run imperialist ventures. In the late 1980s there are fresh understandings, therefore, of the ways in which international feminist theorizing and organizing has to be rooted in clear explanations of how women from different, often unequal societies, are used to sustain the world patterns that feminists seek to change. Women organizing to challenge UN agencies, the International Monetary Fund or multinational corporations are developing theory and strategies simultaneously. A feminist international campaign lacking a feminist analysis of international politics is likely to subvert its own ultimate goals. Among the sectors 'subsystems' of the world political system that are being most affected by internationalized feminist organizing today are prostitution; population politics; development assistance; military alliances; textile and electronics production. It takes a lot of information-gathering, a lot of thinking, a lot of trial and error and a lot of emotionally draining work to understand how notions about femininity and masculinity create and sustain global inequalities and oppressions in just one of these sectors. Yet a truly effective international feminism requires us to make sense of how patriarchal ideas and practices link all of these sectors to each other and to other relationships whose gendered dynamics we have scarcely begun to fathom.

Making women invisible hides the workings of both femininity and masculinity in international politics. Some women watching the Iran/Contra hearings found it useful to speculate about how the politics of masculinity shape foreign-policy debates. They considered the verbal rituals that public men use to blunt the edges of their mutual antagonism. A congressman would, for instance, preface a devastating attack on Admiral Poindexter's rationale for destroying a document by reassuring the admiral and his male colleagues that he believed the admiral was 'honorable' and 'a gentleman'. Another congressman would insist that, despite his differences with Reagan officials Robert McFarlane and Oliver North, he considered them to be 'patriots'. Would these same male members of Congress, selected for this special committee partly because they had experience of dealing with military officers and foreign-policy administrators, have used the word 'honorable' if the witness had been a woman? Would 'patriot' have been the term of respect if these men had been commending a woman? There appeared to be a platform of trust holding up these investigations of US foreign policy. It was a platform that was supported by pillars of masculinity, pillars that were never subjected to political scrutiny, but which had to be maintained by daily personal exchanges, memos and formal policy. A theme that surfaced repeatedly during the weeks of the Iran/Contra hearings was 'We live in a dangerous world'. Critics as well as supporters of selling arms to Iran and using the profits to fund the Contras were in agreement on this view of the world in 1987. No one chimed in with, 'Well, I don't know; it doesn't feel so dangerous to me.' No one questioned this portrayal of the world as permeated by risk and violence. No one even attempted to redefine 'danger' by suggesting that the world may indeed be dangerous, but especially so for those people who are losing access to land or being subjected to unsafe contraceptives. Instead, the vision that informed these male officials' foreign-policy choices was of a world in which two super-powers were eyeball-to-eyeball, where small risks were justified in the name of staving off bigger risks the risk of Soviet expansion, the risk of nuclear war. It was a world in which taking risks was proof of one's manliness and therefore of one's qualification to govern. Listening to these officials, I was struck by the similarity to the 'manliness' now said to be necessary for success in the international financial markets. With Britain's 'Big Bang', which deregulated its financial industry, and with the French and Japanese deregulators following close behind, financial observers began to warn that the era of gentlemanliness in banking was over. British, European and Japanese bankers and stockbrokers would now have to adopt the more robust, competitive form of manliness associated with American bankers. It wouldn't necessarily be easy. There might even be some resistance. Thus international finance and international diplomacy seem to be converging in their notions of the world and the kind of masculinity required to wield power in that world in the 1990s. 8 At first glance, this portrayal of danger and risk is a familiar one, rooted in capitalist and Cold War ideology. But when it's a patriarchal world that is 'dangerous', masculine men and feminine women are expected to react in opposite but complementary ways. A 'real man' will become the protector in such a world. He will suppress his own fears, brace himself and step forward to defend the weak, women and children. In the same 'dangerous world' women will turn gratefully and expectantly to their fathers and husbands, real or surrogate. If a woman is a mother, then she will think first of her children, protecting them not in a manly way, but as a self-sacrificing mother. In this fashion, the 'dangerous world' evoked repeatedly in the Iran/Contra hearings is upheld by unspoken notions about masculinity. Ideas of masculinity have to be perpetuated to justify foreign-policy risk-taking. To accept the Cold War interpretation of living in a 'dangerous' world also confirms the segregation of politics into national and international. The national political arena is dominated by men but allows women some select access; the international political arena is a sphere for men only, or for those rare women who can successfully play at being men, or at least not shake masculine presumptions. Notions of masculinity aren't necessarily identical across generations or across cultural boundaries. An Oliver North may be a peculiarly American phenomenon. He doesn't have a carbon copy in current British or Japanese politics. Even the Hollywood character 'Rambo', to whom so many likened Oliver North, may take on rather different meanings in America, Britain and Japan. 9 A Lebanese Shiite militiaman may be fulfilling an explicitly masculinist mandate, but it would be a mistake to collapse the values he represents into those of a British SAS officer or an American 'Rambo'. Introducing masculinity into a discussion of international politics, and thereby making men visible as men, should prompt us to explore differences in the politics of masculinity between countries and between ethnic groups in the same country. These differences have ignited nationalist movements which have challenged the existing international order, dismantling empires, ousting foreign bases, expropriating foreign mines and factories. But there have been nationalist movements which have engaged in such world challenges without upsetting patriarchal relationships within that nation. It is important, I think, to understand which kinds of nationalist movement rely on the perpetuation of patriarchal ideas of masculinity for their international political campaigns and which kinds see redefining masculinity as integral to re-establishing national sovereignty. Women do not benefit automatically every time the international system is re-ordered by a successful nationalist movement. It has taken awareness, questioning and organizing by women inside those nationalist movements to turn nationalism into something good for women. In conventional commentaries men who wield influence in international politics are analyzed in terms of their national identities, their class origins and their paid work. Rarely are they analyzed as men who have been taught how to be manly, how to size up the trustworthiness or competence of other men in terms of their manliness. If international commentators do find masculinity interesting, it is typically when they try to make sense of 'great men' Teddy Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Mao Tset'ung not when they seek to understand humdrum plantation workers or foreign tourists. Such men's presumptions about how to be masculine in doing their jobs, exercising influence, or seeking relief from stress are made invisible. Here are some examples: In 1806 executives of the Northwest Company decided it was no longer good international company politics for their trappers to take Native Canadian women as their wives; they calculated that it was more advantageous to encourage their Canadian white male employees to import European women. That was a self-conscious use of power to reshape the relationships between women and men for the sake of achieving specific international goals. The decisions of managers in London altered the way in which Canada was integrated into the British empire. It was an imperial strategy that relied on the currencies of gender and race. 10 When US Defense Department officials insisted that the Philippines government take responsibility for conducting physical examinations of all women working in the bars around the American military bases in the Philippines, it affected the lives of thousands of young Filipinas and sent a clear message to thousands of American sailors and Air Force pilots. The message symbolized the unequal alliance between the US and Philippines governments. Its implementation rooted that government-to-government inequality in the everyday lives of American military men and Filipino working women.11 The chapters that follow explore some accepted arenas of international politics: nationalist movements, diplomacy, military expansion, international debt. However, we will examine these familiar realms from unconventional vantage points. We will listen to male nationalist leaders worrying about their women abandoning traditional feminine roles. Those masculine worries and nationalist women's responses to them will be taken as seriously as male nationalists' strategies for ousting colonial rulers. We will look at diplomacy by listening to wives of foreign-service careerists. To understand how military alliances actually work, we will consider the experiences of women who live and work around military bases and women who have camped outside those bases in protest. We will explore bankers' international operations by paying attention to women who have to live on austerity budgets or work in factories, hotels and other people's kitchens in order for government debts to be serviced. Later chapters explore areas assumed to fall outside 'international politics'. Looking at fashions in clothing and food sheds light on the relationships between affluent and developing countries. The often difficult relationships between domestic servants and the middle-class women who hire them will be examined to make sense of new trends in international politics. We will take a close look at the foreign travel of Victorian women explorers and present-day businessmen to understand how power between countries is made and challenged. We will listen to women married to diplomats in order to see to what extent governments' foreign-policy machinery depends on notions of wifely duty.
 * The notion that America must protect its vulnerable allies maintains partriarchy—the reasons for the plan are significant because they cast it as a challenge to patriarchy rather than a cosmetic change in the patriarchal system **
 * Enloe 93 ** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “Bananas, Beaches and Bases” p. 11-15 MT)

It is a misplaced hope. For the significant work now being done on masculinity is not a repopulating of the political landscape with men in the name of postmodernism. Rather, those conducting the valuable investigations of masculinity start from the essential feminist discovery that we can make sense of men's gendered reactions only if we take women's experiences seriously. Indeed, the more we have learned about the deliberate efforts to circumscribe women's behavior, the more we have exposed the human decision making that undergirds much of masculinity. We don't yet have feminist-informed studies of such male-dominated institutions as the United Nations Security Council or the Central Intelligence Agency. But the day when we will may not be far off. Already we have a Canadian feminist's analysis of the International Labor Organization.17 And there are North American, European, and Japanese feminist scholars energetically at work right now charting the masculinist assumptions that have guided the distinctively post-World War II profession of international relations research.18 The 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe brought about the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and a surge of demilitarization. But although Polish, Czech, Hungarian, East German, and Romanian women played central roles in the grass-roots organizing that made the eventual upheavals possible, this demilitarization was not guided by feminist insights into the causes of militarization.19 In a mirror image of Western anti-Communist regimes' needing the symbol of the overworked, "unfeminine" Soviet or Polish woman to justify their Cold War policies, the Communist regimes had depended on feminism's being so tainted by its association with Western bourgeois individualism that no woman in their own nations would be inspired by feminist analyses or aspirations. Without the image of the self-absorbed, materialistic, man-hating Western feminist to combat, the restlessness of women in Eastern Europe might have translated into gender-conscious political action much earlier. Olga Havel might have become famous in her own right rather than as an imprisoned playwright's loyal wife. But, unlike the revolutions in Eritrea and Nicaragua, most of those in Eastern Europe were informed by only the faintest glimmers of organized feminist consciousness. Thus, men were not challenged to rethink their own masculinist presumptions about power or public life until after the Communist regimes had crumbled. East Germany initially appeared to provide a contrast. Cities such as Berlin, Dresden, and Weimar were the sites of feminist organizing in 1989. 20 It often appeared ahead of male-led organizing because the regime was preoccupied with monitoring the masculinized coffee houses and universities and thus was caught unprepared for the political activism that flowed out of the theaters and the churches, sites of women's organizing. During those turbulent autumn months, women's groups presented detailed platforms, built diverse umbrella organizations, and mobilized thousands of women in public rallies. For a while they couldn't be ignored by the male contestants for power. They wedged their way into the bargaining rooms and into the transitional regime. But even these consciously feminist women of East Germany couldn't direct the course of the next stage, the government-to-government bargaining sessions that ultimately produced German reunification. Whereas the bringing down of the old regime had been a process shaped by struggles between politicized women and men in East Germany, German reunification was a virtually all-male political process. Soon after, many East German women joined many East German men in voting for Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party, with its promises of material wellbeing and free markets. Those few feminists who warned that reunification without feminist guarantees could be a disaster for women were seen as out of step. Even they might have found it hard to believe that, within two years after reunification, 12 percent of single mothers in eastern Germany would be among the ranks of the unemployed.21 Democratization and demilitarization have commonly been presumed to serve women's interests. Demilitarization loosens the bond between men and the state; thus, it should make the state more transparent and porous. Democratization simultaneously opens up the public spaces; thus, it should permit more voices to be heard and policy agendas to be reimagined. But such changes will take place only if the two processes are not designed in such a way as to reprivilege masculinity. The democratic elections of 1990 in Eastern Europe revealed the tenacity of patriarchy. The results of these elections made invisible women's contributions to creating the conditions that made these elections possible: ·The percentage of women in Czechoslovakia's parliament dropped from 29.3 to 8.6. ·The percentage of women in Poland's parliament dropped from 20.2 to 13.5. ··The percentage of women in Hungary's parliament plummeted from 26.6 to 7.2. ·In the pre-reunification election of March 1990, the percentage of women in East Germany's parliament slipped from 33.6 to 20.5; parliamentary elections in December for a unified German legislature managed to return the same proportion of women, 20.5 percent. ·· The percentage of women in Romania's parliament fell from 34.4 to 5.5. 22 It is not that those Cold War legislatures in which Eastern European women had held a quarter or a third of the seats had wielded effective influence. They hadn't. But that may be the point. Demilitarization and democratization together infused these once drab and impotent bodies with new vitality and new power. Legislatures became places where one could give meaningful voice to public concerns. Even in Poland, where a conservative woman has been made prime minister, the legislative agenda which assigns priority to restricting Polish women's freedom of reproductive choice is being hammered out with little organized influence by Polish women.23 If a man had never felt comfortable spending his waking hours fixing his car or building a garden shed, now he had an alternative outlet for his energies. It was precisely because the legislatures were transformed by the end of the Cold War that they became, in many men's eyes, worthy loci for re-emergent civic activism. Legislatures became thereby places too important to allow more than a handful of women. Does the democratization of parliaments equal the defeminization of parliaments? While Eastern European nations' legislatures have been masculinized, their popular cultures have been sexualized. As women have filed out of the parliaments, they have walked into proliferating beauty contests, franchised brothels, free-enterprise escort services, and joint-venture overseas marriage services. 24 Nor have they done so necessarily against their wills. Russian and Eastern European feminist social commentators who have observed the postrevolutionary traumas of the last several years explain that consumerism is being woven into the democratized fabric of civic life in ways that co-opt many women in their own objectification. "Now there are calendars full of nude women everywhere in the ministry." A Czech feminist who worked in her country's environmental affairs ministry is describing the new bureaucratic culture of post-1989 Prague. Such sexist expressions were defined as pornography and prohibited under the old regime. But with the emergence of capitalism and liberalism in the 1990s, nude women's photos on office walls have become so commonplace that most women office workers feel they have no space to object. "And imagine what it's like coming into a colleague's office to discuss a policy. You sit down and have to put your cup of coffee on a glass-topped coffee table which is displaying assorted cut-out photographs of nude women."25 Some women even seem to be taking pleasure in the widespread availability of pornography. The shriveled consumer markets of the Cold War the price paid for Cold War expenditures on bloated armies and protected weapons factories nurtured aspirations among the double-burdened women that can only now be pursued: for beauty, for pleasure, for financial security, for the marriageable man with a good income and a two-car garage. Filipina feminists allied with women working as prostitutes servicing American sailors around Subic Bay naval base learned what Eastern European feminists trying to create a nascent women's movement today are learning (and what impatient American feminists still may have to learn): any woman hoping to sow the seeds of political consciousness must take other women's desires and even fantasies seriously. Those fantasies could throw light on how political priorities constructed in one era shape women's attitudes toward themselves and the men in their lives in the following era. Writing off as merely a victim of false consciousness a Russian woman who sends her name to a new marriage service for American men risks missing a chance to gain a new understanding of how the post Cold War world is being constructed.Like militarization, demilitarization is sexualized. Men returning from wars have sexual expectations. Fathering is one form of demilitarized citizenship. A year after victory but still in desert fatigues, proud men hold up their newborn babies. No women are inside the photographer's frame. But they are more than bit players in any country's demilitarization. Other men return from war zones anxious about jobs, not just for their own well-being but with a sense of the male breadwinner's familial responsibilities. With the many-stranded winding-down of the Cold War, wars have been ending often raggedly in Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Namibia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Lebanon. Each of these wars was fueled by its own particular internal sparks its class disparities, factional rivalries, and ethnicized oppressions. But each was prolonged and made more ferocious by American and Soviet infusions of direct and indirect aid and encouragement, sometimes to the regime and sometimes to the insurgents. To end each of these Cold War proxy wars, thousands of men must be persuaded to change their ideas of what is right and natural and even pleasurable to do as men. Militarized forms of manliness may be all that some of the younger Cambodian, Lebanese, or Ethiopian men have known. The precise recipes for militarized masculinity will differ, however. Each man's willingness to hand in his grenade launcher or his combat boots and to imagine a demilitarized role for himself in his society will depend on his own experiences as a vigilante, a death squad assassin, an army conscript, a unit commander, or a nighttime civil guard. Perhaps he has been humiliated by other men and thus sees demilitarization as a chance to regain his manly dignity. Or perhaps he has felt more important in his military role than he ever did as a shopkeeper or civil servant. He may have been embarrassed in front of his buddies when he vomited every time he saw a person being wounded. Or he may have felt energized by his new license to wield violent force. Perhaps he found emotional satisfaction in a rarely felt intensity of friendship among men. Or perhaps he felt lonely, deprived of the support and comfort formerly supplied by his wife or mother. Just how a man (or adolescent boy) has experienced militarization and how willingly he sheds the habits and expectations of militarization will redound on the women he returns to. His new definition of his masculinity or his refusal to redefine his identity will be played out in his family life, in his interactions with women workmates, and in his exchanges with women who are perfect strangers. Each of these women, in turn, will be counted on, as she always has been, to coax, absorb, sacrifice, and tutor. Some women, however, may not want to give up their jobs, may not want to have another child, may have grown used to having sex only on occasional leaves, or may not think donning a veil is a proper price for peace (in the home or in the government). These women may rebel against the sorts of expectations leaders will try to impose on them in the name of post Cold War ''political stabilization." It can take years to demilitarize a society. Masculinity and femininity will be among the political territories where the struggles for demilitarization will have to be played out. Vietnamese women and men are still in the process of demilitarization, long after most Americans and Europeans have turned their attention elsewhere. During 1990-92 alone, 500,000 Vietnamese soldiers overwhelmingly male were demobilized. 26 Some had fought in the earlier war against the United States and its Saigon ally. Many were young boys then but were conscripted to fight the succeeding war in neighboring Cambodia. The conclusion of that conflict, due in large measure to the new cooperation between Washington and Moscow, has reunited husbands and wives after long separations. It has also thrown thousands of men onto the already strained Vietnamese labor market, causing the regime to feel nervous over the lack of jobs for men who believe they have made patriotic sacrifices. These scores of male veterans are searching for jobs at a time when Hanoi is cutting support to unprofitable state companies. Women's own waged work, as well as the continuing high birth rate, have thus become issues not simply of economic planning but also of demilitarization. It is no coincidence that prostitution has spread. Local Women's Federation activists are expressing alarm. Vietnamese journalists estimate that there are now one hundred thousand women working as prostitutes in Ho Chi Minh City and another thirty thousand in Hanoi.27 We often think that increasing numbers of women are pressed into prostitution because of militarization. But there are forms of demilitarization such as in Russia or Vietnam that can bring rising prostitution, as men look for new enterprises and as women are displaced from other forms of livelihood. In September 1991, the Hanoi newspaper Lao Dong reported that "hundreds of girls have been sold to brothels in Phnom Penh and southern China."28 An American reporter assigned to Phnom Penh in early 1992 went to the disco at Le Royal Hotel, only to see "swarms of Vietnamese prostitutes descend on unaccompanied men." He offhandedly speculated that, "with lighter skins and more experience than Cambodian women, they dominate the market, and apparently find Phnom Penh more profitable than Saigon."29 These articles did not explore what these Vietnamese women had done before working as prostitutes, who had transported them to Cambodia or southern China, or who owned the brothels in which some of them worked. Prostitutes were mentioned either as features on the landscape or as indicators of economic stress. Women working as prostitutes requiring radical reformations of existing state defense institutions in El Salvador, South Africa, Cambodia, and Lebanon. Every one of these new militaries will prompt government officials to make decisions about whether to recruit women, whether to inaugurate compulsory military service, how to instill discipline and enthusiasm in young men, and whether to acknowledge homosexuality in the ranks. These decisions are only the beginning. Governments creating new militaries will also make deliberate decisions about whether to manipulate masculinized ethnic stereotypes to enhance officers' authority, how to control soldiers' wives, whether to condone military prostitution with what safeguards for male soldiers and whether to turn a blind eye to wife battering within soldiers' homes. As they reach these decisions, to which existing militaries will they look to provide models? Canada? Finland? The United States? India? It is important to record which groups are invited to sit around the policymaking table when these crucial decisions are made. Whose credentials will be deemed relevant those of prostitutes? Of school teachers? Of mothers? The large industrial states are reacting to the end of the rivalry between the great powers by forecasting substantial personnel reductions "downsizing" is the American bureaucratic term. But cutting back on the number of soldiers a military needs is never a simple numerical operation. Will African-American women, who currently comprise 45 percent of all the women in the U.S. Army's rank and file, make up such a large percentage after the cuts? In the wake of the Los Angeles riots, will there be more pressures on the Pentagon to continue to serve as a major socializer of African-American men, even if this means organizing troop reductions so that more white soldiers are given early demobilization? 31 If German leaders respond to calls to end male conscription and introduce an all-volunteer force, will women be allowed to enlist in greater numbers than they are now? What about Turkish-German men? And what will happen to the peculiar relationship of Scottish men to the British army if historic Scottish regiments are merged into less regionally distinct units? If the Gurkha Brigade falls under the same British budgetary ax, will Nepali notions of masculinity undergo a profound transformation? A substantially reduced military is rarely just a smaller military. Cuts in any military's personnel usually alter significantly its relationships to the women and men in the country's various social classes and ethnic communities. Not all of the militaries being created, redesigned, or proposed are being tied to orthodox, sovereign nation-states. French and German officials have proposed the formation of a new European defense force under the aegis of the previously dormant WEU, the Western European Union. Such a force has the attraction to some of being separate from NATO and at arm's length from U.S. influence. Simultaneously, the United Nations peacekeeping forces, drawn from the militaries of its member states, are being looked upon by the governments of many industrialized and Third World countries as offering the best hope for a genuinely post Cold War, non imperialist military. Others worry that so much preoccupation with the UN's new military responsibilities will draw money and value away from the organization's less glamorous, somewhat less masculinized development efforts. Like any other institution, the United Nations is susceptible to masculinization and militarization. Thus we are entering a period of global history when perhaps more new militaries are being designed and launched than at any time since the multiplication of new states during the decolonialization of the 1950s. However, the point is not that militaries have been fixed institutions during the Cold War and are only now being projected into uncertain orbit. A military isn't like a Georgia O'Keeffe painting or an I. M. Pei building when it's done it's done. A military is forever in a state of becoming like a compost heap. The questions we must pose today to understand just what is happening in the Ukraine or South Africa are questions we should have been asking of any military in 1951 and 1985. They are questions that come out of an awareness that any government trying to use its military to sustain its domestic authority and its influence with other states will attempt to use ideas about femininity and masculinity as well as ideas about race and class to get the armed force it feels it can trust. At this moment, then, someone in the corridors of Estonia's fledgling defense ministry is mulling over whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed into the country's new military. That decision is not a foregone conclusion. It never has been a foregone conclusion not in any country's military since homosexuality became an object of explicit state manipulation in the twentieth century. So there will be memos, discussions, advice from psychologists, off-the-record anecdotes, and sly asides. Faxes will likely be sent to Brussels to ask NATO about the policies of its fifteen allies on homosexual soldiering. Back will come faxes saying that the Dutch and Canadians no longer see heterosexuality as a requisite for effective soldiering, while the Americans and British do, though with far less confidence than they did even five years ago. Of principal concern for designers of the Estonian military will no doubt be the question of whether permitting gay men and lesbians to soldier will enhance or jeopardize the new military in the eyes of the country's citizenry. Another matter for official debate will be whether a homosexual man lacks the sort of manly qualities presumed to be needed to wield a gun, follow orders, risk physical danger, and support fellow soldiers under stress. Lesbians will be considered quite differently. If the Estonian bureaucratic discussions sound at all like those in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, then Baltic concern over lesbians will be voiced in terms of their being "too" compatible, not incompatible, with soldiering. In the London headquarters of the once-somnolent WEU, another official is having to figure out how to respond to the official referred to as Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman. She is formally titled the vice-chairman of the WEU's Defense Committee, so she cannot be dismissed cavalierly. Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has submitted a formal report that surveyed the status of women in the union's member forces and found it wanting. She and her committee have looked forward to the mid-1990s, when in all probability a number of WEU forces that now rely on male conscriptionsuch as France, Germany, and Italywill have forsaken that personnel formula and moved toward volunteerism. At that point, she predicts, there will be more appreciation for the skills, educational attainments, and commitment that women can bring to soldiering. She and her colleagues urge the entire WEU not to drag its feet until that day arrives, but instead to take the initiative now to lower the barriers which are keeping the proportion of women in the military well below 10 percent throughout Western Europe. If the WEU is to play a more active role in postCold War security arrangements, it cannot afford to deprive itself of such potentially valuable "manpower." Nor can it afford to be so far out of step with changes in all other sectors of European socioeconomic life. 32 Portugal, with one of the most patriarchal of Western European militaries, is moving in the direction the report recommends. In 1992, the Portugese defense ministry cautiously opened the officer corps to women. Joana Costa Reis, a twenty-five-year-old student of modern languages, was one of the first applicants for the fifteen slots. She thought officer training would allow her to pursue her interests in camping, survival skills, and guns. She was joined by twenty-three-year-old Rosa Maria Santos, who quit her job in order to pursue a career in the army.33 At about the same time, Japan's Self-Defense Agency admitted thirty-nine women cadets into the National Defense Academy. Upon graduation, they will become the first women officers in Japan's military.34 The creation and reorganization of so many military institutions are occurring at a time when gay men and lesbians are more vocal and better organized politically in a wider array of countries than ever before. Militaries have never conducted their discussions about the sorts of sexuality they deemed best suited for soldiering under such a public gaze. Not that there is agreement among gay and lesbian activists in any country over whether military service offers a chance for homosexuals to gain first-class citizenship. What is true, however, is that discussions of such topics among gay men and lesbians have served to underscore for everyone the state-sanctioned artificiality of the heterosexualized soldier.35 Similarly, the question of how and when to use women to compensate for shortages of the kinds of men the government trusts with its weaponry can no longer be addressed within the safe confines of ministerial offices. Women officers in NATO have their own organizations. Civilian feminists, women legislators, and civil rights lawyers in the United States, Canada, and Scandinavia monitor closely their governments' responses to sexual harassment and discrimination in promotions as well as any refinements in the definition of combat. As among gay men and lesbians, however, there is no consensus among feminists about how women should regard military service. Some feminists in each of these countries see the state's military as a potential site for economic advancement and for political legitimation and never use the concept of militarism to gauge that military's impact on the social order. Other feminists start with questions about militarism. They begin their assessment of their country's military with a wary belief that a military is essentially a patriarchal institution, even if it occasionally sees fit to enlist women into its fold. 36 As each new country joins the ranks of nonconscription militaries and as governments are tempted to reach out to at least a small sector of women, these debates will grow more common. They are already going on in Italy.37 The form of military force that is inspiring perhaps the greatest hope is the United Nations peacekeeping force. It inspires optimism because it seems to perform military duties without being militaristic. And its troops at first glance appear to escape the distorting dynamics of militarism because they may not depend so heavily on patriarchal masculinity. According to one UN official, who observed UN peacekeeping soldiers in Namibia in the 1980s, local women seemed to view men soldiering under the UN's banner as less alienating, more approachable, and perhaps more trustworthy than men soldiering for any of the several rival governments. This official reported that she witnessed a higher proportion of marriages between UN soldiers and local women than she believed had occurred between, for instance, American soldiers and local women in Korea.38 To date we in fact know amazingly little about what happens to a male soldier's sense of masculine license when he dons the blue helmet or armband of the United Nations peacekeeper. The contents of formal agreements, or "codes of conduct," between the United Nations Secretary and specific host officials are kept secret. This makes it difficult, for instance, for women in a host country to find out what suppositions about male peacekeeping soldiers' sexuality are written into the code's provisions for health and policing. The crucial question may be whether soldiering for a state calls forth different notions of masculinity than soldiering for a nonstate international agency does. What exactly happens to a Canadian or Fijian male soldier's presumptions about violence, about femininity, about enemies, or about his own sexuality when he is placed in the position of maintaining peace between two warring armies? If a man can discard inclinations and presumptions with just the switch from one set of stenciled initials to another, it may mean that militarized masculinity is only shirtsleeve-deep. 39 Any United Nations peacekeeping unit whether in Bosnia, Cambodia, or Somaliais in practice a compilation of soldiers enlisted in and trained by particular states. There is no direct UN recruitment. There is no UN basic training. From the UN-sanctioned action in Korea in the 1950s through the UN-sanctioned action in the Persian Gulf in 1991, U.S. presidents refused to allow U.S. soldiers to be commanded by anyone but a U.S. officer. Only in early 1993 did President Bill Clinton permit a small group of noncombat soldiers left behind as peacekeepers in Somalia to be commanded by a non-American, a Turkish general operating under UN authority. On the other hand, there are certain governments which have quite consciously viewed UN peacekeeping as a priority mission for their soldiers, and this purpose has undoubtedly filtered down through the ranks in as yet unanalyzed ways. Ireland, Fiji, India, Ghana, Finland, and Malaysia are among the countries whose governments have routinely contributed troops to UN missions. Canada's former prime minister, Brian Mulroney, announced in early 1992 that with the end of the Cold War his country's military would see UN service as its most important function after self-defense. From the south came rumblings of displeasure. Washington officials saw the Mulroney declaration as a diversion of Canadian military resources from NATO.40 They were right. Finland's new women volunteer soldiers serve in the Finnish contingent on loan to the UN, and Australia's military has just deployed its first women soldiers to Cambodia on UN duty. Nonetheless, United Nations peacekeeping forces remain as overwhelmingly male as most state militaries. With such a composition, it must have the same sort of policies around masculinity as other, more conventional forces do. We have yet to hear how United Nations force commanders imagine male sexuality. Are the blue-helmeted men on duty in Cambodia explicitly ordered not to patronize prostitutes? What steps are taken to prevent AIDS and other forms of sexually transmitted diseases among UN peacekeepers? Each of these policies will be informed by ideas about women, about the roles women must play if a male soldier is to be able to do his job. United Nations male peacekeepers are as likely to have mothers, girlfriends, and wives as the male soldiers of any other military. Just as in those more orthodox forces, the contributions of these women are accepted as natural, even if policies are devised to ensure that they fill these roles. Nowhere was this clearer than in the New York Times 'discussion of the proposal that Britain's famed Gurkhas, the celebrated troops recruited from Nepal, should serve as the core of a genuinely nonstate United Nations peacekeeping force. 41 The advantage of this proposal was not only that the Gurkhas, being citizens of an impoverished Asian country, would cost less than Canadian or Finnish soldiers. Nor was it only that Gurkhas had established a record of battlefield competence and discipline. It was also an unstated plus that the Nepali men serving in the Gurkhas apparently didn't need the company of their wives while stationed abroad and didn't compensate for their wives' absence by engaging in alienating abuse of other countries' women. These Nepali men seemed to have learned a kind of militarized masculinity quite unlike that of their British, American, or French counterparts. While such different constructions may indeed exist and while they may make one set of men better at post Cold War international peacekeeping than another, such a proposal leaves out the women. Gurkhas have earned this reputation for celibate soldiering because of what their wives absorb, are compelled to absorb, because they live under British military policies for wives. Nepali women at home in Darjeeling, India, or in villages in the hills of Nepal construct their lives in ways that have made life easier for British defense planners. They have made it possible for the British to use their husbands in ways that have given the Gurkhas the image of the ideal post Cold War peacekeepers. 42 What is distinctive here is not the particular marriage practices of Nepali women. Rather, by making Nepali women visible we are reminded that one cannot assess which forms of masculinity are most suitable for the postCold War world unless one asks, Where are the women? The end of the superpower rivalry that has shaped the distribution of aid, the construction of fears, and the ferocity of hostilities has not made masculinity irrelevant in international relations. To make sense of how masculinity is being demilitarized and remilitarized today, one must pay attention to women and to ideas about femininity. The Australian woman soldier donning the UN's blue helmet to serve in Cambodia, the Vietnamese woman trying to find a client in Le Royal Hotel's disco, the international civil servant devising policies to bolster the morale of UN troops, the recently demobilized Khmer Rouge guerrillaall are partners in a postCold War dance.
 * Reducing Military presence alone doesn’t solve—we must prioritize an understanding of masculinity and femininity to truly demilitarize and break the cycle of militarization and patriarchal attitudes. **
 * Enloe 93 ** – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 21-31 MT)
 * Our challenge to patriarchy can fundamentally transform the international system—all types of destruction and violence are inevitable until this is done **
 * Warren 94.** Professor of philosophy at Macalester College. (Ecological Feminism, p. 193-194), MR

In a similar vein, Paula Smithka argues that sexism, naturism, nuclearism, and other “isms of domination” are symptoms of the disease of dissociation by which humans attempt to sever their relationships with others and with nature (Smithka 1989). In the terminology introduced here, patriarchaism constructs one’s perception of the “other” as inferior, permits the psychological and conceptual distancing (dissociation of “the other,” and justifies the interiorizing of “the other.” Suppose nuclearism is indeed an “addiction,” as Lifton and Falk claim, or unhealthy dissociation, as Smithka claims – partly psychological conditions. How does one recover from it? Addictions and dissociation ultimately involve faulty beliefs which, for recovery to occur, must be seen and rejected (Warren 1990). Nuclear awareness, then, involves seeing the insanity of nuclear confrontation. For a feminist peace politics, this involves seeing the patriarchalist biases of nuclear parlance (in addition to whatever other biases must be seen.) The case is the same for sexism, racism, classism, naturism, and any other “isms of domination” based on faulty belief systems – what I have called oppressive and patriarchal conceptual frameworks. They must be seen to be rejected. What is involved in seeing and breaking through the addictions, the illusions against the earth (e.g. “rape of the land”); perhaps even global, systemic, economic violence (e.g. poverty). This would involve, the dissociation? To employ the familiar language of recovery from addictions such as alcoholism, to recover from nuclearism and other “isms of domination” we can and must now, in the pre-feminist patriarchal present, choose to become recovering nuclearists, recovering naturists, recovering sexists and racists. And we can start to do that by seeing and changing the faulty patriarchalist thinking that underlies and sustains these “isms.” Seen in terms of the psychological phenomena of dissociation, addiction, or dysfunctional systems generally, then, patriarchalism might be also viewed as ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak views it: as a primary, progressive, terminal disease, the “logical” because predictable consequence of which could quite literally be the death of the planet. Seen from a psychological perspective, nuclear madness needs to be taken seriously as a madness, that is, as a craziness which has delusion, denial, and dissociation at its core. An ecofeminist peace politics would help explore and clarify the nature of the conceptual, psychological, and behavioral ties of nuclearism and other “isms of domination” to this flawed thinking – patriarchalism. Feminists can being to develop analyses of violence and nonviolence which show the interconnections among kinds of violence: violence against the self (e.g. anorexia and bulimia, suicide); violence against others (e.g. spousal and child abuse, rape); violence showing ways in which patriarchalism underlies all such kinds of violence and itself breeds violence.


 * Contention 3: We will prempt negative lies**

The positivist conception of the world and reality typifies much of mainstream international relations theory in the 1990s despite the emergence of the 'third debate' or the so-called post-positivist revolution. This understanding of the world allows the possibility of thinking that defining specific referents or identities as the central issues in international relations theory is not a particularly political or epistemologically significant act; it is merely one of choice. In other words, the choice of referent is seen as a neutral activity by positivists. Waltz can choose to study states, wars and the activity of leaders, others can look at the situation of women or whatever group they wish. Each then collects data and facts about the chosen group and ultimately develops theories about them. Jim George calls this the 'spectator theory of knowledge, in which knowledge of the real world is gleaned via a realm of external facts' (1993, p. 204). Mark Neufeld similarly talks about 'truth as correspondence' (1993, p. 55). This involves believing that there is a distinct separation between 'theory' and the 'real' world, 'the former, the realm of "internally" generated "invention" - the latter, the "external" repository of laws which theories (retrospectively) explain, order and systematise. . . theory. . . always remains distinct from that world' (George, 1993, p. 209). The key point to be taken from this is that theory is represented as a 'cognitive reaction to reality rather than integral to its construction. Theory, in this context, takes place after the fact' (p. 213).But theory does not take place after the fact. Theories, instead, play a large part in constructing and defining what the facts are. This is a central claim made by those scholars working on postpositivist perspectives in international relations theory but it is not a new claim. Albert Einstein once pointed out that 'on principle it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality, the very opposite happens' (quoted in MacKinnon, 1989, p. 106). However, it is a claim resisted strongly by mainstream international relations theory, which remains, despite recent claims to the contrary, entrenched in a realist-positivist paradigm (Runyan and Peterson, 1991; Peterson, 1992b; George, 1993). When vilified for serving the interests of the powerful and preserving the status quo, classical and neo-realists simply reply that they are 'telling things the way they are' (Runyan and Peterson, 1991, p. 70). It may be becoming somewhat of post-positivist cliche to claim that we are living in a complex world and thus simplistic theories will be of little explanatory or descriptive use. But if we are trying to understand more about the world and in particular those events which cause pain and destruction, why would anyone not want to include insights which might help us do that? If realist scholars want genuinely to investigate the causes of war in a sophisticated and systematic manner, why not investigate the construction and internalization of certain images of masculinity in military ideology? If they want to argue that students be better equipped, intellectually and conceptually, to understand international politics, why not extend their analyses to include concepts of identity? There may, of course, be ideological resistance to thinking about these issues. The assumption is made that sexual identity or gender identity can have nothing to do with the causation and enactment of war. But although these are just assumptions they do a great deal of work in defining what is and is not relevant to consider. When this ideological commitment is linked with a limited epistemological understanding of the construction of reality, it becomes easy for scholars within international relations to think that such things as the politics of identity can have no real importance to our understanding of the international system. Additionally, it implies a lot more work in the sense that more books have to be read (ones that many realist scholars might think irrelevant), new methodological tools have to be learned and old positions have to be rethought. iCKal Holsti (1993) is one who laments the increasing theoretical expansion of the discipline of international relations. This expansion, he argues, is not necessarily evidence of progress. Unless we can agree on, at least, the purposes of the theoretical enterprise and on what some of the fundamental problems in the real worldare, the 'menu [of international relations theory] threatens to become tasteless for all but the few that inhabit the rarefied sanctuaries of the Universities' (p. 408). Why should this be the case? If, as Holsti suggests, our 'consumers' are students and policy-makers and what they want most of all is to know 'what is going on in the real world' (p. 407), it seems to make eminent sense to find out more about how that 'real world' works by asking more, deeper and searching questions. What apparently seems to be 'staring us in the face' (p. 407) in the world may well be an example of what psychologists call a perceptual illusion. In these illusions what stares one person in the face cannot be seen at all by another person. The same can be true when we move from a psychologist's drawing to the 'reality' of politics on a global scale. The simple questions 'Who am I?' and 'Who defines who I am?' might be as revolutionary for the discipline of international relations as that of the little boy who questioned not the magnifi- _ cence of the Emperor's clothes, but whether he had any at a l l ! ^ 3 ° In a global age, one characterized by a global menu, global music and global time, the resurgence of claims to identity might be seen as a response to a fear of disappearing into bland sameness. We can drink Coke, eat sushi and watch Neighbours and be in practically any country in the world. The fight for identity may, at one level, be an example of resistance to such an image of global uni-identity. Alternatively, the struggle for identity may be a reaffirmation of belonging, in a postmodern, post-local age. This desire may be fuelled by nostalgia, a nostalgia for 'tradition', which might be construed as a nostalgia for the nation-state, the icon of modernity. Identities in this view may be increasingly fluid and multiply at ever more rapid rates as we approach the twentyfirst century. But those properties do not make them analytically irrelevant to the international relations analyst. Who we are, how we are, who defines us, how international processes and events are moulded and manipulated by identities: these are all questions relevant to international politics. Anyone trying to make sense of international political trends in the near future who treats these maddeningly complex and infuriatingly dynamic identities as a mere mosquito to be swatted away risks being surprised.
 * Proclaimed inevitability of realism shuts down self reflection and excludes alternative insights- theory is not natural or inevitable, it is always contingently produces **
 * Zalewski and Enloe, 95- ** *Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Wales **Professor of Government at Clark University (Marysia and Cynthia,** **1995, “International Relations Theory Today,”** **pg.** **299)**


 * Understanding gender is critical to prevent a false epistemology in values and science**
 * Anderson 9 [ ** Prof of women’s studies &philosophy at Michigan, “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,” AW] (PAGE 56)

The symbolic identification of the scientific with a masculine outlook generates further cognitive distortions. The ideology of masculinity, in representing emotion as feminine and as cognitively distorting, falsely assimilates emotion-laden thoughts—and even thoughts about emotions—to sentimentality. In identifying the scientific outlook with that of a man who has outgrown his tutelage, cut his dependence on his mother, and is prepared to meet the competitive demands of the public sphere with a clear eye, the ideology of masculinity tends to confuse seeing the natural world as indifferent in the sense of devoid of teleological laws with seeing the social world as hostile in the sense of full of agents who pursue their interests at others' expense (Keller 1992, 116-18). This confusion tempts biologists into thinking that the selfishness their models ascribe to genes and the ruthless strategic rationality their models ascribe to individual organisms (mere metaphors, however theoretically powerful) are more "real" than the actual care a dog expresses toward her pups. Such thoughts also reflect the rhetoric of unmasking base motivations behind policies that seem to be benevolent, a common if overused tactic in liberal politics and political theory. The power of this rhetoric depends on an appearance/reality distinction that has no place where the stakes are competing social models of biological phenomena, whose merits depend on their metaphorical rather than their referential powers. Thus, to the extent that the theoretical preference for competitive models in biology is underwritten by rhetoric borrowed from androcentric political ideologies, the preference reflects a confusion between models and reality as well as an unjustified intrusion of androcentric political loyalties into the scientific enterprise. These are not concerns that can be relieved by deploying the discovery/justification distinction. To the extent that motivations tied to acquiring a masculine-coded prestige as a theorist induce mathematical ecologists to overlook the epistemic defects of models of natural selection that fail to consider the actual impact of sexual selection, parenting, and cooperative interactions, they distort the context of justification itself. Some of the criteria of justification, such as simplicity, are also distorted in the light of the androcentric distinction between public and private values. For example, simplicity in mathematical biology has been characterized so as to prefer explanations of apparently favorable patterns of group survival in terms of chance to explanations in terms of interspecific feedback loops, if straightforward individualistic mechanisms are not available to explain them (Keller 1992,153). Finally, to the extent that gender ideologies inform the context of discovery by influencing the direction of inquiry and development of mathematical tools, they prevent the growth of alternative models and the tools that could make them tractable, and hence they bias our views of what is "simple" (Keller 1992, 160). The discovery/justification distinction, while useful when considering the epistemic relation of a theory to its confirming or disaffirm- ing evidence, breaks down once we consider the relative merits of alternative theories. In the latter context, any influence that biases the development of the field of alternatives will bias the evaluation of theories. A theoretical approach may appear best justified not because it offers an adequate model of the world but because androcentric ideologies have caused more thought and resources to be invested in it than in alternatives