Matt+and%20Kevin


 * Subject to minor changes**

The United States federal government should reduce nearly all of its military presence in Afghanistan to a level necessary to pursue a counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan.

Observation 1 is consequences will never be the same.

The war in Afghanistan will collapse American primacy – 3 internal links:

First – credibility. Obama announced a July 2011 withdrawal date, but at most only small numbers will leave and it depends on conditions on the ground. CBS News 6/24** (Brian Montopoli, 6/24/10, " July 2011 Deadline for Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal: Politics Over Policy? ", http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20008781-503544.html ) **
 * When President Obama announced late last year he was deploying 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, he said the troop surge would "allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011." …political pressure from the left may simply be too significant for the White House not to make at least some concessions to their deadline.**

The July 2011 announcement destroyed the perception of US commitment to Afghanistan Rubin, 10** – resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute ; senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations; and a senior editor of the // Middle East Quarterly //. (Michael, Public Square, 3/8, “The Afghanistan Withdrawal: Why Obama Was Wrong to Insist on a Deadline,” http://www.michaelrubin.org/7033/afghanistan-withdrawal-deadline ) **
 * It is true, as Schlesinger points out,  that Obama did … Pakistan, Iran, and even Russia  .**

Second –overstretch Counterinsurgency doctrine is overstretching the US military and exhausting American leadership – withdrawing to a counterterrorism strategy is vital to preventing great power challengers Kretkowski, 10 ** – Frequently assists think tank in conferences and other work products that aid DoD's long-term thinking about threats that may not be addressable via weapons platforms. Spent six months in Afghanistan working with Army public affairs. (Paul, “Against COIN, for CT in Afghanistan and Elsewhere”, 1/7, Beacon (a blog), http://softpowerbeacon.blogspot.com/2010/01/against-coin-for-ct-in-afghanistan-and.html) **
 * Over the winter break I had an epiphany about the interrelation of U.S. hard and soft power: …  Latin American instability (Mexico, Venezuela, post-Castro Cuba);  rogue-state nuclear development (Iran, North Korea); or complex challenges from a rising power (China, a reinvigorated Russia  ).**

Afghanistan is a quagmire of attrition warfare that is destroying US morale and readiness. Kuhner, 9 - **the president of the Edmund Burke Institute for American Renewal (Jeffrey, Washington Times, “Obama’s quagmire; US should look to its own interests,” 9/7, Lexis Academic)  **


 * America is losing the war in Afghanistan. … The Taliban is too hated to reoccupy the country - unless our huge military and economic footprint drives numerous Afghans into the evil, welcoming arms of extremists.**

This will obliterate American primacy Pyne, 9 - ** Vice Chair of the Utah State Legislative Compensation Commission and Vice President of the Association of the United States Army's Utah chapter and a Vice President of the Salt Lake Total Force Chapter of the Military Officers Association of America (David, “  Obama failing our troops in Afghanistan,” 11/7, http://westernfrontamerica.com/2009/11/07/obama-failing-troops-afghanistan/) **
 * Since we invaded Iraq six and a half years ago and Afghanistan eight years ago, we have lost nearly 7,000 American soldiers and contractors killed in action with tens of thousands more severely wounded at the cost of a trillion dollars thus far… .  Even Russia has done so with their invasion of US-ally Georgia  this past year.**

American primacy is vital to accessing every major impact—the only threat to world peace is if we allow it to collapse Thayer, 6 - ** professor of security studies at Missouri State (Bradley, The National Interest, “In Defense of Primacy”, November/December, p. 32-37) **
 * A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power‑the diplomatic, economic and military leader. …As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.**

The alternative is multi or a polarity – that’s results in escalation of regional conflicts and transition wars
[Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “End of Dreams, Return of History” //Policy Review,// []] This is a good thing, and … use its natural resources as  means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-… will provide an easier path. The plan solves – reducing to a counterterrorism focus creates sustainable presence, and prevents vacillations between engagement and isolationism Stewart, 9- ** Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan ) **
 * Kagan, 2007**
 * The best Afghan policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of 90,000 to far fewer – perhaps 20,000. … and humanitarian assistance and work out how to work with fewer troops and less money over a longer period. In Afghanistan in the long-term, less will be more.**

Obama will sell the plan as a drawdown to a lighter but permanent commitment to Afghanistan – this resolves confusion over the withdrawal deadline and restores US credibility Stewart, 10 ** - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “ Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14,  http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3) **
 * But this moderate tone gains Obama the leverage that Bush lacked. …  We might hope in South Asia,  for example,  for a lighter involvement in Afghanistan but a much greater focus on Kashmir  .1**

The plan’s rejection of counterinsurgency creates a doctrinal shift towards selective engagement that can sustain US presence globally Gventer, 9 ** - Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. She served two tours in Iraq, including a year as a senior adviser to General Peter Chiarelli, the operational commander in Iraq in 2006 (Celeste, “False Promise of 'Counterinsurgency'”, 12/1, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/12/01/NYT.html) **
 * An effort to conduct "counterinsurgency" in Afghanistan is not just a costly business for still-unspecified strategic returns. …  based on  confidence in America's own values, protection of its borders, strong intelligence capabilities, and  selective engagement of a strong, credible U.S. military capable of applying overwhelming force.  **

Maintaining a large counterinsurgency strategy will bankrupt the US, end the dollar and collapse global US financial influence Corn, 9 ** – Ph.D. from the University of Paris and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, currently on leave from the US State Department (Tony, “Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan? Bounding Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, 10/21, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/10/toward-a-kilcullenbiden-plan/ **
 * Just do the math - with 63,000 troops on the ground, the cost for the U.S. of the Afghan War is already 6.7 billion dollars a month. With a hypothetical 40,000 troop increase, it would rise to //more than 10 billion a month//. …That said, a //temporary// 40,000 //surge// remains a realistic option, but only so long as the White House strategy rests on two pillars “bounding” the counterinsurgency campaign - on the one hand, a convocation of a new loya jirga as advocated by counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen - on the other, a regional diplomatic settlement as advocated by Vice-President Joe Biden.**

Economic leadership prevents economic collapse—leadership preserves resilience Mandelbaum 2005** – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005 [Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 192-195] **
 * Although the spread of nuclear weapons, with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be fired in anger somewhere in the world, counted as the most serious potential consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's government, it was not the only one. … A world without the United States would in this way resemble a fleet of cars without gasoline.**

That goes nuclear without economic leadership Mandelbaum 2005** – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005 [Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 224] **
 * At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic uncertainty that characterized the years before World War II. …and because of the presence, in large numbers, of nuclear weapons.**

Observation 2 is: One does not simply walk into Mordor

__In June__ Gen. McChrystal, then … __ anyone would say we're winning." __
 * We are losing the war now – violence is increasing**
 * Bandow 7/20** (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan, 7/20/10, “Why Are We in Afghanistan?” http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11995)

Counterinsurgency failure inevitable – the mountainous terrain and impossible troop requirements mean the Taliban can hide forever Stewart, 10 ** - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “ Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14,  **
 * http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3) **
 * The counterinsurgency strategy and surge in Iraq led to a drop in violence (against predictions),  but the same will not happen in Afghanistan  . In short, COIN won’t work on its own terms because of the lack of numbers and a credible Afghan partner and in absolute terms because of the difficulties of the country and its political structures.**

A large military footprint combined with the perception of an illegitimate government make crushing the Taliban impossible – it can recruit faster than we can kill
 * Galston 10 - Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ Brookings (William, Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ Brookings, “A Question of Life and Death: U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” Brookings, June 15th, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0615_afghanistan_galston.aspx) **
 * Are the basic premises of our current policy in Afghanistan fatally flawed? … we’re stuck with the Taliban as a long-term military presence and political force in Afghanistan.**

Pashtun nationalism and the lack of history with a strong state make combatting corruption or raising a sustainable security force impossible. Dorronsoro, 09 ** - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (9/23/09, Gilles, The National Interest, “Afghanization,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22218 ) **
 * In addition, there is no state structure to speak of in the Pashtun belt. …Yet it is unrealistic to expect quick results, especially in training the Afghan National Army. And at the same time, it is more and more difficult to argue in support of the discredited Karzai regime. **

Nationalism means that even if the US won every battle it couldn’t beat the insurgency Dorronsoro, 09 ** - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2/9/09, Gilles, The National Interest, “Going South in Afghanistan,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20794 ) **
 * Afghanistan may be the right war, but the United States could very well fight it in the wrong place…. This is the Taliban’s historical base and they understand the political dynamics of these regions better than any foreign forces ever could. **

Multiple impacts - First – Pakistan. A large counterinsurgency footprint drives insurgents to Pakistan, mobilizes the Pakistani Taliban and will cause Pakistan to collapse Akhtar, 10- ** professor of international relations, and a senior analyst & writer. He was the dean of faculty of management, Baluchistan university, and former chairman of International Relations Department, Karachi university (1/26/10, Shameem, “Pakistan’s Instability : The US War Factor,” http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1262372328640&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs/MAELayout# **1 ) If it is a war against extremists and militancy inside Pakistan, it is a civil war because its **origins stem** from the US, NATO occupation of neighboring Afghanistan … These have been overshadowed by the counterinsurgency operations in FATA, but they may erupt at any moment, thus destabilizing the state.

|| ||
 * Pakistan collapse causes global nuclear conflict – draws in China, India and Russia**
 * Pitt, 9** - //a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” // http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183 )



But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. … The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

WASHINGTON — President Obama is asking world leaders to commit to a new international offense against nuclear terrorism  — a threat so dire that it  could challenge "our ultimate survival  ." … Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack" by 2013.
 * Second – terrorism –**
 * Risk of nuclear terrorism is high – probably an attack will come from al Qaeda by 2013 **
 * Hall, 10 ** (Mimi, USA Today, “Obama seeks front against nuclear terror”, 4/12, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-11-nukesummit_N.htm

I spent five years as a counterterrorism analyst for the Pentagon and rigorously studied plots from Madrid to London to 9/11… .. But to avoid the Big One, the U.S. president's best bet is to deny al Qaeda the only physical space it can access.
 * Afghanistan is a vital safe haven for al Qaeda – terrorism is inevitable but nuclear risks can be reduced is the US drives them out **
 * Arkedis, 9 ** - director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute. He was a counterterrorism analyst with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service from 2002 to 2007 (Jim, “Why Al Qaeda Wants a Safe Haven”, 10/23, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/got_safe_haven)

Speice 06 – 06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary (Patrick Jr., “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427] Accordingly, there is a significant and … the use of nuclear weapons  . 53
 * A nuclear terrorist attack escalates to a global nuclear war**

When the administration's principal war target is not the Taliban but rather al-Qaida remnants on the run, why chase a troop-intensive strategy pivoted on protecting population centers to win grassroots support? …The threat of an Islamist takeover of Pakistan comes not from the Taliban but from these groups that have long drawn support from the Pakistani army as part of the deep-rooted military-mullah alliance.
 * Gradual withdrawal while maintaining a counterterrorism strategy allows more effective US leadership in the war on terror and maximizes US credibility **
 * Chellany, 09 ** - professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi (9/14/09, Brahma, Japan Times, “An Advantagous U.S. Exit,” http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090914bc.html )

This three-zone strategy is not, //per se,// a gamechanger, and it must be accompanied by an incremental, phased withdrawal… Corruption is a problem primarily if it accelerates the independence of Afghanistan’s peripheral regions.
 * Withdrawal of combat troops will immediately turn the population against the Taliban and shore up Afghan government legitimacy **
 * Dorronsoro, 9 - ** Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (January 2009, Gilles, “Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War,”http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf)

It will therefore take about three years to get to this posture. …The counterterrorism option is not only possible, but as Steve Simon and Jonathan Stevenson argue, it is the best alternative for the United States.
 * A counterterrorism posture empirically works – it reduces the threat of terrorism and can provide actionable intelligence without undermining US credibility **
 * Long, 10 ** - assistant professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Austin, “Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in Afghanistan,”Orbis, Spring 2010, Science Direct)