Tyler+and+Matthew

= = =1AC=

US-Mexico border enforcement drives immigrants to smugglers—-this generates significant profit for violent cartels
(Alex, "Immigration Enforcement Aids Smugglers – Unaccompanied Children Edition," http://www.cato.org/blog/immigration-enforcement-aids-smugglers-unaccompanied-children-edition)//BB The increase of human smugglers transporting unauthorized immigrants to the United States is likely a consequence of more effective border enforcement. Although the Obama administration has de-emphasized internal immigration enforcement after 2011, his administration has ramped up enforcement along the border – focusing on increasing the legal and economic costs imposed on unlawful immigrants apprehended while trying to enter the United States. Since border and internal enforcement are substitutes, the shift in resources and increase in penalties for unlawful crossers does not represent a decrease in total enforcement. Matt Graham from the Bipartisan Policy Center wrote an excellent breakdown of the reprioritization of immigration enforcement, the increase in penalties, and how it has deterred unauthorized immigration.∂ The price of smuggling is an indication of the effectiveness of immigration enforcement along the border. The first effect of increased enforcement is to decrease the supply of human smugglers. As the supply of human smugglers decreases, the price that remaining human smugglers can charge increases. Before border enforcement tightened in the early 1990s, migrants typically paid about %24725 (2014 dollars). Currently, unauthorized migrants from Central America are paying around %247500. ∂ The kink in the human smuggling demand curve represents a hypothesized increase in inelasticity for certain consumers of human smuggling. The inelastic portion of the demand curve represents consumers who very much want to come to the United States and who will pay a very high price to do so. For that group, an increase in price does not much decrease their quantity demanded for human smuggling. For the relatively elastic portion of the demand curve, a small rise in price causes a large drop off in the quantity demanded for human smuggling. The increase in enforcement has shifted the supply curve to the left, pricing the immigrants with a relatively elastic demand for human smuggling out of the market while raising the price on the inelastic demanders. ∂ The immigrants most likely to have inelastic quantity demand for human smuggling are those fleeing violence or seeking to reunite with their families in the United States. An increase in smuggling price will not much decrease the quantity of smuggling demanded by parents seeking to reunite with their children and children fleeing the threat of death. Smugglers know that children reuniting with their families and those fleeing violence are the most likely to pay high prices, thus the smugglers have focused on recruiting those groups as customers – one large reason why so many unaccompanied children (UAC) are transported to the border by smugglers. ∂ Another result of more effective immigration border enforcement is that it increases immigrant reliance on human smugglers. Unauthorized immigrants who used to walk across the border when immigration enforcement was light now increasingly rely on human smugglers to avoid detection. The crackdown on unauthorized immigrants, especially after 1993, caused a big increase in the use of smugglers by unauthorized immigrants. In 1999, 3.2 percent of apprehended unlawful immigrants reported hiring a human smuggler. In 2008, 18 percent of apprehended unlawful immigrants reported hiring a human smuggler – an almost six-fold increase. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and private organizations have also noted an increase in the price of smuggling. ∂ From 1972 to 2003, a 10 percent increase in the number of border patrol enforcement hours increases the price that smugglers can charge by 2.5 percent. Line watch hours have grown by over 400 percent since the early 1990s. ∂ The economics of industrial organization can shed some light on why smugglers have shifted from mom and pop operations to large, organized, and violent criminal cartels who now seek children clients instead of adults. Mom and pop smugglers ran small and unsophisticated operations to smuggle immigrants over the border. As border patrol cracked down on them and put many out of business, more intensive smuggling operations that required more capital, planning, and violence to overcome enforcement were needed to satisfy the demand. As a result of the shrinking mom and pop smuggling operations, serious criminal organizations and drug gangs have become specialized in smuggling migrants because of the higher profits. The shift from mom and pop smugglers to sophisticated criminal smugglers that focus on smuggling those with an inelastic demand for smuggling is the result of larger and more effective border enforcement.
 * Nowraseteh 14** – MS @ London School of Economics, immigration policy analyst at the Cato Institute~’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity

Limiting smuggling revenue solves cartel violence
(Colby, "Re: FORCOMMENT- Cartels and Human Smuggling/Trafficking," published on wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/49/4971351_re-forcomment-cartels-and-human-smuggling-trafficking-.html)//BB The cartel war currently underway in Mexico has forced Mexican cartels∂ to look for alternative sources of capital outside of the trafficking∂ of narcotics. Now more than ever, cartels need money to pay for∂ weapons, enforcers, and bribes necessary for fighting the drug war. ∂ Because of the increased operational costs incurred by the cartels∂ fighting each other and fighting state security forces, alternative∂ revenue streams of all types - including human smuggling and∂ trafficking, piracy, extortion, kidnapping, oil theft, money∂ laundering and arms smuggling ( the arms smuggling for revenue stream∂ contradicts with the idea above that they need money for weapons, they∂ are paying to have weapons smuggled to them which doesnt make this a∂ revenue stream) have become valuable business operations for the∂ cartels. Narcotics~’ trafficking remains the cartel~’s primary source∂ of income because the profit margins are much higher for drugs than∂ other types of illicit cargo, however, Mexican cartels are no longer∂ just drug trafficking organizations, but are now international∂ criminal organizations. ∂ Two enterprises the Mexican cartels have easily absorbed into their∂ corporate structure are human smuggling and trafficking operations. ∂ Human smuggling (the transportation of people from one place to∂ another for an agreed upon fee) and trafficking (the exploitation of∂ people through forced prostitution, slavery, or bonded servitude) has∂ become much more lucrative in the past 20 because of the increased∂ difficulty and danger involved in moving migrants over the Mexican∂ border and into the United States.∂ Cartel involvement in human smuggling is not a new phenomenon. In the∂ 1990~’s cartels were content with collecting taxes paid by alien∂ smuggling organizations for use of cartel smuggling routes through the∂ borderlands into the United States. However, as profits increased and∂ alternative revenue streams were needed, the cartels realized they had∂ no reason or desire to share profits with traditional alien smuggling∂ organizations. In fact, cartels now typically kidnap or kill any∂ smugglers who do not have approval to operate in their territory. ∂ The infrastructure used for narcotics smuggling is also used for human∂ smuggling, with very little if any modifications made to routes, safe∂ houses (called drop houses), and modes of transportation. These∂ existing networks have allowed cartels to seamlessly incorporate human∂ smuggling into their normal smuggling operations. ∂ Cartels are also able to use human smuggling operations to protect∂ loads of narcotics because migrants will be used as a diversion for∂ drug shipments by moving the people through one location at the same∂ time the drugs are moved through a different entry point. This draws∂ border patrol resources away from the drug smuggling operations and∂ makes it much easier to get drug load into the United States. ∂ Illegal migrants are also sometimes forced to become drug mules and∂ carry drugs into the United States, although it is not as common as∂ sometimes reported in main stream media. Sometimes the migrant could∂ ask to be a mule in order to pay off some of the debt incurred for∂ being brought across the border, or are forced to carry it for unknown∂ reasons. However, using scared, inexperienced migrants who do not∂ know there way through the desert or mountains is not a good way to∂ insure safe transport of the most drug load. It also isn~’t necessary∂ for the cartels to rely heavily on illegal migrants to mule drugs∂ because paying a professional is inexpensive (wasn~’t it like, 300 US a∂ load or less?) and they are better trained to deal with anything that∂ goes wrong. ∂ Starting in 1993-94 with Operation Hold-the-Line in El Paso and∂ Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego anti-smuggling operations and∂ increased numbers of border patrol agents, from about 8000 in 1998 to∂ around 17,000 in 2010(victoria do you have 2011 numbers?), have forced∂ migrants away from urban crossing points into increasingly desolate∂ areas. ∂ This dynamic has caused profits for alien smuggling operations to∂ skyrocket over the past 10 years because the intensified interdiction∂ efforts have increased the value of the services coyotes provide. A∂ decade ago, most illegal migrants did not use a coyote, but now find∂ it almost impossible to cross over without one. A STRATFOR source that∂ works on the Arizona border confirmed that only the migrants who have∂ crossed into the United States illegally multiple times or have∂ fraudulent documents do not use a coyote. ∂ Prices have gone from %24500 a head paid to "mom and pop" outfits who∂ typically smuggled migrants into the United States for seasonal work. ∂ Many times, the coyote was just a local who lived near the border and∂ knew how to get across safely. The illegal migrants would go to the∂ United States to work, and then return home after they had earned∂ enough money or the growing season was over. Now, typical prices∂ range from %242000 for Mexicans, %2410,000 for Central Americans or∂ Cubans, to %2440,000 or more for a Chinese national or special interest∂ aliens from countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. (it∂ is actually more, victoria?)∂ Mexican cartels also use their control over human smuggling∂ infrastructure to increase profits in other areas of their criminal∂ enterprise. As the economic crisis in the US has caused a decrease in∂ the numbers of migrants crossing the border, cartels have increasingly∂ turned to human trafficking, declared by the Department of Homeland∂ Security as a form of modern day slavery. Sex trafficking and slavery∂ operations are a source of income for the cartels long after the∂ migrants have been brought into the United States, whereas smuggling a∂ person only nets one payment for services rendered.∂ Kidnapping, especially of Central Americans, from anywhere along the∂ migrant routes into the United States is also extremely lucrative.∂ Mexican train yards are prime locations because the migrant must stay∂ close to the train tracks in order to catch a ride north. ∂ It is common for cartels to kidnap migrants, called "chickens," from∂ other smugglers drop-houses inside the United States and then hold∂ them for ransom, sometimes thousands of dollars above the fee agreed∂ upon between the smugglers and alien. The family members or sponsors∂ will be forced to pay using the same money wires they use for paying∂ the coyotes. If payment is not made the illegal migrants are commonly∂ forced to work off the ransom, or they are killed.∂ The 2010 National Mexican Human Rights Commission claimed Los Zetas∂ are the most active criminal organization involved in human smuggling∂ and trafficking in Mexico, although other cartels are also involved. ∂ In 2008 the Sinaloa cartel were linked to trafficking minors for∂ prostitution with the president of Peruvians against child∂ pornography, Dimitri Senmache Artola, stating that narco-trafficking∂ organizations were combining drug trafficking and sex trafficking∂ operations because they were able to utilize the same routes and modes∂ of operation, including corruption of authorities. A February, 2010∂ Foreign Policy Research Institute report on the impact of Arturo∂ Beltran Leyva~’s death listed the ability to smuggle humans, promote∂ prostitution, and carry out kidnappings as part of ABL~’s assets.∂ The diversification of capital streams into Mexican Cartels makes them∂ much stronger institutions because they are less dependent on one∂ product for their survival. If the drug war in Mexico subsided, the∂ remaining cartels would be extremely diverse, strong organizations∂ with multiple sources of income, territorial control of ports of∂ entry, and a massive infrastructure for controlling trade flows into∂ the United States. ∂ Human smuggling and trafficking operations are perfect for cartels∂ because the demand for cheap labor will never completely go away. As∂ long as the United States represents a better life for the thousands∂ of migrants each year, cartels will be willing to take them, for a∂ price.
 * Martin 11** – Technical Analyst @ Stratfor

Independently, US border surveillance causes cartel competition over trafficking routes—-the impact is escalating violence
(Tom, "Policy on the Edge: Failures of Border Security and New Directions for Border Control," Center for Int~’l Policy, http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/failures-of-border-security-and-new-directions-for-border-control)//BB The exact correlation and configuration of forces responsible for the drug-related and organized crime violence in Mexico is difficult to discern. However, on the border it is clear that the border security buildup contributes to the violent competition among crime groups for control over the plazas for drug smuggling and other related crime. Increased border security on the U.S. side means increased public insecurity on the Mexican side and makes border crossing increasingly fraught with risk and violence.∂ Stephen Flynn, author of America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism, calls the resulting increased border violence the "hardened border paradox."21 Flynn concluded that "stepped-up enforcement along the Mexican border suggests that U.S. efforts aimed at hardening its borders can have the unintended consequence of creating the kind of environment that is conducive to terrorists and criminals," noting how the increasingly fortified border in the 1990s raised the costs of getting into the United States while also creating "a demand for those who are in the business of arranging illegal crossings."22∂ The illegality at the border in this new border security era usually refers to illegal border crossers themselves together with the coyotes (human smugglers/guides) and the organized crime bands that charge for illegal crossings. This border illegality has escalated to include bandits that prey on the border crossers and on Border Patrol agents who cross their path.∂ Tightened control has made illegal crossings more difficult and more expensive. It has also turned what were previously routine, nonviolent crossings into dangerous undertakings that regularly involve dealings with criminal organizations. An indirect and certainly unintended consequence of the U.S. border security buildup has been the increasingly violent competition between criminal organizations and gangs as they both struggle to maintain markets and trafficking corridors.
 * Barry 11** – Senior Policy Analyst @ CIP, authored or co-authored more than twenty books on Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, food aid, the United Nations, free trade and U.S. foreign policy

Cartel violence causes Mexican collapse, terror attack on US homeland, and US Military response
(Stephen, "Strategic Horizons: All Options Bad If Mexico~’s Drug Violence Expands to U.S.," February 19, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13576/strategic-horizons-all-options-bad-if-mexico-s-drug-violence-expands-to-u-s) Over the past few decades, violence in Mexico has reached horrific levels, claiming the lives of 70,000 as criminal organizations fight each other for control of the drug trade and wage war on the Mexican police, military, government officials and anyone else unlucky enough to get caught in the crossfire. The chaos has spread southward, engulfing Guatemala, Honduras and Belize. Americans must face the possibility that the conflict may also expand northward, with intergang warfare, assassinations of government officials and outright terrorism in the United States. If so, this will force Americans to undertake a fundamental reassessment of the threat, possibly redefining it as a security issue demanding the use of U.S. military power. One way that large-scale drug violence might move to the United States is if the cartels miscalculate and think they can intimidate the U.S. government or strike at American targets safely from a Mexican sanctuary. The most likely candidate would be the group known as the Zetas. They were created when elite government anti-drug commandos switched sides in the drug war, first serving as mercenaries for the Gulf Cartel and then becoming a powerful cartel in their own right. The Zetas used to recruit mostly ex-military and ex-law enforcement members in large part to maintain discipline and control. But the pool of soldiers and policemen willing to join the narcotraffickers was inadequate to fuel the group~’s ambition. Now the Zetas are tapping a very different, much larger, but less disciplined pool of recruits in U.S. prisons and street gangs. This is an ominous turn of events. Since intimidation through extreme violence is a trademark of the Zetas, its spread to the United States raises the possibility of large-scale violence on American soil. As George Grayson of the College of William and Mary put it, "The Zetas are determined to gain the reputation of being the most sadistic, cruel and beastly organization that ever existed." And without concern for extradition, which helped break the back of the Colombian drug cartels, the Zetas show little fear of the United States government, already having ordered direct violence against American law enforcement. Like the Zetas, most of the other Mexican cartels are expanding their operations inside the United States. Only a handful of U.S. states are free of them today. So far the cartels don~’t appear directly responsible for large numbers of killings in the United States, but as expansion and reliance on undisciplined recruits looking to make a name for themselves through ferocity continue, the chances of miscalculation or violent freelancing by a cartel affiliate mount. This could potentially move beyond intergang warfare to the killing of U.S. officials or outright terrorism like the car bombs that drug cartels used in Mexico and Colombia. In an assessment for the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Robert Bunker and John Sullivan considered narcotrafficker car bombs inside the United States to be unlikely but not impossible. A second way that Mexico~’s violence could spread north is via the partnership between the narcotraffickers and ideologically motivated terrorist groups. The Zetas already have a substantial connection to Hezbollah, based on collaborative narcotrafficking and arms smuggling. Hezbollah has relied on terrorism since its founding and has few qualms about conducting attacks far from its home turf in southern Lebanon. Since Hezbollah is a close ally or proxy of Iran, it might some day attempt to strike the United States in retribution for American action against Tehran. If so, it would likely attempt to exploit its connection with the Zetas, pulling the narcotraffickers into a transnational proxy war. The foundation for this scenario is already in place: Security analysts like Douglas Farah have warned of a "tier-one security threat for the United States" from an "improbable alliance" between narcotraffickers and anti-American states like Iran and the "Bolivarian" regime in Venezuela. The longer this relationship continues and the more it expands, the greater the chances of dangerous miscalculation. ¶ No matter how violence from the Mexican cartels came to the United States, the key issue would be Washington~’s response. If the Zetas, another Mexican cartel or someone acting in their stead launched a campaign of assassinations or bombings in the United States or helped Hezbollah or some other transnational terrorist organization with a mass casualty attack, and the Mexican government proved unwilling or unable to respond in a way that Washington considered adequate, the United States would have to consider military action. ¶ While the United States has deep cultural and economic ties to Mexico and works closely with Mexican law enforcement on the narcotrafficking problem, the security relationship between the two has always been difficult—understandably so given the long history of U.S. military intervention in Mexico. Mexico would be unlikely to allow the U.S. military or other government agencies free rein to strike at narcotrafficking cartels in its territory, even if those organizations were tied to assassinations, bombings or terrorism in the United States. But any U.S. president would face immense political pressure to strike at America~’s enemies if the Mexican government could not or would not do so itself. Failing to act firmly and decisively would weaken the president and encourage the Mexican cartels to believe that they could attack U.S. targets with impunity. After all, the primary lesson from Sept. 11 was that playing only defense and allowing groups that attack the United States undisturbed foreign sanctuary does not work. But using the U.S. military against the cartels on Mexican soil could weaken the Mexican government or even cause its collapse, end further security cooperation between Mexico and the United States and damage one of the most important and intimate bilateral economic relationships in the world. Quite simply, every available strategic option would be disastrous.
 * Metz 14** - Defense Analyst and author of "Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy"

That undermines US power projection
(Robert, This Week at War: If Mexico Is at War, Does America Have to Win It?, Sept 10, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/09/10/this_week_at_war_if_mexico_is_at_war_does_america_have_to_win_it) While answering a question on Mexico this week at the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "We face an increasing threat from a well-organized network, drug-trafficking threat that is, in some cases, morphing into, or making common cause with, what we would consider an insurgency." Mexico~’s foreign minister Patricia Espinosa was quick to dispute this characterization, arguing that Mexico~’s drug cartels have no political agenda. But as I have previously discussed, the cartels, evidenced by their attacks on both the government and the media, are gradually becoming political insurgents as a means of defending their turf.¶ I note that Clinton used the phrase "We [the United States] face an increasing threat ...," not "they [Mexico]." The cartels are transnational shipping businesses, with consumers in the United States as their dominant market. The clashes over shipping routes and distribution power — which over the past four years have killed 28,000 and thoroughly corrupted Mexico~’s police and judiciary — could just as well occur inside the United States. Indeed, growing anxiety that southern Arizona is in danger of becoming a "no-go zone" controlled by drug and human traffickers contributed to the passage of Arizona~’s controversial immigration enforcement statute earlier this year.¶ Both Clinton and Mexican officials have discussed Colombia~’s struggle against extreme drug violence and corruption, revealing concerns about how dreadful the situation in Mexico might yet become and also as a model for how to recover from disaster. Colombia~’s long climb from the abyss, aided by the U.S. government~’s Plan Colombia assistance, should certainly give hope to Mexico~’s counterinsurgents. But if the United States and Mexico are to achieve similar success, both will have to resolve political dilemmas that would prevent effective action. Clinton herself acknowledged as much when she remarked that Plan Colombia was "controversial ... there were problems and there were mistakes. But it worked."¶ Isolating Mexico~’s cartel insurgents from their enormous American revenue base — a crucial step in a counterinsurgency campaign — may require a much more severe border crackdown, an action that would be highly controversial in both the United States and Mexico. Plan Colombia was a success partly because of the long-term presence of U.S. Special Forces advisers, intelligence experts, and other military specialists inside Colombia, a presence which would not please most Mexicans. And Colombia~’s long counterattack against its insurgents resulted in actions that boiled the blood of many human rights observers.¶ Most significantly, a strengthening Mexican insurgency would very likely affect America~’s role in the rest of the world. An increasingly chaotic American side of the border, marked by bloody cartel wars, corrupted government and media, and a breakdown in security, would likely cause many in the United States to question the importance of military and foreign policy ventures elsewhere in the world.¶ Should the southern border become a U.S. president~’s primary national security concern, nervous allies and opportunistic adversaries elsewhere in the world would no doubt adjust to a distracted and inward-looking America, with potentially disruptive arms races the result. Secretary Clinton has looked south and now sees an insurgency. Let~’s hope that the United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from getting out of control.
 * Haddick 10** – Managing Editor of the Small Wars Journal

Heg prevents great-power war
(Zach, "America~’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic? The end of the unipolar era will create new dangers that the world mustn~’t overlook," 1-24-14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/) Still, China~’s relative rise and the United States~’ relative decline carries significant risks, for the rest of the world probably more so than for Americans. Odds are, the world will be worse off if China and especially others reach parity with the U.S. in the coming years. This isn~’t to say America is necessarily as benign a hegemon as some in the U.S. claim it to be. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. has undoubtedly at times disregarded international laws or international opinions it disagreed with. It has also used military force with a frequency that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War or a multipolar era. Often this has been for humanitarian reasons, but even in some of these instances military action didn~’t help. Most egregiously, the U.S. overrode the rest of the world~’s veto in invading Iraq, only for its prewar claims to be proven false. Compounding the matter, it showed complete and utter negligence in planning for Iraq~’s future, which allowed chaos to engulf the nation. Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it~’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It~’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the "rules of the road." This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America~’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven~’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China~’s and potentially other nations~’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today~’s "globalized" world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole~’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War. The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar or multipolar order. This, in turn, will make solving these transnational issues much more difficult. Despite the optimistic rhetoric that emanates from official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years ahead. If other countries like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant global powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for effective global governance.
 * Keck 14** – the Assistant Editor at The Diplomat, a researcher at the Middle East Desk at Wikistrat, and an M.A. candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. Former Deputy Editor at e-International Relations; a foreign policy reporter at the Washington, D.C. edition of Examiner.com, a Joseph S. Nye, Jr. National Security Research Intern at the Center for a New American Security, a Research Assistant at the Center for Research, Regional Education and Outreach,

Border surveillance creates perceived danger for migrants—-that promotes permanent residence in the US
(Calynn, "DIVIDING THE SKY: THE FORTIFICATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER," The Migrationist, http://themigrationist.net/2013/05/24/dividing-the-sky-the-fortification-of-the-u-s-mexico-border/)//BB A Brief Overview of U.S. Border Fortification In 1993, the Clinton administration took the first steps toward fortifying the border, largely in an effort to quell Republican criticisms of the administration~’s lax approach to immigration. Subsequent administrations have continued these policies, allocating unprecedented funding to an impressive display of force along the southern border: steel fences, high-intensity lighting, remote-controlled, 24-hour-a-day video surveillance systems, helicopters, and unmanned surveillance drones (Cornelius 2005: 779).∂ In the early days of border fortification, strategists determined not to distribute resources uniformly along the border. Instead, they focused attention on "high-risk" sections of the border, where 70-80% of crossings were made. The logic was that if authorities could secure these areas "geography would do the rest" to discourage would-be migrants from leaving their homes (Cornelius 2005: 779). Policymakers assumed that the natural borders of the U.S. – soaring mountains, swift rivers, and wide deserts– would deter crossings. They believed that migrants would not risk their lives crossing such brutal terrain.∂ Twenty years later, it is clear that they were wrong. The flow of migrants has continued, and there is no evidence that the expansion of border enforcement has effectively deterred irregular migration from Mexico to the U.S. (Cornelius 2005: 776). However, there is ample evidence from recent research that border fortification policies have contributed to the "bottling up" of unauthorized migrants in the U.S. (Cornelius 2005: 782). Unwilling to risk traveling home, undocumented migrants have ended up staying in the U.S. longer, and more migrants have settled permanently. This has resulted in a paradox policymakers seem hesitant to discuss: an explosion in the numbers of unauthorized migrants living in the U.S. at a time when this country spends more on border security than ever before (Cornelius 2005: 777). In fact, Washington now pours more money into immigration control than all other federal criminal law-enforcement agencies combined, its total spending estimated at over %2418 billion a year.
 * Dowler 13** – PhD in Anthropology @ Boston U

Permanent migration collapses wages—-the plan eliminates the dual labor market and causes a resource shift to enforcement of labor laws
(Kevin, "LAW AND THE BORDER: Open Borders?," 51 UCLA L. Rev. 193, Lexis)//BB Moreover, beyond its dubious morality, the use of law to assist in the creation of a disposable, racially stratified labor force is poor labor policy. 367 The dual labor market, with immigrant labor in one low-wage market and citizens in a higher-wage one, may injure U.S. citizen workers as well as immigrant workers. Failure to enforce labor standards for immigrant labor makes it difficult for domestic labor to maintain wages and working conditions. 368 If possible, employers will look to the more inexpensive immigrant labor market. 369 By enforcing labor protections for immigrant workers, all workers stand to benefit. 370 This suggests that the answer to the claim that immigrants undercut domestic workers is not to restrict immigration, which historically has been the preferred approach of organized labor, 371 but rather, to ensure employer compliance with wage and conditions laws and regulations for all workers. So long as a dual labor market exists, in which a lawless regime governs one market, and in which low-wage labor is subject to easy exploitation, one can expect employers to opt for immigrant labor over domestic workers.∂ Only by eliminating the dual labor market with undocumented labor will it be possible to begin to take the necessary steps to enforce uniform wage and condition laws that benefit all workers. With a new system of open entry, resources could be shifted from border controls to enforcement of the labor laws. By helping to end the exploitation of workers on account of immigration status, open borders would further national labor policy.
 * Johnson 3** – JD @ Harvard, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of California at Davis, Professor of Law and Chicana/o Studies; Director, Chicana/o Studies Program

Wage depression collapses the US economy
(Victoria, "Wages Haven~’t Been This Crucial to U.S. Economy in Half Century," http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-20/wages-haven-t-been-this-crucial-to-u-s-economy-in-half-century)//BB When it comes to U.S. economic growth, wages may never have been this important. The link between earnings and consumer spending has been tighter in this expansion than in any other since records began in the 1960s, according to calculations by Tom Porcelli, chief U.S. economist at RBC Capital Markets LLC in New York.∂ Wages have become even more critical as households, still shaken after being caught with too much debt when the recession hit, remain unwilling or unable to tap home equity or let credit-card balances balloon to buy that new television or dishwasher. By not overextending themselves again, Americans are only spending as much as their incomes will allow, meaning that 70 percent of the economy is riding on how fast pay rises.∂ "In an environment where credit is not being used in a material way, the fate of wages matters," Porcelli said. "They~’re doing all of the driving from a consumption perspective."∂ The correlation between growth in wages and consumer spending adjusted for inflation stands at 0.93 since June 2009, when the recovery began, according to Porcelli. A reading of 1 means they move in the same direction all the time, zero means there is little relationship and minus 1 means they continually diverge.∂ Porcelli tracked wages through the index of aggregate weekly payrolls for private production workers, which takes into account hourly earnings, the length of the workweek and changes in employment for about 80 percent of the labor force. Records go back to 1964, longer than the measure for all employees that includes supervisors, which dates back only to 2006.∂ Yellen~’s View∂ The outlook for earnings is among the things that will help policy makers decide when to raise interest rates, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen said Wednesday. The labor market has improved enough for central bank officials to prepare to exit the most aggressive easing in the central bank~’s 100-year history, though too-low inflation and weak pay gains are reasons for caution.∂ "We will be looking at wage growth," Yellen said during a press conference following the central bank~’s announcement that it was leaving its benchmark rate near zero. While faster increases in income aren~’t a precondition for raising rates, "that would be at least a symptom that inflation would likely move up over time," she said.∂ Fed policy makers reduced their forecasts for how quickly they will raise interest rates this year and next and also lowered the projected rate of economic growth.∂ ~’Residual Effects~’∂ One reason why officials will be slow to increase borrowing costs is "the residual effects of the financial crisis, which are likely to continue to constrain spending and credit availability for some time," Yellen said in their press conference.∂ Six years into the U.S. economic expansion, Americans are still shying away from credit. As of the fourth quarter, total household indebtedness was %2411.83 trillion, up 1 percent from the previous three months, according to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. That remains short of the record %2412.7 trillion reached in the third quarter of 2008.∂ Credit-card balances totaled %24700 billion in the fourth quarter, little changed from the average of %24703 billion for the economic expansion.∂ "I have been impressed with how reluctant consumers are to increase their debt on especially credit cards," Richard Curtin, director of the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers, said on a conference call last week. "I wouldn~’t expect a sharp increase in credit-card debt, and that~’s going to limit spending at the retail level."∂ Sentiment Subdued∂ Last week~’s report showed the University of Michigan~’s preliminary consumer sentiment reading for this month dropped as home-heating bills came due following the plunge in temperatures during February.∂ Shaka Asuma, 45, of Waldorf, Maryland, is among those shunning debt. He doesn~’t have any credit cards, and depends solely on his income to drive purchases.∂ "I try to spend within my means," said Asuma, who works in facilities at a law firm in Washington. Most of his salary goes toward paying for transportation to work, groceries and bills. If anything is left over, he might splurge on a game for his Microsoft Corp. Xbox console, Asuma said.∂ "I don~’t like owing money," said Asuma. "I didn~’t want to get a credit card just because I didn~’t want to put myself in a predicament where I was tempted."∂ Home Refinancing∂ Another reason wages are key to the outlook is that homeowners are reluctant to use home equity to boost spending. An estimated %246.7 billion was taken out during refinancing of conventional prime mortgages in the fourth quarter, down from %247.6 billion in the previous three months, according to figures from McLean, Virginia-based Freddie Mac. Adjusted for inflation, so-called cash-out home refinancing reached a peak of %2499 billion in the second quarter of 2006.
 * Stilwell 15** – Reporter @ Bloomberg Business

The multiplier effect is significant
(Pedro, "How Higher Wages Can Be Boon Rather Than Cost to Business," http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/01/13/how-higher-wages-can-be-boon-rather-than-cost-to-business/)//BB Better-paid workers are healthier and more productive.∂ That~’s among the findings of Justin Wolfers and Jan Zilinsky at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in a review of the academic literature and theory.∂ "Higher wages are associated with better health—less illness and more stamina, which enhance worker productivity," they write in a blog post on the think tank~’s website.∂ The authors posed the question, "Under what circumstances can raising the pay of low-skilled workers at large corporations lead to general improvements in productivity?" They were prompted by word that Aetna Inc., the large health insurer, planned to boost the incomes of its lowest-paid workers to a minimum of %2416 per hour to reduce employee turnover and attract top job applicants. The company announced the move Tuesday.∂ The Peterson Institute blog post cites papers going back decades finding numerous benefits to higher wages. They include prompting employees to work harder, attracting more capable and productive workers, and reducing turnover and the costs of hiring and training new workers.∂ Among the papers they cite is one from 1984 by labor economist Janet Yellen, now the Federal Reserve chairwoman, suggesting higher wages make workers more productive. She wrote, "reduced shirking by employees due to a higher cost of job loss; lower turnover; an improvement in the average quality of job applicants and improved morale." ∂ The issue of wages has become central to the Fed~’s decision on when to start raising interest rates. Worker pay has been stagnant for decades, a trend that has continued despite a recent pickup in the economy and the labor market. Among private-sector workers, average hourly earnings were up 1.7% in December from a year earlier, barely ahead of inflation.
 * da Costa 15** – MA in IR @ UC-San Diego, Federal Reserve and Economics Reporter at The Wall Street Journal

US economic decline goes global, wage growth is key and BRIC countries can~’t fill in
(Rich, "U.S. Retakes the Helm of the Global Economy," Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-09/u-s-retakes-the-helm-of-the-global-economy)//BB The U.S. is back in the driver~’s seat of the global economy after 15 years of watching China and emerging markets take the lead.∂ The world~’s biggest economy will expand by 3.2 percent or more this year, its best performance since at least 2005, as an improving job market leads to stepped-up consumer spending, according to economists at JPMorgan Chase %26 Co., Deutsche Bank AG and BNP Paribas SA. That outcome would be about what each foresees for the world economy as a whole and would be the first time since 1999 that America hasn~’t lagged behind global growth, based on data from the International Monetary Fund.∂ "The U.S. is again the engine of global growth," said Allen Sinai, chief executive officer of Decision Economics in New York. "The economy is looking stellar and is in its best shape since the 1990s."∂ In the latest sign of America~’s resurgence, the Labor Department reported on Jan. 9 that payrolls rose 252,000 in December as the unemployment rate dropped to 5.6 percent, its lowest level since June 2008. Job growth last month was highlighted by the biggest gain in construction employment in almost a year. Factories, health-care providers and business services also kept adding to their payrolls.∂ About 3 million more Americans found work in 2014, the most in 15 years and a sign companies are optimistic U.S. demand will persist even as overseas markets struggle.∂ U.S. government securities rose after the report as investors focused on a surprise drop in hourly wages last month. Ten-year Treasury yields declined seven basis points to 1.95 percent at 5 p.m. in New York on Jan. 9.∂ "We are still waiting to see the kind of strengthening of wage numbers we would expect to be consistent with what we are seeing elsewhere in terms of growth and the absolute jobs numbers," Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart said in a Jan. 9 interview.∂ Breaking Away∂ The U.S. is breaking away from the rest of the world partly because it has had more success working off the debt-driven excesses that helped precipitate the worst recession since the Great Depression.∂ "The progress has been far greater in the U.S.," Glenn Hubbard, dean of the Columbia Business School in New York and a former chief White House economist, told the American Economic Association annual conference in Boston on Jan. 3.∂ Delinquencies on consumer installment loans fell to a record-low 1.51 percent in the third quarter, the American Bankers Association said on Jan. 8. That~’s "well under" the 15-year average of 2.3 percent on such loans, which include credit cards and borrowing for car purchases and home improvements, it said.∂ U.S. households have benefited from the strengthening job market and the collapse in oil prices. The nationwide average cost of a gallon of regular gasoline was %242.13 on Jan. 11, the cheapest since May 2009, according to figures from motoring group AAA.∂ Wage Gains∂ While wage gains have lagged — average hourly earnings fell 0.2 percent last month from November — they will accelerate as the labor market continues to tighten, according to Mohamed El-Erian, a Bloomberg View columnist and an adviser to Munich-based Allianz SE.∂ "It~’s just a matter of time before wage growth picks up," he told Bloomberg Television~’s "In The Loop" program on Jan. 9.∂ Spending is already strengthening. Households splurged on new cars, appliances, televisions and clothing as spending climbed 0.6 percent in November, double the gain in October, according to figures from the Commerce Department in Washington. Light-vehicle sales totaled 16.5 million in 2014, the most since 2006.∂ "The economy picked up a nice tailwind at the end of the year," Bill Fay, group vice president for Toyota Motor Corp.~’s U.S. sales arm, said on a Jan. 5 conference call. "This strength will carry the auto industry to a sixth straight year of growth in 2015 with analyst projections ranging as high as 17 million."∂ Consumer Spending∂ At %2411.5 trillion in 2013, U.S. personal consumption expenditures were larger than the gross domestic product of any other country that year, including China, according to statistics from the IMF in Washington. The figures aren~’t adjusted to reflect price discrepancies for the same goods in different nations — so-called purchasing power parity — which tends to inflate the output of developing nations where consumers pay less for everything from haircuts to coffee.∂ Deutsche Bank economists led by David Folkerts-Landau in London forecast U.S. GDP will expand 3.7 percent this year, after climbing 2.5 percent in 2014. The U.S. will contribute close to 18 percent to global growth of 3.6 percent in 2015, compared with 11 percent for all other industrial countries combined, they wrote in a Jan. 9 report.∂ While the U.S. is gathering strength, the BRIC nations — Brazil, Russia, India and China — are facing tougher times after spending much of the past 15 years basking in the attention of global investors.∂ BRICs Faltering∂ Brazil~’s debt was downgraded last year for the first time in a decade while Russia is heading into recession, its economy pummeled by the collapse of oil prices and U.S. and European sanctions. Growth in China and India has slowed as both countries grapple with revamping their economies.∂ "Close the book on emerging markets driving global growth," Nancy Lazar, co-founder and a partner at Cornerstone Macro LP in New York, wrote in a Jan. 8 report to clients.∂ Even Jim O~’Neill, the former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. chief economist who coined the BRIC acronym, has soured on some of its members, saying in an e-mail that he would be tempted to remove Brazil and Russia from the group if they fail to revive their flagging economies.∂ "It is tough for the BRIC countries to all repeat their remarkable growth rates" of the first decade of this century, said O~’Neill, a Bloomberg View columnist and former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management International.
 * Miller 15** – Bloomberg reporter

Economic decline causes nuclear terrorism, proliferation, and war
(Geoffrey, "The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia~’s Growing Presence in the Middle East," p. 233-4)//BB The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more "failed states." Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet~’s population.
 * Kemp 10** – Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Robust studies prove
(Jedidiah, "Economic Integration, Economic Signalling and the Problem of Economic Crises", chapter in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)//BB First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson~’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also show that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown.¶ Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland~’s (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ~’future expectation of trade~’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 ¶ Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession lends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-rein force each other. (Blomberg %26 Hess. 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. %26 Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. ¶ Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ~’rally around the flag~’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blombcrg. Mess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.
 * Royal 10** – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the US Department of Defense

Border surveillance is increasing—-it~’s the heart of immigration enforcement
(Anil, "IMMIGRATION SURVEILLANCE," 74 Md. L. Rev. 1)//BB B. Immigration Enforcement as Immigration Surveillance These four sets of migration and mobility surveillance functions - identification, screening and authorization, mobility tracking and control, and information sharing - play crucial but underappreciated roles in immigration control processes across the entire spectrum of migration and travel. In the growing number of contexts in which immigration control activities now take place, enforcement actors engage in extensive collection, storage, analysis, and dissemination of personal information, in order to identify individuals, screen them and authorize their activities, enable monitoring and control over their travel, and share information with other actors who bear immigration control responsibilities. Initially deployed for traditional immigration enforcement purposes, and expanded largely in the name of security, these surveillance technologies and processes are qualitatively remaking the nature of immigration governance, as a number of examples illustrate.∂ 1. Border Control∂ Despite implementation challenges, Congress and DHS have placed new surveillance technologies at the heart of border control strategies. 162 Physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border have been supplemented with advanced lighting, motion sensors, remote cameras, and mobile surveillance systems, and DHS has deployed a fleet of unmanned aerial [42] vehicles to monitor coastal areas and land borders. 163 To date, these drones primarily have been used to locate illegal border crossers and individuals suspected of drug trafficking in remote areas using ultra high-resolution cameras, thermal detection sensors, and other surveillance technologies. 164 However, drones also have been used to patrol and monitor activities within Mexico itself. 165 In addition, government documents indicate that DHS~’s drones are capable of intercepting wireless communications and may eventually incorporate facial recognition technology linked to the agency~’s identification databases. 166 According to one official, CBP~’s drones can "scan large swaths of land from 20,000 feet up in the air while still being able to zoom in so close that footprints can be seen on the ground." 167 The DHS has plans both to expand its fleet of drones and to increase their surveillance capabilities, and immigration reform proposals in Congress would significantly build upon these recent expansions. 168
 * Kalhan 14** – Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University. A.B., Brown University; M.P.P.M., Yale School of Management; J.D., Yale Law School

Immigration surveillance is an outright failure at deterring entry—-but it does shape migration patterns—-this sustains cartel revenue and creates a dual labor market that depresses US wages
(Raul, "THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT," Baker Institute)//BB The Unintended Consequences of Border Enforcement While enforcement-only border policies have not stopped nor even slowed the pace of unauthorized immigration, they have distorted the migration process in ways that produce unintended consequences, which are detrimental for both the U.S. economy and unauthorized migrants themselves. To date, the primary accomplishments of the enforcement-only strategy have been to make the U.S.-Mexico border more lethal; to create new opportunities and higher profits for people-smugglers; to break historical patterns of circular migration and promote permanent settlement in the United States instead; and to depress low-wage U.S. labor markets. • Making the Southwestern border more lethal: By channeling unauthorized migrants through extremely hazardous mountain and desert areas, rather than the relatively safe urban corridors used in the past, the concentrated border-enforcement strategy has contributed to a surge in migrant fatalities since 1995. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has estimated that the number of border-crossing death doubled in the decade following the beginning of enhanced border-enforcement operations.11 A report released in October 2009 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of San Diego and Imperial Counties and Mexico~’s National Commission of Human Rights estimates that 5,607 migrants died while crossing the border between 1994 and 2008 (Figure 6).12 • Creating new opportunities for people-smugglers: Stronger enforcement on the U.S.- Mexico border has been a bonanza for the people-smuggling industry. Heightened border enforcement has made smugglers essential to a safe and successful crossing by closing safer, traditional routes. Cornelius~’ research in rural Mexico shows that more than nine out of 10 unauthorized migrants now hire smugglers to get them across the border. Only a decade ago, use of smugglers was the exception, rather than the rule.13 And the fees that smugglers charge have tripled since 1993. By January 2006, the going rate for Mexicans was between %242,000-3,000 per head, and there is evidence of a further rise since that time.14 But, even at these prices, it is still economically rational for migrants—and, often, their relatives living in the United States—to dig deeper into their savings and go deeper into debt to finance illegal entry. • Breaking circular migration and promoting permanent settlement in the United States: Given the high costs and physical risks of unauthorized entry, migrants have a strong incentive to extend their stays in the United States; and they longer they stay, the more probable it is that they will settle permanently.15 • Depressing low-wage labor markets: The enhanced enforcement regime moves unauthorized workers further underground, lowering their pay and, ironically, creating a greater demand for unauthorized workers. A 2008 report from the Atlanta Federal Reserve analyzes how this vicious cycle is activated and then expands as firms find themselves forced to compete for the supply of cheaper, unauthorized labor. When a firm cuts costs by hiring unauthorized workers for lower wages, its competitors become more likely to hire unauthorized workers for lower wages, as well, in order to benefit from the same cost savings.16
 * Hinojosa -Ojeda 13** – ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CHICANA AND CHICANO STUDIES

Opening the borders solves
(Peter, "Wetback nation: The case for opening the Mexican-American border," p. xv-xix)//BB I have traveled the artificial line between our two countries with Border Patrol officers, and many have acknowledged that they cannot keep determined Mexicans from crossing north.∂ It~’s time to try a new approach.∂ Let~’s begin by opening the border to all Mexicans who wish to travel north. Supporters of guns, guards, and fences argue that if the border were open, the United States would be smothered by Mexicans escaping their poverty-stricken homeland. Yet there is no restriction on immigrants coming to California from Mississippi or West Virginia, and California is not inundated with a parade of workers from those poorer states. They cannot afford to live here without working, and they apparently don~’t want the jobs that are available. As long as those agriculture, construction, restaurant, and other positions are vacant, workers will come north. But that~’s good. We need the help. Our economy depends on its Mexican workforce. Economically driven immigration ultimately is self-regulating. When and if enough migrants fill the jobs that U.S. citizens refuse to take, there will be little motivation for Mexicans to leave home. There is no restriction on the movement of labor within the European Community. When the German economy was humming, the Portuguese, for example, moved north to better paying jobs from Stuttgart to Berlin. When stagnating growth then created high unemployment in Germany, the Portuguese went home or sought jobs elsewhere.∂ Critics argue that unrestricted traffic north from Mexico will result in increased demands on schools, health care, and welfare. But that~’s also a fatuous worry. Few workers from Mexico who do not qualify legally for such benefits attempt to secure the services. They are afraid of being caught. And if workers earn a living up here and do qualify for benefits, it does our social service systems no harm for them to collect.∂ Historically there is no basis for keeping Mexicans south of the frontier. Aside from the fact that much of the West was once half their country, there were no restrictions on the movement of Mexicans back and forth across the current border until relatively recently. Controls were first placed at the border in the late nineteenth century to keep out Europeans and Asians who were denied legal access to the United States. Well into the twentieth century, Mexicans continued to enjoy free passage back and forth from their country to ours. U.S. authorities found that most of these border crossers traveled for work, and they were therefore treated as commuters.∂ Restrictions began to be enforced during the Mexican Revolution of 1910, when Mexicans were forced to pass a literacy test and pay a onetime eight-dollar fee to cross legally into the United States.∂ Today Mexicans are treated as a threat, and futile attempts continue to keep them on their side of the line. Some proponents of a closed border fear problems associated with overpopulation. Others worry that an open border will encourage employers to pay even less for entry-level jobs because of a growing and anxious labor pool.∂ Perhaps these concerns could be rationalized if our border controls worked. But in addition to the fact that most any determined Mexican eventually can get north and find a job, the borderlands have become a tragic gauntlet for them to run. Violent robbers, cheating coyotes [the smugglers of illegal immigrants], murderous desert heat, and cruel vigilantes all compete to victimize those crossing the border illegally. For many, the Border Patrol is the least of their problems. Its officers may end up providing lifesaving rescue from the other threats.∂ Yet despite these miserable conditions, a Mexican who really wants to come north, comes north. Most just want to come work, make some money, and go home. After the Berlin Wall fell back in 1989, there was an initial rush of East Germans west. Then they went home. They did not enjoy the West German culture, they missed their families and friends. They went home.∂ So let~’s stop this deadly nonsense—at least as a test—and replace the failed barrier we~’ve erected with a banner reading Bienvenidos. Let~’s make it as easy for a Mexican to come north as it is for a Canadian to come south.∂ Timing is everything, they say. Shortly after my call to open the border was published in the Chronicle, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked. Immediately following those tragedies there were few takers for the idea of opening the southern frontier to Mexicans. But as the years pass since the September nth events, the validity of eliminating the futile attempts to keep Mexicans out of the United States only seems∂ ∂ ∂ greater. Not only would such free passage for Mexicans end a deadly cha-rade along the borderline, it would make it much easier for the United States to secure its southern border against aliens who are genuine threats to its security.∂ Consider these points. Most everyone agrees that the current border policy is a fraud. Mexicans come north despite U.S. law restricting their migration. The U.S. government spends enormous amounts of money and human resources chasing millions of Mexicans. If these migrants crossed into the United States in an orderly fashion, unafraid of deportation, the numbers of people trying to cross illegally would be dramatically reduced. The Border Patrol would be in a much better position to apprehend those undocumented OTMs (Other Than Mexicans, to use the Border Patrol~’s parlance) who pose a much greater potential threat to national security than the Mexicans who eventually get across to the other side despite U.S. efforts. Fringe benefits to such a policy would include a radical decline in the abuse of Mexican labor by U.S. employers. They would no longer be able to take advantage of workers afraid to stand up for a fair wage and decent working conditions. Predatory coyotes would be all but put out of business.∂ The best arguments for eliminating attempts to control Mexican mi-gration are that such a policy is counterproductive to attempt and impossible to achieve, Instead, open the border to Mexicans. These people are coming north despite U.S. laws. Open the border to Mexican workers so that the bad guys cannot hide in their shadows as they sneak across the border. Open the border to Mexicans the United States wants and needs, and then the Border Patrol will know that the people trying to break into the country—the ones in the tunnels, those running across the desert and jumping the fences—are the real villains. Open the border to Mexicans, a significant fuel for the U.S. economy, and make it easier for the Border Patrol to keep out the drug traffickers and the terrorists.∂ To find fact, opinion, and experience to bolster my argument, I~’ve traveled the U.S.-Mexican border, meeting with the victims and the per-petrators of current U.S. government immigration policy, contemplating alternatives. I~’m a journalist, so I~’ve looked at the border wars through the∂ prism of news and news reporting, broadcasting, and publishing. Stories related here of my Mexican colleagues fighting bribery—long institu-tionalized as a tool to manipulate Mexican journalism—offer glimpses into the rot in the Mexican economy, rot that emboldens frustrated workers to look to Gringolandia for a better life. I~’ve wandered deep into Mexico to observe, experience, and record the poverty and hopelessness that drive migrants to leave their homes and risk their lives on the long journey north. I~’ve talked with undocumented immigrants living the American Dream, walked the beat with cops frustrated by unenforceable immigration laws. I~’ve interviewed immigration lawyers and those ultimately responsible for enticing Mexicans north: their employers in El Norte. On my journey I~’ve avoided the obvious border trip, that crooked line from San Diego and Tijuana east to Matamoros and Brownsville, the line that marks the artificial national frontier between Mexico and the United States. Instead I~’ve traveled the extended border, crisscrossing our melded cultures from Niagara Falls to Chiapas, from Mexico City to Washington, D.C., studying the borders that exist in our heads and hearts, searching for sane and humane solutions to the problems and conflicts plaguing our two countries.
 * Laufer 4** – Ph.D. in Cultural Studies from Leeds Metropolitan University Faculty of Arts and Society in England, Professor @ Oregon

The plan doesn~’t link to terrorism or circumvention
(Tom, "Policy on the Edge: Failures of Border Security and New Directions for Border Control," Center for Int~’l Policy, http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/failures-of-border-security-and-new-directions-for-border-control)//BB MUDDLING OF IMMIGRANTS AND TERRORISTS In his book The Closing of the American Border, Edward Alden noted, "The muddling of counterterrorism and immigration enforcement is the single biggest mistake we~’ve made since 9/11."∂ By mixing border control, immigration regulation and counterterrorism, DHS preempted the possibility of maintaining a sharp focus on foreign and domestic terrorism threats. While spending most of its resources on immigrant- and drug-related enforcement, DHS failed to mount the intelligence operations needed to track the rise of domestic terrorists and has not functioned as a much-needed clearinghouse for domestic and foreign counterterrorism intelligence.∂ Not only has its counterterrorism mission suffered from this muddling, but by lumping together immigrants and prospective terrorists, DHS has played a central role in demonizing both legal and illegal immigrants. By doing so it must accept major responsibility for the nation~’s failure to address immigration and border issues fairly and reasonably.∂ This muddling also accounts for the waste of federal homeland security resources and empowers border politicians like Texas Governor Rick Perry and Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, together with allied border sheriffs, to mount their own border security operations and immigration crackdowns.∂ There~’s no denying that a prospective terrorist might attempt sneaking across the southwestern border. But it is unlikely, and has not yet happened. Terrorists, like those involved in the September 11 attacks, are much more likely to enter with visas as tourists, students or workers. Any illegal border crossing by terrorists would be much more likely to occur on the vast largely unpatrolled northern border, where a large sum of cash could all but guarantee a safe crossing. A northern entry would also avoid the harsh conditions and the pervasive crime of the southwestern border.
 * Barry 11** – Senior Policy Analyst @ CIP, authored or co-authored more than twenty books on Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, food aid, the United Nations, free trade and U.S. foreign policy

States can~’t circumvent because immigration is exclusively federal—-Constitution proves
("League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson," 908 F. Supp. 755)//BB HN7 The federal government possesses the exclusive power to regulate immigration. That power derives from the Constitution~’s grant to the federal government of the power to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4., and to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government~’s power to control immigration is inherent in the nation~’s sovereignty. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > General Overview HN8 Congress has exercised its power over immigration in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101 et seq. The INA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme that regulates the authorized entry, length of stay, residence status and deportation of aliens. The INA delegates enforcement duties to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Because the federal government bears the exclusive responsibility for immigration matters, the states can neither add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the several states. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
 * US District Court of Central California 1995**

Minuteman can~’t circumvent
(Tim, "The Meltdown of the Anti-Immigration Minuteman Militia," Mother Jones, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/minuteman-movement-border-crisis-simcox)//BB In early July, Chris Davis issued a call to arms. "You see an illegal, you point your gun right dead at them, right between the eyes, and say, ~’Get back across the border, or you will be shot,~’" the Texas-based militia commander said in a YouTube video heralding Operation Secure Our Border-Laredo Sector, a plan to block the wave of undocumented migrants coming into his state. "If you get any flak from sheriffs, city, or feds, Border Patrol, tell them, ~’Look—this is our birthright. We have a right to secure our own land. This is our land.~’"∂ Davis~’ video was publicized by local newspapers and the Los Angeles Times. But the militia never materialized in Laredo, and Davis walked back his comments. (The video has been taken down.) Over the last few weeks, a smaller force under Davis~’ watch has appeared along the southern border, spread thinly across three states. The fizzling of this grand mobilization was another reminder that the current immigration crisis has been missing a key ingredient of recent border showdowns: Bands of the heavily-armed self-appointed border guardians known as Minutemen.∂ During the past four years, the Minuteman groups that defined conservative immigration policy during the mid-to-late-2000s have mostly self-destructed—sometimes spectacularly so. Founding Minuteman leaders are in prison, facing criminal charges, dead, or sidelined. "It really attracted a lot of people that had some pretty extreme issues," says Juanita Molina, executive director of the Border Action Network, an advocacy group that provides aid to migrants in the desert. "We saw the movement implode on itself mostly because of that." An analysis by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which monitors right-wing extremist groups, found that the number of Minuteman groups in the Southwest had declined from 310 to 38 between 2010 and 2012.∂ The movement~’s coming-out moment was in 2005, as an influx in migrants from Mexico collided with post-9/11 security concerns to create a nativist revival. A Marine vet named Jim Gilchrist announced the formation of a monthlong, 1,000-man patrol along Arizona border. His Minuteman Project found a natural platform on conservative talk radio and cable news, and attracted support from nativist politicians such as then-Arizona Senate president Russell Pearce. Some Minuteman groups patrolled the US-Mexico line on foot, investing in night-vision goggles, ham radios, and ammunition by the bucket. Others were content to squat in lawn chairs under canopies, scanning the border for crossers and alerting Customs and Border Protection.∂ But the movement quickly splintered, and activists who found Gilchrist~’s methods too easygoing rushed to start their own organizations, many bearing the Minuteman name. Things went downhill from there.∂ Shawna Forde, an Arizona activist, left behind two larger groups to found Minutemen American Defense with Jason Bush in 2007. To get money for their operations, they turned to crime. In 2011, Forde, Bush, and another man were convicted of murdering Raul Flores and his nine-year-old daughter after a botched armed robbery of Flores~’ Arivaca, Arizona, home. When police dug deeper, they found a bloody past. Bush was also charged for the murder of a Latino man in Washington state in 1997, and in the murder of an Aryan Nations member he considered to be a "race-traitor" that same year. He also was suspected of a third, unidentified murder, but not charged. Washington prosecutors opted not to pursue the case because Forde and Bush were already on death row for the Flores murders.∂ Minutemen volunteers "find out the border is huge. They get tired of sitting in lawn chairs."∂ Forde and Bush were on the fringe, but they had connections to the more prominent mainstream Minuteman groups. Forde, for instance, had once been a member of a group called the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, which has gone through several crises of its own. In 2012, one of the group~’s founders, a neo-Nazi Marine veteran named J.T. Ready—who also left the group to form a splinter unit—killed himself, his girlfriend, and three of her family members at his home in Gilbert, Arizona. At the time of his death, Ready was the subject of an FBI domestic terrorism investigation in connection with the deaths of an unspecified number of migrants whose bodies had been found in the Arizona desert.∂ Chris Simcox, who cofounded the MCDC with Ready, faces a more uncertain fate. A media-friendly personality who once considered challenging Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) for his Senate seat, he planned on taking the Minuteman movement to new heights by building a %2455 million state-of-the-art border fence "based on the fences used in Gaza and the West Bank." But he raised just %241.8 million, and installed only two miles of barbed wire.∂ In 2010, Simcox went on the lam after his estranged wife filed a petition for a protective, saying that he had twice threatened to kill his family. (Simcox has denied those allegations.) He was tracked down by Stacey O~’Connell, a former Minuteman who started a bounty hunting firm after resigning as the Arizona state director of Simcox~’s group three years earlier, citing mismanagement. Two months after being served by his old lieutenant, Simcox was charged with six counts of child molestation. He rejected a plea offer and is set to stand trial in September. (One of the charges has since been dropped.) When I called him, O~’Connell said he had no plans to rejoin the Minutemen. "I haven~’t been involved with that in years," he said.∂ After Simcox~’s arrest, the leadership of the MCDC fell to Carmen Mercer, a German immigrant who ran a buffalo burger restaurant in Wyatt Earp~’s old home of Tombstone. Mercer announced a new operation targeting drug smugglers. She suggested acting without the aid of the US Border Patrol, inviting volunteers to come to the border "locked, loaded, and ready." But a week later, Mercer sent announced that the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps was disbanding. "People are ready to come locked and loaded, and that~’s not what we are all about," she wrote after a sudden change of heart.∂ Chris Simcox (left) and Rep. Steve King (R-Iowa) celebrate the beginning of construction of a private border fence in 2006. Simcox is facing child molestation charges. Jack Kurtz/ZUMA∂ Even Gilchrist, the original Minuteman, has seen his brainchild disintegrate. The board of Minuteman Project accused him of fraud; in turn, Gilchrist accused the board of theft. He was deposed as its president but was reinstated by a judge. He then lost a defamation lawsuit for launching an internet smear campaign wrongfully accusing another member of various federal crimes.∂ Meanwhile, the politicians who once embraced vigilante activities along the border have begun to drift away. Last August, Richard Malley, a member of an organization calling itself the Arizona Special Operations Group, was arrested on charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon after aiming his AR-15 at a Pinal County sheriff~’s deputy he had concluded was a member of a drug cartel. Malley, who had been on patrol 80 miles north of the border, had refused to put down his rifle even after the deputy pointed to his badge. After the incident, Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, a longtime ally of the Minutemen who once accepted an award from Simcox, sounded like he~’d had enough. "If they continue this there could be some dead militia out there," Arpaio told the Associated Press. "He~’s lucky he didn~’t see 30 rounds fired into him."∂ "I~’ve been in the trench for a decade, you hear me? We~’re being invaded and you guys are mamsy-pamsying this shit."∂ Malley had been making the rounds that day with Robert Crooks, the founder of the Mountain Minutemen, who had disseminated a video in which he staged the fake execution of an undocumented immigrant. Crooks declined a request for an interview. "Dude, I~’ve been doing this for 10 fucking years, I got a full-length movie out, I was in Penthouse magazine April ~’08, I got the fence of San Diego County, I~’ve been in the trench for a decade, you hear me?" he said when I reached him on patrol in the desert. "I ain~’t fucking around with this bullshit. We~’re being invaded and you guys are mamsy-pamsying this shit. This country~’s fucking going to hell in a handbasket. Never mind%21" Click.∂ But the Minuteman movement~’s problems go deeper than its fractious leadership. Patrolling the border is a massive undertaking. Glenn Spencer, the founder of American Border Patrol, proudly notes that his group predated the Minuteman movement and has largely outlived it. His seven-man outfit uses drones and small planes to monitor the border. Spencer, who had just come back from a flyover with a film crew from conspiracy theorist Alex Jones~’ InfoWars site, estimates it would take 30,000 committed and qualified military veterans to watch the border properly. "I don~’t encourage people to come down," he says. Volunteers "find out the border is huge. They get tired of sitting in lawn chairs."∂ The changing geography of the border crisis also make things difficult for civilian patrols. Arizona became a hub for Minutemen groups in part because it was so easy; much of the state~’s 362-mile border and points north are public lands, meaning anyone can walk it. But southern Arizona is no longer the most popular route into the United States; that distinction now belongs to South Texas. And in Texas, there~’s very little federal land; the border is the provenance of private ranchers who don~’t take kindly to strangers patrolling their property with high-powered rifles.
 * Murphy 14** - senior reporter in MoJo~’s DC bureau. His writing has been featured in Slate and the Washington Monthly

=Drones 1AC=

The war on terror has being brought to America in the form of aerial surveillance, making Orwell~’s dystopia a reality
Imagine for a moment. A scenic drive along a picturesque highway, it is a vacation, a trip of a lifetime. Suddenly, the serenity of your surrounding is interrupted by a Hellfire missile from a Predator drone. You are obliterated. Again, imagine you are in the seclusion of your fenced in backyard. Lounging, barely clothed, and drenched in suntan lotion, it is your well-earned time off from work. Suddenly, your zone of private reflection is shattered by the buzzing noise of a Hummingbird drone above. Before you can cover up, the high-resolution zoom lens of the drone has already completed its mission—to capture multiple images of sunbathers like yourself. This was a self-led mission by a voyeur rogue law enforcement personnel. Your privacy is obliterated. This Orwellian dystopia is no imagination. Rather, it may be coming sooner than any of us can imagine. Welcome to the post-modern America—where society may be heading to a fast track dissent into the abyss of limitless government surveillance. The domestic drones have arrived, and they are almost ready to intrude upon our sacrosanct zone of private seclusion. n2 The above scenarios are certainly not this author~’s imagination. They are not bad dreams or morbid fantasies either. Instead, they are based on the recorded incidences of killer drones wreaking havoc in the civilian communities in the rugged mountains of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen. n3 The [*581] very same drones are now waiting for either a legislative nod or the regulatory approval to begin hovering over the byways and alleys of America. Yet, it seems the national discourse has not awakened to this new reality. These drones are relatively cheap to build, remotely controlled, and devoid of emotions and physiological limitations. Today~’s drones can both strike with deadly finality n4 and peer deep into individual homes with see-through imaging capability, n5 high-powered zoom lenses, n6 and night-vision capability. n7 This emerging new reality will soon be at the horizon of American social landscape for various reasons. First, the public proclamation of success in containing al-Qaeda n8 has emboldened the current administration. This has created a fertile ground for law enforcement agencies in various states to deploy drones for domestic surveillance. n9 Second, previously limited as an aid in border protection, n10 drones have now become a desirable necessity for law enforcement across the nation. n11 Third, despite the federal [*582] government~’s reluctance in allowing pervasive use for fear of aviation safety, n12 recent presidential declarations n13 and congressional authorization n14 has brought this drone-induced Orwellian dystopia into palpable reality. Domestic drones have the potential to obliterate individual privacy and transmogrify the traditional way of life. Yet, the public hue and cry is well muted. Why? This Article examines the issue in two threads. In the first, it dissects the factors that brought us face-to-face with this impending reality. In the second, it analyzes a set of constitutional, ethical, and philosophical reasons for the illegitimacy of future deployment of domestic drones. Thus, this Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the current landscape to identify the socio-legal factors that may have contributed to the emergence of the mindset of domestic surveillance. Identifying the post-9/11 landscape as the primary contributor to an emerging reality of a security-centric society, this Part evaluates how jurisprudence may have attenuated the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, while enabling the law enforcement framework to rise above individual privacy concerns. Part II also analyzes the reasons and societal factors that have given rise to the sociological apathy towards a growing privacy disaster in our horizon. Part III examines how the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can still be a viable bulwark against an all-pervasive imposition of a drone culture. By analyzing the aspiratory dimensions of the Framers~’ view and evaluating the continued applicability of older cases in analogues behavior in the post-modern era, this Part identifies why an individual~’s expectation of privacy when decoupled from the shaping effect of society~’s mass hysteria may be an objective measure to reject drone surveillance. Part IV delves into a fundamental analysis of the impending domestic surveillance. By combining social contract theory with the deeper liberty principles espoused by Warren and Brandeis, this Part drives home that individuals in the contemporary American society have a fundamental right and long-standing inheritance to be secure within their private seclusion. Finally, Part V concludes that the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence may still be robust enough to address complexities arising out of drone surveillance [*583] and when taken in conjunction with social contract theory, may present a strong rationale for rejecting drones introduction at this time.
 * Gohoshray 2013** (Saby [President, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies Director, Research, and Compliance WorldCompliance Company]; Domestic Surveillance Via Drones: Looking Through the Lens of the Fourth Amendment; 33 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 579)

As police forces become increasing paramilitarized, drones will be a critical tool to stifle and kill dissidents
Law enforcement agencies have begun deploying drones for routine domestic surveillance operations, unrestrained by constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, Congress has mandated a comprehensive integration of unmanned aerial systems into the national airspace no later than September 30, 2015. But does the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribe such drone surveillance as an unreasonable search? While this question cannot be easily answered under conventional precedents, doctrinal inconsistency raises this Comment~’s central question: What role will the Fourth Amendment play in an age of pervasive digital surveillance and limited privacy rights? In the last few decades, the Supreme Court has narrowed its vision of Fourth Amendment rights to an opaque privacy rationale. The Court has muddled doctrine and strained to avoid difficult issues involving technological progress. A recent example of this phenomenon came in the 2012 decision, United States v. Jones, where the Court paradoxically revived the common law trespass test for Fourth Amendment searches, as a proxy for the "degree of privacy that existed" at the founding. This Comment argues, instead, for a "pluralist" approach to understanding Fourth Amendment searches that would—in addition to securing privacy and property—proscribe any search that Copyright © 2014 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of publications. * J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, 2014; B.A., As such, this Comment~’s major concern with domestic drone surveillance is not "privacy." In the vast majority of cases, police will not use drones to observe "at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath."60 Although this Comment does not focus on "voyeuristic" or Peeping Tom drones,61 intimate privacy concerns are relevant Fourth Amendment values that deserve protection. To be sure, one can imagine such distasteful surveillance being used for blackmail and persuasion (among other things), even from public vantage points. However, those privacy concerns are being trumpeted so loudly that they have obscured another relevant problem with drone surveillance—discriminatory sorting through discretionary law enforcement. More precisely, the fear is "provid[ing] law enforcement with a swift, efficient, invisible, and cheap way of tracking the movements of virtually anyone and everyone they choose."62 Police, through legislative encouragement and judicial acquiescence, now have power—unmatched in history—on the streets of this country: "a form of paramilitarized violence found in a rapidly expanding criminal justice-industrial complex, with both ideological and material connections to the military industrial complex."63 Drone surveillance is yet another tool in the arsenal of police discretion, including "surveillance, [*741] arrest, [detention and] incarceration, and the use of force up to and including the authority to kill."
 * Talai 14 -** University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Andrew, "The Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age," 102 Cal. L. Rev. 729, Lexis/SEP)

Police drones will weaponized in the squo
The use of drones by domestic US law enforcement agencies is growing rapidly, both in terms of numbers and types of usage. As a result, civil liberties and privacy groups led by the ACLU - while accepting that domestic drones are inevitable - have been devoting increasing efforts to publicizing their unique dangers and agitating for statutory limits. These efforts are being impeded by those who mock the idea that domestic drones pose unique dangers (often the same people who mock concern over their usage on foreign soil). This dismissive posture is grounded not only in soft authoritarianism (a religious-type faith in the Goodness of US political leaders and state power generally) but also ignorance over current drone capabilities, the ways drones are now being developed and marketed for domestic use, and the activities of the increasingly powerful domestic drone lobby. So it~’s quite worthwhile to lay out the key under-discussed facts shaping this issue. I~’m going to focus here most on domestic surveillance drones, but I want to say a few words about weaponized drones. The belief that weaponized drones won~’t be used on US soil is patently irrational. Of course they will be. It~’s not just likely but inevitable. Police departments are already speaking openly about how their drones "could be equipped to carry nonlethal weapons such as Tasers or a bean-bag gun." The drone industry has already developed and is now aggressively marketing precisely such weaponized drones for domestic law enforcement use. It likely won~’t be in the form that has received the most media attention: the type of large Predator or Reaper drones that shoot Hellfire missiles which destroy homes and cars in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and multiple other countries aimed at Muslims (although US law enforcement agencies already possess Predator drones and have used them over US soil for surveillance). Instead, as I detailed in a 2012 examination of the drone industry~’s own promotional materials and reports to their shareholders, domestic weaponized drones will be much smaller and cheaper, as well as more agile - but just as lethal. The nation~’s leading manufacturer of small "unmanned aircraft systems" (UAS), used both for surveillance and attack purposes, is AeroVironment, Inc. (AV). Its 2011 Annual Report filed with the SEC repeatedly emphasizes that its business strategy depends upon expanding its market from foreign wars to domestic usage including law enforcement: AV~’s annual report added: "Initial likely non-military users of small UAS include public safety organizations such as law enforcement agencies. . . ." These domestic marketing efforts are intensifying with the perception that US spending on foreign wars will decrease. As a February, 2013 CBS News report noted, focusing on AV~’s surveillance drones: "Now, drones are headed off the battlefield. They~’re already coming your way. "AeroVironment, the California company that sells the military something like 85 percent of its fleet, is marketing them now to public safety agencies." Like many drone manufacturers, AV is now focused on drone products - such as the "Qube" - that are so small that they can be "transported in the trunk of a police vehicle or carried in a backpack" and assembled and deployed within a matter of minutes. One news report AV touts is headlined "Drone technology could be coming to a Police Department near you", which focuses on the Qube. But another article prominently touted on AV~’s website describes the tiny UAS product dubbed the "Switchblade", which, says the article, is "the leading edge of what is likely to be the broader, even wholesale, weaponization of unmanned systems." The article creepily hails the Switchblade drone as "the ultimate assassin bug". That~’s because, as I wrote back in 2011, "it is controlled by the operator at the scene, and it worms its way around buildings and into small areas, sending its surveillance imagery to an i-Pad held by the operator, who can then direct the Switchblade to lunge toward and kill the target (hence the name) by exploding in his face." AV~’s website right now proudly touts a February, 2013 Defense News article describing how much the US Army loves the "Switchblade" and how it is preparing to purchase more. Time Magazine heralded this tiny drone weapon as "one of the best inventions of 2012", gushing: "the Switchblade drone can be carried into battle in a backpack. It~’s a kamikaze: the person controlling it uses a real-time video feed from the drone to crash it into a precise target - say, a sniper. Its tiny warhead detonates on impact." What possible reason could someone identify as to why these small, portable weaponized UAS products will not imminently be used by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in the US? They~’re designed to protect their users in dangerous situations and to enable a target to be more easily killed. Police agencies and the increasingly powerful drone industry will tout their utility in capturing and killing dangerous criminals and their ability to keep officers safe, and media reports will do the same. The handful of genuinely positive uses from drones will be endlessly touted to distract attention away from the dangers they pose. One has to be incredibly naïve to think that these "assassin bugs" and other lethal drone products will not be widely used on US soil by an already para-militarized domestic police force. As Radley Balko~’s forthcoming book "Rise of the Warrior Cop" details, the primary trend in US law enforcement is what its title describes as "The Militarization of America~’s Police Forces". The history of domestic law enforcement particularly after 9/11 has been the importation of military techniques and weapons into domestic policing. It would be shocking if these weapons were not imminently used by domestic law enforcement agencies. In contrast to weaponized drones, even the most naïve among us do not doubt the imminent proliferation of domestic surveillance drones. With little debate, they have already arrived. As the ACLU put it in their recent report: "US law enforcement is greatly expanding its use of domestic drones for surveillance." An LA Times article from last month reported that "federal authorities have stepped up efforts to license surveillance drones for law enforcement and other uses in US airspace" and that "the Federal Aviation Administration said Friday it had issued 1,428 permits to domestic drone operators since 2007, far more than were previously known." Moreover, the agency "has estimated 10,000 drones could be aloft five years later" and "local and state law enforcement agencies are expected to be among the largest customers." Concerns about the proliferation of domestic surveillance drones are typically dismissed with the claim that they do nothing more than police helicopters and satellites already do. Such claims are completely misinformed. As the ACLU~’s 2011 comprehensive report on domestic drones explained: "Unmanned aircraft carrying cameras raise the prospect of a significant new avenue for the surveillance of American life." Multiple attributes of surveillance drones make them uniquely threatening. Because they are so cheap and getting cheaper, huge numbers of them can be deployed to create ubiquitous surveillance in a way that helicopters or satellites never could. How this works can already been seen in Afghanistan, where the US military has dubbed its drone surveillance system "the Gorgon Stare", named after the "mythical Greek creature whose unblinking eyes turned to stone those who beheld them". That drone surveillance system is "able to scan an area the size of a small town" and "the most sophisticated robotics use artificial intelligence that [can] seek out and record certain kinds of suspicious activity". Boasted one US General: "Gorgon Stare will be looking at a whole city, so there will be no way for the adversary to know what we~’re looking at, and we can see everything." The NSA already maintains ubiquitous surveillance of electronic communications, but the Surveillance State faces serious limits on its ability to replicate that for physical surveillance. Drones easily overcome those barriers. As the ACLU report put it: I~’ve spoken previously about why a ubiquitous Surveillance State ushers in unique and deeply harmful effects on human behavior and a nation~’s political culture and won~’t repeat that here (here~’s the video (also embedded below) and the transcript of one speech where I focus on how that works). Suffice to say, as the ACLU explains in its domestic drone report: "routine aerial surveillance would profoundly change the character of public life in America" because only drone technology enables such omnipresent physical surveillance. Beyond that, the tiny size of surveillance drones enables them to reach places that helicopters obviously cannot, and to do so without detection. They can remain in the sky, hovering over a single place, for up to 20 hours, a duration that is always increasing - obviously far more than manned helicopters can achieve. As AV~’s own report put it (see page 11), their hovering capability also means they can surveil a single spot for much longer than many military satellites, most of which move with the earth~’s rotation (the few satellites that remain fixed "operate nearly 25,000 miles from the surface of the earth, therefore limiting the bandwidth they can provide and requiring relatively larger, higher power ground stations"). In sum, surveillance drones enable a pervasive, stealth and constantly hovering Surveillance State that is now well beyond the technological and financial abilities of law enforcement agencies. One significant reason why this proliferation of domestic drones has become so likely is the emergence of a powerful drone lobby. I detailed some of how that lobby is functioning here, so will simply note this passage from a recent report from the ACLU of Iowa on its attempts to persuade legislators to enact statutory limits on the use of domestic drones: "Drones have their own trade group, the Association for Unmanned Aerial Systems International, which includes some of the nation~’s leading aerospace companies. And Congress now has ~’drone caucuses~’ in both the Senate and House." Howie Klein has been one of the few people focusing on the massive amounts of money from the drone industry now flowing into the coffers of key Congressional members from both parties in this "drone caucus". Suffice to say, there is an enormous profit to be made from exploiting the domestic drone market, and as usual, that factor is thus far driving the (basically nonexistent) political response to these threats. What is most often ignored by drone proponents, or those who scoff at anti-drone activism, are the unique features of drones: the way they enable more warfare, more aggression, and more surveillance. Drones make war more likely precisely because they entail so little risk to the war-making country. Similarly, while the propensity of drones to kill innocent people receives the bulk of media attention, the way in which drones psychologically terrorize the population - simply by constantly hovering over them: unseen but heard - is usually ignored, because it~’s not happening in the US, so few people care (see this AP report from yesterday on how the increasing use of drone attacks in Afghanistan is truly terrorizing local villagers). It remains to be seen how Americans will react to drones constantly hovering over their homes and their childrens~’ schools, though by that point, their presence will be so institutionalized that it will be likely be too late to stop. Notably, this may be one area where an actual bipartisan/trans-partisan alliance can meaningfully emerge, as most advocates working on these issues with whom I~’ve spoken say that libertarian-minded GOP state legislators have been as responsive as more left-wing Democratic ones in working to impose some limits. One bill now pending in Congress would prohibit the use of surveillance drones on US soil in the absence of a specific search warrant, and has bipartisan support. Only the most authoritarian among us will be incapable of understanding the multiple dangers posed by a domestic drone regime (particularly when their party is in control of the government and they are incapable of perceiving threats from increased state police power). But the proliferation of domestic drones affords a real opportunity to forge an enduring coalition in defense of core privacy and other rights that transcends partisan allegiance, by working toward meaningful limits on their use. Making people aware of exactly what these unique threats are from a domestic drone regime is the key first step in constructing that coalition.
 * Greenwald 2013** (Glenn [former columnist on civil liberties and US national security issues for the Guardian. An ex-constitutional lawyer]; The US Needs To Wake Up To Threat Of Domestic Drones; Mar 30; http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/29/domestic-drones-unique-dangers; kdf)

This will disproportionately impact communities of color
Bernd 2015 (Candice; Proposed Rules Regulating Domestic Drone Use Lack Police Warrant Requirement; Feb 24; www.truth-out.org/news/item/29250-proposed-rules-regulating-domestic-drone-use-lack-police-warrant-requirement; kdf) "You~’re not just talking about the physical border, you~’re talking about an area that encompasses many major cities that have large minority populations, and the idea that these drones can be flown with little or no privacy protections really mean that, people, just by virtue of living in that region are somehow accepting that they have a right to less privacy," she said. African-American communities could well feel the disproportionate impacts of the integrated use of domestic drones and other surveillance in the coming years, as technologies such as StingRay are already being used mostly in the ongoing war on drugs to track those suspected of selling and buying drugs. The drug war has long negatively impacted communities of color, based on racialized drug policies and racial discrimination by law enforcement; two-thirds of all those convicted of drug crimes are people of color, despite similar rates of drug use among whites and people of color. These already-existing racial disparities in intrusive policing tactics and deployment of surveillance technologies are one of the primary reasons civil liberties experts are saying the government often gets it backward when thinking about privacy issues: deploying intrusive technologies first, and coming up with privacy policies governing their use afterward (when they may already be violating many people~’s civil rights). "What we see with StingRays is the same phenomenon that we~’re seeing with [UAS], where federal agencies are using them," Guliani said. "State and local agencies are using them. There~’s federal dollars that are going to buy them, and we~’re kind of having the privacy debate after the fact with very little information."

Furthermore, it will further exasperate structural racism
Today, media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward Snowden that millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother~’s visit from the FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. It~’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance. Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted surveillance is an obvious answer—it may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the inherently innocent. The trouble is, targeted surveillance frequently includes the indiscriminate collection of the private data of people targeted by race but not involved in any crime. For targeted communities, there is little to no expectation of privacy from government or corporate surveillance. Instead, we are watched, either as criminals or as consumers. We do not expect policies to protect us. Instead, we~’ve birthed a complex and coded culture—from jazz to spoken dialects—in order to navigate a world in which spying, from AT%26T and Walmart to public benefits programs and beat cops on the block, is as much a part of our built environment as the streets covered in our blood. In a recent address, New York City Police Commissioner Bill Bratton made it clear: "2015 will be one of the most significant years in the history of this organization. It will be the year of technology, in which we literally will give to every member of this department technology that would~’ve been unheard of even a few years ago." Predictive policing, also known as "Total Information Awareness," is described as using advanced technological tools and data analysis to "preempt" crime. It utilizes trends, patterns, sequences, and affinities found in data to make determinations about when and where crimes will occur. This model is deceptive, however, because it presumes data inputs to be neutral. They aren~’t. In a racially discriminatory criminal justice system, surveillance technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing discrimination, predictive policing is a face of what author Michelle Alexander calls the "New Jim Crow"—a de facto system of separate and unequal application of laws, police practices, conviction rates, sentencing terms, and conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of social control by racial hierarchy than as crime prevention or punishment. In New York City, the predictive policing approach in use is "Broken Windows." This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life crimes—like selling loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was choked to death. Without oversight, accountability, transparency, or rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial profiling—indiscriminate data collection that drives discriminatory policing practices. As local law enforcement agencies increasingly adopt surveillance technologies, they use them in three primary ways: to listen in on specific conversations on and offline; to observe daily movements of individuals and groups; and to observe data trends. Police departments like Bratton~’s aim to use sophisticated technologies to do all three. They will use technologies like license plate readers, which the Electronic Frontier Foundation found to be disproportionately used in communities of color and communities in the process of being gentrified. They will use facial recognition, biometric scanning software, which the FBI has now rolled out as a national system, to be adopted by local police departments for any criminal justice purpose. They intend to use body and dashboard cameras, which have been touted as an effective step toward accountability based on the results of one study, yet storage and archiving procedures, among many other issues, remain unclear. They will use Stingray cellphone interceptors. According to the ACLU, Stingray technology is an invasive cellphone surveillance device that mimics cellphone towers and sends out signals to trick cellphones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspect~’s cellphone, they also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby. The same is true of domestic drones, which are in increasing use by U.S. law enforcement to conduct routine aerial surveillance. While drones are currently unarmed, drone manufacturers are considering arming these remote-controlled aircraft with weapons like rubber bullets, tasers, and tear gas. They will use fusion centers. Originally designed to increase interagency collaboration for the purposes of counterterrorism, these have instead become the local arm of the intelligence community. According to Electronic Frontier Foundation, there are currently seventy-eight on record. They are the clearinghouse for increasingly used "suspicious activity reports"—described as "official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity." These reports and other collected data are often stored in massive databases like e-Verify and Prism. As anybody who~’s ever dealt with gang databases knows, it~’s almost impossible to get off a federal or state database, even when the data collected is incorrect or no longer true. Predictive policing doesn~’t just lead to racial and religious profiling—it relies on it. Just as stop and frisk legitimized an initial, unwarranted contact between police and people of color, almost 90 percent of whom turn out to be innocent of any crime, suspicious activities reporting and the dragnet approach of fusion centers target communities of color. One review of such reports collected in Los Angeles shows approximately 75 percent were of people of color. This is the future of policing in America, and it should terrify you as much as it terrifies me. Unfortunately, it probably doesn~’t, because my life is at far greater risk than the lives of white Americans, especially those reporting on the issue in the media or advocating in the halls of power. One of the most terrifying aspects of high-tech surveillance is the invisibility of those it disproportionately impacts. The NSA and FBI have engaged local law enforcement agencies and electronic surveillance technologies to spy on Muslims living in the United States. According to FBI training materials uncovered by Wired in 2011, the bureau taught agents to treat "mainstream" Muslims as supporters of terrorism, to view charitable donations by Muslims as "a funding mechanism for combat," and to view Islam itself as a "Death Star" that must be destroyed if terrorism is to be contained. From New York City to Chicago and beyond, local law enforcement agencies have expanded unlawful and covert racial and religious profiling against Muslims not suspected of any crime. There is no national security reason to profile all Muslims. At the same time, almost 450,000 migrants are in detention facilities throughout the United States, including survivors of torture, asylum seekers, families with small children, and the elderly. Undocumented migrant communities enjoy few legal protections, and are therefore subject to brutal policing practices, including illegal surveillance practices. According to the Sentencing Project, of the more than 2 million people incarcerated in the United States, more than 60 percent are racial and ethnic minorities. But by far, the widest net is cast over black communities. Black people alone represent 40 percent of those incarcerated. More black men are incarcerated than were held in slavery in 1850, on the eve of the Civil War. Lest some misinterpret that statistic as evidence of greater criminality, a 2012 study confirms that black defendants are at least 30 percent more likely to be imprisoned than whites for the same crime. This is not a broken system, it is a system working perfectly as intended, to the detriment of all. The NSA could not have spied on millions of cellphones if it were not already spying on black people, Muslims, and migrants. As surveillance technologies are increasingly adopted and integrated by law enforcement agencies today, racial disparities are being made invisible by a media environment that has failed to tell the story of surveillance in the context of structural racism.
 * Cyril 2015** (Malkia Amala [under and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network]; Black America~’s State of Surveillance; Mar 30; www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance; kdf)

Challenging institutional racism is a prior ethical question— it makes violence structurally inevitable and foundationally negates morality
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one~’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is "the truly capital sin."fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity~’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. "Recall," says the bible, "that you were once a stranger in Egypt," which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
 * Memmi 2000** (Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris, Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165)

Plan
====The United States federal government should curtail its domestic unmanned aerial surveillance by ruling that such searches constitute a search within the Fourth Amendment and is unreasonable without a warrant.====

A Supreme Court ruling on aerial surveillance is uniquely key to revitalizing 4th Amendment~’s ability to protect privacy and to stop the onslaught of advancing technologies
[*493] The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has been criticized for its circular nature. n284 As long as UAS surveillance remains sufficiently rare, an individual~’s expectation of privacy is considered reasonable and it is protected from government intrusion by the Fourth Amendment. n285 Once UAS flights become routine, the expectation of privacy is no longer reasonable and its protection is removed. n286 The result becomes a "paradoxical situation in which law enforcement overreach is legitimized once it becomes routinized." n287 This could happen as early as 2015 when UAS can be fully integrated into U.S. airspace. n288 Equally disconcerting is the fact that the Supreme Court~’s estimation of what society considers reasonable is not necessarily accurate. n289 Justice Scalia facetiously observed that "unsurprisingly, those "actual (subjective) expectations of privacy~’ "that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable~’ bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." n290 For example, poll results indicate that the American public opposes the use of UAS for routine police work. n291 According to the Court however, if the police used UAS to track people in public, they would lack constitutional protection because those people have no reasonable expectation of privacy. n292 Considering these problems with the Katz formulation, some have argued that the protection of privacy, especially pertaining to sophisticated technologies such as UAS, should be removed from the courts and given to the legislature. n293 The problem with this solution is that it essentially concedes that, in the absence of legislation, the [*494] Fourth Amendment cannot protect privacy rights against the government~’s use of sophisticated technologies. n294 Instead, the courts need to adopt a novel jurisprudence to protect actual privacy expectations, rather than defer to Congress. V. CONCLUSION Under the Supreme Court~’s current jurisprudence, it is only a matter of time before the Fourth Amendment will no longer be able to provide protection from warrantless UAS surveillance, even in the home. n295 The answer to the question posed by Justice Scalia in Kyllo should not be that technology has the power to "shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy" to the point of elimination. n296 This is especially true given the Court~’s articulated concern that it "assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." n297 Although the original degree of privacy is difficult to ascertain, allowing the government to use a UAS outfitted with facial recognition software or high-powered cameras to silently track individuals for extended periods of time without a warrant hardly seems to qualify. n298 Equally unlikely is the idea that Congress, rather than the Constitution, was expected to be the guarantor of privacy protections at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. n299 It is clear that the courts need a new approach to their Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to protect privacy from a technological onslaught. Requiring a warrant for all UAS surveillance will ensure that even the widespread use of UAS will not erode society~’s legitimate privacy expectations.
 * Celso 2014** (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)

Unchecked executive is leading to ineffective surveillance and drone policies that are devoid of standards
Each of these accounts is connected by a common thread – the exercise of unrestrained Executive Branch power that ignores the fundamental principle that the President and his subordinates do not have unilateral authority to surveil any call, to engage in illegal torture, or to launch attacks almost certain to kill. Each reflects policies that pursue national security while ignoring a fundamental truth about our democracy: Absent appropriate checks and balances, the rule of law is undermined and individual liberty is likely to be sacrificed. Of course, this observation is hardly novel and has been reiterated constantly throughout the 240 year history of the Republic. James Madison articulated it in the Federalist Papers: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands…may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Justice Kennedy wrote about it in 2004, upholding the right of habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees: "The Framers~’ inherent distrust of governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty." America~’s post-9/11 response abandons this foundational principle, ceding unitary authority to the Executive Branch, despite strong evidence that its surveillance, interrogation and drone policies have been ineffective, counter-productive, lack transparency, and are devoid of specific standards or oversight for their implementation.
 * Brand and Guiora 15** (Jeffrey S., J.D., Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, Director Center for Law and Global Justice, University of San Francisco School of Law, and Amos N., Ph.D, Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, Co-Director, Center for Global Justice, The Steep Price of Executive Power Post 9/11: Reclaiming Our Past to Insure Our Future, Jan. 27, 2015, http://www.law.utah.edu/the-steep-price-of-executive-power-post-911-reclaiming-our-past-to-insure-our-future/)

Provides a counterweight that shifts executive decision-making towards more careful procedures as well as rights-sensitive policies
The observer effect provides an important counterweight to the executive~’s instinct to prioritize national security equities at the expense of individual rights because the executive knows that the courts may be a future audience for its policies. A primary reason to be concerned about allowing the executive to completely dominate national security decisionmaking is the fear that the executive will conduct skewed risk assessments, overstate the threat that the country faces, and establish excessively draconian policies as a result.151 As Cass Sunstein suggests, "[T]he President has a strong incentive to take precautions even if they are excessive and even unconstitutional."152 Ensuring some level of ambiguity about whether a court will step in to review a particular policy helps counteract that bias. Christina Wells notes that the "lack of predictability regarding a court~’s approach . . . should force the executive to consider that the possibility of rigorous judicial review is very real."153 In her view, advance knowledge of the existence of judicial review can force the executive to assume some "pre-decisional awareness of accountability."154 That is, when the executive understands that it likely will be forced to explain its reasoning after the fact for particular security policies it adopts, it will think more carefully ex ante about what those policies should be and weigh a greater number of alternatives.155 While this element has procedural aspects to it—forcing a more careful and considered process of adopting policy—it also has important substantive effects. Assuming that courts as a rule will favor policies that are more rights protective than those favored by the executive, this perception of future judicial oversight will shift the substantive policy in a more rightssensitive direction.156
 * Deeks 13 – Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School, Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State** (Ashley S., "The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference," 82 Fordham Law Review 2, SEP)

Leads to greater executive transparency and accountability

 * Deeks ~’13** (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention, the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with al-Qaeda, "The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference", Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)

A third type of pressure imposed by the observer effect prompts the executive to reveal nonpublic executive policies and, in doing so, try to attest to its own responsible behavior. Once the policies are widely available, foreign governments, NGOs, and legal scholars can assess and debate them.112 The disclosure provides a baseline against which courts and the public may evaluate future executive behavior and challenge that behavior when it appears to countermand the stated policy.113 Of course, these disclosures are self-serving; they reflect an executive calculation that these policy revelations are likely to benefit the executive~’s case at a manageable cost. And not all litigation leads to disclosure: in some cases, being sued causes government officials to be more cautious than usual about making public statements on issues implicated by the litigation. Nevertheless, the executive has revealed a number of policies under the influence of the observer effect. The government~’s decision to reveal publicly the process by which it determines when and how to transfer military detainees to other countries serves as an example.114 Initially, the government transferred people from Guantánamo to other countries without publicly explaining the standards and process by which it conducted those transfers. The government had not revealed when it sought diplomatic assurances that receiving countries would not mistreat the detainees; when it sought security assurances (by which a receiving country agreed to take measures to ensure that a transferred detainee would not undertake dangerous activities); and which government officials were involved in the process.115In addition, several cases have prompted the government to identify which set of individuals it deems detainable in particular armed conflicts, even though no court specifically ordered the government to do so.

Spills over to other executive policies implicating individual rights

 * Deeks ~’13** (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention, the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with al-Qaeda, "The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference", Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)

More systemically, the observer effect reminds the executive of the courts~’ presence, and so has a subtle rights-protective influence on a number of executive policies in the wake of a triggering event. The observer effect tends to work without regard to the subject matter of the specific case or cases on which a court is focused. But that fact might leave categories of individual plaintiffs out in the cold in case after case. Assume the courts are aware of and seek to foster the observer effect in the executive. If the courts decide not to defer only in cases that do not implicate individual rights, and decide to defer in national security cases that do implicate individual rights, the courts might preserve the observer effect while failing to serve their function as individual rights protectors. We might conclude that the observer effect will have some influence in shifting national security policies that do implicate individual rights, but those changes might be more modest and less satisfying from a rightsprotective approach than they would be if the cases on which the courts did not defer were individual rights cases. In short, the observer effect produces a better "second-best" world when the cases in which the courts show less deference are those that implicate individual rights.

Fixes skewed executive decisionmaking
One of the core tenets of national security doctrine is that courts play a deeply modest role in shaping and adjudicating the executive~’s national security decisions. In most cases, courts use abstention doctrines and other tools to decline to hear such cases on the merits. When courts do hear these cases, they often issue decisions that are highly deferential to executive choices.1 The courts~’ behavior in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks largely bears this out: courts have declined to reach the merits of almost all of the cases challenging executive policies on renditions, detainee treatment and transfers, lethal targeting, and warrantless wiretapping.2 And even where the courts have stepped in, they have focused on the decisional processes that surround executive decisionmaking, rather than on the substance of those decisions themselves.3 Some national security scholars celebrate this state of affairs.4 In their view, courts are structurally ill equipped to assess the executive~’s intelligence and security calculations, which often must be made rapidly and which carry important foreign policy implications. These scholars also believe that the executive is far more accountable to the public than courts, such that its decisions will be guided and tempered by the public will. Other scholars, in contrast, bemoan the absence of courts from the playing field.5 To them, the executive has undue incentives to emphasize security values over liberty values, and only a vigorous judicial role can counter that. More broadly, these scholars view robust judicial deference to the executive as weakening a critical tool by which to inhibit a single branch of government from accruing undue power. Both camps tend to assume, however, that the courts do play only a limited role in executive calculations about appropriate national security policies.
 * Deeks 13 – Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School** (Ashley S., The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham L. Review, 827, 2013, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4941%26context=flr)

Executives empirically follow court decisions on counterrorism policy
Bradley and Morrison 13 (Curtis, Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and Trevor, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, "Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint" Duke Law Scholarship Repository, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5451%26context=faculty_scholarship) Insisting on a sharp distinction between the law governing presidential authority that is subject to judicial review and the law that is not also takes for granted a phenomenon that merits attention—that Presidents follow judicial decisions.118 That assumption is generally accurate in the United States today. To take one relatively recent example, despite disagreeing with the Supreme Court~’s determination in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the war on terror, the Bush Administration quickly accepted it.119 But the reason why Presidents abide by court decisions has a connection to the broader issue of the constraining effect of law. An executive obligation to comply with judicial decisions is itself part of the practice-based constitutional law of the United States, so presidential compliance with this obligation may demonstrate that such law can in fact constrain the President. This is true, as we explain further in Part III, even if the effect on presidential behavior is motivated by concerns about external political Executive is particularly responsive to the observer effect in national security because of limited court involvement

Utilitarian calculations are fundamentally immoral – murder, even to save a life, is an unethical and justifies mass violence.
Kramer 11 [Nicholas Kramer, former associate investigator for an oversight & investigations committee in the United States Senate, “Murdering Some to Save Others”, http://original.antiwar.com/nkramer/2011/04/12/murdering-some-to-save-others/, 4-12-11] In my ongoing quest to understand how morality and justice apply in a complex society, I have recently been watching a series of lectures on these topics available online from Harvard University’s Michael Sandel. Professor Sandel begins the series by posing two scenarios to his audience of Harvard undergraduates. In the first, Sandel suggests that a surgeon has a choice between saving five moderately injured patients at the cost of not saving one severely wounded patient, or saving the one at the cost of the five. When asked which choice they would make, by a show of hands the students almost unanimously indicate their preference for saving the most people possible. In Sandel’s second scenario, the choice is the same, but the surgeon must actually kill the one patient in order to save the rest (in this case, to harvest the vital organs necessary to keep the others alive). This time, not a single student supports the principle of saving the many at the cost of the one. Sandel then asks members of his audience to explain the apparent inconsistency in their collective logic; although these future leaders of our political and economic systems seem to have a very difficult time articulating their rationales, the difference between the scenarios is obvious, and the implications should be heartening to us all. Murdering some people to save others is // fundamentally immoral //. When this principle is put before us in a hypothetical example such as Professor Sandel’s, it is easy to understand, even instinctual. I believe that, with the possible exceptions of serial killers, psychopaths, narcissists, and other outliers, the vast majority of people left to their own devices would not follow the cold calculations of utilitarianism to the extreme of murdering another person even if that action would benefit many others. I will leave it to the philosophers to determine why this is so, but most of us know such murders to be wrong and would not participate in them. If that is the case, what then explains the recent line of “moral” reasoning expressed by liberals and neoconservatives alike in favor of the “humanitarian” bombing of Libya ? There are only two explanations I can imagine: either the interventionists are among the outliers mentioned above, or there is something about murder by the state that allows people to circumvent their own innate moral instincts. During a recent discussion I had with a favorite college professor, he wondered how different our moral view of war would be if we had not developed the technology and mindset that allows for mass murder from afar. For instance, he asked rhetorically, “ Would we really have gone into Hiroshima with broadswords and hacked to death 100,000 people of all ages, sizes, and shapes? Yet we dropped a single bomb on them, and those who lose sleep over that fact are considered so far out of the mainstream as to not be taken seriously.” The simple and uncomfortable truth is that // murder is murder //, regardless of whether we do it with a 1,000-lb. explosive delivered via cruise missile or with a broadsword. As much as I would like to blame the pro-war liberals and neoconservatives for the horrors they support, the reality is that it is the state that allows and perpetuates the limitless destruction brought about by war in our name. The appeal of this destruction is so powerful that even people (such as Nicholas Kristof) who generally seem not to be mass murderers or overall “bad” folks can be seduced into blind support of absolutely immoral actions. If we accept that otherwise “good” people cannot be relied upon to maintain their moral principles when it comes to the actions of the state, the only way we can hope to inoculate ourselves against the temptations of state violence for “humanitarian” causes is to adopt a strictly non-interventionist foreign policy. I would not want to live in a society that condoned surgeons actively murdering some patients in order to save others; likewise, I despise and regret my implicit support for a government that murders Libyans to theoretically prevent the deaths of other Libyans. As heart-breaking as it is when people on the other side of the world kill each other, it is indeed better to save no one if that is the only way to avoid committing murder. ====The source of value comes from the way we spend our lives rather than their continuation – utilitarian focus on death impact obscures the ability to construct meaningful existences through an irrational fear of death.==== --- Death can only be evil if it deprives us of the good things about life --- Utilitarian calculations that require a sacrifice about the positive things about life therefore are counterintuitive Nagel 12 [Thomas, University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, “Mortal Questions”, Cambridge University Press, Mar 26, 2012, Pg.1-3] If death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence, the question arises whether it is a bad thing to die. There is conspicuous disagreement about the matter: some people think death is dreadful; others have no objection to death per se, though they hope their own will be neither premature nor painful. Those in the former category tend to think those in the latter are blind  [not privy] to the obvious, while the latter suppose the former to be prey to some sort of confusion. On the one hand it can be said that life is all we have and the loss of it is the greatest loss we can sustain. On the other hand it may be objected that death deprives this supposed loss of its subject, and that if we realize that death is not an unimaginable condition of the persisting person, but a mere blank, we will see that it can have no value whatever, positive or negative. Since I want to leave aside the question whether we are, or might be, immortal in some form, I shall simply use the word ‘death’ and its cognates in this discussion to mean permanent death, unsupplemented by any form of conscious survival. I want to ask whether death is in itself an evil; and how great an evil, and of what kind, it might be. The question should be of interest even to those who believe in some form of immortality, for one’s attitude toward immortality must depend in part on one’s attitude toward death. If death is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its positive features, but only because of what it deprives us of. I shall try to deal with the difficulties surrounding the natural view that death is an evil because it brings to an end all the goods that life __ contains __. We need no: give an account of these goods here, except to observe that some of them, like perception, desire, activity, and thought, are so general as to be constitutive of human life. They are widely regarded as formidable benefits in themselves, despite the fact that they are conditions of misery as well as of happiness, and that a sufficient quantity of more particular evils can perhaps outweigh them.That is what is meant, I think, by the allegation that it is good simply to be alive, even if one is undergoing terrible experiences. The situation is roughly this: There are elements which, if added to one’s experience, make life better ; there are other elementswhich , if added to one’s experience, make life worse. But what remains when these are set aside is not merely neutral: it is emphatically positive. Therefore life is worth living even when the bad elements of experience are plentiful, and the good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself, rather than by any of its contents. I shall not discuss the value that one person’s life or death may have for others, or its objective value, but only the value it has for the person who is its subject. That seems to me the primary case, and the case which presents the greatest difficulties. Let me add only two observations. First, the value of life and its contents does not attach to mere organic survival: almost everyone would be indifferent (other things equal) between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening. And second, like most goods, this can be multiplied by time: more is better than less. The added quantities need not be temporally continuous (though continuity has its social advantages). People are attracted to the possibility of long-term suspended animation or freezing, followed by the resumption of conscious life, because they can regard it from within simply as continuation of their present life. If these techniques are ever perfected, what from outside appeared as a dormant interval of three hundred years could be experienced by the subject as nothing more than a sharp discontinuity in the character of his experiences. I do not deny, of course, that this has its own disadvantages. Family and friends may have died in the meantime; the language may have changed; the comforts of social, geographical, and cultural familiarity would be lacking. Nevertheless these inconveniences would not obliterate the basic advantage of continued, though discontinuous, existence. If we turn from what is good about life to what is bad about death, the case is completely different. Essentially, though there may be problems about their specification, what we find desirable in life are certain states, conditions, or types of activity. It is being alive, doing certain things, having certain experiences that we consider good. But ifdeath is an evil, it is the loss of life, rather than the state of being dead, or nonexistent, or unconscious, that is objectionable .1 This asymmetry is important. If it is good to be alive, that advantage can be attributed to a person at each point of his life. It is a good of which Bach had more than Schubert, simply because he lived longer. Death, however, is not an evil of which Shakespeare has so far received a larger portion than Proust. If death is a disadvantage, it is not easy to say when a man suffers it.

Even if util is good, you still vote aff—it’s key to allowing society to begin to change the system—only the aff reverses the trend of deontology
Burkhart et al. 2007 (Laurie Burkhart, Michael Haubert, and Damon Thorley, undergraduate editors who published a book on surveillance under the supervision of Dr. Dirk S. Hovorka, “The Efect [sic] of Government Surveillance on Social Progress,” in Confronting Information Ethics in the New Millennium” [] ) //Under util//__itarian, duty-based, and rights-based ethical theories__ the act of heavy //government surveillance policy is an ethical violation. From a utilitarian perspective//, one must look at the consequences of an action, and determine which consequence would be the most desirable for the greatest number of people involved. In this case, the government is not acting in line with what is the greatest good for the greatest number. //The greatest good is allowing a society to// have the ability to //freely participate and change the system// in order to adhere to what is best for the people. By limiting radical political groups the government can effectively take away this ability. In taking the ability to change and progress away from the people in a democratic system the government violates the greatest good for the greatest number. The use of //government surveillance// to hinder radical movements //is causing a “chilling effect” on political participation and results in an obstruction of social progress//__. The consequences__ of these government actions __are undesirable__, the actions are considered to be unethical under utilitarian or consequence-based theory. The duty-based and rights-based theories also show extreme surveillance to be an ethical violation. __From a__ duty-based, or //deontological perspective//, heavy government //surveillance is an ethical violation// __because__ it does not treat people in a universal or impartial way. Immanuel Kant, one of the most famous and influential deontological theorists, claimed that __actions are unethical if they conflict with the idea that all people are free and rational beings__. He stated that //everyone has a duty to stop such unethical acts// and promote freedom and rationality. Furthermore he stated that rules should only be applied if they are universal and impartial. __Acts of__ government __surveillance are__ often __carried out with heavy biases against certain__ types of __groups and ideologies__, such as the civil rights or communist groups. In addition, __using surveillance tactics__ against certain groups and individuals goes against the idea that people are free and capable of making their own decisions, and __implies that people need to be monitored and controlled__. Certain types of monitoring and controlling are necessary in any society, but in a democratic society __when__ the __control__ tactics __goes as far to limit the effect the people can have on their own society then the system is not only undemocratic ,but unethical as well__. The surveillance bias towards particular groups also violates several rules and regulations stated in our countries legal doctrines. Rights-based theory states that an action is unethical if it goes against rights that have been given through contract or law. __Surveillance practices__ of the FBI and other government groups have shown to __violate__ several laws and the __rights__ that have been given to citizens by the government, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, protection against illegal searches, and many more. In order to be ethical under a rights-based theory a democratic government must follow the laws and regulations set forth by the people ‟ s elected government agents. Past and present government surveillance tactics violate these principles __and are therefore unethical.__ “One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes a revolution in order to establish a dictatorship.” -- George Orwell16 Legal Implications Our democratic system is built on the people ‟ s participation in politics. This participation is most commonly practiced by voting in government elections and identifying with a major political party. Although these types of political participation are the most practiced and socially accepted they are not the only form of participation the system is built on. As outlined in Amendment I of the U.S. Constitution Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances17. Based on these laws the people of our country can speak out, challenge, and criticize the government as they see fit without fear of persecution. The theory behind this system is to allow for free and unaltered participation in the government by the people so that the laws and discourse of the country reflect that of the people ‟ s beliefs. For this legal system to function properly the free participation of the people must be protected. Although our society generally chooses to believe this to be true, U.S. historical evidence shows the contrary. Each radical social movement in the U.S. has posed a general threat to the government administration of that time. From a present day perspective some of these movements brought about positive social change. Aside from the moral value of each radical movement, the government agencies of their times determine what to be in the best interest of the country and exude enormous surveillance and propaganda tactics for or against them. At the time of the civil rights movements the FBI classified pro-black groups as threats to national security. Despite these past classifications, these groups made a large positive impact on our countries values and laws. As a result of these “threats to national security” citizens of our country can now expect to be treated equally under the law and not endure unjust policies based on race. At the basis of all social change there is an opposition to the norm or majority. In the case of the civil rights movement the norm was a predominately racist society with national laws and regulations to perpetuate the racist system. Despite the efforts of government agencies to curb the radical groups and halt the social progress being made the people were able to assemble and cause radical reformations to take place in legal and social aspects of the country. It can be said that although the FBI and government tried to curb the Civil Rights movement the social change did occur and the theory of free political participation was upheld. Although it is true that the government ultimately failed in stopping the movement and societal change, they did not have the same technology that is available today. During the civil rights movement the FBI used basic surveillance technology including wire taps, bugged rooms, stake outs and propaganda. Today __technology is advancing at a quicker rate than we can make use of it__. The government now has technology and the access to information far greater than that of the 1960 ‟ s and can use it however they see fit. __If not kept in check__ the __government surveillance can lead to a system in which social change__ brought about by the people __becomesimpossible__. Conclusion Demonstrated by the history in our country each government administration has used every resource they have in order to pursue the values and goals of their administration. __As technology increases, so does the power of the government to monitor citizens__, infiltrate groups, control information, and further push their view of what is best for the society. In an age of data mining, satellite surveillance, RFID chips, vast social networks, and an overall state of heightened security there is almost no limit to the capabilities of the government and its surveillance. We can assume based on historical facts that the government is currently monitoring to the best of their ability all radical groups in the country as well as the world. With current technology it ‟ s also safe to assume that this __surveillance__ and group monitoring is much more effective than in the past and __could__ possibly __end radical political influence before it starts__. Coupled with increased technology there has been a decrease of freedom in our legal system with war time laws such as the Patriot Act limiting fundamental rights and legal discourse outlined in the U.S. constitution. __The system is moving__ away from free political participation and __towards__ an information influenced __police state__. The U.S. legal system is based on change and adaptability. A historical example of this is the change in role the U.S. legal system took on in the nineteenth century. “An instrumental perspective of law did not simply emerge as a response to new economic forces in the nineteenth century. Rather, judges began to use law in order to encourage social change even in areas where they had previously refrained from doing so. It was not until the nineteenth century that the common law took on its innovating and transforming role in American society18.” Examples such as this show that the legal system has always played its part in influencing societal change since the early days of this country, but conversely the U.S. society members have also influenced changes to the legal system. The changes and innovation of U.S. law have consistently been influenced by social movements. The labor movements, civil rights movements, and feminist movements have all challenged the government of their time and as a result moved the U.S. towards a more equal and just society. As the power and technology of the government increases today so do the chances of any kind of societal change being halted. “Social movements are not distinct and self-contained; rather, they grow from and give birth to other movements, work in coalition with other movements, and influence each other indirectly through their effects on the larger cultural and political environment19.” If the government can monitor and stop one major movement they can influence and deter the masses from further radical ideology. In this lies the ethical violation. Under utilitarian, duty-based, and rights-based ethical theories the act of heavy government surveillance policy is an ethical violation. From a utilitarian perspective the government is not acting in line with what is the greatest good for the greatest number. The greatest good is allowing a society to have the ability to freely participate and change the system in order to adhere to what is best for the people. By limiting radical political groups the government can effectively take away this ability. In taking the ability to change and progress away from the people the government violates the greatest good for the greatest number. The duty-based and rights-based theories also show extreme surveillance to be an ethical violation. These theories examine how government surveillance is carried out and the ethical and legal violations that are inherent in the practices. From a duty-based perspective, heavy government surveillance is an ethical violation because it does not treat people in a universal or impartial way. It is often carried out with heavy biases against certain types of groups and ideologies. Not only is the surveillance bias towards particular groups but it also violates several rules and regulations stated in our countries legal doctrines. Surveillance practices of the FBI and other government groups have shown to violate several laws and the rights of the group participants. This type of surveillance discourse causes it to be an ethical violation. __The democratic system needs free political participation__ and radical movements __in order to progress__. History has shown the positive effects radical groups have played in the progression of American society through out U.S. history. //If// __the //unethical practices of government surveillance are not kept in check// into the future, the ideologies of freedom of speech and //the power of the people will be lost forever.//__

Actions determine morality, not results—consequentialism might be good, but moral side constraints exist that we cannot violate
Nagel 79 (Thomas, 1979, Philosopher, Mortal Questions, p 58-59) Many people feel, without being able to say much more about it, that __something has gone seriously wrong when certain measures are admitted into consideration in the first place. The fundamental mistake is made there, rather than at the point where the overall benefit of some monstrous measure is judged to outweigh its disadvantages__, and it is adopted. An account of absolutism might help us to understand this. __If it is not allowable to //do// certain things__, such as killing unarmed prisoners or civilians, __then no argument about what will happen if one does not do them can show that doing them would be all right__. //Absolutism does not//__, of course, //require one to ignore//the //consequences// of one’s acts. //It operates as a limitation on utlitiarian reasoning, not as a substitute for it//__. __An absolutist can be expected to try to maximize good and minimize evil, so long as this does not__ require him to __transgress an absolute prohibition__ like that against murder. __But when such a conflict occurs, the prohibition takes complete precedence over any consideration of consequences__. Some of the results of this view are clear enough. It requires us to forgo certain potentially useful military measures, such as the slaughter of hostages and prisoners or indiscriminate attempts to reduce the enemy population by starvation, epidemic infectious diseases like anthrax and bubonic plague, or mass incineration. It means that __we cannot deliberate on whether such measures are justified by the fact that they will avert still greater evils, for__ as intentional measures __they cannot be justified in terms of any consequences whatever__. __Someone__ unfamiliar with the events of this century __might imagine that utilitarian arguments__, or arguments of national interest, __would suffice to deter measures of this sort. But it has become evident that such considerations are insufficient to prevent the adoption and employment of enormous antipopulation weapons once their use is considered a serious moral possibility. The same is true of the piecemeal wiping out of__ rural civilian __populations__ in airborne antiguerrilla warfare. __Once the door is opened to calculations of utility and national interest, the usual //speculations about the future// of freedom, peace, and economic prosperity //can// be brought to bear to //ease the consciences of those responsible// for a certain number of charred babies__.

Our advantage is one of those side constraints—the injustices we have described should not be tolerated at any cost
__Justice is the first virtue of social institutions____as truth is of systems of thought__. __A theory however elegant__ and economical __must be rejected or revised if it is untrue__ ; __likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust__. __Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override__. For this reason __justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by the many__. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; __the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests__. The only thing that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack of a better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary to avoid an even greater injustice. __Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are uncompromising__.
 * Rawls 71** (John, 1971, philosopher, A Theory of Justice, p. 3-4)

====No consequence justifies voting neg—either rights are absolute and we win, or they’re not, and the neg’s moral calculus is incoherent. The question of this debate is whether the plan is a //moral action// or not. The judge as a moral agent is not responsible for intervening actors no matter how bad the consequences sound. The decisions of other agents are //outside your power to determine// and you should therefore say that you support the aff even if we should perhaps also stop bad consequences that stem from it because consequentialism with no limit results in constantly escalating evils which makes it self-defeating and also undermines the value of life==== Gewrith 81 (Alan, 1981, prof of philosophy at U Chicago, “Are There Any Absolute Rights?,” Philosophical Quarterly, January) __It is a widely held opinion that there are no absolute rights__. Consider what would be generally regarded as the most plausible candidate: the right to life. This right entails at least the negative duty to refrain from killing any human being. But it is contended that this duty may be overridden, that a person may be justifiably killed if this is the only way to prevent him from killing some other, innocent person, or if he is engaged in combat in the army of an unjust aggressor nation with which one’s own country is at war. It is also maintained that even an innocent person may justifiably be killed if failure to do so will lead to the deaths of other such persons. Thus an innocent person’s right to life is held to be overridden when a fat man stuck in the mouth of a cave prevents the exit of speleologists who will other- wise drown, or when a child or some other guiltless person is strapped onto the front of an aggressor’s tank, or when an explorer’s choice to kill one among a group of harmless natives about to be executed is the necessary and sufficient condition of the others’ being spared, or when the driver of a runaway trolley can avoid killing five persons on one track only by killing one person on another track.1 And topping all such tragic examples is the cata-strophic situation __where a nuclear war or some other unmitigated disaster can be avoided only by infringing some innocent person’s right__ to life. Despite such cases, I shall argue that certain rights can be shown to be absolute. But first the concept of an absolute right must be clarified. I1. I begin with the Hohfeldian point that the rights here in question are claim-rights (as against liberties, powers, and so forth) in that they are justified claims or entitlements to the carrying out of correlative duties, positive or negative. A duty is a requirement that some action be performed or not be performed; in the latter, negative case, the requirement constitutes a prohibition. A right is fulfilled when the correlative duty is carried out, i.e., when the required action is performed or the proliibited action is not performed. A right is infringed when the correlative duty is not carried out, i.e., when the required action is not performed or the proliibited action is performed. Thus someone’s right to life is infringed when the prohibited action of killing him is performed; someone’s right to medical care is infringed when the required action of providing liim with medical care is not performed. A right is violated when it is unjustifiably infringed, i.e., when the required action is unjustifiably not performed or the prohibited action is unjustifiably performed. And a right is overridden when it is justifiably infringed, so that there is sufficient justification for not carrying out the correlative duty, and the required action is justifiably not performed or the prohibited action is justifiably performed. A right is absolute when it cannot be overridden in any circumstances, so that it can never be justifiably infringed and it must be fulfilled without any exceptions. The idea of an absolute right is thus doubly normative: it includes not only the idea, common to all claim-rights, of a justified claim or entitlement to the performance or non-performance of certain actions, but also the idea of the exceptionless justifiability of performing or not performing those actions as required. These components show that the question whether there are any absolute rights demands for its adequate answer an explicit concern with criteria of justification. I shall here assume what I have else- where argued for in some detail: that these criteria, insofar as they arc valid, are ultimately based on a certain supreme principle of morality, the Principle of Generic Consistency [PQC).* This principle requires of every agent that he act in accord with the generic rights of his recipients as well as of himself, i.e., that he fulfil these rights. The generic rights are rights to the necessary conditions of action, freedom and well-being, where the latter is defined in terms of the various substantive abilities and conditions needed for action and for successful action in general. The POC provides the ultimate justificatory basis for the validity of these rights by shoving that they are equally had by all prospective purposive agents, and it also provides in general for the ordering of the rights in cases of conflict. Thus if two moral rights are so related that each can be fulfilled only by infringing the other, that right takes precedence whose fulfilment is more necessary for action. This criterion of degrees of necessity for action explains, for example, why one person’s right not to be lied to must give way to another person’s right not to be killed when these two rights are in conflict. In some cases tho application of this criterion requires a context of institutional rules. 2. The general formula of a right is as follows: “A has a right to X against B by virtue of Y”. In addition to the right itself, there are four elements here: the subject of the right, the right-holder (A); the object of the right (X); the respondent of the right, the person who has the correlative duty (B); and the justificatory basis or ground of the right (Y). I shall refer to these elements jointly as the contents of the right. Each of the elements may vary in gener- ality. Various rights may conflict with one another as to one or another of these elements, so that not all rights can be absolute. One aspect of these conflicts is especially important for understanding the question of absolute rights. Although, as noted above, the objects of moral rights are hierarchically ordered (according to the degree of their necessity for action), this is not true of the subjects of the rights. If one class or group of persons inherently had superior moral rights over another class or group (as was held to be the case throughout much of human history), any conflict between their respective rights would be readily resoluble: the rights of the former group would always take precedence, they would never be overridden (at least by the rights of members of other groups), and to this extent they would be absolute.8 It is because (as is shown by the PGC as well as by other moral principles) moral rights are equally distributed among all human persons as prospective purposive agents that some of the main conflicts of rights arise. This is most obviously the case where one per- son’s right to life conflicts with another person’s, since in the absence of guilt on either side, it is assumed that the two persons have equal rights. Thus the difficulty of supporting the thesis that there are absolute rights derives much of its force from its connection with the principle that all persons are equal in their moral rights. 3. The differentiation of the elements of rights serves to explicate the various levels at which rights may be held to be absolute. We may distinguish three such levels. The first is that of Principle Absolutism. According to this, what is absolute, and thus always valid and never overridden, is only some moral principle of a very high degree of generality which, referring to the subjects, the respondents, and especially the objects of rights in a relatively undifferentiated way, presents a general formula for all the diverse duties of all respondents or agents toward all subjects or recipients. The PGC is such a principle; so too are the Golden Rule, the law of love, Kant’s categorical imperative, and the principle of utility. Principle Absolutism, however, may leave open the question whether any specific rights are always absolute, and what is to be done in cases of conflict. Even act-utilitarianism might be an example of Principle Absolutism, for it may be interpreted as saying that those rights are absolute whose fulfilment would serve to maxi- mize utility overall. These rights, whatever they may be, might of course vary in their specific contents from one situation to another. At the opposite extreme is Individual Absolutism, according to which an individual person has an absolute right to some particular object at a partic- ular time and place when all grounds for overriding the right in the particular case have been overcome. But this still leaves open the question of what are the general grounds or criteria for overriding any right, and what are the other specific relevant contents of such rights. It is at the intermediate level, that of Rule Absolutism, that the question of absolute rights arises most directly. At this level, the rights whose absoluteness is in question are characterized in terms of specific objects with possible specification also of subjects and respondents, so that a specific rule can be stated describing the content of the right and the correlative duty. The description will not use proper names and other individual referring expressions, as in the case of Individual Absolutism, nor will it consist only in a general formula applicable to many specifically different kinds of rights and duties and hence of objects, subjects, and respondents, as in the case of Principle Absolutism. It is at this level that one asks whether the right to life of all persons or of all innocent persons is absolute, whether the rights to freedom of speech and of religion are absolute, and so forth. The rights whose absoluteness is considered at the level of Rule Absolutism may vary in degree of generality, in that their objects, their subjects, and their respondents may be given with greater or lesser specificity. Thus there is greater specificity as we move along the following scale: the right of all persons to life, the right of all innocent persons to life, the right of all innocent persons to an economically secure life, the right of children to receive an economically secure and emotionally satisfying life from their parents, and so forth. This variability raises the following problem. For a right to be absolute, it must be conclusively valid without any exceptions. But, as we have seen, rights may vary in generality, and all the resulting specifications of their objects, subjects, or respondents may constitute exceptions to the more general rights in which such specifications are not present. For example, the right of innocent persons to life may incorporate an exception to the right of all persons to life, for the rule embodying the former right may be stated thus: All persons have a right not to be killed except when the persons are not innocent, or except when such killing is directly required in order to prevent them from killing somebody else. Similarly, when it is said that all persons have a right to life, the specification of ‘persons’ may suggest (although it does not strictly entail) the exception-making rule that all animals (or even all organisms) have a right to life except when they are not persons (or not human). Hence, since an absolute right is one that is valid without any exceptions, it may be concluded either that no rights are absolute because all involve some specification, or that all rights are equally absolute because once their specifications are admitted they are entirely valid without any further exceptions. The solution to this problem consists in seeing that not all specifications of the subjects, objects, or respondents of moral rights constitute the kinds of exception whose applicability to a right debars it from being absolute. I shall indicate three criteria for permissible specifications. First, when it is asked concerning some moral right whether it is absolute, the kind of specification that may be incorporated in the right can only be such as results in a concept that is recognizable to ordinary practical thinking. This excludes rights that are “overloaded with exceptions” as well as those whose application would require intricate utilitarian calculations.4 Second, the specifications must be justifiable through a valid moral principle. Since, as we saw above, the idea of an absolute right is doubly normative, a right with its specification would not even begin to be a candi- date for absoluteness unless the specification were moraljustified and could hence be admitted as a condition of the justifiability of the moral right. There is, for example, a good moral justification for incorporating the restriction of innocence on the subjects of the right not to be killed; but there is not a similarly good moral justification for incorporating racial, religious, and other such particularist specifications. It must be emphasized, however, that this moral specification guarantees only that the right thus specified is an appropriate candidate for being absolute; it is, of itself, not decisive as to whether the right is absolute. A third criterion is that __the__ permissible __specification of a right must exclude any reference to the possibly disastrous consequences of fulfilling the right__. Since a chief difficulty posed against absolute rights is that for any right there can be cases in which its fulfilment may have disastrous con- sequences, to put tliis reference into the very description of the right would remove one of the main grounds for raising the question of absoluteness. The relation between rights and __disasters__ is complicated by the fact that the latter, __when caused by the actions of persons, are themselves infringements of rights__. This point casts a new light on __the consequentialist’s thesis__ that there are no absolute rights. For when he says __that every right may be overridden if this is required in order to avoid certain catastrophes__ — such as when torture alone will enable the authorities to ascertain where a terrorist has hidden a fused charge of dynamite— __the consequentialist is appealing to basic rights__. He is __saying that__ in such a case __one right__ —the right not to be tortured— __is overridden by another right__ —the right to life of the many potential victims of the explosion. This raises the following question. __Can the process of one right’s overriding another continue in- definitely or does the process come to a stop with absolute rights?__ In order to deal with this question, two points must be kept in mind. First, even when catastrophes threatening the infringement of basic rights are invoked to override other rights, at least part of the problem created by such conflict depends, as wras noted above, on the assumption that all the persons involved have equal moral rights. There would be no serious con- flict of rights and no problem about absolute rights if, for example, the rights of the persons threatened by the catastrophe were deemed inferior to those of persons not so threatened. Second, despite the close connection between rights in general and the rights threatened by disastrous consequences, it is important to distinguish them. For if the appeal to avoidance of disastrous consequences w'ere to be construed simply as an appeal for the fulfilment or protection of certain basic rights, then, __on the assumption that certain disasters must always be avoided when they arc threatened, the consequentialist would__ himself __be an absolutist__. We can escape this untoward result and render more coherent the opposition between absolutism and consequentialism if we recognize a further important assumption of the question whether there are any absolute rights. Amid the various possible specifications of Rule Absolutism, the rights in question are the normative property of distinct individuals.6 In referring to some event as a “disaster” or a “catastrophe”, on the other hand, what is often meant is that a large mass of individuals taken collectively loses some basic good to which they have a right. It is their aggregate loss that constitutes the catastrophe. (This, of course, accounts for the close connec- tion between the appeal to disastrous consequences and utilitarianism.) Thus the question whether there are any absolute rights is to be construed as asking whether distinct individuals, each of whom has equal moral rights (and who are to be characterized, according to the conditions of Rule Abso- lutism, by specifications that are morally justifiable and recognizable to ordinary practical thinking), have any rights that may never be overridden by any other considerations, including even their catastrophic consequences for collective rights. II 4. We must now examine the merits of __the prime consequentialist argu- ment__ against the possibility of absolute moral rights: that circumstances can always be imagined in which the consequences of fulfilling the rights would be so disastrous that their requirements would be overridden. The formal structure of the argument __is__ as follows: (1) If R, then D. (2) 0 ('--'D). (3) Therefore, 0(~R). For example, (1) __if some person’s right__ to life __is fulfilled__ in certain circumstances, __then some great disaster may__ or will __occur. But__ (2) __such disaster ought never to (be allowed__ to) occur. __Hence__, (3) in such circumstances __the right__ ought not to be fulfilled, 80 that it __is not absolute__. __Proponents of this argument have usually failed to notice that a parallel argument can be given in the opposite direction. If exceptions to the fulfil- ment of any moral right can be justified by imagining the possible disastrous consequences of fulfilling it, why cannot exceptionless moral rights be justi- fied by giving them such contents that their infringement would be unspeak- ably evil?__ The argument to this effect may be put formally as follows: (1) If ~R, then E. (2) 0(~E). (3) __Therefore__, 0(R). __For example__, (1) __if a mother’s right not to be tortured to death by her own son is not fulfilled, then there will be unspeakable evil. But__ (2) __such evil ought never to (be allowed to) occur. Hence__, (3) __the right ought to be fulfilled without any exceptions, so that it is absolute__. Tw'o preliminary points must be made about these arguments. First, despite their formal parallelism, there is an important difference in the meaning of ‘then’ in their respective first premises. __In the first argument, ‘then’ signifies a consequential__ causal __connection__ : if someone’s right to life is fulfilled, there may or will ensue as a result the quite distinct phenomenon of a certain great disaster. __But in the second__ argument, __‘then’ signifies a moral conceptual relation: the unspeakable evil is not a causal consequence__ of a mother’s being tortured to death by her own son; __it is rather a central moral constituent of it. Thus the second argument is not consequentialist,__ as the first one is, despite the fact that each of their respective first premises has the logical form of antecedent and consequent. A related point bears on the second argument’s specification of the right in question as a mother’s right not to be tortured to death by her own son. This specification does not transgress the tliird requirement given above for permissible specifications: that reference to disastrous consequences must not be included in the formulation of the right. For the __torturing__ to death __is not a disastrous causal consequence of infringing the right; it is directly an infringement of the right itself__, just as not being tortured to death by her own son is not a consequence of fulfilling the right but is the right. This distinction can perhaps be seen more clearly in such a less extreme case as the right not to be lied to. Being told a lie is not a causal consequence of infringing this right; rather, it just is an infringement of the right. In each case, moreover, the first two requirements for permissible specifications of moral rights are also satisfied: their contents are recognizable to ordinary practical thinking and they are justified by a valid moral principle. 5. Let us now consider the right mentioned above: a mother’s right not to be tortured to death by her own son. Assume (although these specifica- tions are here quite dispensable) that she is innocent of any crime and has no knowledge of any. What justifiable exception could there be to such a right? I shall construct an example which, though fanciful, has sufficient analogues in past and present thought and action to make it relevant to the status of rights in the real world.6 __Suppose a__ clandestine __group__ of political extremists have __obtained an arsenal of nuclear weapons__ ; to prove that they have the weapons and know' how to use them, they have kidnapped a leading scientist, shown him the weapons, and then released him to make a public corroborative statement. The terrorists have now __announced that they will use the weapons__ against a designated large distant city __unless__ a certain prominent resident of the city, a young politically active lawyer named __Abrams, tortures his mother to death__, this torturing to be carried out publicly in a certain way at a specified place and time in that city. Since the gang members have already murdered several other prominent residents of the city, their threat is quite credible. Their declared motive is to advance their cause by showing how powerful they are and by unmasking the moralistic pretensions of their political opponents. __Ought Abrams to torture his mother to death in order to prevent the threatened nuclear catastrophe?__ Might he not merely pretend to torture his mother, so that she could then be safely hidden while the hunt for the gang members continued? Entirely apart from the fact that the gang could easily pierce this deception, the main objection to the very raising of such questions is the moral one that they seem to hold open the possibility of acquiescing and participating in an unspeakably evil project. __To inflict such extreme harm__ on one’s mother __would be an ultimate act of betrayal; in__ performing or **__even contemplating the performance of such an action__** __the son would lose all self-respect and would regard his life as no longer worth living__ .7 __A mother’s right not to be tortured__ to death by her own son __is beyond any compromise. It is absolute__. This absoluteness may be analysed in several different interrelated dimen- sions, all stemming from __the supreme principle of morality__. The principle __requires respect for the rights of all persons to the necessary conditions of human action__, and this includes respect for the persons themselves as having the rational capacity to reflect on their purposes and to control their behav- iour in the light of such reflection. __The principle hence prohibits using any person merely as a means to the well-being of other persons__. For a son to torture his mother to death even to protect the lives of others would be an extreme violation of this principle and hence of these rights, as would any attempt by others to force such an action. For this reason, __the concept appropriate to it is not merely ‘wrong’ but__ such others as **__‘despicable’__**, ‘dis- honourable’, **__‘base’, ‘monstrous’__**. In the scale of moral modalities, such con- cepts function as the contrary extremes of concepts like the supererogatory. What is supererogatory is not merely good or right but goes beyond these in various ways; it includes saintly and heroic actions whose moral merit surpasses what is strictly required of agents. In parallel fashion, what is base, dishonourable, or despicable is not merely bad or wrong but goes be- yond these in moral demerit since it subverts even the minimal worth or dignity both of its agent and of its recipient and hence the basic presupposi- tions of morality itself. Just as the supererogatory is superlatively good, so the despicable is superlatively evil and diabolic, and __its moral wrongness is so rotten that a moralty decent person will not even consider doing it__. This is but another way of saying that the __rights__ it would violate **__must remain absolute__**. 6. There is, however, another side to this story. __What of the thousands of innocent persons__ in the distant city __whose lives are imperilled__ by the threatened nuclear explosion? Don’t they too have rights to life which, because of their numbers, are far superior to the mother’s right? May they not contend that while it is all very well for Abrams to preserve his moral purity by not killing his mother, he has no right to purchase this at the ex- pense of their lives, thereby treating them as mere means to his ends and violating their own rights? Thus it may be argued that the morally correct description of the alternative confronting Abrams is not simply that it is one of not violating or violating an innocent person’s right to life, but rather not violating one innocent person’s right to life and thereby violating the right to life of thousands of other innocent persons through being partly responsible for their deaths, or violating one innocent person’s right to life and thereby protecting or fulfilling the right to life of thousands of other innocent persons. __We have__ here __a tragic conflict of rights__ and an illustration of the heavy price exacted by moral absolutism. The aggregative consequen- tialist who holds that that action ought always to be performed which maxi-mizes utility or minimizes disutility would maintain that in such a situation the lives of the thousands must be preferred. An initial answer may be that terrorists who make such demands and issue such threats cannot be trusted to keep their word not to drop the bombs if the mother is tortured to death; and even if they now do keep their word, __acceding in this case would only lead to further escalated demands__ and threats. It may also be argued that it is irrational to perpetrate a sure evil in order to forestall what is so far only a possible or threatened evil. Philippa Foot has sagely commented on cases of this sort that if it is the son’s duty to kill his mother in order to save the lives of the many other innocent residents of the city, __then “anyone who wants us to do something__ we think __wrong has only to threaten__ that otherwise he himself will do __ some- thing __ we think __ worse __ ”.8 Much depends, however, on the nature of the “wrong” and the “worse”. If someone threatens to commit suicide or to kill innocent hostages if we do not break our promise to do some relatively unimportant action, breaking the promise would be the obviously right course, by the criterion of degrees of necessity for action. The special diffi- culty of the present case stems from the fact that the conflicting rights arc of the same supreme degree of importance. It may be contended, however, that this whole answer, focusing on the probable outcome of obeying the terrorists’ demands, is a consequentialist argument and, as such, is not available to the absolutist who insists that Abrams must not torture his mother to death whatever the consequences.9 This contention imputes to the absolutist a kind of indifference or even callousness to the sufferings of others that is not warranted by a correct understanding of his position. He can be concerned about consequences so long as he does not regard them as possibly superseding or diminishing the right and duty he regards as absolute. It is a matter of priorities. So long as the mother’s right not to be tortured to death by her son is unqualifiedly respected, the absolutist can seek ways to mitigate the threatened disastrous consequences and possibly to avert, them altogether. A parallel case is found in the theory of legal punishment : the retributivist, while asserting that punish- ment must be meted out only to the persons who deserve it because of the crimes they have committed, may also uphold punishment for its deterrent effect so long as the latter, consequentialist consideration is subordinated to and limited by the conditions of the former, antecedentalist consideration.10 Thus the absolutist can accommodate at least part of the consequentialist’s substantive concerns within the limits of his own principle. Is any other answer available to the absolutist, one that reflects the core of his position? Various lines of argument may be used to show that in refusing to torture his mother to death Abrams is not violating the rights of the multitudes of other residents who may die as a result, because he is not morally responsible for their deaths. Thus the absolutist can maintain that even if these others die they still have an absolute right to life because the infringement of their right is not justified by the argument he upholds. At least three different distinctions may be adduced for this purpose. In the unqualified form in which they have hitherto been presented, however, they are not successful in establishing the envisaged conclusion. One distinction is between direct and oblique intention. When Abrams refrains from torturing his mother to death, he does not directly intend the many ensuing deaths of the other inhabitants either as end or as means. These are only the foreseen but unintended side-effects of his action or, in tliis case, inaction. Hence, he is not morally responsible for those deaths. Apart from other difficulties with the doctrine of doublo effect, this distinction as so far stated does not serve to exculpate Abrams. Consider some parallels. Industrialists who pollute the environment with poisonous chemicals and manufacturers who use carcinogenic food additives do not directly intend the resulting deaths; these are only the unintended but foreseen side-effects of what they do directly intend, namely, to provide profitable demand-fulfilling commodities. The entrepreneurs in question may even maintain that the enormous economic contributions they make to the gross national product outweigh in importance the relatively few deaths that regrettably occur. Still, since they have good reason to believe that deaths will occur from causes under their control, the fact that they do not directly intend the deaths does not remove their causal and moral responsi- bility for them. Isn’t this also true of Abrams’s relation to the deaths of the oity’s residents? A second distinction drawn by some absolutists is between killing and letting die. This distinction is often merged with others with which it is not entirely identical, such as the distinctions between commission and omission, bctwoen harming and not helping, between strict duties and generosity or supererogation. For the present discussion, however, the subtle differences between those may be overlooked. The contention, then, is that in refraining from killing his mother, Abrams does not kill the many innocent persons who will die as a result; he only lets them die. But one does not have the same strict moral duty to help persons or to prevent their dying as one has not to kill them; one is responsible only for w-hat ono does, not for what one merely allows to happen. Hence, Abrams is not morally responsible for the deaths he fails to prevent by letting the many innocent persons die, so that he does not violate their rights to life. The difficulty with this argument is that the dutios bearing on the right to life include not only that one not kill innocent persons but also that one not let them die when one can prevent their dying at no comparable cost. If, for example, one can rcscuc a drowning man by throwing him a rope, one has a moral duty to throw him the rope. Failure to do so is morally culpable. Hence, to this extent the son who lets the many residents die when he can prevent this by means within his power is morally responsible for their deaths. A third distinction is between respecting other persons and avoiding bad consequences. Respect for persons is an obligation so fundamental that it cannot be overridden even to prevent evil consequences from befalling some persons. If such prevention requires an action whereby respect is withheld from persons, then that action must not be performed, whatever the con- sequences. One of the difficulties with this important distinction is that it is unclear. May not respect be withheld from a person by failing to avert, from him some evil consequence? How can Abrams be held to respect the thousands of innocent persons or their rights if he lets them die when he could have prevented this? The distinction also fails to provide for degrees of moral urgency. One fails to respect a person if one lies to him or steals from him; but sometimes the only way to prevent the death of one innocent person may be by stealing from or telling a lie to some other innocent person. In such a case, respect for one person may lead to disrespect of a more serious kind for some other innocent person. 7. None of the above distinctions, then, serves its intended purpose of defending the absolutist against the consequentialist. They do not show that the son’s refusal to torture his mother to death does not violate the other persons’ rights to life and that he is not morally responsible for their deaths. Nevertheless, the distinctions can be supplemented in a way that does servo to establish these conclusions. The required supplement is provided by the principle of the intervening action. According to this principle, __when there is a causal connection be- tween some person__ A’s __performing some action__ (or inaction) X __and some other person__ C’s __incurring a certain harm__ Z, A’s __moral responsibility__ for Z __is removed if__, between X and Z, __there intervenes some other action__ Y __of some person__ B who knows the relevant circumstances of his action and who intends to produce Z or who produces Z through recklessness. __The__ reason for this removal is that B’b __intervening action__ Y __is the more direct or proximate cause__ of Z __and__, unlike A’s action (or inaction), Y is __the sufficient condition__ of Z as it actually occurs.11 An example of this principle may help to show its connection with the absolutist thesis. __Martin Luther King__ Jr. __was repeatedly told that because he led demonstrations in support of civil rights, he was morally responsible for the__ disorders, __riots__, and deaths __that ensued__ and that were shaking the American Republic to its foundations.12 By the principle of the intervening action, __however, it was King’s opponents who were responsible__ because their intervention operated as the sufficient conditions of the riots and injuries. King might __also__ have replied that __the Republic would **not be worth saving** if the price that had to be paid was the violation of__ the __civil rights__ of black Americans. As for the rights of the other Americans to peace and order, the reply would be that these rights cannot justifiably be secured at the price of the rights of blacks. It follows from the principle of the intervening action that it is not the son but rather the terrorists who are morally as well as causally responsible for the many deaths that do or may ensue on his refusal to torture his mother to death. The important point is not that he lets these persons die rather than kills them, or that he does not harm them but only fails to help them, or that he intends their deaths only obliquety but not directly. The point is rather that, it is only through the intervening lethal actions of the terrorists that his refusal eventuates in the many deaths. Since the moral responsibility is not the son’s, it does not affect his moral duty not to torture his mother to death, so that her correlative right remains absolute. This point also serves to answer some related questions about the rights of the many in relation to the mother’s right. Since the son’s refusal to torture his mother to death is justified, it may seem that the many deaths to which that refusal will lead are also justified, so that the rights to life of these many innocent persons are not absolute. But since they are innocent, why aren’t their rights to life as absolute as the mother’s? If, on the other hand, their deaths are unjustified, as seems obvious, then isn’t the son’s refusal to torture his mother to death also unjustified, since it leads to those deaths? But from this it would follow that the mother’s right not to be tortured to death by her son is not absolute, for if the son’s not infringing her right is unjustified, then his infringing it would presumably be justified. The solution to this difficulty is that it is a fallacy to infer, from the two premises (1) the son’s refusal to kill his mother is justified and (2) many innocent persons die as a result of that refusal, to the conclusion (3) their deaths are justified. For, __by the principle of the intervening action__, the son’s refusal is not causally or morally responsible for the deaths; rather, it is the terrorists who are responsible. Hence, the justification referred to in (1) does not carry through to (2). Since the terrorists’ action in ordering the killings i8 unjustified, the resulting deaths are unjustified. Hence, __the rights to life of the many innocent victims remain absolute even if they are killed as a result of the__ son’s __justified refusal__, and it is not he who violates their rights. He may be said to intend the many deaths obliquely, in that they arc a foreseen but unwanted side-eflfect of his refusal. But he is not responsible for that side-effect because of the terrorists’ intervening action. It would be unjustified to violate the mother’s right to life in order to protect the rights to life of the many other residents of the city. For __rights cannot be justifiably protected by violating another right__ which, according to the criterion of degrees of necessity for action, is at least equally important. Hence, the many other residents do not have a right that the mother’s right to life be violated for their sakes. To be sure, the mother also does not have a right that their equally important rights be violated in order to protect hers. But. here too it must be emphasized that in protecting his mother’s right the son does not violate the rights of the others; for by the principle of the intervening action, it is not he who is causally or morally responsible for their deaths. Hence too he is not treating them as mere means to his or his mother’s ends. 8. Where, then, docs this leave us? __From the absoluteness of the__ mother’s __right__ not to be tortured to death by her son, __does it follow that__ in the described circumstances __a nuclear explosion should be permitted to occur__ over the city so that countless thousands of innocent persons may be killed, possibly including Abrams and his mother? Properly to deal with this question, __it is vitally important to distinguish between abstract and concrete absolutism. The abstract absolutist at no point takes account of consequences__ or of empirical or causal connections that may affect the subsequent outcomes of the two alternatives he considers. He views the alternatives as being both mutually exclusive and exhaustive. His sole concern is for the moral guiltlessness of the agent, as against the effects of the agent’s choices for human weal or woe. __In contrast__, as I suggested earlier, __the concrete absolutist is concerned with consequences and empirical connections, but always within the limits of the right__ he upholds as absolute. His __consequentialism is thus limited__ rather than unlimited. Because of his concern with empirical connections, he takes account of a broader range of possible alternatives than the simple dualism to w'hich the abstract absolutist confines himself. His __primary focus is not on the moral guiltlessness of the agent but__ rather on __the basic rights of persons not to be subjected to unspeakable evils__. Within this focus, however, the concrete absolutist is also deeply concerned with the effects of the fulfilment of these rights on the basic well-being of other persons. The significance of tliis distinction can be seen by applying it to the case of Abrams. If he is an abstract absolutist, he deals with only two alternatives which he regards as mutually exclusive as wrell as exhaustive: (1) he tortures his mother to death; (2) the terrorists drop a nuclear bomb killing thousands of innocent persons. For the reasons indicated above, he rejects (1). He is thereby open to the accusation that he chooses (2) or at least that he allows (2) to happen, although the principle of the intervening action exempts him from moral guilt or responsibility. If, how'ever, __Abrams__ is a concrete absolutist, then he does not regard himself as being confronted only by these two terrible alternatives, nor does he regard them or their negations as mutually exclusive. His thought- proccsses include the following additional considerations. In accordance with a point suggested above, he __recognizes that his doing (1) will not assure the non-occurrence of (2). On the contrary, his doing (1) **will**__ probably **__lead to further threats__** __of the occurrence of (2) **unless** he__ or someone else **__performs further unspeakably evil actions__** (3), (4), and so forth. ( __A parallel example may be found in Hitler’s demand for Czechoslovakia at Munich after__ his taking over of __Austria, his further demand for Poland__ after the capitulation regarding Czechoslovakia, __and the ensuing tragedies__ .) Moreover, (2) may occur even if Abrams does (1). For persons who are prepared to threaten that they will do (2) cannot be trusted to keep their word. On the other hand, Abrams further reasons, his not doing (1) may well not lead to (2). This may be so for several reasons. He or the authorities or both must try to engage the terrorists in a dialogue in which their griev- ances are publicized and seriously considered. Whatever elements of ration- ality may exist among the terrorists will thereby be reinforced, so that other alternatives may be presented. At the same time, a vigorous search and preventive action must be pursued so as to avert the threatened bomb- ing and to avoid any recurrences of the threat. It is such __concrete absolutism__, taking due account of consequences and of possible alternatives, that constitutes the preferred pattern of ethical reasoning. It __serves to protect__ the __rights____presupposed in the very possibility of a moral community while at the same time__ it __gives the greatest probability of averting the threatened catastrophe__. In the remainder of this paper, I shall assume the background of concrete absolutism.ni 9. I have thus far argued that the right of a mother not to be tortured to death by her son is absolute. But the arguments would also ground an extension of the kind of right here at issue to many other subjects and respondents, including fathers, daughters, wives, husbands, grandparents, cousins, and friends. So there are many absolute rights, on the criterion of plurality supplied by Rule Absolutism. It is sometimes held that moral obligations are “agent-relative” in that, at least in cases of conflict, one ought to give priority to the welfare of those persons with whom one has special ties of family or affection.13 Applied to the present question, this view would suggest that the subjects having the absolute right that must be respected by respondents are limited to the kinds of relations listed above. It may also be thought that as we move away from familial and affectional relations, the proposed subjects of rights come to resemble more closely the anonymous masses of other persons who would be killed by a nuclear explosion, so that a quantitative measure of numbers of lives lost would become a more cogent consideration in allocating rights. These conclusions, however, do not follow. Most of the arguments I have given above for the mother’s absolute right not to be tortured to death apply to other possible human subjects without such specifications. My purpose in beginning with such an extreme case as the mother-son relation was to focus the issue as sharply as possible; but, this focus once gained, it may be widened in the ways just indicated. Although the mother has indeed a greater right to receive effective concern from her son than from other, unrelated persons, the unjustifiability of violating right® that are on the same level of necessity for action is not affected either by degrees of family relationship or by the numbers of persons affected. Abrams would not be justified in torturing to death some other innocent person in the described circumstances, and in failing to murder he would not be morally responsible for the deaths of other innocent persons who might be murdered by someone else as a consequence. These considerations also apply to various progressively less extreme objects of rights than the not being tortured to death to which I have so far confined the discussion. The general content of these objects may be stated as follows: All innocent persons have an absolute right not to be made the intended victims of a homicidal project. Tliis right, despite its increase in generality over the object, subject, and respondents of the previous right, still conforms to the requirements of Rule Absolutism. The word ‘intended’ here refers both to direct and to oblique intention, with the latter being subject to the principle of the intervening action. The word ‘project’ is meant to indicate a definite, deliberate design; hence, it excludes the kind of unforeseeable immediate crisis where, for example, the unfortunate driver of a trolley whose brakes have failed must choose between killing one person or five. The absolute right imposes a prohibition on any form of active participation in a homicidal project against innocent persons, whether by the original designers or by those who would accept its conditions with a viewr to w'arding off what they would regard as worse consequences. The meaning of ‘innocent’ raises many questions of interpretation into which I have no space to enter here, but some of its main criteria may be gathered from the first paragraph of this paper. As for ‘persons’, this refers to all prospective purposive agents. The right not to be made the intended victim of a homicidal project is not the only specific absolute right, but it is surely one of the most important. The general point underlying all absolute rights stems from the moral principle presented earlier. At the level of Principle Absolutism, it may be stated as follow's: __Agents and institutions are **absolutely prohibited** from degrading persons, treating them as if they had no rights or dignity. The benefit of this prohibition extends to all persons__, innocent or guilty; for the latter, when they are justly punished, are still treated as responsible moral agents who are capable of understanding the principle of morality and acting accordingly, and the punishment must not be cruel or arbitrary. Other specific absolute rights may also be generated from this principle. Since the principle requires of every agent that he act in accord with the generic rights of his recipients as well as of himself, specific rights are absolute insofar as they serve to protect the basic presuppositions of the valid principle of morality in its equal application to all persons.

The obsession with human survival is self-defeating—the tyranny of survival paradoxically destroys more people in the long run and diminishes the value of life
CALLAHAN 1973 (Daniel, institute of Society and Ethics, The Tyranny of Survival, p. 91-3) __The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life__. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. __The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid__, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. __In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children__. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and __in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress.__ It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But __my point__ goes deeper than that. It __is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing__. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and __if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival__. To put it more strongly, __if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories__.

Err on the side of probability to check psychological bias toward long improbable internal link chains – we cite studies
Yudkowsky 8 – cofounder of Machine Intelligence Research Institute [Eliezer, research fellow at MIRI, “Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks,” Machine Intelligence Research Institute, pp. 7-8, 2008, https://intelligence.org/files/CognitiveBiases.pdf, Accessed 6/29/15] The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of “A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983” or “A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983.” The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1983). In Johnson et al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats—such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (2008) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against “movie-plot scenarios” of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster (Schneier 2005). Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: “X is not an existential risk and you don’t need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E”; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. “We don’t need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely.” Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures 2 survive after 4 years (Knaup 2005). Dawes (1988, 133) observes: “In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions (‘either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion’) in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions .” The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks we already know about—or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

Expert predictions are wrong—we can’t know the future
It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), that __ people who make ____ prediction their business __ —people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables— __ are no better than the rest of us ____. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it __, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that __ the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable __ their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. __ Our system of expertise __ is completely inside out: it __ rewards bad judgments __ over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. __ Tetlock is a psychologist __ —he teaches at Berkeley— __ and his conclusions are based on a long-term study __ that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And __ he measured his experts on __ two dimensions: __ how good they were at guessing probabilities __ (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), __ and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. __ The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. __ Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world __, in other words, __ are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys __ , who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that __ specialists are not ____ significantly more reliable than non-specialists __ in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in ‘reading’ emerging situations.” And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. “Experts in demand,” Tetlock says, “were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight.” People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlock’s results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. “ __ Expert Political Judgment ____ ” is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse __. In one study, college counsellors were given information about a group of high-school students and asked to predict their freshman grades in college. The counsellors had access to test scores, grades, the results of personality and vocational tests, and personal statements from the students, whom they were also permitted to interview. Predictions that were produced by a formula using just test scores and grades were more accurate. There are also many studies showing that expertise and experience do not make someone a better reader of the evidence. In one, data from a test used to diagnose brain damage were given to a group of clinical psychologists and their secretaries. The psychologists’ diagnoses were no better than the secretaries’. The experts’ trouble in Tetlock’s study is exactly the trouble that all human beings have: we fall in love with our hunches, and we really, really hate to be wrong. Tetlock describes an experiment that he witnessed thirty years ago in a Yale classroom. A rat was put in a T-shaped maze. Food was placed in either the right or the left transept of the T in a random sequence such that, over the long run, the food was on the left sixty per cent of the time and on the right forty per cent. Neither the students nor (needless to say) the rat was told these frequencies. The students were asked to predict on which side of the T the food would appear each time. The rat eventually figured out that the food was on the left side more often than the right, and it therefore nearly always went to the left, scoring roughly sixty per cent—D, but a passing grade. The students looked for patterns of left-right placement, and ended up scoring only fifty-two per cent, an F. The rat, having no reputation to begin with, was not embarrassed about being wrong two out of every five tries. But Yale students, who do have reputations, searched for a hidden order in the sequence. They couldn’t deal with forty-per-cent error, so they ended up with almost fifty-per-cent error. The expert-prediction game is not much different. When television pundits make predictions, the more ingenious their forecasts the greater their cachet. An arresting new prediction means that the expert has discovered a set of interlocking causes that no one else has spotted, and that could lead to an outcome that the conventional wisdom is ignoring. On shows like “The McLaughlin Group,” these experts never lose their reputations, or their jobs, because long shots are their business. More serious commentators differ from the pundits only in the degree of showmanship. These serious experts—the think tankers and area-studies professors—are not entirely out to entertain, but they are a little out to entertain, and both their status as experts and their appeal as performers require them to predict futures that are not obvious to the viewer. The producer of the show does not want you and me to sit there listening to an expert and thinking, I could have said that. __ The expert ____ also suffers from knowing too much: the more facts an expert has __, the more information is available to be enlisted in support of his or her pet theories, and __ the more chains of causation he or she can find beguiling ____. This helps explain why specialists fail to outguess non-specialists __. The odds tend to be with the obvious. Tetlock’s experts were also no different from the rest of us when it came to learning from their mistakes. Most people tend to dismiss new information that doesn’t fit with what they already believe. Tetlock found that his experts used a double standard: they were much tougher in assessing the validity of information that undercut their theory than they were in crediting information that supported it. The same deficiency leads liberals to read only The Nation and conservatives to read only National Review. We are not natural falsificationists: we would rather find more reasons for believing what we already believe than look for reasons that we might be wrong. In the terms of Karl Popper’s famous example, to verify our intuition that all swans are white we look for lots more white swans, when what we should really be looking for is one black swan. Also, __ people tend to see the future as indeterminate and the past as inevitable. If you look backward, the dots that lead up to Hitler or the fall of the Soviet Union __ or the attacks on September 11th __ all connect. If you look forward, it’s just a random scatter of dots, many potential chains of causation leading to many possible outcomes __. We have no idea today how tomorrow’s invasion of a foreign land is going to go; after the invasion, we can actually persuade ourselves that we knew all along. The result seems inevitable, and therefore predictable. Tetlock found that, consistent with this asymmetry, experts routinely misremembered the degree of probability they had assigned to an event after it came to pass. They claimed to have predicted what happened with a higher degree of certainty than, according to the record, they really did. When this was pointed out to them, by Tetlock’s researchers, they sometimes became defensive. And, like most of us, __ experts violate a fundamental rule of probabilities by tending to find scenarios with more variables more likely ____. If a prediction needs two independent things to happen in order for it to be true, its probability is the product of the probability of each of the things it depends on. If there is a one-in-three chance of x and a one-in-four chance of y, the probability of both x and y occurring is one in twelve. But we often feel instinctively that if the two events “fit together” in some scenario the chance of both is greater, not less __. The classic “Linda problem” is an analogous case. In this experiment, subjects are told, “Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” They are then asked to rank the probability of several possible descriptions of Linda today. Two of them are “bank teller” and “bank teller and active in the feminist movement.” People rank the second description higher than the first, even though, logically, its likelihood is smaller, because it requires two things to be true—that Linda is a bank teller and that Linda is an active feminist—rather than one. It was no news to Tetlock, therefore, that __ experts __ got beaten by formulas. But he does believe that he discovered something about why some people make better forecasters than other people. It has to do not with what the experts believe but with the way they think. Tetlock uses Isaiah Berlin’s metaphor from Archilochus, from his essay on Tolstoy, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” to illustrate the difference. He says: Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers __ who “know one big thing,” aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains, __ display bristly impatience with those who “do not get it,” and express considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term. High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible “ad hocery” that require stitching together diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prowess. __ A hedgehog is a person who sees international affairs to be ultimately determined by a single bottom-line force: balance-of-power considerations, or the clash of civilizations, or globalization and the spread of free markets __. A hedgehog is the kind of person who holds a great-man theory of history, according to which the Cold War does not end if there is no Ronald Reagan. Or he or she might adhere to the “actor-dispensability thesis,” according to which Soviet Communism was doomed no matter what. Whatever it is, __ the big idea, and that idea alone, dictates the probable outcome of events __. For the hedgehog, therefore, predictions that fail are only “off on timing,” or are “almost right,” derailed by an unforeseeable accident. There are always little swerves in the short run, but the long run irons them out.
 * MENAND 2005 ** (Louis, “Everybody’s an Expert,” The New Yorker, December 2005, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/12/05/051205crbo_books1?currentPage=1)

The future can’t be predicted
__ Current science is proving this deterministic view of the world to be naïve. The theories of chaos and complexity are revealing the future as fundamentally unpredictable. This applies to our economy, the stock market, commodity prices, the weather, animal populations (humans included), and many other phenomena __. There are no clear historical patterns that carve well-marked trails into the future. History does not repeat itself. __ The future remains __ mostly __ unknowable __.
 * SHERDEN 1998 ** (William, business consultant, The Fortune Sellers, p. 7)

Risk calculus is functionally useless – it’s impossible to have a holistic and unbiased perspective on all the factors.
Whipple 81 (Chris Whipple PhD 40 years of experience in managing risks to human health and the environment, “Energy Production Risks: What Perspective Should We Take?” Risk Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1981 //.nt//) 2. CALCULATING THE RISKS As C. Northcote Parkinson pointed out, ' //people// have a tendency to //allocate// //excessive time and attention to// analytically //tractable or familiar problems//, //and insufficient time to// //intuitively important yet analytically difficult problems//. This observation seems particularly appropriate for energy risk analysis- where, for example, the health risks of low-level radiation have received several orders of magnitude more attention than the risks of war over oil resources.01 There are many aspects of the problem of assessing energy risks which reflect this tendency. 2.1 Omitted Effects //Risks involving social interactions are// in general //more difficult to analyze// //than those which are// more //technical// (i.e., requiring analysis in the physical sciences, engineering, or the medical sciences). //Examples// of these complex risks //include sabotage and// the //international political risks// associated with energy, such as //nuclear weapons proliferation// and //energy embargos//. The difficulty in assessing, even in retrospect, the impact of //the Three Mile Island accident illustrates this point//. //The predominant impact// of the accident was not the several man-rems of radiation exposure which occurred. Instead it //was the stress suffered by those living near the plant and the longer-term influence of the accident on national energy policies.//

No great power war—4 warrants
1 – Conventional war wisdom doesn’t apply 2 – Increase in democratic governments 3 – Multilateral agreements 4 – Taboo against nukes Cohen 14 [Michael, fellow at The Century Foundation, “THE FUTURE OF WAR: LESS IS MORE”, War on The Rocks, Feb 13 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/the-future-of-war-less-is-more/] AW If one embraces the task of understanding the ways in which the nature of war is changing, a good place to start would be to acknowledge the fact that war, as a feature of international relations, is disappearing. Here, for example, are some of the facts we know about modern war – but that the Future of War project at NAF has, to date, failed to integrate into its thinking: War is Declining: In 2012 there were only six conflicts that caused more than 1,000 battle deaths in a calendar year. That’s the twelfth straight year that the number of such wars has been in single digits – which represents an historic decline over the past several decades. Great Power War Is No More: The world is now in its seventh decade of no major power conflict – the longest such period in the post-Westphalia era. Inter-State War Is Virtually Non-Existent: Wars between countries are, for many, the defining element of global relations, and certainly global history. Yet they almost never occur any more. After a seven-year period of no inter-state wars, 2011 and 2012 saw only two such conflicts – one between Cambodia and Thailand and the other between Sudan and South Sudan, two countries that were recently one. But by and large countries simply do not go to war against other countries. In fact, even the proxy wars that defined the Cold War era have gone the way of the dodo bird. War Is Far Less Deadly: We have not reached a point where war has disappeared completely, as the current bloodletting in Syria reminds us. But // when wars do occur, they tend to be intra-state, contained within national borders and far less deadly //// than they were in the past //. In fact, approximately 90 percent fewer people die in wars today than was the case in the 1950s. According to estimates from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program the battle-related death toll in 2012 was between 37,175 and 60,260 – a slight increase from the year before, but nonetheless representative of the dramatic fall in the deadliness of war. These facts are far more important to the future of war than the advent of new technologies with which to wage conflicts that are highly unlikely to occur. The reasons for this seismic shift are many and multi-varied: the decline in usefulness of territorial conquest as well as the growing adherence to a set of global norms dictating the use of force; the rise in political freedom and number of electoral democracies, which is strongly correlated to a diminished national ardor for war (the United States being a notable exception); improvements in nationalprosperity and human development as well as greater economic and political integration between nations, all of which is correlated to a decline in conflict; the role of the U nited N ations – and in particular UN peacekeeping – as well as regional organizations in preventing and resolving conflict and enforcing peace agreements; and finally, the development of nuclear weapons has certainly chilled the military ambitions of potential adversaries. **__ All of this has an impact on the decision-making of political leaders, which is why the long-term trajectory of military spending is heading downward __** (military expenditures in Asia look to be a possible exception). =__**Negative**__=

Domestic = US Person Domestic = US Persons in US Borders Curtail = Eliminate Surveillance = non-public
 * 1 - T**

Necropolitics Foucault
 * 2 - Kritik**

Cyber-deterrence DA Cuba DA (losers-lose) Iran DA (PC) Israel DA Borders DA (vs Drones) War Power DA
 * 3 - DA's**

Ex-Post CP Executive Self-Restraint CP
 * 4 - Counterplans**

Growth Bad Hegemony Bad Executive War Powers Good
 * 5 - Case Turns**