Edward+Young+&+Melanie+Ji

Past 2NRs: 1) T QPQ 2) HR CP 3) Elections DA

**1AC-China Rise Advantage**

====China's rise is inevitable —- U.S. failure to seek membership in the AIIB sends the signal that it doesn't want to integrate China into global economic governance and crushes America's ability to shape the global order==== The United States has sensibly declared its intention to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific AND writ large—than, respectively, excluding China and shunning its efforts.
 * Wyne, 15** —- contributing analyst at Wikistrat, and a global fellow with the Project for the Study of the 21st Century (4/7/15, Ali, "The American World Order and China's New Bank," http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-american-world-order-and-chinas-new-bank/, article downloaded on 5/3/16, JMP)

U.S. concerns over Chinese governance prevents efforts to positively reform the AIIB and facilitate multilateral diplomacy and deep cooperation with China
China's growing economic clout is complicating US efforts to maintain its grip on the world's AND route for deepening cooperation between the US and the People's Republic of China.
 * Edwards & Qahir, 15** —- *Associate Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, AND **Diplomacy graduate student at Seton Hall (4/6/15, Martin & Katayon, "US should stop blocking China's AIIB and join allies in new club," https://theconversation.com/us-should-stop-blocking-chinas-aiib-and-join-allies-in-new-club-39406, article downloaded 4/23/16, JMP)

====Engaging on the AIIB is critical —- it's the focal point for China's expanded international role and cooperation will help resolve Myanmar conflict and spillover to cybersecurity and the South China Sea==== In 2011, U.S. president Barack Obama announced plans to "pivot AND . cooperation. Development lending could prove a minimally politically sensitive testing ground.
 * Noori, et. al, 15** —- Program Specialist, Middle East & North Africa Programs at United States Institute of Peace (8/24/15, Maral Noori, Daniel Jasper and Jason Tower, "Overcoming Barriers to U.S.-China Cooperation," http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/08/24/overcoming-barriers-us-china-cooperation, downloaded on 4/21/16, JMP)

====The suspicious atmosphere allows military conflict to erupt at any time —- both sides must manage competition to prevent war and expand cooperation on global governance issues that represent existential risks==== The relationship between the United States and China has rightly been described as the most AND a marriage in which divorce is not an option. Divorce means war.
 * Shambaugh, 15** – professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (David, "In a fundamental shift, China and the US are now engaged in all-out competition," South China Morning Post, 6/11/15, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out?page=all //Red+JMP)

Independently, China will be forced to turn to aggressive military actions if the U.S. doesn't support its growing role in the global economy via the AIIB
When China first proposed creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013 AND military pressure. The AIIB may or may not ultimately succeed, but it
 * Lipscy, 15** —- Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University (5/7/15, Phillip Y., "Who's Afraid of the AIIB; Why the United States Should Support China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib, downloaded 4/23/16, JMP)

Failure to establish good relations guarantees war —- coop key to economy and climate solutions
What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How AND of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.
 * Ash, 10/16/15** (Timothy Garton Ash, "If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably be war; America needs a strategy to handle its superpower rival that can last 20 years. Instead we get soundbites," http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-war-america, downloaded 4/22/16, JMP)

Expanding economic engagement key to maintain foundation for relations —- Key to prevent conflict
DR. DOLLAR: The leaders on the two sides, U.S. AND of the relationship. And then the risks of conflict become much greater.
 * Dollar, 15** —- Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings (9/30/15, David, "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND CHINA'S RISE: HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN RESPOND?" http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2015/09/30-international-economic-governance-chinas-rise/20150930_china_economic_governance_transcript.pdf, article downloaded 6/12/16, JMP)

U.S. opposition to AIIB causes Chinese media to spin narrative of economic containment
MS. SOLÍS: And do you think – exactly. Do you think the AND and frustrating because I think the United States has been really quite engaging.
 * Solis & Dollar, 15** —- Senior Fellow & Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies at Brookings, AND **Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings (9/30/15, Mireya & David, "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND CHINA'S RISE: HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN RESPOND?" http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2015/09/30-international-economic-governance-chinas-rise/20150930_china_economic_governance_transcript.pdf, article downloaded 6/12/16, JMP)

Cyber attacks cause nuclear war – accidents
Short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces have particularly increased the AND a 2014 paper titled "Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear".
 * Gady 15** (Franz Stefan, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute. Article quotes: James Cartwright, retired US Marine Corps General and eighth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Greg Austin of the EastWest Institute in New York, and Pavel Sharikov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, "Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War?", http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/could-cyber-attacks-lead-to-nuclear-war/)

Cyberattacks escalate to nuclear war and extinction.
Andrew Nolan, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, former Trial Attorney at the United States Department of Justice, holds a J.D. from George Washington University, 2015 ("Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions," CRS Report to Congress, March 16th, Available Online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf, Accessed 07-05-2015, p. 1-3) The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a AND to encourage, not discourage, Chinese foreign policy initiatives such as theAIIB.
 * Nolan, 15**

1ac Plan + Solvency —- Join AIIB
====Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its diplomatic and economic engagement with the People's Republic of China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the purpose of joining the bank.====

U.S. should engage China to join the AIIB —- allows it to exert net more influence
A growing number of countries are joining the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AND best, working quietly with China, to ensure that it actually does.
 * Knight, 15** —- Faculty Director of the SIS Honors Program and Assistant Professor at American University's School of International Service and expert on international political economy (4/3/15, Sarah Cleeland Knight, "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – Three Questions for Sarah Cleeland Knight," http://www.american.edu/sis/news/20150403-3Q-Cleeland-Knight-Asian-Infrastructure-Investment-Bank.cfm, article downloaded 5/11/16, JMP)

The plan will rebalance the relationship with China —- preventing a collision between the rising powers
LEE: And at the same time, you know, there is interesting AIIB AND which does come back to leadership. MABRY: Mmm hmm. Excellent.
 * Lee & Fullilove, 5/17/16** —- *President, East Asia Institute (South Korea), AND **Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy (Australia) (Michael, "Crisis in Global Governance: A Conversation with Richard N. Haass and the Council of Councils," http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/crisis-global-governance-conversation-richard-n-haass-council-councils/p37852, article downloaded 5/30/16, JMP)

U.S. involvement will allow AIIB to safeguard its independence from China, develop higher standards and transparency, reverse perception of containment and boost the credibility of its Asia rebalance
China's new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been the source of considerable AND improve the AIIB as a member, instead of opposing the bank altogether.
 * Lazarus, 3/2/16** —- MA candidate at The Fletcher School, Tufts University (Leland, "Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB; There are compelling reasons for the U.S. to join China's new development bank," http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-the-u-s-should-embrace-the-aiib/, article downloaded 4/24/16, JMP)

1AC – Climate Advantage
====The choices made in Asian infrastructure development now will determine the future of global warming – expanding renewable energy markets and building sustainable and climate resilient infrastructure through the AIIB are key to keep warming below 2 degrees==== The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (the AIIB or the Bank) is poised AND with major long-term commercial benefits for many members of the AIIB.
 * Nassiry and Nakhooda 16** – Darius Nassiry, head of the international cooperation department at the Global Green Growth Institute, investment manager with the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund) Center for Global Development, Smita Nakhooda, international finance to support developing countries to respond to climate change, "The AIIB and the investment in action," 4/13/2016, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/the_aiib_and_investment_in_action_final_20160413.pdf//TK

And the aff causes a global alt energy movement – spills over and creates a global model that solves climate change
Can China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) fix climate change? Yes. AND to climate change replicable elsewhere. Deals like this don't occur every day.
 * Taggart 15** - principal of Sydney, Australia-based Grenatec, a non-profit research organization studying the viability of a Pan-Asian Energy Infrastructure (Stewart Taggart, 3/31/2015, "Can China's Infrastructure Bank Solve Climate Change?," http://grenatec.com/can-chinas-infrastructure-bank-solve-climate-change)//TK

Consensus of global scientists agree – warming is real, anthropogenic and happening now
Human-caused climate change is happening and is accelerating; dangerous impacts are becoming AND to inform Americans about the scientific consensus regarding the realities of climate change.
 * Maibach et al '14** Distinguished Professor of Communication at George Mason University and Director of the Center for Climate Change Communication at GMU. (Edward Maibach, Teresa Myers, Anthony Leiserowitz, "Climate Scientists need to set the Record Straight: There is a scientific consensus that human caused climate change is happening," 5/7/14, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2013EF000226/full)//NH

Climate change will be catastrophic and result in human extinction
In the Online Journal of Space Communication, Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA AND our Sun" (Hsu 2010) (Fig. 2.1).
 * Flournoy Ph.D. 12** – Professor at the University of Ohio, Ph.D. and M.A. from the Univeristy of Texas, Postgraduate Associateship at the University of London, B.A. from Southern Methodist University, Editor of the Online Journal of Space Communications. Citing Dr. Feng Hsu, Senior Engineer and Manager at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (Don M., Ph.D., SpringerBriefs in Space Development, "Solar Power Satellites," 2012, Springer)//JSL

Loopholes and loose regulations in the AIIB now could cause backsliding – only U.S. involvement can correct course and ensure environmentally friendly regulations
Unfortunately, the AIIB's draft environmental and social framework, released last week, does AND
 * Elgin-Cossart and Hart '15** - Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at American Progress. She focuses on U.S. foreign policy toward China and works to identify new opportunities for bilateral cooperation, particularly on energy, climate change, and cross-border investment - Senior Fellow at American Progress, where she works on issues involving foreign policy, international development, and global conflict (Center for American Progress, "China's New International Financing Institutions Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Investment Standards," September 2015, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/21140703/RaceToTheTop-brief.pdf)// VM

as well as the comparative advantage of each institution in undertaking specific projects. 

=1AC-China Rise Advantage=

====China's rise is inevitable —- U.S. failure to seek membership in the AIIB sends the signal that it doesn't want to integrate China into global economic governance and crushes America's ability to shape the global order==== The United States has sensibly declared its intention to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific AND writ large—than, respectively, excluding China and shunning its efforts.
 * Wyne, 15** —- contributing analyst at Wikistrat, and a global fellow with the Project for the Study of the 21st Century (4/7/15, Ali, "The American World Order and China's New Bank," http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-american-world-order-and-chinas-new-bank/, article downloaded on 5/3/16, JMP)

U.S. concerns over Chinese governance prevents efforts to positively reform the AIIB and facilitate multilateral diplomacy and deep cooperation with China
China's growing economic clout is complicating US efforts to maintain its grip on the world's leading multilateral economic institutions – as it's done since the end of World War II. The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established last year by China and many other Asian countries, has brought this challenge and how to address it front and center. The AIIB is similar to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank – in that it's intended to finance infrastructure investments – except that it will serve more as an instrument of Chinese rather than Western influence. Thus far, the US has reacted by trying to marginalize the bank's impact, urging other Western powers to follow its lead and steer clear. As we've seen in recent weeks, that strategy has failed miserably, with Australia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and even Taiwan now interested in becoming founding members. Of the major powers, only Japan has continued to follow its ally's lead. This represents a serious setback for the White House's ability to lead the international economic order on its own terms. While the narrative of the day is that of a policy defeat for the Obama administration, some larger points are worth noting. Manage multilateralism, don't block it First, the very existence of the AIIB is a self-inflicted problem for the US. It could have been avoided had the US been willing to cede some power at the IMF and ADB. Second, objections to European and other Western countries joining it are shortsighted because the best way to influence its actions is by being on the inside. Finally, the AIIB is a good thing for both China and the US over the long term as it shows the rising power's interest in taking on more global responsibilities – exactly what the White House has sought – so arguments against it are counterproductive. Hoisted on its own petard The AIIB is intended to solve a problem by providing money to support the trillions of dollars of infrastructure investment that emerging markets will need in coming years. With a veritable ocean of foreign exchange at its disposal, creating a regional development bank right now makes perfect sense for China. It is a vehicle for the Chinese government to help aid regional development as well as a signpost to demonstrate its international prestige. But China would not have been so willing to create its own international bank had it felt appropriately valued in the ones that already exist. What is frequently omitted in the discussion of the AIIB is the extent to which this problem was created by dysfunction between Washington and Tokyo over reforming the Asian Development Bank, as well as within Washington around International Monetary Fund reform. The Asian Development Bank has been dominated by the US and Japan since its creation in 1966. China is the largest economy in Asia, while only the third-largest shareholder in the Asian Development Bank. As it has been custom that the president of the ADB is Japanese, Chinese attempts to gain influence within the bank commensurate with its economy's size have been blocked. Similarly, IMF reform was proposed in 2010 by the G20. Under the proposed reforms, China's voting power was to double, making it the third-largest shareholder at the IMF behind only the US and Japan. Brazil and India would both become top-ten "quota-holders" as well, displacing Saudi Arabia and the Netherlands. In this manner, global economic governance would be reinvigorated, as these emerging economies would receive a voice at the IMF equivalent to their influence. Though IMF reform has been approved by more than 150 countries, including many that would lose influence under the proposals, the US Congress has refused to budge. Despite warnings from the rest of the G20 underscoring the urgency of passing the reforms, Congress has sought to squeeze compromises on the IRS and healthcare from the White House in exchange for its support. While the Obama Administration wants the reforms, it has refused to sacrifice its signature health care law or link it to other measures. So at this point, IMF reform simply won't happen in the current Congress. Given China's inability to produce reforms of the existing development banks that would address China's concerns, its move to create its own development bank was its only way forward. US objections are shortsighted Washington has been on the wrong side of this issue by dismissing the AIIB rather than celebrating it. For the past year, the White House has raised concerns about how the new bank would operate, suggesting that the AIIB would have insufficient safeguards. The AIIB might undercut the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, the argument goes, as countries might prefer the promise of cheap money from Beijing without the strings the other lenders attach. But questioning Chinese governance of the bank not only reminds our allies of our shortcomings in IMF reform, it also overlooks the surest route to reforming the AIIB. Cooperation is always more difficult in large groups with divergent preferences than smaller ones. The growing list of AIIB members (including South Korea, Norway and Denmark) means that the Chinese will have to accommodate those countries concerned about safeguards. Rather than push back on AIIB, the US should welcome the participation of many countries. It will fall to China to figure out how to reconcile this diverse membership. This will ensure that fighting climate change and improving environmental standards will not be sacrificed in favor of growth at any cost. Chinese engagement should be welcomed For years, Washington has sought to encourage China to be a "responsible stakeholder" in the global economy. The AIIB demonstrates that China seeks to embrace this challenge, and the fact that it is doing so multilaterally rather than bilaterally should not be overlooked. The US has helped to support regional development banks in Africa and Europe, so a new one in Asia should not be the threat that it is made out to be. The need for infrastructure in emerging Asian economies is so acute that the two banks need not be in competition. Embracing AIIB will help keep US-Chinese relations moving forward by moving beyond the sharp rhetoric of recent weeks. It will also give us a means to smooth over relations with European allies. More importantly, joining the AIIB gives the US a seat at the table, and a way to work with allies to moderate Chinese behavior. What will make the difference in the long term in shaping US relationships with Asia is working with allies to address common challenges. Multilateral diplomacy is not just a means to an end, but an end in itself, and enmeshing China in a network of international organizations, regardless of who created them, provides the best route for deepening cooperation between the US and the People's Republic of China.
 * ====Edwards & Qahir, 15** —- *Associate Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, AND **Diplomacy graduate student at Seton Hall (4/6/15, Martin & Katayon, "US should stop blocking China's AIIB and join allies in new club," https://theconversation.com/us-should-stop-blocking-chinas-aiib-and-join-allies-in-new-club-39406, article downloaded 4/23/16, JMP)====

====Engaging on the AIIB is critical —- it's the focal point for China's expanded international role and cooperation will help resolve Myanmar conflict and spillover to cybersecurity and the South China Sea====

In 2011, U.S. president Barack Obama announced plans to "pivot" toward Asia. In 2012, Chinese president Xi Jinping expressed his hope for "a new type of relationship" with the United States. A lack of strategic trust between the two countries, however, prevents critically needed productive cooperation. This Peace Brief addresses the misunderstandings behind this mistrust and a possible way to move beyond them. Summary The United States has urged China to take on greater international responsibility and to leverage its rise to power by adhering to international law and urging its strategic partners to do the same. However, Beijing's adherence to its principle of noninterference has drawn sharp U.S. criticism, as has its tendency to support incumbent governments in contentious states. Beijing is presenting a more flexible and proactive foreign diplomacy. At the same time, it is concerned about U.S. military policies and diplomatic campaigns seemingly targeted at containing China or undermining Chinese efforts to influence global institutions. Identifying common ground is more imperative than ever if what Beijing calls a "new type of major country relations" are to be manifest in cooperative frameworks, policies, and joint initiatives. Washington and Beijing need to build strategic trust, overcome domestic policy hurdles, demonstrate their willingness to participate as leaders in the international community, and better coordinate to fill gaps in global governance and development issues. About this Brief In April 2015, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) convened government officials and leading policy analysts from the United States and China to discuss how both countries can jointly support peace and development initiatives. These discussions, implemented collaboratively with the Chinese People's association for Peace and Disarmament and the China Foundation for Peace and Development, informed this Peace Brief. Maral Noori is a program specialist at USIP. Daniel Jasper is the public education and advocacy coordinator for Asia at the AFSC. Jason Tower is the East Asia Quaker International Affairs representative at the AFSC. Introduction In late 2011, the Obama administration announced plans to "pivot" toward Asia, and in late 2012, shortly after taking office, Chinese president Xi Jinping expressed his desire for "a new type of relationship between major countries in the twenty-first century."1 Chinese interpretations of these relations usually highlight a greater voice in global governance and sharing power with the United States. Yet many in Washington think that Beijing's true intentions are to challenge the U.S. presence in Asia at a time when Washington intends to consolidate its regional leadership. Many U.S. analysts point to Chinese initiatives such as the One Belt One Road or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to argue that China is pushing to reshape international institutions and responding aggressively to Washington's initiatives. Chinese experts point to U.S. diplomatic efforts to undermine Chinese initiatives and argue that Washington is trying to contain China in Asia. They also question U.S. policies, which they insist exacerbate tensions over regional maritime disputes. Both nations' directives leave ample room for interpretation and have added to mounting tensions. Because misunderstandings abound, identifying common ground is imperative. U.S.-China Relations and Global Governance Washington has urged Beijing to take on greater international responsibility. From the U.S. perspective, China should leverage its rise to power by supporting international law and urging its strategic partners to comply. Response to chemical warfare in Syria was a key example as Washington urged Beijing to agree to a UN intervention against the Assad regime. Beijing's preference for a softer approach and strict adherence to noninterference drew sharp criticism from U.S. observers, who characterized it as irresponsible. From Beijing's point of view, China has prioritized international trade—particularly with the United States—and investment mechanisms as it remakes its diplomacy, emphasizing that security is rooted in development. Unbalanced governance structures in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have left China feeling slighted and unwelcome in global financial discussions. Thus, the entry of Chinese state-owned enterprises into developing markets created competition in spaces where formerly the United States and Bretton Woods institutions held comfortable control. China offered developing nations less restrictive terms for development aid, investment capital, and trade, which proved a boon to Latin America and Africa. The creation of the AIIB highlights Beijing's understanding of its new role. Beijing prioritizes economic contributions and investment in its global engagement in shouldering its fair share of international responsibilities. U.S. efforts to halt AIIB exemplify Washington's distrust of Chinese foreign investment and reinforce China's perceptions that the United States does not welcome China's economic rise. For its part, Washington asserts the existence of serious gaps in the social and environmental safeguards of Chinese-supported efforts—concerns echoed by civil society representatives across the developing world. On global policy issues, Beijing tends to focus on economics and Washington on security. Were this to emerge as a division of labor, however, neither party would benefit. It is critical that a shared security incorporate both domains. In recent months, bilateral cooperation on global nontraditional security issues has seen some success. In April, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security held their first ministerial meeting, signaling at least a willingness to discuss joint efforts. The two powers also found grounds for collaboration during the Ebola crisis in West Africa—as evidenced by a Chinese-trained Liberian engineering firm helping establish the U.S. Ebola Treatment Center. These measures may seem like basic starting points but have provided camaraderie in the security realm. In more contentious cases, such as Myanmar, cooperation has proven elusive despite a track 1.5 dialogue. Challenges include not only lack of mutual trust but also local Myanmar concerns. Since opening up, Myanmar has moved a little closer to the West. China considers this suspect, even conspiratorial. Many in Beijing viewed Burmese protests to stop construction of the Chinese-backed Myitsone Dam as Washington's doing. Yet Washington's interest in Myanmar has largely been economic. Myanmar is a vast, untapped, and resource-rich market. For Beijing, conflict on the Sino-Myanmar border and the proximity of Washington's focus make Myanmar a security issue. This intersection of economic and security concerns looks like a crisis but could be an opportunity. China's economic involvement could help provide the infrastructure necessary for Myanmar to become a viable market. In turn, the United States could work more productively with China to ensure that development is inclusive, safe, and profitable. Additionally, given the sixty-year civil war and talks for a nationwide cease-fire, U.S. and Chinese support to help end the conflict is needed now more than ever. Finding common ground on which to build a more trusting relationship, then, needs to be a priority in both Chinese and U.S. foreign policy agendas. Strategic Trust Lack of strategic trust between the United States and China prevents productive cooperation. Both sides have largely continued to act as if their relationship is a zero-sum game. These tensions have only intensified over recent security concerns in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Moreover, Washington has cited concerns about Beijing's steady increase in military spending, from $10 billion in 1997 to $145 billion in 2015, and sees China as a direct threat to its allies and interests in the Asia-Pacific.2 Beijing sees the U.S. military presence in the region and across Asia as its greatest security threat. It is also keenly aware that Washington maintains the world's highest military spending, up from $560 billion in 2015 to a requested $585 billion in 2016.3 Washington also routinely accuses Beijing of cyber attacks on government agencies—most recently in June 2015 when both the Office of Personnel Management's systems and corporate computer systems were breached. Both sides lack strategic trust in trade, despite China being Washington's second largest trade partner ($592 billion in 2014).4 A sense of competition is constant. As Washington pushes forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Beijing pursues the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Each framework tacitly excludes the other country, underscoring the mistrust. Further, the two nations continue to compete for influence in Myanmar, a nascent democracy still threatened by conflict. Points of tension should not prevent the United States and China from overcoming their challenges, enhancing cooperation, and fostering deeper mutual understanding and strategic trust. The private sectors and nongovernmental organizations on both sides could launch this process by enhancing their own cooperation. Ultimately, Washington and Beijing need to compartmentalize early on and hope that positivity on some ends—such as cooperation in Myanmar—will spill over to others—such as cyber security and the South China Sea. Both sides will need to commit to greater transparency so that in a moment of crisis, chances are minimal for misunderstanding to lead to a major conflict. Domestic Politics Political interests undermine the bilateral relationship. U.S. hard-liners fear an increasingly powerful China. The military threat is used both to rationalize increasing U.S. defense funding and to counter any Obama administration attempt to constructively engage China. Even the U.S.-China climate change and clean energy cooperation joint announcement was denounced, with Republicans complaining that China would not be required to make changes for sixteen years.5 Similar hard-line Chinese sentiments are a growing trend. Conspiracy theories or perceived illintentions related to U.S. policies abound, and nearly any negative outcome in China's foreign diplomacy is blamed on Washington. The political transition in Myanmar is an example. To prevent domestic politics from inhibiting constructive cooperation, both the Obama and Xi administrations should devise strategies to manage the impacts of interest groups on the relationship. Such strategies might include more talks to repair damaged cooperative efforts, such as civilian nuclear cooperation (a current point of contention on Capitol Hill), or perhaps to explore Chinese mediation in U.S.-North Korea relations. Another option might be to establish a track II dialogue on the impact of interest groups on the relationship that could generate stronger awareness of the dynamics. Willingness Although Washington is intent on spreading liberal democracy and continuing as a global leader, Beijing demonstrates growing commitment to what President Xi terms "strive to achieve"—a more active involvement in global governance and international affairs.6 This policy looks to reshape China's traditional approaches to foreign development assistance, trade, and investment. Washington, on the other hand, is often willing to step within another state's boundaries to confront conflict and fulfill what it sees as its responsibility as a global leader. A willingness gap in the relationship is clear as both countries struggle to adhere to their foreign policy principles in a changing global arena. Beijing and Washington need to continue to show flexibility in their foreign policy. Extreme applications of principles damage each side and their ability to cooperate constructively. Perhaps it is time for them to change their political narratives and take on their shared role in the international community. The AIIB is one arena for such cooperation. Because its rules and guidelines have yet to be fully defined, the AIIB provides Western states an opportunity to share experiences with China and China an opportunity to integrate its approach to development with those that other states have already developed. Capability The final barriers to cooperation involve capability. China is newer to the field of peace and development, has yet to fully establish the AIIB, and has only recently become a major contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. Meanwhile, the United States can no longer provide the support needed in least developed countries, a gap further handicapped by congressional emphasis on U.S. defense rather than development and humanitarian assistance. China and the United States can be complementary. China is strong in engineering, construction, and infrastructure, and the United States is strong in developing risk and security guidance—areas where Chinese and Western analysts alike have pointed out key gaps in Chinese approaches. For optimal impact, the two countries need to coordinate their development efforts. Conclusion As security tensions continue to rise in Asia and as China begins launching global initiatives, it is imperative that Washington and Beijing find ways to collaborate. As Beijing academic Wang Jisi recently wrote, both countries risk seeing the emergence of competing global institutions, which may result at best in wasted resources and at worst in deeper conflict and tensions across the developing world. The AIIB is a possible starting point. Fifty-seven countries signed the bank's charter in June 2015, and the bank has emerged as a global initiative promising to remake the face of global finance. Washington might be well advised to engage with the AIIB. Because the AIIB will target infrastructure and development projects in least developed countries and conflict hotspots, its emerging portfolio is an opportunity for Chinese-U.S. cooperation. Development lending could prove a minimally politically sensitive testing ground.
 * ====Noori, et. al, 15** —- Program Specialist, Middle East & North Africa Programs at United States Institute of Peace (8/24/15, Maral Noori, Daniel Jasper and Jason Tower, "Overcoming Barriers to U.S.-China Cooperation," http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/08/24/overcoming-barriers-us-china-cooperation, downloaded on 4/21/16, JMP)====

====The suspicious atmosphere allows military conflict to erupt at any time —- both sides must manage competition to prevent war and expand cooperation on global governance issues that represent existential risks====

The relationship between the United States and China has rightly been described as the most important relationship in world affairs. It is also the most complex and fraught one. These two titans are the world's two leading powers and are interconnected in numerous ways bilaterally, regionally, and globally. It is therefore of vital importance to understand the dynamics that underlie and drive this relationship at present, which are shifting. While Washington and Beijing cooperate where they can, there has also been steadily rising competition in the relationship. This balance has now shifted, with competition being the dominant factor. There are several reasons for it - but one is that security now trumps economics in the relationship. The competition is not only strategic competition, it is actually comprehensive competition: commercial, ideological, political, diplomatic, technological, even in the academic world where China has banned a number of American scholars and is beginning to bring pressure to bear on university joint ventures in China. Mutual distrust is pervasive in both governments, and is also evident at the popular level. The last Pew global attitudes data on this, in 2013, found distrust rising in both countries. Roughly two-thirds of both publics view US-China relations as "competitive" and "untrustworthy" - a significant change since 2010 when a majority of people in both nations still had positive views of the other. One senses that the sands are fundamentally shifting in the relationship. Viewed from Washington, it is increasingly difficult to find a positive narrative and trajectory into the future. The "engagement coalition" is crumbling and a "competition coalition" is rising. In my view, the relationship has been fundamentally troubled for many years and has failed to find extensive common ground to forge a real and enduring partnership. The "glue" that seems to keep it together is the fear of it falling apart. But that is far from a solid basis for an enduring partnership between the world's two leading powers. The macro trajectory for the last decade has been steadily downward - punctuated only by high-level summits between the two presidents, which temporarily arrest the downward trajectory. This has been the case with the last four presidential summits. Occasionally, bilateral meetings like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which will convene in Washington in two weeks' time, provide similar stabilisation and impetus for movement in specific policy sectors. But their effects are short-lived, with only a matter of months passing before the two countries encounter new shocks and the deterioration of ties resumes. The most recent jolts to the relationship, just a few months since Xi Jinping and Barack Obama took their stroll in the Zhongnanhai (the so-called Yingtai Summit), have been the escalating rhetoric and tensions around China's island-building in the South China Sea. Behind this imbroglio lies rising concerns about Chinese military capabilities, US military operations near China, and the broader balance of power in Asia. But there have been a number of other lesser, but not unimportant, issues that have recently buffeted the relationship in different realms - in law enforcement (arrests of Chinese for technology theft and falsification of applications to US universities), legal (China's draft NGO and national security laws), human rights (convictions of rights lawyers and the general repression in China since 2009), cyber-hacking (of the US Office of Personnel Management most recently) and problems in trade and investment. Hardly a day passes when one does not open the newspaper to read of more - and serious - friction. This is the "new normal" and both sides had better get used to it - rather than naively professing a harmonious relationship that is not achievable. This has given impetus to an unprecedented outpouring of commentary and reports by Washington think tanks in recent months. I have lived and worked there a long time, and cannot recall such a tsunami of publications on US-China relations - and they are all, with one exception (Kevin Rudd's Asia Society report), negative in nature, calling for a re-evaluation of US policy towards China, as well as a hardening of policy towards China across the board. A qualitative shift in American thinking about China is occurring. In essence, the "engagement" strategy pursued since Nixon across eight administrations, that was premised on three pillars, is unravelling. The American expectation has been, first, as China modernised economically, it would liberalise politically; second, as China's role in the world grew, it would become a "responsible stakeholder" - in Robert Zoellick's words - in upholding the global liberal order; and third, that China would not challenge the American-dominant security architecture and order in East Asia. The first premise is clearly not occurring - quite to the contrary, as China grows stronger economically, it is becoming more, not less, repressive politically. There are any number of examples, but political repression in China today is the worst it has been in the 25 years since Tiananmen. With respect to the other two, we are not witnessing frontal assaults by China on these regional and global institutional architectures. But we are witnessing Beijing establishing a range of alternative institutions that clearly signal China's discomfort with the US-led postwar order. Make no mistake: China is methodically trying to construct an alternative international order. This disillusion with China in America probably says much more about America than it does about China. One pattern has repeated itself over the past two centuries of the relationship: America's "missionary impulse" to transform China in its image has repeatedly been disappointed by not understanding the complexities on the ground in China and by China's unwillingness to conform to American expectations. So, once again, this seemingly has more to do with the United States and its unrealistic expectations, than with China. Despite this overall macro climate in the relationship, the United States and China still have to coexist, and to do so peacefully if at all possible. We have business to do with each other - both commercial and diplomatic business. Perhaps the most immediate opportunity - and one that would give an enormous boost to the relationship - would be the conclusion of a bilateral investment treaty. But negotiating this treaty is hung up in the queue behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement. Given the difficulty the White House is having getting that agreement finalised and through Congress, there may be little appetite in Washington to conclude an investment treaty with China this year. Also high on the agenda at present is the real need to forge practical cooperation on a number of so-called "global governance" issues, including North Korea, Iran, Islamic State, Afghanistan, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, climate change, maritime security, economic stability, energy security, sea-lane security, and setting global rules for cyber activity. To date, China has been extremely reluctant to collaborate openly with the United States on such global governance issues, but now it possibly seems more feasible. This is because President Xi has personally endorsed more "proactive diplomacy" by China in the global governance arena. This won't solve the problems in US-China relations, but it will help. The upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue and Xi's September state visit to Washington are golden opportunities to discuss these issues, try to forge tangible cooperation, and arrest the negative dynamic in the relationship. The question is whether it will be temporary again, or a real "floor" can be put beneath the relationship. If the past is any indicator, we should not expect too much. What worries me is that in this increasingly negative and suspicious atmosphere, "tests of credibility" will increase. The best we can probably hope for over the next two to three years - as President Obama becomes a lame duck and the election cycle stimulates more heated rhetoric about China - is tactical management of the relationship, with sensitivity to each side's "red lines" and "core interests", while hoping that no "wild card" events occur. This could include another military incident in the air or at sea, or renewed tension over Taiwan. Even the current situation in the South China Sea has real potential to haemorrhage, as China is not going to stop its island-building activities and hence will not meet American demands that it do so. Or if China, having fortified the islands, proclaims an air defence identification zone over the South China Sea. What is Washington to do then? The potential for military confrontation is not insignificant. So, looking to the future, the key responsibility for both countries is to learn how to manage competition, keep it from edging towards the conflictual end of the spectrum, while trying to expand the zone of practical cooperation. Neither country has any playbook to guide such a relationship. Henry Kissinger envisions what he calls "co-evolution" between the two powers, but even he concludes that this will require "wisdom and patience". But it is not at all clear to me that the respective political cultures and existing political systems, national identities, social values, and world views will afford such a strategic grand bargain today. Thus, these two great nations are likely to find it increasingly difficult to coexist - yet they must. However fraught, this is a marriage in which divorce is not an option. Divorce means war.
 * ====Shambaugh, 15** – professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (David, "In a fundamental shift, China and the US are now engaged in all-out competition," South China Morning Post, 6/11/15, http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-are-now-engaged-all-out?page=all //Red+JMP)====

Independently, China will be forced to turn to aggressive military actions if the U.S. doesn't support its growing role in the global economy via the AIIB
When China first proposed creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013 AND military pressure. The AIIB may or may not ultimately succeed, but it
 * Lipscy, 15** —- Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University (5/7/15, Phillip Y., "Who's Afraid of the AIIB; Why the United States Should Support China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank," https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-07/whos-afraid-aiib, downloaded 4/23/16, JMP)

Failure to establish good relations guarantees war —- coop key to economy and climate solutions
What is the biggest challenge facing the next president of the United States? How AND of generating anything more than a partisan soundbite for the next 20 minutes.
 * Ash, 10/16/15** (Timothy Garton Ash, "If US relations with China turn sour, there will probably be war; America needs a strategy to handle its superpower rival that can last 20 years. Instead we get soundbites," http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/16/us-relations-china-war-america, downloaded 4/22/16, JMP)

Expanding economic engagement key to maintain foundation for relations —- Key to prevent conflict
DR. DOLLAR: The leaders on the two sides, U.S. AND of the relationship. And then the risks of conflict become much greater.
 * Dollar, 15** —- Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings (9/30/15, David, "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND CHINA'S RISE: HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN RESPOND?" http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2015/09/30-international-economic-governance-chinas-rise/20150930_china_economic_governance_transcript.pdf, article downloaded 6/12/16, JMP)

U.S. opposition to AIIB causes Chinese media to spin narrative of economic containment
MS. SOLÍS: And do you think – exactly. Do you think the AND and frustrating because I think the United States has been really quite engaging.
 * Solis & Dollar, 15** —- Senior Fellow & Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies at Brookings, AND **Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings (9/30/15, Mireya & David, "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND CHINA'S RISE: HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN RESPOND?" http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2015/09/30-international-economic-governance-chinas-rise/20150930_china_economic_governance_transcript.pdf, article downloaded 6/12/16, JMP)

Cyber attacks cause nuclear war – accidents
Short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces have particularly increased the AND a 2014 paper titled "Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear".
 * Gady 15** (Franz Stefan, Associate Editor of The Diplomat, Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute. Article quotes: James Cartwright, retired US Marine Corps General and eighth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Greg Austin of the EastWest Institute in New York, and Pavel Sharikov of the Russian Academy of Sciences, "Could Cyber Attacks Lead to Nuclear War?", http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/could-cyber-attacks-lead-to-nuclear-war/)

Cyberattacks escalate to nuclear war and extinction.
Andrew Nolan, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, former Trial Attorney at the United States Department of Justice, holds a J.D. from George Washington University, 2015 ("Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions," CRS Report to Congress, March 16th, Available Online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf, Accessed 07-05-2015, p. 1-3) The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a AND to encourage, not discourage, Chinese foreign policy initiatives such as theAIIB.
 * Nolan, 15**

1ac Plan + Solvency —- Join AIIB
====Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its diplomatic and economic engagement with the People's Republic of China over the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the purpose of joining the bank.====

U.S. should engage China to join the AIIB —- allows it to exert net more influence
A growing number of countries are joining the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AND best, working quietly with China, to ensure that it actually does.
 * Knight, 15** —- Faculty Director of the SIS Honors Program and Assistant Professor at American University's School of International Service and expert on international political economy (4/3/15, Sarah Cleeland Knight, "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – Three Questions for Sarah Cleeland Knight," http://www.american.edu/sis/news/20150403-3Q-Cleeland-Knight-Asian-Infrastructure-Investment-Bank.cfm, article downloaded 5/11/16, JMP)

The plan will rebalance the relationship with China —- preventing a collision between the rising powers
LEE: And at the same time, you know, there is interesting AIIB AND which does come back to leadership. MABRY: Mmm hmm. Excellent.
 * Lee & Fullilove, 5/17/16** —- *President, East Asia Institute (South Korea), AND **Executive Director, Lowy Institute for International Policy (Australia) (Michael, "Crisis in Global Governance: A Conversation with Richard N. Haass and the Council of Councils," http://www.cfr.org/global-governance/crisis-global-governance-conversation-richard-n-haass-council-councils/p37852, article downloaded 5/30/16, JMP)

U.S. involvement will allow AIIB to safeguard its independence from China, develop higher standards and transparency, reverse perception of containment and boost the credibility of its Asia rebalance
China's new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has been the source of considerable AND improve the AIIB as a member, instead of opposing the bank altogether.
 * Lazarus, 3/2/16** —- MA candidate at The Fletcher School, Tufts University (Leland, "Why the U.S. Should Embrace the AIIB; There are compelling reasons for the U.S. to join China's new development bank," http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-the-u-s-should-embrace-the-aiib/, article downloaded 4/24/16, JMP)

1AC – Climate Advantage
====The choices made in Asian infrastructure development now will determine the future of global warming – expanding renewable energy markets and building sustainable and climate resilient infrastructure through the AIIB are key to keep warming below 2 degrees==== The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (the AIIB or the Bank) is poised AND with major long-term commercial benefits for many members of the AIIB.
 * Nassiry and Nakhooda 16** – Darius Nassiry, head of the international cooperation department at the Global Green Growth Institute, investment manager with the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund) Center for Global Development, Smita Nakhooda, international finance to support developing countries to respond to climate change, "The AIIB and the investment in action," 4/13/2016, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/the_aiib_and_investment_in_action_final_20160413.pdf//TK

And the aff causes a global alt energy movement – spills over and creates a global model that solves climate change
Can China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) fix climate change? Yes. AND to climate change replicable elsewhere. Deals like this don't occur every day.
 * Taggart 15** - principal of Sydney, Australia-based Grenatec, a non-profit research organization studying the viability of a Pan-Asian Energy Infrastructure (Stewart Taggart, 3/31/2015, "Can China's Infrastructure Bank Solve Climate Change?," http://grenatec.com/can-chinas-infrastructure-bank-solve-climate-change)//TK

Consensus of global scientists agree – warming is real, anthropogenic and happening now
Human-caused climate change is happening and is accelerating; dangerous impacts are becoming AND to inform Americans about the scientific consensus regarding the realities of climate change.
 * Maibach et al '14** Distinguished Professor of Communication at George Mason University and Director of the Center for Climate Change Communication at GMU. (Edward Maibach, Teresa Myers, Anthony Leiserowitz, "Climate Scientists need to set the Record Straight: There is a scientific consensus that human caused climate change is happening," 5/7/14, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2013EF000226/full)//NH

Climate change will be catastrophic and result in human extinction
In the Online Journal of Space Communication, Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA AND our Sun" (Hsu 2010) (Fig. 2.1).
 * Flournoy Ph.D. 12** – Professor at the University of Ohio, Ph.D. and M.A. from the Univeristy of Texas, Postgraduate Associateship at the University of London, B.A. from Southern Methodist University, Editor of the Online Journal of Space Communications. Citing Dr. Feng Hsu, Senior Engineer and Manager at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (Don M., Ph.D., SpringerBriefs in Space Development, "Solar Power Satellites," 2012, Springer)//JSL

Loopholes and loose regulations in the AIIB now could cause backsliding – only U.S. involvement can correct course and ensure environmentally friendly regulations
Unfortunately, the AIIB's draft environmental and social framework, released last week, does AND as well as the comparative advantage of each institution in undertaking specific projects.
 * Elgin-Cossart and Hart '15** - Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at American Progress. She focuses on U.S. foreign policy toward China and works to identify new opportunities for bilateral cooperation, particularly on energy, climate change, and cross-border investment - Senior Fellow at American Progress, where she works on issues involving foreign policy, international development, and global conflict (Center for American Progress, "China's New International Financing Institutions Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Investment Standards," September 2015, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/21140703/RaceToTheTop-brief.pdf)// VM