Ranpreet+Gill+-+Anish+Kulkarni

Aff: AIIB

Contention One: China’s Rise
====China’s rise is inevitable --- U.S. failure to __seek membership__ in the AIIB signals that it doesn’t want to integrate China into global economic governance and crushes America’s ability to shape the global order==== Wyne, 15 --- contributing analyst at Wikistrat, and a global fellow with the Project for the Study of the 21st Century (4/7/15, Ali, “The American World Order and China’s New Bank,” [], article downloaded on 5/3/16, JMP)

U.S. concerns over __Chinese governance__ prevents efforts to positively __reform__ the AIIB and facilitate multilateral diplomacy and __deep cooperation__ with China
Edwards & Qahir, 15 --- *Associate Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, AND **Diplomacy graduate student at Seton Hall (4/6/15, Martin & Katayon, “US should stop blocking China’s AIIB and join allies in new club,” [], article downloaded 4/23/16, JMP)

====Engaging on the AIIB is critical --- it’s the focal point for China’s expanded international role and cooperation will help resolve Myanmar conflict and spillover to cybersecurity and the South China Sea==== Noori, et. al, 15 --- Program Specialist, Middle East & North Africa Programs at United States Institute of Peace (8/24/15, Maral Noori, Daniel Jasper and Jason Tower, “Overcoming Barriers to U.S.-China Cooperation,” [], downloaded on 4/21/16, JMP)

Cyber-attacks escalate and go nuclear Nolan, 15 Andrew Nolan, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, former Trial Attorney at the United States Department of Justice, holds a J.D. from George Washington University, 2015 (“Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions,” CRS Report to Congress, March 16th, Available Online at [], Accessed 07-05-2015, p. 1-3)

South China Sea conflict goes nuclear.
Christensen 6/5/ 15 – Thomas J., Boswell professor of world politics and director of the China and the World Program at Princeton University, is a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, “China's Rising Military: Now for the Hard Part” http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-05/china-s-rising-military-now-for-the-hard-part

====The suspicious atmosphere allows military conflict to erupt at any time --- both sides must __manage competition__ to prevent war and expand cooperation on __global governance issues__ that represent existential risks==== Shambaugh, 15 – professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (David, “In a fundamental shift, China and the US are now engaged in all-out competition,” South China Morning Post, 6/11/15, [] //Red+JMP)

Independently, China will be forced to turn to __aggressive military__ actions if the U.S. doesn’t support its growing role in the global economy via the AIIB
Lipscy, 15 --- Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University (5/7/15, Phillip Y., “Who's Afraid of the AIIB; Why the United States Should Support China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” [], downloaded 4/23/16, JMP)

Failure to recalibrate U.S. __economic policy__ toward China risks miscalculation that triggers great power conflict
Wyne, 15 --- contributing analyst at Wikistrat and a global fellow at the Project for the Study of the 21st Century (6/1/15, Ali, “Is America’s Mind-set the Greatest Threat to Its Future?” [], article downloaded 5/3/16, JMP) ***Joseph Nye is a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and one of the most esteemed analysts of world affairs Nye suggests that the greatest threat to U.S. influence may not be debt, political gridlock, or even the resurgence of China, but America’s own psychology. Near the end of his book, he identifies two scenarios that could cause it to enter //“absolute” decline//, which he defines as Roman-style “domestic deterioration or decay”: “the //U// nited //S// tates becomes too fearful and overreacts to terrorist attacks by closing inwards,” or it overreacts “by becoming overcommitted andwaste blood and treasure as it did in Vietnam and Iraq .”America’s reaction to the progression of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ( AIIB) suggests that Nye’s concern is justified. The AIIB is a fledgling enterprise, after all, //not an imminent challenge to global economic governance// , and it responds to a pressing global need for high-quality infrastructure. The //U// nited //S// tates should have welcomed the institution and asked to //play a role in shaping its norms and arrangements//. By lobbying vigorously against it —only to see 57 countries sign up as founding members, including close allies— the //U// nited //S// tates //inflated the Bank’s strategic significance and compounded the apprehensions of its Asian-Pacific allies that it seeks to thwart China’s continued economic rise//. America’s comprehensivenational power will long surpass China’s. If, however, the//U// nited //S// tates reacts defensively to every indicator of Chinese progress, failing to discern between Chinese actions that compromise vital U.S. interests and those that do not, it will distort the magnitude of the Chinese challenge and //render itself more susceptible to making the sorts of miscalculations that have precipitated great-power conflicts in the past// .How the //U// nited //S// tates handles the continued ascent of a country that proclaims its own exceptionalism will be a multi-generation, perhaps even multi-century, //litmus test of its psychology//. Two others come to mind: · The application of military force, the asset in which the //U// nited //S// tates has the greatest comparative advantage, is producing diminishing strategic returns. After nearly 15 years of principally U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, those two countries’ prospects are highly uncertain. The global terrorist threat continues to diffuse—and, in certain quarters, metastasize—despite an intensified campaign of U.S. drone strikes (Reuters reports that the United States carried out 2,320 strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) between August 8 and March 12). Will the //U// nited //S// tates double down on its application of conventional military power, or will it make greater use of diplomacy and geoeconomics? As it emerges that the United States is playing more of a role in supporting Saudi Arabian strikes against Houthi rebels in Yemen, and given extant pressure by some policymakers to deploy troops against ISIL and/or bomb nuclear facilities in Iran, the United States must guard against getting dragged back into Middle Eastern quicksand. Nye argues that because “revolutions [in the region] may last another generation, smart application of force will be essential….a Kennan-like policy of containment may have more promise than efforts to occupy and control.” · Some of the principal challenges to regional orders across the world are incremental, not existential: consider Iran’s nuclear odyssey, Russia’s slow-drop incursion into Ukraine, and China’s “salami-slicing” campaign in the South China Sea. The dilemma: opposing them without precipitating an escalatory spiral from which there would be no easy avenue of extrication. Will the United States convince itself of its impotence if it is unable to win quick, decisive victories or if it goes through occasional rough patches of strategic setbacks? The balance of power has always been in flux; so, too, have the contours of world order; and so, too, has the nature of the challenges that that order poses to U.S. interests. The United States has always adapted—even if sometimes clumsily—and, in view of its prodigious resources, there is no reason why it cannot do so again. It is ironic that perhaps the most sensible advice in this regard comes from the most famous declinist, Paul Kennedy : in his 1987 classic The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, he concluded that //“the only serious threat to the real interests of the////U// nited //S// tates //can come from a failure to adjust sensibly to the newer world order.”// Here’s to hoping that the //U// nited //S// tates heeds that judgment.

Ensuring __peaceful rise__ is necessary to prevent World War 3 --- lack of engagement on AIIB has wrecked U.S. leadership
Lehmann, 15 --- Emeritus Professor at IMD, Lausanne (Switzerland), currently Visiting Professor at Hong Kong University and at NIIT University in Neemrana, Rajasthan (India) (4/2/15, Jean-Pierre Lehmann, “China And The US: The AIIB Fiasco &amp; America's Colossal Loss Of Face,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/jplehmann/2015/04/02/china-and-the-us-the-aiib-fiasco-americas-colossal-loss-of-face/print/, article downloaded 6/14/16, JMP) It is very worrying for the world that American policy makers should be capable of making such outrageous errors, scoring own-goals, as the decision to play poker against China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and losing so spectacularly and humiliatingly. There is today, I think, little disagreement that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was the US’ most monumental foreign policy error since the Vietnam War. Until then during the previous four decades on balance the US could be described as a benign hegemon. With the collapse in the early 1990s of the Soviet Union as a military threat and Japan as an economic threat, the US emerged as the global uncontested hyper-power. Then with the illegal and ill-considered invasion of Iraq George W Bush blew it. In the last dozen years it has been pretty much downhill for both American power and American prestige. //The US, according to many, is in decline. That, however, does not mean that it is about to be replaced.// As Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote almost twenty years ago (1997): ““No state is likely to match the US in the four key dimensions of power – military, economic, technological, and cultural – that confer global political clout.” It was true then, it remains true now. The US since Iraq may have lost a good deal of credibility in its hard power clout, but, as Professor Joe Nye repeatedly reminds us: it remains supreme in soft power; hence “the American century will survive the rise of China ”.China is indeed an emerging great power, but Joe Nye is right: //the notion that it will replace the US as global hegemon in the foreseeable future is fantasy//. It is a notion, incidentally, that one finds mainly among foreign pundits, but that I at least have not come across among Chinese thought leaders. They are more than conscious of the immense challenges that lie ahead. There was no dancing in the Chinese street when the IMF announced that China had overtaken the US in aggregate GDP. At the per capita level, China is still a middle income country and the jury is out on whether it will succeed to graduate, as it hopes to by 2030, to high income status. Having said that, there is no doubt that not only China is indeed a rising great power, but it is the first rising great power for a century. The record of former rising great powers – whether Portugal and Spain in the 16th century, the Dutch in the 17th, the British and French in the 18th and 19th, followed by the Germans, the Japanese, the Soviets and the Americans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries – in terms of bullying, blood, oppression, etc, etc, is hardly comforting: thus the insistence among Chinese policy makers and thought leaders that what they aspire to is the “peaceful rise” of China to great power status. Whether China achieves the aim of being the first ever great power to rise peacefully remains to be seen. It isthe key question of the 21st century, the answer to //which may determine whether the world will fall into a cataclysmic third world war or// whether the pattern will be broken and a new 21st century global paradigm of enhanced peace and prosperity emerges. __//As things stand currently, signals are mixed. China has territorial disputes with virtually all its neighbors.//__ As I tell my students in India, I personally do not fear for the moment China breaking out as not just a great power, but an imperialist great power, but then I live in Switzerland. If I were a citizen of India, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc, I would possibly feel differently. The closer one gets to China, by and large the greater the apprehensions. Apart from the territorial disputes and occasional naval skirmishes in the East and South China seas, perhaps most alarming for China’s southern neighbors are Beijing’s policies of diversion and damming of rivers from the Tibetan Plateau to the country’s more populated and industrialized north away from feeding into the rivers providing water to billions in South and Southeast Asia. //Water//, as Indian scholar Brahma Chellaney argues, //may be Asia’s “new battleground”//. Thus the jury is out here too. By no means, at the moment, can China be condemned as a malign imperialist power; nor however is it a cuddly panda bear. The outcome will depend on essentially two factors. The first is how Beijing responds to its multiple domestic issues and challenges – social, political, economic, technological, environmental, demographic, gender and cultural. As many Chinese policy makers and thought leaders emphasize there is an urgent imperative of deep reforms in all these areas. The second determining factor is //how the outside world, especially the established powers, and// of course //above all the US, respond and adjust to China’s great power rise//. Among China’s policies that a priori would seem to merit close attention and a positive response is the New Silk Road Economic Belt and New Maritime Route, which could have the effect of a fundamental re-engineering of the planet, providing opportunities for enhanced global prosperity, connectivity, employment and entrepreneurship. Among other possible beneficial consequences, it will integrate into the world economy areas, specifically in Central Asia, that have hitherto been marginalized. Samarkand may once again become a hub! China is a fragile rising great power. In contrast to the US, it is highly dependent on access to global resources (energy, minerals, food) and to global markets. The New Silk Road serves its national purpose in an enlightened way by also serving extensive global interests. There is as Beijing and every other capital in Asia are acutely conscious a huge need for improved infrastructure – measured in the trillions of dollars. Having been rebuffed by the established powers in its request for an enhanced role in existing US dominated international organizations, the IMF, the World Bank and its regional affiliates, Beijing has proposed to set up a new China driven global multilateral institution: the AIIB. (This is in addition to the New Development (so-called BRICS) Bank.) Whereas there may be areas in which China’s expanding power might better be contained; there are other initiatives for which it should be //engaged and encouraged//. //The AIIB is a clear case of the latter.// As I told a senior American official, “you keep haranguing the Chinese about being ‘responsible stakeholders’, the establishment of //the AIIB is about as solid and constructive an illustration of stakeholder responsibility one could imagine”//. Washington urged and pressured its allies not to join the AIIB. Fortunately Washington was ignored by over forty capitals, including by its closest ally, the UK, for which London was severely publicly admonished. In Europe, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, Stockholm, Bern, Oslo, etc, quickly followed, as Asian capitals also rapidly signed up (with still the exception of Tokyo, but that may come), and indeed with both Hong Kong and Taipei keen to get a piece of the action, and even Israel expressing interest. The AIIB express train is taking off and a peeved US stands embarrassingly on the platform. //Washington’s colossal imbecility in opposing the bank has resulted in a colossal loss of face.// It is, as suggested above, a spectacular own goal. //It has eroded not only the US’ hard (financial) power, but also its soft power, leadership and prestige.// Readers of Forbes, especially members of the American business community, should seek to ensure that these kinds of errors are not repeated. //The world is in a period of flux, characterized by great uncertainty and volatility.////To accommodate constructively the rising power of China// – emerging from a long period of subjugation to Western imperialism and ostracism – //the existing hegemon must display qualities of responsible and enlightened leadership//. The AIIB saga was a fiasco in every sense, demeaning the status of the US. Let us hope the appropriate lessons are learned. Pax Americana is still needed.

U.S. should engage China to join the AIIB --- allows it to exert net more influence
Knight, 15 --- Faculty Director of the SIS Honors Program and Assistant Professor at American University's School of International Service and expert on international political economy (4/3/15, Sarah Cleeland Knight, “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – Three Questions for Sarah Cleeland Knight,” [], article downloaded 5/11/16, JMP)

====U.S. involvement will allow AIIB to __safeguard its independence__ from China, develop __higher standards__ and __transparency__, reverse perception of containment and boost the credibility of its Asia rebalance==== Lazarus, 3/2/16 --- MA candidate at The Fletcher School, Tufts University (Leland, “Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB; There are compelling reasons for the U.S. to join China’s new development bank,” [], article downloaded 4/24/16, JMP)

U.S. participation in the AIIB ensures that China exercises constructive global leadership --- SQ sends the signal of containment
Bergsten, 15 --- director emeritus and senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (3/15/15, Fred, “US should work with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; Washington should sign up and bless the desire of its friends to join, writes Fred Bergsten,” [], article downloaded 5/2/16, JMP) China’s decision to create a new development bank for Asia is proving a highly divisive enterprise. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, due to open its doors later this year, has sparked deep divisions between Beijing and Washington. The latter argues that the bank will undermine existing international institutions and that it will be a vehicle for a broader expression of Chinese strategic interests. Now the AIIB has also become a source of major discord between the US and some of its chief allies, including the UK, which has decided to become a founder member of the new institution. That sparked an angry response in Washington, a sorry development that reflects the huge mistake the US has made in opposing a bank aimed at helping to meet Asia’s need for trillions of dollars of investment in energy, power, transportation, telecommunications and other infrastructure sectors. China and 20 other Asian countries agreed in October to establish the AIIB. Beijing will provide the bulk of capital and founding members include India, the second largest shareholder, as well as two Gulf Arab states, Kuwait and Qatar. A number of non-regional countries were invited to be founder members, an offer rejected by the US, which then lobbied allies, including Australia, South Korea, the UK and other European states, not to join. Washington argues there is no need for a new development lender, given the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. There are dark mutterings in DC that AIIB’s Chinese leadership may ignore international lending norms and support projects that promote Chinese political, or even military, interests. The US is wrong to adopt this position. President Barack Obama has called for more Asian infrastructure investment. The existing institutions are only scratching the surface of those needs and have adopted different priorities in recent years. Competition is good for development lending as well as other markets. //Concerns about backsliding from standards on transparency, procurement and anti- corruption are justified but the way to address them is to join the institution and work from within// ; it is nonsense to argue that carping from outside will be more effective. Most importantly, //this issue represents a fresh skirmish in the inevitable competition for leadership of the world economy in the 21st century//. As the incumbent power, the US naturally wants China to support the international rules and institutions that it has led for 70 years. As the rising power, China naturally challenges a status quo it had no role in creating and wants to begin shaping a modified order itself .The US has correctly urged China to exercise leadership consistent with its expanding power, and to provide more resources to support development and other global goals. When the Chinese move in those directions, as they are doing with the AIIB, it is short-sighted and hypocritical for the US to seek to block them. This is especially true when the Obama administration has not persuaded Congress in four years to adopt legislation to provide enhanced roles for China and other emerging economies in the International Monetary Fund, as agreed by all other countries; and has opposed increasing the capital of the Asian Development Bank. //This US hostility reinforces the Chinese view that US strategy is to contain and suppress it; so increasing rather than decreasing the prospect of uncooperative Chinese behaviour.// The UK and other US allies, by contrast, are wise to accept China’s invitation to join. //The US should reverse course.// It should join the bank and persuade Congress to provide the small amounts needed to fund a minority share. It should bless the desire of its friends in Asia and Europe to join, to help counter any untoward Chinese actions. And it should encourage the World Bank and the other current multilateral lenders to co-operate closely with the new institution. //The AIIB initiative can then play a positive role in the world economy and capitalise on China’s growing willingness to exercise constructive global leadership//.

The plan reverses the perception of hostility
Marston, 16 --- Southeast Asia analyst at a Washington, D.C., think tank (2/28/16, Hunter, “A Four-Point Plan for Reviving the U.S. Role in Asia,” [], article downloaded 5/3/16, JMP)

The plan will rebalance the relationship with China --- preventing a collision between the rising powers
Lee & Fullilove, 5/17/16 --- *President, East Asia Institute (South Korea), AND **Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy (Australia) (Michael, “Crisis in Global Governance: A Conversation with Richard N. Haass and the Council of Councils,” [], article downloaded 5/30/16, JMP)

Past 2NR's: Elections T QPQ T Conditional Neoliberalism K Sino-Russia DA Japan DA