Nick+Silva+and+Danny+Broadson

toc = 1ac - taiwan =

plan
The United States Federal Government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China over a staged Framework Agreement, beginning with an offer of reciprocal reductions in military commitments over Taiwan.

1ac – Taiwan adv
The risk of a US-China war over Taiwan is high. Blocking independence is China’s __ core __ national interest and outweighs economic ties As Taiwan is important to both China and the United States, conflict of interests AND bonds of commerce, trade, and military ties between the two powers. The DPP’s election means Taiwan is moving towards de jure independence with US backing Th e pro-independence DPP has returned to power in Taiwan. Despite repeated warnings AND of the Taiwan Strait and for the benefit of the US itself too. This enraged China which just ended relations with Taiwan Well before Taiwan held its elections on January 20, Beijing made it clear that AND more damage done to cross-strait relations than either side can fix. Nationalist pressure and nuclear insecurity make the risk of war high and nuclear escalation probable Although a number of regional sovereignty and maritime disputes have the potential to sour the AND Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses .”67 Strategic ambiguity risks miscalculation Colby and Slocombe, 16 - Mr. Colby is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Mr. Slocombe was U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001 (Elbridge and Walter, “U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous” Wall Street Journal, 5/23, [] If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense  AND  not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals. It risks extinction But what would that “victory” entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear    AND    — destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine , and generating chaos and destruction.
 * Kuntić, 15** – visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, “The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan-the United States relationship” CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280)
 * Yin, 6**/8**/16 -** Yin Chengde is a research fellow of China Foundation for International Studies (“Time for US to Change Its Taiwan Policy” http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/time-for-us-to-change-its-taiwan-policy/
 * Tiezzi, 6/26/16** - Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation (“Did China Just Kill Cross-Strait Relations?” The Diplomat, []
 * Glaser, 15** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199
 * Wittner, 12** - Professor of History emeritus, SUNY Albany (Lawrence, “Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?” Huffington Post, 1/30, []

1ac - plan
Plan The United States Federal Government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China over a staged Framework Agreement, beginning with an offer of reciprocal reductions in military commitments over Taiwan.

1ac – relations adv
The US and China are locked an action-reaction cycle of hostility. Negotiating a staged Framework Agreement will de-escalate tensions and create a sustainable path towards relations and cooperation on global existential threats To overcome the structural weakness es in U.S.-China relations—which could AND conflict U.S. and Chinese military operations and avoid accidental confrontations. Taiwan is the most important __starting point__ to address strategic distrust – plan is the vital internal link to broader, sustainable cooperation More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current crossstrait relations AND of // cooperation on other issues // and reduce the probability of competition and conflict. Strategic distrust blocks Chinese support for Korean unification and undermines South Korean leadership China’s support for North Korea at the United Nations as well as its opposition to AND that nonetheless occurs and has an adverse impact on South Korea’s international prospects. __China’s leverage is necessary__ to force out North Korean leadership and ensure a peaceful transition Kydd 15 – Prof of Political Science at UW Madison Andrew H, “Pulling the Plug: Can There Be a Deal with China on Korean Unification?”, The Washington Quarterly Volume 38, Issue 2, 2015, p 63-77 Finally, what about North Korea itself? Pyongyang's leadership would definitely be opposed to   AND , the United States and China must first address their legacy of mistrust. It is the only way to provide stability in North East Asia, prevent nuclear conflict, and lift 25 million people from poverty Terry 14 - former analyst at the CIA and a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute Sue Mi, “A Korea Whole and Free,” July/Aug 2014 Foreign Affairs The real fear of South Koreans, however, is not that Seoul won’t be AND the Soviet Union and the United States divided it at the 38th parallel. A nuclear war on the peninsula would kill millions, involve massive amounts of fallout, and risk escalation Mount, 15 - Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relation Adam, The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Restraint, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 57, Issue 4, 2015, p. 53-76 As things stand today, the most plausible scenario for US nuclear use is in    AND neighbouring countries. An invasion of North Korea would be all but impossible.
 * Gross, 13** - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 152-155
 * Glaser, 15** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199
 * Gross, 13** - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 218-219)

1ac – solvency
Gross, 13 **- adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 159-165)** Swaine, 11 – **senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, __America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century__, p. 359-363** Swaine, 15 **- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace( Micheal, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JS** Glaser, 15 **- Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199** Kupchan, 12 –** Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University (Charles, How Enemies Become Friends, p. 41-45 During the second phase of the onset of stable peace, the trading of individual AND
 * Plan begins negotiations over a Framework Agreement with staged, reciprocal reductions of forces over Taiwan. China will say yes and it will build a foundation for larger cooperation that reduces the overall risk of nuclear war in Asia**
 * Taiwan currently faces an overwhelming military threat from China, which uses its forces to **
 * AND **
 * be more than sufficient to deter and dissuade China from seeking regional dominance . **
 * China says yes to greater diplomatic engagement; it’s verifiable and won’t destabilize relations with Taiwan or Asia**
 * Under such circumstances, avoiding future escalating Sino-American crises over  People’s Liberation Army **
 * AND **
 * also not inconceivable that Beijing would permit  or provide convincing levels of  verification  . **
 * Say no arguments overlook the staged implementation of the negotiations – small acts of reciprocation in negotiations will lead to larger cooperation over Taiwan**
 * These obstacles clearly indicate that Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake, much **
 * AND **
 * , including any resort to nuclear weapons, would almost certainly be avoided . **
 * Even if China says no, the plan boosts US resolve and reinforces regional alliances**
 * The preceding assessment lays bare the complexity of a U.S. policy of **
 * AND **
 * East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security. **
 * Negotiated reciprocal concessions are vital to rapprochement and de-securitizing the conflict**

second phase, each state becomes confident that the other has benign motivations.

=NEG=

NEG vs AIIB
1nc: T qpq, japan cp, elections da, appeasement da

2nr: Elections

NEG vs s&ed
1nc: Appeasement da, Germany da

2nr: appeasement

Neg vs ssa
1nc: low level coop cp, elections, espionage da

2nr: Elections

Neg vs Korea
1nc: T uncodo, unification cp Korea da

2nr: Korea da, Unification cp

If you have any questions email me, (2n) danny.brodson@gmail.com

 = =

 The United States Federal Government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China over a staged Framework Agreement, beginning with an offer of reciprocal reductions in military commitments over Taiwan.