Derek+and+Ethan

=1ac plan=
 * The United States federal government should substantially increase its expedited investment in port deepening transportation infrastructure projects in the United States.**

=1ac economy=
 * Contention one is the __economy__ —**

Graham says the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers sent a wakeup call to Congress last month with a report outlining the nation's coastal and inland port needs. The administration in recent days designated seven projects at five ports as significant and promised to streamline federal studies so the work is done sooner. Those projects include deepening the shipping channels in both Charleston and Savannah, Ga. The administration's move "is a significant step toward a national vision that has been lacking ," Graham said, adding the nation needs a broader picture of its port needs. "The system is broken and unless you change the system we will never have a modern port infrastructure to compete with the Middle East and China ," said Graham, a member of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee. "We either get our act together or we lose market share." The corps report that was requested by Congress and released last month said the nation needs a strategic plan to handle harbor projects. It said ports in the Southeast and Gulf of Mexico are expected to experience the greatest impact from the widening of the Panama Canal in 2014 to handle the larger ships. Ports in that region along will need about $5 billion to deepen their shipping channels, it said. Graham said the report shows that Congress must look at port needs "in a visionary way" as it moves away from the old method of using earmarks to pay for local projects with little concern of how those projects meet national needs. " Our job is not just Charleston ," he said. " Our job is the county as a whole . The good news for Charleston is it can complete with anybody because God has given us a very good harbor." The president issued an executive order in March to have the Office of Management and Budget oversee efforts to smooth the permitting and review process for infrastructure projects. So the $300 million Charleston project, which wasn't even in the president's budget two years ago, is now a national priority. Aaron Ellis, a spokesman for the American Association of Port Authorities, said it's significant that the seven projects designed by the administration for expedited studies are all port projects. "It says a lot that all seven were related to supporting America's seaports," he said. "What that says to us is that the president and the administration recognize the importance of port-related infrastructure and what it does to more freight efficiently, reduce costs to consumers and create jobs." Charleston, along with Savannah, Ga., Miami and several Gulf Coast ports currently have deepening projects being planned. The corps study said the target depth is 50 feet for the so-called post-Panamax ships, which the report noted will represent 62 percent of the world's container ship capacity by 2030. **Getting the money for** such **projects is another challenge**. Graham says it could cost $20 billion but "in a budget of $3 trillion, that's not a whole lot." " If you fund them all100 percent you would solve the issue ," said U.S. Rep. Tim Scott, whose district in includes Charleston. "If the projects are relevant to economic outcomes and they are important to the viability of the country, why would we not fund them appropriately?" The corps is already streamlining some of its work and announced earlier this month the $300 million Charleston Harbor deepening could be completed by 2020 - four years earlier than originally projected. The administration announcement is expected to shave still a nother year off that.
 * Dredging underfunded now — Obama’s XO was __highly limited__, __provided no funding__ and __didn’t expedite sufficiently__**
 * AP, 12** (Associated Press, “Graham: Nation starting to move to port vision”, reprinted in the Miami Herald, 7/21/2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/21/2905712/graham-nation-starting-to-move.html, Deech)

Since the birth of our nation, U.S. seaports and waterways that connect them have served as a vital economic lifeline by bringing goods and services to people around the world and by delivering prosperity to our nation. U.S. seaports are responsible for moving more than 99 percent of our country’s overseas cargo. Today, international trade accounts for more than a quarter of Americas Gross Domestic Product. Americas seaports support the employment of 13.3 million U.S. workers, and seaport- related jobs account for $649 billion in annual personal income. For every $1 billion in exports shipped through seaports, 15,000 U.S. jobs are created. Seaports facilitate trade and commerce, create jobs, help secure our borders, support our military and serve as stewards of valuable coastal environmental resources. Ports are dynamic, vibrant centers of trade and commerce, but what is most important to understand is that seaports rely on partnerships. Seaports invest more than $2.5 billion every year to maintain and improve their infrastructure. In recent years, however, this commitment has not been adequately matched by the federal government. Federal funding for dredging federal navigation channels has slowed and decreased, especially for new construction. Further, maintenance dredging is sorely underfunded, despite a more than $6 billion and growing surplus in the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. Landside improvements have also been too low a priority, with little of the highway funds going to freight transportation projects. The only bright light has been the newly created TIGER grants, although not enough of this funding benefited ports. Virginia Port Authority received a TIGER grant for its heartland project. As we look to the future, we do know that there are challenges and opportunities. As we recover from this economic downturn, we must make investments today to address the trade realities of the future. Here are some the challenges and we have to ask: are we ready? So are we ready? While ports are planning for the future, the federal government has not kept pace with the industry or our international competitors. The federal government has a unique Constitutional responsibility to maintain and improve the infrastructure that enables the flow of commerce, and much of that infrastructure in and around seaports have been neglected for too long. Many of our land and water connections are insufficient and outdated, affecting the ports' ability to move cargo efficiently into and out of the U.S. This hurts U.S. business, hurts U.S. workers and hurts our national economy. Port projects take decades to plan and build and we cannot wait. Federal investments in seaports are an essential and effective utilization of limited resources, paying dividends through increased trade and commerce, long-term job creation, secure borders, military support, environmental stewardship, and more than $200 billion in federal, state and local tax revenue. Earlier this month, the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness made an urgent plea for improvements in the nation's transportation infrastructure, including landside and waterside access to seaports. We cannot wait.
 * __Increased shipping is inevitable__ — only new dredging guarantees American ports will remain competitive**
 * Bridges, 11 –** Chairman of the Board of the American Association of Port Authorities and Executive Director of Virginia Port Authority (Jerry A., “Testimony of Jerry A. Bridges Chairman of the Board of the American Association of Port Authorities and Executive Director of Virginia Port Authority before the United States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee Hearing: the Economic importance of Seaports: Is the United States Prepared for 21st Century Trade Realities?”, 9/26/2011, http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2011-10-26%20Bridges.pdf)
 * The Panama Canal expansion is due to be completed in 2014 and is expected to influence trade patterns . VPA and other ports have been making investments, but federal funding has been slow to match these investments . Ship sizes continue to get larger, requiring on-'going modernization of ports and federal navigation channels, even for ports that will not require 50 feet of depth.
 * Canada and Mexico are making investments which could result in losses of maritime jobs in the U.S. as cargo enters the U.S. through these countries . We have already seen this job loss on the West Coast.
 * The U.S. seeks to double exports; however countries like Brazil and Chile, who we compete against the U.S. in terms of agricultural exports, are making investments that could make their exports more competitive.
 * New trade agreements with Korea, Panama and Colombia have been approved, with other trade agreements under negotiations which should result in increased exports and imports through ports.
 * In addition to these near-term challenges, we know that the U.S. population is forecast to grow by 100 million - a 30 percent increase - before the middle of the 2lst century. And many of the goods used by this population will flow through seaports.

Note: Figure Removed A century ago in 1914, the Panama Canal opened to commercial shipping traffic. After 34 years of on-and-off construction and a price tag of $375 million -- more than $8 billion in today’s dollars -- the canal became one of the biggest and most expensive infrastructure projects in human history. The opening of the canal created a tectonic shift for global trade and forever altered shipping routes for United States ports. Now, 100 years later, it’s happening again. By the end of 2014, the __Panama Canal__ is scheduled to have completed its greatest __expansion__, more than __doubling its capacity__ and allowing it to handle the world’s most massive ships. And U.S. ports are scrambling. State __governmentsand__ their __port authorities__ all along the Gulf and East coasts __are seeking to spend billions of dollars building bigger ports____as____quickly as possible, in a rush to accommodate the larger ships__ that will start traveling through the canal. (Ports on the West Coast, which are naturally deeper, can already handle the bigger vessels.) It’s a high-stakes investment, and in a sense, they’re all competing with one another. The ports that become the first go-to destinations for larger vessels will have a huge competitive advantage over their peers. “They’ll be established as the destination to be,” says South Carolina state Sen. Larry Grooms, an advocate for expanding the port in Charleston. “It will be hard for the other ports to take business away.” But __port officials__ almost universally say they __face a__ n even bigger __threat to__ their __development than one another: the federal government__. Byzantine __regulatory hurdles and the__ overall __lack of a__ clear __federal ports strategy__, they say, can __leave expansion projects stuck in limbo for years. That threatens to keep the country from capitalizing__ on the work being done in Central America. “[If] Washington, D.C., and this administration don’t step up,” says South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley, “ __we won’t even have the luxury to compete__ .” If __the U.S.__ doesn’t act fast, port officials agree, it __could find itself at a competitive disadvantage compared to other countries.__ If American ports expand, __shipping processes could become more efficient, making American exports less expensive and more attractive__. Additionally, __failure to expand could facilitate a robust business of__ feeder __ports in Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean__. At those facilities, workers would ready goods so they’re available for door-to-door shipping before being put on trains or smaller ships bound for the U.S. __That would be bad news for American shipping __ and logistics companies, says Paul Anderson, CEO of the Jacksonville, Fla., Port Authority. “We don’t want somebody else to do all that work if we’re consuming it and we’re paying for it.” It’s worth noting that there are some observers who don’t necessarily agree that the Panama expansion will have major stateside effects. The Southern office of The Council of State Governments, in a 2010 report, noted that one school of thought contends that East Coast ports are already struggling to handle loads from smaller ships and wouldn’t be able to manage bigger ships even if the ports were technically deep enough. Others doubt that shipping routes would change that drastically, since many shippers would still place a premium on speed; typically, East Coast-bound goods arrive faster on trains from the West Coast than by being shipped across the canal. And many people have acknowledged that projections about the future of shipping can’t accurately predict exactly how the shift will shake out. Port officials know this but believe that, even if the forecasts don’t play out in the short term, they almost certainly will over time. “There’s always this fear that you’ll create overcapacity” in the short term, says Jim Newsome, CEO of the South Carolina Ports Authority. “What people don’t realize is these are long-term assets. You’re building an asset for 30 or 40 years.” This all started in 2006, when the citizens of Panama voted overwhelmingly to approve construction of a massive canal expansion, including two new sets of locks and wider, deeper navigation channels. The cost will exceed $5.2 billion, and the project will dramatically increase the size of the ships that can move through the canal. The maximum capacity of a cargo ship is described using a measure called TEU -- short for 20-foot equivalent units -- that’s based on the volume of a standard 20-foot-long metal shipping container. As it stands right now, the maximum capacity of a ship crossing the Panama Canal, known as a Panamax ship, is 4,800 TEUs. The improvements currently under way would allow for much, much bigger ships: 50 percent wider, 25 percent longer and with a volume of more than 12,000 TEUs. Bigger ships with more cargo are heavier and sit deeper in the water. In this case, ports are literally digging up the harbor floor to increase the minimum depth from 39.5 feet to 50 feet. Ports at Baltimore, Charleston, Houston, Jacksonville, Miami and Savannah, among others, are at various stages of expanding to accommodate the larger vessels known as post-Panamax ships. A total of 17 port projects are being studied for improvements by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Right now, though, __there are few__ East Coast __ports with__ the __depths__ required __to handle post-Panamax ships__. Norfolk, Va., has long been able to accommodate such ships. The Port of New York and New Jersey can too, but its container terminals on Newark Bay have height restrictions due to the Bayonne Bridge. The port is planning to raise the bridge 64 feet, which will cost $1 billion and take five years. Baltimore has just completed its 50-foot dredging project. And that’s about it. That means the rest of the East and Gulf coasts -- essentially everything from Virginia to Miami to Houston -- is up for grabs. That’s why these ports are competing so fiercely to go deeper. Industry __experts say__ that __nearly 80 percent of ships on order are post-Panamax__ size, and elected officials on the East and Gulf coasts are predicting that if they can expand their ports to accommodate these larger ships, they can capture much of the traffic that currently goes to West Coast ports and reaches the East Coast by rail. Still, despite the energy and political will behind the rush to expand ports, the process isn’t going smoothly. __Port-deepening__ projects generally are initiated by states, but __require federal approval and funding__ from both entities. That means __the fates of ports__, which typically are state authorities, __are dictated__ largely __by the federal government__. And the federal government, according to a growing chorus of governors, state legislators and port directors, isn’t equipped to handle their needs. __Federal policies addressing ports are a complicated web__, and no single entity determines overarching strategy. The last federal Water Resources Development Act, which governs much of federal ports policy, was enacted by Congress nearly five years ago. A fee paid by shippers into a federal trust fund intended for harbor maintenance and dredging is projected to end the 2013 fiscal year with a balance of $8.1 billion under President Obama’s budget, while just 10 percent of that total will actually be spent on its intended purpose. Jerry Bridges, chairman of the American Association of Port Authorities, says funding for dredging has been on the decline. Even the feds seem to realize they aren’t prepared to deal with the onslaught of projects. “There is a growing consensus that the existing budgeting process and budget levels are not adequate to meet the critical needs of future modernization,” the Army Corps of Engineers’ Institute for Water Resources wrote in an early draft of a report ordered by Congress. __Preparing to dredge a harbor is an enormously complicated process__. Such projects must be authorized by Congress, but there’s no guarantee that any funds will be appropriated. Before construction can begin, a project must undergo two sets of impact studies. These studies, run by the Army Corps of Engineers, are major undertakings that can cost millions of dollars and take a decade or more to complete. One of the most egregious examples is Savannah, Ga., which is trying to deepen its port from 42 feet to 48 feet. Earlier this year, the corps released its final documentation for that project -- after 15 years of study. “This whole process of dredging is completely broken,” says Eugene Pentimonti, a former senior vice president of Maersk, one of the world’s largest shipping companies. “There’s virtually no way for a port to get their facilities dredged in a commercially acceptable time frame, to be able to compete, to use the opportunities it will provide them.” Maryland Port Administration Executive Director James White is more blunt, calling the lengthy approval process “an embarrassment. We’re not reinventing the wheel,” White says. “We’re moving mud.” The problem, say many in the ports community, is that **__the federal government has not acted quickly enough to prioritize port expansion__**. During a congressional hearing last year, Anderson, of the Jacksonville port, bemoaned the “stepchild status” of ports among both federal officials and the general public, speculating that most elected officials seem to have little interest in ports largely because voters don’t think about them. Indeed, some in the transportation community believe the federal government was caught flat-footed by the Panama expansion and as a result doesn’t have a framework for addressing the rapid changes necessary. “They didn’t believe Panama would put the money together to be able to do it,” says Pentimonti, a board member at the Eno Center for Transportation, a think tank. “Nobody thought it would happen as quickly as it did.” In Jacksonville, for example, the port completed a project in 2010 to deepen a channel from 38 feet to 40 feet. The project took nearly 15 years from start to finish. Now, the port is projecting a 50-foot deepening that will be finished in 2018, if all goes according to schedule. “Because our ports take so long compared to the rest of the world, we finished the project, and the world had changed,” says Anderson. Despite the uncertainty regarding the federal government -- or perhaps more likely because of it -- states are ponying up more money themselves. Their logic: If they can’t make the feds speed up the approval process, they can at least ensure that the projects have the money to go forward once they do get the green light. “If ports want to get it done in a timely manner, ports are starting to see they’re going to have to come up with a larger portion of the cost share,” says Susan Monteverde, vice president of government relations at the American Association of Port Authorities. “The reason they’re doing that is to get the jobs more quickly.” Indeed, mayors like Alvin Brown of Jacksonville and Joe Riley of Charleston have become cheerleaders for their projects largely by touting both the economic benefit they’ll have for their community and for the nation as a whole. “A deeper harbor produces more maritime activity,” says Riley. “It means larger ships can come in. It means it’s a more effective place to ship your goods from. It means suppliers and assemblers and manufacturers will be more advantageous in the state. It’s a very important economic generator.” The Port of Baltimore just completed deepening a berth at one of its container terminals to 50 feet. The $105 million project, which includes four new cranes for ships that are two to three times larger than vessels currently calling on the port, was accomplished through a public-private partnership with a company called Ports America Chesapeake. Under the agreement, the company paid for the improvements as part of its 50-year lease to operate the terminal. Maryland officials viewed the project as a critical economic and jobs driver. Without the public-private arrangement, “we wouldn’t have been ready,” says White. Last year, Florida Gov. Rick Scott decided to channel $77 million in state funds to cover part of the Port of Miami’s $180 million deepening. The state had initially wanted the feds to pay that sum, but Florida has decided to move forward with the hope that Washington may eventually reimburse some of the money. In South Carolina, the Legislature is poised to allocate $180 million for a $300 million dredging project that’s still in the feasibility study phase, even though it won’t be completed for years. It may also be willing to borrow up to $120 million to fund the rest of the project if the feds don’t come up with their share of the cost. “The cost of dredging shouldn’t bother anyone,” says Grooms, the state senator. “We’ll be there. We’ll be at a post-50-foot harbor. The question is, how long will it take? And the big unknown is the harbor deepening study.”
 * The Panama Canal expansion necessitates port deepening but __federal regulations__ make it impossible to complete in time**
 * Holeywell, 12** — reporter, has been published in the Washington Post and USA Today, graduate of George Washington University (Ryan, “Panama Canal Expansion Has U.S. Ports Rushing”, The Governing, July 2, 2012, http://www.governing.com/panama-canal-expansion-has-ports-rushing.html)

It seems the U nited S tates willingly allows infrastructure to crumble as other countries – particularly the BRICs – bolster the physical support systems that foster economic growth. The American Association of Port Authorities is concerned over the state of America’s aged transportation infrastructure so it’s urging investments in both landside and waterside connections with ports. The burning question on the mind of many US lawmakers, administration officials and others is how best to stimulate the economy and spur job creation. The answer lies in focus ing scarce federal resources in areas that will have the greatest impact on economic growth, immediate and long-term job creation, national security, and our current and future competitiveness in the global economy. Enhancements in seaport -related infrastructure should ebe a high priority among the limited investment options. For centuries, US seaports – and the connecting waterways – have served as a vital economic lifeline, bringing goods and services to people around the world and delivering prosperity to our nation. They facilitate trade and commerce, create jobs, secure our borders, support our military and serve as stewards of valuable coastal environmental resources. **Seaports are the primary gateway for overseas trade. They’re essential to economic security**. As such, federal funding for infrastructure in and around ports pays dividends. Deep-draft coastal and Great Lakes ports are the nexus of critical transportation infrastructure that connects America’s exporters with markets overseas, and they provide access for imports of raw materials, components and consumer goods that are a key part of US manufacturing and help define our standard of living. Investments in America’s port infrastructure and the intermodal connections that serve seaports – both land and waterside – foster prosperity and provide an opportunity to bolster the country’s economic and employment recovery. ECONOMIC IMPACT: HUGE Currently, international trade accounts for more than a quarter of America’s GDP (gross domestic product). Oceangoing vessels that load and unload cargo at US seaports move 99.4 percent of the nation’s overseas trade by volume and 65.5 percent by value. Further, customs collections from seaport cargo provide tens of billions of dollars a year to the federal government, including $23.2 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2007, $24.1 billion in FY 2008, $20.3 billion in FY 2009 and $22.5 billion in FY 2010. The latest economic impacts analyses conducted in 2007 indicated that **US seaport activities generated $3.15 trillion** in annual economic output, with $3.8 billion worth of goods moving in and out of seaports every day. Impact extends far beyond seaport communities. On average, any given state uses the services of 15 different ports around the country to handle its imports and exports. Also, seaports are a proven job creator. In addition to handling international trade, US seaports – and the waterways that serve them – represent important transportation modes for the movement of domestic freight. Greater utilization of America’s coastal and inland water routes for freight transportation complements other surface transportation modes – providing a safe and secure alternative for cargo while offering significant energy savings and traffic congestion relief. VIEW FROM WATERSIDE As US investment in its waterways infrastructure is trending downward, countries like India, Brazil and the U nited K ingdom commit the equivalent of billions of US dollars to port and channel modernization. The expansion of the Panama Canal slated for completion in 2014 – the first major expansion in more than a century – is driving ports around the world to deepen navigation channels and improve harbor facilities. Look at what’s happening: India plans to invest $60 billion – including both public and private funds – to create seven new major ports by 2020. Expect this to have a substantial impact: It will handle the anticipated rapid expansion of merchandise exports, forecasted to triple by 2017. Brazil expects tonnage at its coastal ports to more than double (to 1.7 billion tons) by 2022. In response, the nation is committing $17 billion to port improvements (including $14 billion from the private sector). In Great Britain, DP World (the world’s fourth-largest marine terminal operator) plans to spend $2.5 billion on London’s Deep-Water Gateway, the country’s first such development in the last 20 years. Meanwhile, in the U nited S tates, public funding for new navigation channel improvements has all but dried up. Lawmakers focus on reducing the deficit and eliminating appropriation “earmarks” that have traditionally funded federal navigation deepening projects. At the same time, funding for projects already approved and underway is slow, incremental and insufficient. Insufficient appropriations make it impossible to maintain most federal navigation channels at their authorized and required dimensions. The US Army Corps of Engineers has been commissioned with the responsibility of improving and maintaining the nation’s water access to ports. But while this charge comes from the US government, the federal government is less than supportive. It spends only about half of the tax that it collects specifically directed toward deep-draft channel maintenance. The rest – more than $6 billion since 1986 – has essentially been “disappeared” into the US Treasury while serious dredging needs remain neglected. This is unfortunate at a crucial juncture. Projects to maintain these critical waterways would create jobs immediatelyand would provide transportation savings to benefit US businesses.With decreases in the cost of freight transportation, these sectors can enhance their global competitiveness and create more jobs. The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) has continually and strongly urged Congress to take action to ensure that 100-percent of the annual amount collected from the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) is utilized to maintain federal navigation channels.
 * The impact is the __economy__ — three internal links — first is __seaport competitiveness__**
 * Nagle, 11** — president and chief executive officer of the American Association of Port Authorities (December 2011, Kurt, Industry Today, “Association: American Association of Port Authorities; Port-Related Infrastructure Investments Can Reap Dividends,” vol. 14, no. 3, http://www.industrytoday.com/article_view.asp?ArticleID=F370 )

2.2.2 Other Tangible Benefits Indirect benefits of Corps projects include gains associated with international trade. Historical expenditures for harbor improvements facilitate international trade by providing ships more efficient access to the Nation's ports. International trade in turn creates and sustains jobs and generates Federal tax revenues. The exact method of computing income and employment associated with international trade is debatable, but one of the best techniques is to calculate the value added by U.S. businesses and households to imports and exports. 5 Computations reveal that nearly 20 percent of all U.S. jobs are directly associated with international trade. A slightly higher percentage of personal income would be associated with international trade because such jobs pay somewhat more than the U.S. average. In addition, about $553 million were collected for the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund in 1999. Some benefits of harbor improvements are difficult or impossible to quantify. For individual projects these are given little attention. Policy decisions concerning project authorizations and appropriations should consider intangible benefits as well as tangible direct and secondary benefits. This idea is particularly applicable to international trade and specifically container trade. For example, America is such a big market, **__international trade gives the U.S. considerable leverage when__** dealing **__with foreign governments__**. Thus, international **__trade__** can **__enhance the U__** nited **__S__** tates’ **__role as a world leader__**. National **__harbors are__** also **__a vital part of__** our **__military’s power projection__** platform. __Economists believe__ in the law of comparative advantage, which states that nations benefit when they specialize in producing certain goods and services and then trade with each other rather than producing everything themselves. For example, most people perceive that the majority of foreign trade consists of consumer goods such as clothing and televisions. However, as shown in Table 2-2, a significant portion of __U.S. foreign trade consists of semi-manufactured commodities and raw materials such as iron and steel or crude petroleum. These products are used to produce other goods, or are further processed in the importing country__. For example, in the United States imported car parts are often used to produce exports of finished automobiles. Machinery and electrical equipment are often used the same way. Thus, efficient flow of international commodities is important for all nations including the United States. __Global trade is very competitive and profit margins are thin. This is particularly true for maritime transportation including the container shipping industry__. . Growth in U.S. foreign trade, even though it is substantial, is not as high as growth in total international trade, particularly with respect to containerships. __It is__ quite __possible for__ some __U.S. trade to be diverted__ or to be serviced __by less efficient ships__. This may occur __if American ports__ and the Federal government __are not able to meet__ current __challenges__ posed by developments in international trade. 2.2.4 Lost Benefits There are lost benefits associated with delays in the construction of harbor improvement projects. Costs increase with delays, not only because of inflation but because the construction process becomes distorted by available funds. Costs associated with delays can and have been estimated. Typically, a year’s delay in schedule leads to a penalty of more than 10 percent of project cost. This is sizable and should be considered when making cost-sharing policies. Cost-sharing policies should seek to insure that both public ports and the Federal government fund projects in a timely manner. There are also benefits foregone due to lost transportation cost savings with project delays. Project delays affect the Nation in another way. Although these benefits are difficult to quantify, such effects are perhaps more important than those that can be measured. Delays create an uncertain atmosphere that can impact decisions to develop infrastructure elsewhere. Container ports are very capital intensive and require long term planning. Massive containerships are rapidly being put into service at ports throughout the world. Without a clear signal of intent to accommodate these vessels in the United States, necessary ports and facilities may be built elsewhere. Once major investments are made elsewhere, the full efficiencies of large containerships in the form of lower transportation costs for general cargo may be lost to the Nation for a long time to come. 2.3 Geographical Incidence of International Trade Public ports generally have a regional or local economic development mandate along with authorizations to improve harbor facilities. This does not mean, however, that local economies near ports capture all or most of the benefits associated with international trade. For example, when a port unloads crude petroleum from a ship, it charges a fee that generates revenues for the port and the local community. But imported oil also fuels cars and homes throughout the Nation. Likewise, when a port loads grain or coal onto a ship for export, farmers in the U.S. heartland benefit as do coal miners in the hills of West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Kentucky. Container trade benefits all regions of the country as well. As shown in Table 2-3, fifteen __U.S. ports account for__ about __80 percent of international__ maritime __trade__ in terms of value. These ports represent only ten states, however much of the cargo they handle flows to other regions. Table 2-4 shows the origin and destination of international cargo for each U.S. state measured in terms of value. On average, any given state uses the services of 15 different ports around the country. For example, the California ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach and Oakland collectively handle about $187 billion worth of cargo, but the state of California is the origin or destination of only $106 billion. While most container trade flows in and out of ports on the East and West Coasts, it is distributed throughout the Nation as shown in Tables 2-5 and 2-6. For instance, the Port of Charleston, S.C. handled about 800 thousand TEUs in 1996, but the state of South Carolina was the origin or destination of only 160 thousand of these TEUs. Similarly, the ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach and Oakland handled five million TEUs but only 2.5 million originated or were destined to sites within California. [table omitted] 2.4 Conclusion The benefits of harbor improvements are numerous. Expenditures for harbor improvements have facilitated international trade by providing ships more efficient access to the Nation's ports. International trade in turn creates and sustains jobs and generates Federal tax revenues. Foreign commerce has become crucial to the economic well-being of the United States. In 1946, U.S. international trade represented a relatively small portion of the U.S. economy, but today foreign trade accounts for 27 percent of U.S. gross domestic product. Harbor improvements also affect prices of U.S. imports and exports. With deeper channels vessel operators can load more cargo onto a ship and sail deeper, or they can use larger more efficient vessels. Unit transportation costs decline and lower transportation costs are reflected in commodity prices. Intangible benefits are also important. __Free trade promotes international relations and stability and bolsters the U__ nited __S__ tates’ __position as a world leader__. Lastly, it is important to stress that the economic benefits of international trade are widespread and are not limited to a handful of coastal states.
 * This is also critical so solve __trade__ and __leadership__**
 * Kiefer et al, 2k** – principal investigator for Planning and Management Consultants– study authorized by Section 401 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1999, report to the US Army Corps of Engineers (Jack, Planning and Management Consultants, “The National Dredging Needs Study of Ports and Harbors Implications to Cost-Sharing of Federal Deep Draft Navigation Projects Due to Changes in the Maritime Industry”, May 2000, http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/docs/iwrreports/00-R-8.pdf )

__The rise in__ isolationism and **__protectionism will bring__** about ever more heated arguments and **__dangerous confrontations__** over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. __Disputes__ over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and __natural resources will become__ more __commonplace__. Around the world, such __tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters__, often __with minimal provocation__. In some instances, __economic conditions will serve as a__ convenient __pretext for conflicts__ that stem __from cultural and religious differences__. Alternatively, __nations may__ look to __divert attention__ away __from domestic problems by channeling__ frustration and __populist sentiment toward other countries__ and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, __terrorist groups will__ likely __boost the frequency and scale of__ their horrifying __attacks__, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. __Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling__ and interdictions __by____rogue nations__ running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. __China will__ likely __assume a__ n increasingly __belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may__ embark on overt __coloniz__ ation of its __neighbors__ in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or **__nuclear weapons will__** vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to **__cause widespread destruction__**. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies **__as the beginnings of a new world war__**.
 * Trade solves war**
 * Pazner, 8** (Michael J., Faculty – New York Institute of Finance, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138)

Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend .” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “ unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war .” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, th ey can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers isunimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states : Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, si gnificantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economiesfreer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free.A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “tra ding nations cooperate more and fight less. ” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All thishelps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terr orism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology t o the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real jobat an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruite r. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.
 * Robust statistics and empirics prove**
 * Griswold, 11** (Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9 [|http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf Accessed 6/30/12] BJM)

Just like the nation itself, our maritime industry is facing a multitude of challenges like flooding in the Midwest, silting of our major shipping arteries, and the need for recapitalization for our lock and dam infrastructure, to name a few. But these challenges and the solutions to them must be viewed as investments in the future of our nation itself because __without a__ strong, reliable __marine transportation industry, we__ simply __cannot competitively sell__ our export __products__ in the world marketplace. Those countries that buy from America do so because we are a dependable supplier of products at a competitive price__, thanks __ in no small part to the existence of our enviable transportation system. __If__ that system becomes __compromised__, those foreign buyers will simply shop elsewhere and __that will__ further __impact the__ United States' precarious __economic recovery__. Witness the dredging situation on the Lower Mississippi River. This year, we have seen unprecedented levels of high water on the Mississippi River carrying millions of tons of silt and debris to the mouth of the River. This silting has resulted in restrictions being imposed for ships and vessels that rely on this passageway to export products to the world market, as well as import goods competitively, via ports in south Louisiana. In the past the Corps of Engineers has been able to manage silting issues with funding for dredging that sometimes required the reprogramming of funds to be sure shortfalls did not occur. __This year the Corps has said it can no longer reprogram funds and that a funding shortfall indeed exists on this vital part of the system__. Throughout this country's great history, __the federal government's role is in part to ensure that the inland navigation system__, including the Mississippi River, __remains open to transport products such as grain, coal, steel, petroleum and aggregate materials. The federal government__ now __needs to take__ necessary __steps to provide funding for our national transportation asset__ and to allow the Lower Mississippi River __to remain fully open for commerce__. We urge the White House to immediately submit an emergency request for supplemental funds to Congress, and we ask that Congress expeditiously process that request for Emergency Supplemental Appropriations funding. All of us who are responsible for managing money have faced times when cutting costs have become necessary, yet those who are successful rarely focus on reducing costs if it results in an even greater loss in the revenue stream. Again, dredging this critical artery should be viewed as an investment, not a cost, in the future of our inland waterways transportation system.
 * Second is a __federal commitment__ — it’s critical to attract __foreign customers__**
 * Calhoun, 11** — President of Cargo Carriers (Cargill) and Chairman of Waterways Council, Inc (Rick, “DREDGING FOR PROSPERITY”, Marine Log, August, ProQuest, http://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/889143450?accountid=14667 ”)

Port-related jobs are critical to augment our economy. Direct and indirect jobs generated by ports result in the employment of more than 8 million Americans who earned and spent $314.5 billion in 2006. Every $1 billion in exports alone creates an estimated 15, 000 new jobs. In Texas alone one in every four jobs is linked to trade. America´s deep-draft navigation system is at a crossroads, with a future that can be bright or bleak. Our waterways ´ ability to support the Nation?s continuing growth in trade and in the defense of our Nation, hinges on much-needed Federal attention to unresolved funding needs that are derail ing critical channel maintenance and deep-draft construction projects of the water highways to our ports. Because most ports do not have naturally deep harbors, they must be regularly dredged to allow ships to move safely through Federal navigation channels. Also, as modern vessels increase in size, navigation channel depths must increase accordingly, if we are to continue to be a player on the international marketplace. A recent U.S. Army Corps of Engineers study reports that almost 30 percent of the 95, 550 vessel calls at U.S. ports are constrained due to inadequate channel depths. Ladies and gentlemen, these are the things that cause port directors nightmares. Without a channel dredged to its authorized depth, nothing else comes into play. Attracting new customers, dealing with labor issues, environmental concerns, and the public - all go away - because without a properly-dredged channel, business goes away. Public ports are at a critical state in keeping their channels open for business. We are losing existing business and potential new business to ports outside of the U nited S tates ? and once lost, it is rarely regained. Dredging can literally make or break our industry, and a lack of dredging is an issue throughout the U nited S tates. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that in many parts of the United States, we face a dredging crisis. On the Great Lakes, as Chairman James L. Oberstar of this Committee and Chairman David R. Obey of the Appropriations Committee well know, decades of inadequate funding for dredging have left a backlog of 18 million cubic yards of sediment. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates removing the backlog will cost more than $230 million on the Great Lakes alone. In some cases, ports on the Great Lakes have actually shutdown due to inadequate dredging. There are similar examples of dredging problems in ports and harbors on all coasts of our Nation. In many cases, vessels must ? load light ? because of dredging shortfalls. The economic implications of light loading are enormous. On the Great Lakes, for example, vessels lose between 50 to 270 tons of cargo for each inch they must reduce their draft a nd, in some areas, the lost draft is measured in feet, not inches. Light loading because of inadequate dredging impacts everyone. A ship that is light-loaded reduces its efficiencies in the same way that a commercial airplane that is required to set aside seats with no passengers would quickly lose its efficiencies. The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund The Harbor Maintenance Tax and the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund were established in the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986. The Trust Fund (HMTF) applies a 0.125 percent ad valorem tax on the value of commercial cargo loaded or unloaded on vessels using Federally-maintained channels. The tax is only assessed on imports and domestic cargo, as it was ruled as an unconstitutional assessment on exports in a 1998 Supreme Court ruling. This Fund - that you, members of Congress - established, was authorized to be utilized to recover 100 percent of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers eligible Operations and Maintenance (O&M) expenditures for commercial navigation, along with 100 percent of the O&M cost of the St. Lawrence Seaway, certain costs of NOAA, and the costs to Customs to collect the tax. Fixing the Problem Ladies and gentleman - would it surprise you to know that this utilization has not been honored? HMTF revenues exceed transfers for authorized activities by an increasing margin. Yet, our Federal channels are not being maintained at authorized depths. The Fund is being held hostage to paper balance the budget - interestingly, not one of its legal uses. In 2007, the HMTF began with a $3.3 billion surplus and collected an additional $1.4 billion - resulting in a $4.7 billion surplus, while only $751 million was utilized for maintenance dredging. That is incredible. I would ask that you consider this analogy offered by my colleague in a Gulf Coast port: "What would you say to a toll booth operator who took your money to use the toll road only to then tell you that the road was unusable?"? That is what is happening to shippers who pay this tax every day. We must solve this problem. We must draft legislation that mandates that the Fund be utilized for its intended purpose - the maintenance dredging of Federal ports and harbors. There are a number of ways to address this problem. As you know, other modes of transportation - surface transportation and aviation ? have faced similar problems in the past decade. Although we are in the early stages of addressing this problem, our Coalition believes Congress should consider an approach similar to that taken with the Highway Trust Fund in 1998 and with the Airport and Airway Trust Fund in 2000. In those cases, Congress legislatively enacted "firewalls" around the Trust Funds ? essentially guaranteeing minimum levels of spending that could only be used to support eligible projects. Although there are some variations between the Highway, Aviation, and Harbor Maintenance Trust, the point of a firewall in each case is the same - ensuring that monies from a tax would be used for their intended purpose and not merely for deficit reduction.
 * Third is __light-loading__ — it threatens the __collapse__ of the economy —only federal action through the plan solves it**
 * Weakley, 8** – Realize America’s Maritime promise, Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Fairness Coalition, testimony of James Weakley the president of the Lake Carriers’ Association (James, “Realize America’s Maritime Promise”, Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund Fairness Coalition, 4/30/08, http://www.ramphmtf.org/speeches_043008.html )

Perhaps **__the greatest value of globalization is__** its potential for **__creating__** a **__world__** of **__peace__**. Economic __growth has been identiﬁed as one of the strongest force__ s that turn people __away from__ conﬂict and __wars among__ groups, tribes, and __nations.__ Global companies strongly discourage governments from warring against countries in which they have investments. __Focusing on economic growth encourages cooperation and living in__ relative __peace__ (Marquardt, 2001, 2002).
 * Growth solves conflict**
 * Marquardt, 5** (Michael J., Professor of Human Resource Development and International Affairs, George Washington University, Globalization: The Pathway to Prosperity, Freedom and Peace,” Human Resource Development International, March 2005, Volume 8, Number 1, pg. 127-129, Taylor and Francis, Tashma)

Less intuitive is how __periods of economic decline__ may __increase the likelihood of external conflict__. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that __rhythms in the global economy are associated with__ the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often __bloody transition__ from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as __economic crises could usher in a redistribution of__ relative __power__ (see also Gilpin, 1981) __that lead__ s __to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalc__ ulation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain __redistribution__ of power __could lead to__ a permissive environment for __conflict as a rising power may__ seek to __challenge a declining power__ (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that __interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefit__ s __from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations__. However, __if__ the __expectations__ of future trade __decline,__ particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, __the likelihood for conflict increases__, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. __Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which__ in turn __returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other__. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p. 89) __Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism__ (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), __which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions__. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. __'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect__. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that __periods of **weak economic performance**__ in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, **__are statistically linked to__** an increase in **__the use of force__**. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.
 * Collapse causes war**
 * Royal, 10** — Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises?”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215, 2010)

Conversely, global policymakers do not seem to have grasped the downside risks to the global economy posed by a deteriorating domestic and international political environment. If the past is any guide, the souring of the political environment must be expected to fan the corrosive protectionist tendencies and nationalistic economic policy responses that are already all too much in evidence. After spending much of 2008 cheerleading the global economy, the International Monetary Fund now concedes that output in the world's advanced economies is expected to contract by as much as 2% in 2009. This would be the first time in the post-war period that output contracted in all of the world's major economies. The IMF is also now expecting only a very gradual global economic recovery in 2010, which will keep global unemployment at a high level. Sadly, the erstwhile rapidly growing emerging -market economies will not be spared by the ravages of the global recession. Output is already declining precipitously across Eastern and Central Europe as well as in a number of key Asian economies, like South Korea and Thailand. A number of important emerging-market countries like Ukraine seem to be headed for debt default, while a highly oil-dependent Russia seems to be on the cusp of a full-blown currency crisis. Perhaps of even greater concern is the virtual grinding to a halt of economic growth in China. The IMF now expects that China's growth rate will approximately halve to 6% in 2009. Such a growth rate would fall far short of what is needed to absorb the 20 million Chinese workers who migrate each year from the countryside to the towns in search of a better life. As a barometer of the political and social tensions that this grim world economic outlook portends, one needs look no further than the recent employment forecast of the International Labor Organization. The ILO believes that the global financial crisis will wipe out 30 million jobs worldwide in 2009, while in a worst case scenario as many as 50 million jobs could be lost. What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and __global chaos__ __followed hard on economic collapse__. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. __The threat of instability is a pressing concern__. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, __China faced__ upward of __70,000 labor uprisings a year.__ __A__ sustained __downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability__. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. __Russia__, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, __has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow__. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then __wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a__ continuing __threatening posture toward__ Russia's __neighbors,__ __is likely__. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. __Europe__ as a whole __will face dangerous__ ly increasing __tensions__ between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. **__A__** prolonged **__global__** downturn, let alone a **__collapse__****__,__** **__would dramatically raise tensions__** __inside these countries.__ __Couple that with__ possible protectionist legislation in the United States, __unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe__ and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. __The result may__ be a series of __small explosions that coalesce into a big bang__.
 * Extinction**
 * Auslin, 9** (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman, Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

=1ac sealift=


 * Contention three is sealift**


 * The plan is critical to sealift capabilities – two internal links**

(1973), Burroughs: professor, Department of Marine Affairs, University of Rhode Island, Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (1975) (Lawrence Juda and Richard Burroughs, “Dredging Navigational Channels in a Changing Scientific and Regulatory Environment” 34 Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 174-179) // CB But port facilities and maritime transportation are __also important from another perspective, that of national security. They enable the supply of United States military forces deployed abroad. For example,DOT points out thatninety per cent of all supplies used in Operation Desert Storm were shipped from U.S. ports__. 6 According to DOT, water transportation is environmentally sound, since ships and barges, when compared to other means of transportation, have the smallest number of accidental spills or collisions. 7 Further, water transportation is more fuel efficient per ton of cargo moved than other modes of transportation. 8 But these assessments focus only on the actual operation of transportation systems and do not consider, for example, potential environmental problems associated with dredging, an activity essential for contemporary maritime transportation While the movement of goods in trade is shaped fundamentally by factors of supply and demand, it is also affected by the ability to transport goods from where they are found or manufactured to where they are desired, as well as the ability to do so in a dependable and efficient manner and on cost competitive terms. 9 __Containerization 10 and the use of ever larger ships, tankers and bulk ships as well as container ships, represent responses by the shipping industry to these transportation influences.__ Simply put __, larger ships benefit from economies of scale, so that a larger container vessel has lower costs per container and a larger tanker lower costs per unit of crude oil or other cargo__. 11 DOT has noted the trend toward the use of mega-container ships__, that is ships designed to carry over 4,500 boxes measured in terms of twenty foot equivalent units__ (TEUs). 12 The Regina Maersk, the first 6,000+ TEU containership, was delivered in early 1996, [table omitted] and in the period of 1997-1999 some thirty five new vessels were ordered with a TEU capacity ranging from 4,500 to 9,000 TEUs. 13 Ships on order now include what will be the two largest containerships in the world, with a capacity of 9,800 TEUs (for the China Shipping Group to be operated between Hong Kong and Los Angeles). 14 Industry sources suggest that in the near future ships with up to 12,000 TEU capacity will enter into service, 15 and DOT expects that, by 2010, almost one third of all general cargo tonnage will be transported on ships with more than 4,000 TEUs. 16 __But if larger vessels offer cost efficiencies for ship operators, they present new problems for port managers. As ships have become larger, they have acquired deeper drafts, demanding deeper water to accommodate their hulls.__ At the start of the twentieth century, navigational channels of thirty 30 feet in depth were sufficient to allow safe movement of almost all ships, 17 but this is no longer the case. Since the introduction of container carrying ships in the 1950s, six generations of such ships have evolved, with successively deeper drafts (Figure 1). 18 It is believed that the drafts of the mega-containerships [table omitted] that will be coming online will not be greater than 14.5 meters, a figure that does not exceed the draft of the largest containerships now in service. 19 __Mega container ship operations require a water depth of at least fifty feet in ship channels, turning basins, and ship berths__. 20 According to the Maritime Administration, in 1997 only four of the ten major U.S. container ports that collectively loaded and unloaded almost eighty per cent of container traffic had channel and berthing areas deep enough in draft for fully laden megacontainerships. 21 (Table 2). It is not ship draft alone that must be considered in navigational dredging. Other factors, such as increased beam and windage, create maneuverability problems in narrow channels. 22 A particular port’s lack of the clearances needed by these larger, deeper draft vessels undercuts its potential for commercial success. To maximize their attraction for very large containerships, __ports must be able to offer easy entrance and departure, the capacity to entertain such vessels even with full loads__ (high load factors), __efficient loading and unloading, and ready access to other forms of transportation as part of the desired seamless network of intermodal carriage__. For ship operators, fast turnaround time is essential, as any time lost at ports lessens the time that ships can move cargoes and generate revenues, frustrates the expectations of shippers regarding delivery, and generally raises questions about the reliability of service. In this market, ports with channels or berthing facilities that do not provide needed clearance for these newer and larger vessels may be avoided altogether. Otherwise, they may be left to served only by smaller ships or those that are not fully loaded. In the port of Oakland, for example, deep draft vessels have had to key their arrival times to tidal schedules, and delays in unloading might then cost an additional 10.5-14 hours of waiting for the next high tide. 23 Such scenarios have serious implications for the port, for businesses dependent on maritime transportation, and, ultimately, for the consumer. __The needs of ports to accommodate larger vessels with deeper drafts, taken together with the natural process of sedimentation, create demands for the dredging of shipping lanes__. As noted by a former DOT official, for ports “ __the competition to capture markets by having the deep channels required for mega-ships translates simply and inescapably into millions of tons of dredged materials__ .” 24 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that the Corps of Engineers annually dredges and disposes of some 300 million cubic yards of material from navigation maintenance and improvement projects. To this figure must be added some 100 million cubic yards of material dredged by port authorities, terminal owners, marinas, and private individuals. 25 In connection with maritime transportation, dredging is needed in three types of situations: to maintain present widths and depths by counteracting the natural redistribution of coastal sediments, to widen and deepen existing channels for access by new, larger vessels, and to create new port facilities where they have not existed before.
 * First is __size limitations__ and __efficiency__ – this will __immobilize__ our maritime forces**
 * Juda and Burroughs 04** – Juda: professor, Department of Marine Affairs, University of Rhode Island, Ph.D., Columbia University

**DOTMA 5** (U.S. department of transportation maritime administration “ REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF PORTS AND THE INTERMODAL SYSTEM” http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Rpt_to_Congress-Perf_Ports_Intermodal_Sys-June2005.pdf)JC The addition of military mobilization to normal commercial operations dramatically stresses the freight transportation system and severely tests its capability. Both strategic and non-strategic commercial port operators maintain infrastructure based on their normal commercial requirements and generally there is little excess capacity. During deployments, the increased demand placed on infrastructure capacity is met by using existing excess commercial capacity and by balancing the military needs with the commercial workload. Problems occur when the military requirement for capacity is greater than the excess commercial capacity available at the time of deployment. Prior to OIF, rail infrastructure was enhanced at a number of major U.S. Army bases by the U.S. Army’s Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP), enabling the U.S. Army to deploy 5 1/3 divisions in 75 days. The Ports of Jacksonville, Beaumont, and Corpus Christi noted that the increased rail throughput capability and the heavy push of loaded rail cars out of U.S. Army bases caused short-term rail congestion in the ports. This congestion rippled through the rail system and temporarily degraded cargo security. In some instances, military trains were left on rail sidings between U.S. Army bases and the ports. Port rail infrastructure shortfalls could become more serious in the future as trade grows and larger military deployments are required, or if the deployment occurs during peak commercial cargo shipment seasons. The strategic ports recognize this problem and are embarking on locally and Federally funded improvement programs.
 * Second is __port congestion__ and __commercial capacity__**

Deter major power war**.** __No other disruption is as potentially disastrous to global stability as war among major powers__. __Maintenance and extension of this Nation’s comparative seapower advantage is a key component of **deterring major power war**__. While war with another great power strikes many as improbable, __the near-certainty of its ruinous effects demands that it be actively deterred using all elements of national power.____The expeditionary character of maritime forces—our lethality, global reach, speed, endurance, ability to overcome barriers to access, and operational agility—provide the joint commander with a range of deterrent options__. We will pursue an approach to deterrence that includes a credible and scalable ability to retaliate against aggressors conventionally, unconventionally, and with nuclear forces. Win our Nation’s wars. __In times of war, our ability to impose local sea control, overcome challenges to access, force entry, and project and sustain power ashore, makes our maritime forces an indispensable element of the joint or combined force. __ This expeditionary advantage must be maintained because it provides joint and combined force commanders with freedom of maneuver. Reinforced by **__a robust sealift capability__** that **__can concentrate and sustain__** forces, **__sea control and power projection__** enable extended campaigns ashore.
 * __Sealift__ solves great power war and is __critical to naval power__**
 * Conway et al 7** [James T., General, U.S. Marine Corps, Gary Roughead, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Thad W. Allen, Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf]

NLUS, 12 – a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating our citizens about the importance of sea power to U.S. national security and supporting the men and women of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine and their families (Navy League of the United States, “Maritime Primacy & Economic Prosperity: Maritime Policy 2012-13”, Navy League of the United States, 1/21/12, http://www.navyleague.org/files/legislative_affairs/maritime_policy20122013.pdf | AK) Global engagement is critical to the U.S. economy, world trade and the protection of democratic freedoms that so many take for granted. The guarantors of these vital elements are hulls in the water, embarked forward amphibious forces and aircraft overhead. The Navy League of the United States’ Maritime Policy for 2012-13 provides recommendations for strategy, policy and the allocation of national resources in support of our sea services and essential to the successful execution of their core missions. We live in a time of complex challenges — //terrorism//, //political// and //economic turmoil// , //extremism// , //conflicts// over environmental resources, manmade and natural //disasters// — and potential //flash points// exist //around the globe//. It is the persistent **forward presence** and engagement **of maritime forces that keep these flash points in** **check**, **prevent conflict** **and crisis escalation**, and allow the smooth flow of goods in a global economy.
 * This solves every transnational threat**

**Hegemonic decline results in great power war** **Brzezinski 12** [Zbigniew Brzezinski, //national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter,// January/February 2012, “After America”, Foreign Policy, [], DMintz] Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased **tension** among **global competitors**, and even outright **chaos** would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to **global political and economic disorder**, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially **fatal risks to global well-being**. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions : Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of **acute international tension** in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including **Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East** -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering U nited S tates could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as **sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment**, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict. None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate **global insecurity**, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

Events in Libya are a further reminder for __Americans__ that we __stand at a crossroads in our__ continuing __evolution as the world's sole__ full-service __superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly__ seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are __tired of the responsibility__. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: __We live in__ a time of arguably __the greatest structural change in__ the __global order yet endured, with this__ historical __moment's most amazing feature being its__ relative and absolute __lack of mass violence__. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **__As the guardian of globalization, the U.S.__** military **__has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known__**__. Had America been removed from__ the global __dynamics__ that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable __there would now be no__ identifiable __human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered__ the killing equation. But __the world did not keep sliding down__ that path of __perpetual war__. Instead, __America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in__ our now- __perpetual great-power peace. We introduced__ the international liberal trade order known as __globalization__ and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. __What resulted was__ the collapse of empires, an explosion of __democracy__, the persistent spread of __human rights__ , the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold __increase in__ adjusted global __GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from__ state-based __conflicts__. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these __calculations suggest a__ 90 percent absolute drop and a __99 percent__ relative __drop in deaths due to war. We are__ clearly __headed for__ a world order characterized by __multipolarity__, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. __But__ given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, __we would do well to keep U.S. power__, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.As a result, the vector of structure-building connectivity shifted from trans-Atlantic to trans-Pacific. But if the connectivity push of the past several decades has been from West to East, with little connectivity extended to the South outside of the narrow trade of energy and raw materials, the current connectivity dynamic is dramatically different. Now, the dominant trends are: first, the East cross-connecting back to the West via financial and investment flows as well as Asian companies "going global"; and second, the East creating vast new connectivity networks with the South through South-South trade and investment. __The challenge here is how to adjust great-power politics to these profound forces of structural change__. Because of the West's connectivity to the East, we are by extension becoming more deeply connected to the unstable South, with China as the primary conduit. Meanwhile, America's self-exhausting post-Sept. 11 unilateralist bender triggered the illusion -- all the rage these days -- of a G-Zero, post-American world. The result, predictably enough for manic-depressive America, is that we've sworn off any overall responsibility for the South, even as we retain the right to go anywhere and kill any individuals -- preferably with flying robots -- that we deem immediately threatening to our narrowly defined national security interests. The problem with this approach is thatChina has neither the intention nor the abilityto step up and play anything resembling a responsible Leviathan over the restive South, where globalization's advance -- again, with a Chinese face -- produces a lot of near-term instability even as it builds the basis for longer-term stability. Libya is a perfect example of where the world is now stuck: America is very reticent to get involved militarily, while China, for the first time in its history, engages in long-range military operations to evacuate its workforce there. Meanwhile, the expanding civil war rages on, to everyone's moral and economic distress.The point is not that America must invade Libya pronto to keep the world as we know it from coming to an end. But if the United States and the West sit by while the Rest, risers that they are, manage nothing more than pious warnings about needlessly butting in, then __we__ all __run the risk of__ collectively making __the post-American__, G-Zero, do-nothing storyline a self-fulfilling prophecy. While that alone won't stop the __world__ from spinning, if it persists as a pattern, __globalization will slide__ down another path: one of regionalism, __spheres of influence and neocolonial burdens that are intuitively hoarded by great powers grown increasingly suspicious of one another__. And __if you know your history, that should make you nervous__.
 * Statistics and empirics prove**
 * Barnett, 11** (Thomas, P.M. Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, American military geostrategist, Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads”, 3/7/2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads)

=1ac lng=
 * Contention three is __liquefied natural gas__ —**

Economists at a recent forum disagreed about the potential impact of the Panama Canal expansion set for 2014, arguing in turns that it could greatly boost energy trade or that it needs to improve its depth and width before it can attract new traffic. Last week, I covered an economic panel and watched as three economists discussed Houston’s economic future. The canal expansion was just one piece of the discussion, and it wasn’t the only point of contention. __Michael Economides, a professor of chemical and biomolecular engineering at the University of Houston, told an audience__ of about 100 __that the Panama Canal expansion would be a defining moment for the U.S.’s energy sector__, especially __in its competition with Russia__ and China. “The reason for that is LNG, liquid natural gas,” Economides said. “ __The Panama Canal expansion will allow__ for __super tankers__ to be able __to traverse (the canal). We would be exporting energy__ from the U.S. Some of it's going to go east to Europe__, primarily__ .” Patrick Jankowski, regional economist at the Greater Houston Partnership, said __the expansion will boost trade__, but it won’t necessarily be a game-changer.
 * The Panama Canal expansion means the US will try to export liquid natural gas**
 * Eaton, 12** – reporter for the Houston Business Journal (Collin, “Economists differ on Panama Canal expansion's impact”, Houston Business Journal, May 29 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/blog/money-makers/2012/05/economists-differ-on-panama-canal.html )

Shipping Capacity The successful export of LNG will depend upon the necessary shipping infrastructure and capacity being in place. Cheniere Energy is looking to export up to 2.2 bcf/day of gas from its Sabine Pass LNG terminal in Louisiana. 39 Depending on the size of the LNG vessel, this would require between three and five supertankers per week. In order to accommodate this volume of large ships, some domestic U.S. ports will require additional dredging. Other shipping-related concerns include security of vessels and the adequacy of Coast Guard capacity to provide that security (exporters must meet Coast Guard Waterway Suitability, Security, and Emergency standards prior to approval); and the capacity of sea lanes, particularly to Asia. Increasing shipments to Asia will depend on the capacity of the Panama Canal, which is currently too small to accommodate most LNG tankers. However, afterthe planned expansion of the canal is completed—expected to be in 2014—roughly 80 percen t of the world’s LNG tankers will be able to pass through the isthmus, resulting in a dramatic decline in shipping costs to Asia. 40
 * The plan is critical to make this successful**
 * Ebinger, et al., 12** — Task Force Co-Chair of Brookings Institution Natural Gas Task Force("Evaluating the Prospects for Increased Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas from the United States", January, p. 15, Brookings, www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/natural%20gas%20ebinger/natural_gas_ebinger_2.pdf)

__Europe will watch the debate__ with considerable interest – not just because __the likes of BG__ Group __have a__ 34% stake in total US LNG export capacity being developed,but because European hub prices currently sit mid-way between the US and Asia. European spot market __liquidity has held up__ reasonably well __thanks to Qatari supplies__, but __Doha__ is increasingly looking East, a dynamic that __could leave Europe__ with its more traditional Russian, North Sea and North African pipeline mix. If American LNG doesn’t come good, North West European liquidity will dry up quicker than most think – with potentially serious price and dependency implications. __Europe will inevitably fail to develop its shale reserves, not unless the states in question happen to be perched on the Russian border. Little __ __wonder serious forecasts already think Europe will end up importing more US LNG by 2020 than it manages to frack in its own backyard__.
 * That solves European gas dependence**
 * Hulbert, 12** – a Lead Analyst at European Energy Review and consultant to a number of governments, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations (Clingendael), was previously Senior Research Fellow at ETH Zurich working on energy and political risk. He started work in the City of London, advising on energy markets and political risk, as Senior Energy Analyst at Datamonitor for leading global utilities, and headed up the Global Issues Desk at Control Risks Group, specializing in political risk, geopolitics and security analysis for multinational companies, governments and institutional investors. He was also seconded to work in Washington, D.C., to enhance CRG's political risk offerings in North America. (Matthew, “Why American Natural Gas Will Change The World”, Forbes, 5/26/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/05/26/why-american-natural-gas-will-change-the-world/)

IN THE early 1990S, after the Iron Curtain lifted, Western leaders seized a historic opportunity to open the doors of NATO and the EuropeanUnion (EU)to post communist central and eastern Europe. __By consolidating democracy__ and ensuring stability __from the Baltics to the Black Sea__, they redrew the map of Europe. As a result, __the continent__ today __is more peaceful__, democratic, and free. This accomplishment was the result of a common U.S.-European grand strategy that was controversial and fiercely debated at the time. The goal was to build a post-Cold War Europe "whole, free, and at peace"; to renew the transatlantic alliance; and to reposition the United States and Europe to address new global challenges. But as successful as the strategy of enlargement has been, the world has changed dramatically since it was forged. The United States and Europe face new risks and opportunities on Europe's periphery and need to recast their strategic thinking accordingly for a new era. Current policy toward Europe's periphery is increasingly out of date, for three reasons. First, the West has changed. The 9/11 attacks pulled U.S. attention and resources away from Europe and toward the Middle East. The reservoir of transatlantic goodwill and political capital accumulated during the 1990S has evaporated in the sands of RONALD D. As MU s is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in Brussels. From 1997 to 2000, he served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. [95] Ronald D. Asmus Iraq. In Europe, enlargement fatigue has set in thanks to stumbling institutional reforms and the mounting expense of integrating new EU members. It was widely assumed that the western Balkan states (Albania and the former Yugoslav republics) would all eventuallyj oin the EU and NATO, but even that can no longer be taken for granted. Turkey's chances of gaining EU membership are fading. Indeed, **__the__** window of **__opportunity to expand the democratic world__** that opened with the end of the Cold War **__is__** now **__at risk of closing__**. Second, the East has changed. The challenge of the 1990S was to consolidate democracy in central and eastern Europe along a north south axis from the Baltics to the Black Sea. __Today's__ even more difficult __challenge is to stabilize__ the countries of __Eurasia____, the region where Europe and Asia meet, along a new axis extending eastward from the Balkans across the Black Sea region__. The Wests policy to the southern Caucasus and including Turkey, toward Europe, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan toward Europe's Sandwiched between an unstable Middle periphery cannot East to the south and a hostile Russia to the north, these countries are the new flank of remain on cruise the Euro-Atlantic community. Old may still work in the Balkans, but countries have changed such as Georgia and Ukraine-let alone Moldova and Belarus, if and when the latter opens up to the outside world-are weaker, poorer, and more politically problematic than the central and eastern European countries NATO and the EU sought to integrate earlier. Their claim to be part of Europe is more tenuous, and the perceived Western imperative to help is less obvious. The policy tools developed for central and eastern Europe a decade ago are, accordingly, no longer as effective. Finally, __Russia has changed__. In the 1990S, it was a weak, quasi democratic state that wanted to become part of the West. Now, a more powerful, __nationalist__, and __less democratic Russia__ __is challenging the West__. Moscow sees itself as an independent Eurasian power, offering its own authoritarian capitalist model of development as an alternative to democratic liberalism. It practices a form of mercantilist geo political hardball that many in Europe thought was gone for good. Nowhere is this more clear than in its policies toward Europe's [96] Europes Eastern Promise periphery, where it is seeking to halt or roll back democratic breakthroughs in places such as Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow's willingness to use its energy resources as a political weapon has made Europe an countries reluctant to confront Russia over its antidemocratic behavior. Until __the EU can__ liberalize its energy markets and __diversify its supplies____, Moscow will have the upper hand__. Inthis new strategic environment, Western policy toward the nations on Europe's periphery cannot remain on cruise control as if nothing has changed. NATO and the EU need to articulate a new strategic rationale for expanding the democratic West and devise a new approach to dealing with Russia. __There is another opportunity today to advance Western values and security and redraw the map of Europe and Eurasia once more.__ But new ideas will be necessary to seize it-and to reinvent the transatlantic alliance in the process. OUT WITH THE OLD THE GRAND strategy of democratic enlargement that lay behind the opening up of NATO and the EU early in the 1990S grew out of the twin imperatives of reuniting Europe following communism's collapse and reinventing the transatlantic alliance for the post-Cold War era. **__The goal was to consolidate democracy across the__** eastern half of the **__continent__** by anchoring central and eastern European countries to the West. It reflected the vision of a peaceful Europe expanding its foreign policy horizons and sharing global leadership and responsibility with the United States. At the time, Washington concluded that the EU alone was too weak to lead the enlargement process. Thus NATO took the lead in bringing central and eastern Europe into the fold. NATO'S membership could more easily be expanded, and extending NATO'S security umbrella to countries in those regions was critical to the consolidation of democracy. NATO also contributed to reform by raising its requirements for new members, a "tough love" policy designed to reinforce positive transformation. As NATO played a key role in taking the security issue off the table and opening its doors to the East, the EU assumed most of the burden of transforming post-communist societies into liberal democratic ones. E.U. enlargement policy was an asymmetric negotiation. Candidate countries simply had to accede to the EU'S existing acquiscommunautaire the full range of its laws, regulations, and institutions. The newcomers had little say in anything but the timeline under which the EU'S requirements would be implemented. Nevertheless, it was this transformation that fundamentally tied these countries to the West and thus created enduring security on the continent. Great care was taken to ensure that countries not included in the initial round of enlargement would not be destabilized. The West did not want to repeat the mistake that U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made in 1950, when he appeared Expanding the reach to sketch a new Western security perimeter and thereby invited the conclusion that of NATO and the EU countries on the other side of the line were once again does not of no interest to the West. Therefore, NATO and EU Policy sought to blur the lines between mean starting a new members, potential future members, and Cold War partners. In practice, this meant finding new ways to embrace and deepen cooperation with countries that did not seek membership or were not yet realistic candidates for it. NATO explicitly left open the possibility of further expansion down the road. The EU was more circumspect, but it, too, expanded its outreach to countries on Europe's periphery whose future stability and orientation it wanted to shape. The West's desire to mitigate any negative fallout was perhaps most visible in its handling of Russia. In different yet reinforcing ways, the Americans and the Europeans signaled their strategic desire to pull Russia toward the West in the hope that Moscow would eventually evolve into a partner and perhaps even a de facto ally. NATO and EU enlargement were accompanied by an unparalleled effort to engage Moscow and work for Russia's own democratic trans formation, while still taking what were seen as its legitimate interests into account. This strategy was not a new effort to contain Russia but an attempt to integrate it-albeit in a looser form and on a different timeline than that of its smaller western neighbors. And it was not merely rhetoric. NATO rethought its military strategy and force posture in order to underscore that it had no offensive intentions. Moreover, it offered to expand political and military cooperation and plan for future joint military operations with Russia. The EU set out its own far-reaching plans to deepen cooperation. The West took such steps despite uncertainty over where Russia was headed and despite the fear that Moscow would take advantage of these openings to paralyze Western institutions rather than cooperate with them. Looking back, Western policy achieved two of its goals-anchoring much of central and eastern Europe and preventing instability in those countries remaining outside NATO and the E u-and was partially successful in dealing with Russia. These successes were not inevitable, and their importance should not be underestimated. Had NATO and the EU not acted, Europe today would be a messier, less stable, and more inward-looking place. And Washington would have even fewer allies in dealing with crises beyond Europe, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, it is only too easy to forget that a decade ago there were concerns that enlargement would create new and sharper divisions between those countries joining NATO and the EU and those remaining on the outside. It has done the opposite. The success of NATO and EU enlargement, and the inclusion of countries such as the Baltic states, set a positive precedent for the former Soviet republics. Following the Rose and Orange Revolutions, democratic leaders in Georgia and Ukraine became more serious about seeking to tie their countries to the West. After all, if the Baltic states could do it, why should they not dare to do the same? The results in Russia were mixed, however. On the one hand, the train wreck that was so frequently predicted by enlargement critics never happened. New arrangements for cooperation with NATO and the EU were set up, and a breakdown of relations with Moscow was avoided. But the West's broader hopes of establishing deeper relations with a more democratic Russia never materialized. Instead of becoming more democratic and cooperative, **__Moscow has become__** more **__authoritarian__** **__and adversarial__**. Hopes that the West and Russia could find common strategic ground after 9/11 have largely gone unfulfilled, and the two are even further apart now on issues such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Kosovo. The Orange and Rose Revolutions were interpreted in Moscow not as democratic breakthroughs but as threatening developments that needed to be challenged and reversed. Who or what is responsible for these trends is, of course, an issue of considerable dispute. Was it a lack of U.S. and European imagination and will that allowed Russia to drift in this anti-Western direction? Or was it the result of internal Russian dynamics over which the West had little, if any, influence? Did NATO and EU enlargement push Russia in the wrong direction, or was the West fortunate to act when it did given what has followed? Enlargement has created more democratic stability on Russia's western border than at any time since Napoleon. Yet today, the Kremlin's spin doctors are creating a new stab-in-the-back legend of how the West betrayed Moscow during the 1990s. The gap in historical narratives mirrors the increasingly tense relationship between the West and Russia. ALL QUIET ON THE EASTERN FRONT? IN LIGHT of these new circumstances in Russia, enlargement needs to be rethought from the ground up, starting with its strategic rationale. [1oo] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume87No.i Europe’s Eastern Promise After the accession of a band of countries from the Baltic states in the north to Bulgaria and Romania in the south, many in the West assumed that the enlargement project was almost complete, with the western Balkans constituting the last piece of unfinished business. They were surprised to suddenly find new countries from Eurasia, and specifically the wider Black Sea region, starting to knock on the doors of NATO and the EU-and unsure how to respond. In dealing with these new candidate countries, the West must stick to the values and diplomatic principles it laid down in the l990s, including the notion that countries are free to choose their alliances. But that alone is unlikely to be enough, because although these countries clearly consider themselves European, many Europeans do not feel the same historical or moral commitment to them or see a compelling strategic need to integrate them. Thus, in addition to moral and political arguments, the United States and Europe need to articulate a strong strategic rationale for anchoring them to the West. That argument is straight forward. **__The challenge of securing Europe__** 's eastern border from the Baltics to the Black Sea **__has been replaced by the need to extend peace and stability__** along the southern rim of the Euro Atlantic community-from the Balkans across the Black Sea and further into Eurasia, Russia needs friends region that connects Europe, Russia, and the Middle East and involves core security and allies and the interests, **__including a critical energy corridor__**. United States and Working to consolidate democratic change and build stability in this area is as important Europe can and for Western security today as consolidating should be among them. Democracy in central and eastern Europe was in the 1990s. **__It is__** not only **__critical to expanding the democratic peace__** in Europe but also vital to repositioning the West vis-a-vis both Central Asia and the Middle East. This strategy presents an opportunity to redraw the strategic map of Europe and Eurasia in a way that enhances the security of countries on Europe's periphery as well as that of the United States and Europe. The United States and Europe also need to rethink what anchoring means in practice. In the 1990s, it meant pursuing membership in NATO and the EU roughly in parallel. Now the West needs to be more flexible and take a long-term view. The goal is to tie these countries as closely to the West as politics and interests on both sides allow. For some countries, this may mean eventual membership in both NATO and the EU; for others, it may mean membership only in NATO; and for the rest, it may mean membership in neither but simply much closer relations. Policy will have to be much more "ala carte than prix fixe. The link between NATO membership and EU membership should be relaxed, if not dropped. The EU has enough on its plate sustaining its commitments to the western Balkans and Turkey; anything beyond that is probably a nonstarter for the time being. NATO will once again have to take the lead in anchoring countries such as Georgia and others in the wider Black Sea region. The West must also rethink how it should engage and reach out to these countries. If membership is less plausible as a short-term option, then the quality of ties short of membership must be improved to compensate. Outreach must grow in importance and may increasingly become the centerpiece of U.S. and European strategy. At the moment, the fear of future enlargement is one factor actually holding allies back, with institutions afraid of taking even small steps down what some fear could be a slippery slope. Yet precisely because the countries in question are weaker and more endangered, NATO and the EU should actually be reaching out and engaging them earlier. They need the security umbrella and engagement of the West as much, if not more, than the countries of central and eastern Europe did. The way out of this dilemma is to consider membership a long-term goal and focus in the meantime on strengthening Western outreach and engagement. This means recasting policy tools to address the different needs of the countries that are less developed politically and economically. Tools such as NATO's" membership action plan" should be extended earlier and tied less closely to actual membership commitments, thus allowing these countries to benefit from guidance and engagement while downplaying the question of the end goal. At the same time, the EU needs to enhance its own tools, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Neighborhood Policy, as well as reach out to these countries more directly by offering them political and economic support. When communism collapsed, NATO and the EU had little idea how to reach out to post-communist countries [102] Europe’s Eastern Promise and anchor them to the West. Bureaucrats in both institutions said it could not be done. But political will and strategic imagination prevailed, and fresh approaches were developed. Political will can do the same today. As for Russia, neither Washington nor Brussels wants a confrontation with Moscow at a time when they face daunting challenges beyond Europe. But this does not mean the West should abandon its belief that the spread of democracy along Russia's borders contributes to peace and stability just because the current authoritarian rulers in Moscow disagree. Nor should the West abandon its principles and succumb to the sphere-of-influence thinking currently emanating from Moscow. If the United States and Europe still hope that democracy will eventually take root in Russia, they must recognize that consolidating a pro-Western, democratic Ukraine would indirectly encourage democratization in Russia. Of course, antidemocratic forces in Russia will oppose such a move. After all, Moscow only acquiesced in previous rounds of NATO and EU enlargement because it concluded that the United States and Europe were determined to carry them out and that its efforts to oppose the West would be futile. Western unity on issues such as the future of Ukraine is therefore of the utmost importance. Still, holding true to NATO'S and the EU'S core principles and expanding these organizations' reach does not mean starting a new Cold War. The West and Moscow should look for other areas in which their interests are more aligned, such as expanding trade and investment or controlling nuclear proliferation and building a new arms control regime. The key question is whether Russia--when faced with a unified West-will start to look for common ground. As strong as Russia may appear at the moment, it remains a country with real long-terms structural weaknesses and problems. It, too, needs friends and allies, and the United States and Europe should be among them. UNCERTAIN FUTURES THREE VERY different scenarios for the future of Western policy toward Europe's periphery reveal just how high the stakes are in this region. In the best-case scenario, the United States and Europe would regroup under the next U.S. president and launch a new era of transatlantic operation by overcoming differences on Iraq, avoiding disagreements over Iran, and stabilizing Afghanistan. This renaissance would include a new and ambitious democratic-enlargement strategy, and the results would be significant. Securing independence for Kosovo without turning Serbia against the West would facilitate the successful integration of the western Balkans into NATO and the EU. In Turkey, the AKP-led government would continue democratic reforms, bringing the country closer to EU accession. Georgia and Ukraine would continue to move closer to the West as well. That prospect would help create positive pressure for democratic change in Azerbaijan and encourage Armenia's reorientation toward the West. By 2012, a reunified West would have begun to build an arc of democratic stability eastward into Eurasia and especially the wider Black Sea region. Realizing that its real adversaries lie elsewhere, Russia would eventually have no choice but to reassess its policy and seek a new rapprochement with the West. A less optimistic scenario is stagnation. In this case, the United States and Europe would regain some political momentum after 2008 but fail to achieve any significant democratic breakthroughs. A new U.S. administration would manage to stabilize and then extricate itself from Iraq, but transatlantic tensions over Iran and other Middle Eastern issues would persist. Kosovo would achieve independence, but in a manner that leaves Serbia alienated and unable to find its way back onto the path toward EU accession. In the western Balkans, only Croatia would remain on track for both EU and NATO membership. Turkey's prospects for joining the EU would fade, and reforms in Georgia and Ukraine would stall. Azerbaijan would remain an autocratic pro-Western ally increasingly vulnerable to growing radicalization from within. By 2012, the West would have patched up relations across the Atlantic but __without breakthroughs in__ the Balkans or Turkey-let alone in Ukraine or __the__ wider __Black Sea region__. All of __this would lead to a__ more competitive relationship with Russia, resulting in stalemate and __a new chill in relations with Moscow__. In the worst-case scenario, rather than the West consolidating new democratic breakthroughs, Russia would succeed in a strategy [104] Europe' Eastern Promise of rollback. The United States and Europe would not achieve a meaningful rapprochement, and they would fail to consolidate democracy in the western Balkans. Kosovo would become independent, but without agreement from all sides. This would launch Serbia on a new nationalist trajectory, bringing further instability to the region. U.S. failure in Iraq would lead to partition, estranging Turkey and prompting Ankara to invade northern Iraq and further loosen its ties to the West. This, in turn, would badly damage Turkey's already strained relations with both Washington and Brussels. Ukraine would drift back to autocracy, and Georgia, the one liberal democratic experiment in the Black Sea region, would lose reform momentum and teeter toward failure. Last November's declaration of a state of emergency in Tbilisi was a reminder of how fragile and vulnerable this experiment is. Using its energy supplies and influence, Russia would emerge as an authoritarian capitalist alternative to the West, attracting autocratic leaders throughout Europe and Eurasia. Rather than a renaissance of the transatlantic alliance, the result would be a retreat of democracy and a further splintering of the democratic West. As these scenarios make clear, the western Balkans, Georgia, Ukraine, and the wider Black Sea region are less stable and more at risk today than central and eastern Europe were a decade ago. And the stakes are high. A world in which Ukraine has successfully anchored itself to the West would be very different from one in which it has failed to do so. A world in which Georgia's success has sparked democratic progress in the region and helped stabilize the southern flank of the Euro-Atlantic community would be a much safer one than a world in which Georgia has become an authoritarian state in Russia's sphere of influence. And **__a world in which the democratic West is ascendant would be very different from__** one in which **__an autocratic__**, nationalist **__Russia__** is on the rise.
 * The impact is a __democratic peace__ in Central Asia**
 * Asmus, 8** - Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, in Brussels, From 1997 to 2000, he served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Ronald, “ Europe's Eastern Promise; Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement,” Foreign Affairs. New York: Jan/Feb 2008. http://www.jstor.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdfplus/20020270.pdf?acceptTC=true )

In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov may be replaced, possibly by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed Forces. The latest rumors also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, offered widely reported comments on __the potential for nuclear conflict__ __erupting__ close to the country’s borders. His key observation was controversial, based on estimating that __the potential for armed conflict along__ the entire __Russia__ n periphery __had grown dramatically__ over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, November 28; Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the Defense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked **__the potential for__** local or **__regional conflict__** **__to escalate into large-scale warfare__** “possibly even **__with nuclear weapons__** .” Many Russian __commentators were bewildered__ by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective. However, __they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing conflict escalation__ (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks, particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues (Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his presentation, __armed confrontation__ __with the West could occur__ partly based __on the “anti-Russian policy__ ” pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, __which__ may equally __undermine__ __Moscow’s__ future __relations with NATO. **Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability** __ in Afghanistan or Pakistan; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color revolutions” similar to the Arab Spring and the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18). Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a fully integrated network, __Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change__ (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17). The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in __the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation__. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria. Potential __escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable__ ; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises **__Moscow may have few options__** __at its disposal__ (Interfax, November 17). There is also the added complication of __a possibly messy aftermath____of__ the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that __the Russia__ n General Staff __takes Central Asian security__ much more __seriously__ __in this regard__. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather __limited conventional__ military __power__ Russia currently possesses, which __may compel__ early __nuclear first use__ likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to “de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention – especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities. Unlike other nuclear powers, **__Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actorsclose to its borders__** .In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context. Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.
 * That solves __nuclear war__**
 * Mcdermott 11** — specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues and is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, Senior International Research Fellow for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. McDermott is on the editorial board of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. He recently wrote The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges and Policy Implications (Roger, “General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict”, 12/6/11, The Jamestown Foundation, http://www.jamestown.org/details/?tx_bzdstaffdirectory_pi1%5BshowUid%5D=140&tx_bzdstaffdirectory_pi1%5BbackPid%5D=60&no_cache=1 )

=1ac solvency=


 * Contention four is __solvency__ —**

First, the funding level of the Corps of Engineers’ new construction budget has decreased considerably, with the President’s current request at a level that is less than half of what we have seen historically. This decrease comes despite the challenges noted above, the need to be able to handle the current and future World fleet, the expansion of the Panama Canal, our new trade agreements, and America’s international competitiveness. Our neighbors and competitors are not waiting. We must make this a higher priority to avoid negative consequences resulting in job loss, worsening road congestion, and less competitive exports. Some may suggest that we should concentrate federal investment in just a few ports, but we must take a closer look at the diversity of port cargo and the impact of only deepening a few ports. Often a container port doesn’t handle significant bulk cargo, dangerous cargo or refrigerated cargo. Additionally, often smaller ports are located near key U.S. manufacturers to aid in their imports and exports. Each of our 50 states relies on about 15 seaports to handle its imports and exports. Concentrating port activity to a smal ler geographic area will result in increased transportation costs__and more congestion__ on roads and rails. Total throughput should not be the only calculation in determining federal investment. The second troubling trend that impacts our ability to be ready for the challenges of the future is the time it takes to complete new projects. Ports are growing increasingly wary of the time it takes to complete a project. The new norm is decades, with costs rising with each delay. There are a multitude of reasons for these delays, including a long, slow approval process, lack of funding which results in small amounts of funding for each project, and lack of resources to maintain expertise at the Corps. We must make port modernization a higher priority in our future funding. Maritime movement of cargo is the most cost-effective way to move cargo, and we should be encouraging this through effective federal project development processes, investments and funding.5 As our nation recovers from its economic troubles, we know that cargo growth will expand as well. As our nation invests in infrastructure, we must ensure that ports and their needs are high on the list. We are in a critical time for our nation. We face enormous challenges, and ports are making the necessary investments to build and maintain a world-class maritime transportation system which support U.S. jobs, our global competitiveness, and our economy. We need our federal partner to make that commitment, too. We urge your subcommittee to serve as advocates for waterside port infrastructure so that we can meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.
 * Federal regulations guarantee status quo projects will take __decades__**
 * Nagle, 12** — President and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities (Kurt J., “Testimony of Kurt J. Nagle President and CEO of the American Association of Port Authorities Before the United States House of Representatives Appropriations Committee Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies Subommittee”, Budget Hearing- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Assistant Secretary, Chief of Engineers, March 7, 2012, http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/EWTestimony%20Mar2012%20Final.pdf)

With increasingly larger ships calling the East Coast, it is now more crucial than ever for the United States to invest in its gateway infrastructure. This call for federal investment should come as no surprise. Improving our nation’s waterways for navigation and security harkens back to the birth of our country, when General George Washington assigned such missions to the Continental Army. [7] In the U.S. Constitution, Congress is charged with the task of regulating commerce in Article I, Section 8. Yet, the full authorized depths and widths of U.S. waterway navigation channels are available only 35 percent of the time. [8] Harbor projects take an average of 12 years to complete. The Corps’ cumbersome review procedures are not consistent with the President’s initiative to reduce red tape and streamline preconstruction federal review procedures for major infrastructure “jobs creating” projects. The President’s Aug. 31 directive to five federal agencies ‐ Agriculture, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Interior and Transportation ‐ called for identification of high priority infrastructure projects for expedited review. This expedited review initiative should be extended to the Army Corps. Additionally, Independent Peer Review – a procedure required by Sec. 2034 of the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 2007 – should not be applied to Corps studies begun prior to the two year period preceding enactment of the law, as expressly stated in Sec. 2034 (h). Because of procedural delay, most East Coast ports are not authorized to dredge to deep ‐ draft requirements. Harbor project sponsors attempt to wade through the muddied and shiftingapproval, authorization and appropriation process, and changing requirements are making it increasingly difficult to move forward with these critical projects. In Jacksonville, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers recently added an additional level of review by requiring “Harbor Sym modeling” for our city’s deep draft navigation project. This new requirement has not been applied to previous deep draft projects, will increase costs to the federal government and the Jacksonville Port Authority, and will extend the timeline for completion of the project by one year. Any business leader assessing the current situation would quickly determine our country’s process for prioritizing, approving and funding critical infrastructure projects is fundamentally broken.
 * That means only the plan __cuts through red tape__ and __expedites construction__**
 * Anderson, 11** – Chief Executive Officer of the Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) (A. Paul, “testimony of A. Paul Anderson Chief Executive Officer of the Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) for the Record of the united States House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Subcommittee on Water Resources and the Environment Hearing: “The Economic Importance of Seaports: Is the United States Prepared for 21st Century Trade Realities?””, October 26, 2011, http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyWater/2011-10-26%20Anderson.pdf)

Over time these constitutional responsibilities have been further defined and our Constitution has formed the basis for the U.S. government to play a significant role in our nation’s transportation and infrastructure system. As established in the timeline on page 2, over the years the leaders of our country saw that it was in the national interest to ensure that our ports, waterways, railways and highways benefited from federal oversight and support. For four centuries, beginning with the founding of the Jamestown colony, seaports have served as a vital economic lifeline for America by bringing goods and services to people, creating economic activity and enhancing the overall quality of life. Seaports continue to be the critical link for access to the global marketplace here in the United States handling more than 99 percent of cargoes. __Maintaining our__ national __infrastructure that supports__ foreign and interstate __commerce is__ not only __a federal responsibility__ but is in the national interest as established by our forefathers. In fact, improving waterways and coastal ports for navigation and national security is the most feder__al__ __of infrastructure responsibilities__, dating to the early missions assigned the Continental Army by then General George Washington. In Federalist Paper #42 written by James Madison, a case is made that the powers conferred by the Constitution for regulating commerce and establishing post roads are essential. He wrote: “Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be deemed unworthy of the public care.” Back to Basics In these times of a tightening Federal Budget, as Congress and the Administration take on the task of prioritizing expenditures, we need to identify and prioritize core federal missions that are in the national interest and help to revitalize our economy. Modern, navigable seaports are vitalto international commerce and economic prosperity. For this to be a reality, Federal government investment is needed to maintain and strengthen our nation’s infrastructure that supports foreign and interstate commerce— the underpinnings of our economic security. These are wise investments that pay dividends immediately and over time, and form the backbone of our economy and society at large. Investments in port infrastructure are multipliers, as they create infrastructure that allows long-term job creation, positioning the U nited S tates as a leader __in international trade and commerce__. Waterways Pursuant to Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress, by statute, has reserved jurisdiction over navigable waters for the federal government, which can determine how the waters are used, by whom, and under what conditions. As a result, the federal government takes the lead in building, maintaining, and operating the nation’s navigation channels. Authority to construct and maintain navigation projects on behalf of the United States was granted to the Corps of Engineers in the General Survey Act of 1824. In 1826, Congress passed the first Rivers and Harbors Act and provided funds to the Corps to make specific navigation improvements to the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri Rivers. Congress has continued to appropriate funds for specific navigation projects and the Corps has played a dual role by assessing, as well as implementing, needed projects in federal navigation channels. In 1899, Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act, which makes it unlawful to undertake any modifications of navigable water channels unless authorized by the Secretary of the Army on the recommendation of the Corps of Engineers. It is well established that __the Commerce Clause is the basis for exclusive federal jurisdiction__ __over navigable waterways__. __The__ landmark United States __Supreme Court__ case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) __found that navigation of vessels in and out of__ the __ports__ of the nation __is__ a form of __interstate commerce__ __and__ that federal law takes precedence. Federal authority over navigable waterways has been repeatedly affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Highways and Intermodal Connectors With interstate commerce and connectivity as the impetus, the federal role in ensuring a contiguous system of roads spanning the states has been implicit in our federal government since the writing of the Constitution. These powers were granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution by the clauses describing the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the several states …” and the responsibility “to establish Post Offices and Post Roads.” As the timeline illustrates, since the founding of this great nation, our most visionary leaders have engaged in national infrastructure initiatives. The highway system as we know it today was largely borne out of the 1939 Bureau of Public Roads report commissioned by Franklin Delano Roosevelt titled Toll Roads and Free Roads, which proposed a map of a transcontinental national superhighway system. This led to President Eisenhower’s Federal-Aid Highway of 1956 and subsequent development of the Interstate System. Without the federal role in planning, coordinating and providing funding, our current system of inter-regional highways would not have been possible. Today, this federal responsibility continues through the surface transportation programs funded largely by federal gas taxes. Highways, arterials and secondary roads that are identified as being important to the nation's economy, defense, and mobility are classified as part of the National Highway System (NHS) and are eligible for federal funds through the federal-aid program. Road infrastructure that accesses major intermodal terminals, including seaports, are designated NHS connectors by the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT). While accounting for less than one percent of total NHS mileage, this important infrastructure represents a critical link in the goods movement value chain, carrying truck traffic between transportation modes and to the broader network of the interstate system. According to the Federal Highway Administration, of the 616 total defined NHS intermodal connectors, 253 are connected to ocean and river ports. Of the 1,222 total miles defined as part of the NHS intermodal connectors, 532 miles are port-related infrastructure. Unfortunately, these roads are often inadequate and in poor condition, plagued by inadequate turning radii and shoulder deficiencies and have been found to have twice the percentage of mileage with pavement deficiencies when compared to non-interstate NHS routes according to a study conducted by USDOT. States and MPOs have traditionally assigned freight-focused projects a low priority when compared with passenger-related improvements. Due to their freight-focused nature, NHS connectors generally do not fare well in project selection within the State and MPO planning processes. This critical infrastructure is more important than ever as our nation rebuilds the economy and creates jobs by expanding commerce through free trade agreements and increasing America’s exports and international competitiveness. These roads are key pieces of our connection to the world marketplace. In addition to their national economic importance, NHS Intermodal connectors are vital to defense mobilization and national security. With the military's increasing reliance on strategic ports and commercial trucking for mobility, intermodal connectors are critical to national defense planning. Given the reliance of our national economy and defense on intermodal connectors, it is important that the federal government remain engaged in identifying, prioritizing and funding improvements to this critical infrastructure which has languished when dependent upon State and local planning processes. Summary From the earliest days of our nation, there has been a clear and consistent federal role and national interest in developing and maintaining landside and waterside connections to America’s seaports. This vital transportation infrastructure literally connects American farmers, manufacturers and consumers to the world marketplace. More than a quarter of U.S. GDP and over 13 million jobs are accounted for by international trade. Especially in challenging fiscal times like today, it is critical that basic, core federal missions such as these, that directly impact America’s economic vitality, jobs, and global competitiveness, be recognized and prioritized.
 * The federal government is key — port infrastructure is under __federal jurisdiction__ **
 * AAPA, 11** - AAPA represents 160 of the leading seaport authorities in the United States, Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean and more than 300 sustaining and associate members, firms and individuals with an interest in seaports (American Association of Port Authorities, “The U.S. Government’s Historic Role in Developing and Maintaining Landside and Waterside Connections to Seaports”, March 2011, http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/Transportation%20and%20the%20Constitution1.pdf)

Getting Ready for post-Panamax Vessels The U.S. population is expected to increase 32 percent from 313.4 million people in 2011 to 412.2 million in 2042, as shown in chapter 2. The two regions expected to grow the most by 2030 are the South at 43 million and the West at 29 million. IHS-GI has forecast U.S. imports to grow from $2,666 billion in 2011 to $12,444 billion in 2042 to support this population growth. Exports are projected to increase from $2,088 billion to $14,831 billion over the same time period. San Pedro Bay TEU traffic, representative of West Coast port expectations, is expected to grow to 36.7 million TEUs by 2030. On the East Coast containerized tonnage is expected to grow from 65.66 million tons in 2012 to 146.3 million tons by 2029. Gulf Coast containerized tonnage is expected to grow from 29.6 million tons in 2012 to 64.6 million tons by 2029. One-half of the growth in Center Gulf bulk exports is expected to use the Panama Canal and it is projected that the Center Gulf will increase its share of total U.S. exports over the next 10 years. These exports will transit the Mississippi River to the Port of New Orleans. __Carriers are expanding their fleet of vessels with larger ships to serve the current and future global demand.__ By 2030 post-Panamax vessels could represent 62 percent of the total TEU capacity of the container vessel fleet. __Post-Panamax vessels are already calling at__ some __U.S. ports and will call with increasing regularity in the future. The challenge is to invest in capacity expansion__ in the right places, __at the right time__, and in the right way __in response to the Panama Canal improvements.__ For this report__, a port is be considered “post-Panamax ready” if it has a channel depth of about 50 feet__ net of allowances for usable tide, as well as sufficient dock and crane capacity. U.S. West Coast ports at Seattle, Oakland, Los Angeles and Long Beach all have 50-foot channels. Northeastern U.S. ports at Baltimore and New York have or will soon have 50-foot channels. On the Southeast coast, Norfolk has a 50-foot channel. Below Norfolk along the U.S. Southeast and Gulf Coasts, there are no ports with 50-foot channels, although Charleston with a 45-foot channel depth and nearly 5 feet of tide can accommodate most post-Panamax vessels. This is also a region with high forecast population and the associated potential for trade growth. To respond to these needs, Miami is deepening their channel and will soon have 50-foot channel depth. In order __to prevent ports from becoming the limiting component of the navigation system, the__ vision for the __system must extend beyond the major ports to include lower tier ports__. New, large vessels are typically deployed on the longest and largest trade service – Asia to Northern Europe. The “__smaller” vessels__ on that service __are__ forced to __re-deploy__ to the next most efficient service for that vessel size. This cascading continues until the most marginal vessels in the fleet are forced to be scrapped. __Cascading__ typically __increases average vessel size__ for each trade service, __placing__ __demands on the port__ infrastructure __to support larger__ capacity __vessels__. For U.S. ports to be ready to take advantage of post-Panamax vessel opportunities, __major ports not only need to be “post-Panamax ready,” but second tier ports need to be “cascade ready” as they__ in turn have the opportunity to take advantage of larger vessels that begin to service their trade. For the purposes of this report IWR defines “cascade ready” as a channel depth of 45 feet.
 * All ports are key**
 * USACE, 12** – federal agency that regulates port infrastructure projects (“U.S. Port and Inland Waterways Modernization: Preparing for Post-Panamax Vessels”, USACE, June 20 2012, @http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/docs/portswaterways/rpt/June_20_U.S._Port_and_Inland_Waterways_Preparing_for_Post_Panamax_Vessels.pdf)

Since 1789, Congress has authorized and funded activities to ensure free and open access of the nation’s waterways to navigation. __The General Survey Act of 1824 established the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as the agency responsible for the Nation’s navigation system. Today, the entire U.S. economy depends on an efficient and reliable transportation system to remain competitive in domestic and international markets. Our ability to trade is a major component of our prosperous economy. U.S. port development and maintenance is a shared responsibility of Federal, state, and local governments, with extensive private sector participation. The Federal government maintains harbor access channels, while individual ports construct and maintain the landside terminal facilities, dredge their own berths, and contribute to channel improvement cost-sharing programs__. Relying in good faith on this long-standing partnership, local port authorities have spent over $16.8 billion since World War II and expect to spend an additional $1.3 billion annually to construct and maintain the landside facilities over the next five years. __Local ports fund a share of Federal navigation improvement projects, either 35 percent or 60 percent depending on depth. Federal spending for maintenance dredging of navigation channels is about $500 million annually. Investment decisions made by local ports and the private sector have been based on the expectation that the Federal Government will continue to fund maintenance dredging.__ The benefits of safe and efficient trade provided by our system of water highways are spread throughout the country. Foreign trade activities of each state are supported by a variety of ports; on average, each state relies on between 13 and 15 ports to handle 95 percent of its imports and exports.
 * Federal funding is critical to getting the private sector on board**
 * AAPA 9** – American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA, “The Role of the Federal Government in Maintaining Federal Channels,” 2009, []) // CB