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Japan Leadership- American Leadership

**Plan: The United States federal government should remove its military presence from Japan.**

U.S. President Barack Obama made his first official trip to Asia in November. The results were thin. Unfortunately, his agenda focused on reinforcing the status quo and "strengthening" the usual ties with the usual allies. Worse, the administration is dedicated to maintaining and even expanding Washington's Cold War-era security ties. The U.S. achieved its dominant position in East Asia after defeating Japan in World War II. Washington created a network of alliances to both prevent any imperial Japanese renaissance and contain Soviet and, later, Chinese expansion. But that world has largely disappeared. Japan has recovered and created the world's No. 2 economy. The Soviet Union is gone. Maoist China lives on only in propaganda images. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. Vietnam has joined the global economy. South Korea has raced past the decrepit Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Other countries, ranging from Australia to India, are expanding their regional roles. The potential for conflict remains. However, without any link to a global hegemonic competitor like the Soviet Union, such instability would pose little threat to the U.S. Yet Washington's Cold War alliance structure remains essentially unchanged. The U.S. maintains one-sided "mutual" defense treaties with Japan and South Korea. That the U.S. must remain militarily dominant is taken for granted. In Washington, the People's Republic of China's apparent determination to create a military capable of deterring U.S. intervention along its border is treated as a threat to American security. What has ever been must ever be appears to be the basis of U.S. foreign policy.
 * Bandow, 2009, senior fellow at the Cato Institute** [Doug, November 29, “Policy Change for East Asia,” available at[], accessed on 7/14/2010]

Klingner, 2010-is senior research fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation **[Bruce, “Japan Risks Irrelevancy In Asia” March 24, accessed July 14,[]]** Japan's international influence and relevance are diminishing due to a faltering economy, national indecisiveness, and constrained security policies. The current trajectory of Japan's future is disheartening, with little reason for optimism of a change in course. This disturbing trend long predates the election of the Democratic Party of Japan. Left unchecked, Japan risks devolving into a second-tier, middle-power nation. Japan's economic capacity and growing military capabilities enable it to be a strong alliance partner and a significant force to pursue global objectives. Yet, Japan is a powerful nation that consistently punches below its weight. Rather than implementing a strategic policy, Japan has followed a minimalist, cost-effective, and reactive approach designed to derive maximum security and economic benefits from its alliance with the U.S. while providing the minimal necessary reciprocal gestures.
 * Japan is not fulfilling its leadership role – it does not have the military resources to match its economic potential**

**Specifically, Japanese defense spending is insufficient now - US military presence in Japan undermines their incentive to increase military spending** Although Japan’s defense spending is comparable to that of other advanced industrial democracies, it might still be insufficient relative to the threats Japan faces. Tokyo’s allocation of approximately 1 percent of its GDP to defense in 2004 contrasts with the 2.4 percent spent by the South Koreans, for example, and the more than 4 percent spent by the United States during the same period, and yet Japan is operating within the same strategic environment and is concerned about similar threats. It is logical to conclude, therefore, that the U.S. security guarantee has enabled the Japanese to refrain from spending more on their defense.31 On the other hand, military spending is hardly the only measure of a country’s international engagement. Japan remains a leading provider of foreign aid, contributing more than $6.7 billion in Official Development Assistance in 2003, more than any other country with the exception of the United States.32 These numbers make clear that Japan already plays an active role in world affairs, in spite of the constitutional restrictions on the use of military force. What Japan has lacked for much of its history since the end of World War II is the incentive and the will to take responsibility for its own security—and for regional security—to a degree commensurate with its economic power and interests. The U.S. security guarantee serves as a disincentive for change, and U.S. policy has therefore impeded the development of Japan’s indigenous military capabilities, capabilities that might prove useful to both countries in the future.
 * Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute** [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, [], accessed 7/14/10]

World War II ended 65 years ago. The Cold War disappeared 21 years ago. Yet America's military deployments have little changed. Nowhere is that more evident than on the Japanese island of Okinawa. Okinawans are tired of the heavy U.S. military presence. Some 90,000 — nearly 10 percent of the island's population — gathered in protest at the end of April. It is time for Washington to lighten Okinawa's burden. An independent kingdom swallowed by imperial Japan, Okinawa was the site of a brutal battle as the United States closed in on Japan in early 1945. After Tokyo's surrender, Washington filled the main prefecture island with bases and didn't return it to Japan until 1972. America's military presence has only been modestly reduced since. The facilities grew out of the mutual defense treaty between America and Japan, by which the former promised to defend the latter, which was disarmed after its defeat. The island provided a convenient home for American units. Most Japanese people also preferred to keep the U.S. military presence on Japan's most distant and poorest province, forcing Okinawans to carry a disproportionate burden of the alliance. It is time for Washington to lighten Okinawa's burden. Whatever the justifications of this arrangement during the Cold War, the necessity of both U.S. ground forces in Japan and the larger mutual defense treaty between the two nations has disappeared. It's time to reconsider both Tokyo's and Washington's regional roles. The United States imposed the so-called "peace constitution" on Japan, Article 9 of which prohibits the use of force and even creation of a military. However, American officials soon realized that Washington could use military assistance. Today's "Self-Defense Force" is a widely accepted verbal evasion of a clear constitutional provision. Nevertheless, both domestic pacifism and regional opposition have discouraged reconsideration of Japan's military role. Washington's willingness to continue defending an increasingly wealthy Japan made a rethink unnecessary.
 * America’s Military Presence locks in an outdated security arrangement – it prevents Japan from rethinking its constitution and expanding their military responsibilities.**
 * Bandow, 2010, senior fellow at the Cato Institute** [Doug, May 12, “Japan Can Defend Itself,” available at[], accessed on 7/14/2010]

The Japanese public appears to be generally sympathetic to the Taiwanese cause, suggesting that Tokyo’s decision to show support for Taipei goes beyond narrow security concerns, and also beyond a desire to please Washington. An estimated 2.3 million tourists travel between Taiwan and Japan each year, and Japan is Taiwan’s largest trading partner.73 Favorable sentiment does not necessarily translate into support for independence among Japanese, however. In a September 2002 Japan Times survey, 71 percent of Japanese declared they were satisfied with the status quo on Taiwan; in other words, they favored neither reunification with the PRC nor independence from it.74 This may reflect a recognition on the part of the Japanese public that Taiwanese independence may provoke the Chinese to military action, which would certainly prove detrimental to Japanese security. But doubts and fears about the PRC do not completely overwhelm Japanese affinity for Taiwan and the Taiwanese. A Mainichi poll taken in 2001 asked Japanese citizens to identify countries and regions friendly to Japan. Taiwan ranked third, behind the United States and South Korea.75 On balance, the Japanese like Taiwan and the feeling is apparently mutual. “The Japanese built universities, roads, and other infrastructure. They educated us, they turned us into a more modern society,” said Hwang Kuan-hu, a national policy adviser to Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian, “We welcome Japan becoming more involved again with Taiwan.”76 Whether this mutual appreciation would translate into a formal Japanese pledge to assist Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression remains to be seen, but that should ultimately be a decision for the Japanese government, and the Japanese public, consistent with their own security concerns. The presumed wishes or desires of the United States should not be the determining factor. Given Taiwan’s strategic location across crucial Japanese lines of communication, the Japanese would view PRC control over the island as a security threat. Although Japan currently has only a limited capacity for blocking military annexation, a strong statement, building on the February 2005 joint declaration, may help deter Chinese military action against Taiwan. Even a position of deliberate ambiguity, holding out the possibility that Japan might employ military means to repel Chinese aggression, would likely be more credible coming from a regional military power than is the current ambiguous pledge originating with a United States that is struggling to sustain a host of commitments around the globe.
 * Japanese leadership is necessary to prevent a Chinese attack on Taiwan – it solves better than US military presence because China would be more credibly deterred by a regional actor, and Japan would support Taiwan**
 * Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute** [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, [], accessed 7/14/10]

Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute **[Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, [], accessed 7/14/10]** Meanwhile, Japan’s neighbors should welcome a potential counterweight to a rising China. Many already do. Attitudes toward Japan vary widely, with Taiwanese, Singaporeans, Filipinos, and Malays much more favorably disposed than are Koreans. The Chinese are not eager to see the emergence of a strategic competitor in Asia. From the perspective of political and military leaders in Beijing, a “proper” role for the Japanese SDF would have little if any impact on the regional balance of power. China’s path over the past 30 years has been marked by increased economic liberalization combined with some (albeit halting) political reform. But there is still a long way to go. Common economic interests within Asia may lead to China’s peaceful integration into the region. Or China could turn away from its current course of political and economic liberalization and revert to economic autarchy imposed by military force. It is even possible that China could become a revisionist power, no longer content to accept regional security configurations in their present form. That could occur even if the PRC holds to a course of economic reform. Against those unlikely but dangerous possibilities, East Asian countries might wish to adopt a hedging strategy that would allow for the emergence, in the meantime, of other regional powers capable of balancing against a rising China. Japan is the one regional power best suited to play this role. Japan is a stable and mature democracy. The pre–World War II era, when an imperial Japan attempted to secure an exclusive economic sphere for itself, is long past. The Japanese people have demonstrated a consistent aversion to the use of force and an equally strong determination to maintain firm civilian control over the nation’s military. It is highly unlikely that a new strategic relationship between the United States and Japan, one that affords Japan a place within the international community consistent with its economic, political, and military strength, would open the door to Japanese militarism that has remained dormant for nearly 60 years.
 * Expanding Japanese military power is necessary to balance Chinese expansion without destabilizing Asia – Japan is the only Asian nation that would be accepted as a counterweight**

One very clear fact emerged from my recent meetings with officials and foreign-policy scholars in Australia and New Zealand: even though both countries have major economic stakes in their relationship with China, they are exceedingly nervous about the possibility of Chinese hegemony in East Asia. Since most of them also are reaching the (reluctant) conclusion that the United States will not be able to afford indefinitely the financial burden and military requirements of remaining the region's security stabilizer, a role the United States has played since the end of World War II, they are looking for other options to blunt China's emerging preeminence. Increasingly, policy makers and opinion leaders in Australia and New Zealand seem receptive to the prospect of both India and Japan playing more active security roles in the region, thereby acting as strategic counterweights to China. That is a major shift in sentiment from just a decade or two ago. The notion of India as a relevant security player is a recent phenomenon, but there did not appear to be any opposition in Canberra or Wellington to the Indian navy flexing its muscles in the Strait of Malacca in the past few years. That favorable reaction was apparent even in vehemently anti-nuclear New Zealand, despite India's decision in the late 1990s to deploy a nuclear arsenal, which dealt a severe blow to the global nonproliferation cause. The emergence of a multipolar power system in East Asia is the best outcome both for the United States and China's neighbors.
 * Japanese leadership is key to a regional multipolar system to stabilize East Asia – it serves as a strategic counter weight to China**
 * Carpenter, 2010, vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute** [Ted, April 7, “Tokyo Rising”, available at [], accessed on 7/14/2010]

If China does not succumb to internal weaknesses (which are not trivial), it will almost certainly be the most prominent power in East Asia in the coming decades, gradually displacing the United States. But there is a big difference between being the leading power and being a hegemon. The latter is a result that Americans cannot welcome. The emergence of a multipolar power system in East Asia is the best outcome both for the United States and China's neighbors. It is gratifying that nations in the region seem to be reaching that conclusion. Australia and New Zealand may be a little ahead of the curve in that process, but the attitude in those countries about the desirability of Japan and India adopting more active security roles is not unique. Washington should embrace a similar view.
 * Asian Multipolarity is the best solution to Chinese expansion – Japan must play a leading role**
 * Carpenter, 2010, vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute** [Ted, April 7, “Tokyo Rising”, available at [], accessed on 7/14/2010]

Hunkovic, 09 - American Military University **[Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, []]** A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential **to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war**, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.
 * The impact is Global nuclear war**

The North Korean crisis may have provided the catalyst for a fundamental shift in Japanese strategy and policy, but it cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Although the steps thus far taken by Koizumi against North Korea have not satisfied a segment of the Japanese population, many of whom remain more concerned about the emotional abductee issue than about the objective security threat, China’s rise poses a more important challenge to Japan’s security over the medium to long term.93 For now, given the urgency of the North Korean threat to Japan, and befitting Japan’s emergence as a normal power, it would be natural for Japan to take a leading role in attempting to end North Korea’s nuclear program. As other regional threats become more serious, however, many Japanese may come to resent U.S. policies that appear to impede their reasonable efforts to defend themselves. Continued strong opposition within Japan to the use of the military for offensive ends suggests that unilateral preemptive action by Japan against North Korea is highly unlikely. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect that Tokyo would wait for U.S. permission to respond to a direct attack. It is only slightly more plausible that the Japanese would refrain from using force in response to credible evidence of an imminent threat. Military action against North Korea, even if it were found to be a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense, would certainly stir regional animosity. That is a reflection of the difficult balancing act that Japan must play vis-à-vis other potential allies in the region, chief among them South Korea. North and South Koreans alike harbor deep resentment toward the Japanese. Koreans were the victims of horrible crimes at the hands of the Japanese, of which the notorious abuses inflicted on Korean “comfort women” were only the most infamous. Although U.S. policymakers should rightly be concerned about regional hostility toward Japan, such concerns are not more worrisome than the crisis in the here and now, when an impoverished and increasingly desperate North Korea might be tempted to sell nuclear materials to terrorists. Short of offensive military operations against Pyongyang, Japan has other means for defending itself from North Korean nuclear weapons independent of the United States. Japan has cooperated with the United States in the construction of an anti-ballistic missile system, but the further development and deployment of such a system need not depend on U.S. support. If active countermeasures for dealing with regional security threats were deemed insufficient, the Japanese might even take the fateful step of developing their own nuclear deterrent.94 In short, a Japanese military, operating independent of the United States but still constrained by the pacifist impulses of the Japanese public, could prove a credible deterrent to offensive actions by North Korea against Japan proper and might also succeed in convincing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear ambitions, in contrast to U.S. economic and diplomatic pressure, which has been completely ineffective. Beyond the North Korean crisis, Japanese military power might prove instrumental for dealing with future serious challenges to the regional security order.
 * A more independent Japan would resolve North Korean provocation and proliferation better than America’s military presence – it would be more credible than US pressure which has empirically failed**
 * Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute** [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, [], accessed 7/14/10]

The International Crisis Group, 09 **(6/18/09, International Crisis Group, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” [], JMP)** This report examines North Korea’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities in the context of its military doctrine and national objectives. It is based on open source literature, interviews and unpublished documents made available to Crisis Group. Companion reports published simultaneously assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities and what the policy response of the international community should be to its recent nuclear and missile testing.[1] North Korea’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles pose serious risks to security. Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities are the greatest threat, but it also possesses a large stockpile of chemical weapons and is suspected of maintaining a biological weapons program. The Six-Party Talks (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) had been underway since August 2003 with the objective of ending the North’s nuclear ambitions, before Pyongyang announced its withdrawal in April 2009, but there is no direct mechanism for dealing with its chemical weapons and possible biological weapons. The North Korean leadership is very unlikely to surrender its WMD unless there is significant change in the political and security environments. The Six-Party Talks pro duced a “Statement of Principles” in September 2005 that included a commitment to establish a permanent peace mechanism in North East Asia, but the structure and nature of such a cooperative security arrangement is subject to interpretation, negotiation and implementation. Views among the parties differ, and no permanent peace can be established unless North Korea abandons all its WMD programs. The diplomatic tasks are daunting, and diplomacy could fail. If North Korea refuses to engage in arms control and to rid itself of WMD, the international community must be prepared to deal with a wide range of threats, including those posed by Pyongyang’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Unclassified estimates of the chemical weapons (CW) arsenal are imprecise, but the consensus is that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) possesses 2,500-5,000 tons, including mustard, phosgene, blood agents, sarin, tabun and V-agents (persistent nerve agents). The stockpile does not appear to be increasing but is already sufficient to inflict massive civilian casualties on South Korea. The North’s CW can be delivered with long-range artillery, multiple rocket launchers, FROGs (free rocket over ground), ballistic missiles, aircraft and naval vessels. North Korean military doctrine emphasises quick offensive strikes to break through enemy defences in order to achieve national military objectives before the U.S. can intervene effectively on behalf of its South Korean ally. However, the North’s conventional military capabilities are declining against those of its potential foes, so the leadership is likely to rely on asymmetric capabilities for its national security objectives. This strategy poses a significant danger because it risks deliberate, accidental or unauthorised WMD attacks or incidents.
 * Aggressive North Korean behavior makes the accidental or intentional use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Likely**

STRATFOR, 10 **(5/26/10, “North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula,”[], JMP)** Managing Escalation But no one, of course, is interested in another war on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides will posture, but at the end of the day, neither benefits from a major outbreak of hostilities. And despite the specter of North Korean troops streaming under the DMZ through tunnels and wreaking havoc behind the lines in the south (a scenario for which there has undoubtedly been significant preparation), neither side has any intention of invading the other. So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could precipitate escalation — that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quite real. Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. For nearly 40 years, tensions on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War. During that time it was feared that a second Korean War could all too easily escalate into and a thermonuclear World War III, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But current tensions are quickly escalating to a level unprecedented in the post-Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.
 * Even if a conflict won’t start intentionally, current high Korean tensions risk accidents that escalate to global nuclear war**

At the same time, it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others’ balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. Although the United States, contrary’ to my 1993 prediction, probably will not he challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010, it is even more doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for, at best, another two decades? Given that American hegemony’ is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to “shape the international system” to America’s liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish), it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.
 * America’s Forward Deployed military presence relies on a strategy of Unipolarity – which will inevitably collapse due to overstretch. We must begin transitioning away from unipolar primacy soon so that we can control the shape of the transition**
 * Layne, 2006- Senior Research Fellow at the CATO Institute.** [Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to Present)

What interests me here is that we’re talking about something that looks very much like the end of the Roman Republic—which was, in many ways, a model for our own republic—and its conversion into a military dictatorship called the Roman Empire as the troops began to take over. The kind of figure that the Roman Republic began to look for was a military populist; of course, the most obvious example was Julius Caesar. But after Caesar’s assassination in 44B.C., the young Octavian becomes the “god” Augustus Caesar. I’m not trying to be a sensationalist, but I actually do worry about the future of the United States; whether, in fact, we are tending in the same path as the former Soviet Union, with domestic, ideological rigidity in our economic institutions, im perial overstretch—that’s what we’re talking about here—the belief that we have to be everywhere at all times. We have always been a richer place than Russia was, so it will take longer. But we’re overextended. We can’t afford it. One of my four “sorrows of empire” at the end of the book is bankruptcy. The military is not productive. They do provide certain kinds of jobs, as you discover in the United States whenever you try and close a military base—no matter how con servative or liberal your congressional representatives are, they will go mad to try and keep it open, keep it functioning. And the military-industrial complex is very clever in making sure that the building of a B-2 bomber is spread around the country; it is not all located at Northrop in El Segundo, California.
 * Overseas bases in Japan will collapse US military readiness due to imperial overstretch**
 * Johnson, 2010, president of Japan Policy Research Institute** [Chalmers, May 6, “The Downward Slope of EmpireTalking With Chalmers Johnson”, [] .html, accessed 7/17/10]

Bandow, 2009, senior fellow at the Cato Institute **[Doug, August 31, “Tokyo Drift,” available at[], accessed on 7/14/2010]** In fact, America's aggressive foreign policy and force structure, oriented to offense rather than defense, is why the United States spends so much on the military — roughly half of the global total. Washington has eleven carrier groups in order to attack other nations, such as Iran, North Korea and China, not to prevent them from attacking America. Even more so, the role of U.S. bases and forces abroad is offensive, to intervene. Protecting war-torn allied states in the aftermath of the greatest conflict of human history made sense. Doing the same today, when allied states have prospered and the most serious hegemonic threat has disappeared, does not make sense. Washington should return to Japan responsibility for its defense. Even today, Tokyo, though spending just one percent of GDP ($47 billion last year) on the military, is on par with the leading European states. But with the world's second largest economy (third based on purchasing power parity), Japan could do much more. Doubling its defense effort — which would still be half of America's burden — would match Chinese military spending
 * Japanese bases make our leadership unsustainable – they cause interventionism because they are inherently offense oriented. This undermines US national security**

Bandow, 2009, senior fellow at the Cato Institute **[Doug, August 31, “Tokyo Drift,” available at[], accessed on 7/14/2010]** Particularly important is the future of so-called extended deterrence. Analysts like Harvard's Joseph Nye take the policy for granted, worrying only about whether or not it is credible. However, as Beijing develops its own strategic nuclear deterrent against America, the question will arise: should the United States risk Los Angeles for Tokyo? The increasing unpredictability of North Korean behavior has led to more discussion in Japan about the possibility of developing a countervailing weapon. The potential for further proliferation in the region is worrisome, but no more so than the possibility of a confrontation between the United States and nuclear-armed China over the interests of other nations. Deterrence can fail. And protecting other nations can lead them to be dangerously irresponsible. In any case, the United States would be less likely to have to rely on nuclear deterrence for Japan if that nation possessed an adequate conventional defense. With the rise of prosperous and/or populous allied states (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and several ASEAN nations) as well as friendly powers (India and Indonesia, most notably), Washington is in the position to act as an off-shore balancer, prepared to act against an aggressive hegemonic power should one arise, but not entangled in daily geopolitical controversies. America's overwhelming power and geographic isolation give Washington greater flexibility in defending its own security.
 * Offshore balancing solves better for US leadership than a forward deployed military presence in Japanese bases – it avoids nuclear entanglement in Deterrence failures – this outweighs the risk of proliferation**

The United States is far better placed than Britain ever was to be a successful offshore balancer, for two reasons: America's margin of power relative to other great powers is, and is likely to remain, far greater than Britain's was, and the United States enjoys a far higher degree of immunity from external threat than Britain did. The underlying premise of an offshore balancing strategy is that it will become increasingly more difficult, dangerous, and costly for the United States to maintain order in, and control over, the international political system. In contrast to the strategy of preponderance, offshore balancing would define U.S. interests narrowly in terms of defending America's territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian hegemon (that is, a state so powerful that, like Nazi Germany had Hitler been victorious, would potentially command sufficient resources to threaten North America). As an offshore balancer, the United States would disengage from its military commitments in Europe, Japan, and South Korea. The overriding objectives of an offshore balancing strategy would be to insulate the United States from possible future great power wars and maximize its relative power position in the international system. Offshore balancing would reject the strategy of preponderance's commitment to economic interdependence because interdependence has negative strategic consequences. Offshore balancing also would eschew any ambition to perpetuate U.S. hegemony and would abandon the ideological pretensions embedded in the strategy of preponderance. As an offshore balancer, there would be a strong presumption against U.S. involvement in the following kinds of activities: assertive promotion of democracy abroad; participation in peace enforcement operations; rescuing "failed states" (like Somalia and Haiti); and the use of military power for the purpose of humanitarian intervention. U.S. involvement in these types of external actions should be viewed skeptically because they seldom affect the geostrategic and security interests that would be the core of an American offshore balancing grand strategy. Offshore balancing is based on the following assumptions: balance of power strategies are superior to hegemonic ones; for a great power like the United States, economic interdependence is a danger, not a comfort; the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments will be significantly degraded in coming years; U.S. strategy need not be burdened by excessive concern with credibility, resolve, and reputation; geography has important grand strategic implications; the risk of a rival Eurasian hegemon emerging is small; U.S. grand strategy can confidently assume that other states would balance against a potential hegemon; the dynamics of alliance relationships favor an offshore balancing strategy; and relative power concerns remain the bedrock of a prudent grand strategy.
 * Offshore balancing solves great power conflict – it is an effective alternative to US unipolar primacy**
 * Layne, 98 Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School** (Christopher,, World Policy Journal, “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” Volume 15, Issue 2, Summer, Proquest)

Layne, 98 Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School **(Christopher,, World Policy Journal, “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?” Volume 15, Issue 2, Summer, Proquest)** Because of the interlocking effects of geography, nuclear weapons (which enhance insularity's strategic advantages), and formidable military and economic capabilities, the United States is virtually impregnable against direct attack. The risk of conflict, and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack, derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by an expansive definition of U.S. interests. In multipolar systems, insular great powers have a much broader range of strategic choices than less fortunately placed powers. They can avoid being entrapped by alliance commitments and need worry little about being abandoned by actual or potential allies. Offshore great powers also can choose to stay out of great power wars altogether or to limit their involvement--a choice unavailable to states that live in dangerous neighborhoods in which rivals lurk nearby. As an insular great power in a multipolar world, the United States would retain a free hand strategically: although it might need to enter into temporary coalitions, America would disengage from permanent alliance relationships. An insular great power like the United States need not subject itself to strategic constraints of this kind. The strategy of preponderance is based, in part, on the assumption that the United States must prevent the rise of a hegemonic challenger because other states either will not do the job, or at least will not do so effectively. In contrast, an offshore balancing strategy would recognize that, in a multipolar world, other states will balance against potential hegemons, and it is to America's advantage to shift this responsibility to them. In a multipolar world, the United States could be confident that effective balancing ultimately would occur because, to ensure their survival, other states have an incentive to balance against geographically proximate rivals, and great powers do not "bandwagon"--that is, they do not align with threatening, would-be hegemons. Because of its geographic position, the United States generally can stand aloof from security competitions and engage in strategic "buck passing," thereby forcing others to assume the risks and costs of balancing against threatening great powers. When an offshore balancer shifts to others the dangers entailed by "going first," it can reasonably hope that it will be able to avoid being drawn into war. The strategy of preponderance commits the United States to alliance relationships that run counter to geostrategic logic: it imposes the greatest burden (in terms of danger and cost) on the alliance partner (the United States) whose security is least at risk. An offshore balancing strategy, therefore, would reverse this pattern of alliance relations. There is no inherent reason why the United States should be compelled to bear the high costs of providing security for other states. Japan and Western Europe, for example, long have possessed the economic and technological capabilities to defend themselves. But the strategy of preponderance (notwithstanding U.S. complaints about burden-sharing inequities) has actively discouraged them from doing so because American policymakers fear any diminution of U.S. control over the international system (including control over U.S. allies) would have adverse geopolitical consequences. Washington has decided that it is more preferable strategically for the United States to defend Germany and Japan than it is for Germany and Japan to defend themselves. In contrast, offshore balancing would rest on the assumption that America's overall strategic position would be enhanced by devolving to others the responsibility for their own defense. The Strategic Consequences of Economic Openness The strategy of preponderance incorporates contradictory assumptions about the importance of relative power. On the one hand, the strategy seeks to maximize America's military power by perpetuating its role as the predominant great power in the international system. Yet, the strategy's economic dimension is curiously indifferent to the security implications of the redistribution of power in the international political system resulting from economic interdependence. Nor does the strategy resolve the following conundrum: given that economic power is the foundation of military strength, how will the United States be able to retain its hegemonic position in the international political system if its relative economic power continues to decline? In purely economic terms, an open international economic system may have positive effects. But economics does not take place in a political vacuum. Strategically, economic openness has adverse consequences: it contributes to, and accelerates, a redistribution of relative power among states in the international system (allowing rising competitors to catch up to the United States more quickly than they otherwise would). This leads to the emergence of new great powers. The resulting "power transition," which occurs as a dominant power declines and new challengers arise, usually climaxes in great power wars. 24 Because great power emergence is driven by uneven growth rates (that is, some states are growing faster economically than others), there is little, short of preventive war, that the United States can do to prevent the rise of new great powers. But U.S. grand strategy, to some extent, can affect both the pace and the magnitude of America's relative power decline.
 * It’s not a questions of “Hegemony Good” vs “Hegemony Bad” – it is a question of which Strategy best promotes and extends US Global Leadership – an Onshore Military Presence or an Offshore Balancing role. Offshore balancing solves All of their offense—multipolarity boxes in conflicts and allows the U.S. to maintain strategic flexibility**

These numbers make clear that Japan already plays an active role in world affairs, in spite of the constitutional restrictions on the use of military force. What Japan has lacked for much of its history since the end of World War II is the incentive and the will to take responsibility for its own security—and for regional security—to a degree commensurate with its economic power and interests. The U.S. security guarantee serves as a disincentive for change, and U.S. policy has therefore impeded the development of Japan’s indigenous military capabilities, capabilities that might prove useful to both countries in the future. The best way to break this cycle of dependence is to phase out the American security guarantee and replace it with a more equitable mutual defense pact. It is unlikely that Japan can assume its place among the community of great nations—despite its considerable wealth and foreign policy activism through financial aid—without a fundamental reorientation of the current patron-client security relationship with the United States.
 * The US military presence deters Japan from developing its own military capabilities due to dependence – withdrawal will encourage Japan to assume an international leadership role**
 * Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute** [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, [], accessed 7/14/10]

Under the terms of the current security treaty, Japanese forces have primary responsibility for defending Japan. Those forces, although configured for self-defense, also possess the capability to play a wider role in the region, but they have been discouraged from doing so by the presence of U.S. forces in the region, particularly on the island of Okinawa. Accordingly, the Bush administration should clearly outline U.S. plans for shifting security responsibilities to the Japanese, a process that would culminate with the removal of U.S. forces from Japan. The announcement that 8,000 Marines will be moved from Okinawa to Guam by 2012 does not go nearly far enough fast enough96 and implies that U.S. forces will forever remain on Japanese soil in some capacity. Instead of assuming an indefinite troop presence, the final security agreements between the two countries should include provisions for port access for the United States, and the agreements might also include some prepositioning of heavy equipment, in the event that other U.S. facilities in the western Pacific (for example at Guam, Hawaii, and Wake Island) prove inadequate to deal with future security emergencies.97 Continued consultations would allow the Japanese to take prudent steps to address their own security needs and possibly also to assume broader security responsibilities in East Asia. But consultations might not be enough to assuage Japanese concerns about their security over the long term. The Japanese are already considering changes to their constitution, most important Article 9, and the push for such modifications may take on added urgency as the U.S.-Japan security relationship changes. The Japanese might also contemplate the need for an indigenous nuclear deterrent. Japan has long possessed the ability to develop nuclear weapons. It is unrealistic to expect that Japan would permanently eschew such weapons if, in the end, they were seen as essential for Japanese security, but there are many reasons to believe that the Japanese will weigh such considerations very carefully.
 * Withdrawing our presence encourages Japan to expand its military role in Asia – this is necessary for regional security arrangements**
 * Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute** [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, [], accessed 7/14/10]

Bandow, 2010, senior fellow at the Cato Institute **[Doug, March 25, “Okinawa and the Problem of Empire,” available at[], accessed on 7/14/2010]** The Japanese people may decide that the threats they face are small — as, indeed, they are today. However, the future might not be so safe. Brad Glosserman of the Pacific Forum CSIS argues that "Northeast Asia, from a Japanese perspective, is a scary place." A threatening North Korea and aggressive China are much bigger potential threats to Tokyo than to Washington. The Japanese government needs to assess future dangers and decide on appropriate responses — without assuming that the U.S. Marines will show up to the rescue. It is Japan's decision, but it should not be based on the presumption of American intervention. Having made its decision, then Tokyo should reconfigure its forces. Fairness suggests a major drawdown from Okinawa irrespective of whose military is protecting Japan. If the U.S. disengaged militarily, these decisions could be made without pressure from Washington. The two countries would still have much to cooperate about, including security. Leaving responsibility for Japan's defense with Tokyo would simply eliminate the unrealistic expectations engendered by the alliance on both sides. The governments could focus on issues of mutual interest, sharing intelligence, preparing emergency base access, and otherwise cooperating to meet international challenges. The best way for Americans to help residents of Okinawa is to press Washington to reshape U.S. foreign policy, making it more appropriate for a republic than a pseudo-empire. With the rise of numerous prosperous allied and friendly states — most notably Japan, but also South Korea, Australia, India, and others — the U.S. should step back, prepared to deal with an aggressive hegemon should one arise but determined to avoid being dragged into routine geopolitical squabbles. Then Tokyo could chart its own destiny, including deciding what forces to raise and where to base them. The Japanese government could no longer use American pressure as an excuse for inaction in Okinawa. Then Okinawans finally might gain justice — after 65 long years.
 * Withdrawal allows Japan’s military to contain future threats by increasing flexibility and by allowing the US to act as an offshore balancer**

The Obama administration should pursue a different course, a transformational agenda, emphasizing economic integration while promoting military detachment. America still has a major economic role to play, but should increasingly devolve defense responsibilities on countries in the region. The most important relationship for the 21st century will be that between the existing superpower and the potential superpower. Washington should strengthen economic and trade ties with China. Moreover, Washington must forge a cooperative relationship on difficult regional issues like North Korea. The PRC has much at stake on a stable Korean Peninsula; it also has much to gain from taking the lead in promoting diplomatic solutions of regional problems. The president should press for a more active PRC policy to support reinvigorated U.S. engagement with the North. Washington should speak frankly about the importance of human rights, while recognizing America's limited ability to influence the PRC's behavior. An improved bilateral relationship is more likely than isolation to encourage greater respect by Beijing for the liberty of its citizens. The president should treat Japan as a full partner. In economics, that means proposing a free trade agreement. On defense, rather than merely adjusting its controversial Status of Forces Agreement, Washington should withdraw its garrisons from Japanese soil and turn defense responsibility for Japan over to Tokyo. The U.S. also should encourage greater cooperation between Japan and its neighbors. World War II ended more than six decades ago: The Japanese do not have a double dose of original sin and America should no longer play geopolitical wet-nurse for nations that long ago developed the means to protect their own interests. Washington should engage North Korea over its nuclear program. At the same time, the U.S. should inform the North that full international integration requires the participation of South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia as well. The Obama administration should coordinate South Korea, Japanese, and U.S. policies regarding Pyongyang. However, Washington should allow the Republic of Korea to lead the nonproliferation campaign. Seoul has the most at stake in maintaining a peaceful peninsula. As the U.S. steps back from its dominant military role, the ROK and its neighbors should step forward. At the same time, Washington should seek to tighten regional economic integration. The starting point should be a push to ratify the FTA with South Korea. President Obama needs to promote a changed attitude as much as offer new policies. The Japanese government apparently is interested in promoting a regional order, called the East Asian Community, apart from the U.S. Washington should embrace rather than resist such an approach. The U.S. will be most secure if friendly states in East Asia work together to confront sources of instability, promote respect for human rights, and encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes. Such a cooperative venture also would help channel China's rise in peaceful directions. The U.S. will remain engaged in East Asia. America's cultural and economic ties are long-lasting and mutually beneficial. But Washington no longer has any need to attempt to preserve regional military hegemony.
 * Withdrawal from Okinawa causes the US to forge new relations with East Asia that encourage cooperation and diplomatic solutions**
 * Bandow, 2010, senior fellow at the Cato Institute** [Doug, March 25, “Okinawa and the Problem of Empire,” available at[], accessed on 7/14/2010]

On the other hand, it seems more likely that, in the absence of U.S. pressure to become more actively involved around the world, a more independent Japan would use its military forces to deal with issues more directly relevant to its own national security. That would be beneficial to both the United States and Japan. To be sure, an equitable strategic partnership could make things more difficult for U.S. policymakers in certain instances, but that is a chance worth taking in the interest of devolving security responsibilities away from the United States and lowering U.S. risk exposure. Reducing the global U.S. military presence is essential to alleviating the considerable burdens on U.S. taxpayers, who collectively spend more than 10 times as much on defense as do the Japanese. U.S. policy should seek to accelerate Japan’s emergence as a more effective military ally in the region. Within the context of a more equitable U.S.-Japan alliance, if Japanese forces were deployed to any country far outside the East Asian region, their dispatch would be dependent on Tokyo’s assessment of Japanese security interests and therefore would be far more likely to enjoy the support of the Japanese public. Under the current patron-client relationship, Japanese and American officials alike have bent over backwards to place the small number of SDF troops in a location where they are unlikely to be exposed to harm; by extension, this small number of troops is not measurably contributing to the completion of the mission in Iraq; nor are they substantially reducing the threat to other Coalition forces. In short, their presence is almost entirely symbolic and has little, if any, strategic value. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Koizumi risked some political capital, as well as time and attention, rallying a modicum of public support for an exceedingly modest, even token, military deployment. And while the Japanese agonized over the dispatch of a few hundred troops to a country thousands of miles away, China ratcheted up its threats against a democratic entity a few hundred miles away from Japan and North Korea continued to process nuclear material. At best, Japan’s conduct seems a case of misplaced priorities and confusion over Japan’s strategic interests; at worst, Japan has subordinated its own interests to those of its distant patron.
 * Japanese independence allows it to focus on its most important foreign policy issues, fostering responsible leadership. It also reduces the US’s exposure to entanglement**
 * Preble, 2006, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute** [Christopher, April 18, “Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship”, [], accessed 7/14/10]

Bandow, 2009, senior fellow at the Cato Institute **[Doug, October 20, “Transforming Japan-US Alliance,” available at[], accessed on 7/14/2010]** Tokyo should spend whatever it believes to be necessary on its so-called "Self-Defense Force." Better relations with China and reform in North Korea would lower that number. Japan should assess the risks and act accordingly. In any case, the U.S. should indicate its willingness to accommodate Tokyo's changing priorities. It's the same strategy that Washington should adopt elsewhere around the globe. The Marine Expeditionary Force stationed on Okinawa is primarily intended to back up America's commitment to South Korea. Yet, the South has some 40 times the GDP of North Korea. Seoul should take over responsibility for its own defense. Even more so the Europeans, who possess more than 10 times Russia's GDP. If they don't feel at risk, there's no reason for an American defense guarantee. If they do feel at risk, there's no reason for them not to do more — a lot more.
 * Forcing Japan to fund its own military will force it to act more responsibly – they will look for diplomatic solutions because they are cheaper.**