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Pervasive surveillance has ushered us into a society of control, subjectivity is ceded to the corporations and a capitalist teleology steals identity in favor of sustaining the system.
Deleuze 90 (Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies,” L’autre Journal 1, May 1990) 1. History Foucault located the disciplinary societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ; they reach their height at the outset of the twentieth. They initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one closed environment to another, each having its own laws: ﬁrst, the family; then the school  (“you are no longer in your family");  then the barracks  (“you are no longer at school");  then the factory ; from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison , the preeminent instance of the enclosed environment. It's the prison that serves as the analogical model: at the sight of some laborers, the heroine of Rossellini’s Europa '51 could exclaim, “I thought I was seeing convicts." Foucault has brilliantly analyzed the ideal project of these environments of enclosure, particularly visible within the factory: to concentrate; to distribute in space; to order in time; to compose a productive force within the dimension of space-time whose effect will be greater than the sum of its component forces. But what Foucault recognized as well was the transience of this model: it succeeded that of the societies of sovereignty , the goal and functions of which were something quite different (to tax rather than to organize production, to rule on death rather than to administer life); the transition took place over time,  and  Napoleon seemed to effect the large-scale conversion from one society to the other. But in their turn the disciplines underwent a crisis to the beneﬁt of new forces that were gradually instituted and which accelerated after World War II: a disciplinary society was what we already no longer were, what we had ceased to be. We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure—prison, hospital, factory, school, family. The family is an “interior," in crisis like all other interiors—scholarly, professional, etc. The administrations in charge never cease announcing supposedly necessary reforms: to reform schools, to reform industries, hospitals, the armed forces, prisons. But everyone knows that these institutions are ﬁnished, whatever the length of their expiration periods.  It's only a matter of administering their last rites and of keeping people employed until the installation of the new forces knock ing at the door. These are the societies of control  , which are in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies. “Control" is the name Burroughs proposes as a term for the new monster, one that Foucault recognizes as our immediate future. Paul Virilio also is continually analyzing the ultrarapid forms of free-ﬂoating control that replaced the old disciplines operating in the time frame of a closed system. There is no need here to invoke the extraordinary pharmaceutical productions, the molecular engineering, the genetic manipulations, although these are slated to enter into the new process. There is no need to ask which is the toughest or most tolerable regime, for it’s within each of them that liberating and enslaving forces confront one another. For example, in the crisis of the hospital as environment of enclosure, neighborhood clinics, hospices, and day care could at first express new freedom, but they could participate as well in mechanisms of control that are equal to the harshest of conﬁnements. There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons. 2. Logic The different internments or spaces of enclosure through which the individual passes are independent variables: each time one is supposed to start from zero, and although a common language for all these places exists, it is analogical. On the other hand, the different control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a system of variable geometry the language of which is numerical (which doesn't necessarily mean binary). Enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point. This is obvious in the matter of salaries: the factory was a body that contained its internal forces at a level of equilibrium, the highest possible in terms of production, the lowest possible in terms of wages; but in a society of control, the corporation has replaced the factory, and the corporation is a spirit, a gas. Of course the factory was already familiar with the system of bonuses, but the corporation works more deeply to impose a modulation of each salary, in states of perpetual metastability that operate through challenges, contests, and highly comic group sessions. If the most idiotic television game shows are so successful, it's because they express the corporate situation with great precision. The factory constituted individuals as a single body to the double advantage of the boss who surveyed each element within the mass and the unions who mobilized a mass resistance; but the corporation constantly presents the brashest rivalry as a healthy form of emulation, an excellent motivational force that opposes individuals against one another and runs through each, dividing each within. The modulating principle of “salary according to merit“ has not failed to tempt national education itself. Indeed, just as the corporation replaces the factory, perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control to replace the examination. Which is the surest way of delivering the school over to the corporation. In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never ﬁnished with anything —the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation. In The Trial, Kafka, who had already placed himself at the pivotal point between two types of social formation, described the most fearsome of juridical forms. The apparent acquittal of the disciplinary societies (between two incarcerations); and the limitless postponements of the societies of control (in continuous variation) are two very different modes of juridical life, and if our law is hesitant, itself in crisis, it's because we are leaving one in order to enter into the other. The disciplinary societies have two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her position within a mass. This is because the disciplines never saw any incompatibility between these two, and because at the same time power individualizes and masses together, that is, constitutes those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the individuality of each member of that body. (Foucault saw the origin of this double charge in the pastoral power of the priest—the flock and each of its animals—but civil power moves in turn and by other means to make itself lay “priest.”) In the societies of control , on the other hand, what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password , while on the other hand the disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords (as much from the point of view of integration as from that of resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer ﬁnd ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become “dividuals ," and masses, samples, data, markets, or “banks." Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best, since discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold in as numerical standard, while control relates to ﬂoating rates of exchange, modulated according to a rate established by a set of standard currencies. The old monetary mole is the animal of the spaces of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control. We have passed from one animal to the other, from the mole to the serpent, in the system under which we live, but also in our manner of living and in our relations with others. The disciplinary [person] was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the [person] of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports. Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society—not that machines are determining, but because they express those social forms capable of generating them and using them. The old societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines—levers, pulleys, clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy and the introduction of viruses. This technological evolution must be, even more profoundly, a mutation of capitalism, an already well-known or familiar mutation that can be summed up as follows: nineteenth- century capitalism is a capitalism of concentration, for production and for property. It therefore erects the factory as a space of enclosure, the capitalist being the owner of the means of production but also, progressively, the owner of other spaces conceived through analogy (the worker's familial house, the school). As for markets, they are conquered sometimes by specialization, sometimes by colonization, sometimes by lowering the costs of production. But, in the present situation, capitalism is no longer involved in production, which it often relegates to the Third World, even for the complex forms of textiles, metallurgy, or oil production. It’s a capitalism of higher-order production. It no longer buys raw materials and no longer sells the ﬁnished products: it buys the ﬁnished products or assembles parts. What it wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy is stocks. This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which is to say, for being sold or marketed. Thus it is essentially dispersive, and the factory has given way to the corporation. The family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner —state or private power— but coded ﬁgures—deformable and transformable —of a single corporation that now has only stockholders. Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank. The conquests of the market are made by grabbing control and no longer by disciplinary training, by ﬁxing the exchange rate much more than by lowering costs, by transformation of the product more than by specialization of production. Corruption thereby gains a new power. Marketing has become the center or the “soul" of the corporation . We are taught that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world. The operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impudent breed of our masters. Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, inﬁnite and discontinuous. [ The subject] is no longer [someone] enclosed, but [someone] in debt . It is true that capitalism has retained as a constant the extreme poverty of three quarters of humanity, too poor for debt, too numerous for conﬁnement: control will not only have to deal with erosions of frontiers but with the explosions within shanty towns or ghettos. 3. Program The conception of a control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open environment at any given instant (whether animal in a reserve or human in a corporation, as with an electronic collar), is not necessarily one of science ﬁction. Félix Guattari has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s neighborhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position—licit or illicit —and effects a universal modulation. The socio-technological study of the mechanisms of control, grasped at their inception, would have to be categorical and to describe what is already in the process of substitution for the disciplinary sites of enclosure, whose crisis is everywhere proclaimed. It may be that older methods, borrowed from the former societies of sovereignty, will return to the fore, but with the necessary modifications. What counts is that we are at the beginning of something. In the prison system: the attempt to ﬁnd penalties of “substitution,” at least for petty crimes, and the use of electronic collars that force the convicted person to stay at home during certain hours. For the school system: continuous forms of control, and the effect on the school of perpetual training, the corresponding abandonment of all university research, the introduction of the “corporation" at all levels of schooling. For the hospital system: the new medicine “without doctor or patient" that singles out potential sick people and subjects at risk, which in no way attests to individuation—as they say—but substitutes for the individual or numerical body the code of a “dividual" material to be controlled. In the corporate system: new ways of handling money, profits, and humans that no longer pass through the old factory form. These are very small examples, but ones that will allow for better understanding of what is meant by the crisis of the institutions, which is to say, the progressive and dispersed installation of a new system of domination. One of the most important questions will concern the ineptitude of the unions : tied to the whole of their history of struggle against the disciplines or within the spaces of enclosure, will they be able to adapt themselves or will they give way to new forms of resistance against the societies of control ? Can we already grasp the rough outlines of these coming forms, capable of threatening the joys of marketing ? Many young people strangely boast of being “motivated"; they re- request apprenticeships and permanent training . It's up to them to discover what they're being made to serve, just as their elders discovered, not without difficulty, the telos of the disciplines . The coils of a serpent are even more complex than the burrows of a molehill.
 * Edited for gendered language

Societies of control bereave us of agency and establish difference as a threat to be eliminated justifying endless enemy construction and violence.
Technologies of Control __There can be little doubt that we are living today in a control society.__ The signs are all around us: ubiquitous CCTV cameras filming public spaces; the introduction of biometric scanning and facial recognition technology in major airports; the planned implementation of ID cards in the United Kingdom and elsewhere - cards which would contain biometric information;1 widespread DNA testing for even minor offences, and the setting up of national DNA databases; the use of electronic monitoring bracelets for offenders or terrorist suspects placed under home detention; the use of 'smart cards' on public transport systems and for accessing health services, and so on. __ We are see ing the development - bit by bit - of **an all-encompassing system of surveillance** and regulation, the weaving of a n intricate web of overlapping circuits of control, information gathering and identification.__ __We live in a society that is more closely and minutely monitored, regulated and policed than ever before, where personal privacy is more or less non-existent, and where information about our whereabouts, personal details and spending habits is ceaselessly collected by both governments and corporations__ (the two entities are now all but indistinguishable). De Tocqueville, in his exploration of American democracy in the nineteenth century spoke of a new despotism there, 'an immense and protective power' that stands above the race of men and keeps them in perpetual childhood (de Tocqueville 1966: 667). __Today we can find this protective power operating in societies of control - where ** surveillance technologies and government paternalism combine to hold us in a state of perpetual childhood** and dependency. From the TV monitoring of large crowds of people in public places, to the technological intrusion into individual bodies, desires and pathologies through DNA testing and the mapping of the human genome, **we are subjected to a new technology of power which seeks to make everything visible in a way that even Foucault could not have dreamt of** - the old panoptic techniques employed in the prison, school and workshop now seem almost laughable by comparison.__ 1 Already Foucault had analysed the growth of disciplinary technologies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, tracing their permeation of an ever wider array of social practices - medical care, punishment, military training, pedagogy, psychiatry. Such disciplinary practices, which - reversing the old medieval paradigm - imprisoned the body within the 'soul', were to be found functioning in enclosed institutions that we had hitherto seen as politically innocent: the school, the family, the hospital. Disciplinary power, moreover, coincided with a certain transformation of the law: increasingly, the law was being used to enforce the norm, creating certain standards of behaviour and rationality according to which the 'abnormal' was constituted as an object of perverse fascination (Foucault 2002: 1-89). As Foucault showed: __There also appeared the idea of a penalty that was not meant to be a response to an infraction but had the function of correcting individuals at the level of their behaviour, their attitudes, their dispositions, the danger they represented - at the level of their supposed potentialities. __ (Foucault 2002: 67) __Today, this deployment of the law for the purposes of normalisation has become the most banal and uncontroversial feature of the societies of control: in the name of controlling what governments like to call 'anti­ social' behaviour, we see the proliferation of an endless series of petty, ridiculous and excessive laws which regulate, at the most minute level, personal behaviours and actions.__ Ideological wars are now waged against 'noisy neighbours', 'rogue cyclists', 'inconsiderate motorists', 'skinny models', 'irresponsible parents', 'parents who smack their children', 'obese children', 'problem children', 'welfare cheats', smokers, paedophiles - and a series of fines, sanctions, punishments are enforced for the most trivial of infractions.3 __Any aberrant or deviant behaviour is immediately pathologised, medicalised, criminalised ; it comes under the authority of social workers, teachers, doctors, police, judges, prison officials, psychiatrists - **a whole diffuse and localised network that polices and monitors** **individuals**.__ Here the most sophisticated of control technologies - DNA screening, electronic tagging, forced medication - work in tandem with the most rigid and draconian laws and policies of 'zero­tolerance' in order to reproduce the tyranny of the norm: the law becomes normalisation and normalisation becomes the law. __Such techniques of control have the effect of position ing individuals as **continual subjects of risk and suspicion**__ (Campbell 2004: 78-92): __ every young person is potentially a thug or a criminal, every Muslim potentially a terrorist .__ __Control techniques are used not so much to identify a particular individual, but rather to identify a future risk and to attach this risk to certain types of individuals.__ Governments today, for instance, talk about identifying children 'at risk' of delinquency or of posing a potential threat to society - in some cases before they are even born! __New surveillance technology is even being developed which claims to be able to predict crimes and terrorist attacks on public transport systems before they occur - CCTV recordings of members of people on buses and trains are matched against computer files of 'suspicious' behaviour, triggering an alarm when they correspond. We see here the automatic functioning of control technology - where computers rather than judges, police and psychiatrists become the arbiters of the norm.__ __Perhaps we could say that whereas disciplinary societies constituted the subject as a fixed identity - defining__ __ him ____[them] according to rigid categories such as normal/abnormal, sane/mad - ** societies of control seek to define the individual through a series of different, modulated and overlapping states of risk **, with indeterminate and shifting borders: being 'at risk' of delinquency, terrorism__ (we see that the metaphor of the virus is now used to describe the risk of terrorism spreading through Muslim communities, fuelled by those demonic 'radical preachers'), __sickness, mental illness, Attention Deficit Disorder, drug abuse, and so on. ** We are now all positioned as subjects of permanent risk, capable of certain unpredictable and criminal behaviours at any time.**__
 * Newman ‘9** (Saul Newman, Professor of Political Theory@ ULondon, “Politics in the Age of Control”, //Deleuze and New Technology//, ed. Mark Poster, pg 105-107, //wcp//)

Control societies use the logic of biopower to control every aspect of life sustaining violent policing against marked bodies
Biopolitics and Global Capitalism __In this paradigm, moreover, the body itself becomes the site of permanent crisis and, thus, the target of control technologies .__ The body is policed, monitored, controlled - and yet is seen as constantly threatened by obesity, smoking, binge-drinking. Health standards such as the BMI (Body Mass Index) are enforced with all the ferocity of Victorian moral codes. __ Our bodies - particularly our genes - have become the source of all our pathologies, moral failings and deviant behaviours: it is no longer our sexuality, as Foucault maintained, but our DNA that is seen as the secret of our being .__ This obsession with the body would be characteristic of what Foucault himself termed 'biopower' - a new kind of power that functioned at the level of biological life, seeking to control its flows and functions and to harness its vital forces. __The emergence of this new political technology coincided with developments, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in the biological, human and social sciences, and governmental discourses - bodies of knowledge and political rationalities which took the population and economic life as their proper domain__. As Foucault says: For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its fatality; part of it passed into knowledge's field of control and power's sphere of intervention. (Foucault 1979: 142) It is within this paradigm of biopower that governments busy themselves with health matters, with 'obesity epidemics', for instance; that they take an interest in the health of individuals and the general population; that they centralise medical information in large national databases. __Biopower, and the practice of biopolitics, in this sense, can be seen as providing a general strategy of coordination for the diffuse technologies of control. To put it simply, ** the general aim of power today is the control of life itself**.__ As Foucault showed, politics no longer generally subscribes to the sovereign function of the power to kill, the power to end life - although as we shall see, this sovereign function has uncannily reappeared today at the heart of modern power regimes; rather, power now functions to preserve and sustain life. __Yet, as benign as this might sound, it means that power now reaches deep into life itself, controlling, monitoring and regulating its palpitations. Moreover, ** the destruction of life in the name of preserving it functions as biopower's permanent and lethal underside **. __ Deleuze's notion of control as superseding discipline can only be understood against the background of biopower/biopolitics. Already Foucault himself had charted a general shift from disciplinary power to biopower: __while disciplinary power was focused on the individual, his body and his pathologies, biopower focuses on the population at large, monitoring its movements, migrations and epidemics; measuring its birth, mortality and longevity rates; assessing its economic output.__ It produces a sort of globalising effect. Secondly, __where disciplinary power sought to enclose the individual within a physical or discursive space, biopower presupposes a certain freedom of movement and choice - therefore requiring a free-floating and modulated form of regulation and control__ (Foucault 2003). The superseding of disciplinary power by biopower - a process accompanied by a frequent overlapping between the two paradigms - seems to directly prefigure De1euze's description of the emergence of the control society. __Control societies seek an all - encompassing control over life - both at the global level of populations, and at the infinitesimal level of our biological substratum.__ __Moreover, the logic of biopolitical control coincides with and sustains the spread of global capitalism and the unchallenged hegemony of the neo-liberal economic model. Economic liberalism__, as Foucault showed, __was not a withdrawal of the state from economic life__ - as traditional laissez-faire notions would have it - __but rather a much more complex interaction whereby the market is discursively constructed as an entity to be shaped and guided through certain governmental rationalities and strategies__ (Foucault 2004; Gordon 1991). **__Moreover, within this paradigm, individuals are seen as subjects to be regulated and policed through the market.__** __In modern control societies, this occurs through the construction of the subject as a consumer who has a certain number of 'choices' defined by the market; and who is subjected to constant advertising.__ The individual is thus policed through the market. As Deleuze points out, control today takes place through marketing, and the individual is no longer the individual but the 'dividual' who is inserted into an endless series of samples, data and markets: 'marketing is now the instrument of social control and produces an arrogant breed who are our new masters' (Deleuze 1995: 181). __ This new breed of master s is none other than ** the corporation : an entity which now has a global reach and achieves a planetary colonisation**, turning the world into a giant market. The corporation is the 'soul', as Deleuze would say, of modern control societies.__ However, what we see is not simply the corporation taking over from the government and displacing its traditional role of service provider, but rather __the corporation and the government melding together and becoming indistinguishable. Public/private sector 'partnerships' increasingly manage what were traditionally public services and infrastructure; governments and government institutions today are run like corporations__, introducing private sector management techniques and free market mechanisms, and subjecting employees to continual performance reviews. Moreover, __the economic and social dislocations wrought by neoliberal economic policies require a more sophisticated form of social control: the workforce must be disciplined, and industrial and political militancy must be discouraged - ** the only acceptable form of freedom in modern neoliberal societies is the narrow consumerist freedom of the market .**__ The destruction of traditional working-class identities and communities due to retrenchment, downsizing and outsourcing must be patched over with a new ideological conservatism - one that stresses the dangers posed to community and family life from crime, drugs, anti­social behaviour and the breakdown of discipline. The communitarian discourse of New Labour in the UK - with its almost hysterical focus on 'law-and-order' issues - would be an example of this, functioning as nothing more than a flimsy disguise for its ruthless pursuit of Thatcherite economic policies. __The spectre of crime or terrorism serves as a n ideological scapegoat here: society needs its enemies, as Foucault would say, and the enemies of the control society - ** those who endanger our 'safety' and 'security' - are constituted as the 'other' ** in opposition to which society achieves an uncertain cohesion.__ __In our current paradigm of neo-liberal global capitalism, then, the technology of control is required to harness the productive energies of the population, while at the same time imposing on it a new form of social disciplining and surveillance.__ In what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) refer to as a new capitalist Empire, __social and biopolitical control and surveillance circulates through a **diffuse hybrid network of localised points - thus producing a new form of global sovereignty**, one without a defined centre of power. With the breakdown of the traditional model of the nation-state, where **the state no longer exercises sovereignty over economic life within its borders**, new forms of control are required which flow across borders, mimicking the very fluidity of capitalist flows themselves.__ As Hardt and Negri write: 'Empire thus appears as a very high tech machine: it is virtual, built to control the marginal event, and organised to dominate and when necessary intervene in the breakdowns of the system (in line with the most advanced technologies of robotic production)' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 39). __Deleuze and Guattari themselves see capitalism as a process of deterritorialisation - in which identities and institutions are destabilised and integrated into global circuits of flux and becoming.__ __And yet, as they point out, for every deterritorialisation there is also a reterritorialisation: **while capitalism releases flows of desire, and economic and social flows, it simultaneously imposes a 'code' on them, seeking to regulate and control them**__ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 129). Control technology is the means by which this is achieved.
 * Newman ‘9** (Saul Newman, Professor of Political Theory@ ULondon, “Politics in the Age of Control”, //Deleuze and New Technology//, ed. Mark Poster, pg 107-110, //wcp//)

The rhizmoatic nature of surveillance makes targeted approaches at change asinine and counter-productive
Haggerty and Ericson 2000 (Kevin D. Haggerty Department of Sociology University of Alberta and Richard V. Ericson Principal of Green College Professor of Law and Sociology University of British Columbia, “The Surveillant Assemblage”, British Journal of Sociology Vol. 51 Issue No. 4 pg. 614–616, December 2000)

RHIZOMATIC SURVEILLANCE Deleuze and Guattari (1987) outline how ‘rhizomes’ are plants which grow in surface extensions through interconnected vertical root systems. The rhizome is contrasted with arborescent systems which are those plants with a deep root structure and which grow along branchings from the trunk. The rhizome metaphor accentuates two attributes of the surveillant assemblage : it s phenomenal growth through expanding uses, and its leveling effect on hierarchies. Rhizomatic Expansion Rhizomes grow across a series of interconnected roots which throw up shoots in different locations. They ‘grow like weeds’ precisely because this is often what they are. A rhizome ‘may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 9). Surveillance has comparable expansive and regenerative qualities. It is now estimated that there are 500,000 surveillance cameras operating in Britain (Freeman 1999), where a city dweller can now expect to be caught on film every five minutes (Duffy 1999). Paul Virilio argues that this growth in observation has transformed the experience of entering the city: ‘Where once one necessarily entered the city by means of a physical gateway, now one passes through an audiovisual protocol in which the methods of audience and surveillance have transformed even the forms of public greeting and daily reception’ (Virilio 1997: 383). Resounding echoes of his point can be heard in the effusive boastings of an operation’s director for a British surveillance firm who recounts how ‘The minute you arrive in England, from the ferry port to the train station to the city centres, you’re being CCTV’d ’ (Freeman 1999). The study by Norris and Armstrong (1999) of British CCTV also demonstrates how this ostensibly unitary technology is in fact an assemblage that aligns computers, cameras, people and telecommunications in order to survey the public streets. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize how ‘ the rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots’ (1987: 21). No single technological development has ushered in the contemporary era of surveillance. Rather, its expansion has been aided by subtle variations and intensifications in technological capabilities, and connections with other monitoring and computing devices. Some of the rhizomatic offshoots of the surveillant assemblage derive from efforts to seek out new target populations that ostensibly require a greater degree of monitoring. The list of such populations is limited only by imagination, and currently includes, for example, the young, caregivers, commuters, employees, the elderly, international travelers, parolees, the privileged and the infirm. Much of this expansion is driven by the financial imperative to find new markets for surveillance technologies which were originally designed for military purposes (Haggerty and Ericson 1999). For Orwell, surveillance was a means to maintain a form of hierarchical social control. Foucault proposed that panoptic surveillance targeted the soul, disciplining the masses into a form of self-monitoring that was in harmony with the requirements of the developing factor y system. However, Bauman (1992: 51) argues that panopticism in contemporary society has been reduced in importance as a mechanism of social integration. Instead of being subject to disciplinary surveillance or simple repression, the population is increasingly constituted as consumers and seduced into the market economy. While surveillance is used to construct and monitor consumption patterns , such efforts usually lack the normalized soul training which is so characteristic of panopticism. Instead, monitoring for market consumption is more concerned with attempts to limit access to places and information, or to allow for the production of consumer profiles through the ex post facto reconstructions of a person’s behaviour, habits and actions. In those situations where individuals monitor their behaviour in light of the thresholds established by such surveillance systems, they are often involved in efforts to maintain or augment various social perks such as preferential credit ratings, computer services, or rapid movement through customs. Foucault’s larger body of work displays an appreciation for the multiple uses and targets of surveillance. Most discussions of surveillance fixate on his analysis of the panopticon, with its individualized disciplinary form of bodily scrutiny. However, Foucault also analysed aggregate forms of surveillance. Institutions are involved in the production and distribution of knowledge about diverse populations for the purpose of managing their behaviour from a distance (Foucault 1991). In this way, surveillance also serves as a vital component of positive population management strategies. The concept of ‘surplus value’ has traditionally been associated with Marxism. For Marx, it designated how the owners of the means of production profit from workers’ excess labour power for which they are not financially compensated. Surveillance plays an important role in this process, as it allows managers to establish and monitor production norms at previously unheard of levels. Today, however, surplus value has escaped from a purely labour-oriented discourse and can now also be located in the language of cybernetics. Increasingly important to modern capitalism is the value that is culled from a range of different transaction and interaction points between individuals and institutions. Each of these transactions is monitored and recorded, producing a surplus of information. The monetary value of this surplus derives from how it can be used to construct data doubles which are then used to create consumer profiles, refine service delivery and target specific markets. There is a growing trade in the corporate sale of such information. Governments are also keen to profit from the sale of information stored in scattered official databases. Millions of dollars are already being made through the sale of data from license bureaus, personal income data and employment records (Kanaley 1999). In a cybernetic world, surplus value increasingly refers to the profit that can be derived from the surplus information that different populations trail behind them in their daily lives. The public is slowly awakening to the profits that are being made from the sale of their data doubles. One consequence of this recognition has been the further commodification of the self. Parallel to how the emergence of the wage economy necessitated the fixing of monetary prices to labour power, citizens and economists are now contemplating what, if any, compensation individuals should receive for the sale of their personal information. Dennis (1999) reports on a recent study which found that 70 per cent of Britons were happy to have companies use their personal data, on the condition that they receive something in return, such as more personal service or rewards. Privacy is now less a line in the sand beyond which transgression is not permitted, than a shifting space of negotiation where privacy is traded for products, better services or special deals. In addition to a desire for order, control, discipline and profit, surveillance has voyeuristic entertainment value. Clips from CCTV’s are now a staple of daytime talk shows while programmes such as America’s Dumbest Criminals have helped soften the authoritarian overtones of mass public surveillance (Doyle 1998). The proliferation of hand-held video cameras has also given rise to America’s Funniest Home Videos, as well as the more morbid Faces of Death videos which portray a procession of accidental fatalities which have been captured on film.

Voting affirmative can free the subject from the telos of bureaucracy and allow a joyous creativity in its place
Deleuze and Negri 90 (Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri, “Gilles Deleuze in conversation with Antonio Negri,” [] ) Negri: In your book on Foucault, and then again in your TV interview at INA,6 you suggest we should look in more detail at three kinds of power: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and above all the control of "communication " that's on the way to becoming hegemonic. On the one hand this third scenario relates to the most perfect form of domination, extending even to speech and imagination, but on the other hand any man, any minority, any singularity, is more than ever before potentially able to speak out and thereby recover a greater degree of freedom. In the Marxist Utopia of the Grundrisse, communism takes precise­ly the form of a transversal organization of free individuals built on a tech­nology that makes it possible. Is communism still a viable option? Maybe in a communication society it's less Utopian than it used to be? Deleuze: We're definitely moving toward "control" societies that are no longer exactly disciplinary. Foucault's often taken as the theorist of discipli­nary societies and of their principal technology, confinement (not just in hospitals and prisons, but in schools, factories, and barracks). But he was actually one of the first to say that we're moving away from dis­ciplinary societies, we've already left them behind. We're moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication. Bur­roughs was the first to address this. People are of course constantly talking about prisons, schools, hospitals: the institutions are breaking down. But they're breaking down because they're fighting a losing battle. New kinds of punishment, education, health care are being stealth­ily introduced. Open hospitals and teams providing home care have been around for some time. One can envisage education becoming less and less a closed site differentiated from the workspace as anoth­er closed site, but both disappearing and giving way to frightful con­tinual training, to continual monitoring7 of worker-schoolkids or bureaucrat-students. They try to present this as a reform of the school system, but it's really its dismantling. In a control-based system noth­ing's left alone for long. You yourself long ago suggested how work in Italy was being transformed by forms of part-time work done at home, which have spread since you wrote (and by new forms of circulation and distribution of products). One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine —with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermo-dynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies. But the machines don't explain any­thing, you have to analyze the collective arrangements of which the machines are just one component. Compared with the approaching forms of ceaseless control in open sites, we may come to see the harsh­est confinement as part of a wonderful happy past. The quest for "uni-versals of communication" ought to make us shudder. It's true that, even before control societies are fully in place, forms of delinquency or resistance (two different things) are also appear ing. Computer pira­cy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and what the nine­teenth century called "sabotage" ("clogging" the machinery) .8 You ask whether control or communication societies will lead to forms of resis­tance that might reopen the way for a communism understood as the "transversal organization of free individuals." Maybe, I don't know. But it would be nothing to do with minorities speaking out. Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They're thoroughly per­meated by money—and not by accident but by their very nature. We've got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something dif­ferent from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control. Negri: In Foucault and in The Fold, processes of subjectification seem to be studied more closely than in some of your other works. The subject's the boundary of a continuous movement between an inside and outside. What are the political consequences of this conception of the subject^ If the subject can't be reduced to an externalized citizenship, can it invest citizenship with force and life? Can it make possible a new militant pragmatism, at once a pietas toward the world and a very radical construct. What politics can carry into history the splen­dor of events and subjectivity. How can we conceive a community that has real force but no base, that isn't a totality but is, as in Spinoza, absolute? Deleuze: It definitely makes sense to look at the various ways individuals and groups constitute themselves as subjects  through processes of subjec-tification:  what counts in such processes is the extent to which, as they take shape, they elude both established forms of knowledge and the dominant forms of power. Even if they in turn engender new forms of power or become assimilated into new forms of knowledge. For a while, though, they have a real rebellious spontaneity. This is nothing to do with going back to "the subject," that is, to something invested with duties, power, and knowledge. One might equally well speak of new kinds of event, rather than processes of subjectification: events that can't be explained by the situations that give rise to them, or into which they lead. They appear for a moment, and it's that moment that matters, it's the chance we must seize. Or we can simply talk about the brain: the brain's precisely this boundary of a continuous two-way movement between an Inside and Outside, this membrane between them. New cerebral pathways, new ways of thinking, aren't explicable in terms of microsurgery; it's for science, rather, to try and discover what might have happened in the brain for one to start thinking this way or that. I think subjectification, events, and brains are more or less the same thing. What we most lack is a belief in the world, we've quite lost the world, it's been taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small their surface or volume. It's what you call pietas. Our ability to resist control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move. We need both creativity and a people.

Societies of control draw lines to position the population against the insurgent and use necropolitics to violently eliminate the other, it’s the root cause of all violence impacts
Mirzoeff 11. Nicholas, professor in the Department of Media, Culture and Communication at New York University, “The Right to Look”, Duke University Press 2011. The goal of such governance is not to produce disciplined, docile bodies, so much as to manage what Deleuze called the “ // society of control // .” In the parlance of counterinsurgency, this terrain is known as “culture,” sometimes even defined and described using poststructuralist and cultural-studies theorists—including Deleuze. T his // post-panoptic imaginary //  operates a  // control // that seeks to separate the “host population” from the “insurgent,” as if quarantining the former from infection by the latter. This // necropolitics //  is  // invisible //  to the insurgent, with no expectation of //reforming// or //disciplining// that person, hence the sense that it is //post-panoptic//. For Bentham's Panopticon was designed above all to reform and improve the inmate, pupil, or factory worker, while post-panoptic visuality centers on population control. Despite an apparent but carefully stage-managed success in Iraq, which seems to be coming unstuck after the failed elections of 2010, global counterinsurgency has struggled to deliver basic services and public safety in its key areas of operations from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Yemen. These quantitative shortcomings are perhaps the corollary of the qualitative failure to define the practice of counterinsurgency beyond the classification and separation of the insurgent. Precisely because this is the era of globalization, characterized by transnational migration and electronic media, the digitized “border” between insurgent and host population consistently fails to hold. In the resulting crisis, the very pattern that counterinsurgency is trying to sustain is unclear : a centralized nation, a client state, or a global market? Although the U.S. military continue to use a moralized rhetoric of //nation-building//, their practical administration of counterinsurgency has significantly shifted to the management of disaster by means of targeted killing of insurgents using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ( UAV ), Special Forces, and private contractor s. Ironically, perhaps, the Bush-era pursuit of governmentality in regions like Afghanistan has yielded to Obama's //necropolitics// , in which killing enemy leaders is the priority, epitomized by the killing of Osama bin Laden.

The 1AC affirms an infinite process of becoming, our assault on conventional subjectivity liberates the subject from asinine guilt and microfascism.
But the usual suspects have another, much more serious problem. Even if postmodern liberals can reject Nietzsche’s assaults on capitalism and the liberal state—and it is easy enough to locate passages in Nietzsche’s books where he seems to contradict these assaults—those who would use Nietzsche to shore up the eroding foundations of liberal democracy must contend with the even more powerful and radical forms of anarchy which are to be found in Nietzsche’s thought. They must contend, for example, with Nietzsche’s well-known anarchy of the subject. A number of commentators have pointed out that one of Nietzsche’s main contributions to political thought is his destruction of the con­ventional concepts of human subjectivity which lie at the basis of most modem political theories. Keith Ansell-Pearson suggests, for example, that the Genealogy aims “to show that one of the central ideas of moral and political theory, that of a human subject in possession of conscience and a free will, is not a natural given.”51 William Connolly points out that after Nietzsche, “the subject is not simply or unambiguously the self which establishes its unity, freedom, independence and self-transparency.” __And the assault on conventional __ (i.e., post-Enlightenment) __ideas of subjectivity is not simply a metaphysical or epistemological issue. It is also a deeply political issue which has profound implications for the construction of political theories and institutions.__ Those implications do not bode well for liberalism. Mark Warren summarizes the problem nicely: “ __Because liberals put a metaphysical placeholder in the space of the individual, they failed to theorize this space. As a result, they justified liberal forms of the state in terms of a historically conditioned effect mistaken for a universal essence.__ This is why Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism in Western culture as the collapse of the individual as agent also implicates the individualistic metaphysics of liberalism.’’53 __ Nietzsche’s assault on modern sub­jectivity, then, undermines the philosophical foundations of the liberal state .__ After Nietzsche, liberals find themselves thrown into a confusing postmodern world of multiple subject positions and decentered identities. They are forced to try to develop a new kind of liberal politics, one which will not rely upon epis­temologically suspect categories of individuality. This is, as we have seen, a difficult task, and one which liberals rarely complete in a satisfying way. Let us now look in more detail at Nietzsche’s anarchy of the subject. Nietzsche famously regarded the free will which is central to most conventional notions of subjectivity as an egregious error. For example, he notes in Human, All Too Human that “we do not accuse nature of immorality when it sends thunderstorms and makes us wet: why do we call the harmful man immoral? Because in the latter case we assume a voluntary commanding free will, in the former necessity. But this distinction is an error,”54 __Here **Nietzsche seems to be advocating a kind of radical determinism: he views individual actions not as the product of some chimerical free will, but rather as the indirect product of the social and cultural forces** which have constituted the individual who performs those actions.__ Of course, this has radical implications for political theory. __If we understand individual actions as the product of the society and culture which produced the individual, then society is quite literally to blame for what its members do.__ This naturally renders conventional ideas of punishment radically incoherent. “How is it that every execution offends us more than a murder?” Nietzsche demands. “It is the coldness of the judges, the scrupulous preparation, the insight that here a human being is being used as a means of deterring others. For it is not the guilt that is being punished, even when it exists: this lies in educators, parents, environment, in us, not in the murderer—I mean the circumstances that caused him to become one.”55 This is a key point for the postmodern anarchist. __ If we accept that humans possess no metaphysical, pre­social essence , if we accept that they are little more than nodal points where var­ious social, economic, and cultural forces converge to produce the illusion of subjectivity, then the punishment schemes of the liberal state make no sense. Indeed, on this reading it would make more sense to execute the system itself, since ** it is the system that is guilty of manufacturing criminals **. Revolutionaries who follow this kind of interpretation would also, perhaps, be less likely to al­low their uprisings to descend into the kind of mindless terror__, which was, un­fortunately, to be found in abundance in France during the 1790s, in Russia dur­ing the 1920s and 1930s, or in China during the 1950s. I say this because the radical denial of free will applies to the rulers as well as the ruled. __This point was made, remarkably enough, by Bakunin, who observed in 1869 that “ the kings, the oppressors, exploiters of all kinds, are as guilty as the criminals who have emerged from the masses; like them, they are evildoers who are not guilty, since they, too, are involuntary products of the present social order.”56 ** Let the guillotine be deployed , then, not against aristocratic or bourgeois tyrants, but against the philosophy of subjectivity which gives such tyrants their power in the first place.**__ Nietzsche continues his assault on traditional forms of subjectivity and con­sciousness in Beyond Good and Evil, questioning whether “there must necessar­ily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an ‘ego,’ and, finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I know what thinking is.”57 An obvious assault on the old Cartesian concept of subjec­tivity (“I think, therefore I am”), __Nietzsche’s critique of consciousness also has dramatic political meaning. These “thinking egos”—the rational, autonomous subjects who have dominated political discourse since the Enlightenment—are supposedly the beings who vote in liberal elections, who serve on the liberal juries which decide the fate of the supposedly autonomous criminals who stand before them, who use the media to inform themselves about issues so that they may form rational opinions, and so on. In short, a whole host of liberal theories and institutions depend upon a certain idea of subjectivity which is, after Nietzsche, extremely difficult to sustain.__ This anarchy of the subject makes possible another, possibly even more rad­ical form of anarchy, an anarchy of becoming. __ If Nietzsche is right about the sta­tus of the subject in the late modern period—-and an entire tradition of twentieth-century Continental philosophy suggests that his analysis is at least presciently persuasive with regards to the postmodern period—then we must radically rethink what it means to be human. Previous concepts of subjectivity __ (and thus previous political theories) __ focused on being: I am this autonomous person __, I am this rational citizen of a liberal democracy. **__ Nietzsche shifts our attention to becoming __**__.__ If, as he argues, the subject has no firm metaphysical ground and no center, __ if indeed our subjectivity is in a constant state of flux, then **the meaning of our lives must be** **constantly changing **. __ It is, of course, somewhat alarming to think that we might have no fixed being, that our essence (if we have one) must reside in a constant stream of transformations. __However, the thought of becoming can also be a very liberating thought.__ All radical thinking demands change, and Nietzsche’s demands more than most. __To the conventional radical’s demand for social and political change, Nietzsche adds the demand for a change in our very consciousness, in the way we view our relationship to time and history. In this sense Nietzsche’s thought stands as one of the most radical ever conceived, for it asserts nothing less than this: ** change is the very heart of who and what we are **. __ And this is true, says Nietzsche, not only of ourselves but of our world. “If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there were for it some unintended final state, this also must have been reached. If it were in any way capable of a pausing and becoming fixed, of ‘being,’ if in the whole course of its becoming it possessed even for a moment this capability of ‘being,’ then all becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, all ‘spirit.’ The fact of ‘spirit’ as a form of becoming proves that the world has no goal, no final state, and is incapable of being.”58 __For Nietzsche the world has no teleology, no destination.__ The forces of history do not direct us toward a Zeitgeist named Hegel. Indeed, if Hegel was the preeminent philosopher of the state, Nietzsche’s philosophy of perpetual becoming can only herald the state’s demise. __Conventional radicals who find themselves dismayed at the seeming invin­cibility of ossified states and entrenched economic structures might find Nietzsche’s thought invigorating in this respect, for the philosophy of becoming assures us that nothing is permanent. **Oppressive institutions** **and reactionary ideas will not endure; these institutions and these ideas are, like the people who created them, nothing more than streams of becoming **. The philosophy of be­coming thus suggests that we are in a state of permanent and total revolution, a revolution against being .__ 59 __Becoming also implies the kind of radical personal responsibility which is so crucial to anarchist theory. “We, however, want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.”__ 60 __ Nietzsche views humans not as finished beings but as works of art, and specifically works in progress. The philosophy of becoming implies a single ethical imperative: **become who you are, create yourself as a masterpiece. ** And as Nietzsche argues, this involves cre­ating one’s own law. Needless to say, this kind of radical individual legislation is hardly compatible with the legislative system of any statist order.__ It is thus misleading to suggest, as Bruce Detweiler does, that the philoso­phy of becoming “means that the Left’s cry for social justice is based upon an error.”61 Detweiler should say that the orthodox Left suffers from this error. The postmodern Left embraces becoming, and refuses to formulate its emancipatory policies in terms of epistemologically suspect categories of subjectivity. This may seem strange—whom are we liberating?—but it is the only way for radical thinking to avoid the traps of modernist political theory. And while this post­modern revolutionary thinking may be odd, it is not impossible. The revolu­tionary possibilities of becoming have been conceived most clearly by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. “ __All becoming is becoming- minoritarian,” they tell us; “becoming-minoritarian is a political affair and necessitates a labor of power, an active micropolitics. This is the opposite of macropolitics, and even of History, in which it is a question of knowing how to win or obtain a majority.”__ 62 __This micropolitics is crucial to any postmodern political agenda. The Left must learn once and for all the lessons of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao: macropolitical action, however well-intentioned, does not produce meaningful liberation. The attempt to seize control of the state, to direct the flow of history in the name of some ill-defined class of supposedly rational proletarian subjects, is doomed to failure.__ But this by no means heralds the end of radical thought. It simply means that we must refocus our attention on the possibilities of postmodern anarchism. “Common sense, the unity of all the faculties at the center constituted by the Cogito,” writes Deleuze, “is the State consensus raised to the absolute.”63 But this consensus is confronted by “counterthoughts, which are violent in their acts and discontinuous in their appearances, and whose existence is mobile in history.”64 __Nietzsche’s thought of becoming is certainly such a counterthought. Its effect is not to encourage the reform of the state or the seizure of state power but rather to **abolish the conditions of thinking which make the state possible in the first place**. The micropolitics implied by the philosophy of becoming suggests that our primary duty is to reprogram or redesign ourselves, creating ourselves anew as the kind of beings who can legislate new values and inscribe new laws. Interestingly, then, the anarchy of the subject proclaimed by Nietzsche does not by any means imply the end of our responsibility to constitute ourselves as sub­jects.__ 65 __ Out of the critical anarchy of the subject, there emerges an equally pow­erful but affirmative anarchy of becoming, one which understands humans not as beings with fixed essences but rather as selves-in-process.__ __Of course, the im­plication of this for state institutions is quite dire: such institutions run the risk of becoming entirely irrelevant once these processes of becoming and self ­transformation proceed past a certain point. As Rolando Perez astutely observes, “the overman or over(wo)man is she who no longer needs the State, or any other institution, for that matter. She is her own creator of values and as such the first true an(archist).”66__ There is, of course, a danger here. The move toward an anarchy of becoming is an extraordinarily radical one, both politically and epistemologically. Like all such moves, it carries with it this risk: if all essence, all fixed being, all laws of states and subjects are to be swept away in the torrent of becoming, can we be sure that this torrent will not carry us into some dark quagmire? Can we avoid, for example, the danger of becoming-fascist? __This is a genuine danger, especially if (following Deleuze) we begin to suspect that what lends fascism its terrifying seductive power is its ability to operate at an almost cellular level: “ what makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement: a cancerous body rather than a totalitarian organism. ”67 The real horror of fascism grows not, perhaps, out of the fact that it can seize power at the macropolitical level; any state can do that. What is peculiarly hor­rific about fascism is the way that it penetrates the smallest nooks and Crannies of the social organism. “Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, fas­cism of the Left and fascism of the Right, fascism of the couple, family, school and office: every fascism is defined by a micro-black hole that stands on its own and communicates with the others, before resonating in a great, generalized cen­tral black hole.”68 At the microscopic level, ** fascism is able to divert many of the supposedly liberating streams of personal becoming, sucking them down into the seemingly irresistible gravity-well of an ethical-political black hole **.__ Is this the limit of becoming? Must we conclude that becoming is bordered by a law after all—a visceral, pretheoretical law which says simply, “I will not give myself over to the fascist inside me”? Perhaps. But I do not believe that this constitutes a fatal flaw of anarcho-becoming. The possibility of fascism does not strip becoming of its anarchistic implications. Rather, microfascism should be understood as the limit which defines becoming, grants it a definite (albeit fluid and flexible) shape, and prevents it from dissipating into a politi­cally meaningless gasp of chaos. Foucault reminds us that “the limit and trans­gression depend on each other for whatever density of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally, trans­gression would be pointless if it merely crossed a limit composed of illusion and shadows.”69 I would say of anarcho-becoming and microfascism what Foucault has said of transgression and the limit. They have a definite relation­ship—not dialectical, to be sure, but spiraling. __The threat of microfascism is what motivates anarcho-becoming, what makes it possible, and indeed what completes it. Anarcho-becoming is thus locked in a permanent duel with micro- fascism, but ironically this duel is actually crucial to the anarchy of becoming, for it is what channels and focuses that anarchy into a coherent program of polit­ical self-creation. By granting the anarchy of becoming something to define it­self against, microfascism takes a strange force—which might otherwise exhaust itself in futile, formless rage—and transforms that force into a powerful post­modern political agenda. ** Kill your inner fascist —this single, minimal limit opens up incomprehensibly vast vistas of becoming,** for there are surely a bil­lion ways to fulfill this prescription.__ And it is a prescription which comes not from the mind but from the viscera—as Nietzsche would surely be delighted to observe. Anarchy of the subject, anarchy of becoming—Nietzsche lays the founda­tions for some of the most unique and innovative varieties of anarchist thinking which are to be found in modern political theory. And yet the usual suspects would be quick to point out that there are powerful elements of Nietzsche’s thinking which seem to undermine those foundations. Is not der Ubermensch some kind of acting agent who hopes to impress his will upon human history? And (even more troubling for the postmodern anarchist) doesn’t Nietzsche’s thought, despite all the rhetorical force of its drive towards becoming, return eternally to a deep concern for being? Nowhere are these twin problems made more manifest than in the works of Martin Heidegger. “We must grasp Nietzsche’s philosophy as the metaphysics of subjectivity," Heidegger provoca­tively declares.70 “Nietzsche’s thought has to plunge into metaphysics because Being radiates its own essence as will to power; that is, as the sort of thing that in the history of truth of beings must be grasped through the projection as will to power. The fundamental occurrence of that history is ultimately the transfor­mation of beingness into subjectivity.”71 Heidegger’s deeply disturbing political commitment to the Nazi party makes it tempting, of course, to dismiss his reading of Nietzsche as reactionary. __A subject-centered Nietzscheanism which dams up the river of becoming in a futile attempt to isolate the elusive essence of Being—surely, says the postmodern anarchist, this is nothing more than a limit case which shows the extreme ethical and epistemological dangers inherent in the totalitarian “liberal” consensus of the usual suspects.__ Yet such a dismissal is too easy. Jean-Franqois Lyotard, one of the fore­most French postmodern radicals, has persuasively insisted that “one must maintain both assertions—that of the greatness of [Heidegger’s] thought and that of the objectionable nature of [his] ‘politics’—without concluding that if one is true then the other is false.”72 For Heidegger’s thought is great: it provides use­ful answers to many interpretive questions regarding Nietzsche’s philosophy, and it helps to tease out some very interesting answers to some of the most stubborn riddles in Nietzsche’s writing.73 Controversial and problematic though it is in some ways, there is much to recommend Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as “the last metaphysician in the West.” For the postmodern anarchist, what is most valuable in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is precisely this point: Nietzsche stands at a crucial transition point in the intellectual history of the Western world. He is simultaneously the last metaphysician and the entry into postmodernity. This limits the radical poten­tial of Nietzsche’s thinking in one sense, for it means that Nietzsche’s philoso­phy must contain elements of a very traditional metaphysics. Yet the unique dual identity of Nietzsche’s thought also provides that thinking with a multi­faceted theoretical versatility which makes it more radical, in another sense, than any previous philosophy. Yes, the metaphysics of subjectivity lingers in Nietzsche’s writings, and yes, those writings are haunted by the specter of Being. No one knew this better than Nietzsche. Perhaps this is why he chose to title his second book Die Unzeitgemtisse Betrachtungen. Typically translated as Untimely Meditations, this title has also been rendered somewhat less accurately (but perhaps more interestingly, for our present purposes) as Thoughts Out of Season. This is the essence of Nietzsche’s thought, to the extent that it can be said to have one. He simultaneously concludes the project of Western meta­physics, and begins to think thoughts whose time has not yet come. “I know my fate,” Nietzsche declares in a section of Ecce Homo which the humorless com­mentator might overlook simply because it is entitled “Why I Am a Destiny.” “One day my name will be associated with the memory of something tremen­dous—a crisis without equal on earth.”74 And Nietzsche is quite careful to em­phasize that this is a specifically political crisis: “it is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics.”1* We should not let Nietzsche’s playful bombast obscure the fact that he is, to a certain extent, right about this. Nietzsche’s thought does indeed mark the beginning of great politics. Particularly in France, some of the best and brightest minds of the twentieth century have dedicated substantial portions of their intellectual careers to the project of articulating this new radical politics. Deleuze and Derrida, Baudrillard and Bataille, Lyotard and Foucault have gone to great lengths to turn the sketch for a postmodern anarchism which is to be found in Nietzsche’s writings into a full-fledged political philosophy. For Nietzsche himself, however, postmodern anarchism must remain an agenda for the future. His thought continues to be captive to the metaphysical tradition which it completes. He must leave it to others to articulate the full meaning of the political and philosophical position toward which the twin anarchies of subjectivity and becoming clearly point. Like all the great radical thinking of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche’s thought is utopian. It develops a devastating critique of the world as it is, and dreams of a better future. But the construction of that future is for those who follow. __So: Nietzsche’s thought, which explodes all manifestations of the conven­tional political subject—its rationality, its language, its thoughts, its theories, its states, its economics—stands at the origin of the subversive counteridea which I call postmodern anarchism. Such an anarchism represents a tactical use of Nietzsche’s thinking, not__ (as the usual suspects propose) __to shore up the rapidly eroding theoretical foundations of liberal democracy but rather to finish off that withered remnant of subject-centered post-Enlightenment politics, in or­der to open up a space for something more interesting. Postmodern anarchism asserts that **the problems which face us today are not the result of flaws in our political structures** which can be alleviated through reform or through the seizure of state power. Rather, ** the problem lies in the structures themselves **, and in the epistemologies which sustain those structures.__ __ Nietzsche’s anarchy of the subject makes it quite clear that our culture is to blame for the sorry state of affairs in which we find ourselves. Following this guilty verdict, modem political culture in general and liberal political culture in particular may expect to receive a death sentence.__ The liberals warn that this way lies madness. We say: we cannot know what may lie further down this river of becoming. But at least we know that it will be radically different from the disastrous political situation in which we find ourselves presently. __Perhaps the greatest appeal of postmodern Nietzschean anarchism lies in the fact that it runs little risk of falling into the theoretical and political traps faced by all merely modern revolutions. Marxism and nineteenth-century anarchism criticized capital, bourgeois values, and the liberal state—but they did so using the language, the terms, and the theoretical tools of the very bourgeois order they sought to undermine. Lenin and Mao sought to reshape the state into something which could sanction genuine political and economic freedom, but they retained so many of the old forms that they ended up reproducing the old varieties of repression and exploitation.__ “The problem for revolutionaries today,” as Deleuze argues, is to unite within the purpose of a particular struggle without falling into the despotic and bureaucratic organization of the party or state apparatus. __We seek a kind of war machine that will not re-create a state apparatus, a nomadic unit related to the outside that will not revive an internal despotic unity. Perhaps this is what is most profound in Nietzsche’s thought and marks the extent of his break with philosophy, at least so far as it is mani­fested in the aphorism: he made thought into a machine of war—a battering ram—into a nomadic force.__ 76 __As always, it is the performative effect of Nietzsche’s thought, rather than its explicit content, which concerns us. And one crucial effect of his thinking is that it removes philosophy from the horizons of the state. This is an event which is unprecedented in the history of Western thought. And it is an event whose ramifications will continue to be felt for some time. **Just as news of the death of God takes a long time to reach us, so too does news of the death of the state. But word of these deaths draws inexorably nearer. For no God and no state can hope to survive a full engagement with that thinking which detonates all fixed human identities** and reveals as mere phantasms of consciousness all fixed politics, economics, and culture.__
 * Call ‘2** (Lewis, Associate Professor of History @ Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, “Postmodern Anarchism”, pg 47-56, //wcp//)

The ballot gives you a choice – You can either be a good little bureaucrat and drop us or you can vote aff and accept the possibility for agency
Bleiker ‘3 Confronting the difficulties that arise with this dualistic dilemma, I have sought to advance a positive concept of human agency that is neither grounded in a stable essence nor dependent upon a presupposed notion of the subject. The ensuing journey has taken me, painted in very broad strokes, along the following circular trajectory of revealing and concealing: discourses are powerful forms of domination. They frame the parameters of thinking processes. They shape political and social interactions. Yet, discourses are not invincible. They may be thin. They may contain cracks. By moving the gaze from epistemological to ontological spheres, one can explore ways in which individuals use these cracks to escape aspects of the discursive order. To recognize the potential for human agency that opens up as a result of this process, one needs to shift foci again, this time from concerns with Being to an inquiry into tactical behaviours. Moving between various hyphenated identities, individuals use ensuing mobile subjectivities to engage in daily acts of dissent, which gradually transform societal values. Over an extended period of time, such tactical expressions of human agency gradually transform societal values. By returning to epistemological levels, one can then conceptualize how these transformed discursive practices engender processes of social change. __I have used everyday forms of resistance to illustrate how discourses not only frame and subjugate our thoughts and behaviour, but also offer possibilities for human agency. Needless to say, discursive dissent is not the only practice of resistance that can exert human agency. There are many political actions that seek immediate changes in policy or institutional structures, rather than 'mere' shifts in societal consciousness. Although some of these actions undoubtedly achieve results, they are often not as potent as they seem. Or, rather, their enduring effect may well be primarily discursive, rather than institutional .__ Nietzsche (1982b, 243) already knew that __the greatest events 'are not our loudest but our stillest hours.' This is why he stressed that the world revolves 'not around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new values.' And this is why, for Foucault too, the crucial site for political investigations are not institutions, even though they are often the place where power is inscribed and crystallized. The fundamental point of anchorage of power relations, Foucault claims, is always located outside institutions , deeply entrenched within the social nexus. Hence, instead of looking at power from the vantage point of institutions, one must analyse institutions from the standpoint of power relations __ (Foucault, 1982, 219-222).

Modern politics originates from ascetic values that are rooted in ressentiment
__ Political values __ __also grew from this poisonous root .__ For Nietzsche, __ values of equality and democracy ____, which form the cornerstone of radical political theory, arose out of the slave revolt in morality __. They are generated by the same spirit of revenge and hatred of the powerful. __ Nietzsche __ __therefore condemns political movements like liberal democracy, socialism, and indeed anarchism__. He __ sees the democratic movement as an expression of the herd-animal morality __ __derived from the Judeo-Christian revaluation of values__ .[|[6]] __ Anarchism __ is for Nietzsche the most extreme heir to democratic values — the most rabid expression of the herd instinct. It __ seeks to level the differences between individuals ____, to abolish class distinctions, to raze hierarchies to the ground, and to equalize the powerful and the powerless, the rich and the poor, the master and the slave__. To Nietzsche __ this is bringing everything down to level of the lowest common denominator __ __— to erase the pathos of distance between the master and slave, the sense of difference and superiority through which great values are created.__ Nietzsche sees this as the worst excess of European nihilism — __ the death of values and creativity ____.__ __ Slave morality is characterized by the attitude of ressentiment __ __— the resentment and hatred of the powerless for the powerful__. __Nietzsche sees ressentiment as an entirely negative sentiment — the attitude of denying what is life-affirming, saying ‘no’ to what is different, what is ‘outside’ or ‘other’__. Ressentiment is characterized by an orientation to the outside, rather than the focus of noble morality, which is on the self.[|[7]] __While the master says ‘I am good’ and adds as an afterthought, ‘therefore he is bad’; the slave says the opposite__ — ‘He (the master) is bad, therefore I am good’. Thus the invention of values comes from a comparison or opposition to that which is outside, other, different. Nietzsche says: “... in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act all, — its action is basically a reaction.”[|[8]] __ This reactive stance ____, this inability to define anything except in opposition to something else, is the attitude of ressentiment __. It is the reactive stance of the weak who define themselves in opposition to the strong. The weak need the existence of this external enemy to identify themselves as ‘good’. Thus the __slave takes ‘imaginary revenge’ upon the master, as he cannot act without the existence of the master to oppose__. __The man of ressentiment hates the noble with an intense spite, a deep-seated, seething hatred and jealousy.__ It is this ressentiment, according to Nietzsche, that has poisoned the modern consciousness, and finds its expression in ideas of equality and democracy, and in radical political philosophies, like anarchism, that advocate it.
 * Newman 2k ** (saul, Reader in Political Theory at [|Goldsmiths College], anarchism and the politics of ressentiment, [], LB)

Debate holds a potential for an active use of the will to power in order to challenge societies of control.
As pointed out in the last section, __the stakes for the game of debate are high__. The method of __ debate contains the possibility for revolutionary insight and revolutionary praxis __. __The question is how to understand an activity without systematizing and controlling the potential of debate.__ __What we really must do is let free the will to power within debaters __. In this sense, we can use gaming as the topoi to launch our conversation to a debate game that might encourage revolution. __But what does will to power look like?__ How do we encourage it? Lets get a feeling from George Bataille, who orients the Nietzschean impulse of will to power alongside a quote from Nietzsche himself: __Through the shutters into my window comes an infinite wind, carrying with it unleashed struggles, raging disasters of the ages. And don’t I too carry within me a blood rage, a blindness satisfied by the hunger to mete out blows? How I would enjoy being a pure snarl of hatred, demanding death : the upshot being no prettier than two dogs going at it tooth and nail! Though I am tired and feverish. . . “Now the air all around is alive with the heat, earth breathing a fiery breath. Now everyone walks naked, the good and bad, side by side. And for those in love with knowledge, it’s a celebration __ .” (The Will to Power) (4). __ Will to power can be the outgrowth of debate that challenges existing structures __. Bataille and Nietzsche desire a wild emancipation from traditional structures, far beyond conventional morality. __Coupling Nietzsche’s theorizing with the practice of debate something new can emerge, but only if we free ourselves from the shackles of conventional debate, including gaming. How to break these chains__ ? __How do we get beyond that which has brought us so far__ ? To help, I want to turn to Guy Debord and the Situationists.
 * Schnurer 2004 **(Maxwell, Ph.D., Pittsburgh, Assistant Professor at Marist College, Spring 2004 “GAMING AS CONTROL: WILL TO POWER, THE PRISON OF DEBATE AND GAME CALLED POTLATCH,” CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE”, LB)