Policy

Contention 1 is Inherency
====Obama announced that the US would disclose zero-day vulnerabilities, or unknown software flaws, to their vendors --- but loopholes allow the NSA to stockpile zero-days and jeopardize widespread cybersecurity==== Soghoian and Roubini 20 15 ( [|Chris Soghoian], Principal Technologist and Senior Policy Analyst, American Civil Liberties Union Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project & [|Sonia Roubini] , ACLU Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, “Feds Refuse to Release Documents on “Zero-Day” Security Exploits”, March 3, 2015, [])//CLi Federal agencies served with a Freedom of Information Act request are refusing to release documents AND documents like the ones we have requested, this debate cannot take place.

Additionally, loopholes let the NSA stockpile zero-days purchased from the grey market
Zetter 14 [Kim, award-winning journalist who covers cybercrime, civil liberties, privacy, and security for Wired, “Obama: NSA must reveal bugs like Heartbleed, unless they help the NSA,” //Wired//, []] //khirn Healey notes that the public statements on the new policy leave a //lot of questions// //AND// or to the //arsenal of zero-day vulnerabilities// the government //already possesses//.

Intellectual property theft is expanding on a massive scale --- disclosing zero-days __builds trust__ with companies --- __info-sharing legislation__ is key
Jaffer 15 [Jamil N., Adjunct Professor of Law and Director, Security Law Program, George Mason University Law School, Occasional Papers Series, published by the Dean Rusk Center for International Law and Policy, 4-1-2015, “Cybersecurity and National Defense: Building a Public-Private Partnership,” []] //khirn JAMIL N. JAFFER: Thank you Dr. Johnson. Well, I’ll actually AND //trust// between the //government// and //private sector// to //share that kind of////information//.

IP theft destroys military operations --- the impact is primacy
Warikoo 13 professor of Himalayan and Central Asian Studies at the University of Colorado (Arun, “CYBER WARFARE: CHINA'S ROLE AND CHALLENGE TO THE UNITED STATES” p. 67-8, Jul-Dec 2013, //ProQuest//) | js 4.1 Intellectual Property (IP) Protection and Enforcement Intellectual Property or IP AND China's hackers that cost $1 billion and 20 years to develop.36

That solves great power conflict
Kagan, 2/19 /2015 (Robert, Senior fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, Ph.D. in American history from American University, “The United States must resist a return to spheres of interest in the international system”, Brookings, [|http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/19-united-states-must-resist-return-to-spheres-of-interest-international-system-kagan)//JBS] //Great power competition has returned// . Or rather, it has reminded us that it AND , the system will //buckle// under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.

Russian IP theft now --- they can’t be deterred --- bolstering cyberdefense is key
Bennett 4/12 /15 cybersecurity reporter for The Hill (Cory, “Russia’s cyberattacks grow more brazen” 4/12/15, []) | js Russia has ramped up cyber attacks against the U nited S tates to an unprecedented level since AND future,” he said. “So we’ve got some work to do.”

That’s crucial to Russian modernization efforts
Booz Allen Hamilton 13 [Leading provider of management and technology consulting services to the U.S. government, Economist Intelligence Unit, //The Economist//, “Cyber Theft of Corporate Intellectual Property: The Nature of the Threat,” July 2013, []] //khirn Russia’s own espionage effort is also driven by a desire to diversify its economy and AND //industry////and government networks// could give //China// and //Russia military advantages worth billions//.

That causes Russian aggression
Isachenov 15 [Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press, Business Insider, Feb. 4, 2015, “Russia continues massive military modernization despite economic woes,” [|http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-continues-massive-military-modernization-despite-economic-woes-2015-2#ixzz3eVw3maaO]] //khirn MOSCOW (AP) — Hundreds of new Russian aircraft, tanks and missiles are AND the massive military buildup will stretch the nation's economic potential beyond the limit.

That escalates—we’re already on the brink of nuclear war
Reid 15 Professor of Law at University of St. Thomas School of Law (Charles J., //University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy//, “VLADIMIR PUTIN’S CULTURE OF TERROR: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?” p. 53–5) | js In waging such a limited war, furthermore, Putinwouldrely not on ICBMs AND must make sure such threats do not emanate again from a world leader.

IP theft causes Chinese modernization
Hager 2013 (Nicholas, Nicholas Hager is an intern at the Streit Council. U.S. and European Intellectual Property: Strategies to Circumscribe Theft by China; October 3, 2013; http://blog.streitcouncil.org/2013/10/03/u-s-and-european-intellectual-property-strategies-to-circumscribe-theft-by-china/) //JRW China’s relatively new foray into drone creation serves as a reminder of how extensively, AND ., EU, and others the ability to successfully press for China’s compliance.

That leads to global nuclear war
Twomey 2009 (Christopher, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Arms Control Association, Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/china_us_dangerous_dynamism#Twomey) // JRW China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless AND rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

Cyber arms race now --- the US is rapidly expanding offensive capabilities under the guise of surveillance
Correa 15 [Gordon, security correspondent, BBC News, “Rapid escalation of the cyber arms race,” 29 April 2015, []] //khirn Rapid proliferation What surprised cyber-experts is the speed with which cyber-attack AND long before the //Chinese// had also not just caught up but //moved ahead//.

That goes nuclear due to command and control hacking, crisis instability, and fracturing nuclear agreements
Austin 13 [Director of Policy Innovation at the EastWest Institute, “Costs of American Cyber Superiority,” 8/6, []] //khirn The U nited S tates is racing for the technological frontier in military and intelligence uses of AND be every bit as reasonable given their anxiety about unconstrained American cyber superiority.

Independently risks miscalc --- hair-trigger status causes nuclear war
Japan Times 15 [May 1, 2015, “U.S., Russian ‘hair-trigger’ nuclear alert urged ended, especially in age of cyberattack,” [|http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/01/world/u-s-russian-hair-trigger-nuclear-alert-urged-ended-especially-age-cyberattack/#.VZIjlflVikp]] //khirn WASHINGTON – Former U.S. and Russian commanders Thursday called for scrapping “ //AND// //systems// are subject to //false alarms// ,” Cartwright said at a news conference.

And, low response times means there’s a greater timeframe and probability than traditional nuclear escalation
Dycus 10 [Stephen is a Professor of national security law at Vermont Law School, former member of the National Academies committee on cyber warfare, LLM, Harvard University, LLB, BA, Southern Methodist University, “Congress’ Role in Cyber Warfare,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 4(1), 2010, p.161-164, []] //khirn In other ways, cyber weapons are //critically different from their nuclear counterparts//. For AND before launching a counterstrike, if that were U.S. policy.

Uniquely true because of misperception fostered by offensive dominance
Rosenzweig 9 [Paul, founder of Reid Branch Consulting, specializing in homeland security, senior advisor to the Chertoff Group, Carnegie Fellow at Northwestern, professor at National Defense University, Editorial board at the Journal of National Security Law & Policy, deputy assistant secretary for policy at the US Department of Homeland Security, "National Security Threatsin Cyberspace" merican Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security And National Strategy Forum, September 2009, [|www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf]] //khirn //Offensive dominance// creates a great risk of **__cyber arms races__**__.__ State and non- AND it came from a third party, could also ignite a conflict .124

Disclosing vulnerabilities instead of using them for surveillance prevents arms races --- builds legitimacy to negotiate international cyberdefense agreements
Schneier 14 (Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, called a "security guru" by The Economist. Schneier is a fellow at the [|Berkman Center for Internet and Society] at Harvard Law School and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's [|Open Technology Institute] . “Should U.S. Hackers Fix Cybersecurity Holes or Exploit Them?”, May 19, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/should-hackers-fix-cybersecurity-holes-or-exploit-them/371197/)//CLi The implications of U.S. policy can be felt on a variety of AND fix almost all the vulnerabilities we find. But not all, yet.

That spurs international coop and mitigates offensive use
Clark et. al. 9 (David Clark, Senior Research Scientist at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Whitfield Diffie, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Abraham Sofaer, former federal judge for the[|United States District Court for the Southern District of New York], and then a Legal Adviser to the[|United States State Department], “Cyber Security and International Agreements”, [|http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/lec17/Sofaer.pdf)//CLi] The potential utility of international cybersecurity agreements deserves to be carefully examined. //International agreements// AND //more secure cyber environment// through measures that go beyond conventional forms of deterrence.

Eliminating offensive cyberattacks allows the US to set global norms in cyberspace --- that’s key to prevent cyber arms races
Goldsmith 10 [Jack, teaches at Harvard Law School and is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, “Can we stop the Cyber Arms Race,” //Washington Post//, February 1, 2010, []] //khirn In a speech this month on "Internet freedom," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton AND //arms race// in an arena where the offense already has a natural advantage.

Contention 4 is Solvency
====The plan solves effective information sharing between the government and private sector --- a signal of clear commitment and a steady flow of actionable disclosure is key to cooperative cyberdefense --- overcomes legal barriers==== Rosenzweig 12 [Paul, leading cybersecurity expert, founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company, and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group, “Cybersecurity and Public Goods: The Public/Private “Partnership,” An Emerging Threats Essay, Hoover Institution, Stanford] //khirn Information Sharing, Public Goods, and the Law This economic understanding of cybersecurity suggests AND problems are not likely to be ones of law, but of //commitment//.

Disclosing zero-days __disarms__ cyberattackers globally
Masnick 14 [Mike, founder and CEO of Floor64 and editor of the Techdirt blog, “Obama Tells NSA To Reveal, Not Exploit, Flaws... Except All The Times It Wants To Do The Opposite,” Techdirt, April 14, 2014, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140413/07094726892/obama-tells-nsa-to-reveal-not-exploit-flaws-except-all-times-it-wants-to-do-opposite.shtml] //khirn However, the NY Times had a story this weekend about how this move has AND do that. Because they're not about protecting anyone -- other than themselves.

US is the lynchpin of the zero-days market---that sustains the arms race and global cyberattacks—the plan reverses that and reduces the market drastically
Perlroth and Sanger 13 (Nicole Perlroth covers cyberattacks, hackers and the cybersecurity industry for The Times’s business news section. She is a graduate of Princeton University, Stanford University’s Graduate School of Journalism and is a guest lecturer at Stanford’s graduate schools of business and communications. David Sanger is the chief Washington correspondent of The New York Times. “Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code”, July 13, 2013, [] )//CLi Now, themarket for information about computer vulnerabilities has turned into a gold rush regulate a market in which government agencies are some of the biggest participants.
 * AND **

Disclosing vulnerabilities amounts to disarming the NSA --- zero-days are key
Kehl et al. 14 [Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI, New America is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy institute that invests in new thinkers and new ideas to address the next generation of challenges facing the United States, Policy Paper, “Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,” July 2014, []] //khirn In April 2014, Bloomberg reported that the NSA had known for at least two AND are documented, subject to full analysis, and acted upon promptly.”296

The status quo provides incentives for writing software with vulnerabilities --- the signal of the plan is crucial to long-term cybersecurity
Schneier 12 [Bruce, security expert with 13 books, fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute and the CTO of Resilient Systems, “The Vulnerabilities Market and the Future of Security,” Forbes, 5/30/2012, []] //khirn Recently, there have been several articles about the new market in zero-day AND for the 1%.” And it makes the rest of us less safe.

US policies spillover—leads to international cooperation
Fidler 14 (Mailyn Fidler, graduate student at the Center for International Security and Cooperation Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. “ANARCHY OR REGULATION: CONTROLLING THE GLOBAL TRADE IN ZERO-DAY VULNERABILITIES”, May 2014, https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:zs241cm7504/Zero-Day%20Vulnerability%20Thesis%20by%20Fidler.pdf)//CLi

International cooperation is needed on the zero-day issue, but U AND day policies as a necessary element of addressing the need for collective action.

Alt fails – abstract movements won’t produce political results besides violence – embrace the hard work of pragmatic reform
Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to AND now include the // hard labor //to produce alternative visions that appear mater
 * Condit 15 ** [Celeste, Distinguished Research Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Georgia, “Multi-Layered Trajectories for Academic Contributions to Social Change,” Feb 4, 2015, //Quarterly Journal of Speech//, Volume 101, Issue 1, 2015]