Jackson+Hoffmann+and+Gabe+Esquivel

Email: gaboesquivel@gmail.com or jackson.hoffmann77@gmail.com w questions

__**1ac**__ We read Taiwan

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Nuclearism K Elections DA Rust Belt Elections DA China War Good Japan DA w AIIB mdb CP T military T qpq Suicide Reps PIC QPQ CP w Steel DA HR Conditions CP Elections (Kritikal) and Passavant on case __**1nc**__ Japan DA Xi good/bad DA T qpq Nuclearism K Elections DA Engagement PIC w State Dept DA Appeasement DA T USfg Linguistic Indeterminacy (Passavant) DA Consult Japan CP w Japan DA Add a condition CP v Taiwan Secret Negotiations CP v Korea Invasive Species Turn v Trade affs Warming turn v Trade Affs Negotiations Bad v NoKo scenarios DOD Grids Adv CP
 * answers to the navy can be found in the china war good file
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Plan
The United States federal government should diplomatically engage the People’s Republic of China over a staged Framework Agreement, beginning with an offer of reciprocal reductions in military commitments over Taiwan. The Contention is Significant Harms

Risk of war over Taiwan high – miscalc and distrust mean no interdependence

 * Kuntić, 15** – visiting fellow at European Union Centre in Taiwan, National Taiwan University; PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb (Dario, “The Ominous Triangle: China-Taiwan-the United States relationship” CIRR XXI (72) 2015, 239-280)

As Taiwan is important to both China and the United States, conflict of interests over the island put Beijing and Washington in a relationship plagued with perplexities. Moreover, a sharp escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait could provoke a U.S. show of force in support of its ally. In that case, only a // slightest miscalculation //  could end in a militarized dispute  between the two powers. While the political situation across the Taiwan Strait remains far from being resolved, military conflict between China and Taiwan is not inevitable. Were it to occur, however, it would very likely lead to serious political, and potentially military, conflict between the United States and China (Bergsten at al. 2006: 135). China’s recent behavior fostered a perception that Beijing was shifting to a more assertive regional policy and that it could quickly change its declared policy of “peaceful rise” toward a more confrontational one. The large-scale buildup of Chinese military forces directed at Taiwan, periodic threats by China of its determination to use forceful means to prevent Taiwan’s independence, and China’s assertiveness in the South and East China seas have raised deep mistrust in China’s intentions. Moreover, as China grows stronger, uncertainty about what it will do next may only increase. In the last decade China has demonstrated its willingness to cultivate closer economic, cultural, and social ties with Taiwan in order to promote peaceful reunification. However, increasing economic interests do not necessarily coincide with political interests. Trade and other economic relations are one element of cooperative relations. China has shown its determination to prevent Taiwan’s de jure separation from the mainland. Beijing considers Taiwan an integral part of China, its sovereign territory, and thus its “core interest”, similar to Tibet or Xinjiang. As the Chinese elite feels that China’s status as a great power depends on unity, nation building, integrity, identity, political legitimacy, and national stability, the return of Taiwan to the “motherland” has become a critical measure to restore national greatness. Moreover, Beijing wants to ensure that the island cannot be used to encircle and threaten China. The fact that Taiwan is a strategic U.S. ally armed with advanced weaponry is in deep contrast to China’s interests. Thus, it is not likely that Beijing will accept the resolution of the Taiwan issue that would permanently separate the island from the mainland any time soon. A Chinese defense white paper, released in April 2013, declared that China will “resolutely take all necessary measures to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity”.23 Therefore, it seems that China is ready to prevent Taiwan’s independence at all costs. Michael D. Swaine stresses that although China would prefer to avoid conflict over Taiwan, “this does not mean that it would be unprepared to go to war over the island” (Carpenter 2005: 118). Finally, given China’s increasing self-confidence about its growing economic and political power, and military capabilities, it is questionable for // how long Beijing will ////be willing to tolerate Taiwan’s de facto independence //. Should it become clear that Taipei has foreclosed the possibility of future unification, there is // little doubt //  Beijing would take military action , // regardless of the ////potential political or economic price // (Bergsten et al. 2006: 138). Given the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, that would be the worst-case scenario. It is certain that China and the United States do not intend to go to war, but they are preparing for an emergency. The U nited  S  tates  and China are  not only rivals, but also states that are deeply interdependent and would more likely choose cooperation over conflict. However, their mutual suspicion, contest for domination and conflicting interests undermine flourishing relations and that could drive them towards an open conflict. Both historical experience and contemporary politics have shown that increased geopolitical rivalry, military competition, or ideological divergence could overshadow the enmeshing bonds of commerce, trade, and military ties between the two powers.

The DPP’s election means Taiwan is moving towards de jure independence with US backing

 * Yin, 16 -** Yin Chengde is a research fellow of China Foundation for International Studies (6/8/16,“Time for US to Change Its Taiwan Policy” http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/time-for-us-to-change-its-taiwan-policy/

The pro-independence  DPP has returned to power in Taiwan. Despite repeated warnings from Beijing, Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the DPP,  stopped short of recognizing the 1992 Consensus and the  one-China principle in her inaugural speech,  a signal that she may intend to lead the island in pursuing  “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas”, i.e. Taiwan independence. Evidently, her stance has the backing of the U  nited  S  tates. On the eve of the election, Tsai took a trip to the US, which was apparently designed to seek advice from and compare notes with US policy makers on her policy for cross-Strait relations. It must be during this trip that // her ////pro -independence policy was given tacit approval //. She received further reassurance for her inclination toward independence when the US House of Representatives passed a resolution reaffirming support for Taipei just ahead of her inauguration. The US has always been known to support Taiwan’s quiet moves toward independence to hold back China’s reunification through its policy toward Taipei. Though the US pronounced its commitment to the one-China principle and opposition to Taiwan independence, enshrined in its three joint communiques with China, its commitment was never fully kept. The US public position never went further than saying that it does not support Taiwan independence. What that means is, the US does not support anything radical that the DPP might engage in such as de jure independence by changing Taiwan’s title, lest the US be dragged into a frontal clash with China. The US, however, does not prohibit the DPP from desinicization of the island and pursue disguised independence. The Taiwan Relations Act, to start with, and the “six assurances” are nothing but deliberate steps to force China to renounce the use of force and maintain the “status quo” indefinitely. Its consequence? // Emboldened separatists // with less scruples as they seek to pull the island away from the Chinese mainland. Reunification would remain a distant dream for China, and de facto independence might become the reality in Taiwan. Such a policy toward Taiwan is at odds with the fundamental and core interests of China and, in the final analysis, the US’ own interests as well. It is a policy with multiple strategic flaws. First, the US should stop using Taiwan as its “unsinkable aircraft carrier”. Deng Xiaoping made the observation that the US saw the strategic and military value in Taiwan and wanted to keep it as its unsinkable aircraft carrier. It is quite true because though the US has professedly severed diplomatic ties, withdrew troops from and ended mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, it continues to have semi-official political and military ties with it. It has publicly assisted Taiwan’s defense through arms sales and covert military cooperation of various kinds. The goal is to hold back China’s reunification and use Taiwan as an outpost to contain China. This strategy is nothing but a vestige of the Cold War and will only slow down the growth of China-US relations. As time advances and as China continues to rise, Taiwan won’t be the US’ “unsinkable aircraft carrier” forever. Second, the US should stop going back on its commitments. The return of Taiwan to China was written into the Cairo Declaration, an official international instrument formulated and signed by US and other leaders. All three Sino-US joint communiques affirmed the one-China principle and opposition to Taiwan independence. These are legally binding international documents and serve as the guide and rulebook for China-US relations. Honoring such documents is the very foundation for a functioning international system. But any US tacit support of the DPP’s attempts at de facto independence at the cost of its credibility has hurt not just China, but also the authority of the declaration and the post-war order and can only lead to myriad problems. Third, the US should stop supporting separatists. The DPP prospered through street politics, manipulation of public opinion and populism. Those who won’t stop playing with fire will only destroy themselves. The DPP has gone so far as to take the 20-million-plus Taiwanese as hostage to fulfill its selfish objective of Taiwan independence. This is extremely irresponsible and egregious. To demonstrate support to separatists like the DPP through the Taiwan Relations Act and the “six assurances”  is to openly undermine China’s sovereignty, disrespect the basic norms governing international relations, reject the US’ moral responsibility and hurt its international reputation. Fourth, the US should stop misplacing its stakes. The size, population and overall strength of Taiwan is nowhere near that of the Chinese mainland. Neither is Taiwan’s importance to the US. Economically, the People’s Republic of China and the US are as interdependent as any two economies in the world can be; on major international issues, the US needs China’s cooperation. In economic and strategic areas key to America’s future, Taiwan is of minimal consequence. Admittedly, the US has interests in Taiwan. Its interests on the Chinese mainland, however, far outweigh those in Taiwan. Pitching itself against China, a fast-growing country with 1.3 billion people, by supporting separatists in Taiwan is definitely not the wise thing to do. China will not allow Taiwan, which has historically been part of China,  to break away. // This is a permanent red line for China //. The question of Taiwan is a core issue in China-US relations and must be handled with extraordinary care. Some foresighted people in the US have called for adjusting the US’ Taiwan policy, abolish the Taiwan Relations Act and the “six assurances” to herald a fully normal and healthy bilateral relationship with China. Apparently, this is the trend and we only hope that the US government would do it sooner rather than later for the benefit of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and for the benefit of the US itself too.

The brink is now – China cut communications with Taiwan
Well before Taiwan held its elections on January 20, Beijing made it clear that the “1992 consensus” was its bottom line for cross-strait relations. During an historic meeting with then-President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan, Chinese President Xi  Jinping stressed that “as long as the 1992 Consensus and its core values are acknowledged, we stand ready to have contact.” The  implied  threat:  if  then-presidential favorite (and now president)  Tsai  Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party  declined to embrace the 1992 Consensus , such “  contact” might end. Seven months, one election, and one presidential inauguration later, // Beijing has made good on its threat //. On Saturday, the Taiwan Affairs Office said in a statement that communication mechanisms between the two sides had been “suspended” since Tsai assumed office. The 1992 Consensus refers to an agreement between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s former ruling party. According to the consensus, the two sides agree that there is only one China, uniting both sides of the Taiwan strait – but with enough ambiguity so that each government (the People’s Republic of China in Beijing and the Republic of China in Taipei) could frame themselves as “China.” The DPP, however, has never been interested in that formula. Tsai, throughout her campaign, resisted strong pressure from Beijing to endorse the 1992 Consensus. Though she frequently acknowledge the “historical fact” of the “1992 talks between the two institutions representing each side across the Strait,” Tsai’s main takeaway from the 1992 meetings is that “there was joint acknowledgement of setting aside differences to seek common ground.” In her inaugural address on May 20, she proposed to carry on cross-strait relations based on the “existing political foundations”: the 1992 talks (but, importantly, not the consensus itself), “the existing Republic of China constitutional order,” the accumulated outcomes of previous cross-strait “negotiations and interactions,” and the “will of the people of Taiwan.” That wasn’t good enough for Beijing. The TAO called her speech “an incomplete test answer,” saying, “She did not explicitly recognize the 1992 Consensus and its core implications.” The TAO also repeated its core threat of severing cross-strait exchanges: Both the mechanism of contact and communication between the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan and the mechanism of ARATS and SEF are based on the political foundation of the 1992 Consensus. Only affirmation of the political foundation that embodies the one China principle can ensure continued and institutionalized exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. On June 25, over a month later, TAO spokesperson An Fengshan confirmed that those “institutionalized exchanges” were on ice. “After May 20, because the Taiwan side still is not able to confirm the ‘1992 Consensus,’ the common political foundation that embodies the one China principle, cross-strait communication mechanisms have already been suspended,” An said. The timing – a month and change after TAO complained about Tsai’s “incomplete test answer” – is interesting. In fact, instead of making a grand announcement about the severing of ties, the TAO slid that information into a question on an entirely different subject: the case Taiwanese citizens, suspected of telecommunications fraud, who were deported by Cambodia to mainland China for prosecution. That was just the latest in a string of deportations of Taiwanese from third countries – Kenya and Malaysia as well as Cambodia – to China at Beijing’s behest (for more, see Michael Turton’s analysis of the Kenya case for The Diplomat). The deportations first made headlines in the final stretch of Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency; since May 20, the Tsai administration has taken over discussing the cases with Beijing. Or so it was assumed. An was explicitly responding to reports that the Tsai administration had registered a protest about the Cambodia deportations through “cross-strait channels.” His response, in effect, was to say that no such communication channels exist – at least not until the Tsai administration endorses the 1992 Consensus. It’s also noteworthy that this particular announcement comes as Tsai is on her inaugural trip abroad (to Paraguay and Panama, with transits via the U.S. cities of Miami and Los Angeles). Beijing’s announcement, obviously, did not go over well in Taiwan. DPP caucus leader Wu Ping-jui accused Beijing of “blackmailing and coercing” Taiwan over the 1992 Consensus. According to CNA, Wu said that Taiwanese voters rejected the consensus by electing Tsai, and Beijing’s demands will only “toughen up Taiwanese determination  .” As of this writing, neither Tsai’s office nor the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan had commented on An’s statement. Suspending official cross-strait communication mechanisms sets the relationship back nearly a decade – yet in a real sense, there’s no turning back the clock. Cross-strait business partnerships are booming (and, unfortunately, so are cross-strait criminal organizations). A lack of cross-strait dialogue mechanisms was dangerous back in the early 2000s, when there weren’t even direct flights between the two sides. Today, when economic, educational, and people-to-people ties are booming, it’s // potentially catastrophic //. Beijing’s move leaves no outlet for discussing sensitive issues that may arise (the recent deportations, for one). It’s hard to fathom what Beijing’s end game is. Give Taiwan the silent treatment until Tsai’s term is up, and hope for a quick return to power by the KMT? If so, Beijing will have a long wait — at least four years, possibly eight (unless KMT can quickly overcome its worst electoral drubbing ever and internal political squabbling). In the meantime, without any dialogue mechanisms, there could be more damage done to cross-strait relations than either side can fix.
 * Tiezzi, 16** - Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation (6/26/“Did China Just Kill Cross-Strait Relations?” The Diplomat, []

Nationalist pressure and nuclear insecurity make the risk of war high and nuclear escalation probable

 * Glaser, 15** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

Although a number of regional sovereignty and maritime disputes have the potential to sour the U.S.-China relationship and draw the U nited S tates into crises that could escalate into larger wars, the  // key danger //  appears to be Taiwan ’s status. China has long made clear that it considers unification a paramount political and national security goal .62 In contrast, at least until recently,  the disputes in the South China and East China Seas seemed to be of  // secondary //  importance, with the sovereignty disputes concerning islets and very small islands that are strategically unimportant and have uncertain  and negotiable  economic value. The escalating troubles in the South China and East China Seas arguably reduce the special importance of Taiwan and weaken the case for accommodation, which I address in a later section. The most direct benefit of ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would be a reduction in the probability of war between the U nited S tates and China over Taiwan’s status. Current U.S. policy is designed to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan’s aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States will find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan no matter what the source of a Chinese attack. Whether Taiwan provoked an attack might be unclear, which would increase pressure for U.S. involvement. Moreover, the U  nited  S  tates  has limited control over Taiwan’s policy, which puts it in the unfortunate position of being // hostage to decisions made in Taipei //. None of the above dangers is new, but others are. China’s improved military capabilities may increase its willingness both to start and to escalate a Taiwan crisis. Fifteen years ago, China had little capability to invade or blockade Taiwan. Today it can begin to imagine successfully invading Taiwan, and its capability will only increase with time .63 Much of the concern about China’s so-called antiaccess/area-denial ( A2/AD) strategy focuses on its ability to reduce the U.S. ability to come to Taiwan’s aid  .64 In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their survivability and their ability to retaliate following a large U.S. counternuclear attack.65 Arguably, the U nited S tates’ current ability to destroy most or all of China’s nuclear force enhances its bargaining position in a severe crisis or conventional war over Taiwan. Consequently, China’s nuclear modernization may make China more willing to start a crisis, less willing to make compromises once conflict occurs, and // more willing to escalate ////.// A common counterpoint to the argument above is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low.66 This, in turn, means the expected benefits offered by policies that would keep the United States out of a China-Taiwan conflict have decreased. Although this argument has merit, it is hard to be confident that cross-strait relations will remain good. Taiwan might again elect a more pro-independence government, or China might ramp up pressures for unification. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, recently wrote: “[P]olitical pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the U nited S tates from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP  [Chinese Communist Party]  is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses  .”67

Strategic ambiguity risks miscalculation

 * Colby and Slocombe, 16** - Mr. Colby is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Mr. Slocombe was U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy from 1994 to 2001 (Elbridge and Walter, “U.S. ‘Ambiguity’ on Taiwan Is Dangerous” Wall Street Journal, 5/23, []

If China were to attack Taiwan, would American forces come to the island’s defense? It is hard to know because the U.S. maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity”  concerning how it would respond. It’s time for that to change. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 states only that the U.S. would regard such an attack as of “grave concern,” and only commits the U.S. to maintaining the ability to defend the island. This is a much less firm commitment than the U.S. offers in NATO and to allies Japan and South Korea. But the U.S. stakes in defending a democratic Taiwan and maintaining the credibility of the overall U.S. alliance structure are no less significant. The benefits of this approach long outweighed its risks. It preserved flexibility, was less offensive to Beijing and signaled to Taipei the need to tread gingerly on sovereignty issues. Beijing meanwhile appeared content to try honey rather than vinegar in coaxing Taiwan toward unification. Moreover, China lacked the military capabilities to subjugate Taiwan. The U.S. was so dominant militarily that Beijing’s only plausible course was to tolerate the status quo. But this calculus no longer obtains. The military balance is shifting in Beijing’s favor. Sources as diverse as Taiwan’s government and the RAND Corporation have publicly judged that within a few short years any U.S. defense of the island will be extremely demanding. Blocking a Chinese assault will still be possible for the U.S., but it will be harder, riskier and more costly than before. This means that the situation is changing from one in which Beijing would have been foolhardy to attack Taiwan to one in which it may seem an increasingly viable option. Beijing may even deem it necessary to keep alive its ambition of uniting the island with the mainland. Polls show that Taiwan’s residents overwhelmingly prefer the status quo or independence, and fewer identify as Chinese as time goes on. Given that there are already substantial economic links with the mainland, why should Beijing expect support for unification to grow suddenly, particularly in light of China’s turn away from liberalization under Xi Jinping and the discouraging example of Hong Kong? Thus, sooner or later, China may decide that Taiwan is very unlikely to simply fall into its lap—and will be increasingly tempted to turn to coercion. This emerging situation is particularly dangerous because ambiguity can heighten the likelihood of war when military strength becomes more evenly balanced. History is replete with examples of countries starting wars, even against much stronger powers, based on the belief that their strength or resolve over some issue was greater than that of their foes, and that their opponents wouldn’t fight at all or hard enough. Thus Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea in 1950, with Soviet and Chinese support, believing the U.S. wouldn’t come to the South’s defense. Beijing could make a similar miscalculation about U.S. resolve over Taiwan. It might well assess U.S. ambiguity as indicating that, confronted with a tough and costly fight over Taiwan, the U.S. would decide not to go to war or not to fight hard enough to prevent Beijing from achieving its core goals.

They’ll sink a carrier during the crisis
Littlefield and Lowther 15, Dr. Adam Lowther is Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force Global Strike Command. Alex Littlefield is a professor at Feng Chia University, (8/11/15, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/)//kap// // For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque  nuclear thinking , there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing  its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (  SLBM  ) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile , the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American b allistic m issile d efense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. // China seeks // a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the U  nited  S  tates  will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to  blackmail (  coerce ) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the U  nited  S  tates  maintains an ambiguous use- policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the U nited S tates certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the U nited S tates as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the U nited  S  tates. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly // turn to // its anti-access/area-denial (  A2/AD  ) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the U  nited  S  t ates  may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon  (  against a U.S. carrier  in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental U nited S tates, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the U nited S tates. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction ( MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the U nited S tates. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the U nited S tates in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely  use the election  or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and // will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis //. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. While the scenario described is certainly not inevitable, the fact than many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the United States. Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the U nited S tates may be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe.

Sinking carriers destroys military dominance causes a perception crisis - makes war unwinnable for US
Holst 14 – John Hopkins School of Advanced International Affairs (Henry Holst, “The U.S. Military's Ultimate Fear: Are Aircraft Carriers Too Big To Fail?”, The National Interest, 8/12/2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-militarys-ultimate-fear-are-aircraft-carriers-too-big-11066?page=2)//MBB The threat of a full carrier-strike group anchoring offshore has always been a cornerstone of U.S. deterrence. The sinking of a U.S. aircraft carrier--possibly by A2/AD style weapons-- would likely be the defining moment where the era of perceived U.S. global military dominance would come to an end. Such an event -- greatly magnified by  a 24-hour global news cycle and the rise of social media  --  would alter the entire globe’s political and strategic balance. Any regime seeking to carve out local spheres of interest would scramble to seek the means to fend off the U.S. Navy. After all, the U.S. Navy is the single most important force providing security for the globalized economic system. Clearly American security assurances wouldn’t carry as much weight with a carrier sitting at the bottom of the sea. If the Navy’s worst nightmare came true and U.S. adversaries strengthen their ability to threaten aircraft carriers, how does the Navy reorganize itself to project power ? The entire concept of a carrier strike group (CSG) is based on putting bombs on target by primarily carrier-based planes. This is a large part of the Navy’s new operational concept, Air-Sea Battle. Air-Sea Battle (ASB) integrates forces from all domains: space, air, land, sea, and cyber, in order to defeat “adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities.” An asymmetric weapon that can bypass a carrier’s layered defenses and have even a remote chance at hitting a carrier would throw a wrench in a plan that may be costing U.S. taxpayers around half a trillion dollars. Too Many Eggs in One Basket? While the chances of a U.S.-China conflict are remote, Beijing is investing heavily in A2/AD weapons. More importantly, in our current age of breakneck technological development and cyber espionage, nobody can predict what military technologies U.S. rivals may have in five or ten years. Those who believe in the invincibility of the U.S. carrier strike group are tempting fate. The U.S. Navy may be limiting its options by putting too many of its eggs--or shrinking defense dollars--in one basket. Captain Henry Hendrix sums up this fear in a Center for New American Security paper, stating that aircraft carriers are : “Big, expensive, vulnerable – and surprisingly irrelevant to the conflicts of the time … The national security establishment, the White House, the Department of Defense and Congress persist despite clear evidence that the carrier equipped with manned strike aircraft is an increasingly expensive way to deliver firepower and that carriers themselves may not be able to move close enough to targets to operate effectively or survive in an era of satellite imagery and long-range precision strike missiles.”

Collapse of US naval capabilities causes major wars and collapses trade
Eaglen and McGrath 11 - research fellow for national security (Eaglen) and former naval officer and director (McGrath) (Mackenzie Eaglen and Bryan McGrath, “Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy”, Heritage Foundation, 5/16/2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/thinking-about-a-day-without-sea-power-implications-for-us-defense-policy)//MBB Global Implications. Under a scenario of dramatically reduced naval power, the U nited S tates would cease to be active in any international alliances. While it is reasonable to assume that land and air forces would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the lack of credible maritime capability to move their bulk and establish forward bases would render these forces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were retained at today’s levels. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea, although material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into theater. China’s claims on the S outh C hina S ea, previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces, are accepted as a fait accompli, effectively turning the region into a “Chinese lake.” China establishes expansive oil and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling technology and  secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship. Japan is increasingly isolated and in 2020–2025  executes long-rumored plans to create an indigenous nuclear weapons capability  .[11] By 2025, Japan has 25 mobile nuclear-armed missiles ostensibly targeting China, toward which Japan’s historical animus remains strong. China’s entente with Russia leaves the Eurasian landmass dominated by Russia looking west and China looking east and south. Each cedes a sphere of dominance to the other and remains largely unconcerned with the events in the other’s sphere. Worldwide, trade in foodstuffs collapses. Expanding populations in the Middle East increase pressure on their governments, which are already stressed as the breakdown in world trade disproportionately affects food importers. Piracy increases worldwide, driving food transportation costs even higher. In the Arctic, Russia aggressively asserts its dominance and effectively shoulders out other nations with legitimate claims to seabed resources. No naval power exists to counter Russia’s claims. India, recognizing that its previous role as a balancer to China has lost relevance with the retrenchment of the Americans, agrees to supplement Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to protect the flow of oil to Southeast Asia. In exchange, China agrees to exercise increased influence on its client state Pakistan. The great typhoon of 2023 strikes Bangladesh, killing 23,000 people initially, and 200,000 more die in the subsequent weeks and months as the international community provides little humanitarian relief. Cholera and malaria are epidemic. Iran dominates the Persian Gulf and is a nuclear power. Its navy aggressively patrols the Gulf while the Revolutionary Guard Navy harasses shipping and oil infrastructure to force Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC ) countries into Tehran’s orbit. Russia supplies Iran with a steady flow of military tech nology and nuclear industry expertise. Lacking a regional threat, the Iranians happily control the flow of oil from the Gulf and benefit economically from the “protection” provided to other GCC nations. In Egypt, the decade-long experiment in participatory democracy ends with the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a violent seizure of power. The United States is identified closely with the previous coalition government, and riots break out at the U.S. embassy. Americans in Egypt are left to their own devices because the U.S. has no forces in the Mediterranean capable of performing a noncombatant evacuation when the government closes major airports. Led by Iran, a coalition of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacks Israel. Over 300,000 die in six months of fighting   that includes a limited nuclear exchange  between Iran and Israel. Israel is defeated, and the State of Palestine is declared in its place. Massive “refugee” camps are created to house the internally displaced Israelis, but a humanitarian nightmare ensues from the inability of conquering forces to support them. The NATO alliance is shattered. The security of European nations depends increasingly on the lack of external threats and the nuclear capability of France, Britain, and Germany, which overcame its reticence to military capability in light of America’s retrenchment. Europe depends for its energy security on Russia and Iran, which control the main supply lines and sources of oil and gas to Europe. Major European nations stand down their militaries and instead make limited contributions to a new EU military constabulary force. No European nation maintains the ability to conduct significant out-of-area operations, and Europe as a whole maintains little airlift capacity. Implications for America’s Economy. If the United States slashed its Navy and ended its mission as a guarantor of the free flow of transoceanic goods and trade, globalized world trade would decrease substantially. As early as 1890, noted U.S. naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan described the world’s oceans as a “great highway…a wide common,” underscoring the long-running importance of the seas to trade.[12] Geographically organized trading blocs develop as the maritime highways suffer from insecurity and rising fuel prices. Asia prospers thanks to internal trade and Middle Eastern oil, Europe muddles along on the largesse of Russia and Iran, and the Western Hemisphere declines to a “new normal” with the exception of energy-independent Brazil. For America, Venezuelan oil grows in importance as other supplies decline. Mexico runs out of oil —as predicted—when it fails to take advantage of Western oil technology and investment. Nigerian output, which for five years had been secured through a partnership of the U.S. Navy and Nigerian maritime forces, is decimated by the bloody civil war of 2021. Canadian exports, which a decade earlier had been strong as a result of the oil shale industry, decline as a result of environmental concerns in Canada and elsewhere about the “fracking” (hydraulic fracturing) process used to free oil from shale. State and non-state actors increase the hazards to seaborne shipping, which are compounded by the necessity of traversing key chokepoints that are easily targeted by those who wish to restrict trade. These chokepoints include the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran could quickly close to trade if it wishes. More than half of the world’s oil is transported by sea. “From 1970 to 2006, the amount of goods transported via the oceans of the world…increased from 2.6 billion tons to 7.4 billion tons, an increase of over 284%.”[13] In 2010, “$40 billion dollars [sic] worth of oil passes through the world’s geographic ‘chokepoints’ on a daily basis…not to mention $3.2 trillion…annually in commerce that moves underwater on transoceanic cables.”[14] These quantities of goods simply cannot be moved by any other means. Thus, a reduction of sea trade reduces overall i nternational trade. U.S. consumers face a greatly diminished selection of goods because domestic production largely disappeared in the decades before the global depression. As countries increasingly focus on regional rather than global trade, costs rise and Americans are forced to accept a much lower standard of living. Some domestic manufacturing improves, but at significant cost. In addition, shippers avoid U.S. ports due to the onerous container inspection regime implemented after investigators discover that the second dirty bomb was smuggled into the U.S. in a shipping container on an innocuous Panamanian-flagged freighter. As a result, American consumers bear higher shipping costs. The market also constrains the variety of goods available to the U.S. consumer and increases their cost. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report makes this abundantly clear. A one-week shutdown of the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports would lead to production losses of $65 million to $150 million (in 2006 dollars) per day. A three-year closure would cost $45 billion to $70 billion per year ($125 million to $200 million per day). Perhaps even more shocking, the simulation estimated that employment would shrink by approximately 1 million jobs.[15] These estimates demonstrate the effects of closing only the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports. On a national scale, such a shutdown would be catastrophic. The G overnment A ccountability O ffice notes that: [O]ver 95 percent of U.S. international trade is transported by water[;] thus, the safety and economic security of the United States depends in large part on the secure use of the world’s seaports and waterways. A successful attack on a major seaport could potentially result in a dramatic slowdown in the international supply chain with impacts in the billions of dollars .[16]

Deterrence doesn’t check – the aff is __the only__ mechanism to solve

 * Glaser, 11** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“Will China's Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, March/April, []

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the U nited S tates' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the U nited S tates and China -- whatever they might formally agree to -- have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly //easily// //escalate to nuclear war//, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the U  nited  S  tates  would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the U nited S tates found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. // China's nuclear modernization might remove that check // on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile,  could fuel a  conventional and  nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations. Given such risks, the United States should consider backing away from  its commitment to  Taiwan. This would remove the  // most // obvious and // contentious flash point // between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Critics of such a move argue that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward -- spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong, however, because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension.

Nuclear subs means it’s impossible to deescalate the conflict once it starts
Goldstein and Knott, ’13 –Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania [“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89] The role of China’s SSBNs is to enhance the deterrent threat of nuclear retaliation. To fulfill this role, China’s SSBNs need to leave their coastal home waters. Until this fleet grows larger and China is able to routinely keep part of its force on long-range patrol, its principal contribution to China’s nuclear deterrent is not the incremental addition of survivable warheads (the much larger fraction of which will continue to be based on land-mobile systems) but its usefulness as a hedge against U.S. missile defenses, whose effectiveness would be challenged by the less predictable trajectories of widely dispersed, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).54 This role, along with the limited range of the current generation of Chinese SLBMs, requires the SSBNs to deploy in more distant waters. China’s conventionally armed attack submarines must do the same if they are to play their key strategic role—increasing the dangers that confront American naval forces as they approach areas that Beijing contests. Only by leaving China’s coastal seas can these submarines discourage U.S. naval forces from reaching the point where the latter’s superior long-range power projection capabilities would threaten China while remaining out of reach of its counterpunch. But this means that, in a crisis, China’s leaders face a choice. They can maximize the survivability of their submarines by keeping them in nearby waters, or they can maximize their coercive impact by moving the submarines out to deeper seas, where they must face superior American ASW operations no longer constrained by the poor acoustics in coastal waters or by land-based Chinese aircraft and antiair fire.55 Whichever choice China makes, //early in a Sino-American crisis// the prospect of China’s submarines breaking out will present both sides with // potentially destabilizing incentives to consider initiating the use of force .// ¶ Although American ASW would be more effective against China’s attack submarines operating in less noisy open waters (where the United States also enjoys air superiority), the submarines would still  pose a challenge to American naval forces. ASW can reduce, but cannot eliminate, the vulnerability of U.S. naval assets that come within range of Chinese submarines. Therefore, during a crisis the // U // nited // S // tates  will have an incentive both to attack as many submarines as possible if they attempt to leave their littoral home waters and to // counter //  China’s  //C4ISR//  assets that would provide the necessary cueing information for successful ballistic and cruise missile strikes against U.S. surface forces .56 If the United States does not take such action, or if some attack submarines nevertheless manage to break out, the surviving Chinese submarines , deprived of the relative security they enjoy in coastal waters, will face familiar //“ use //  ’em  // or lose //  ’em” pressures for  // early escalation to the use of force// .57¶ With respect to China’s SSBNs, the risks for instability are different, but still significant. The United States would again have an improved ability to track and target these Chinese submarines once they enter deeper waters. It is less clear, however, that the United States would be as willing to consider initiating an attack on what is unquestionably an element of China’s strategic nuclear forces unless it were part of a broader U.S. plan for a disarming first strike that also sought to eliminate China’s larger, land-based missile force. Especially because an attack on strategic forces is one of the scenarios that China has set forth as justifying abandonment of its no-first-use policy, the //U// nited //S// tates could not target China’s SSBNs simply to signal resolve in a crisis without accepting a clear risk of nuclear retaliation .58 This means that, in a crisis, the //U// nited //S// tates would likely tolerate the increased credibility of China’s retaliatory capability that dispersed SLBMs would provide. Recognizing this, China would have incentives to deploy its SSBNs to distant, deeper waters early in a crisis. Such deep-water deployment, however, would introduce two other dangers. ¶ One danger is the (presumably small) possibility that the // U // nited // S // tates  might not recognize a vessel as an SSBN and use force against what it thinks is an attack submarine. Intending a serious but still presumably safe signal of resolve during an intensifying crisis, the // U // nited // S // tates  would have  // inadvertently escalated to a strike against China’s strategic nuclear forces // .59 The other, more plausible, danger is the possible failure of China’s //c// ommand and //c// ontrol over its SSBNs. The balance between negative control to prevent unauthorized use and positive control to ensure that one’s threats can be carried out //is notoriously delicate for SSBNs//, which limit their communications to avoid detection. The challenge is most daunting during a crisis and becomes still more formidable if either side begins using military force, or if uncertainty about the durability of communications requires // delegating decisions // to submarine commanders who have  // limited information about how a confrontation is evolving // and which standing orders they should execute. These problems pose challenges even for the //U// nited //S// tates, which has more than half a century’s experience of working on solutions. China’s search for solutions to command and control dilemmas that are exacerbated by the small size and greater vulnerability of its small SSBN fleet is in its early stages .60 The challenges for China become more daunting as its fleet is deployed to deeper, distant waters where the communication requirements for maintaining command and control conflict with the need for SSBNs to remain silent as they try to evade detection by superior American ASW.

It causes extinction
But what would that “victory” entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, r  adioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe — destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine , and generating chaos and destruction.
 * Wittner, 12** - Professor of History emeritus, SUNY Albany (Lawrence, “Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?” Huffington Post, 1/30, []

Security dilemma theory is the best explanation for conflict
Still, I think Yan might consider additional explanations other than the two he dismisses in this article. An obvious alternative would come from security dilemma theory .31 A security dilemma has the following features. Two or more essentially status-quo-oriented states with more or less benign intentions begin to doubt the other is similarly oriented. Each side takes politico-military steps to enhance its security in the face of this  uncertainty. These steps are seen by Self as defensive and non-threatening to the other side’s core interests. Others, however, sees them as offensive and threatening. The result is a spiral of insecurity and the mutual construction of an adversary. Security dilemmas are endogenous social processes. As they intensify, the meaning of cooperative moves is discounted and the meaning of conflictual moves is amplified. Each side comes to believe that it is more or less the status quo state, but increasingly doubts that the other side is. At first, Self’s response is framed in terms of maintaining its prior strategy, perhaps in hopes that the other side is misperceiving the relationship. But Self then begins to shift to a view that the other side is more revisionist than previously thought, e.g. a shift towards a dispositional conclusion about Other. This leads to a reassessment of the wisdom or appropriateness of Self's old strategy, and the rise of voices in support of a more basic shift towards a more coercive strategy. So a security dilemma can start out as a cycle of insecurity between two essentially status quo states but end up changing preferences in less status quo directions. In this regard, security dilemmas are socialization experiences.32 This process also suggests that, contrary to Yan’s logic, relations of enmity are not necessarily more stable than so-called ‘superficial friendship ’33— enmity breeds security dilemma dynamics which are likely to amplify and accentuate malign signalling and malign reactions. Although relations will not zigzag between amity and enmity, // the probability of conflict increases exponentially // or at least non-linearly. To check whether security dilemma dynamics are increasingly characteristic of the US–China relationship, we need to look for three basic pieces of evidence. First, we need to look for evidence that Self discounts Other’s cooperative behaviour and amplifies Other’s non-cooperative behaviour, such that these behaviours are now interpreted differently from in the past. In contrast, superficial friendship theory might suggest an equal exaggeration of positive (exuberance) and negative (disappointment) information.
 * Johnston, 11** - Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government, Harvard University (“Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2011) 4 (1): 5-29. doi: 10.1093/cjip/por003

The status quo is a mutual self-fulfilling prophecy - negotiating a staged Framework Agreement is a form of diplomatic architecture that will de-escalate tensions and bolsters broad relations
To overcome the structural weaknesses in U.S.-China relations—which could lead to a major military or economic conflict between the two countries— it is in America’s best interests to seek a new paradigm for relations with China. A paradigm shift that leads the two countries to deal with each other on an intrinsically friendly basis would enhance U.S. security, strengthen the U.S. economy and encourage the expansion of democracy and human rights practices in China. Achieving this new paradigm is possible through a Framework Agreement which addresses outstanding disputes between the U.S. and China on security, economic and political issues. In the context of U.S.-China relations, a Framework Agreement is best considered a joint declaration of principles and goals—  // a conceptual expression of diplomatic architecture // —rather than a “grand bargain” in the sense of an all-or-nothing solution. Critics may find fault with some elements of the Framework Agreement proposed here, and surely it can be improved through scrutiny and reflection by many good minds. The most important thing is for the proponents of peaceful coexistence between the U.S. and China to undertake a serious ongoing exercise in conflict resolution and “win-win” thinking that leads to rapprochement and mutual accommodation. Doing so makes it far more likely that the two countries will resolve their major outstanding security, economic and political disputes—an objective that is in the best interests of both China and the United States at a time when the status quo is becoming progressively more risky and untenable. The U.S. and China are not doomed to confront each other in a terribly destructive war any more than the U.S. and Soviet Union were destined to do so. But to prevent the occurrence of worst-case scenarios, American and Chinese leaders must exhibit a strong desire to achieve a stable peace through the exercise of // reciprocal restraint //. Such leadership would make a Framework Agreement both politically feasible and allow for the // step-by-step implementation // of its agreed principles and goals over time. This leadership would be founded on a precept that is recognized and esteemed in both Chinese and American political culture—that achieving most of a nation’s core objectives through prudent compromise is far better than risking a mutually destructive war to achieve maximalist national goals. Security policy The foremost shortcoming in U.S. security policy toward China is its uncritical embrace of the view that the only way to protect the United States against a future threat from China is to maintain military dominance in the Asia Pacific. As noted in Chapter Two, for more than a hundred years, U.S. strategic doctrine called for “preventing the hegemony of a hostile power in any of the three regions outside of North America with major industrial or energy resources—Europe, Asia, and the Middle East,” in the words of historian and policy expert Michael Lind of the New America Foundation.1 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has become the dominant worldwide power and currently seeks to maintain its superiority in Asia through measures aimed at containing China. The pursuit of U.S. domination represents, as Lind puts it, “a radical departure from America’s previous policy of seeking to preserve rather than prevent a diversity of power in the world, while sharing the burdens of preserving the peace with other rich and militarily powerful states.”2 From a pragmatic standpoint, this policy is costly, risky, and above all, unnecessary for achieving the core goals of U.S.-Asia policy: regional stability, security and prosperity. Moreover, it continues to stoke resentment and spur nationalism in China. A policy of strong U.S. deterrence and engaging China through closer security cooperation against common threats will be more than adequate to prevent China from seeking regional dominance. Another major weakness in American security policy is its unstated premise that China inevitably poses a decisive military threat to the United States. To justify this premise, China hawks regularly hype China’s future and potential capabilities, while obscuring the current reality that the U.S. dwarfs China in both nuclear and conventional military capabilities. They almost always fail to note the United States is highly likely to strengthen its military superiority to China over time, and the U.S. spends more than three times as much as China on defense. As a means of deterring or defeating China in the most likely worst-case scenario—a Chinese attack on Taiwan—the U.S. has pursued what it officially terms a “hedging” strategy to counter China’s future military capability. This strategy couples intensive intelligence gathering off China’s coast and a major buildup of U.S. military forces in the Pacific with a determined effort to create stronger alliances with India and Japan as well as closer ties with other countries in East Asia. The Obama  Administration has accelerated the // strategic encirclement //  of China through a series of coordinated military measures it initiated in November 2011. This U.S. strategy deepened anxiety in China about a potential “U.S. threat” and // strengthened ////the position of hardliners // calling for the modernization of China’s armed forces to prepare for an expected U.S. attack. Building up U.S. forces to threaten China has thus increased the likelihood of a // self-fulfilling prophecy ////of war// between the two countries. The more the U.S. seeks to hedge against the “China threat,” the more intensively China prepares for conflict with its most likely adversary. Justifying new U.S. military pressure as a response to perceived Chinese “assertiveness” obscures the reality of a //U.S.-China action-reaction dynamic // that entails more aggressive military measures by both sides. The greatest security benefit to the United States of improving relations with China would be ending the likely prospect of a future military conflict if the Taiwan standoff precipitously deteriorates. On a structural level, // China and the U.S. remain on a collision course over Taiwan. // The U.S. is committed to defending the island and preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.3 China is equally determined to reunite Taiwan with the “motherland” and redress the legacy of its “century of humiliation” when foreign powers carved up China into colonial fiefdoms. A peaceful resolution of the Taiwan conflict would //remove the major irritant in U.S.-China security relations// and replace the current impasse with far greater stability. It would protect Taiwan’s democracy against the threat from China’s communist regime, thus achieving a long-standing U.S. policy objective in Asia. Improved relations with China would also allow the U.S. to more easily shape the direction and extent of China’s military modernization as well as its over-arching security goals. If the “U.S. threat” to China ends and America is perceived as a friendly country, China would very probably reduce its defense expenditures , which are now preeminently aimed at defeating U.S. forces in a future confrontation. China would be far more amenable to reaching mutual arms control and threat reduction agreements that significantly increase strategic stability between the two countries. A Framework Agreement between the U.S. and China, moreover, would provide guidance for resolving maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas that have previously led to confrontations between the United States and Chinese forces (as well as a security crisis between China and Japan). A Framework Agreement would limit and scale back U.S. military activities off the coast of China and Chinese military activities off the coast of Japan. By establishing new coastal buffer zones that reflect each country’s legitimate desire for protection against attacks from the sea or air, the Agreement would sharply reduce the chance of conflict. Through facilitating legal settlement of disputed maritime claims with the assistance of a recognized international legal tribunal, it would end hostile encounters by a number of East Asian countries over islands and surrounding maritime areas rich in oil and gas. Another further security benefit of improved U.S.-China relations is that it would allow the U nited S tates to leverage Chinese capabilities in meeting transnational security threats far more than the U.S. can do now. Mutually beneficial security cooperation would include much more effective joint measures to combat // terrorism // , proliferation of //weapons of mass destruction//  , piracy,  //pandemic disease //  ,  // environmental degradation //  and human trafficking. It would also be conducive to conducting military-to-military discussions in an atmosphere of mutual trust (which currently does not exist) to de-conflict U.S. and Chinese military operations and avoid accidental confrontations.
 * Gross, 13** - adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, PhD at University of Iowa (Donald, __The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War__, p. 152-155

Taiwan is the most important __starting point__ to address strategic distrust – plan is the vital internal link to broader, sustainable cooperation
More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current crossstrait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly  the  // most important //,  policy-driven sources of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives  and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust  .” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that B   eijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China’s domestic affairs  and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues that “ continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons. . . is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s .”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “ most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down .”69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the // essence of American strategy // toward China,  and thus //determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations //. ”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China’s National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and  are the  // fundamental //  cause of  some  anti-American sentiment among the  // Chinese public // ....I assure you that  a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the // hearts and minds // of 1.3 billion Chinese people. ”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to  // dramatically improve U.S.-China relations // , which in turn could increase the possibility of  // cooperation on other issues // and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.
 * Glaser, 15** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

China will say yes and it will build a foundation for larger cooperation that reduces the overall risk of nuclear war in Asia

 * Gross, 13** - Adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, former Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of State, former Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, PhD at University of Iowa (Donald, //The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China’s Rise and Avoid Another Cold War//, p. 159-165)

Taiwan currently faces an overwhelming military threat from China, which uses its forces to pressure and intimidate the island’s government. China’s buildup of missiles along its coast across from Taiwan has continued over the past decade despite periodic improvements in cross-Strait relations. The number of China’s deployed short-range ballistic missiles has now reached somewhere between approximately 1,000 and 1,200 according to the U.S. Defense Department.6 In 1995 and 1996, missiles were the weapon of choice China wielded to threaten imminent attack by conducting “tests” in the vicinity of Taiwan. As noted earlier, beyond missile deployments, China has concentrated air and naval assets, especially submarines, near Taiwan. One objective of these Chinese forces, in the event of conflict, is to significantly degrade Taiwan’s defenses so the island becomes vulnerable to a fullscale amphibious assault. Professor Robert Sutter of George Washington University makes the compelling point that “the military balance in the Taiwan Strait is no longer ‘healthy’ for Taiwan” and that “annual reports by the U.S. Defense Department now testify to the growing imbalance in military capabilities.”7 Professor Lyle Goldstein, former director of the China Maritime Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, argues that the easing of tensions between Taiwan and China as well as a military balance where China holds the upper hand create a “window of opportunity ... in U.S-China relations that has not been adequately exploited.” With respect to the sensitive [Taiwan] arms-sales issue, a new US approach is now warranted. Stark geographic reality, combined with the radically altered military balance in China’s favour, suggest that continued arms sales are, to a very large extent,  symbolic in nature. For example, more advanced F-16s could be purchased by Taipei, but in an actual conflict with China, these aircraft would almost surely never leave the ground, as their bases would likely be quickly obliterated by Chinese missile strikes. Thus, it will make little or no practical difference to the military balance if such arms sales are made or not. Arms sales could safely be reduced gradually over time in both volume and scope, consistent with the 1982 communiqué between Washington and Beijing. Diplomacy should also yield local confidence-building measures, such as the withdrawal of some Chinese strike platforms to locations at greater distance from Taiwan, a proposal that Jiang Zemin himself put on the table back in 2002 .8 If China were to permanently eliminate the missiles facing Taiwan , while significantly and verifiably reducing and redeploying the air and naval forces currently threatening the island, Taiwan’s security would be markedly improved. This outcome can be achieved through mutual threat reduction measures that reduce, eliminate and redeploy advanced weapons and military equipment that either Taiwan or China could employ in the event of conflict. Such measures would make it far more difficult for either side to threaten or intimidate the other for political purposes, in addition to significantly lowering their capacity to wreak destruction during an actual war. Because Taiwan is now militarily inferior to China with regard to missiles, naval vessels and air force assets, it lacks the diplomatic leverage to eliminate the security threat that China poses. Short of agreeing to reunification—which is currently opposed by a majority of Taiwan’s citizens—there are no measures Taiwan can offer as a sufficient quid pro quo to secure significant Chinese arms reductions. And, without  // reciprocal // security measures, China refuses to engage in what it considers “unilateral disarmament. ”9 By contrast, the U.S. is capable of securing a drastic reduction in China’s military threat to Taiwan by offering // reciprocal //  military measures that would lead to far greater stability in the region, creating a transformed regional security environment. China is // highly likely //  to reduce, redeploy and eliminate its missile, naval and air forces now threatening the island, in exchange for the U.S. pulling back forces now engaged in surveillance and patrolling of Chinese territory, significantly reducing U.S. military deployments in the Asia Pacific, and scaling down major arms sales to Taiwan. It is also important to recall that Taiwan’s prior negotiations with China on long-term political issues reflect the profound difficulty the two sides face in reaching an agreement that could truly stabilize their relations for the foreseeable future. Taiwan understandably fears being absorbed by China, knowing full well that Beijing’s foremost objective is national reunification at the earliest possible time. A large majority of Taiwan’s people reject Beijing’s promise to guarantee the island’s autonomy and democratic political system through a so-called “one country, two systems” formula. For its part, China worries that Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), though currently out of power, could strongly re-emerge in the future, and once again lead a drive for political independence which effectively thwarts national reunification. A Framework Agreement would strengthen the security of Taiwan and the preservation of its democratic political system // without requiring it to agree // to eventual // reunification // with China. It would be entirely up to the Taiwanese government and people whether to conduct bilateral negotiations on political reunification at some future time. The two sides would be able to carry out their negotiations in a largely non-threatening and stable security environment, which would help support, in and of itself, a successful agreement on difficult political issues. Eliminating the Risk of a U.S.-China military conflict The proposed security measures in a Framework Agreement would end the current military standoff over Taiwan as well as the broader friction arising from aggressive U.S. air and sea surveillance along China’s coast. Whenever China-Taiwan relations become acrimonious —as they typically do when the Taiwanese political party favoring independence is in power or when Chinese leaders play to nationalist public opinion and threaten a future attack on the island— it greatly heightens the security risks that the U.S. faces in Asia. In the event of an imminent or actual attack on Taiwan, the U.S. would almost certainly send military forces to the island’s aid, with proponents of intervention citing U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act .10 National security strategists would argue that a military response is essential to ensure the credibility of the overall U.S. security posture in Asia, particularly the defense commitments to Japan and South Korea. The current standoff over Taiwan effectively puts the U.S. at the mercy of political elements in China and Taiwan that seek to achieve their goals without regard for U.S. interests. Those interests include both protecting Taiwan and avoiding a war with China that could conceivably //escalate to a nuclear exchange//. By realizing a Framework Agreement with China that protects Taiwan’s democracy, stabilizes the region and eliminates the risk of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. would greatly advance its core policy objectives. Once China significantly reduces, eliminates and redeploys the missile, air and naval forces currently threatening Taiwan, the U.S. would no longer need to carry out close surveillance and intrusive reconnaissance of China’s coast, whose essential purpose is to probe and evaluate China’s military capabilities. As discussed in Chapter Two, there is a history of small-scale confrontations between U.S. and Chinese military forces, especially in the region of the South China Sea, //that could blow up into a major conflict//. More dangerous encounters can be expected to occur in the future, as Mark Valencia, a maritime expert at the Nautilus Institute, points out: Military and intelligence gathering activities in [coastal areas] are likely to become more controversial and more dangerous. In Asia, this disturbing prospect reflects the increasing and changing demands for technical intelligence; robust weapons acquisition programs of the littoral states, especially increasing electronic warfare capabilities; and the widespread development of information warfare capabilities. Further, the scale and scope of U.S. maritime and airborne intelligence collection activities are likely to expand rapidly over the next decade, involving levels and sorts of activities quite unprecedented in peacetime. They will not only become more intensive; they will produce //defensive reactions and escalatory dynamics// ; and they will lead to less stability in the most affected regions, especially in Asia.11 A U.S.-China Framework Agreement that strengthens Taiwan’s security by significantly reducing China’s capability to threaten it would make the current level of U.S. reconnaissance unnecessary. By agreeing to curtail American coastal surveillance in exchange for China’s arms reductions, the U.S. would also go far toward ending the ongoing military friction with China that could potentially //escalate to a major military confrontation//. Strengthening Japanese security Feuding over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and clashes in their vicinity have sharply heightened Tokyo’s concerns about the presence of Chinese forces near Japan.12 Following the September 2010 crisis when a Chinese fishing trawler rammed a Japanese patrol vessel, Japan announced it would build up its military capabilities to defend the islands. Under new defense guidelines, Japan is shifting ground forces once intended to counter the Soviet Union to the south and acquiring new submarines, fighter jets and destroyers. It is also forming new ground units that can be transported by air to defend the disputed territory in the event of another crisis. Under a Framework Agreement between China and the United States, Beijing would agree to pull back all its forces, permanently and verifiably, from a coastal security zone around Japan, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. This measure would significantly reduce the Chinese military threat to Japan as well as the need for Tokyo to build up its forces in the region. The new zone would strengthen Japan’s security by providing more warning time as well as more freedom of action for Japan’s air and naval self-defense forces to conduct operations in the area of the East China Sea. It is very much in China’s interest to recognize a coastal security zone around Japan in the context of a Framework Agreement. The new security zone would relieve pressure on Japan’s leaders to pursue a buildup aimed at preparing for a possible military conflict with China. More broadly, it would undercut the right-wing political figures in Japan who advocate developing a nuclear deterrent force. According to one informed estimate, Japan has already stockpiled enough plutonium to build a thousand nuclear bombs, should it choose to do so.13 China is deeply concerned about the prospect of a nuclear-armed Japan and surely recognizes that Tokyo’s deepseated fear of Chinese forces operating near the Japanese islands increases the risk of a Japanese nuclear break-out. By agreeing to a coastal zone that strengthens Japan’s security, China would also facilitate //joint development// of the maritime resources in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, especially oil and gas deposits, and lay the basis for settling competing territorial claims. Although the two countries reached a “political agreement” on resource sharing and exploration in 2008, it has never been implemented because of deep suspicion on both sides. Much of that suspicion stems from Tokyo’s fear of China using its claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu to allow for a greater military presence near Japan. On China’s part, suspicion is compounded by fear of aggressive Japanese intentions in light of the “history” issue—Japan’s oppressive occupation of China from 1931 to 1945. The increased presence of Chinese vessels and aircraft near the islands and resulting security tensions makes it extremely difficult to resolve legal disputes over land and resources—even though both countries would clearly benefit from settling the issue to spur joint development. A coastal security zone that protects Japan, recognized by China under a new Framework Agreement, would foster resolution of the Senkaku/Diaoyo conflict and lead to broader cooperation between the two countries. Ending the U.S. military containment of China The buildup of U.S. forces in the Pacific today continues apace in the name of “hedging ” against the possibility of a future war with China. The United States conducts intensive reconnaissance and intelligence gathering along China’s coast while continuing to deploy extensive military assets to the region—particularly long-range bombers, aircraft carriers and submarines. Steps taken by the Obama Administration in November 2011 accelerated deployments in the name of “rebalancing,” a term as benign as “hedging,” which largely disguises the serious nature of the military preparations taking place. A Framework Agreement would bring about an end to the effective U.S. policy of containing China for an overriding reason: following resolution of major security disputes between the two countries, there would no longer be any rationale for pursuing a containment strategy. At its base, containment aims to maintain U.S. military dominance in East Asia and discourage Chinese military activity in the Western Pacific, including in the South China and East China Seas. If the U.S. successfully uses diplomatic means to end the Chinese threat to Taiwan, secure Taiwan’s democratic system for the long term and halt dangerous military encounters along China’s coast, a Cold War-style containment policy would not find significant mainstream support in the United States. The U.S. could return to its traditional strategic doctrine of preventing any other power, including China, from dominating the Asia Pacific. Abandoning containment would have several other important consequences from the standpoint of the United States. A major reduction in the “U.S. threat” would eliminate the primary factor driving China’s military modernization program. The U.S. would be in a better position to shape the scope of China’s military development in the future. In addition, sharply lowering military tensions in the South China and East China Seas would encourage the peaceful settlement of the competing claims  to islands and maritime resources in that region. Territorial disputes could then be considered on their own legal merits, apart from considerations of power politics and military strategy. A recognized institution with deep expertise in maritime affairs—the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea— would be able, for the first time, to fairly resolve those controversies. The parties could also pursue settlement negotiations in the context of a legal proceeding to resolve the issues between themselves and avoid risking an adverse judicial decision. Finally, since China would no longer be regarded as a potential major security threat, the U.S. would be able to scale down its forces in the Asia Pacific. A reduced but still strong U.S. military presence coupled with greater security cooperation would be // more than sufficient to deter // and dissuade  China from seeking regional dominance.

Plan is verifiable and won’t destabilize relations with Taiwan or Asia – China won’t cheat

 * Swaine, 11 –** senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies, formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations, PhD from Harvard (Michael, //America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century//, p. 359-363)

Under such circumstances, avoiding future escalating Sino-American crises over People’s Liberation Army ( PLA) deployments and arms sales will probably depend almost entirely on the ability of Taipei and Beijing to reach a strong political understanding that permits mutual restraint  in the military realm. And yet such an understanding is unlikely without some level of credible prior understanding between Beijing and Washington regarding both arms sales and larger political calculations. As indicated in chapter 2, in the very likely absence of far more domestic political unity on Taiwan in favor of cross-Strait political talks, Beijing will probably maintain if not substantially increase its military deployments relevant to Taiwan during the current decade, regardless of how much progress occurs in advancing cross-Strait economic and social links, thus almost certainly provoking further significant U.S. arms sales to the island. Most important, assuming that China continues to grow in power and confidence, Beijing will also likely attempt to make any future major U.S. arms sale decisions increasingly costly for Washington, thus greatly feeding mutual security suspicions and undermining U.S. attempts to maintain or enhance both strategic reassurance and deterrence .30 Such a situation could ultimately prove disastrous for the Sino-U.S. relationship, greatly increasing the risk of confrontation and even armed conflict. In this context, a continued U.S. commitment to its long-standing, essentially “hands-off” approach to the cross-Strait political process, including a refusal to engage in discussions with Beijing over each side’s respective military deployments and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, will become increasingly counterproductive for stability in the Western Pacific. // Only the U // nited // S // tates // can alter China’s calculus toward Taiwan ////in ways that would facilitate a military drawdown // and genuine movement toward a more stable cross-Strait modus vivendi through  // political dialogue //. Therefore, Washington policymakers should consider negotiating //directly with Beijing//, in consultation with Taipei, a set of mutual assurances regarding PLA force levels and deployments on the one hand, and major U.S. arms sales and defense assistance to Taiwan on the other hand, that are linked to the opening of a cross-Strait political dialogue .31 Such an agreement would need to be designed as a combined military and political confidence-building measure, intended to create some level of trust that each side would stop directly threatening the other with military deployments specifically aimed at the Taiwan situation, while providing a basis for an openended (and almost inevitably long-lasting) political dialogue. It would not need to require either Washington or Beijing to give up its military deployments in other areas.32 The feasibility and parameters of such an agreement could be initially explored via an authorized Track II dialogue, given its many obvious sensitivities. Indeed, any such approach would confront three major problems for the United States. First and foremost, some politicians and pundits in both the United States and Taiwan (and perhaps also in Japan) would attempt to label any effort by Washington to negotiate with Beijing, even in consultation with Taipei, as a “sell-out” of Taiwan’s interests that could result in China eventually coercing or seizing the island and, more broadly, in irreparable damage to America’s credibility and strategic position in Asia and perhaps beyond. Second, both the United States and China might face considerable difficulties in defining what constitutes a reasonable exchange of forces, deployments, and arms sales to Taiwan. A third consideration, often voiced by some observers of the Taiwan situation, is that any such U.S. attempt to intervene in the cross-Strait imbroglio could easily expose Washington to manipulation by both Taipei and Beijing while possibly increasing the chances of a miscalculation by all three parties. The first objection is the most serious because it is directly related to the domestic political environments in the United States and Taiwan—arguably the most serious obstacles to a resolution of the Taiwan problem. There is no doubt that those in both places who want Washington to treat Beijing as a mortal enemy and Taiwan as an independent, sovereign nation entirely separate from China would highlight (and in some instances distort or exaggerate) the dangers confronting such an approach. In fact, while pursuing such an option, Washington would obviously also need to enhance its larger security posture in Asia, partly in support of its basic commitment to an uncoerced and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Also, in this regard, one should not assume that Taipei would inevitably regard Washington’s efforts to negotiate with Beijing as a form of coercion toward the island. Taiwan’s objections to opening a cross-Strait dialogue could be reduced considerably if this dialogue were presented as seeking, with a more active U.S. role, higher levels of cross-Strait economic interdependence; negotiated Chinese commitments to more political, economic, and personal freedoms than those currently contained within the “one country, two systems” formula; and significant, tangible reductions in Beijing’s capacity to launch a rapid attack on the island. Also, it is by no means clear that other Asian nations would regard Washington’s efforts to negotiate with Beijing about the Taiwan problem as an unambiguous indication of America’s weakness or as a loss of its credibility, as some would argue. Most Asian nations would doubtless prefer for the issue to be addressed through some form of direct talks designed to place it on a more stable long-term footing. It is also possible that many Americans would support U.S. efforts to negotiate with China to stabilize, if not resolve, the Taiwan issue. This is suggested by the fact that most U.S. citizens view Taiwan as the least critical threat to U.S. vital interests out of a litany of threats. Moreover, a vast majority of Americans are opposed to using U.S. troops to prevent China from invading Taiwan.33 The second objection would obviously be addressed through negotiations and consultations between Washington and both Beijing and Taipei and is not on the face of it unsolvable. Some observers disagree, assert ing that Beijing would need to severely limit or destroy most if not all of its more advanced power projection capabilities to provide significant assurances to Washington and Taipei as part of any negotiations—a highly unlikely possibility. Others argue that the U nited S tates could not in any event conclusively verify Chinese commitments to limit or destroy military capabilities such as ballistic missiles. In this author’s view, //neither objection is convincing//. Some PLA capabilities, such as short-range ballistic missiles and amphibious attack platforms, are really only relevant (and critical) to Taiwan-based scenarios. Beijing would thus not be sacrificing its capabilities in other areas by limiting such forces as part of a Taiwan agreement. Other PLA capabilities of relevance to Taiwan—such as deployments of certain levels of air or naval forces to bases or ports within rapid striking distance of the island— could also be subject to limitation without arguably affecting China’s other security interests. Given the potentially significant benefits for China of reaching a stable agreement on this matter, it is also not inconceivable that Beijing would permit  or provide convincing levels of  verification.

Say no arguments overlook the staged implementation of the negotiations – small acts of reciprocation will lead to larger cooperation

 * Swaine, 15 **- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies, formerly a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations, PhD from Harvard (Michael, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power)//JS//

// These obstacles clearly indicate that Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake, much less reach, a  formal  grand-bargain  -type of agreement to establish a new regional security environment anytime soon .4 Such a fundamental shift in policies and approaches  can only occur  // gradually, in stages //  , and over an extended period of time. But it can only begin if elites in Washington, Beijing, and other Asian capitals seriously examine the enduring trends under way in Asia and accept the reality of the changing power distribution and the need for more than just marginal adjustments and assurances. Only then will they undertake a systematic examination of the requirements of a stable balance of power over the long term, involving a serious consideration of the more fundamental actions. Such an examination and acceptance must  initially  occur  domestically, then among allies and protectorates, and finally  via a bilateral U.S.-China strategic dialogue aimed at developing understandings about the process and actions required. Such understandings must provide for //ample opportunities and means for both sides to assess and evaluate the credibility and veracity of the actions of the other side //. If such understandings can be reached regarding the overall need for strategic adjustment, then the specific concessions to minimize potential instabilities and arrangements for meaningful cooperation, involving Korea, Taiwan , and maritime issues within the first island chain, will become much more possibl e. In particular, a strategic understanding designed to achieve a peaceful and stable transition to a genuine balance of power in the Western Pacific could make Beijing more likely to pressure or entice North Korea to abandon or place strong limits on its nuclear weapons program and undertake the kind of opening up and reforms that would almost certainly result eventually in a unified peninsula. While difficult to envision at present, such a shift in Chinese policy is certainly possible, given the obvious incentives to do so. While South Korea might also resist movement toward a nonaligned status in a post-unification environment, the obvious benefits that would result from a stable balance of power, if presented properly, could very likely overcome such resistance. Regarding Taiwan, if both U.S. and Chinese leaders can convince Taipei of the benefits of the kind of mutual assurances and restraints necessary to neutralize the cross-strait issue, //none of which require the U.S. abandonment// of the island, these possible adverse outcomes of the proposed or ongoing shift, including any resort to nuclear weapons, would almost certainly be avoided.

Even if China says no, the plan boosts US resolve and reinforces regional alliances by making concessionary demands

 * Glaser, 15** - Charles L Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00199

The preceding assessment lays bare the complexity of a U.S. policy of territorial accommodation. On the one hand, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan could greatly reduce and might even eliminate the possibility of a large war between the U nited S tates and China by keeping the U nited S tates out of a China-Taiwan conflict. In addition, accommodation could improve China’s understanding of U.S. goals and its image of the U nited S tates, and moderate military competition in Northeast Asia, thereby setting U.S.-China relations on a promising trajectory that takes advantage of the relatively benign structural environment in which China’s rise will occur. On the other hand, accommodation would be costly —running contrary to U.S. political and ideological interests— and risky, possibly reducing U.S. security by fueling Chinese underestimates of U.S. resolve and by encouraging China to adopt more extensive geopolitical aims. The U nited S tates’ choice of whether to end its commitment to defend Taiwan is complicated further by uncertainty about the nature and extent of China’s goals. If China places relatively little value on expanding its control and influence beyond Taiwan, then even if U.S. accommodation generated doubts about U.S. resolve, they would be of little consequence. In contrast, if China highly values winning all of its maritime disputes and pushing the U nited S tates out of Northeast Asia, then reductions in U.S. credibility would be more costly. Similarly, if China’s aims are both limited and stable, then U.S. accommodation would not risk creating a more dangerous China. In contrast, if China’s goals are still evolving and if U.S. accommodation would empower domestic hard-liners, then U.S. security would be reduced. Therefore, the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the  United States’  best option might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan  // contingent on China making concessions of its own //. The preceding analysis suggests that the U  nited  S  tates  should design such a grand bargain  with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives;  to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and , related,  to preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies. Likely the most common way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the states trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form, partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater than those of the United States. The first component of a grand bargain, and probably the most important, would be for China to resolve its maritime disputes on “fair” terms .100 Oddly, there seems to be both a little and a lot at stake in these disputes. Gaining sovereignty over the offshore islands would strengthen China’s claims to the oil and gas reserves, which have increased the importance of the disputes. At the same time, however, the disputes have severely hindered the exploration and extraction of these resources, and joint extraction and sharing agreements could provide all parties with substantial resource benefits. Growing nationalism has given the disputed territorial claims importance far beyond their material and strategic value, and it has damaged the prospects for any type of agreement. An ideal solution would be for China and its neighbors to place the territories under some sort of international control as a maritime preserve and to share the resources.101 Other solutions include joint governance over the use of the islands/islets, agreement not to object to other states’ sovereignty claims, and agreement to end unilateral military patrols near the disputed territories.102 China’s willingness to reach an agreement on the offshore islands and related maritime disputes would provide the U nited S tates with valuable information. Most obviously, it would demonstrate that China’s aims are limited (at least for now). Closely related, it would demonstrate a degree of reasonableness in Chinese foreign policy priorities and decisionmaking: given that the value of Taiwan dwarfs the value of these maritime disputes, Chinese unwillingness to reach this type of bargain would indicate deep inflexibility in its emerging foreign policy and possibly overconfidence in its ability to use its growing power to achieve all of its aims. China’s claims in these disputes are also weaker than its claims to Taiwan: for example, China did not claim the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands until 1970, which suggests that it should be able to moderate this claim if the benefits were sufficiently large. In addition, an agreement would provide the U nited S tates with insights into the balance of power within China’s foreign policy decisionmaking. If China’s more assertive policies have reflected the growing influence of the People’s Liberation Army, narrow nationalist pressures, or both, then Chinese concessions would demonstrate that the country’s leaders could control these forces when the stakes are sufficiently large. Taken as a whole, this information about China’s goals would make U.S. accommodation over Taiwan less risky. Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the U nited S tates would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies ’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China’s refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia),  would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the U nited S tates into dangerous crises with China. A second component of a grand bargain would be official Chinese acceptance of the U nited S tates’ long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. There have been periods when China viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance relatively favorable. For example, in 1980 China’s leader, Hua Guofeng, stated: “We appreciate Japan’s efforts to strengthen its alliance with the United States.”103 Since then a variety of factors, including the decline of Soviet power and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance starting in the mid-1990s have reduced, if not eliminated, China’s positive assessment.104 In recent years, some Chinese elites have begun expressing harshly negative views. For example, in 2014 the deputy chief of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army described the U.S. alliance system as “an antiquated relic of the Cold War that should be replaced by an Asia-centric security architecture.”105 Although open to varying interpretations, President Xi Jinping’s call for an Asian security order managed by Asian countries and his criticism of “alliances as unhelpful for the region’s security” can be viewed as offering a vision of the future in which the United States no longer plays a security role in East Asia. Increasingly, there is support in China for the conclusion that “in Beijing’s eyes, the U.S. led security architecture is outliving the usefulness it once provided by ensuring the regional stability necessary for China’s development. Instead, China views the alliance system as increasingly incapable of providing lasting security and itself a potential source of threat.”106 Especially in light of Beijing’s increasingly negative assessment, official recognition and acceptance of the United States’ continuing alliance commitments would be a valuable signal ( not cheap talk). It would indicate the dominance of certain domestic forces over others and the Chinese leadership’s willingness to accept domestic political costs to advance China’s foreign policy. Such action would not guarantee stability in China’s policy, but it would provide greater confidence that China was willing to accept a revised geopolitical status quo. Maybe more important, if China were unwilling  (or unable) to provide this official acceptance, the U nited S tates would have to be more worried that China’s leaders believe that its role in East Asia requires pushing the U nited S tates out of the region. A grand bargain would not constitute the entirety of U.S. policy—unilateral measures and alliances would remain essential components of the United States’ policy toward Northeast Asia. When uncertain about an adversary’s motives or when facing a state with mixed motives—a combination of security seeking and greed— a state should pursue a mix of cooperative and competitive policies .107 Maintaining and enhancing U.S. commitments to the region would provide some of the necessary balance in the overall policy of the U nited S tates. These components of U.S. policy would be necessary and appropriate even if China were unwilling to make the types of concessions discussed above, but they would become even more important in the context of a grand bargain. The key challenge is for the U nited S tates to sustain its credibility for protecting its allies. As already discussed, to help accomplish this, the United States could commit additional forces to the region, forward deploy larger forces, invest more in overall U.S. military capabilities, and increase the integration of alliance military planning. These measures would provide the additional benefits of helping to offset increases in China’s military power and to sustain the grand bargain by enhancing the U.S. ability to deter China from breaking the agreement. There is a potential downside, however: increased U.S. capabilities would likely appear threatening to China. But this danger would be reduced by America’s ending its commitment to Taiwan because a U.S. buildup would no longer threaten this vital Chinese interest and would therefore be more clearly intended only to defend U.S. allies. If, however, China wants to push the United States out of the East Asia, then it would be strongly opposed to, and provoked by, these measures. In this case, though, given the priority that U.S. grand strategy places on preserving the United States’ alliances in East Asia, increasing U.S. capabilities would enhance its security.

Negotiated reciprocal concessions are vital to rapprochement and de-securitizing the conflict

 * Kupchan, 12 –** Professor of International Affairs in the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University (Charles, How Enemies Become Friends, p. 41-45

During the second phase of the onset of stable peace, the trading of individual acts of accommodation gives way to the practice of reciprocal restraint. Concessions are no longer bolts from the blue—risky gambits aimed at sending benign signals and probing the other’s intentions. Rather, both parties readily practice accommodation and expect reciprocity; cautious testing gives way to a purposeful effort to dampen rivalry and advance reconciliation. In his book on stable peace, Kenneth Boulding recognizes the importance of iterative acts of mutual accommodation, labeling such behavior as Graduated and Reciprocated Initiative in Tension-Reduction (GRIT). Boulding writes, “The GRIT process begins by some rather specific, perhaps even dramatic, statement or act directed at a potential enemy (like Sadat’s 1977 visit to Israel), intended to be reassuring. . . . If the potential enemy responds, then a third act by the first party, a fourth by the second party, and so on” provides the foundation for a “peace dynamic.”36 As unilateral accommodation gives way to reciprocal restraint, the practice of reciprocity becomes normalized. Amid the onset of rapprochement, restraint takes the form of self-binding: the parties move beyond the exchange of individual acts of accommodation by regularizing the reciprocal withholding of power through measures such as demilitarization, territorial concession, and the removal of barriers to commerce. The exercise of strategic restraint becomes the rule, not the exception. Amid the onset of security community and union, reciprocal restraint also entails co-binding: the parties bind themselves to one another through informal pacts or codified agreements that institutionalize restraint and specify the terms of a rules-based order. Co-binding and the institutionalization of restraint involve the establishment of power-checking devices. These power-checking mechanisms take many different forms, including: rules for resolving disputes and reaching decisions through consensus; provisions to contain or set aside disagreements in order to prevent disputes from leading to conflict; and instruments for redistributing and de-concentrating political influence, military strength, and wealth in order to reduce the political consequences of power asymmetries.37 This account of how reciprocal restraint lays a foundation for reconciliation is, at least at first glance, entirely consistent with a liberal approach to the evolution of cooperation as articulated by scholars such as Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod, and Kenneth Oye.38 Entrenched competition gives way to regularized cooperation as international regimes increase transparency, create enforcement mechanisms to induce compliance, and give states incentives to develop a reputation for reciprocity. The parties remain self-regarding and utilitarian, but their interests are better furthered by cooperation than competition. As Keohane writes, institutionalized cooperation “is not the result of altruism but of the fact that joining a regime changes calculations of long-run self-interest.”39 The second phase of the onset of stable peace does, however, go beyond a liberal account of international cooperation in important and consequential respects. The concessions exchanged by the parties engaging in reconciliation are unique in nature and scope. They involve instances of strategic self-restraint in which states demonstrate their willingness to risk high-value interests such as physical security and territorial integrity. Strategic restraint is a rare commodity in international politics—precisely why it stands out and serves as an exceptional signal of benign intent.40 Self-restraint is especially rare when practiced by a preponderant state, which, as mentioned above, is often the party to initiate the opening gambit. The practice of strategic restraint need not overstep the bounds of a liberal perspective, as John Ikenberry has demonstrated by articulating a rationalist account of the benefits of such behavior. When preponderant states withhold their power and influence, they willingly  give up the full advantages of primacy and  forego immediate opportunities to capitalize on material advantage. They instead invest in stability over the long term by inducing smaller states to enter into a bargain based on the practice of mutual accommodation. Weaker states have a strong incentive to take up this bargain inasmuch as they have on offer a rare chance to minimize the disadvantages associated with material inferiority .41 Although Ikenberry offers a compelling account of the incentives inducing strong and weak states alike to engage in mutual accommodation, he fails to capture fully the transformative effects of reciprocal restraint on interstate relations. Amid reciprocal restraint, states are no longer just probing each other’s intent through isolated acts of accommodation. Rather, they begin to form assessments of each other’s broader motivations, weaving iterated acts of accommodation into a stable evaluation of the other’s long-term objectives. Perceptions of benign intent cumulate and intensify, gradually becoming perceptions of benign motivation. The parties come to see one another as having broadly congruent interests in the international arena, not just compatible intent with respect to the issues on which they have made concessions. From this perspective, the practice of reciprocal restraint ultimately changes how the states engaging in reconciliation perceive the geopolitical implications of power asymmetries. When states exercise strategic restraint and explicitly reveal the benign motivations for doing so, they are able to endow their power with a magnetic ability to attract and reassure other countries instead of a propensity to threaten them and trigger balancing. Material power loses its coercive dimension, instead becoming an ingredient critical to bringing about cooperation and consensual outcomes. This critical transformation in the structural effects of material power can be conceptualized from three different angles. From a functionalist perspective, power wedded to benign motivation emits centripetal rather than centrifugal force, “convening” or “grouping” states instead of prompting them to run for cover. A concentration of power thus exerts an anchoring or centering pull on the states around it, drawing them toward one another. In Deutsch’s words, preponderant states come “to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed.”42 Economic power offers the prospect of mutual gain, military power the prospect of mutual security. The realist logic of power balancing under uncertainty thus ceases to operate when the states in question are confident in their assessment of the other’s benign motivations. From a constructivist perspective, practice alters social reality. As states regularize strategic restraint, they embrace, in the words of Adler and Barnett, “shared meanings and understandings” or “cognitive structures.”43 The normalization of cooperative practices informs a social reality that both parties deem to be noncompetitive, in turn enabling them to further let down their guard. In this sense, a self-fulfilling prophecy is at work. If both parties come to conceive of their relationship as noncompetitive and behave accordingly, then the relationship becomes effectively noncompetitive. As the practice of reciprocal restraint becomes the norm, social reality is, as it were, pacified .44 This interpretation follows directly from Alexander Wendt’s now classic formulation: “Anarchy is what states make of it.”45 From a psychological perspective, affect and emotion play an important role in transforming how partner states respond to one another’s material power.46 Through reciprocal restraint, the parties grow comfortable with each other’s power as they come to see accommodating behavior as the product of benign motivation rather than just situational intent. The respective strength of each state and their combined ability to secure desired outcomes becomes a source of mutual reassurance. They let down their guard not because of a probabilistic calculation suggesting that exploitation is unlikely, but because a favorable emotive bias prevails as mutual perceptions of benign motivation solidify. Just as acts of generosity engender empathy among individuals, acts of strategic restraint engender affinity among states. As the case studies will demonstrate, these three analytic perspectives are by no means incompatible; all three processes are often at work as stable peace advances. Indeed, it is these mechanisms and the insights they offer about the transformative effects of reciprocal restraint that explain how states succeed in going beyond neutrality to warm peace. Glaser and Kydd accept that the mutual perception of benign intent can arrest the operation of the security dilemma. Unintended spirals do not occur when both parties have concluded that the other has benign intentions. But their story stops there. In contrast, the analysis presented here posits that the practice of reciprocal restraint succeeds not only  in arresting the security dilemma, but also in enabling it to work in reverse. Each state takes actions to increase the other’s security, in the first instance winding down rivalry and attaining neutrality, but thereafter actively promoting amity and taking incremental steps toward warm peace. Put differently, the political momentum behind reconciliation gradually shifts from the negative to the positive. At its outset, the exercise of reciprocal restraint, the regularization of accommodation, and the institutionalization of power-checking devices are about dampening rivalry and avoiding competition. As these practices and institutions mature, they become about building up amity and producing friendship. As reassurance and comfort deepen, the relationship starts to become  demilitarized or, to use Ole Waever’s terminology, “ desecuritized  .”47 In the first phase of the onset of stable peace, each state is hopeful that the other has benign intent. In this second phase, each state becomes confident that the other has benign motivations.

Our impact scenarios are theoretically sound – any use of conventional force risks escalation
China and the United States face an increasing number of issues over which a serious crisis could occur. In addition to Taiwan, which could become a more prominent source of tensions than it has been since the election of Ma Ying-jeou in 2008, other potential flashpoints include maritime disputes in East Asia that involve U.S. treaty allies or security partners as well as frictions over the freedom of navigation of U.S. military vessels within what China views as waters under its jurisdiction. The odds of escalation are enhanced because both sides may underestimate the interests at stake for the other and, because the status quo is not clearly defined, they may believe that they are acting defensively while the other is acting offensively revisionist.110 Although recent analyses of U.S.-China security dynamics highlight many of the same factors contributing to crisis instability, they reach somewhat different conclusions about the effect of China’s secure second-strike capability and U.S. China mutual vulnerability on the potential for escalation to the nuclear level in a crisis. ¶ In __a recent article__ on the role of China’s secure second-strike and coercive leverage, Thomas Christensen __draws attention to the danger of inadvertent escalation in a crisis between the United States and__   __. In particular, Christensen challenges the optimistic view that China’s secure second-strike capability will prevent escalation to the strategic nuclear level because each side would be able to impose unacceptable damage on the other after absorbing a first strike.__ 111 Drawing on the Cold War–era scholarship of Robert Jervis and Thomas Schelling, Christensen suggests that __ a conventionally weaker state with a ____secure second-strike capability could create a “threat that leaves something to chance,” whereby any conventional conflict could ultimately escalate to strategic nuclear war .__ 112 __The lack of a clear firebreak between conventional and nuclear operations enhances this risk of nuclear escalation. Conventionally weaker states may unintentionally increase the threat that leaves something to chance if their nuclear and conventional forces are integrated, and “fighting can become blurred between conventional and nuclear war.”__ 113 ¶ __In a possible crisis between the United States and China, Christensen identifies how inadvertent escalation might occur. He suggests that China could be bolder in a conventional crisis with the United States because it believes it could counter U.S. threats of nuclear escalation.114 Complicating matters, some of China’s newly developed conventional systems overlap with its nuclear ones, especially land based ballistic missiles and their attendant command and control infrastructure but also submarines and space-based assets. If a conflict between the United States and China occurred, Christensen notes that U.S. commanders could have strong incentives to attack China’s mobile missiles and related assets to defend U.S. forces and ultimately prevail in a conflict.115 If these strikes occurred, Beijing could mistakenly view them “as a conventional attack on its nuclear retaliatory capability or as a precursor to a nuclear first strike.” As a result, “even a China that generally adheres to a No-First-Use posture might escalate to the nuclear level.”__ 116 Christensen also highlights sections from the Science of Second Artillery Campaigns to show that “ __ China’s NFU __ __[no-first-use]doctrine still allows for blurring of the firebreak between conventional and nuclear warfar e.”117 The book, for example, indicates that China’s nuclear forces create a means “by which to level the playing field with a stronger adversary” and suggests that China could lower its “nuclear deterrence threshold” under certain conditions, including “to compel the enemy to stop its war of invasion.”__ 118 ¶ Avery Goldstein analyzes the effects of asymmetric conventional capabilities under the condition of mutual nuclear vulnerability on, among other factors, crisis stability. __He identifies three incentives for states to use force first in a crisis: to gain a military advantage that could be translated into a coercive bargaining advantage, to signal resolve, or to preempt an attack.119 Where both states have conventional and nuclear forces, nuclear weapons dampen the incentives for either state to use any kind of force in a crisis to gain bargaining leverage, even if one power has superior capabilities.__ __ Mutual possession of nuclear weapons does not ____, however, entirely eliminate incentives to use conventional force first in a competition in risk taking below the nuclear threshold, which could cross that threshold if miscalculation occurred.__ 120 ¶ In the U.S.-China case, Goldstein suggests that crisis instability results from deliberate competition in risk taking for coercive bargaining, played out at the conventional level.121 Each step in this competition is designed to bring the two states closer to nuclear conflict. For Goldstein, the stakes in a U.S.-China crisis would not be high enough for either side “to choose an unrestrained nuclear exchange.” Nevertheless, he suggests that “ some stakes might be high enough for either one to choose to initiate military actions that elevate the risk of escalation to such a disastrous outcome.”122 As the conventionally stronger power, the United States might use conventional force first to gain a bargaining advantage by eliminating China’s ability to escalate using conventional weapons. China would then be required to move immediately to nuclear threats. As the conventionally weaker state, China could use conventional force first to preempt such a U.S. attack, or to signal its resolve over the issues at stake, but it could not improve its bargaining position by altering the balance of conventional forces.123 Neither state would want to take actions that provoked certain nuclear retaliation, but such escalation could occur as the intensity of conventional bargaining escalated .124
 * Cunningham and Fravel 15** - Cunningham is a PhD candidate in Political Science at MIT and a research fellow at the Renmin University of China specializing in Chinese foreign policy, Fravel is Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT and has a phD in political science – (Fiona/Taylor, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Project Muse, Fall 2015, 1-3)//EM

We have a good method
__These conclusions are based on a wide range of Chinese-language sources. To start, we hav e mined the open-source literature in China on military doctrine and nuclear strategy, including the PLA’s most recent texts, such as the Science of Military Strategy.__8 __We also make extensive use of one source that previous studies have not used, namely, more than sixty articles from Foreign Military Arts (Waiguo junshi xueshu), a journal published by the Department of Foreign Military Studies at the Academy of Military Science (AMS).__ In addition, __ we conducted interviews with military and civilian experts who work on nuclear strategy and arms control __. 9 Taken together, __ these sources represent the views held by China’s strategic community, including the Second Artillery, scientists and engineers, scholars affiliated with various PLA academies, and civilian scholars. __
 * Cunningham and Fravel 15** - Cunningham is a PhD candidate in Political Science at MIT and a research fellow at the Renmin University of China specializing in Chinese foreign policy, Fravel is Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT and has a phD in political science – (Fiona/Taylor, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security, Project Muse, Fall 2015, 1-3)//EM