Jake+and+Josh+Aff 

=Zero Days Aff=

=1AC=

Contention 1 is Inherency
====Obama announced that the US would disclose zero-day vulnerabilities, or unknown software flaws, to their vendors —- but loopholes allow the NSA to stockpile zero-days and jeopardize widespread cybersecurity==== Federal agencies served with a Freedom of Information Act request are refusing to release documents AND documents like the ones we have requested, this debate cannot take place.
 * Soghoian and Roubini **20**15** (Chris Soghoian, Principal Technologist and Senior Policy Analyst, American Civil Liberties Union Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project & Sonia Roubini, ACLU Speech, Privacy, and Technology Project, "Feds Refuse to Release Documents on "Zero-Day" Security Exploits", March 3, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/blog/feds-refuse-release-documents-zero-day-security-exploits)//CLi

Additionally, loopholes let the NSA stockpile zero-days purchased from the grey market
Healey notes that the public statements on the new policy leave a lot of questions AND or to the arsenal of zero-day vulnerabilities the government already possesses.
 * Zetter 14** [Kim, award-winning journalist who covers cybercrime, civil liberties, privacy, and security for Wired, "Obama: NSA must reveal bugs like Heartbleed, unless they help the NSA," Wired, http://www.wired.com/2014/04/obama-zero-day/] //khirn

Intellectual property theft is expanding on a massive scale —- disclosing zero-days builds trust with companies —- info-sharing legislation is key
JAMIL N. JAFFER: Thank you Dr. Johnson. Well, I'll actually AND trust between the government and private sector to share that kind of information.
 * Jaffer 15** [Jamil N., Adjunct Professor of Law and Director, Security Law Program, George Mason University Law School, Occasional Papers Series, published by the Dean Rusk Center for International Law and Policy, 4-1-2015, "Cybersecurity and National Defense: Building a Public-Private Partnership," http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=rusk_oc] //khirn

IP theft destroys military operations —- the impact is primacy
4.1 Intellectual Property (IP) Protection and Enforcement Intellectual Property or IP AND China's hackers that cost $1 billion and 20 years to develop.36
 * Warikoo 13** professor of Himalayan and Central Asian Studies at the University of Colorado (Arun, "CYBER WARFARE: CHINA'S ROLE AND CHALLENGE TO THE UNITED STATES" p. 67-8, Jul-Dec 2013, ProQuest) ~| js

That solves great power conflict
Great power competition has returned. Or rather, it has reminded us that it AND , the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.
 * Kagan, 2/19**/2015 (Robert, Senior fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, Ph.D. in American history from American University, "The United States must resist a return to spheres of interest in the international system", Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/19-united-states-must-resist-return-to-spheres-of-interest-international-system-kagan)//JBS

Russian IP theft now —- they can't be deterred —- bolstering cyberdefense is key
Russia has ramped up cyber attacks against the United States to an unprecedented level since AND future," he said. "So we've got some work to do."
 * Bennett 4/12**/15 cybersecurity reporter for The Hill (Cory, "Russia's cyberattacks grow more brazen" 4/12/15, http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/238518-russias-cyberattacks-grow-more-brazen) ~| js

That's crucial to Russian modernization efforts
Russia's own espionage effort is also driven by a desire to diversify its economy and AND industry and government networks could give China and Russia military advantages worth billions.
 * Booz Allen Hamilton 13** [Leading provider of management and technology consulting services to the U.S. government, Economist Intelligence Unit, The Economist, "Cyber Theft of Corporate Intellectual Property: The Nature of the Threat," July 2013, http://www.boozallen.com/insights/2013/07/Cyber-Theft-of-Corporate-Intellectual-Property] //khirn

That causes Russian aggression
MOSCOW (AP) — Hundreds of new Russian aircraft, tanks and missiles are AND the massive military buildup will stretch the nation's economic potential beyond the limit.
 * Isachenov 15** [Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press, Business Insider, Feb. 4, 2015, "Russia continues massive military modernization despite economic woes," http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-continues-massive-military-modernization-despite-economic-woes-2015-2#ixzz3eVw3maaO] //khirn

That escalates—we're already on the brink of nuclear war
In waging such a limited war, furthermore, Putin would rely not on ICBMs AND must make sure such threats do not emanate again from a world leader.
 * Reid 15** Professor of Law at University of St. Thomas School of Law (Charles J., University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy, "VLADIMIR PUTIN'S CULTURE OF TERROR: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?" p. 53–5) ~| js

IP theft causes Chinese modernization
U.S. and European Intellectual Property: Strategies to Circumscribe Theft by China; October 3, 2013; http://blog.streitcouncil.org/2013/10/03/u-s-and-european-intellectual-property-strategies-to-circumscribe-theft-by-china/) //JRW China's relatively new foray into drone creation serves as a reminder of how extensively, AND ., EU, and others the ability to successfully press for China's compliance.
 * Hager 2013** (Nicholas, Nicholas Hager is an intern at the Streit Council.

That leads to global nuclear war
China and the United States are not in a strategic weapons arms race. Nonetheless AND rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.
 * Twomey 2009 **(Christopher, co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Arms Control Association, Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_01-02/china_us_dangerous_dynamism#Twomey) // JRW

Cyber arms race now —- the US is rapidly expanding offensive capabilities under the guise of surveillance
Rapid proliferation What surprised cyber-experts is the speed with which cyber-attack AND long before the Chinese had also not just caught up but moved ahead.
 * Correa 15 **[Gordon, security correspondent, BBC News, "Rapid escalation of the cyber arms race," 29 April 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32493516] //khirn

That goes nuclear due to command and control hacking, crisis instability, and fracturing nuclear agreements
The United States is racing for the technological frontier in military and intelligence uses of AND be every bit as reasonable given their anxiety about unconstrained American cyber superiority.
 * Austin 13 **[Director of Policy Innovation at the EastWest Institute, "Costs of American Cyber Superiority," 8/6, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/costs-of-american-cyber-superiority/] //khirn

Independently risks miscalc —- hair-trigger status causes nuclear war
WASHINGTON – Former U.S. and Russian commanders Thursday called for scrapping " AND systems are subject to false alarms," Cartwright said at a news conference.
 * Japan Times 15** [May 1, 2015, "U.S., Russian 'hair-trigger' nuclear alert urged ended, especially in age of cyberattack," http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/01/world/u-s-russian-hair-trigger-nuclear-alert-urged-ended-especially-age-cyberattack/#.VZIjlflVikp] //khirn

And, low response times means there's a greater timeframe and probability than traditional nuclear escalation
In other ways, cyber weapons are critically different from their nuclear counterparts. For AND before launching a counterstrike, if that were U.S. policy.
 * Dycus 10** [Stephen is a Professor of national security law at Vermont Law School, former member of the National Academies committee on cyber warfare, LLM, Harvard University, LLB, BA, Southern Methodist University, "Congress' Role in Cyber Warfare," Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 4(1), 2010, p.161-164, http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol4no1/11_Dycus.pdf] //khirn

Uniquely true because of misperception fostered by offensive dominance
Offensive dominance creates a great risk of cyber arms races. State and non- AND it came from a third party, could also ignite a conflict.124
 * Rosenzweig 9 **[Paul, founder of Reid Branch Consulting, specializing in homeland security, senior advisor to the Chertoff Group, Carnegie Fellow at Northwestern, professor at National Defense University, Editorial board at the Journal of National Security Law & Policy, deputy assistant secretary for policy at the US Department of Homeland Security, "National Security Threatsin Cyberspace" merican Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security And National Strategy Forum, September 2009, www.utexas.edu/law/journals/tlr/sources/Issue%2088.7/Jensen/fn137.Rosenwieg.pdf] //khirn

Disclosing vulnerabilities instead of using them for surveillance prevents arms races —- builds legitimacy to negotiate international cyberdefense agreements
The implications of U.S. policy can be felt on a variety of AND fix almost all the vulnerabilities we find. But not all, yet.
 * Schneier 14** (Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, called a "security guru" by The Economist. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute. "Should U.S. Hackers Fix Cybersecurity Holes or Exploit Them?", May 19, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/should-hackers-fix-cybersecurity-holes-or-exploit-them/371197/)//CLi

That spurs international coop and mitigates offensive use
The potential utility of international cybersecurity agreements deserves to be carefully examined. International agreements AND more secure cyber environment through measures that go beyond conventional forms of deterrence.
 * Clark et. al. 9 **(David Clark, Senior Research Scientist at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Whitfield Diffie, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Abraham Sofaer, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and then a Legal Adviser to the United States State Department, "Cyber Security and International Agreements", http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/lec17/Sofaer.pdf)//CLi

Eliminating offensive cyberattacks allows the US to set global norms in cyberspace —- that's key to prevent cyber arms races
In a speech this month on "Internet freedom," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton AND arms race in an arena where the offense already has a natural advantage.
 * Goldsmith 10 **[Jack, teaches at Harvard Law School and is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, "Can we stop the Cyber Arms Race," Washington Post, February 1, 2010, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2010-02-01/opinions/36895669_1_botnets-cyber-attacks-computer-attacks] //khirn

Contention 4 is Solvency
====The plan solves effective information sharing between the government and private sector —- a signal of clear commitment and a steady flow of actionable disclosure is key to cooperative cyberdefense —- overcomes legal barriers ==== Information Sharing, Public Goods, and the Law This economic understanding of cybersecurity suggests AND problems are not likely to be ones of law, but of commitment.
 * Rosenzweig 12** [Paul, leading cybersecurity expert, founder of Red Branch Consulting PLLC, a homeland security consulting company, and a Senior Advisor to The Chertoff Group, "Cybersecurity and Public Goods: The Public/Private "Partnership," An Emerging Threats Essay, Hoover Institution, Stanford] //khirn

Disclosing zero-days disarms cyberattackers globally
However, the NY Times had a story this weekend about how this move has AND do that. Because they're not about protecting anyone — other than themselves.
 * Masnick 14** [Mike, founder and CEO of Floor64 and editor of the Techdirt blog, "Obama Tells NSA To Reveal, Not Exploit, Flaws... Except All The Times It Wants To Do The Opposite," Techdirt, April 14, 2014, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140413/07094726892/obama-tells-nsa-to-reveal-not-exploit-flaws-except-all-times-it-wants-to-do-opposite.shtml] //khirn

US is the lynchpin of the zero-days market—-that sustains the arms race and global cyberattacks—the plan reverses that and reduces the market drastically
Now, the market for information about computer vulnerabilities has turned into a gold rush AND regulate a market in which government agencies are some of the biggest participants.
 * Perlroth and Sanger 13** (Nicole Perlroth covers cyberattacks, hackers and the cybersecurity industry for The Times's business news section. She is a graduate of Princeton University, Stanford University's Graduate School of Journalism and is a guest lecturer at Stanford's graduate schools of business and communications. David Sanger is the chief Washington correspondent of The New York Times. "Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code", July 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/world/europe/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html)//CLi

Disclosing vulnerabilities amounts to disarming the NSA —- zero-days are key
In April 2014, Bloomberg reported that the NSA had known for at least two AND are documented, subject to full analysis, and acted upon promptly."296
 * Kehl et al. 14** [Danielle Kehl is a Policy Analyst at New America's Open Technology Institute (OTI). Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI, Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI, and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI, New America is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy institute that invests in new thinkers and new ideas to address the next generation of challenges facing the United States, Policy Paper, "Surveillance Costs: The NSA's Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity," July 2014, https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsas-impact-on-the-economy-internet-freedom-and-cybersecurity/] //khirn

The status quo provides incentives for writing software with vulnerabilities —- the signal of the plan is crucial to long-term cybersecurity
Recently, there have been several articles about the new market in zero-day AND for the 1%." And it makes the rest of us less safe.
 * Schneier 12** [Bruce, security expert with 13 books, fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute and the CTO of Resilient Systems, "The Vulnerabilities Market and the Future of Security," Forbes, 5/30/2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceschneier/2012/05/30/the-vulnerabilities-market-and-the-future-of-security/] //khirn

US policies spillover—leads to international cooperation
International cooperation is needed on the zero-day issue, but U.S AND day policies as a necessary element of addressing the need for collective action.
 * Fidler 14 **(Mailyn Fidler, graduate student at the Center for International Security and Cooperation Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. "ANARCHY OR REGULATION: CONTROLLING THE GLOBAL TRADE IN ZERO-DAY VULNERABILITIES", May 2014, https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:zs241cm7504/Zero-Day%20Vulnerability%20Thesis%20by%20Fidler.pdf)//CLi

=Drones Aff=

The war on terror has being brought to America in the form of aerial surveillance, making Orwell's dystopia a reality
Imagine for a moment. A scenic drive along a picturesque highway, it is AND , may present a strong rationale for rejecting drones introduction at this time.
 * Gohoshray 2013 **(Saby [President, Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies Director, Research, and Compliance WorldCompliance Company]; Domestic Surveillance Via Drones: Looking Through the Lens of the Fourth Amendment; 33 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 579)

As police forces become increasing paramilitarized, drones will be a critical tool to stifle and kill dissidents
Law enforcement agencies have begun deploying drones for routine domestic surveillance operations, unrestrained by AND yet another tool in the arsenal of police discretion, including "surveillance,
 * Talai 14 **(Andrew, "The Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age," 102 Cal. L. Rev. 729, Lexis/SEP)

This will disproportionately impact communities of color
Bernd 2015 (Candice; Proposed Rules Regulating Domestic Drone Use Lack Police Warrant Requirement; Feb 24; www.truth-out.org/news/item/29250-proposed-rules-regulating-domestic-drone-use-lack-police-warrant-requirement; kdf) "You're not just talking about the physical border, you're talking about an area AND kind of having the privacy debate after the fact with very little information."

Furthermore, it will further exasperate structural racism
Today, media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by AND failed to tell the story of surveillance in the context of structural racism.
 * Cyril 2015** (Malkia Amala [under and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network]; Black America's State of Surveillance; Mar 30; www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance; kdf)

And, plans exist to weaponized police drones
The use of drones by domestic US law enforcement agencies is growing rapidly, both AND a domestic drone regime is the key first step in constructing that coalition.
 * Greenwald 2013** (Glenn [former columnist on civil liberties and US national security issues for the Guardian. An ex-constitutional lawyer]; The US Needs To Wake Up To Threat Of Domestic Drones; Mar 30; http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/mar/29/domestic-drones-unique-dangers; kdf)

Drones remove any public anonymity and create an omnipresent Panopticon, enabling totalitarianism
Walking down the street. Driving a car. Sitting on a park bench. AND as immoral, antisocial and part of the dissident cult of individualism. 140
 * Burow 2013** (Matthew L [Candidate for JD @ New England School of Law]; The Sentinel Clouds above the Nameless Crowd: Prosecuting Anonymity from Domestic Drones; 39 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 443; kdf)

Empirically, this has this totalitarian state will be used to perpetuate genocide
This Note has explored the philosophical and psychological effects of panoptic surveillance and the need AND and pray to the better angels of our nature for a worthy answer.
 * Burow 2013** (Matthew L [Candidate for JD @ New England School of Law]; The Sentinel Clouds above the Nameless Crowd: Prosecuting Anonymity from Domestic Drones; 39 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 443; kdf)

Executive's unfettered discretion with drones leads to non-stop fear and oppressive psychological effects
Indeed, it is "important to remember that governments and law enforcement agencies AND between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society."
 * Holmes 09 – **Professor of Law, NYU Law School (Stephen, "In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror," 97 Calif. L. Rev 301, SEP)

Plan
====The United States federal government should curtail its aerial surveillance by ruling that such searches constitute a search within the Fourth Amendment and is unreasonable without a warrant, barring exigent circumstances. ====

Only court action on aerial surveillance solves privacy backsliding, keeps up with technology, and provides law enforcement with legal bright lines
IV. ENSURING A REASONABLE FUTURE BY PREVENTING UNREASONABLE UAS SURVEILLANCE Speaking for the Supreme AND that UAS technology remains within the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.
 * Celso 2014** (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)

A Supreme Court ruling on aerial surveillance is uniquely key to revitalizing 4th Amendment's ability to protect privacy and to stop the onslaught of advancing technologies
[*493] The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has been criticized for its AND even the widespread use of UAS will not erode society's legitimate privacy expectations.
 * Celso 2014** (Joel [JD Candidate U of Baltimore Law]; DRONING ON ABOUT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ADOPTING A REASONABLE FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE TO PREVENT UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BY UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS; 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461; kdf)

First, requiring warrants on drones acts as a catalyst to jolt privacy law forward
Simultaneously, the IHSS survey respondents indicated apprehensiveness over any domestic drone operations: two AND to civil liberties is profound. The law must catch up with technology.
 * Ahsanuddin et al 2014** (Sadia - principal investigator for the report and MPAC research fellow; Domestic Drones: Implications for Privacy and Due Process in the United States; Sep 8; www.mpac.org/publications/policy-papers/domestic-drones.php; kdf)

Second, the plan grants adversarial standing, making it possible to challenge the constitutionality of all surveillance programs
Looking back at the events of 2013, in light of the extensive legislative history AND creates the proper balance between national security and the protection of individual privacy.
 * Correia 2014** (Evan RC [JD Candidate, 2015 @ Temple]; PULLING BACK THE VEIL OF SECRECY: STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE GOVERNMENT'S ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES; 24 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 185; kdf)

Third, our precedent of the plan sets a constitutional floor for states & municipalities, and empirically will be modeled internationally
To begin with, skeptics allege that legislations can more carefully analyze a problem, AND of the courts exercising their proper role as a limited but effective policymakers.
 * Rushin 2011** (Stephen [PhD student at the University of California, Berkeley, Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program; J.D., University of California, Berkeley]; THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO MASS POLICE SURVEILLANCE; 2011 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 281; kdf)

This is particularly important because current counter-terror initiatives are failing
Throughout the 13-plus years of the war on terrorism, one line of AND ideology that Washington is expressing is hazardous, illusory, and sadly unchallenged.
 * Zenko 2015** (Micah [Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action @ CFR]; America's Virulent, Extremist Counterterrorism Ideology; May 21; foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/21/americas-virulent-extremist-counterterrorism-ideology-perpetual-war-islamic-state/; kdf)

The deference the court shows to the executive is to blame
One of the core tenets of national security doctrine is that courts play a deeply AND play only a limited role in executive calculations about appropriate national security policies.
 * Deeks 13 – Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School **(Ashley S., The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham L. Review, 827, 2013, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4941&context=flr)

Deference is to blame for the failures of counterterrorism
(Avidan, Cardozo Law Review, "Presumed Imminence: Judicial Risk Assessment in the post-9/11 World," 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 1415, Lexis/SEP) Arguments favoring judicial abdication because of temporary and possibly exigent circumstances are less persuasive in AND the risks we face should not be left only to the experts. n298
 * Cover 14 -** Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Director, Institute for Global Security Law and Policy

The judicial observer effect provides a counterweight that shifts executive decision-making towards more careful procedures as well as rights-sensitive policies
The observer effect provides an important counterweight to the executive's instinct to prioritize national security AND oversight will shift the substantive policy in a more rights sensitive direction.156
 * Deeks 13 – **Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School, Attorney-Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State (Ashley S., "The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference," 82 Fordham Law Review 2, SEP)

Observer effect spills over to other executive policies, particularly when the triggering case directly implicates individual rights
More systemically, the observer effect reminds the executive of the courts' presence, and AND in which the courts show less deference are those that implicate individual rights.
 * Deeks '13** (Ashley S., attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State, advised on the law of armed conflict, including detention, the U.S. relationship with the International Committee of the Red Cross, intelligence issues, conventional weapons, and the legal framework for the conflict with al-Qaeda, "The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference", Fordham Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, cl)

WE MUST CHALLENGE THE ASSUMPTION THAT PROTECTING national security requires sacrificing the constitutional rights of AND don't have sufficient information. We're fighting for the soul of this democracy."
 * ====Lastly, Justifications for maintaining the squo are wrought with faulty logic—only increasing the amount of info available to public can keep us safe====**
 * Scheer 2015** (Robert [Prof @ USC's School of journalism and communication]; They Know Everything About You; Nation Books; p. 208-212; kdf)