Fran+&+Mary+Grace

NEG- Past 2NRs in lab = -Jackson Vanik DA = = -Virilio K = = -States CP = = -T Investment = = -Tax Cuts DA = = -Cap K = = -Framework = = = = At the camp tournament: = = Round 1 v. dredging aff: 1nc-- jackson vanik (relations), states CP, T maintenance, cap K, heg bad; 2NR: states + ptx = = Round 4 v. dredging aff: 1nc-- cybersecurity, states with P3 mechanism, T maintenance, Virilio, heg bad; 2NR: heg bad = = Round 6 v. HSR with NIB mechanism: 1nc-- cybersecurity, states compact, effects T + loan guarantees=/=capital spending, consumption K, oil impact turns on case (failed states + Russian econ); 2NR: consumption K = = =  **__ 1AC __** = =  **__ 1AC Economy __** = =
 * Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its liquid carbon backbone pipeline infrastructure investment in the United States.**

= =
 * Advantage 1 – economy**

Carbon sequestration is key to averting negative economic consequences of carbon regulation
EPA 10 – US Environmental Protection Agency “Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage,” http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/CCS-Task-Force-Report-2010.pdf = = While CCS can be applied to a variety of stationary sources of CO2, its application to coal-fired power plant emissions offers the // greatest //// potential // for GHG reductions. Coal has served as an important domestic source of reliable, affordable energy for decades, and the coal industry has provided stable and quality high-paying jobs for American workers. At the same time, coal-fired power plants are the largest contributor to U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and coal combustion accounts for 40 percent of global carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions from the consumption of energy. EPA and Energy Information Administration (EIA) assessments of recent climate and energy legislative proposals show that, if available on a cost-effective basis, CCS can over time play a // large //// role // in reducing the // overall cost // of meeting domestic emissions reduction targets. By playing a leadership role in efforts to develop and deploy CCS technologies to reduce GHG emissions, the United States can preserve the option of using an affordable, abundant, and domestic energy resource, help improve national security, help to maximize production from existing oil fields through enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and assist in the creation of new technologies for export. = =

= = = = = = Robin, “Capturing Carbon: The New Weapon in the War Against Climate Change,” Google Book = = __Power generation systems__ (of all types) __tend to have very long life-times__, typically forty years for a coal-fired plant. __Even if we cease build-ing new fossil fuel capacity today, the existing units will continue to emit__ **__for decades__**. This __legacy electricity is extremely cheap____, since a coal plant's fuel is only a small part of its costs. If a power station is decommissioned, it will be relatively cheap to build a new one on the same site, since many facilities, power lines and so on will already be in place, and the site is__ **__unlikely to be attractive__** __for many alternative uses____.__ This is not some 'unfair advantage’ of fossil fuels, as some commentators have rather naively suggested;"" the situation is exactly the same for a hydroelectric dam. It is merely an indication that __it is not efficient to abandon capital goods before the end of their useful life__.102 Similarly, __the__ __traditional energy industry has tremendous resources of skilled people, institutional knowledge, political relationships, physical assets and financial strength__. To some extent, that can be turned to developing renewable energy. But, just as coal-miners from northern England mostly did not find new employment as North Sea rough¬necks, __a rapid abandonment of fossil fuels would waste many of these strengths. Continuing use of carbon energy, combined with carbon capture__, though, __can continue to use this intangible capita____l__. Environmental organisations might reflect that the fossil fuel industry is unlikely to cooperate in its own destruction. However, it can be a very powerful ally in realising a new energy future, as long as the will for cooperation is there, from all parties. = =
 * Coal is locked in – alternative energies are insufficient**
 * Mills 11** - *MSc in Geological Sciences @ Cambridge

= =

Coal is key to all major sectors of the economy
= = Rose and Wei 6 - * Professor of Energy, Environmental and Regional Economics, **Graduate Assistant in the Department of Geography at the Pennsylvania State University = = Adam and Dan, “The Economic Impacts of Coal Utilization and Displacement in the Continental United States, 2015,” http://www.americaspower.org/sites/all/themes/americaspower/images/pdf/penn-state-study.pdf = = We performed our analysis with the aid of an interindustry, or input-output, model. Specifically, we analyzed how coal-based electric generation affects production (output), household income, and employment in other sectors of each state and the continental U.S. as a whole under three alternative displacement scenarios. Our results indicate that the combination “multiplier” and “price-differential” effects are// sizeable //, amounting to $1.05 trillion ($2005) in total 48-state economic output for the “existence” of coal as a relatively inexpensive fuel for electricity generation. The results illustrate that government policies and private industry decisions affecting coal-based electric generation potentially can affect // every major aspect // of the American economy. The methodology underlying the study is summarized in Section II below, as well as in Appendix A, which also presents major assumptions and some basic computations underlying the analysis. The results for the five regions analyzed are summarized in Section III, with tables of basic data presented in Appendix B and simulation results presented in Appendix C. We simulated cases where coal-based electricity generation is displaced at levels of 66% and 33% by alternative energy supplies, including natural gas, nuclear, and a 10% mix of renewables, reflecting potential Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that could be in place by 2015. The results indicate that for the nation, and for nearly every state individually, this displacement -- even factoring in positive offsetting multiplier impacts of replacement fuels and technologies -- would have a net negative economic impact. We project that national gross output would decline by $371 billion for the 66% case, and by $166 billion for the 33% case. II. Methodology A. Measuring Economic Interdependence With a broad base and high level of technological advancement, the U.S. economy exhibits a great deal of interdependence. Each business enterprise relies on many others for inputs into its production process and provides inputs to them in return. This means that the coal and coal-based electric utility industries’ contributions to the nation's economy extend beyond their own production to include demand arising from a succession of "upstream" inputs from their suppliers and "downstream" deliveries to their customers. The economic value of these many rounds of derived demands and commodity allocations is some multiple of the value of direct production itself. Hence, the coal and coal-based electric utility industries generate "// multiplier //" effects throughout the U.S. economy. = =

Nuclear war
= = Harris and Burrows 9 ( Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” [], AM) = =

= = Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions__.__ It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties __in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack__. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, __particularly if__ protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions __of__ renewed energy __scarcity will__ drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world. = =

= = = = = =
 * US double dip is coming now because of the fiscal cliff**
 * The Economist 7/16** —“A global slowdown”, http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/07/world-economy_ ) EL

= = __THE IMF released new economic forecasts today__, updating its April projections. In a nutshell, __things aren't shaping up quite as well as they'd hoped:__ The big worries in advanced economies are all policy oriented. Europe, obviously, is a concern, but the __IMF is growing increasingly nervous about the possibility that American politicians will let the country hurdle off the year-end fiscal cliff. If gridlock is such that all projected tax rises and spending cuts take effect, America's economy could take a hit equal to 4% of GDP, enough to seriously harm the world economy.__ On emerging markets, by contrast, the IMF suggests that __growth prospects have been overstated__. Here's chief economist Olivier Blanchard: In each country you see a slowdown. There’s one explanation per country. I think there’s probably something underneath which is common. Emerging-market countries had a great decade and it may well be that their potential growth rate is really lower than the actual growth rate was, and maybe even their potential growth rate was before. All of them, in different modes, have had to slow down either in exports or investments and so on. My sense is __we may well be in a regime in which these growth rates will be a bit lower than they were. The biggest story, then, is that 2013 could shape up to be at least as difficult a year as 2012__. = =

= =

Independently, the plan is a key fiscal stimulus
= = ACCCE 11 = = American Coalition for Clean Coal Energy, “American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity,” http://www.compasscoal.com/blog/ = = The United States continues to be a world leader in advanced coal technologies not only because of the investments we make. Our leaders also recognize that advanced coal technologies need to be developed in order to continue to use of one of the world’s most abundant resourceswith as small of an environmental impact as possible. Just last week, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu said to the Senate Budget Committee: The world will continue to rely on coal-fired electrical generation to meet energy demand. It is imperative that the United States develop the technology to ensure that base-load electricity generation is as clean and reliable as possible. Plus, taxpayers reap the benefits of our investments into CCS projects. In a 2009 ACCCE-commissioned study, American taxpayers see a // quick and significant // return on federal investments in advanced coal technologies, gaining // $13 in benefits for every dollar // the government invests. = =

= = = = = =
 * Domestic, federal stimulus is key to manufacturing jobs and the economy**
 * Buffenbarger, 11** (Tom Buffenbarger, president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 9/26/11, “Why ‘Buy America’ is integral to the jobs act”, [|http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-buy-america-is-integral-to-the-jobs-act/2011/09/24/gIQArVpF0K_story.html)//EM]

= = = =
 * __Without a strong “Buy America” provision__** in the American Jobs Act, **__the temptation for businesses__** **__to use the funds to purchase goods overseas will be too strong to resist__** . Despite The Post’s enduring support for free trade, one should remember that **__unrestricted outsourcing is one reason why we are in the midst of the most serious economic crisis since the__****__1930s__**__.__ [|Personal Post] For too long, **__too many companies have shipped U.S. jobs to countries that have no regard for fundamental human rights__**** . ****__The last thing we should__****__be doing__** now **__is enabling them to do so with money intended to create jobs here at home. Buy America provisions represent a basic and common-sense solution__** to the jobs crisis. If anything, they should be strengthened. In the past few years, more than 3 million manufacturing workers have lost their jobs. **__Requiring companies to use federal money to purchase domestic materials and manufactured goods will not harm American workers__** . Quite the contrary, **__it will provide much-needed jobs to the millions of manufacturing workers__** **__who have lost theirs__** . It **__will__** also help **__restore__****__our__** nation’s **__economy__**.

That’s solves faster growth
= = Applebaum 12 - *PhD, Professor @ Rutgers, senior economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research = = Eileen, 4-27, “Blame Budget Austerity for Poor GDP Growth,” http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/04/27/blame-budget-austerity-for-poor-gdp-growth = = As the Obama administration's 2009 stimulus continues to wind down, the effects on the US economy are showing up in the economic data. Coming out of a steep recession, the economy should be experiencing robust output, or GDP, growth. Output growth of 3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2011 helped bring the unemployment rate down. However, the government's announcement that output growth fell to 2.2 percent in the first quarter of 2012 should give policy makers pause. The economy // needs to grow // by at least 2.5 percent just to keep unemployment from rising. Thus this latest figure on GDP growth does not auger well for the job market, which has seen a steady rise over the last few weeks in initial unemployment claims. In the face of weaker demand, Investment spending by business is slowing. Cutbacks in government spending at the federal as well as state and local levels are already hurting GDP growth. In the absence of federal revenue sharing with the states--the first time the federal government has not had such a program when unemployment is above 7 percent--state and local government expenditures have fallen for seven consecutive quarters. [See a collection of political cartoons on the economy.] With the U.S. economy slowing and job growth still // very weak //, what should the government do? Continued calls for government belt tightening, fiscal consolidation, and austerity are out-of-step with economic realities. The argument for austerity is that drastic cuts in government spending will stave off inflation and provide businesses with the confidence to go out and invest. But these are // empty arguments //.Oil prices fluctuate widely, rising for reasons unrelated to government policy. Sustained inflation is only possible if wage and benefit costs are rising. Thursday's report on employer costs, however, shows that the year-over-year increase in employment costs is a very modest 2 percent and the increase in the latest quarter is even smaller. As for business confidence taking up the economic slack, the UK provides a stark reminder of just how wrong this argument is. The United Kingdom, like the United States and unlike Greece, has its own currency. The U.K., like the United States and unlike Greece, has its own central bank and control over its own monetary policy. There is no chance that the United States (or the United Kingdom) can end up like Greece. There is, however, the distinct possibility that the United States can end up like the United Kingdom. [Read: Government Economic Intervention Made America Great.] Almost two years ago the U.K. put in place a coalition government led by George Osborne that implemented an austerity program that cut government spending and public services and was supposed to give British businesses the confidence to invest and boost economic growth. The outcome has fallen far short of these expectations. The U.K. is experiencing the slowest growth in a century, with GDP still 4.3 percent below its peak reached four years ago. Output has grown just 0.4 percent in two years under the Osborne government, and now--with two back-to-back quarters of declining GDP--the British economy has officially slipped back into a double-dip recession. Confidence has not returned to U.K. businesses; indeed lending to businesses fell sharply in March despite the fact that banks had cash available to lend out. Meanwhile, the toll on the British people as government services are cut has become more severe. The charitable trust that operates a network of food banks in the United Kingdom reported that the number of people turning to food banks to feed themselves and their children doubled over the past 12 months. The wounds to the U.K. economy are self-imposed. Unlike Greece or Spain, the United Kingdom did not come under pressure from the E.U. Neither was there pressure from the bond markets; interest rates and borrowing costs were quite low. British politicians chose to slash spending and impose austerity on the British economy. The lesson should not be lost on America's political leaders. Like the United Kingdom, the United States has control over its economic policies. It // should not choose // austerity. = =

= = = = Chrysostomidis and Zakkour 8 - * MSc, Environmental Management and Sustainability, **PhD in Environmental Technology = = Ioannis and Paul, “Assessment of the range of potential funds and funding mechanisms for CO2 transportation networks,” ERM, Scholar = = Another option was for the backbone pipeline to be developed entirely as a government project (i.e. via public sector borrowing) and delivered by governments as a public good. Most of the interviewees expect a high level of receptiveness from governments regarding the use of government funds for CCS financing. 5.3.4 Applicable Funds Debt Financing It was made clear from the interviews that t he most likely part of the CCS value chain to be financed through debt, would be the pipeline infrastructure.Such financing is already tried and tested for oil and gas pipelines, contrary to CCS tech nologies that are // far more risky //. On the other hand it was noted that a pipeline represented limited collateral, with limited value in alternative uses, should the project collapse. The general consensus from the // interviews with banks // was that it is // too early // for banks to finance such a CO2 pipeline network on a limited recourse basis, until such process/technology is // well established // and/or until contractual framework can be put in place with creditworthy entities ensuring a throughput revenue for undertaking for such pipelines. = =
 * Specifically federal pipeline investment is key—banks won’t lend **

= = = = Harvey, 11 – Professor of Economics @ TCU (John, “How to Destroy the US Economy? Balance the Budget,” 6-5, [])//AH = =
 * Government spending solves every internal link employment and doesn’t cause inflation – it stimulates demand**

= = Situations like the 1930s and today benefit no one. Unemployed workers would like jobs, employed workers would like not to have to support (formally or informally) the unemployed, and entrepreneurs would like to sell more output. There is an obvious solution: the federal government can supplement demand. Start off with a simple example: just imagine that they pay people $30,000/year to stand on a street corner and make nice comments about passers by to raise national morale: “My, don’t you look handsome today!” “Go get ‘em, tiger!” “You’re important and people like you!” While this may make the others feel uncomfortable and cause them to avoid these particular street corners,it is nevertheless a net addition to aggregate demand. This is so because when these public greeters go home from work, they spend money from their incomes. This takes nothing from the mouths of existing workers because we already had the ability to produce more (again, compare the Roaring Twenties with the Great Depression). On top of that, the formerly unemployed now have jobs plus the ability to purchase goods and services and entrepreneurs earn more income because their sales rise–everyone is better off. Now let’s make the example a little more realistic and actually give the government employees something useful to do (but not necessarily profitable, since that’s what the private sector already does). Instead of street corner greeters, they could be soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, librarians, teachers, police officers, firemen, social workers, national park rangers, et cetera. This adds even more to the nation’s wealth because now even the formerly employed enjoy more goods and services (for example, protection from domestic and foreign aggression and a place to go camping). Remember, the core economic problem is the private sector’s inability to generate sufficient demand to employ everyone. This solves it by supplementing demand. // It creates more employment, higher wages, and greater profits. // How the Government can Finance its Spending Whence comes the money the government uses to pay the soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, librarians, teachers, police officers, firemen, social workers, and national park rangers? It could tax the private sector, but that’s not terribly effective since it raises demand in one place by lowering it in another. So, they should deficit spend. To keep with my desire for simplicity in this entry, let’s say the manner in which this is accomplished is direct borrowing from the Federal Reserve (something that is illegal at the moment but can be, and is, done via a less direct route). This means the Treasury sells its debt to another branch of the government, in exchange for which it receives the cash it needs to pay those workers. When the debt becomes due, they sell more. Because all US debt is owed in a currency we are legally permitted to print, it is impossible to face debt default. We can choose to default, but we are never forced to. Nor is this inflationary. This is true for a variety of reasons, the most critical of which being that it does not represent more money chasing fewer goods since the quantity of the latter rose–that was the whole point of the exercise. We wanted to lower unemployment and produce more output. I have, incidentally, two longer entries on how inflation really works: Money Growth Does Not Cause Inflation! What Actually Causes Inflation (and Who Gains from It) Conclusions That’s the essential story in as few words as I can tell it. For those who are more visual, several months ago a friend of mine used one of my blog posts to make this YouTube explanation of the core issues: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ei_B5MTJofI The bottom line is that the private sector does not generate sufficient demand to hire all those who are willing to work. The real irony is that we have plenty of capacity to produce output for them, they just can’t afford to buy it. But, if we supplement this with public sector deficit spending–something we can finance forever since the debt is owed in our own currency–then this absolutely, totally unnecessary problem can be solved. To do the opposite, to lower government spending (or raise taxes) in the midst of a period of high unemployment, is not only counterproductive, it’s cruel. The federal government does not borrow in order to be able to afford something it could not otherwise buy. Rather, the goal of deficit spending (at least when we are at less than full employment) is to stimulate demand. This is not analogous to how a household budget works. = =

= = = = Harvey 11 – Professor of Economics @ TCU (John, “Why the Private Sector NEEDS the Government to Spend Money” 4-28, http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntharvey/2011/04/29/why-the-private-sector-needs-the-government-to-spend-money/)//AH = = That leaves investment and government spending as the real engines of growth, and this is why I highlighted them in green. They are the forces that drive the business cycle rather than follow it. Businesses and the government together determine whether or not we are in rapid expansion or the depths of depression. This chart illustrates the point: US GDP If you can’t see it clearly, just select this link: US GDP Growth and Causes since 1950 It compares quarterly US GDP growth rates (green) from 1950Q1 to 2011Q1 to the average of the growth rate of investment plus that of government spending (red; the government contribution is weighted by 1.6 to represent it’s relative weight over the time period–in other words, government spending is 1.6 times as large as investment, so it should count more heavily). It’s a very tight fit in terms of when they peak and valley. Note that the scales on each axis are different, but I tried to line up the zeros (which turned out to be a royal pain–I’m not sure I quite nailed it). Note that this means that if there were no government sector, then the job of driving economic activity would be left to investment alone. This is similar to the situation we faced before WWII, when the government was tiny compared to the rest of the economy. The problem is, firms can build new capacity (i.e., invest) relatively quickly so that, ironically, at the very moment we have our greatest ability to produce goods and services, investment falls, layoffs occur, and we slip into recession. This is an absolutely critical point. It is covered in much more detail here: What Causes the Business Cycle Productivity increases have meant that, since the early 20th century, the private sector alone has been unable to generate sufficient opportunities for employment to hire everyone who is willing to wor k –despite our ability to produce plenty of output for them. Capitalism can do a decent job in terms of allocating resources, creating new technologies, developing innovative products, et cetera (not that it always does, of course, but that’s a different discussion). But what it is incapable of doing is generating sufficient employment for all those willing to work. It will do so in spurts, but that’s it. We are just too damn productive which means that we don’t need to hire everyone who wants a job in order to create sufficient output for them. This is the key issue we face. The severity of this problem has been greatly diminished by the fact that WWII, which effectively ended the Great Depression (and left us with far more debt that we have today, incidentally), led to growth in the government sector that only slightly reversed itself once peace came. This created an automatic counterbalance to the fluctuations in investment that I am saying are so important. Consider the following: when the economy slumps, this lowers tax revenues (because people have less money ) and raises, without any legislation being necessary, government spending (because, with the lower level of economic activity, more people qualify for unemployment and income assistance). Since investment is a major driver of the business cycle, look at what happens: fall in investment => fall in GDP => increase in government spending The last entry at least partially compensates for the first, which makes recessions less severe and lengthy. This has dampened, if not eliminated, the effect of the private sector’s instability since WWII. And it works in reverse, too: rise in investment => rise in GDP => decrease in government spending Hence, as the economy gro ws, so the government budget tends toward balance (as it did at the end of our longest peacetime expansion in the 1990s). But, and this is terribly important for today, the line of causation does not run in the opposite direction!!! It is not true that lowering government spending has a tendency to increase investment. Unfortunately, this appears to be the basis of a great deal of policy in Washington today (assuming there is any economic logic to it at all). Taking discretionary action to cut spending now will be an absolute disaster. We haven’t even started doing that with any gusto yet, and look at the results from 2011Q1. And, just today, President Obama signed a bill that cut $38 billion from the government budget, while the house passed one reducing government spending by $6.2 trillion over the next decade. This is absolute insanity. What do these people think is going to happen? Something that appears to be completely lost in this discussion is that every cut in government spending represents a reduction in someone’s income. It has the same effect as an increase in taxes. How is this going to excite entrepreneurs about investing? Interest rates are already ridiculously low and workers come at a bargain-basement price (as they always do when unemployment is high). And yet look at investment over the past few years (even before the run up in oil and commodity prices had hit epidemic levels): US Investment and Unemployment Here is a link to see it in more detail (note that I went back to 2000 to give a bit more context–the Great Recession started in December 2007): US Investment and Unemployment To be sure, there has been some recovery in investment (the blue line), but it has also backtracked and we are a long, long way from the levels that were generating around 4.5% unemployment (the red line) back in early 2007. We can’t really do much more to realistically lower firms’ costs, and that’s not the problem anyway–businesses know damn well that investing right now would be a complete waste of time (as were QEI and QEII, incidentally, because they were aimed at lowering borrowing costs–that was never the problem). Sales aren’t going to be brisk when 13.5 million of your customers are unemployed and many more underemployed or discouraged. That is the major obstacle to economic recovery. The government’s plan? More layoffs and wage reductions. This is supposed to encourage entrepreneurs to take the risks about which they are reluctant at the moment. If that seems illogical to you, it’s because it is. It’s sheer lunacy. What we saw from 2011Q1 is just a taste. It’s going to get much worse. The private sector needs the injections of income that will create profits for those entrepreneurs and induce them to invest. Instead, we are about to further impoverish their potential customers. = =
 * The private sector is reliant on government stimulus – it can’t generate employment and investment alone**

= =

Even absent a recession, slow growth leads to global wars
= = Khalilzad 11 – PhD, Former Professor of Political Science @ Columbia, Former ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan = = Zalmay Khalilzad was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992. "The Economy and National Security" Feb 8 www.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/259024 = = Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers fromfiscal imbalances and // low //economic // growth //, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even // war among the great powers //.The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without // faster // economicgrowthand actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.

= =  **__ 1AC Warming __** = =
 * Advantage 2 – warming**

Global warming is real and human induced – top climate scientists agree
Anderegg et. al 10 – PhD Candidate @ Stanford in Biology William, “Expert credibility in climate change,” National Academy of Sciences, p. 12107-12109 = = Preliminary reviews of scientific literature and surveys of cli- mate scientists indicate striking agreement with the primary conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): anthropogenic greenhouse gases have been responsible for “most” of the “unequivocal” warming of the Earth ’s average global temperature over the second half of the 20th century (1–3). Nonetheless, substantial and growing public doubt remains about the anthropogenic cause and scientific agreement about the role of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in climate change (4, 5). A vocal minority of researchers and other critics contes t the conclusions of the mainstream scientific assessment, frequently citing large numbers of scientists whom they believe support their claims (6–8). This group, often termed climate change skeptics, contrarians, or deniers, has received large amounts of media attention and wields significant influence in the societal debate about climate change impacts and policy (7, 9–14). An extensive literature examines what constitutes expertise or credibility in technical and policy-relevant scientific research (15). Though our aim is not to expand upon that literature here, we wish to draw upon several important observations from this literature in examining expert credibility in climate change. First, though the degree of contextual, political, epistemological, and cultural in- fluences in determining who counts as an expert and who is credible remains debated, many scholarsacknowledge the need to i dentify credible experts and account for expert opinion in tech- nical (e.g., science-based) decision-making (15–19). Furthermore, delineating expertise and the relative credibility of claims is critical, especially in areas where it may be difficult for the majority of decision-makers and the lay public to evaluate the full complexities of a technical issue (12, 15). Ultimately, however, societal decisions regarding response to ACC must necessarily include input from many diverse and nonexpert stakeholders. Because the timeline of decision-making is often more rapid than scientific consensus, examining the landscape of expert opinion can greatly inform such decision-making (15, 19). Here, we examine a metric of climate-specific expertise and a metric of overall sci- entific prominence as two dimensions of expert credibility in two groups of researchers. We provide a broad assessment of the rel- ative credibility of researchers convinced by the evidence (CE) of ACC and those unconvinced by the evidence (UE) of ACC. Our consideration of UE researchers differs from previous work on climate change skeptics and contrarians in that we primarily focus on researchers that have published extensively in the climate field, although we consider all skeptics/contrarians that have signed pro- minent statements concerning ACC (6–8). Such expert analysis can illuminate public and policy discussions about ACC and the extent of consensus in the expert scientific community. We compiled a database of 1,372 climate researchers based on authorship of scientific assessment reports and membership on multisignatory statements about ACC (SI Materials and Methods). We tallied the number of climate-relevant publications authored or coauthored by each researcher (defined here as expertise) and counted the number of citations for each of the researcher’s four highest-cited papers (defined here as prominence) using Google Scholar. We then imposed an a priori criterion that a researcher must have authored a minimum of 20 climate publications to be considered a climate researcher, thus reducing the database to 908 researchers. Varying this minimum publication cutoff did not ma- terially alter results (Materials and Methods). We ranked researchers based on the total number of climate publications authored. Though our compiled researcher list is not comprehensive nor designed to be representative of the entire cli- mate science community, we have drawn researchers from the most high-profile reports and public statements about ACC. Therefore, we have likely compiled the strongest and most credentialed re- searchers in CE and UE groups. Citation and publication analyses must be treated with caution in inferring scientific credibility, but we suggest that our methods and our expertise and prominence criteria provide conservative, robust, and relevant indicators of relative credibility of CE and UE groups of climate researchers (Materials and Methods). Results and Discussion The UE [unconvinced by evidence] group // comprises only 2% // of the top 50 climate researchers as ranked by expertise (number of climate publications), 3% of researchers of the top 100, and 2.5% of the top 200, excluding researchers present in both groups (Materials and Methods). This result closely agrees with expert surveys, indicating that // ≈97% // of self-identified actively publishing climate scientists agree with the tenets of ACC (2). Furthermore, this finding complements direct polling of the climate researcher community, which yields quali- tative and self-reported researcher expertise (2). Our findings capture the added dimension of the distribution of researcher expertise, quantify agreement among the highest expertise climate researchers, and provide an independent assessment of level of scientific consensus concerning ACC. In addition to the striking difference in number of expert researchers between CE and UE groups, the distribution of expertise of the UE group is far below that of the CE group (Fig. 1). Mean expertise of the UE group was around half (60 publications) that of the CE group (119 pub- lications; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 57,020; P < 10−14), as was median expertise (UE = 34 publications; CE = 84 publications). Furthermore, researchers with fewer than 20 climate publications comprise ≈80% the UE group, as opposed to less than 10% of the CE group. This indicates that the bulk of UE researchers on the most prominent multisignatory statements about climate change have not published extensively in the peer-reviewed climate literature. We examined a subsample of the 50 most-published (highest- expertise) researchers from each group. Such subsampling facili- tates comparison of relative expertise between groups (normalizing differences between absolute numbers). This method reveals large differences in relative expertise between CE and UE groups (Fig. 2). Though the top-published researchers in the CE group have an average of 408 climate publications (median = 344), the top UE re- searchers average only 89 publications (median = 68; Mann– Whitney U test: W = 2,455; P < 10−15). Thus, this suggests that not all experts are equal, and top CE researchers have much stronger expertise in climate science than those in the top UE group. Finally, our prominence criterion provides an independent and approximate estimate of the relative scientific significance of CE and UE publications. Citation analysis complements publication analysis because it can, in general terms, capture the quality and impact of a researcher’s contribution—a critical component to overall scientific credibility—as opposed to measuring a research- er’s involvement in a field, or expertise (Materials and Methods). The citation analysis conducted here further complements the publication analysis because it does not examine solely climate- relevant publications and thus captures highly prominent re- searchers who may not be directly involved with the climate field. We examined the top four most-cited papers for each CE and UE researcher with 20 or more climate publications and found immense disparity in scientific prominence between CE and UE communities (Mann–Whitney U test: W = 50,710; P < 10−6; Fig. 3). CE researchers’ top papers were cited an average of 172 times, compared with 105 times for UE researchers. Because a single, highly cited paper does not establish a highly credible reputation but might instead reflect the controversial nature of that paper (often called the single-paper effect), we also considered the av- erage the citation count of the second through fourth most-highly cited papers of each researcher. Results were robust when only these papers were considered (CE mean: 133; UE mean: 84; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 50,492; P < 10−6). Results were ro- bust when all 1,372 researchers, including those with fewer than 20 climate publications, were considered (CE mean: 126; UE mean: 59; Mann–Whitney U test: W = 3.5 × 105; P < 10−15). Number of citations is an imperfect but useful benchmark for a group’s scientific prominence (Materials and Methods), and we show here that even considering all (e.g., climate and nonclimate) publications, the UE researcher group has substantially lower prominence than the CE group. We provide a large-scale quantitative assessment of the relative level of agreement, expertise, and prominence in the climate re- searcher community. We show that the expertise and prominence, two integral components of overall expert credibility, of climate researchers convinced by the evidence of ACC // vastly overshadows //that of the climate change skeptics and contrarians. This divide is even starker when considering the top researchers in each group. Despite // media // tendencies to present both sides in ACC debates (9), which can contribute to continued public misunderstanding re- garding ACC (7, 11, 12, 14), not all climate researchers are equal in scientific credibility and expertise in the climate system. This extensive analysis of the mainstream versus skeptical/contrarian researchers suggests a strong role for considering expert credibi- lity in the relative weight of and attention to these groups of re- searchers in future discussions in media, policy, and public forums regarding anthropogenic climate change. = =

= = = = Rahmstorf 8 – Professor of Physics of the Oceans at Potsdam University (Richard. Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto. Edited by Ernesto Zedillo. “Anthropogenic Climate Change?” Page 42-49) = = It is time to turn to statement B: human activities are altering the climate. This can be broken into two parts. The first is as follows: global climate is warming. This is by now a generally undisputed point (except by novelist Michael Crichton), so we deal with it only briefly. The two leading compilations of data measured with thermometers are shown in figure 3-3, that of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and that of the British Hadley Centre for Climate Change. Although they differ in the details, due to the inclusion of different data sets and use of different spatial averaging and quality control procedures, they both show a consistent picture, with a global mean warming of 0.8°C since the late nineteenth century. Temperatures over the past ten years clearly were the warmest since measured records have been available. The year 1998 sticks out well above the longterm trend due to the occurrence of a major El Nino event that year (the last El Nino so far and one of the strongest on record). __These__ events are examples of the largest natural climate variations on multiyear time scales and, by releasing heat from the ocean, generally cause positive anomalies in global mean temperature. It is remarkable that the year 2005 rivaled the heat of 1998 even though no El Nino event occurred that year. (A bizarre curiosity, perhaps worth mentioning, is that several prominent "climate skeptics" recently used the extreme year 1998 to claim in the media that global warming had ended. In Lindzen's words, "Indeed, the absence of any record breakers during the past seven years is statistical evidence that temperatures are not increasing.")33 In addition to the surface measurements, the more recent portion of the global warming trend (since 1979) is also documented by satellite data. It is not straightforward to derive a reliable surface temperature trend from satellites, as they measure radiation coming from throughout the atmosphere (not just near the surface), including the stratosphere, which has strongly cooled, and the records are not homogeneous' due to the short life span of individual satellites, the problem of orbital decay, observations at different times of day, and drifts in instrument calibration.' Current analyses of these satellite data show trends that are fully consistent with surface measurements and model simulations ." If no reliable temperature measurements existed, could we be sure that the climate is warming? The "canaries in the coal mine" of climate change (as glaciologist Lonnie Thompson puts it) ~are mountain glaciers. We know, both from old photographs and from the position of the terminal moraines heaped up by the flowing ice, that mountain glaciers have been in retreat all over the world during the past century. There are precious few exceptions, and they are associated with a strong increase in precipitation or local cooling.36 I have inspected examples of shrinking glaciers myself in field trips to Switzerland, Norway, and New Zealand. As glaciers respond sensitively to temperature changes, data on the extent of glaciers have been used to reconstruct a history of Northern Hemisphere temperature over the past four centuries (see figure 3-4 ). Cores drilled in tropical glaciers show signs of recent melting that is unprecedented at least throughout the Holocene -the past 10,000 years. Another powerful sign of warming __,__ visible clearly from satellites, is the shrinking Arctic sea ice cover (figure 3-5), which has declined 20 percent since satellite observations began in 1979. While climate clearly became warmer in the twentieth century, much discussion particularly in the popular media has focused on the question of how "unusual" this warming is in a longer-term context. While this is an interesting question, it has often been mixed incorrectly with the question of causation. Scientifically, how unusual recent warming is-say, compared to the past millennium-in itself contains little information about its cause. Even a highly unusual warming could have a natural cause (for example, an exceptional increase in solar activity). And even a warming within the bounds of past natural variations could have a predominantly anthropogenic cause. I come to the question of causation shortly, after briefly visiting the evidence for past natural climate variations. Records from the time before systematic temperature measurements were collected are based on "proxy data," coming from tree rings, ice cores, corals, and other sources.These proxy data are generally linked to local temperatures in some way, but they may be influenced by other parameters as well (for example, precipitation), they may have a seasonal bias (for example, the growth season for tree rings), and high-quality long records are difficult to obtain and therefore few in number and geographic coverage. Therefore, there is still substantial uncertainty in the evolution of past global or hemispheric temperatures. (Comparing only local or regional temperature; as in Europe, is of limited value for our purposes,' as regional variations can be much larger than global ones and can have many regional causes, unrelated to global-scale forcing and climate change.) The first quantitative reconstruction for the Northern Hemisphere temperature of the past millennium, including an error estimation, was presented by Mann, Bradley, and Hughes and rightly highlighted in the 2001 IPCC report as one of the major new findings since its 1995 report; it is shown in figure 3_6.39 The analysis suggests that, despite the large error bars, twentieth-century warming is indeed highly unusual and probably was unprecedented during the past millennium. This result, presumably because of its symbolic power, has attracted much criticism, to some extent in scientific journals, but even more so in the popular media. The hockey stick-shaped curve became a symbol for the IPCC, .and criticizing this particular data analysis became an avenue for some to question the credibility of the IPCC. Three important things have been overlooked in much of the media coverage. First, even if the scientific critics had been right, this would not have called into question the very cautious conclusion drawn by the IPCC from the reconstruction by Mann, Bradley, and Hughes: "New analyses of proxy data for the Northern Hemisphere indicate that the increase in temperature in the twentieth century is likely to have been the largest of any century during the past 1,000 years." This conclusion has since been supported further by every single one of close to a dozen new reconstructions (two of which are shown in figure 3-6).Second, by far the most serious scientific criticism raised against Mann, Hughes, and Bradley was simply based on a mistake. 40 The prominent paper of von Storch and others, which claimed (based on a model test) that the method of Mann, Bradley, and Hughes systematically underestimated variability, "was [itself] based on incorrect implementation of the reconstruction procedure."41 With correct implementation, climate field reconstruction procedures such as the one used by Mann, Bradley, and Hughes have been shown to perform well in similar model tests. Third, whether their reconstruction is accurate or not has no bearing on policy. If their analysis underestimated past natural climate variability, this would certainly not argue for a smaller climate sensitivity and thus a lesser concern about the consequences of our emissions. Some have argued that, in contrast, it would point to a larger climate sensitivity. While this is a valid point in principle, it does not apply in practice to the climate sensitivity estimates discussed herein or to the range given by IPCC, since these did not use the reconstruction of Mann, Hughes, and Bradley or any other proxy records of the past millennium. Media claims that "a pillar of the Kyoto Protocol" had been called into question were therefore misinformed. As an aside, the protocol was agreed in 1997, before the reconstruction in question even existed. The overheated public debate on this topic has, at least, helped to attract more researchers and funding to this area of paleoclimatology; its methodology has advanced significantly, and a number of new reconstructions have been presented in recent years. While the science has moved forward, the first seminal reconstruction by Mann, Hughes, and Bradley has held up remarkably well, with its main features reproduced by more recent work. Further progress probably will require substantial amounts of new proxy data, rather than further refinement of the statistical techniques pioneered by Mann, Hughes, and Bradley. Developing these data sets will require time and substantial effort. It is time to address the final statement: most of the observed warming over the past fifty years is anthropogenic __.__ A large number of studies exist that have taken different approaches to analyze this issue, which is generally called the "attribution problem." I do not discuss the exact share of the anthropogenic contribution (although this is an interesting question). By "most" I imply mean "more than 50 percent.” The first and crucial piece of evidence is, of course, that the magnitude of the warming is what is expected from the anthropogenic perturbation of the radiation balance, so anthropogenic forcing is able to explain all of the temperature rise . As discussed here, the rise in greenhouse gases alone corresponds to 2.6 W/tn2 of forcing. This by itself, after subtraction of the observed 0'.6 W/m2 of ocean heat uptake, would Cause 1.6°C of warming since preindustrial times for medium climate sensitivity (3"C). With a current "best guess'; aerosol forcing of 1 W/m2, the expected warming is O.8°c. The point here is not that it is possible to obtain the 'exact observed number-this is fortuitous because the amount of aerosol' forcing is still very' uncertain-but that the expected magnitude is roughly right. There can be little doubt that the anthropogenic forcing is large enough to explain most of the warming. Depending on aerosol forcing and climate sensitivity, it could explain a large fraction of the warming, or all of it, or even more warming than has been observed (leaving room for natural processes to counteract some of the warming). The second important piece of evidence is clear: there is no viable alternative explanation . In the scientific literature, no serious alternative hypothesis has been proposed to explain the observed global warming. Other possible causes, such as solar activity, volcanic activity, cosmic rays, or orbital cycles , are well observed, but they do not show trends capable of explaining the observed warming. Since 1978, solar irradiance has been measured directly from satellites and shows the well-known eleven-year solar cycle, but no trend. There are various estimates of solar variability before this time, based on sunspot numbers, solar cycle length, the geomagnetic AA index, neutron monitor data, and, carbon-14 data. These indicate that solar activity probably increased somewhat up to 1940. While there is disagreement about the variation in previous centuries, different authors agree that solar activity did not significantly increase during the last sixty-five years. Therefore, this cannot explain the warming, and neither can any of the other factors mentioned. Models driven by natural factors only, leaving the anthropogenic forcing aside, show a cooling in the second half of the twentieth century (for an example, See figure 2-2, panel a, in chapter 2 of this volume). The trend in the sum of natural forcings is downward. The only way out would be either some as yet undiscovered unknown forcing or a warming trend that arises by chance from an unforced internal variability in the climate system. The latter cannot be completely ruled out, but has to be considered highly unlikely. No evidence in the observed record, proxy data, or current models suggest that such internal variability could cause a sustained trend of global warming of the observed magnitude. As discussed, twentieth century warming is unprecedented over the past 1,000 years (or even 2,000 years, as the few longer reconstructions available now suggest), which does not 'support the idea of large internal fluctuations. Also, those past variations correlate well with past forcing (solar variability, volcanic activity) and thus appear to be largely forced rather than due to unforced internal variability." And indeed, it would be difficult for a large and sustained unforced variability to satisfy the fundamental physical law of energy conservation. Natural internal variability generally shifts heat around different parts of the climate system-for example, the large El Nino event of 1998, which warmed, the atmosphere by releasing heat stored in the ocean. This mechanism implies that the ocean heat content drops as the atmosphere warms. For past decades, as discussed, we observed the atmosphere warming and the ocean heat content increasing, which rules out heat release from the ocean as a cause of surface warming. The heat content of the whole climate system is increasing, and there is no plausible source of this heat other than the heat trapped by greenhouse gases. ' A completely different approach to attribution is to analyze the spatial patterns of climate change. This is done in so-called fingerprint studies, which associate particular patterns or "fingerprints" with different forcings. It is plausible that the pattern of a solar-forced climate change differs from the pattern of a change caused by greenhouse gases. For example, a characteristic of greenhouse gases is that heat is trapped closer to the Earth's surface and that, unlike solar variability, greenhouse gases tend to warm more in winter, and at night. Such studies have used different data sets and have been performed by different groups of researchers with different statistical methods. They consistently conclude that the observed spatial pattern of warming can only be explained by greenhouse gases .49 Overall, it has to be considered, highly likely' that the observed warming is indeed predominantly due to the human-caused increase in greenhouse gases. ' This paper discussed the evidence for the anthropogenic increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration and the effect of CO2 on climate, finding that this anthropogenic increase is proven beyond reasonable doubt and that a mass of evidence points to a CO2 effect on climate of 3C ± 1.59C global-warmin g for a doubling of concentration. (This is, the classic IPCC range; my personal assessment is that, in-the light of new studies since the IPCC Third Assessment Report, the uncertainty range can now be narrowed somewhat to 3°C ± 1.0C) This is based on consistent results from theory, models, and data analysis, and, even in the absence-of any computer models, the same result would still hold based on physics and on data from climate history alone. Considering the plethora of consistent evidence, the chance that these conclusions are wrong has to be considered minute. If the preceding is accepted, then it follows logically and incontrovertibly that a further increase in CO2 concentration will lead to further warming. The magnitude of our emissions depends on human behavior, but the climatic response to various emissions scenarios can be computed from the information presented here. The result is the famous range of future global temperature scenarios shown in figure 3_6.50 Two additional steps are involved in these computations: the consideration of anthropogenic forcings other than CO2 (for example, other greenhouse gases and aerosols) and the computation of concentrations from the emissions. Other gases are not discussed here, although they are important to get quantitatively accurate results. CO2 is the largest and most important forcing. Concerning concentrations, the scenarios shown basically assume that ocean and biosphere take up a similar share of our emitted CO2 as in the past. This could turn out to be an optimistic assumption; some models indicate the possibility of a positive feedback, with the biosphere turning into a carbon source rather than a sink under growing climatic stress. It is clear that even in the more optimistic of the shown (non-mitigation) scenarios, global temperature would rise by 2-3°C above its preindustrial level by the end of this century. Even for a paleoclimatologist like myself, this is an extraordinarily high temperature, which is very likely unprecedented in at least the past 100,000 years. As far as the data show, we would have to go back about 3 million years, to the Pliocene, for comparable temperatures. The rate of this warming (which is important for the ability of ecosystems to cope) is also highly unusual and unprecedented probably for an even longer time. The last major global warming trend occurred when the last great Ice Age ended between 15,000 and 10,000 years ago: this was a warming of about 5°C over 5,000 years, that is, a rate of only 0.1 °C per century. 52 The expected magnitude and rate of planetary warming is highly likely to come with major risk and impacts in terms of sea level rise (Pliocene sea level was 25-35 meters higher than now due to smaller Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets), extreme events (for example, hurricane activity is expected to increase in a warmer climate), and ecosystem loss. The second part of this paper examined the evidence for the current warming of the planet and discussed what is known about its causes. This part showed that global warming is already a measured and-well-established fact, not a theory. Many different lines of evidence consistently show that most of the observed warming of the past fifty years was caused by human activity. Above all, this warming is exactly what would be expected given the anthropogenic rise in greenhouse gases, and no viable alternative explanation for this warming has been proposed in the scientific literature. Taken together., the very strong evidence accumulated from thousands of independent studies, has over the past decades convinced virtually every climatologist around the world (many of whom were initially quite skeptical, including myself) that anthropogenic global warming is a reality with which we need to deal. = =
 * Warming is real and human induced—trends and data prove—action now is key**

= =

Warming is an existential risk – //__quickening__// reductions is key to avoiding extinction
= = Mazo 10 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA = = Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122 = = The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." // Without early and severe reductions // in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are // likely to be catastrophic // for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries .' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an // existential threat // to civilisation ." What is certain is that there is // no precedent //in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes. = =

= = = = Joe **Romm** is a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, “Science: Ocean Acidifying So Fast It Threatens Humanity’s Ability to Feed Itself,” 3/2/ 2012, http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2012/03/02/436193/science-ocean-acidifying-so-fast-it-threatens-humanity-ability-to-feed-itself/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+climateprogre = =
 * Unmitigated carbon emissions cause extinction.**

= = __ The world’s oceans may be turning acidic faster __ today __ from human carbon emissions __ than they did during four major extinctions in the last 300 million years, when natural pulses of carbon sent global temperatures soaring, says a new study in Science. The study is the first of its kind to survey the geologic record for evidence of ocean acidification over this vast time period. “What we’re doing today really stands out,” said lead author Bärbel Hönisch, a paleoceanographer at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. “We know that life during past ocean acidification events was not wiped out—new species evolved to replace those that died off. But __ if industrial carbon emissions continue at the current pace, we may lose organisms we care about __ —coral reefs, oysters, salmon.” That’s the news release from a major 21-author Science paper, “The Geological Record of Ocean Acidification” (subs. req’d). We knew from a 2010 Nature Geoscience study that the oceans are now acidifying 10 times faster today than 55 million years ago when a mass extinction of marine species occurred. But this study looked back over 300 million and found that “ __ the unprecedented rapidity of CO2 release ____ currently taking place” has put marine life at risk in a frighteningly unique way: … the current rate of (mainly fossil fuel) CO2 release stands out as capable of driving a combination and magnitude of ocean geochemical changespotentially unparalleled in __ at least the last ~300 My of __ Earth history __, raising the possibility that **__ we are entering an unknown territory __** of marine ecosystem change. That is to say, it’s not just that acidifying oceans spell marine biological meltdown “by end of century” as a 2010 Geological Society study put it. __ We are also warming the ocean and decreasing ____ dissolved oxygen concentration. **That is a recipe for mass extinction**. __ A 2009 Nature Geoscience study found that __ ocean dead zones __ “devoid of fish and seafood” __ are poised to expand and “remain for thousands of years.“ __ And remember, we just learned from a 2012 new Nature Climate Change study that __ carbon dioxide is “driving fish crazy” and threatening their survival __. Here’s more on the new study: The oceans act like a sponge to draw down excess carbon dioxide from the air; the gas reacts with seawater to form carbonic acid, which over time is neutralized by fossil carbonate shells on the seafloor. But __ if CO2 goes into the oceans too quickly, it can deplete the carbonate ions that corals, mollusks and some plankton need for reef and shell-building. __ = =

= =

Carbon sequestration is key
= = Mack and Endemann 10 - *partner in the Houston office and global Chair of the Environmental Transactional Support Practice, provides over 25 years of experience advising on the transactional, environmental and regulatory issues associated with all sectors of the oil and gas industry, power (including both fossil and renewable energy), mining and chemical industries in the United States and abroad, in addition to the development, financing and entitlements for telecommunications and other industrial and public infrastructure facilities in the United States and offshore, **JD, Faculty @ USD Law, provides comprehensive environmental counseling on energy and infrastructure projects, and represents clients in related litigation = = Joel and Buck, “Making carbon dioxide sequestration feasible: Toward federal regulation of CO2 sequestration pipelines,” Energy Policy, http://lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub3385_1.pdf = = At present, approximately 50% of the United States’ base load electrical energy requirements are met by coal -ﬁred resources (ASME, 2005). While substantial expansion of renewable energy resources will eventually diminish reliance on coal resources, 1 coal-ﬁred power plants provide base load energy resources twenty-four hours per day, seven days a week, all year long. Base load power plants provide energy even when the wind is not blowing or the sun is not shining. While all power plants have the ability to generate a ﬁxed amount of full output, or ‘‘capacity,’’ expressed in megawatts, technologies vary as to the amount of their capacity which can be delivered over time, such as over a calendar year; this is also known as their ‘‘capacity factor.’’ Base load plants, such as coal-ﬁred, nuclear and many natural gas-ﬁred power plants, achieve very high capacity factors (nearly all of their capacity can be delivered over time subject to normal maintenance, scheduled outages or equipment failures). Some plants, such as certain natural gas -ﬁred power plants, can be ‘‘cycled’’ (i.e., turned on or off, or their output can be increased or decreased on short notice to match peaking loads), will have lower capacity factors but can be matched more precisely to the demands of energy consumers. Wind and solar plants, on the other hand, typically have much lower capacity factors (even if they have the same overall total ‘‘capacity’’), because their output cannot be load-matched and their energy output is dependent on environmental factors. As a result, a utility serving a load must blend base load, peaking and renewable resources to meet load requirements, and // cannot // meet its load requirements solely on the basis of current wind or solar technologies. 2 In many regional markets, both energy (a plant’s actual, delivered product) and capacity are tradeable commodities with an economic value, with the renewable energy facilities providing less value in the capacity markets. Indeed, electric utilities are generally required to maintain substantial capacity reserves to serve expected load, and renewable resources do not generally qualify to meet these capacity requirements As a result, and without regard to the relative merits of coal ﬁred power versus other sources of base load power (e.g., nuclear or natural gas-ﬁred power plants), considering (1) the U nited St ates’ large native coal resources, (2) the lower cost of coal fuel against other base load technologies, and (3) the substantial existing investment in coal-ﬁred power plants, it is likely that coal-ﬁred power plants will // for many decades // continue to comprise a substantial part of the U nited St ates’ energy generation portfolio. Indeed, the United States will have to make policy choices regarding which base load resources to pursue, as oil, coal, nuclear and natural gas fuels each have their own economic and environmental beneﬁts and drawbacks. 3 Against this backdrop, both the private and public sectors have begun to look closely at various technologies to address the high carbon footprint of traditional coal combustion technologies. In the United States, the average emission rate of CO2 from coal-ﬁred power generation is 2.095 pounds per kilowatt hour, nearly double the 1.321 pounds per kilowatt hour for natural gas (DOE, 2000). 4 Among the technologies receiving the most such attention to reduce CO2’s impacts is CO2 sequestration. CO2 sequestration involves removing the CO2 from the fuel, either before, during, or after combustion, and then doing something with it to avoid its release to the atmosphere. While other greenhouse gases (e.g., methane) are more potent in terms of global warming effects per unit of mass, the CO2 emissions of industrialized economies are // so great as // to dwarf the contributions from other gases in terms of overall impact on global warming. Hence the focus on CO2 sequestration technologies. The size and impact of this challenge is daunting—while coal resources provide approximately half of the energy generated annually in the United States, coal-ﬁred power plants emit almost 80% (1.8 billion metric tons per year) of the total CO2 emissions from power plants in the United States (DOE, 2000). The magnitude of this challenge cannot be underestimated. Using the above production ﬁgures, coal-ﬁred power plants in the United States emit approximately 900 billion cubic meters of CO2 annually. 5 The current CO2 pipeline system, though, handles only 45 million metric tons of CO2 per year over 3500 miles of pipe (Nordhaus and Pitlick, 2009). 6 Thus, to the extent that the United States has a policy goal of sequestering and transporting any appreciable fraction of CO2 emissions from coal-ﬁred power plants, the required infrastructure investment will require at least a 40-fold increase. 7 While such an undertaking presents obvious practical and economic challenges, it demonstrates that a new vision is required if the U nited S tates is going to develop a sequestration infrastructure to meet this challenge // on any time frame // that is reasonably coincident with reducing near- to medium-term // impacts //from global climate change. 8 = =

No other technology solves and immediate action is key
= = Rogers 7 - *CEO of Duke Energy = = James, “SENATE ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE,” http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=96b0a903-32fc-47f8-9a36-b4ddd9805e2b = = Carbon capture and storage ( CCS ) for coal-fired power plants is a // critical technology // if we are to achieve our environmental goals while continuing to use our abundant domestic coal resources. CCS captures the CO2 from the power plant and channels it underground for permanent storage in deep geological formations. However, this storage capacity is not available everywhere and, contrary to some statements I’ve seen recently, the technology itself is not fully developed and ready for deployment. We believe CCS ultimately will prove to be one of the least-cost ways to reduce CO2, and we are actively involved in projects to advance the research. Duke Energy is hosting a small-scale Phase II sequestration demonstration project at its East Bend power plant in Kentucky, which will involve injection of CO2 into deep saline reservoirs in the area, between 3,000 and 4,000 feet below the surface. If the site is determined to be suitable, about 10,000 tons of CO2 would be injected in 2008. The sequestration will be subject to monitoring, measurement and verification. Duke Energy’s commitment to CCS also includes membership in three DOE-funded carbon sequestration regional partnerships (the Midwest Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership, the Midwest Geological Sequestration Consortium and the Southeast Regional Carbon Partnership) which are collecting, sharing and assessing data. DOE’s National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) manages a number of regional sequestration consortia, creating a nationwide network to help identify the best technologies, regulations and infrastructure needed for carbon capture and storage. These partnerships will support multiple small-scale projects that will provide invaluable information on siting, monitoring, evaluation and public acceptability of carbon sequestration. Expanded federal financial support will be // necessary // to continue the process of demonstrating geologic sequestration. USCAP has advocated that Congress fund at least three full-scale CO2 injection demonstration projects, each at a scale equivalent to the CO2 emissions produced by a large coal-fired power plant. 7 The MIT Future of Coal study calls for three to five demonstration projects at a projected cost of $500 million to $1 billion over eight years. 8 In addition to proving the technology and geology for sequestration, a number of critical regulatory and legal issues will need to be resolved. As USCAP has stated, “Congress should require the EPA to promulgate regulations promptly to permit long-term geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide from stationary sources.” 9 In addition to developing an appropriate regulatory system that will specify the ground rules for sequestration projects and enhance public acceptability, Congress should also provide appropriate protections against costly litigation and liability claims. The potential for significant liability claims and litigation defense costs, even when facility operators comply with all regulatory requirements, will be a significant damper on the commercial development of sequestration facilities. Given the speed with which we will need to put sequestration capacity into operation, we cannot simply wait to see if the common law in each state develops in a way that acceptably moderates these liability and litigation risks. Instead, I expect that the legal and liability issues must be settled before any company will feel comfortable moving forward with a large-scale CCS project. Finally, despite all the seeming activity described above, CCS development needs a much greater sense of // urgency // if we are truly to respond to the climate problem. To paraphrase an MIT economist who has looked at this problem – if CCS doesn’t work, we are in big, big trouble. I would characterize the current focus on CCS as something of a hobby. It should be an obsession, and receive a // great deal // more attention and resources. = =

= =

= = = = = = Sarah, CCS Guidelines: Guidelines for Carbon Dioxide Capture, Transport, and Storage, World Resources Institute, http://pdf.wri.org/ccs_guidelines.pdf = = Scenarios for stabilizing climate-forcing emissions suggest atmospheric __ CO2 stabilization can only be accomplished through ____ the development and deployment of a robust portfolio of solutions, including __ significant increases in energy __ efficiency __ and conservation in the industrial, building, and transport sectors; increased reliance __ on renewable __ energy and potentially additional nuclear energy sources; __ and __ deployment of __ CCS __. Slowing and stopping emissions growth from the energy sector will require transformational changes in the way the world generates and uses energy. CCS is a broad term that encompasses a number of technologies that can be used to capture CO2 from point sources, such as power plants and other industrial facilities; compress it; transport it mainly by pipeline to suitable locations; and inject it into deep subsurface geological formations for indefinite isolation from the atmosphere. __ CCS is a **critical option** in the portfolio ____ of solutions available to combat climate change, because it allows for significant reductions in CO2 emissions from fossil-based systems, enabling it to be used as a **bridge** to a sustainable energy future __. = = = = = = Interdisciplinary Study, The Future of Coal, http://web.mit.edu/coal/ = = Washington, DC – Leading __ academics from an interdisciplinary __ Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( __ MIT) panel issued a report ____ today that examines how the world can continue to use coal, an abundant and inexpensive fuel, in a way that mitigates __, instead of worsens, __ the global warming crisis __. __ The study __, "The Future of Coal – Options for a Carbon Constrained World," __ advocates __ the __ U.S. __ assume global __ leadership on this issue __ through adoption of significant policy actions. Led by co-chairs Professor John Deutch, Institute Professor, Department of Chemistry, and Ernest J. Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems, the report states that carbon capture and sequestration ( __ CCS) ____ is the **critical** **enabling** technology to help reduce CO2 emissions significantly while also allowing coal to meet the world's pressing energy needs __. According to Dr. Deutch, "As the world's leading energy user and greenhouse gas emitter, __ the U.S. must **take the lead** in showing the world CCS can work. Demonstration of __ technical, economic, and institutional features of __ CCS __ at commercial scale coal combustion and conversion plants __ will give policymakers and the public confidence that a practical carbon mitigation control option exists, will reduce cost of CCS ____ should carbon emission controls be adopted, and will maintain the __ low-cost __ coal option __ in an environmentally acceptable manner." Dr. Moniz added, "There are many opportunities for enhancing the performance of coal plants in a carbon-constrained world – higher efficiency generation, perhaps through new materials; novel approaches to gasification, CO2 capture, and oxygen separation; and advanced system concepts, perhaps guided by a new generation of simulation tools. An aggressive R&D effort in the near term will yield significant dividends down the road, and should be undertaken immediately to help meet this urgent scientific challenge." Key findings in this study: __ Coal ____ is __ a low-cost, per BTU, __ mainstay of both the developed and developing world, and its use is projected to increase __. Because of coal's high carbon content, __ increasing use will exacerbate the problem of climate change unless coal plants are deployed with __ very high efficiency and large scale __ CCS __ is implemented. __ CCS is the **critical** enabling technology because it allows significant reduction in ____ CO2 emissions whileallowing coal to meet future energy needs __. A significant charge on carbon emissions is needed in the relatively near term to increase the economic attractiveness of new technologies that avoid carbon emissions and specifically to lead to large-scale CCS in the coming decades. __ We need large-scale __ demonstration projects of the technical, economic and environmental performance of an integrated __ CCS __ system. __ We should proceed with carbon sequestration projects as soon as possible __. Several integrated large-scale demonstrations with appropriate measurement, monitoring and verification are needed in the United States over the next decade with government support. This is important for establishing public confidence for the very large-scale sequestration program anticipated in the future. __ The regulatory regime for __ large-scale commercial __ sequestration should be developed with __ a greater sense of __ urgency __, with the Executive Office of the President leading an interagency process. The U.S. government should provide assistance only to coal projects with CO2 capture in order to demonstrate technical, economic and environmental performance. Today, IGCC appears to be the economic choice for new coal plants with CCS. However, this could change with further RD&D, so it is not appropriate to pick a single technology winner at this time, especially in light of the variability in coal type, access to sequestration sites, and other factors. The government should provide assistance to several "first of a kind" coal utilization demonstration plants, but only with carbon capture. Congress should remove any expectation that construction of new coal plants without CO2 capture will be "grandfathered" and granted emission allowances in the event of future regulation. This is a perverse incentive to build coal plants without CO2 capture today. Emissions will be stabilized only through global adherence to CO2 emission constraints. __ China and India are unlikely to adopt carbon constraints unless the U.S. ____ does so and **leads the way** in the development of **CCS technology** __. Key changes must be made to the current Department of Energy RD&D program to successfully promote CCS technologies. The program must provide for demonstration of CCS at scale; a wider range of technologies should be explored; and modeling and simulation of the comparative performance of integrated technology systems should be greatly enhanced. = =
 * CCS is a //__critical bridge__// to a broader portfolio of sustainable energy **
 * Forbes et al 8** - senior associate at the World Resources Institute, former member of the National Energy Technology Laboratory
 * Even if regulations aren’t likely now, the plan is key to convincing the world that emissions can be cut without economic cost **
 * MIT 7**

= =

Only the plan is modeled – BRIC countries won’t cut emissions unless they can avoid economic cost
= = Apt et al 7 – PhD in Physics @ MIT, Professor of Technology, Tepper School of Business and Engineering and Public Policy = = Jay, “Incentives for Near-Term Carbon Dioxide Geological Sequestration,” Carnegie Mellon, http://wpweb2.tepper.cmu.edu/ceic/pdfs_other/Incentives_for_Near-Term_Carbon_Dioxide_Geological_Sequestration.pdf = = The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ( IPCC ) Fourth Assessment Report projects that if current greenhouse gas emissions trends continue, the average global temperatures in 2090- 2099will b e 3.6 – 10 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than average temperatures in 1980-1999. 20 When past emissions are factored in, the U nited S tates is responsible for just over a quarter of all anthropogenic CO2 from fossil fuels currently in the atmosphere. Europe, China, and India are responsible for 19%, 9%, and 3% respectively. The EU has agreed to reduce emissions to 8% below 1990 levels by 2012; the United States has made no such commitments, although several states and groups of states have begun to make commitments. EU emissions are the same as in 1990; U.S. emissions have increased by 20%. And because a large fraction of CO2 emissions remain in the atmosphere for over a century, the largest single share of atmospheric CO2 will continue to belong to the United States for many decades, despite China’s growth. If no action is taken to reduce its emissions, the Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Outlook estimates that the US will emit approximately 8,000 million metric tonnes (8,800 million short tons) of CO2 by 2030 , an increase over 2005 emission levels of more than 33 percent. 21 27 Since the U nited S tates has put the largest single share of CO2 into the air, it is under intense pressure to begin to // take the lead // in reducing it. In a few decades, China, India, Brazil, and other developing countries also will have to undertake serious controls. But they will not do so // until // the U.S. // takes the lead // and shows how it can be done in an // efficient and affordable // way. By seizing the opportunity provided by industrial coal gasification, the nation can get the experience required to reduce the technical and commercial unknowns of carbon dioxide // capture and sequestration // at commercial scale within the next decade. Coal combustion is responsible for 30% of the total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions; coal and petcoke together account for 32% of the total U.S. GHG emissions. The sources and sector uses of greenhouse gases in the 2005 U.S. economy are shown in figure 28 below. = =

= =

= =  **__ 1AC Solvency __** = =

= = = = = =
 * Regulations coming now—a large scale investment in CCS is key**
 * Worldwatch Institute 11** (“Growth of Carbon Capture and Storage Stalled in 2011” Worldwatch Institute, 2011, [])//MR

= = = =
 * __Although CCS__** technology **__has the potential to significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions__** —particularly when used in greenhouse gas-intensive coal plants— **__developing the CCS sector to the point that it can make a serious contribution to emissions reduction will require large-scale investment.__** Capacity will have to be increased several times over before CCS can begin to make a dent in global emissions. Currently, the storage capacity of all active and planned large-scale CCS projects is equivalent to only about 0.5 percent of the emissions from energy production in 2010. The prospects for future development and application of CCS technology will be influenced by a variety of factors, according to the report. **__This March, the U.S. E__** nvironmental **__P__** rotection **__A__** gency **__proposed regulations on carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. As a result, U.S. power producers would soon be unable to build traditional coal plants without__** carbon-control capabilities (including **__CCS__** ). **__The technology will__** likely **__become increasingly important as__** power **__producers adjust to the new regulations.__**

= = = = = = Bruce, “Eliminating CO2 Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants,” in Generating Electricity in a Carbon-Constrained World, Google Book = = __ Underground injection of CO2 is feasible __**__ today __** at an affordable price. __ Thus, there is no obstacle to starting __**__ immediately __**. It appears likely that additional storage options need to be tapped to provide storage to match the scale of the fossil carbon resource. Mineral sequestration and the storage of CO2 under deep ocean floors, where CO2 is denser than the surrounding pore waters [48], offer large additional reservoirs, but these technologies are in their infancies and require further development. __ Existing power plants could collect at least some of their CO2 __**__ immediately __**. Even if retrofitting proves uneconomical in many instances, __ new power plants could be designed to capture all their CO2. __ Air capture technology, because it can be introduced without affecting the existing infrastructure, could offer an alternative, if it is developed to its full potential. Because units can be small, __ development could be quite fast __ ; __ commercial applications could be ready in a matter of __**__ years __** rather than decades. __ Capture at new integrated power plants could essentially decarbonize the entire coal-fueled power plant sector __. Though we did not discuss gas- or oilfired power plants, it is clear that these could also be decarbonized in a similar manner. = =
 * CCS technology is advancing – can begin capture immediately and sequestration is currently economical**
 * Miller et al 9 ** – PhD, Associate Director, Energy Institute Senior Research Associate Energy Fuels

The //__entire project__// depends on a national network for pipeline infrastructure
= = I R G C 8 = = International Risk Governance Council, “Regulation of Carbon Capture and Storage,” http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/Policy_Brief_CCS.pdf = = Large-scale CCS deployment // cannot proceed //until // extensive // pipeline infrastructure is in place. Large volumes of CO2 – a 1,000 MW coal-ﬁred power plant produces 5 to 8 million tonnes of CO2 annually – will need to be transported from source to sink. Linkages are complex, and the business model for pipeline operators includes signiﬁcant risk, as their operations are subject to uncertainties beyond their control at both ends of the pipe. This risk puts upward pressure on pipeline costs, as do recent steel price increases. Transport infrastructure investment requires regional and sitespeciﬁc knowledge of geological storage prospects, as well as knowledge of current and future CO2 source locations, volumes, and characteristics. Pipeline transport of CO2 is successfully regulated for enhanced oil recovery in the US, but with a framework that does not necessarily translate to the industrial organisation of CCS. Regulation of risks related to pipeline transport is straightforward, but more complicated regulatory decisions will relate to funding, siting and construction of pipeline networks off-shore, onshore, and through urban zones, natural monopoly concerns, and issues of eminent domain. Different regulatory models for CO2 pipeline ownership, a privately owned, common carrier approach or a public utility approach could stimulate different levels of investment, potentially inﬂuencing the ultimate organisational structure ofthe CCS industry. = =

= =

= = = = = = “Building Essential Infrastructure for Carbon Capture and Storage,” Report to the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute, http://cdn.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/13361/development-carbon-capture-and-storage-infrastructure.pdf = =
 * //__Significant__// and //__immediate__// government investment is key**
 * Insight Economics 11**

= = This has ramifications for investment in CCS infrastructure. It is not clear, for example, that private investors are willing to provide storage facilities for CO2 in onshore locations because the nature and extent of contingent liabilities are insufficiently understood. __ There may be a concern over building CO2 pipelines __ near areas of high population density. __ If ____ the construction of efficient CCS infrastructure is deemed to produce significant public benefits, government intervention __, perhaps in terms of assuming the liability at least for a period of time, __ may ____ well be justified. __ A detailed study of the appetite of the private sector to invest in CCS facilities, undertaken by BCG for the Global CCS Institute, found that: “ __ Funding, ____ finance and commercial models for full-scale, integrated CCS projects are at an early stage of development. High risks and uncertain returns for early projects mean __**__ significant __**__ and __**__ immediate __**__ government ____ support through grants or equity investments are likely to be needed to engage the private sector __ .” 21 While this conclusion reflects the investment status of a technology that is still in the stage where it is being demonstrated at commercial scale, __ it may still be __**__ some time __**__ before the market ____ can be relied upon to deliver private investment in CCS, __ including the associated __ infrastructure. If investment is to take place, it is likely to be on the basis of __ the mixed funding model incorporating __ a __**__ substantial contribution __**__ from the public sector __. = =

= = = = = = “Building Essential Infrastructure for Carbon Capture and Storage,” Report to the Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute, http://cdn.globalccsinstitute.com/sites/default/files/publications/13361/development-carbon-capture-and-storage-infrastructure.pdf = =
 * The high-risk nature of the CO2 market necessitates federal investment**
 * Insight Economics 11**

= = Thirdly, __ one major issue for potential investors in CO2 pipelines is that substantial economies of scale exist __, suggesting that __ it is desirable for pipelines initially to be oversized relative to current demand. Yet in this industry __, which is far from being mature, __ there are a number of factors that militate against investing in excess capacity, including first mover disadvantage and __ the existence of some major __ risks __ , including the possibility of stranding a substantial part of the asset. In considering the preferred model for securing investment in an efficient pipeline network, the two alternative approaches recently raised in a discussion paper by DECC in the UK are considered. These are the decentralised model — effectively a market-driven approach — and a centralised model under which government plays a more active role. While economists generally favour the first option, largely, it must be said, on the basis of theoretical models, empirical studies undertaken by financial consultants suggest that, __ in the absence of __**__ government support __**__, the private sector would be __**__ unwilling to invest __**__ in optimally sized pipeline infrastructure. This is partly the result of uncertainty in that CCS technologies are still at the demonstration phase and it is difficult to predict the circumstances in which they will be commercially deployed __. __ This is essentially a timing issue. If and when CCS technologies become commercially attractive, there will be scope to move __ to a market driven model in the future. We cannot assume such an outcome in any particular timeframe, __ however __, and __ in the meantime governments will need to play a __**__ significant role __**__ if __**__ investment __**__ in the industry is to occur and __ , particularly important for the purposes of this study, __ if efficiently sized pipeline infrastructure is to develop. A mixed funding model __ could __ involve government subsidies ____ to private providers __ and could operate under either the decentralised or the centralised approach. Another important issue to be considered is the need for regulation to mandate terms and conditions for third party access to CO2 pipelines and storage infrastructure. Under the ‘new’ competition policy that has been developed in many countries over the past two decades, natural monopolies are often regulated so as to provide services to third parties on a basis that attempts to mimic what would have occurred under a theoretical competitive outcome. Because of the availability of economies of scale in CO2 pipelines, there are probably good grounds for classifying them as natural monopolies. In this context the EU Directive on CCS, issued in 2009, requires member countries to establish regulated third party access regimes for CO2 pipeline infrastructure and storage facilities. Whether or not storage sites constitute natural monopolies, however, is somewhat less clear. __ Much of the analysis underlying this approach is based on an analogy between natural gas and CO2 pipelines. Such a comparison, __ however, __ appears __ to be somewhat // tenuous //__. Natural gas is a valuable commodity subject to ____ intense competition between suppliers in wholesale and retail markets so that ownership and exclusive use of a pipeline could provide one player with a considerable competitive advantage. By contrast __, with the minor exceptions of where it is used for EOR and to produce carbonated drinks, __ CO2 is a by-product that has no commercial value and is being transported solely for disposal __ although, with the introduction of a carbon price, the disposal of CO2 has a commercial value. In addition, __ while owners of gas pipelines may oversize them for their own use so as to give them a competitive advantage over rivals in an expanding market, CO2 pipelines in general transport a stable and consistent flow of carbon dioxide. __ Given the fact that CO2 has no value, together with the current state of the industry and the fact that,particularly in electricity generation, CCS will be subject to considerable competitive pressure from other technologies, it is questionable whether any significant benefit would accrue to an owner of CO2 infrastructure by denying access on reasonable terms to other players who may seek it. On the contrary, additional usage will reduce costs for every user including the owner. Investment in CO2 storage sites is currently impeded by issues concerning property rights and liability. They are often compared to waste disposal facilities. It is questionable whether they are natural monopolies or whether the public interest would be served by regulating access to them. In particular instances they may have a monopolistic position, however, in which case they would be subject to the provisions of regular competition (anti-trust) law. Conclusions This report has been prepared under the circumstances where the commercial viability of CCS has yet to be proven at a large scale. These conclusions reflect the fact that it is an infant industry. In part this is a timing issue. If and when the industry becomes commercial, with vigorous competition occurring between a number of players, then a stronger framework of economic regulation may be required. At this stage, however, the public interest case, in our view, is not proven and there is a possibility that mandatory third party access regulation of the nature of that employed for gas pipelines could discourage investment in this nascent industry. Community acceptance of the transport and storage of CO2 will be essential if the CCS industry is to meet its future potential. __ Government will have an important role to play __ in facilitating this, not just by providing information but also by working with the industry to develop a set of robust technical standards for CO2 pipelines. One approach to standard setting would be for an international agency to develop a recommended set of engineering protocols for CO2 pipelines which could then be examined by individual governments in consultation with industry and applied or modified as necessary. In evaluating the decentralised as opposed to the centralised model for facilitating the construction of an efficient network of CO2 pipelines, it is very difficult, at this stage of CCS development, to determine appropriate policy in what will be the large scale deployment stage of carbon capture and storage facilities in the future. This is because the technologies have yet to be successfully demonstrated commercially at scale. If the technologies are demonstrated to be commercially successful and if the necessary condition of an appropriate level of carbon prices is established then, in theory at least, there would seem to be little reason why the private sector would not invest in deploying CCS, including in the necessary pipeline infrastructure and storage facilities. On the other hand, __ there may well be __ ongoing __ risks and uncertainties for potential ____ investors __ in CCS infrastructure. Indeed, __ while many of these will have been reduced by the end of the demonstration phase, it is unlikely that all of the risks and uncertainties will have been substantially reduced __. Understanding these risks and uncertainties is particularly important in terms of setting the policy environment for building the future pipeline network that will be required for the large scale deployment of CCS. Financial analysis suggests that __ the private sector would be __ understandably __ unwilling to invest in __ the currently __ oversized pipelines that ____ would provide __ more __ efficient transport in ____ the longer term __. A reasonable question then is __ why should taxpayers take on this risk __ if private investors will not? One answer is that __ there __ may __ well be public benefits __ in reducing the costs of CCS transportation, __ in terms __ perhaps __ of electricity prices ____ and the carbon price being lower than otherwise __, together with any social benefits that accrue from having a wider portfolio of emissions reduction technologies than may otherwise be the case. The conclusion from this analysis is that, __ at this stage __ at least, __ governments will __ probably __ need to play an __**__ important role __**__ in facilitating investment in CCS infrastructure __ for the foreseeable future. __ This ____ may involve subsidising the construction of efficiently sized CO2 ____ pipelines __. Another option is for governments to develop CCS infrastructure itself and then sell it to the private sector when the risks are better understood and the uncertainties have been substantially reduced. Of these two options, the mixed funding approach has the advantage that it will be driven to a greater extent by market forces and could operate in the context of a decentralised approach. = =

= = = = = = Rotterdam Climate Initiative, “Co2 capture, transport and storage in Rotterdam,” http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/documents/RCI-English-CCS-report_2009.pdf = = It is obvious that emitters, transportation companies and offshore operators will have to join forces to make the first investments. Allocation of European and national subsidies will play a crucial role. Once operational, the CCS chain will attract more users and investors, facilitating efforts to upscale it. Infrastructure subsidies are also necessary to make it possible to start with a degree of overcapacity in the first years of development and to optimise capital expenditures in the longer term. However, financing is not the only obstacle for a quick start. Relevant legislation and regulations regarding liability, planning permission and procedures should be developed and enacted. In order to stimulate decision making: operators and transportation companies should have a clear view of the conditions for the transport and storage of CO2. For this reason, __ we recommend that the __**__ government __**__ take the following __ legislation and __ measures to further reduce the ____ investment risk for transport __ and storage: - __ the __**__ national government __**__ subsidises ____ investments in the pipeline network ____ infrastructure __ ; - __ the __**__ national government __**__ ensures the development of a master plan with __ the associated __ legislation to ensure __ the timely __ availability of __ suitable reservoirs and __ pipelines __ in the Dutch continental shelf (with fields like Q8A, P18, P6, L10, K7 or suitable equivalents) to offer emitters the required storage capacity for their CO 2 = =
 * Key to reduce investment risk – EU model proves**
 * RCI 9**

= = = = = =
 * Absent federal funding, companies will inevitably build point-to-point**
 * Chrysostomidis et al. 9** – Ioannis Chrysostomidis and Paul Zakkour, Environemtal Resources Management; Mark Bohm and Eric Beynon, Suncor Energy; Renato de Filippo, Eni SpA; Arthur Lee, Chevron Corporation (“Assessing issues of financing a CO2 transportation pipeline infrastructure” Energy Procedia Volume 1, Issue 1, Pages 1625–1632, February 2009, http://www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S1876610209002148)//MR

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 * __For carbon dioxide capture and geologic storage to be deployed commercially and in a widespread manner will require well__** ¶ **__thought out approaches for transporting the CO2 in a pipeline system__** from the capture facility to the injection site. **__Establishing a__** ¶ **__widespread CO2 transportation infrastructure will require strategic long-term planning, taking into account__** the potential ¶ magnitude of **__future deployment scenarios for CCS, up to a scale of infrastructure__** that could be **__comparable to__** the scale of **__oil &__** ¶ **__gas infrastructure__**. This paper outlines the results of **__a study__**, commissioned **__by the CO2 Capture Project__** (CCP) **__and__** completed by ¶ **__Environmental Resources Management__** (ERM) that **__evaluated__** the benefits and risks of two **__approaches to developing CO2__** ¶ **__pipeline systems__****__. The two__** basic **__approaches are__** described in the paper as: ¶ 1. **__On a point-to-point basis, which matches a specific source to a specific storage location; or__** ¶ 2. Via the development of pipeline networks, including **__backbone pipeline systems,__** which allow for common carriage of CO2 ¶ from multiple sources to multiple sinks. ¶ **__An integrated approach__** to pipeline infrastructure approach **__offers the lowest average cost on a per ton basis for operators over the__** ¶ **__life of the projects__** if sufficient capacity utilization is achieved relatively early in the life of the pipeline. **__Integrated pipelines also__** ¶ **__reduce the barriers to entry and__** are more likely to **__lead to faster development and deployment of CCS. Without incentives to__** ¶ **__encourage the development of optimized networks project developers are likely to build point to point pipelines because they__** ¶ **__offer lower costs for the first movers__** **__and do not have the same capacity utilization risk.__**

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 * That drives up costs, delays the project, and doesn’t store enough CO2**
 * National Grid 12** – international electricity and gas company and one of the largest investor-owned energy companies in the world (“The benefits of a clustered carbon capture and storage system over point-to-point” National Grid, 2012, [|http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/EnergyandServices/NonRegs/CCS/ClusteringBenefits/#header)//MR]

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 * __A shared pipeline system__** **__can__** very **__effectively serve a cluster of emitters__** situated **__in a__** single **__geographic area. It also provides a more cost effective and reliable solution than individual emitters developing their own point-to-point CO2 pipelines.__** ¶ **__Clustering reduces costs__** **__as a given storage site can serve multiple emitters and only one backbone pipeline is needed. A clustered transport system could__** potentially **__save__** **__well over 25 per cent of expenditurecompared to a point-to-point system__**, depending on the scale of the cluster. ¶ **__A cluster system allows extra capacity__** **__over point-to-point systems, reduces barriers to future investment and increases the speed of deployment. It__** also **__opens up the opportunity to connect small emitters for whom point-to-point solutions may be too expensive.__**

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= = = = = = Tim, “Storage of Captured Carbon Dioxide Beneath Federal Lands,” Dept of Energy, http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/Fed%20Land_403.01.02_050809.pdf = =
 * Federal lands are key to accelerate deployment of CCS**
 * Grant 9** - Physical Scientist Office of Systems, Analyses, and Planning @ DoE

= = A global effort is underway to assess storage potential for captured carbon dioxide (CO2). In North America, the Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the United States and Canada provided an initial assessment. The analysis presented in this report was done to assess the storage potential beneath Federal lands and further the effort undertaken in the atlas by defining a resource potential beneath a specific category of land. Also considered in this analysis was the location of potential CO2 point sources that might utilize Federal lands for storage, pipeline Right-Of-Way (ROW), and wells located on or near Federal land. Relevant laws, regulations, and legislation at the Federal and State level are also summarized. A significant portion of Federal land is unavailable for leasing due to administrative, statutory, and executive orders. Examples include national parks and lands owned by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other agencies. These limitations render 44 percent of all Federal acreage unavailable for lease. Remaining __ Federal lands ____, totaling 400,730,534 acres, are available for lease __ (Figure ES-1). The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) controls 59 percent of this acreage and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) controls another 40 percent with the balance managed by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). All of the BLM acreage and 80 percent of FS acreage is west of the Mississippi. __ The storage resource beneath Federal lands ranges between 126 and 375 billion metric tons __ (Table ES-1). Since the vast majority of Federal lands are west of the Mississippi, it follows that the majority of storage potential beneath these lands are also located in the western half of the Nation. Of the estimated storage potential beneath Federal land in the United States, 68 percent can be found in the stratigraphy of Montana, Wyoming, and the Dakotas. Conversely, the majority of CO2 point sources in the United States are found east of the Mississippi. Federal lands are not as contiguous in the east as they are in the west; however, there is some storage potential available for consideration, the majority of which is found in the stratigraphy of the Gulf Coast states and Arkansas. Saline formations account for between 71 and 90 percent of the total carbon storage potential beneath Federal lands. Oil and gas reservoirs provide between 9 and 25 percent of Federal land storage potential. Unmineable coal seams provide a further 1 to 3 percent. Whereas saline formations and unmineable coal seam resource estimates present a low and high range of potential, the storage potential estimate for oil and gas reservoirs is a single quantity: 32 billion metric tons. This reflects the higher level of knowledge operators have about these reservoirs due to oil and gas activity. It also represents a good opportunity for additional recovery of an important energy resource through Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) operations. In the interest of furthering Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) efforts, __ Federal lands present a __**__ unique advantage __** over those that are privately owned: single ownership of large, continuous acreage tracts. Negotiating with a single landowner to secure the rights to extensive continuous parcels of land can provide cost and project timeline advantages, __ not only for __ potential __ future operations but also __ for __ early large-scale demonstration projects that will help __**__ accelerate __**__ commercial deployment of CCS technology __. = =

= = = = = = “Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage,” http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/downloads/CCS-Task-Force-Report-2010.pdf = = __Enhanced coordination on legal and regulatory issues will be__ **__needed__** __between Federal agencies__as well as between the Federal government and the States. Stakeholders noted that __State__ UIC __programs have faced__ **__resource limitations__** in implementing the SDWA UIC Program. __Significant increases in permit applications could__ **__overwhelm__** the capacity of both EPA and primacy __States__. While some __States__ may be able to take on many of these challenges, others __may have difficulties in certain areas such as reviewing and validating the results of complex computational models__. As can be expected in a nascent industry, regulatory agencies will be challenged to gain the expertise needed to ensure they have capacity to adequately implement the program, and avoid lengthy delays in permitting. __Permitting and regulatory authorities may face challenges in terms of__ training and __workforce__ capacity. __CO2__ pipeline __infrastructure__ deployment __would be aided through__ training and designated resources to assist __Federal__, State, and local __agencies__ with permitting, compliance, and public outreach, as well as for training first responders. For sequestration, stakeholders have expressed concern that __States may__ **__not have sufficient technical resources__** __in__ __very specialized areas related to CO2 sequestration__ that will be critical in the review of permit applications, such as new site characterization technologies, specialized CO2 -compatible well construction techniques, computational modeling, geochemistry, injection formation dynamics, and financial responsibility. __States may not have sufficient staff to review a large number of__ Class VI permit applications, write __permits____, and review and enforce those permits__. __Several challenges need to be addressed for onshore Federal lands to be fully used in an efficient and effective manner for CO2 sequestration__. First, the BLM and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) currently lack clear authority for long-term CO2 sequestration. Second, the authority that may be applicable does not address issues of long-term liability, stewardship, ownership of pore space, and the appropriate rent for the use of Federal pore space. As discussed in Section IV.C, CO2 sequestration presents unique challenges related to long-term liability and stewardship, since it is contemplated that the CO2 will remain stored indefinitely, perhaps for hundreds or even thousands of years. BLM and USFS current authorities do not deal with these unique issues. Third, sequestration on split estate lands also presents complications due to ownership of pore space and limitations that may need to be placed on surface and subsurface uses to ensure integrity of sequestration. = =
 * Federal government will correctly site the backbone**
 * EPA 10**

= = = = = = __ Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act __ of 1977 The second major act that directly regulates coal mining is the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. This act __outlines environmental regulations for strip or open pit mining, and ultimately requires that land used for surface mining is restored to its original condition, or "reclaimed" after operations have ceased.__ This act also created the Office of Surface Mining, which oversees surface mines and ensures that the act is being enforced. __Clean Water and Air Acts Other laws__ do not directly address coal mines, but they do __affect how coal mines operate. The Clean Water Act__, passed in 1972, __prohibits the discharge of pollutants into waterways, which effectively restricts how coal mines deal with slurry: liquid waste generated by the mining process__. The Clean Air Act, first passed in 1970, affects both the mining and burning of coal by restricting the amount of air pollution that industrial sources can create. Laws Tied to Location Other laws that affect the coal industry relate to the actual location of mines. These laws, which include the Antiquities Act and the National Historic Preservation Act, set aside pieces of land that cannot be used or developed by industry, including coal mining. In other areas, __the Endangered Species Act restricts mining in locations where it could harm an endangered animal population__. = = = = = = Will, “RECONCILING KING COAL AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, http://vjel.org/journal/pdf/VJEL10107.pdf = = Because CO2 is toxic at high concentrations, __some fear that escaping CO2__ from a non-performing sequestration site __could poison__ surrounding __air__ supplies, potentially harming humans and animals. 93 __The threat of catastrophic escape is often cited as an argument against CCS__ demonstration projects. The Lake Nyos disaster of 1986, in which volcanic activity led to a massive release of naturally occurring CO2 from beneath an African lake, is often mentioned. 94 The Lake Nyos incident was an earth science anomaly and not analogous to commercial CCS storage. At Lake Nyos, volcanic activity beneath the lake led to a buildup of pure CO2, which was sequestered in the deepest waters of the lake and eventually escaped in a large poisonous cloud. 95 By contrast, __any atmospheric releases of CO2 at a non-performing CCS site would be__ **__small__** __and__ **__incremental__**, not likely to result in harm like that at Lake Nyos. __Captured CO2 is injected while in a supercritical state__ (with both gaseous and liquid characteristics) and __is stored as it permeates porous rock__. 96 __Thus, the stored CO2 is not sequesteredin vast underground reservoirs, and it is__ **__unlikely__** __that a massive cloud of CO2 could escape__. = =
 * Laundry list of legal checks on environmental impacts **
 * Shortino 11** – journalist at the Philadelphia Inquirer (John, “Types of Coal Mining Restrictions” eHow.com, June 29 2011 []) MLR
 * No leaks or spikes**
 * Reisinger 9** – JD, Attorney @ Ohio Environmental Council

= = = = = = Will, “RECONCILING KING COAL AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, http://vjel.org/journal/pdf/VJEL10107.pdf = = __Injecting large quantities of foreign substances deep underground, especially in earthquake-prone regions, could potentially trigger seismic activity__. 101 __Some fear that__ __massive quantities of CO2 could expand__ within porous rock, increase pressure, __and__ possibly __lead to earthquakes__. 102 **__Most geologists__****__,__** however, __have concluded that this__ __type of harm is an__ **__improbable__** __result of CCS injections.__ __The risk of “induced seismicity__” will not likely deter serious operators or investors, but __is__ more likely __to be used as a rallying cry by environmental groups__ and citizen activists __who are opposed to CCS.__ = =
 * Qualified evidence concludes no earthquakes**
 * Reisinger 9**** – ** JD, Attorney @ Ohio Environmental Council

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