Afghanistan- Hegemony

The United States federal government should reduce nearly all military presence necessary to pursue counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.


1AC Cred
The War is unwinnable -numbers
Dorronsoro, 09 - visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2/9/09, Gilles, The National Interest, “Going South in Afghanistan,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20794)
Afghanistan may be the right war, but the United States could very ... of these regions better than any foreign forces ever could.

COIN strategy doesn't fit afghanistan
Nelson, 9 – former director of a Joint Task Force in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, retired naval officer with assignments at the National Counterterrorism Center and National Security Council, and Senior Fellow at the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Rick, “The Other Side of the COIN”, 10/1, http://csis.org/publication/other-side-coin)
Q1: General McChrystal is expected to request up to 40,000 additional troops and recommend a greater focus on counterinsurgency operations. Is this approach likely to succeed in strengthening the Afghan state, defeating the Taliban, and advancing America’s fight against terrorism?
A1: Probably not. Counterinsurgency doctrine, or COIN, has ....of life and dizzying levels of expenditure that any “all-in” approach would entail.


Announced withdrawal shattered credibility
Rubin, 10 – resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations; and a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly. (Michael, Public Square, 3/8, “The Afghanistan Withdrawal: Why Obama Was Wrong to Insist on a Deadline,” http://www.michaelrubin.org/7033/afghanistan-withdrawal-deadline)
It is true, as Schlesinger points out, that Obama did not set a date for the completion of t...states such as Pakistan, Iran, and even Russia.


It was percieved internationally
Rogin, 10 - staff writer for Foreign Policy, Prior to that, Josh covered defense and foreign policy for Congressional Quarterly. Josh has also worked at the House International Relations Committee, and the Brookings Institution (Josh, “Petraeus: Withdrawal timeline does not mean "switching off the lights",” The Cable, 6/29, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switching_off_the_lights)

When General David Petraeus testifies today on Capitol Hill, his main job will be to carefully define the timeline for the beginning of America's exit from Afghanistan, a timeline that has stakeholders in Washington and throughout the region ... beginning was lost and it strengthens the ability of different interests to hedge, which is exactly what they've been doing."

1AC Heg

Public support- afghanistan kills it
Gvosdev, 6/25/10 - former editor of the National Interest (Nikolas, “The Realist Prism: Knowing When to Walk Away from Afghanistan,” World Politics View, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5891/the-realist-prism-knowing-when-to-walk-away-from-afghanistan CT)
The Obama administration is running up .... ends up bearing a closer resemblance to Chiang than to Uribe.

Its key to hegemony
G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice, Georgetown University, Winter 2002 (“American Strategy in the Age of Terror” – Survival) p. 21-22
The United States may be ‘indispensable’ to the .... supplyUnited States public supportthat could be drying up.

US engagement solves genocide
Lieber 2005 – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 51-52, WEA)
The United States possesses the military and economic means to act assertively ....reaction to ethnic cleansing, rape, and widespread killing in the Darfur region of Western Sudan provides a more recent example.


Overstretch- Afghanistan causes it
Kretkowski, 10 – Frequently assists think tank in conferences and other work products that aid DoD's long-term thinking about threats that may not be addressable via weapons platforms. Spent six months in Afghanistan working with Army public affairs. (Paul, “Against COIN, for CT in Afghanistan and Elsewhere”, 1/7, Beacon (a blog), http://softpowerbeacon.blogspot.com/2010/01/against-coin-for-ct-in-afghanistan-and.html)
Over the winter break I had an epiphany about the interrelation of U.S. hard and soft power: I now oppose a
counterinsurgency (COIN) ...rogue-state nuclear development (Iran, North Korea); or complex challenges from a rising power (China, a reinvigorated Russia).



This collapses deterrence
PERRY AND FLOURNOY, 6 - former secretary of defense and senior fellow at CSIS, (William J Perry, Former Secretary of Defense, and Michele A. Flournoy, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, National Defense, “The US Military: Under Strain And At Risk,” – National Defense, May, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/may/TheU.S.MilitaryUnder.htm)
If recruiting trends do not improve during the next year, the Army, both active and reserve, will experience great difficulties.
Fewer than needed recruits and first-term ....visible overextension of our ground forces could weaken our ability to deter aggression.

Overstrech kills multilateralism
Keith W. Mines, Founding Member, Council on Emerging National Security Affairs, and Political Officer, United States Embassy in Ottawa, 3/8/2005 (“On Fighting a 16-Division War with a 10-Division Force” – Foreign Policy Research Institute) accessed 7/9/2006, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050308.military.mines.16dwar10dforce.html
Elsewhere we are also losing opportunities, less dramatic but no less.... have the ability to conduct traditional exercises and engagement for several years.

Thats key to solve every global problem
Stewart Patrick, Research Associate, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2002 (Multilateralism and United States Foreign Policy) p. 19
In the end, the strong argument for multilateralism is less the costs..., economic, financial, and military instruments that can lend legitimacy to US policies.

Independently,- Overstretch causes global WMD conflicts
Florig, 10 - Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Dennis, “Hegemonic Overreach vs. Imperial Overstretch,” 2/6, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1548783_code1259934.pdf?abstractid=1548783&mirid=1)
There is an even larger question than whether the U.S..... the U.S. is particularly prone to massive miscalculation.


Readiness- afghanistan will kill it
Kuhner, 9 - the president of the Edmund Burke Institute for American Renewal (Jeffrey, Washington Times, “Obama’s quagmire; US should look to its own interests,” 9/7, Lexis Academic)
America is losing the war in Afghanistan. .... economic footprint drives numerous Afghans into the evil, welcoming arms of extremists.

This causes great power war
Pyne, 9 - Vice Chair of the Utah State Legislative Compensation Commission and Vice President of the Association of the United States Army's Utah chapter and a Vice President of the Salt Lake Total Force Chapter of the Military Officers Association of America (David, “Obama failing our troops in Afghanistan,” 11/7, http://westernfrontamerica.com/2009/11/07/obama-failing-troops-afghanistan/)
Since we invaded Iraq six and a half years ago and Afghanistan eight years ago, we have lost .... Iran is doing with its near imminent development of weaponized nukes. Even Russia has done so with their invasion of US-ally Georgia this past year.





Dollar hegemony- continued large deployments collapse it along with the global economy
Corn, 9 – Ph.D. from the University of Paris and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College, currently on leave from the US State Department (Tony, “Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan?
Bounding Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal, 10/21,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/10/toward-a-kilcullenbiden-plan/
Just do the math - with 63,000 troops on the ground, the cost for .... on the one hand, a convocation of a new loya jirga as advocated by counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen - on the other, a regional diplomatic settlement as advocated by Vice-President Joe Biden.




Economic leadership prevents economic collapse—leadership preserves resilience
Mandelbaum 2005 – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005 [Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 192-195]
Although the spread of nuclear weapons, with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be fired in anger somewhere in the world, counted as the most serious potential consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's government, it was not the only one. In the previous period of American ....world without the United States would in this way resemble a fleet of cars without gasoline.

That goes nuclear without economic leadership
Mandelbaum 2005 – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005 [Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 224]
At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic....there is more to lose now than there was then—and because of the presence, in large numbers, of nuclear weapons.



No Offense- the US will go down fighting
David P. Calleo (University Professor at The Johns Hopkins University and Dean Acheson Professor at its Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)) 2009 “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy” p. 4-5
It is tempting to believe that America’s recent misadventures will discredit and ..... As Walter Lippmann once put it, our imaginations create a “pseudo-environment between ourselves and the world.”2 Every individual, therefore, has his own particular vision of reality, and every nation tends to arrive at a favored collective view that differs from the favored view of other nations. When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the world severely at odds with one another, the world grows dangerous.

Hegemony still matters in a multipolar world
Kaplan 08 Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (George, “A Gentler Hegemony”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121602480.html)
Of course we are entering a more multipolar world....-minded others as their own capacities rise.


1AC Solvency

We make Hegemony Work


The plan’s rejection of counterinsurgency creates a doctrinal shift towards selective engagement that can sustain US presence globally
Gventer, 9 - Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense. She served two tours in Iraq, including a year as a senior adviser to General Peter Chiarelli, the operational commander in Iraq in 2006 (Celeste, “False Promise of 'Counterinsurgency'”, 12/1, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/12/01/NYT.html)
An effort to conduct "counterinsurgency" in Afghanistan is ....selective engagement of a strong, credible U.S. military capable of applying overwhelming force.





Restricting our mission to counterterrorism frees up resources to pay down debt
Kretkowski, 10 – Frequently assists think tank in conferences and other work products that aid DoD's long-term thinking about threats that may not be addressable via weapons platforms. Spent six months in Afghanistan working with Army public affairs. (Paul, “Against COIN, for CT in Afghanistan and Elsewhere”, 1/7, Beacon (a blog), http://softpowerbeacon.blogspot.com/2010/01/against-coin-for-ct-in-afghanistan-and.html)
Benefits of a CT Focus
Pulling the bulk of U.S. troops from the two active wars ....warn off adversaries, and sway those in the middle.



The plan solves – reducing to a counterterrorism focus creates sustainable presence, and prevents vacillations between engagement and isolationism
Stewart, 9- Ryan Family Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (9/16/09, Rory, “The Future of Afghanistan,” http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/testimonies/rory-stewart-on-afghanistan)
The best Afghan policy would be to reduce .... how to work with fewer troops and less money over a longer period. In Afghanistan in the long-term, less will be more.

Obama will sell the plan as a drawdown to a lighter but permanent commitment to Afghanistan – this resolves confusion over the withdrawal deadline and restores US credibility
Stewart, 10 - Professor of the Practice of Human Rights and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, studied at Oxford and served briefly in the British army before working in the diplomatic service in Indonesia and as British representative to Montenegro (Rory, “Afghanistan: What Could Work”, New York Review of Books, 1/14, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jan/14/afghanistan-what-could-work/?page=3)
But this moderate tone gains Obama the leverage that Bush lacked. As long as the
US asserted that Afghanistan was an existential threat, the front line in the war on terror, and that, therefore, failure was not an option, the US had no leverage over Karzai. The worse Afghanistan behaved—the more drugs it grew and terrorists it fostered—the more money it received. If it sorted out its act, it risked being relegated to a minor charitable recipient like Tajikistan. A senior Afghan official warned me this year “to stop referring to us as a humanitarian crisis: we must be the number one terrorist threat in the world, because if we are not we won’t get any money.” .... for a lighter involvement in Afghanistan but a much greater focus on Kashmir.1


Even if there’s a short-term decline in US credibility, withdrawal is on balance better for US leadership
Innocent and Carpenter, 9 - *foreign policy analyst at Cato who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan AND vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato (Malou and Ted, “Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan,” http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)
Myth #3: Withdrawal Would Erode America’s Global Status Former national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Council on Foreign Relations scholar Stephen Biddle, and many others, concede that the war in Central Asia will be long, expensive, and risky, yet they claim it is ultimately worth waging because a withdrawal would boost jihadism globally and make America look weak.26 But what we’ve invested in the .....Overall, remaining in Afghanistan is more likely to tarnish America’s reputation and undermine U.S. security than would withdrawal.







Heg sustainable – doomsayers are wrong
Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 1-2
The United States has been the most powerful country in the ....deficit policy rewarding and buffer the United States from the extreme consequences that a sustained deficit policy would otherwise have.

Your evidence is exaggerated **
Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 3-4
We have seen erroneous predictions of American decline before. ..... how commercial power gives added flexibility in monetary affairs; and, finally, how military preponderance creates advantages in both monetary and trade affairs.